Vieques and Puerto Rican Politics

Vieques and Puerto Rican Politics


Jorge Rodríguez Beruff
University of Puerto Rico




The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the significance to Puerto
Rican politics and to Puerto Rico-United States relations of the issue of
the naval presence and exercises in Vieques. I wish, in particular, to
address the question of whether this conflict has provoked or may provoke
long-term shifts in the dynamics of power and politics in Puerto Rico and a
significant redefinition of US-Puerto Rico relations. I do not aim to
present here the results of an empirical study or well thought out "final"
propositions or conclusions. It is an essay in the original literary
meaning of the term: a conceptual elaboration on a topic, according to
María Moliner "meditaciones del autor", with the main aim of provoking
thought in the reader.
The present controversy about Vieques inevitably refers us to the broader
issue of the historical and political role of the US military presence and
activities in Puerto Rico during this century. How do we approach this
issue without falling into a new reductionism or proposing explanations
devoid of the complexity and multi-faceted character it evidently has?


Military power and colonialism: a historical view
Let me posit some of the hypothesis on the role of military power and
strategic interests in Puerto Rican history that I have developed in other
writings in order to discuss recent developments on the Vieques controversy
with greater historical depth.
Strategic-military considerations and military rule did not begin
with US control in 1898 but go back to the Spanish colonial period.
Spanish possessions in the Caribbean formed part of a vital network of
military bastions for the defense of colonial trade and the Spanish Empire.
The Caribbean, as Juan Bosch has noted, was a frontier of great power
conflict. The military character of the city San Juan, the situado
mexicano, the strategic character of the Capitanía General and
authoritarian rule by military governors, were expressions of this role.
This began to change after the independence of Latin America, but Puerto
Rico, apart from its growing commercial importance, was still considered a
vital strategic stepping stone for the control of Cuba. It is interesting
that the demolition of the San Juan city walls belatedly took place in
1897, much later that in La Habana.
Arturo Morales Carrión has shown that during the 19th century a
growing divorce occurred between commerce and colonial control as Puerto
Rican trade shifted increasingly towards the United States. This does not
mean, however, that US interest was exclusively commercial, nor would
Morales Carrión have argued that. In fact, he was one of the few Puerto
Rican historians who was well aware of the relevance of strategic factors
and defined the dilemma of Puerto Rican history in a 1940 article as "the
fortress or the city".
During the 19th century, the northeast corner of the Eastern Caribbean
became an object of interest to the naval establishment. This was related
to the growing importance of the Central American Isthmus and the entire
Caribbean region. That is why both Samaná Bay in the Dominican Republic
and the Danish Virgin islands became valued potential sites for naval
bases, and, just after the Civil War, the US offered to purchase Culebrita
island from Spain. The long cherished plans to annex the Dominican Republic
and the Virgin Islands are well known. It is interesting to note that the
geostrategic outlook that was eventually formulated by Mahan overlapped in
many ways with traditional Spanish strategic thinking on the region.
I do not want to dwell on the sterile discussion of economic versus
politico-military interests in the annexation of Puerto Rico. Let us just
say that strategic considerations, particularly naval strategy, did play an
important role. The control of Puerto Rico meant the control of the main
European maritime routes to and from the Isthmus and the Caribbean.
Together with Key West and Guantánamo it gave the US control over the
"northern tier" routes into the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. It also
moved the US frontier south, facilitating operations towards South America.
Culebra, for instance, was used to concentrate the fleet during the 1902
blockade of the Venezuelan coast. Certainly, strategic interest has
changed over time due to technological changes and the international and
regional environment, but never has Puerto Rico been considered by the US
as devoid of strategic military importance.
This brings me to the second point I wish to make. Richard Challener, in
his classic study Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy[1] , has
argued very convincingly that during the period of overseas expansion the
military establishment considerably expanded its political role both in the
administration of the new "possessions" and, more generally, in the
formulation and execution of foreign policy. Mahan argued that the
administration of the new possessions should be entrusted to the military
since they were "strategic enclaves", not colonies in the classic sense,
and the military were above "politics" and thus better equipped to promote
the welfare of the natives.
In the case of Puerto Rico, the military played a protracted and overt
political role in colonial administration. Although formally a "civil"
government was instituted, in fact it could best described as a "hybrid" co-
administration of a civil-military character. The role of state builders,
or "Founding Fathers", of the new colonial state was performed by military
officers during the brief period of military government. The Foraker Act
establishing a "civil government" was ironically written in the War
Department.
The Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, for a long time
headed by Col. Frank MacIntyre, coordinated Federal policy until 1934, when
