Wrongful Life: Logico-Empiricism´s Philosophy of Biology (1999)

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au~: M\ C. Dalavotti and A. Pagnini (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation: Essays in Honor of Merrilee and Wesley Salmon, Dordrecht (Kluwer) 1999, 187-208 GEREON WOLTERS

WRONGFUL LIFE: LOGICO-EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY*

If one decides not to abort a fetus, if one decides not to kill it, one musttake care notto injure the future person it may become. [... ] This moral obligation to refrain from actions that will injure the fetus likely in the future to become a person has been explored in the law under the rubric of tort for wrongful life (Engelhardt ( 1986), p. 220)

Logico-empiricist philosophy ofbiology is a case of wrongful life. After conceiving philosophy of biology logical empiricism did almost everything to prevent it from becoming a healthy subdiscipline of the philosophy of science. Right from its birth logico-empiricist philosophy of biology was a defective child and it has remained so until the late sixties when antipositivistic tort-for-wrongful-life thinking together with other developments set a new philosophical stage for biology. In my view the major congenital defects of logical empiricism's philosophy of biology are: ( 1) the wrang people who dealt with it;

(2) the wrang general ('ideological') framework, they worked in, and consequently (3) the wrang questions they asked. In what follows I shall give some evidence for these contentions.

1. THE WRONG PEOPLE As everybody knows the giants of logical empiricism had a background in mathematics, logics or physics (e.g. Carnap, Hahn, Hempel, Reichenbach, Schlick). The only exception is Neurath who came from economics 187 M. C. Galavotti and A. Pagnini ( eds. ), Experience, Reality, and Scient!fic Explanation, 187-208. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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and had a general interest in the social sciences. Nobody had special competence or even a special interest in biology. This becomes immediately clear when one takes a look on the famous - for some notorious- Manifesto ofthe Vienna Circle. 1 Essentially written by Neurath it was published in 1929. Hahn and Carnap ''toned it down"2 in order to make it more acceptable to Schlick, to whom the Manifesto was dedicated on the occasion of his declining an offer from Bonn university. The Manifesto contains sections on the prehistory of the Vienna Circle, an outline of its general ideology (' Scientific Worldview'), and a section 'Fields of Problems' that tells us what in their authors' view had been achieved already and what still remained to be done. lt closes with a section 'Biographical References'. 3 One ofthe fields ofproblems described is 'Problems ofthe Foundations ofBiology and Psychology', of which about fifteen lines relate to biology. That amounts to about a quarter of the space dedicated to each of the other fields mentioned: foundations of arithmetic, foundations of physics, and foundations of geometry. There is a bulk ofbibliographical information, but only three references relate to the biological part ofthe logico-empiricist enterprise (Neurath (1981 ), vol. 1, p. 316). The first, an article on mechanism and vitalism by Philipp Frank, a theoretical physicist, had already been published in 1907. The second reference is Schlick's article "Naturphilosophie" in Dessoir's Lehrbuch der Philosophie. This article deals in a cursory way with topics from the philosophy of biology. The third reference cites Edgar Zilsel's "Naturphilosophie" article in a book entitled Einführung in die Philosophie, edited by a certain Dr. Franz Schnaß. Zilsel deals with biological questions only inter alia. Furthermore, Zilsel' s "Naturphilosophie" as well as his other writings are not listed in the first section of the bibliographical references, i.e. "The members of the Vienna Circle", but in the second only, i.e. "Authors close to the Vienna circle". Apart from that, Zilsel at that time was a gymnasium teacher. Like Frank and Schlick he had not studied biology, but mathematics and physics along with philosophy. 4 On the Berlin side of"logical empiricism things looked slightly, but not decisively better. Tue giants (Grelling, Hempel, von Mises and Reichenbach) had a background in mathematics and physics; accordingly they did not deal much with biology. Reichenbach, for example, in his Ziele und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie (1931 ), touches only briefly on biology (pp. 14-23). 5 The same restraint with respect to biology one finds in von Mises's - somewhat contrary to its title -, monumental Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus (1939, § 19).6 But the Berlin group was

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fortunate enough to have members who were physicians, such as Friedrich Kraus, director ofthe second Clinic for lntemal Medicine ofthe Charite, Berlin's famous university clinic, and Oskar Vogt, director ofthe Kaiser Wilhelm Institut for brain research in Berlin-Buch. 7 To these members of the Berlin group with interests close to biology one may add the gestalt psychologists Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Lewin as weil as the psychiatrist Alexander Herzberg. The latter, before studying medicine, had gained a PhD in philosophy. His dissertation topic - the mind-body problem - was rather close to his later medical field. 8 Thus logical empiricism in its Vienna as weil as in its Berlin branches left the philosophy ofbiology mainly to people outside the movement who had some competence in biology but were not philosophers. Tue only exception is Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who, in 1926, in Vienna received a PhD in philosophy with Schlick, but then tumed tQ biology and medicine. But, although a philosopher, Bertalanffy can hardly be counted as a logical empiricist. In short„ philosophy ofbiology was left by logical empiricism to people at the fringes of the movement. This assessment is confirmed by a quick look at the first eight volumes of Erkenntnis that appeared between 1930 and 1940. The concentration on Erkenntnis as representative for logical empiricism is justified because until volume 3 (1932/33) this joumal was edited jointly by Camap and Reichenbach "on behalf of the Society of Empirical [from volume 2 onwards: 'Scientific' 9] Philosophy Berlin and the Ernst Mach Society Vienna". That means that Erkenntnis can be regarded as a central organ of the two main branches of logical empiricism. Erkenntnis consequently conveys the movement's attitude towards the philosophy of biology. 10 Twelve articles in these eight volumes of Erkenntnis deal with philosophy of biology. 11 To these twelve articles one has to add the contributions to the philosophy ofbiology at Congresses on the Unity of Science in Copenhagen (1936) and Cambridge (1938). These were published in volumes 6 and 7 of Erkenntnis, respectively. None of these articles and contributions were written by a logical empiricist proper. Only one paper, on the relation of quantum physics to biology and psychology (Jordan (1934)), struck at the core of logical empiricists involving Neurath, Reichenbach, and Schlick. 12 To these papers published in Erkenntnis one should also add the contributions ofFrank and Lecomte du Noüy at the first ofthe big meetings ofthe logico-empiricist community in Paris 1935.13

