Varieties of transcendental metaphysics: A comparison of Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth

                 

Varieties of transcendental metaphysics A Comparison of Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth                                                          

Rikard  Dahl        

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction

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2. Preliminaries on limitations, material and emphasis

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3. The legacy of Transcendental Thomism

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3.1. An outline of Joseph Maréchal’s philosophy

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3.2. Maréchal and the transcendental method

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4. Lonergan’s metaphysics

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5. Coreth’s metaphysics

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6. Comparison: Prima facie similarities; underlying differences

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6.1. The architecture of metaphysics: cognitional or ontological primacy?

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6.2. Metaphysics and the critique of knowledge: mediated-immediate realism vs. critical realism

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7. Further discussion

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8. Concluding summary

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Bibliography

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1. Introduction At the core of this thesis is the famous review by Bernard Lonergan of Emerich Coreth’s Metaphysik, published in 19631 as ”Metaphysics as horizon”. This represents the meeting of the mature thought of two extraordinarily innovative minds, working in the AristotelianThomistic tradition, but in deep dialogue with modern philosophy. Both of these thinkers have been called transcendental Thomists, owing to the fact of the influence of Joseph Maréchal on their thought. Both are known for their systematic proposals on the topic of metaphysics, and have thus contributed to the renewal of metaphysical thought during the twentieth century. The major purpose of this thesis then, is to compare Lonergan and Coreth’s metaphysics through the examination of Lonergan’s Insight2, his ”Metaphysics as horizon” and Coreth’s Metaphysik3, to show how Lonergan and Coreth’s metaphysics, despite being seen as similar—not least in terms of their appropriation of Maréchal’s legacy—nonetheless contain a number of fundamental differences. This comparison—undertaken in section 6—will be framed as proceeding from prima facie similarities, to the uncovering of significant underlying differences. Another overall objective will be to show the interdependence of the two philosophies, highlighting the importance of comprehensive analysis when it comes to assessing the adequacy of their respective philosophical legacies. In line with this last point, the present thesis can merely hope to scratch the surface of the large and complex body of material involved; nonetheless it is hoped that some pertinent points involved in such a comparison can be highlighted. Regarding methodology and structure, the thesis approaches the purpose mentioned above through three procedures, the execution of which can be seen as the thesis’ subordinate or methodological aims: firstly, exposition; seeking to present clearly, and render as plausible. the two philosophical positions; secondly, critical investigation; seeking to uncover whether the conflicting positions truly conflict; thirdly, and in significant continuity with the last point, therapeutic analysis4: seeking a rapprochement between the positions where possible. Besides                                                                                                                 1. First published in Gregorianum 44 (1963) 307-18; later published in Bernard Lonergan, Collection (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967), and, perhaps surprisingly, even as an appendix to the English translation of Coreth’s Metaphysik, viz. Metaphysics, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 197-220. 2. Bernard Lonergan, Insight: a study of human understanding (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1975). 3. Emerich Coreth, Metaphysik: eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1961). 4. Therapeutic is here meant in the sense of solving, or untangling, philosophical problems or pseudoproblems; the word is used analogously with the way a Wittgenstein or a John Mcdowell would use the word.

 

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informing the general argumentation of the thesis, these procedures also reflect, to some extent, its structure: first, an exposé of Joseph Maréchal and his legacy, and of both Lonergan and Coreth’s metaphysics is provided; then we proceed to a critical comparative assessment; finally, in the discussion, we pursue a more therapeutic reconciliation. It is hoped that the comparison of these two monumental thinkers and their no less monumental systems—though, admittedly, limited by what can only be seen as an inverse proportion between the actual scope of the thesis and the massive scope of the philosophical systems—may be a help to anyone that is somewhat familiar with their thought, but has, as the present author, wondered about the similarities and differences between them. 2. Preliminaries on limitations, material and emphasis Preliminarily there is needed a comment on a question of omission, namely that of Coreth’s reply to Lonergan’s review titled ”Immediacy and the mediation of being: an attempt to answer Bernard Lonergan”, originally given as a position paper at the First International Lonergan Congress in 19705. We have not included Coreth’s replies here because of the limited amount of space; still, the paper has been surveyed by the present author and it has been utilized for the concretization of the positions in question; it has thus, in its own way, contributed to the final form of the thesis. Further, and in regards to the comparison of the two thinkers in question, the author admits a certain bias of emphasis and of detail, towards Lonergan’s thought. This minor assymetry is deliberate on the part of the author; whose personal objective it is to achieve clearer account of Lonergan’s metaphysics through contrasting it with a reference point that is similar, yet different; nonetheless, we trust that the reader will find that Coreth’s thought is accounted for with appropriate clarity and detail. Besides the concern of this thesis with Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth, there is the concern with the subject of metaphysics; a topic whose magnitude and breadth naturally invites some the drawing up of some clear boundaries. If metaphysics is thought of like a vast metropolitan city, containing both the common infrastructure generally found in cities, a share of unique monuments—witnessing to various historical events—but also different                                                                                                                 5. Available in written form in the second volume of papers from the conference, i.e. Philip McShane, Language, Truth and Meaning (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972).