jurisdiction was transferred to the Interior Department. The BIA
centralized information on all aspects of Puerto Rican life, drafted
legislation, participated in political decisions, and was possibly more
powerful than the Resident Commissioner. That same year of 1934 Major
General Blanton Winship was named governor and his successor in 1939 was
the former Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, Admiral William D. Leahy.
George Colton, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., Winship and William D. Leahy were
all retired military officers who held the governorship. Charles Allen and
Beekman Winthrop had been Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. Even a
reformist civilian governor as Rexford G. Tugwell understood his mission in
Puerto Rico as predominantly geostrategic. The Puerto Rican police,
organized along paramilitary lines, was directly under control of military
officers until the mid-1940s. Several military agencies routinely gathered
information on strictly civlian political affairs, and still do. Finally,
many of the Puerto Rican functionaries that were recruited for key posts in
government were military officers or had a military background.
This colonial arrangement lacked key elements of the liberal model that
was prevalent in the metropolitan political system. There was no clear
demarcation of the spheres of competence of the military and the civilian
leadership, the government was only partially civilian, and the principle
of subordination of the military to civilian leaders and civil values was
never fully effective. Although civil-military relations have always been
a shifting and problematic aspect of the US political system, the
arrangement in Puerto Rico would have been probably found intolerable by
the metropolitan political class and citizenry.
I do not mean to argue that Puerto Rico was subjected prior to the 1940s
to a prolonged military dictatorship, though the Winship administration
closely resembled such a regime, neither that the institutional setup did
not elicit the collaboration of the main Puerto Rican political forces and
had mechanisms to integrate the masses. My point is that the military
played an ostensible political role to an extent significantly broader that
in the US political system. This role was possibly legitimized by the
strategic value adscribed to Puerto Rico and other island bastions under US
control.
During this period the Puerto Ricans were recruited forcibly only for the
First World War. The contingent was shipped to Panama and never saw action
in Europe, returning to Puerto Rico without battle losses. The military
establishment in Puerto Rico was relatively modest due to financial
considerations. Military installations were mostly inherited from Spain
through the Treaty of Paris, with the main exceptions of Culebra and Isla
Grande, and did not provoke major frictions with the local population
except in Culebra and Puerta de Tierra. Repression, when harshly
exercised, was targeted at discrete groups such as the anarchists and the
radicalized segments of the labor movement at the beginning of the century
and, later, at the Nationalists. And never, including during the 1950
Nationalist insurrection, were the US regular Armed Forces used to directly
repress the civilian population.
Indeed, there were changes after the war under the hegemony of the
Popular Democratic Party, with the approval of the law allowing the
election of the Governor and eventually with the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico towards a relative "civilianization" and
democratization of the political system. The overt and conspicuous role of
the military in the governing of Puerto Rico ceased.
However, this was obtained at a cost. Under the concept of "common
defense" all issues relating to war and peace, and to security and military
policy were defined as the exclusive domain of the Federal government. The
high level of legitimacy that participation in the Second World War had
generated and the perception of a generally beneficial impact of the US
Armed Forces in Puerto Rico during the 1940s possibly contributed to elicit
the consent of the Puerto Rican people to the whole arrangement.
It should be remembered that both the War and Navy Departments
participated in the Congressional hearings on the Tydings Bill in the 1940s
to oppose any discussion of independence during or after the war. They
argued that the "operation of a sovereign government" in Puerto Rico would
interfere with their hitherto "unrescricted" use of the land and the
people. Commonwealth, understood as autonomy in strictly "local matters",
was acceptable. Statehood was not even considered as an option, and later
has only been mentioned as a "second best" alternative. Thus, under the
"civilianized" political institutions, the military establishment,
represented by the commanders of the 10th Naval District and the Army´s
Puerto Rico Department, retained a considerable share of power, possibly
augmented by the environment of sharp international tensions during the
Cold War.
Nevertheless, the Korean War, which involved great human suffering and
losses to Puerto Rico, fear of all out nuclear war, forced conscription for
the Vietnam War and its traumatic consequences, the militarization of the
universities, and Navy activities in Culebra and Vieques, placed strains on
the exclusionary framework. In fact, the growth of the independence
movement in the 60s and 70s and the crisis of Popular Democratic Party
hegemony can hardly be understood without making reference to extreme forms
of military oppression as perceived by important segments of the
population. It could be argued that, historically, the main source of
tension in US-Puerto Rico relations in the postwar period, cannot be found
not in economic or social policy, but rather in the impact of military and
security policy.