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2. THE WRONG GENERAL FRAMEWORK Already the Manifesto of 1929 insofar the first public presentation of the basics of logical empiricism of Viennese denomination practically determines the unsuccessful fate that logical empiricist philosophy of biology was to suffer. This is all the more surprising as logical empiricism held the view that philosophy had a right to exist only insofar it became philosophy of science or instrumental to it in producing the formal tools to do to philosophy of science. According to the Manifesto the "scientific world conception", as represented by the Vienna Circle, is characterized14 as (1) "empiricist a.nd positivist" and (2) as "logical analysis" of science. These two features oflogical empiricism sound rather technical. But they are not. Rather they are the methodological instruments for realizing philosophical objectives of a more general sort. These objectives constitute a sort ofideological enlightenment framework ofpre-emigration logical empiricism. 15 This framework forms the driving force behind much oflogico-empiricist philosophy. Its key concepts are 'antimetaphysics' and 'unified science'. Antimetaphysics is basically a Machian heritage. 1 believe that particularly for this reason the public appearances of the Vienna Circle were carried out under the label "Verein Ernst Mach" (Ernst Mach Society). Mach himselfhad died already in 1916. He had vanished from the public much earlier, after a stroke, in 1898. The Machian enlightenment heritage had been brought into the Vienna Circle particularly by Neurath and the physicist-philosopher Philipp Frank, 16 but it was supported wholeheartedly by Camap. While Machian enlightened antimetaphysics was confined mainly to scientific and methodological issues, antimetaphysics in a much wider sense played an important role in the German Monist League (Deutscher Monistenbund), and through the Monist League in the societies of the German speaking countries. The Monist League was founded in 1906 particularly on the initiative of the zoologist Ernst Haeckel, who acted as a sort ofDarwin's German bulldog. The central objective of the German Monist League was to replace traditional religion by a weltanschauung based on science. Many educated people in the German speaking countries were members ofthis anticlerical movement. On Sundays they met to listen to 'Monist Sunday Sermons', 17 which consisted ofpopular accounts ofbasic scientific theories as well as the latest findings of science. Contributions of science to leading everyday life in a morally acceptable way were also welcome. 18 Biology, particu-

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larly evolutionary theory, in this context played an important role. Above all, biology from the monist perspective had to demonstrate that, contrary to Jewish-Christian faith, no divine activity had been necessary to create man. As Darwin had shown, man was one of the primates, whose origin could easily be explained by scientific means. Certainly, the members of the Vienna Circle did hardly support the pseudoreligious aspects ofMonist League. Nonetheless they, by and large, shared its antireligious outlook. From the perspective of the Vienna Circle it is the philosophy of biology that in this context has an eminent antimetaphysical and antireligious task. 19 One can say that, seen from Vienna, one had to do philosophy of science in general and philosophy of biology in particular in order to successfully fight metaphysics, religion included. In Berlin things were viewed slightly differently. Doing philosophy of science and philosophy of biology in the correct way resulted somehow in antimetaphysics. But in Berlin the fight against metaphysics was not of primary concem. This difference µi order and emphasis is omnipresent in the texts. lt becomes e. g. perfectlyclear in the first number of Erkenntnis (p. 1). There is an introduction by Reichenbach, saying that the present editors [i.e. Reichenbach and Carnap] have always regarded it as their task to do philosophy in the sense of Wissenschaftskritik and to achieve by the methods of analysis of science those insights in sense and meaning of human knowledge the philosophy of the historical schools formulated in ever new systems based on autonomy of reason - had looked for in vain. 20

At the end of this first number of Erkenntnis there is a "Chronicle" of the two societies. In the same vain as in the introduction the chronicle of the Berlin group21 opens as follows: Tue 'Society for Empirical Philosophy' has come out ofthe desire to create an intellectual center for all those, who are interested in scientific philosophy.22

In short, there is not one word on fighting metaphysics in the programmatic self-portrayal of the Berliners. The self portrayal of the 'Verein Ernst Mach', two pages forward and written by Neurath, sounds rather different. lt begins:

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Ever wider circles of people whose world-conception is free of metaphysics show the need of establishing permanent relations to the scientific representatives of this movement. The Ernst Mach Society, founded in 1929, should create an active center for all these activities through talks, seminars, workshops, and publications. The creation of such a center in Vienna bad been facilitated by the fact that the circle around Schlick and Camap bad become more and more a permanent institution that could be regarded as a unified center of activity. For that reason also people of the Vienna Circle ofScientific World-Conception belongto the committee of the Ernst Mach Society, along with those men who have disseminated antimetaphysical enlightenment already for a long time. 23

The rest.of the "Chronicle" a la Viennoise consists in giving one ofthe short historical overviews, so much loved by Neurath, about great precursors of the Vienna Circle in the battle against metaphysics, particularly on the Viennese battlefield. Metaphysic is for Neurath a sort of perennial intellectual evil empire that to destroy finally has become possible only recently thanks to logical empiricism. But the difference in rank and emphasis that the battle against metaphysics took in Berlin and Vienna, respectively, does not seem to have been discussed explicitly between the two centers. Berlin had nothing to object against antimetaphysics, and Vienna was not disappointed about that, as long Berlin delivered intellectual arms and contributed with its infrastructure in the dissemination of scientific world-conception as an antidote to metaphysics. With respect to the intellectual climate created by the German Monist League and other non-ecclesiastical, or even anticlerical movements,24 logical empiricists did not think that serious scientific philosophy had to tell once again the popular ape story, in order to contrast with book of Genesis. Tue job of philosophy ofbiology, rather, was to exclude from living nature every possibility ofteleology or action of non 'mechanical' and, therefore, possibly divine forces. This is clearly an antimetaphysical enterprise that at the same time can be regarded as pertaining to the philosophy ofbiology. So Vienna as well as Berlin could agree on it. This first task oflogical empiricist philosophy of biology was dealt with under the heading "Mechanism versus Vitalism". 'Mechanism' stands for the conception that (1) the living world consists ontologically of the same stuff, acted upon by the same forces, as does the non-living one, and that (2) epistemologically scientific concepts as well as laws that apply to the

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inanimate world, i.e. concepts and laws of physics, sufficed in explaining the phenomena in the realm of living beings. I now turn from antimetaphysics to unified science. Unified science also can be traced back to Ernst Mach. 25 In the programmatic first chapter of Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Mach contrasted the task of the philosopher to that of the 'special researcher' (Spezialforscher), i.e. the scientist. Tue philosopher, on the one hand, seeks an orientation as complete and world encompassing as possible about the totality of facts. In doing this he cannot avoid to carry out his construction by rileans of borrowing from the special sciences. 26