 

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neigbourhoods, where particular, local—or parochial—customs are practiced, what we propose to examine in the following have partly to do with the infrastructure—or, architecture—of metaphysics; partly with that part of the city where inhabitants are engaged with maintaining the scholastic tradition—still impressing us with the monuments of figures such as Thomas Aquinas—and partly with that somewhat peripheral suburb that hold transcendental Thomism in high regard. Now this qualification at once brings up the difficulty of separating metaphysics—commonly thought of as the universal, and most general philosophical discipline6—from the other parts of a philosophical whole. In this respect, it must be noted that both Lonergan and Coreth conceive of their respective systems as integrated wholes—though, as we will see, it may be easier to define the distinct place of metaphysics within Lonergan’s thought. The difference between the two may be formulated as follows: while Coreth’s Metaphysik proceeds at once to an explication of the subject matter and structure of metaphysics—integrating within it questions of knowledge and objectivity, and of the subject as material, temporal and historical—Lonergan begins his Insight with a more extensive, and clearly separated account of the subject, before developing his metaphysics. Now, both the extensive nature, and the interdependence of both philosophical systems makes for a significant challenge when attempting an abbreviated presentation of them, as well as complicating the issue of performing a satisfactory comparison. As mentioned above then, the thesis is knowingly somewhat simplistic with respect to philosophical details—though not, hopefully—illegitimately reductionistic. The topics selected, both for presentation and comparison, are the ones that have been regarded to be the most promising, but there are certainly several more that could have been chosen. All of this notwithstanding, it is hoped that the analysis will bring some clarity to the issues involved, as well as providing pointers for some fruitful lines of thought regarding the many similarities and differences between Lonergan and Coreth.

3. The legacy of Transcendental Thomism One common way of characterizing both Lonergan and Coreth, is to frame their thought within that stream of Catholic philosophizing that flows from Joseph Maréchal, viz.                                                                                                                 6. This being true at least when it comes to metaphysicians working in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.

 

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transcendental Thomism. There are both advantages and disadvantages to using this epithet7; if the term is used in general way, there is the risk of obscuring the significant philosophical differences between the particular thinkers associated with it; this seems especially true when comparing transcendental Thomists with philosophers following other schools of thought. Nevertheless, in the context of this particular paper, when contrasting the relative positions of two philosophers that associated with this school, it can be a good starting point. 3.1. An outline of Joseph Maréchal’s philosophy Historically, then, the common source of the varieties of transcendental Thomism is the philosophy of Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944) as outlined in his Le point de départ de la métaphysique8 (1922-1947). The legacy of Maréchal is his synthetic attempt to integrate latemodern Kantian philosophy with the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics. Maréchal’s objective was to reclaim the affirmation of being as the starting point of metaphysics9 vis-á-vis what he saw as the basic error of Kantian philosophy: the denial of true objectivity and the restriction of human knowledge to the phenomenal realm. It is this ”ontological impoverishment” that Maréchal seeks to remedy. Thus he defines metaphysics, pace Kant, as the science of the absolute10. According to one commentator of his work, ”this does not mean that he restricts the nature of metaphysics to the super-sensible[…]but rather that everything must be viewed in relation to the ultimate, non-relative order of being”11 This arguably classical-Aristotelian affirmation of being contrasts with the Kantian analysis which denies this affirmation by denying human access to the thing in itself: ”Kant deceives himself by accepting only the pure synthesis of what is empirically given in the activity of the mind”12 Instead, Maréchal argues that ”the human intellect is, at one and the same time, an empirical faculty and a possibility for the absolute.”13 In opposition to what he perceives as the central Kantian problem, the question of objectivity, Maréchal interprets the act of judgement as referring to being: ”Only in this way is the essential characteristic of judgment (to be either true or false)

                                                                                                                7. Regarding Lonergan's views on transcendental Thomism, we can note that while he acknowledged that he is a part of the movement that came out of Maréchal, he seems to have some reservations against being labeled as a transcendental Thomist per se. Cf. Lonergan, Collection, 189. 8. Joseph Maréchal, Le point de départ de la métaphysique: leçons sur le développement historique et théorique du probl̀me de la connaissance (Brussels: Edition universelle, 1944). 9. Otto Muck, Transcendental method (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 27. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid, 28. 12. From ”Jugement ’scolastique’ concernant la racine de l’agnosticisme kantien” (Romiley, 1914) in Mélanges Joseph Maréchal (Brussels, 1950), 274, quoted in Muck, Transcendental method, 40. 13. Muck, Transcendental Method, 40.