Vieques: a long-standing controversy
If we focus only on what has happened around the Vieques issue after the
death of David Sanes on 19 April 1999, we run the risk of missing the
political significance of this conflict in all its breadth and depth. In
fact the tensions between the Federal government and the Puerto Rican
political leadership began almost immediately after the 1941 land
expropriations. They were provoked not by the process of expropriation
itself, which the Popular Democratic Party did not oppose, but rather by
the catastrophic social and economic consequences that could be foreseen
just a couple of years later.
Muñoz and the Popular Democratic Party had expressed during the 1940
campaign full support and collaboration for military preparations in Puerto
Rico, a position which was emphatically reiterated during the war. Thus,
they did not oppose the massive land expropriations that preceded the
construction of new Army and Navy bases. With the exception of the weak
Nationalist Party, other political forces shared this outlook.
The immediate precedent to Vieques was Aguadilla, where Borinquen Field
was built in 1939 and 1940. The Popular Party sought to lessen the plight
of the many displaced families in Aguadilla and elseqhere in Puerto Rico
through the Autoridad de Tierras (Land Authority), as Josefa Santiago has
studied.. However, the problem in Vieques was probably more dramatic than
anywhere else as by 1943 the Navy had purchased 21,000 of the 32,640 acres.
By 1982 the Navy controlled an officially estimated total of 25,231 acres.
Consequently, it was not a question of resettlement but of the viability
of the economy and the civilian population itself.
Early in 1943, when the consequences of the naval expropriations were
beginning to be felt, a delegation comprising all the political groups
organized in Vieques, visited Muñoz who was then President of the Senate.
Therefore, the existence of a broad coalition or consensus in Vieques to
demand redress against the Navy can be found as early as 1943. Muñoz
responded by ordering Rafael Picó to undertake a study of the situation in
Vieques. The study, carried out by a committee of experts, was submitted
on 18 March 1943. It included the following prescient diagnostic of the
situation:
There is today a boom in Vieques such as the Island has not experienced
for 100 years. But when the day of reckoning comes and Naval
constructions stop, the Island will face the severest crisis in its
history. The crisis will be caused not only by the fact that there is no
evidence that the workers are saving their unusually high salaries, but
from the more basic fact that the Navy has purchased 21,000 of the
Island´s 32,640 acres…[2]


The study demanded that the Navy permit use of 13,000 acres of non-
restricted land for farming and resettlement and recommended additional
emergency measures by a number of Puerto Rican and Federal agencies. Muñoz
submitted the report to Tugwell, but he answered that since Muñoz had
ordered the report he should also see to its implementation.
With the war moving elsewhere and later about to end, the Navy failed
to use intensively its huge real estate in the Ceiba-Vieques area. In
1944, 12,000 acres in Vieques were declared surplus and transferred to
Puerto Rico under revocable conditions. The Puerto Rican government,
through the Puerto Rico Agricultural Company (PRACO), invested almost $2
million in Vieques in several agricultural and cattle projects. These met
with a certain degree of success but were short lived.
By 1947, the outbreak of the Cold War increased naval interest in Vieques
and major maneuvers were scheduled. Towards the end of that year the Navy
was clearly torpedoing Puerto Rican development efforts and undermining
PRACO´s projects. A document found in the Luis Muñoz Marín Foundation
summarizes the new situation in the following manner:
The first real effort to rehabilitate the people of Vieques was
progressing in a highly satisfactory manner, with their cooperation and
support, and with the cooperation of the Navy officials until Admiral
Barbey came to Puerto Rico. He has refused to cooperate with the
established Insular agencies, humiliated their representatives whenever
possible, caused them to lose money and in particular, has made every
effort to wreck the Insular program of rehabilitation on Vieques.