Tue scientist, on the other hand, starts, according to Mach, with seeking orientation in a small domain. This leads in the continuation of his work to artificial and arbitrary fencing of areas of research. The special researcher, too, comes to the conclusion, finally, that the results of all other special researchers have to be taken into account in his own area of research. Thus, also the totality of special researchers oqviously is striving for world orientation by means of joining of the special areas of research. 27

But Mach, setting the goal of unification of science, failed to give the appropriate logical and philosophical means to attain it. Unified science sensu Neurath or logical empiricism can be regarded at the same time as an up-to-date fulfilment of Mach' s professionally limited philosophical program as well as a way in which the broader Viennese antimetaphysical imperative had to be carried out by scientific philosophy. As is well known, Neurath was the chief promoter ofthe idea ofunified science. But many others followed him, at least to a certain degree. For some time 'logical empiricism' or 'scientific philosophy' seemed to be even synonymous with 'unified science' or 'unity of science' .28 Take for example the fact that the five big gatherings of logical empiricists were - called 'Congresses for Unity of Science' .29 What did 'unified science' mean with respect to biology? - The answer is simple: it meant reduction of all sciences, biology included, to physics. This is a consequence of physicalism that has been a core component of logical empiricism. Sure, physicalism in the first place meant reduction of any scientific talk to talk about the given, be it in a phenomenalist language, as Carnap had proposed in the Aufbau, or in a 'thing-language',

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i.e. a language characterized by spatio-temporal reference, as was first advocated by Neurath. But this general physicalist idea was soon interpreted as a reductionist research program. I give two quotations from many. In his "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" Carnap first gives a characterization of physicalist (he says 'physical') language, and then goes on to say: The characterization of physical language just given corresponds to the traditional form of physics. (For simplicity's sake we would like here to dispense with probability coefficients that occur in physical sentences). But we would like to understand the term 'physical language' in such a wide sense that it does not refer only to the special forms of language existing at present, but also to that form of language that physics will apply in any stage ofits development (Carnap (1931), p. 442). 30

Neurath expresses in Empirische Soziologie the same idea in his more dramatic style as follows: All scientific statements may be connected with each other, and they form a uniform domain that includes only statements about observable facts of the matter. For this domain is proposed the name Unified Science. If one wants to emphasize that in this way everything becomes physics, one may speak of physicalism. This includes also that unified science causes the same fate to all sciences as it does to physics. If physics has to give up the mechanistic conception, then this conception has tobe give up everywhere [... ]; ifphysics has to arrange the matters of fact in a new way, then this applies also [... ] to all realwissenschaften (Neurath (1981, Vol. 1), p. 424). 31

Tue physicalist reduction had to proceed on three levels, of which only the one mentioned here at the first place was dealt with explicitly: (1) it had to be shown - epistemologically - that all concepts and sentences of biology, particularly laws, could be redefined as physical concepts or derived from laws of physics, respectively. This meant (2) ontologically - that all seemingly non-physical matter or processes in the living world are basically physical.32 The reductionist credo oflogical empiricism had also (3) a methodological consequence that was hardly ever discussed explicitly by logical empiricists themselves, because it seems to have been taken by them for seif-evident: physics is not only the target of successful reduction, but it also constitutes the model of natural science in method-

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ological respects. 33 A biology modelled after physics, this was one of the dreams of logical empiricism. 'Antimetaphysics', 'reduction', 'physics as model science' are key concepts with which logical empiricism set the stage for more than three decades of stagnation in the philosophy of biology. Antimetaphysical needs, i.e. needs alien to biological science, determined the agenda for the logico-empiricist philosophy ofbiology. These alien needs were imposed on philosophy ofbiology in the form of reductionism andin taking physics as model for biological science. Logical empiricism envisaged through its normative conception of a reductionist biology a biological science that had only slight resemblance to the one actually practised by biologists. Preconceived ideas about what biology ought to be prevented the unprejudiced analysis ofwhat biology, in reality, was. This negative analysis and assessment become amply confirmed in many of the writings of logical empiricists. 1 would like to quote here completely, what the Manifesto has to say about the 'problems of the foundation ofbiology and psychology': Metaphysicians have always been fond of singling out biology as a special field. This came out in the doctrine of a special life force, the theory of vitalism. The modern representatives of this theory endeavour to bring it from the unclear, confused form of the past into a conceptually clear formulation. In place of the life force, we have 'dominants' (Reinke, 1899) or 'entelechies' (Driesch, 1905). Since these concepts do not satisfy the requirement of reducibility to the given, the scientific world-conception rejects them as metaphysical. The same holds true of the so-called 'psycho-vitalism' which puts forward an intervention ofthe soul, a 'role ofleadership of the mental in the material'. If, however, one digs out of this metaphysical vitalism the empirically graspable kernet, there remains the thesis that the processes of organic nature proceed according to laws that cannot be reduced to physical laws. A more precise analysis shows that this thesis is equivalent to the assertion that certain fields of reality are not subject to a uniform and pervasive regularity (Manifesto, Engl. transl., p. 314).

This is all the Manifesto tells us about philosophy of biology. lf one consults the texts referred to in the Manifesto, i.e. Frank' s 1907 article on mechanism and vitalism and the naturphilosophie papers of Schlick and Zilsel one sees that no topic in the philosophy of biology in addition to 'antimetaphysics', 'reduction', and 'physics as model science' is men-

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tioned. And, essentially, logical empiricists themselves for more then three decades did not deal with any other topic in the philosophy ofbiology.

3. THE WRONG SPECIAL QUESTIONS So much for logical empiricists themselves. Let us ask now, if in their infrastructure of publications and congresses they stimulated or, at least, allowed other people to come up with topics, problems or suggestions more genuinely related to the problems in biology. Let us look first again at Erkenntnis. As I mentioned, in the first eight volumes of this journal there are twelve papers that deal with philosophy of biology. Six of them concem the mechanism-vitalism issue. Five of these are part of a controversy about Nils Bohr' s contention that quantum mechanics showed that biology was not reducible to physics. Bohr's argument was discussed mainly in the form given it by Pascual Jordan. 34 Bohr, in several writings of the early thirties, but also in his contribution to the Copenhagen "International Congress for Unity of Science" (Bohr (1936)) had denied the reducibility of biology to quantum physics. His argument35 (1) relied on the claim that quantum mechanics is a theory of closed systems, whereas organisms are open ones, and (2), Bohr contended that every experimental arrangement suitable for following the behavior of the atoms constituting an organism is as exhaustive a way as implied by the possibilities of physical observation and definition would be incompatible with the maintaining ofthe life ofthe organism. 36