Admiral Barbey should be recalled immediately and the Navy lands should
be released for development to their fullest potentialities.


The people of Puerto Rico and Vieques are too poor to give up 28,000
acres of land in order that the Navy use it one month a year for
maneuvers.[3]


By 1948, the conflict between the governments of Puerto Rico and the
US over Vieques became part of a broader conflict around the problem of
military real estate. This came to a head during the first Puerto Rican
governorship of Jesús T. Piñero. During the Second World War the Armed
Forces had acquired thousands of acres for additional bases and
installations throughout the island and in San Juan. Never before had the
military presence had been so obtrusive. Numerous military properties in
San Juan, particularly around the harbor, impeded urban growth and
planning. Also at issue was the preferred location for an international
airport in lands held by the Navy in Isla Verde. In total, about 26
properties were involved.
The government of Puerto Rico wanted a return to "normality", i.e.
the reduction of military real estate to pre-war levels. The Armed Forces,
claiming "national security" considerations in the context of the Cold War,
wanted to hang on to practically all its real estate, which then, as today,
was defined as vital and irreplaceable. Negotiations between the
government of Piñeiro and the military establishment in Puerto Rico had
produced no results by early 1948. This must have been an important topic
discussed with Harry Truman during his brief visit in late February 1948,
since he ordered Admiral William D. Leahy, his military Chief of Staff and
one of his main security advisors, to return to Puerto Rico in April and
make recommendations to him that would break the impasse.
Admiral Leahy, who was a former governor and thus knew personally the
Puerto Rican leadership, including Muñoz, participated in discussions with
Piñero and leading functionaries of his government during the 19 and 20 of
April 1948. One by one, they went over the over 20 properties in dispute.
The presidential mediator was ironically a Fleet Admiral had that governed
Puerto Rico precisely when the plans for the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station
were being laid out. When Governor Piñero tried to pose the Vieques
situation, this brief and lapidary conversation ensued.
Governor PINERO: Going toward the east we come to the island of Vieques.


Admiral LEAHY: I don´t think I can do anything about Vieques except tell
Washington what you want. There is not much purpose in my talking about
that to you. The island is strategically valuable. I think nowhere they
can get a better one of higher value. This is a very important military
training area. It is a key in the overall Navy defenses.[4]


There was some further discussion on Vieques, but the Admiral was adamant
that Piñero should write directly to the President. Leahy´s report to
Truman made some concessions to the civilian authorities, to the dismay of
the recalcitrant military hierarchy in Puerto Rico. It even rejected a
Navy´s claim for more land in Culebra. But it did not include a word on
Vieques. The fate of the people of Vieques was sealed and the words of
Admiral Leahy resound in the recent statements of Admiral Kevin Green fifty
three years later: "There is not much point in talking about that to you."
The conflict over military real estate was possibly the biggest political
stumbling block in US-Puerto Rico relations before agreement could be
reached for the political reforms that crystallized in the election of a
Puerto Rican governor later in 1948 and eventually in the Constitution of
the Free Associated State in 1950. I do not wish to argue, as I do not
have sufficient evidence, that the new political arrangement was the result
of a trade in which Vieques was the victim. This is Arturo Melendez
central thesis in La batalla de Vieques. However, it would be fair to say
that Commonwealth was born with the festering problem of Vieques and that
the Puerto Rican political leadership, despite its evident concern over the
situation, felt unable to impose a favorable resolution.
Then followed crisis after military crisis in the 1950s and 1960s (Turkey
and Greece, Berlin, Korea, Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis, Vietnam…).
Realpolitik advised against bringing up an issue so critical to the Navy
and that was not considered important except by the few thousand viequenses
(even divided among themselves) and the increasingly weakened independence
movement. Also the use of Culebra prevented Vieques from receiving the
full brunt of military exercises, as would later occur in the 70s, to the
90s. However, it would be the Navy´s insatiable land-hunger that would
keep the issue politically alive during that period. It considered the
leonine status quo insufficient.
In reality, the Navy was after the acquisition of the entire islands of
Vieques and Culebra and the removal of the civilian population. That is
why Admiral Richard E. Barbey was not simply an unreasonable fellow.
Economic viability or growth in these "Crown jewels" was seen as an
obstacle to the plan, known as "Plan Dracula" or "Plan BC". It was not an
issue of being a good or bad neighbor, the Navy simply wanted the whole
neighborhood for itself.
The plan was opposed by the Government of Puerto Rico and Muñoz had a
small group of trusted functionaries who followed Navy moves in Washington,
among them Roberto Sánchez Vilella and Antonio Fernós Isern. This is the
context of Muñoz secret letter to Kennedy of 28 December 1961 opposing the
plan, which was about to be moved through Congress (as now the uncanny idea
of separating Vieques from Puerto Rico is being sponsored by the Navy and
its Congressional allies). The governor warned Kennedy of the adverse
political consequences such a move would have. By 16 January 1962, Kennedy
had answered the letter stating that "…we must alter our plans so as to
modify the impact on the civilian community." Muñoz had prevented the
status quo from being changed in favor of the Navy, but the problem
persisted and would flare-up again in the 1970s.

From Culebra to Vieques
A strengthened independence movement, precisely by the anti-Vietnam
struggle, took up the issue of Navy activities in Culebra. The coalition
of forces that acted in that case included an indignant local population
and leadership, the independence movement, radicalized segments of the
Protestant churches and US pacifist groups. It faced an extremely weakened
Federal government and military establishment that was grappling with the
catastrophic military and political consequences of the War in Vietnam. In
this context, the main Puerto Rican political forces represented by Luis A.
Ferré and Rafael Hernández Colón saw no major drawbacks in spousing an
obviously popular cause and many dangers in allowing the independence
movement to keep the issue alive. Furthermore, the deal they brokered was
eventually acceptable to the Navy since it did not preclude a shift of
activities from Culebra to Vieques.
Inevitably the conflict was intensified in Vieques. The intensification
of maneuvers and of the presence of military personnel mobilized segments
of the population, particularly the fishermen whose livelihood was
constantly undermined by the exercises. Between 1974 to 1977, the
launching of 500, 1,000, and 2,000 pound bombs increased 900%. During the
first six months of 1978 alone, the Navy dropped 3,886,000 pounds of
ordnance in Vieques. Maneuvers were held for about 200 days a year from
7:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.[5]
The local opposition was organized in the Cruzada pro Rescate de Vieques.
Throughout Puerto Rico a network of support groups sprang up. Once again
segments of the Protestant and Catholic churches joined the movement, as
well as the Lawyers Guild. The movement felt it could bring about "a
second Culebra". To the Navy it was a question of "Custer´s last stand."
The government of Carlos Romero Barceló responded by filing a suit against
the Navy on environmental grounds.
However, the political situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
different. The US was no longer bogged down in the dual traumas of Vietnam
and Watergate. International tensions with Cuba and the Soviet Union had
increased. The political right was on the upswing leading to Reagan´s
electoral victory in 1980 and the commitment to a strengthened military.
In Vieques the mobilized opposition, though strong, had not reached present
day levels. The solidarity movement in Puerto Rico was so closely
identified with the independence movement that it growth potential was
severely limited. Needless to say, the solidarity movement in Puerto Rico
suffered from the bickering and infighting over "strategy and tactics" to
which the host of "left" fractions have been so prone. Therefore, the Navy
could implement a "dirty tricks" campaign in Vieques and Puerto Rico with
relative impunity. The death of Angel Rodríguez Cristóbal and the
imprisonment of protestors did not elicit the sense of generalized
indignation that the death o David Sanes, a Navy guard, later elicited.
The statehood government eventually succumbed to the pressure of the
military. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan provided a convenient excuse
for the Romero Barceló administration to disentangle itself from the
Vieques issue through the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) without
significant political fallout. His successor, Rafael Hernández Colón, was
loath to intervene as he had been instrumental in the Culebra deal that had
been so damaging to Vieques. Thus, the main political forces decided to
distance themselves from a complicated issue, from which no political
advantage could be derived, and that involved potential conflict with the
Navy and its political allies in Washington. Even the independence
movement lost interest to a large extent and concentrated in its customary
"status" politics.
I cannot describe in detail the role of successive Puerto Rican
administrations in the Vieques issue. That research is being done by Prof.
Luis González Sotomayor and it will be extremely illuminating when
published. The important point is that, though the Navy obtained a major
tactical victory in 1983, the issue failed to dissolve into oblivion.
Under difficult circumstances, the opposition reorganized in Vieques. Under
difficult circumstances, the Comité Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques was
founded in 1993. Some groups, mainly NGOs and church organizations
maintained their support. The media occasionally reported on the more
dramatic aspects of naval activities. More importantly, a process of
sedimentation had occurred in Puerto Rican public opinion, the result of a
slow educational process. A diffuse "state of public opinion" gradually
crystallized based on the perception that naval activities had overstepped
their reasonable bounds and had become unacceptable. It no longer
coincided with pro-independence or nationalistic segments of the population
but cut across parties and ideologies.
It was in this context that the death of David Sanes occurred. The fact
that the victim was a viequense above suspicion of opposition to the Navy,
whose image was in uniform and in a military salute, politically broadened
the impact of the tragedy. He was not a "radical troublemaker", but a
faithful servant. How many Puerto Ricans who had served in the Armed
Forces could see themselves in his image? How many viequenses who still
believed there was a future with the Navy or who had served it felt the
tragedy as an intimate event?
The racist callousness of the Navy, who tried to blame Sanes for his own
death, concealed the injuries of other guards, carried out a reluctant and
questionable inquiry, refused to reveal the name of the pilot or to take
disciplinary action against those responsible, and, generally, tried to
downplay the gravity of the incident and the dangers to the civilian
population, only served to deepen the sense of indignation in Puerto Rico.
But it was the history of the protracted Vieques conflict that transformed
this death into a major crisis for the Navy.