This argument was seen by Bohr as analogous to the complementarity between classical mechanics and quantum physics. But Bohr did not regard his irreducibility argument as support for vitalism nor did he believe that it would restrict the applicability of physico-chemical methods to biology. In addition Bohr in his Copenhagen address emphasized the following: I am far from sharing, however, the widespread opinion that the recent development in the field of atomic physics could directly help us in deciding such questions as 'mechanism or vitalism' and 'free will or causal necessity' in favor of the one or the other altemative. 37

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Jordan understood his own contribution to Erkenntnis essentially as a "comment" (Erkenntnis 5 (1935), p. 351) on Bohr's ideas. But that is certainly not true. Quite to the contrary, Jordan drew rather far-reaching conclusions or at least conjectures from Bohr's theses: Firstly he takes hypothesis of the inheritance of acquired characteristics "as not only not empirically refuted, but even very probably correct" (Jordan (1934), p. 240). 38 Second he is convinced that Bohr's irreducibility thesis backs the idea of free will, because the impartial look at the facts of experience originates the conjecture that there exists, in fact, also a close positive relationship between the teleological faculty of the organisms on one side and the acausal unpredictability of organic reactions on the other. For, in our internal experience we sense the process of a decision of free will as a means to select among different modes ofreaction the most useful one. 39

Third and finally, Jordan believes that in psychology there is also a situation of complementarity. The prediction ofhuman actions requires the knowledge of character traits and motives. This knowledge presupposes knowledge ofunconscious states. To make unconscious states conscious means an intervention of a very drastical kind, because in this way the states of the unconscious are changed considerably. [... ] Thus we have again a similar situation to that in quantum physics: it is impossible to actually carry out the observations necessary as preconditions of a prediction.40

Jordan's consequences ofBohr's irreducibility argument aroused a storm of critical reactions. These, as I mentioned already, cover one half ofthe contributions of Erkenntnis to the philosophy of biology. To the general topic mechanism versus vitalism belong also the contributions of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1930/31) and Max Hartmann (1932/33). Bertalanffy with his 'organismic' (loc. cit., p. 390) systemstheoretic approach believed he had attained a position beyond the opposition of mechanism and vitalism. But Hartmann (( 193 2/3 3), p. 23 7), in his classification of contemporary methodological positions in the philosophy ofbiology, qualified the organismic conceptions ofBertalanffy and others as "only vitalistic theories, even if in a somewhat hidden way". Let us now turn to the remaining philosophico-biological papers in Erkenntnis. The very first and the last are the worst. The first paper is

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written by Friedrich Kraus, founding member of the committee of the Berlin group and host of its meetings in his clinic. This paper is a failed attempt, to a large degree simply not understandable, to embed his own experimental work into a philosophical framework. The author, at the time of publication probably already retired, is certainly influenced by Mach, but he managed to reproduce only Machian rhetoric, not Machian arguments. The last paper in Erkenntnis (Vol. 8 (1939/40), pp. 229-255) in the philosophy of biology is entitled "Principia Genetica: Basic Concepts and Basic Facts ofthe Science ofHeredity" (Principia Genetica: Grundbegriffe und Grundtatsachen der Vererbungswissenschaft). lt is written by Alfred Heilbronn and Curt Kosswig, refugees living in Istanbul. lt consists of 231 numbered propositions, conceived by the authors as a "system strung together of unconnected statements of most succinct form" (loc. cit., p. 229). 41 Of the remaining articles one is a favorable report on behavioristic tendencies in animal psychology, written by the old Machian and former Weimar secretary of state Hermann Baege. Another one is an attempt by a Tübingen professor ofbotany to introduce into biology a refined subjectobject distinction that would be compatible with the logico-empiricist standpoint. Finally, the staunch Communist Julius Schaxel, an experimental geneticist at Jena, in his contribution wanted "to put light upon modern natural science from the standpoint of dialectical materialism" (Erkenntnis 1 (1930/31 ), p. 467) in dealing with - or better- dissolving the concept of the individual in biology. To these papers one has to add the not very much philosophical contributions to the Copenhagen Congress of J.B.S. Haldane on genetics and N. Rashevsky on the mathematization ofbiology. That is all, Erkenntnis has to offer as far as philosophy of biology is concemed, with one exception that I will discuss presently. In Erkenntnis one finds a great number of outstanding and by now classical papers. But, in my view, the only outstanding contribution to the philosophy of biology is Kurt Lewin's classic "The Transition of the Aristotelian to the Galilean Mode ofThinking in Biology and Psychology" (Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie). Ironically, this paper right at the outset takes exception to one ofthe pillars oflogico-empiricist philosophy ofbiology: I do not have the intention, to infer deductively from the history of physics, in which way biology 'should' proceed. For, 1 am not of the opinion that there, finally, is only one empirical science, namely physics, to which all others are reduced" (Lewin ( 1930/31 ), p. 423). 42

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In a footnote Lewin talks about "a thesis with respectto 'unified science "', put forward by Camap, to which Lewin certifies "an absolutely speculative character similar to older conceptions. lt satisfies as little the requirements of considering the factual development of science as it does the requirements of mathematics". To sum up: logical empiricists themselves in Erkenntnis did not contribute any remarkable work to the philosophy ofbiology. In addition, there does not seem to be any positive influence on the work related to philosophy ofbiology of those biologists, physicians, and philosophers to whom logical empiricism provided a platform. The only exception, Lewin, dissociates himself from a central logico-empiricist tenet. One of the most curious things is the fact that even the concept of evolution is hardly mentioned in Erkenntnis. Only Zimmermann, a good botanist, talks in his paper (1937/38) on a couple ofpages (p. 25f.) about evolution, contrasting it with idealist morphology. What was intender:l tobe the summa oflogico-empiricist philosophy of biology, the booklet in the "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science", was written by Felix Mainx (1955). Mainx, a geneticist who worked at Prague and, after the war, at Vienna, again does not go significantly beyond the limitations ofthe logico-empiricist approach. But, there is at least a ten page section on the "history of organisms". Apart from that Mainx gives a good exposition of the basic disciplines of biology. Furthermore, he remarks that one always should regard living beings not only as individuals but also as members of populations. 43 Finally, Mainx gives a clear report of the then current state of the old controversies. Mainx's booklet was translated by Joseph Woodger. Woodger also can be regarded as related to logical empiricism. His Axiomatic Method in Biology (Woodger (1937)) certainly is an impressive piece of scholarly work, and it was praised in a review in Erkenntnis. 44 But it is unclear to me if Woodgers rigorous axiomatization contributes to a deeper understanding of real biological science.