Vieques Post-Sanes
Vieques became after Sanes a "media event". For two years the
controversy has been generating news of all sorts. It is a curious "media
event" since they normally fizzle out in shorter span of time. Thus, there
is a strong temptation to focus on the details or attempt a blow by blow
account of the conflict. However, the fact itself that the media still
considers the issue important, and the complaint of some politicians that
it is still "alive", suggests that there are some new political factors
operating in this case.
If we look at the genesis of the pro-Vieques movement as it unraveled
after the death of Sanes some important features stand out. Firstly, the
existence of a strengthened and organized anti-Navy movement in Vieques
that for the first time represented a clear majority in the island. That
movement counted with an experienced leadership which, despite some
internal divisions, was extremely effective in explaining to the population
in Puerto Rico their plight and demands. It eventually made itself felt
also at the level of municipal politics, a power instance that had been
critical in the past to the Navy.
Secondly, the campamentos set up by the desobedientes civiles kept
the issue in the limelight from early May 1999 to 4 May 2000, almost
exactly one year. A total of 13 were set up by groups such as viequenses,
trade unions, churches, students, and pro-independence parties and groups.
The campamentos demanded complex logistics and were really autonomous
networks of support which combined resources in Vieques, la Isla Grande,
and even the US. The effort to maintain the campamentos involved thousands
of people that found a concrete way to support the Vieques struggle. On
the 11th of May, 2000, a total of 224 desobedientes were arrested. The
Federal Court has since been dealing with over 900 misdemeanor cases and
many have used the Court to air their grievances and demands regarding
naval activities in Vieques.
Thirdly, the movement included a host of non-governmental and
professional organizations that went beyond the groups directly present in
Vieques and which represented a very broad spectrum of civil society. For
different reasons, they saw in Vieques a vital issue that merited
solidarity and that was emblematic of their own aims. An interesting
feature of this process is that it has thrust into political prominence new
voices and personalities such as Wilfredo Estrada or José Paraliticci. In
this sense, the viequenses had been able to portray their case in a
multifaceted way that embraced ecological, peace, human rights, democratic,
developmental, moral and other aspects with which very diverse groups could
identify. The involvement of the Catholic and Protestant churches in this
movement was a crucial factor in its strength and broadness. Certainly,
the solidarity of religious groups who saw the Vieques situation as morally
outrageous was of strategic importance both before and after the death of
David Sanes.
The pro-Vieques movement has also signified new modalities of political
leadership and action in Puerto Rico. The leadership of the civic movement
has developed more effective ways of communicating with the people. The
traditional discourses of national oppression have lost effectiveness in
favour of discourses based on moral, citizenship, democracy, peace,
community, health and ecology demands. In the final analysis, the
situation in Vieques is intolerable under any political arrangement with
the United States and its solution cannot wait a redefinition of the
intractable "status" dilemma. That is why the solidarity movement has
achieved a considerable broadness, and it also explains why the Navy and
its allies wish to identify the movement as nationalist and pro-
independence. In addition, the strategy of peaceful resistance and civil
disobedience as a principled stance has been vital for the survival of the
consensus. Without rejection of violence, popular support would have
dwindled. It has, indeed, been astounding how such a sharp and protracted
conflict has generated so little violence, and how non-violence has turned
weakness into strength. Patience and political acumen on the part of the
opposition will prove vital in the final outcome of this struggle.
Humberto García has suggested that the broad pro-Vieques coalition was
mobilized under the banner of puertorriqueñidad, not nationalist or pro-
independence demands. Even if puertorriqueñidad played a role in providing
an overarching identity to the movement, its content was and is related to
the capacity of the Vieques issue to convoke support on very diverse
grounds. In this sense, for example, as Robert Rabin has noted, the growth
of the ecological movement and consciousness in Puerto Rico was a factor in
the strength of the pro-Vieques response.
Attempts at creating a coordination of all groups resulted in the