4. TRANSATLANTIC TRANSFORMATION? Rather early in the development of logical empiricism as understood in Vienna and Berlin there was a marked difference between these centers and the American branch. On the Prager Vorkonferenz (1934) to the big

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Unity of Science Meetings Charles Morris (Erkenntnis 5 (1935), p. 6) in his first address to the conference discussed what united the "various national groups" ofthe logico-empiricist movement. For him this unity is described by the term 'scientific empiricism'. Scientific empiricism for Morris is pursued by the American pragmatists, whom he calls also "biological positivists", as well as by logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. Morris seems to envisage a sort of communal professional research pro gram. Neurath in his address sees the "necessary unity" (loc. cit., p. 16) slightly differently: "After having switched off metaphysics in continuous fight against metaphysical inclinations, we could occupy ourselves, as a positive project, with realizing an encyclopedic synopsis of the sciences on a logical basis". 45 Neurath, however, speaks of "antimetaphysical empiricism" (loc. cit., p. 22), where Morris had used "scientific empiricism". In an additional address to the Prague Vorkonferenz that Morris was asked for "at the last minute" (loc. cit., p. 142, fn. ), he is explicit about not sharing the ideological framework of European logical empiricism: He emphasizes rather proudly the "fertilization of philosophy [in the US] by acceptance ofthe spirit and results ofthe scientific habit of mind [... ] after 1870" (loc. cit., p.142f.). Until that point (i.e. before Peirce, James, Dewey, Royce) there was, according to Morris, "nothing in American philosophy which had not on the whole been better accomplished elsewhere" (loc. cit., p. 143). Morris then mentions the distinctive refraction "through some scientific medium" of British empiricism, Kantianism, and Hegelianism that was effected by these American philosophers. He goes on to say: This [habit in American philosophy of relating philosophical positions to science] does not mean that American thought has been consciously or predominantly anti-metaphysical. The very absence of an excessive tradition of speculative systems has prevented the sharpness of the contrast between scientific and metaphysical philosophy which is so common in Europe. The only major exception to this statement is found in the opposition at the turn of the century to the version of absolute idealism which had come to dominate philosophy. [... ] By and !arge, the characteristic approach of American philosophy is scientific, though without sharp limitation of interest which is typical of many European movements.

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This quotation shows clearly that the logical empiricists who came to America no longer found themselves in their customary ideological, antimetaphysical environment and conceptual framework. American philosophers were not interested very much in any sort of kulturkampf. This pragmatic, non-ideological American attitude sounds rather promising as far as logico-empiricist post-emigration philosophy of biology is concemed. But, actually, it did not keep its promise. Sure, in the first volumes of Philosophy ofScience there are a few interesting articles, particularly those written by biologists R. A. Fisher and T. Dobzhansky. 46 But these articles do not show any sign oflogico-empiricist influence, and since they are not discussed by other authors by no means do they lead to a breakthrough towards a satisfying philosophy ofbiology. In fact, as far as the philosophy ofbiology is concemed, Philosophy ofScience becomes more and more boring in the following years. The reason for this seems to me rather simple. Logical empiricism had begun to dominate the American philosophy of science. In its new pragmatist and pragmatical transatlantical environment logical empiricism had lost its European antimetaphysical drive. But, unfortunately, it retained in North America its neglect for the specific needs of a genuine philosophy of biology. Logical empiricists with their particular intellectual strength and rigor would have been the right people to create that philosophy ofbiology. But they simply did not. The frustration of American biologists with philosophy ofbiology can be clearly inferred from the proceedings of a meeting on "Concepts in Biology" in 1955. There were first-rate biologists, among them Ernst Mayr, George G. Simpson and Sewall Wright, but not one philosopher. Among the three documents distributed to the participants was- obviously for want of anything better - also Mainx' s contribution to the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. lt is referred to by the editor as "the rather expensive published article by Mainx in German-English" (Gerard (ed) (1955), p. 104b). Its only merit in Gerard's eyes seems tobe that it agrees more or less with the other documents in the way it structures the complex field ofbiology, and that it rightly states the rather rhapsodic character of biology: Biology "is not sufficiently condensed. lt is still a long list of empirical statements, as mentioned in that pamphlet (Mainx)", as a participant (Frank Brink) remarks (Gerard (ed.) (1955), p. 109a). In concluding I would like to speculate about what brought about the change to that philosophy of biological science that has become by now perhaps the most thriving branch of contemporary philosophy of science.

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I suspect that the philosophy of science had to disconnect itself to a certain degree from classical logical empiricism, in order to open itself for a philosophy of the real biological science. This change is connected with names like Morton Beckner, David Hull, Michael Ghiselin and T. A. Goudge. None of them seems to be intimately affiliated with logical empiricism. Quite to the contrary, Hull, who may be regarded as the first proper philosopher of biology, received his PhD at the University of Indiana that was a sort of stronghold of antipositivism in the early sixties with Norwood Russell Hanson and Michael Scriven. 47 In addition to this partly antipositivistic background of contemporary philosophy of science I suspect that the turn to contemporary philosophy of biology was inspired also by the centenary of the publication of the Origin of Species. Maybe that reading or rereading that great biologist furthered more than anything else the philosophy ofbiology. And thirdly one should not underestimate the challenge given to philosophers by the contributions to philosophy of biology by biologists, particularly Francisco Ayala, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Ernst Mayr, none of whom was bom in America. lt seems that logical empiricism needed a sort of antipositivistic purgatory before it was prepared to arrive, finally, in the work of Hull, Ruse, Rosenberg, Sober and others at a philosophy of biology in logico-empiricist spirit which was at the same time very much a philosophy of genuine biological science. To sum up: Logical empiricism did not contribute very much to the philosophy ofbiology, contrary to its claim tobe the philosophy not only ofmathematics and physics, but also ofthe other special sciences. Before the emigration logical empiricism prevented philosophy ofbiology from becoming a healthy child, mainly because of ideological preoccupation with other issues; after emigration we have a case of simple neglect.

NOTES • Previous versions of this paper were read in spring 1996 at a workshop on "German American Interaction in Scientific Philosophy in the post-1933 Period" at the University of Pittsburgh, and, in February 1997, at the Indiana University at Bloomington. I am grateful for conversations and suggestions from these audiences. My special thanks go to Wes and particularly to Merrilee Salmon for many helpful comments and for suggestions that could not be realized yet in this paper. In addition to that Merrilee helped to bring the paper somewhat away from the "German-English" (cf. p. 201) of the original version. 1 Cf. [Manifesto] (1929).

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2 As remembered by the later book seller Heinrich Neider, a minor member ofthe circle. Cf. Neider, 1977, p. 2. 3 Unfortunately this section has not been published in the English edition in Neurath (1973), pp. 299-318. 4 Cf. Jöm Behrmann, "Biobibliographische Notiz" in Zilsel (1976, p. 44). 5 One has to keep in mind that 'naturphilosophie' in the English philosophical terminology is used as a definite description denoting the philosophy of nature of Schelling and his idealistic followers. In German 'Naturphilosophie' is a generic term that characterizes any philosophical effort to deal with nature. Anglo-American naturphilosophie is called in German 'romantische Naturphilosophie'. Tue difference betweenJ naturphilosophie and Reichenbach' s, Schlick' s, and Zilsel' s homonymous efforts marks the difference between the pre-logico-empiricist conception of philosophy and the one oflogical empiricism. Logical empiricists do not talk about nature - as have done the naturphilosophen - , rather, they concentrate on scientific talk about nature. Obviously logical empiricists thought it advisable for strategic terminological reasons not to leave the term 'Naturphilosophie! to metaphysicians only. 6 This book was to form the first volume of the "Library of Unified Science. Book Series", edited by Neurath, with Camap, Frank, Jorgensen and Morris as associate editors. 7 Vogt's fame was of such eminence that, in 1925, he was commissioned by the Soviet govemment to examine the brain of Lenin, who was regarded at that time by many people in and outside the Soviet Union as the greatest genius, who had ever existed. 8 Tue best overview on the Berlin group is L. Danneberg/A. Kamlah/L. Schäfer (eds.) 1994. Tue information on Vogt is in the article of W. Sehemus, loc. cit., p. 41. 9 Cf. Hoffmann (1994), p. 29. This change ofname is the result ofan intervention bythe mathematician and logician David Hilbert. 10 After 1933, i.e. after Reichenbach's emigration to Istanbul, only the names of the editors were given on the title page. II This term does not seem to have been much in use before it became the title ofRuse (1973). One finds it, e. g. in Schlick (1931), pp. 399, 474 and Joergensen (Erkenntnis 6 (1936), p. 281). 12 Cf. the publications in 1935 of Bünning, Jordan, Zilsel, Reichenbach, Neurath, Schlick. Also Jensen ( 1935) has to be seen in this context. Although published prior to Jordan's Erkenntnis article, Jensen's paper is a critique of Jordan's position that was known from earlier publications. 13 Cf. Frank (1935), Lecomte de Noüy (1935). The proceedings ofthe Paris congress were published in eight booklets (Nrs. 388-395) ofthe famous Actualites Scientifiques et industrielles. 14 "We have characterized the scientific world-conception essentially by two features. First it is empiricist andpositivist: there is knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is immediately given. This sets the limits for the content of legitimate science. Second, the scient\fiC world-conception is marked by application of a certain method, namely logical anctlysis. Tue aim of scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material. Since the meaning of every 'statement of science must be statable by reduction to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever branch of science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to other concepts, down to the concepts ofthe lowest

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level which refer directly to the given" (Manifesto (1929), Engl. transl., p. 309). 15 I have dealt with these general ideas behind the actual philosophy of logical empiricism in Wolters (1992a), (1992b), (1994). 16 Frank knew Mach personally. Cf. Wolters (1987), p. 163ff. 17 No lesser person than Wilhelm Ostwald published between 1911 and 1916 bis Monistische Sonntagspredigten. 18 In spite of bis antimetaphysical position Mach himself was put off by the pseudoreligious behavior ofthe monists. He rejected Haeckel's offer to become president ofthe Austrian Section of the German Monist League. "1 don't like any foundation of a religion" was bis comment, as the philosopher Hugo Dingler reports in bis diary (cf. Wolters (1987), p. 407). 19 Schlick does not seem to have shared this mainstream position ofthe Circle. 20 "Die jetzigen Herausgeber haben es von jeher als Aufgabe betrachtet, Philosophie im Sinne von Wissenschaftskritik zu treiben und durch wissenschaftsanalytische Methoden diejenigen Einsichten in Sinn und Bedeutung menschlicher Erkenntnis zu gewinnen, welche die in immer neuen Systemen formulierte, auf einem angenommenen Eigenrecht der Vernunft gegründete Philosophie der historischen Schulen vergeblich gesucht hatte." 21 The author is not named. 22 "Die 'Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie' ist aus dem Bestreben hervorgegangen, einen geistigen Mittelpunkt für alle diejenigen zu bilden, welche an wissenschaftlicher Philosophie interessiert sind" (Erkenntnis l (1930/31 ), p. 72). 23 "Weitere Kreise mit metaphysikfreier Weltauffassung zeigten das Bedürfnis, dauernde Beziehungen zu den wissenschaftlichen Vertretern dieser Richtung herzustellen. Der Verein Ernst Mach, gegründet 1929, soll durch Vorträge, Kurse, Arbeitsgemeinschaften, Veröffentlichungen einen aktiven Mittelpunkt für all solche Bestrebungen bilden. Die Schaffung einer solchen Zentrale war in Wien dadurch erleichtert, daß der Kreis um Schlick und Camap immer mehr zu einem Dauergebilde geworden war, das gewissermaßen als Ganzes zur Verfügung stand. Dem Vorstande gehören denn auch neben den Männern, die seit langem antimetaphysische Aufklärung verbreiten, Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung an" (Erkenntnis l (1930/31),p. 74). 24 A fair overview, particularly about activities of this sort in Austria, gives Stadler (1982). 25 There are, of course earlier roots ofthis thought, e. g. with Leibniz. 26 "Der erstere [i.e. the philosopher] sucht eine möglichst vollständige, weltumfassende Orientierung über die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, wobei er nicht umhin kann, seinen Bau auf Grund fachwissenschaftlicher Anleihen auszuführen" (Mach (1906), p. 3). 27 "Der Spezialforscher kommt schließlich auch zur Einsicht, daß die Ergebnisse aller übrigen Spezialforscher zur Orientierung in seinem Gebiet berücksichtigt werden müssen. So strebt auch die Gesamtheit der Spezialforscher ersichtlich nach einer Weltorientierung durch Zusammenschluß der Spezialgebiete" (Mach, ibid ). 28 Joergen Joergensen, the Danish logical empiricist begins bis inaugural address to the participants ofthe "Second International Congress for Unity ofScience" in Copenhagen (1936): [... ] it is my privilege to bid you all heartily welcome here to Copenhagen and the Second International Congress for the Unity of Science - or for Scientific