founding of Todo Puerto Rico con Vieques. However, this formation could
not embrace the very broad and heterogenous movement that had developed and
was perceived by some as too closely identified with traditional left and
independence groups. Thus, the churches created their own mechanism of
coordination: the Comisión Ecuménica. Leadership, thus, remained very
fluid and decentralized, with the viequenses, Todo Puerto Rico con Vieques,
and the Comisión Ecuménica sharing the initiative with very diverse groups,
including the Independence Party. The Comisión Ecuménica demonstrated its
considerable power of convocation in the massive march of 21 February 2000.
Despite Navy´s claims, at no point was the Independence Party or the
independence movement, defined more broadly, able to hegemonize the Vieques
solidarity movement in Puerto Rico, though they were important
participants.
Fourthly, the civic movement was not confined to Puerto Rico. Puerto
Rican communities in the US also mobilized and a host of solidarity groups
named Todo Hartford con Vieques or Todo Nueva York con Vieques sprang up.
This commitment was also expressed in the participation of Puerto Rican
Congress people and in other Puerto Rican leaders in the US. International
solidarity and awareness has also been growing. Recently a colleague
pointed out to me that she had attended a meeting of English speaking
Caribbean functionaries, normally uninterested in developments in Puerto
Rico, and found that most of them were well informed and avid to learn more
about the Vieques situation.[6]
Finally, although the locus of dynamism of the pro-Vieques movement
has been outside the party system, it has impacted the parties in different
ways. The Independence Party decided to make a major effort from the
beginning with the presence of Rubén Berrios in the impact area for many
months. It later tried to translate their participation into votes during
the last election without much success. Popular sympathy for Berrios
actions did not mean electoral support for the party or for independence.
Governor Pedro Rosselló, for a while, aligned the New Progressive Party
with the main demands of the movement for which he reaped a great level of
popular approval. The Comisión Especial para Vieques served to formulate
the demands of the pro-Vieques coalition. The deal he later obtained from
Clinton, the "Presidential Directives", left most of the country
unsatisfied and were an anticlimax to his "don´t push it" bravado in
Congress. The right of that party, represented by Orlando Parga and Myriam
Ramírez de Ferrer, was never comfortable with the Vieques issue and
gradually most of the leadership felt it was best to distance itself from
the matter while still paying lip service to the "Presidential Directives".
Eventually, leaders such as Ramírez de Ferrer have openly moved to a pro-
Navy stance. However, the issue has remained "alive" even within that
party. Pesquera's comment on Vieques did not help him electorally. The
ongoing attempt to politically destroy Norma Burgos signifies also an
attempt to quash the only voice in the leadership that maintains the
party's original position. It is no coincidence that Norma Burgos presided
the Comisión Especial and obtained the highest number of votes for the
Senate. The party seems bent on distancing itself from the issue, to the
satisfaction of its hard-core supporters, but may not be able to extricate
itself from the political consequences of turning its back on such a strong
popular demand.
Vieques also poses a difficult dilemma for the Popular Party. Its
leadership joined the bandwagon of the movement before the elections and
used the issue for electoral purposes. Some Popular-controlled
municipalities, mainly Carolina, proved extremely supportive of pro-Vieques
activities. It elected an anti-Navy candidate in Vieques, Dámaso Serrano,
who participated in civil disobedience actions. The small margin by which
it won the elections was partly due to the strong expressions of Sila
Calderón. Since the elections Governor Calderón has claimed that it will
be possible to resolve the Vieques situation in a calm dialogue with the
Federal government. Success or failure on this promise will possibly
impact the credibility of Calderón and hence the next elections.
The important point to be made is that in a very short span of time the
Vieques issue, from being a marginal and localized matter, has become
strategic to the political system, has conditioned dominant political
debate and significantly impacted all three political parties. What
sustains the issue is the "state of public opinion" to which we have
referred. That is the main arena of struggle. Hitherto, a broad popular
consensus has been maintained in favor of basic pro-Vieques demands, while
the Navy´s "public relations" efforts have failed to undermine the
consensus.


Vieques and US-Puerto Rico relations
Although the Vieques movement has, by and large, steered clear of the
"status" debate, it has important implications for the colonial
relationship with the United States. It involves the capacity of the
Puerto Rican people to impose a veto on US activities considered
unacceptable and contrary to the interests of the population. In fact, the
Puerto Rican people, through the pro-Vieques movement, have been exercising
this veto power for almost two years. During a full year, naval maneuvers
were brought to a halt by the campamentos and civil disobedience. Even
after mass arrests and prosecutions in the Federal Court, maneuvers have
not been able to resume to normal pre-Sanes levels due to political
considerations. In fact, last year the Navy only held exercises for about
20 days and planned maneuvers for this year were postponed. The Navy and
the US government are faced with the dilemma of sparking new protests or
ceding to democratic demands of the Puerto Rican people that clearly go
beyond the existing political arrangement.
Veto power is not sovereign power, it is shared power, but its political
relevance is evident. Accepting veto power would clearly set a precedent
that could be claimed in other conflicts and would signify a non-colonial
empowerment of the Puerto Rican people. This does not mean, as some pro-
statehood and pro-independence leaders claim, that the pro-Vieques movement
implies a demand for full sovereignty or independence. In fact, the
movement´s demands have been extremely focused on the Navy´s presence in
Vieques. It involves questions of democratic citizenship, of the limits of
state power in a democratic polity, of the power of local communities, and
of the legitimate relations between the military and civil society. In
this sense it is relevant for the "status" debate as it signifies that no
arrangement, be it statehood, commonwealth or independence, that does not
make possible the construction of democratic citizenship and a
democratization and "civilianization" of the political system beyond party
hegemony will find great opposition among the people. Perhaps that was the
long-term meaning of the appeal of the "none of the above" option in the
status referendum.
The present government has stated that it will attempt to resolve the
conflict within the institutional confines of the Commonwealth and without
damaging Puerto Rico-US relations. This claim is faced with the adamant
resistance of the Navy and its allies in Congress and Puerto Rico. The
outcome of the conflict is still impossible to predict. However, it would
be fair to say that if the Navy is able to impose its will in the case of
Vieques, the reverberations will be felt in the Puerto Rican political
system and in the course of Puerto Rican-US relations for years to come.




[1] Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy,
1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[2] Thomas A. Fennell, "Vieques", 6 February 1948, Luis Muñoz Marñín
Foundation.

[3] Rafael Picó, et. al., "Report of the Committee for the Investigation
of Conditions in the Island of Vieques", 18 March 1943, p. 1. Luis Muñoz
Marín Foundation.

[4] Headquarters, Tenth Naval District, San Juan Puerto Rico, "Special
Puerto Rican Insular Government and Federal property Conference"
(Transcription of discussions), 19-20 April 1948, William D. Leahy´s
Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

[5] Personal and Confidential Memorandum de Nelson Rodríguez López a
Hon. Carlos Quirós, Secretario de Estado, "Vieques", 16 March 1982.
Courtesy of Julio Quirós. This memorandum suggested a trasaction with the
Navy of the court cases which later lead to the MOU of 1983.

[6] I have tried to discuss in more detail the daynamics of the Vieques
solidarity movement in, Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, "Vieques y la construcción
de un poder civil en Puerto Rico", Nueva Sociedad, no. 168 (julio-agosto de
2000), pp. 41-48.