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Philosophy as it has also been called (Erkenntnis 6 (1936), p. 278). Much of the rest of Joergensen's address consists in explaining this "somewhat puzzling" (ibid.) title ofthe congress to the participating outsiders. 29 Paris 1935, Copenhagen 1936, Paris 1937, Cambridge (England), Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1939. 30 "Die genannte Charakterisierung der physikalischen Sprache entspricht der traditionellen Form der Physik. (Der Einfachheit halber sehen wir hier von den Wahrscheinlichkeitskoeffizienten, die in physikalischen Sätzen vorkommen, ab.) Wir wollen jedoch den Terminus 'physikalische Sprache' so weit verstehen, daß er sich nicht nur auf die speziellen Sprachformen der Gegenwart bezieht, sondern auf diejenige / Sprachform, die Physik in irgendeinem Entwicklungsstadium jeweils annehmen wird." 31 "Alle wissenschaftlichen Aussagen sind miteinander verknüpfbar und bilden einen einheitlichen Bereich, der nur Aussagen über beobachtbare Tatbestände umfaßtFür ihn wird der Name Einheitswissenschaft vorgeschlagen. Will man betonen, daß auf diese Weise eigentlich alles zur Physik wird, so mag man von Physikalismus sprechen. Damit wird auch ausgesagt, daß die Einheitswissenschaft allen Wissenschaften jeweils dasselbe Schicksal bereitet wie der Physik. Muß die Physik die mechanistische Auffassung aufgeben, dann wird diese Auffassung[ ... ] überall aufgegeben; muß die Physik sich die Tatbesttände auf neue Art ordnen, dann gilt das, soweit auf die letzten Elemente zurückgegriffen wird, für alle Realwissenschaften" 32 Tue ontological aspect ofreduction does not seem to have be dealt with explicitly by logical empiricists. But it is a consequence ofthe logical empiricist conception that what we know scientifically about the world is expressed in the language of science. If that language is physical language this implies that we can scientifically know, finally, only physical matters of fact. 33 Strangely enough the distinction between ontological, epistemological, and methodological reduction was never made explicitly. lt seems to have been given for the first time in Ayala (1974). 34 Jordan himself contributed significantly to the development of quantum mechanics, particularly matrice mechanics. Although he was a fervent Nazi, he did not belong to the "Deutsche Physik". On the contrary, he defended relativity theory against the representatives of"Deutsche Physik". 35 Fora painstaking analysis and critique cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1994). 36 " ••• daß jede denkbare Versuchsanordnung, die dazu eingerichtet wäre, das Verhalten der den Organismus bildenden Atome in so weitem Umfang zu verfolgen wie es die Beobachtungs - und Definitionsmöglichkeiten der Physik zulassen, mit der Aufrechterhaltung des Lebens des Organismus unverträglich wäre" (Bohr (1936), p. 300; Engl. trans., p. 296). 37 "Dabei liegt es mir fern, die vielverbreitete Meinung zu teilen, daß die neuere Entwicklung auf dem Gebiete der Atomphysik uns in direkter Weise dazu verhelfen könnte, Fragestellungen wie 'Mechanismus oder Vitalismus' und 'Willensfreiheit oder Kausalzwang' zugunsten der einen oder anderen Auffassung zu entscheiden" (Bohr (1936), p. 299; Engl. transl. p. 295). 38 First Jordan reformulates the Lamarckian hypothesis: "If in the phenotype of an organism (during its individual life) there occurs a deviation from the average type by way of adaptation, then there in the germ cells develops a probability for a mutation that

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changes the genotype of its descendants in a way that is similar to earlier phenotypical deviation" (loc. cit., p. 240). The argument, then, goes as follows: the genetical variation is not continuous, but discontinuous, i.e. the strength ofthe phenotypic variation has to go beyond a certain threshold to become genetically effective; therefore 'somatic' modifications lead either to no genetic modifications at all or to already rather considerable ones. From that Jordan infers a rather low probability of phenotypically induced mutations. That low probability, in turn, ought to explain why inheritance of I acquired characteristics occurs statistically rather rarely, and, accordingly, has/been /hot observed very often. Unfortunately Jordan does not give arguments for the thesis implied here, that the effect ofphenotypic changes on the genetic material is so small normally. 39 "Der unbefangene Blick auf die Erfahrungstatsachen läßt übrigens die Vermutung entstehen, daß tatsächlich auch eine enge positive Beziehung waltet zwischen dem teleologischen Vermögen der Organismen einerseits und der aukausalen Unberechenbarkeit der organischen Reaktionen andererseits. Denn in unserer inneren Erafhrung spüren wir den Vorgang der freien Willensentscheidung als ein Mittel, unter verschiedenen möglichen Reaktionsweisen die zweckmäßigste auszuwählen" (Jordan (l 934), p. 243). 40 " [ .•. ] bedeutet aber einen Eingriff sehr einschneidender Art, die Zustände des Unbewußten werden dabei erheblich abgeändert[. ..] Wir haben hier also wieder eine ähnliche Situation wie in der Quantenphysik: es ist nicht möglich, die Beobachtungen, welche der deterministischen Auffassung nach nötig wären, um die Unterlagen der Voraussage zu liefern, tatsächlich durchzuführen" (Jordan (1934), p. 247). 41 Surprisingly enough, there exists a second, enlarged edition ofthe Principia Genetica (1966), now consisting of298 propositions. 42 "Ich habe nicht die Absicht, aus der Geschichte der Physik deduktiv zu schließen, was "'die Biologie tun 'soll'. Denn ich bin nicht der Meinung, daß es letzten Endes nur eine einzige Wissenschaft, die Physik, gibt, auf die alle übrigen zurückgehen." 43 Despite his emphasis on populations Mainx cannot be regarded as a representative of what Ernst Mayr has coined 'population thinking'. 44 Vol. 8 (1939/40), pp. 372-377. The review was written by Martin Strauss. But Strauss refers (p. 77) also to a harsh critique of the book from the standpoint of a biologist by J. B. S. Haldane. 45 "Nach Abschaltung der traditionellen Metaphysik, in ständigem Kampf mit metaphysischen Neigungen, könnte uns als positive Arbeit die Schaffung einer enzyklopädischen Zusammenfassung der Wissenschaften auf einheitlicher Grundlage beschäftigen" (Erkenntnis 5 (1935), p. 17). 46 E.g. R. A. Fisher's "Indeterminism and Natural Selection" in Vol. 1 (1934), pp. 99117. 47 1 am grateful to Merrilee and Wes Salmon for valuable information on this point.

REFERENCES Ayala, Francisco (1974): "Introduction", in: Ayala/Dobzhansky(eds.) (1974), pp. vii-xi. Ayala, Francisco/Dobzhansky, Theodosius (eds.) (1974): Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. Reduction and Related Problems, Berkeley (University ofCalifornia Press).

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Bertalanffy, Ludwig von ( 193 0/31 ): "Tatsachen und Theorien der Fonnbildung als Weg zum Lebensproblem", Erkenntnis 1 ( 1930/31 ), pp. 361-407. Carnap, Rudolf(l931): "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft'', Erkenntnis 2 (1931), pp. 432-465. Danneberg, Lutz/Kamlah, Andreas/Schäfer, Lothar (eds.) ( 1994): Hans Reichenbach und die Berliner Gruppe, Braunschweig (Vieweg). Engelhardt, H. Tristram (1986): The Foundations of Bioethics, New York/ Oxford (Oxford University Press). Frank, Philipp (1936): "Die Kluft zwischen Physik und Biologie im Lichte der modernen physikalischen Theorien", in: Actes du Congres Internationale de Philosophie Scientifique. Sorbonne - Paris 1935, Vol. II, Paris (Hennann & Cie), pp. 1-3 (Actualites Scientifiques et Industrielles 389). Gerard, Ralph W. (ed.) (1955): Concepts ofBiology, Special Issue ofBehavioral Science Hartmann, Max (1932/33): "Die methodologischen Grundlagen der Biologie", Erkenntnis 3 (1932/33), pp. 235-261. Heilbronn, Alfred/Kosswig, Kurt (1939/40): "Principia Genetica: Grundbegriffe und Grundtatsachen der Vererbungswissenschaft", Erkenntnis 8, pp. 229-255. 2"d edition as a monograph with the new subtitle: Grunderkenntnisse und Grundbegriffe der Vererbungswissenschaft, Hamburg/Berlin (Paul Parey) 1966. Hoffmann, Dieter (1994): "Zur Geschichte der Berliner 'Gesellschaft für empirische/ wissenschaftliche Philosophie'", in: Danneberg/Kamlah/ Schäfer (eds.) (1994), pp. 21-31. Hoyningen-H\Wne, Paul (1994): "Niels Bohr's Arguments for the Irreducibility of Biology to Physics", in: Jan Faye/Henry L. Folse (eds.), Nils Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, Dordrecht/Boston/ London (Kluwer), pp. 231-255. Lecomte du Noüy, M. P. (1936): "Sur l'unite de Ja methode dans !es science physiques et biologiques", in: Actes du Congres Internationale de Philosophie Scientifique. Sorbonne - Paris 1935, Vol. II, Paris (Hennann & Cie), pp. 4-14 (Actualites Scientifiques et Industrielles 3 89). Lewin, Kurt (1930/31): "Der Übergang von der aristoteleischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie", Erkenntnis l ( 1930/31 ), pp. 421-466 Mach, Ernst (1905): Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung, Leipzig (J. A. Barth). Mainx, Felix (1955): Foundations of Biology, Chicago (The University of Chicago Press)(= International Encyclopedia ofUnified Science, Vol. 1.9). [Manifesto] (1929)]. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung-Der Wiener Kreis, Wien(Artur Wolf). Repr. in Neurath (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 299-336. Partial English Trans!. in Neurath (1973), pp. 299-318. von Mises, Richard (1939): Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus. Einführung in die empiristische Wissenschaftsauffassung, The Hague (W. P. van Stockum & Zoon); repr., introd. Friedrich Stadler, Frankfurt (Suhrkamp) 1990. [Neider, Heinrich] (1977): "Gespräch mit Heinrich Neider. Persönliche Erinnerungen an den Wiener Kreis", in: Johann Christian Marek et al. eds., Österreichische Philosophen und ihr Einfluß aufdie analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart, Vol. 1, Innsbruck (Conceptus), pp. 21-42. Neurath, Otto (1973): Empiricism and Sociology, eds. Marie Neurath/ Robert S. Cohen, Dordrecht (D. Reidel).

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Neurath, Otto (1981): Gesammelte philosophische und methodologische Schriften, 2 Vois, eds. RudolfHaller/Heiner Rutte, Wien (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky). Reichenbach, Hans (1931 ): Ziele und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, Hamburg (Meiner).· Ruse, Michael (1973): The Philosophy of Biology, London (Hutchinson). Sehemus, Wilhelm (1994): "Alexander Herzberg: Psychologie, Medizin und wissenschaftliche Philosophie", in: Danneberg!Kamlah/ Schäfer (eds.), pp. 33-51. Schlick, Moritz (1925): "Naturphilosophie", in: P. Dessoir (ed.), Lehrbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten), Berlin (Ullstein), pp. 393-492. Stadler, Friedrich (1982): Vom Positivismus zur 'Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung'. Am Beispiel der Wirkungsgeschichte von Ernst Mach in Österreich von 1895 bis 1934, Wien/München (Löcker). Wolters, Gereon (1987): Mach I, Mach II, Einstein und die Relativitätstheorie. Eine Fälschung und ihre Folgen, Berlin/New York (W. de Gruyter). Wolters, Gereon (l992a): "Una modemizzazione incompiuta: il programma di unificazione della scienza", Nuova Civilta delle Macchine 10, fase. 3-4, 90-98 (Special edition on "Metodo e Circolazione delle Conoscneze", ed. Raffaella Simili) Wolters, Gereon (l992b): "Ernst Mach e il 'Verein Ernst Mach"', in: Maria Carla Galavotti/Raffaella Simili (eds.), II Circolo di Vienna. Ricordi e Riflessioni, Parma (Pratiche), pp. 43-57. Wolters, Gereon (1994): "Scientific Philosophy: the Other Side", in: Wesley C. Salmon/Gereon Wolters (eds.), Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz 21-24 May 1991, Pittsburgh (University of Pittsburgh Press)/Konstanz (Universitätsverlag), pp. 3-19. Woodger, Joseph H. (1937): The Axiomatic Method in Biology, Cambridge (University Press). Zilsel, Edgar (1928): "Naturphilosophie", in: Franz Schnaß (ed.), Eiriführung in die Philosophie, Osterwieck (A. W. Zwickfeld), pp. 107-143. Zilsel, Edgar (1976): Die sozialen Ursprünge der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft, ed. Wolfgang Krohn, Frankfurt (Suhrkamp). Zimmermann, Walter(l 937/38): "Strenge Objekt/Subjekt-Scheidung als Voraussetzung wissenschaftlicher Biologie, Erkenntnis 7 (1937/38), pp. 1-44.

Gereon Walters Universität Konstanz