 

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possible.”14 This interpretation, in turn, gives Maréchal his starting point for metaphysics; thus from the judgement of the affirmation of being, an entire metaphysic can unfold. 3.2. Maréchal and the transcendental method Now, lest it be assumed that Maréchal is simply doing Scholastic apologetics for NeoKantians, it has to be stressed that Maréchal does not simply defend the classical metaphysical position in Kantian language; because he expressly employs the Kantian method of transcendental analysis to arrive at his position, Maréchal actually introduces something novel into the tradition that he defends; what he introduces is the transcendental method. As is well known, what is central to this way of philosophizing is the shift of focus to the universal and necessary conditions of all possible of knowledge15. More precisely, these conditions are to be found in the subject and its consciousness. These conditions are reached by various moves that are essential to the transcendental method; two of which are transcendental deduction and retorsion16. Simply stated, a transcendental deduction is a logical deduction in which the premises include the conditions of the possibility of some thing or state of affairs17. Retorsion is a strategy of validating a philosophical position by showing that anyone that tries to deny it is involded in a performative self-contradiction or incoherence. 4. Lonergan’s metaphysics Because of the relative brevity of the present thesis we will not present a general overview over Lonergan’s philosophy, but only touch on some of the particularities of his metaphysical thought. What is perhaps most distinctive about Lonergan's metaphysic—most systematically presented in Insight—is its derivation from prior cognitional and epistemic theory, thereby making explicit the inevitable connection between epistemology and ontology. On the conviction that metaphysics is not something to be found in a book but in a mind18—i.e., in the mind of a particular, concrete subject—Lonergan starts with the terms and structures revealed in his own analysis of consciousness—roughly corresponding to the first part of Insight’s two parts—and uses them to form a heuristic anticipation of the terms and structures                                                                                                                 14. Ibid, 30. 15. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines transcendental arguments in the following way: ”As standardly conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.” Cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/ 16. Sometimes spelled retortion. This strategy was not new to Maréchal, indeed, Aristotle can be seen as using a version of it in his Metaphysics, Gamma, 3,4. 17. This definition is my own but I believe it to be consistent with the general understanding of the term. 18. Lonergan, Insight, 421.

 

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of the science of being. The definition of metaphysics that issues from this is formulated as ”   the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.”19 Now, this phrasing may give the reader the impression of a total departure from the Aristotelian-Thomistic formulation of metaphysics as the study of being qua being, but arguably much of the difference is terminological. What is meant by heuristic structure is that the metaphysic in question is a structural systematization of the anticipated ontology that corresponds to the epistemology in question. By proportionate being is meant the being that is known through human experience. During this process, through several key moments, Lonergan progressively develops his own definitions of the key terms of metaphysics. The most important of them are: firstly, what Lonergan calls the notion of being; an anticipation of being inherent in the very nature of the inquiring subject; what he calls the pure desire to know20. This idea is important because it allows Lonergan on the one hand, to speak of the human intellect as directed towards being, and on the other to deny that there is knowledge of being without judgement21. Secondly, there is Lonergan's definition of being as that which is to be known through the totality of true judgements22; this makes explicit the link between judgement and being that is crucial for Lonerganian critical realism. Thirdly, there is the definition of objectivity as a patterned context of judgements23; further translating epistemological terms into prior cognitional correlates. Fourthly, and in line with the idea that was touched upon in the end of the last paragraph: Lonergan builds on the thought of Aquinas—regarding the idea of a proportionality or connaturality between the knower and the known24—and defines what he calls the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and being25; the purpose of which is— again—to make explicit the connection between cognitional theory and metaphysics; allowing for the translation—or transposition—of the terms and structures of the former into the latter.                                                                                                                 19. Ibid, 416. 20. A nice way of putting this is found in G. Sala, when he writes that ”being is the correlate of intentionality”. In this formulation the later Lonergan’s emphasis on intentionality is included, giving us a succinct and correct expression of the idea. Cf. Giovanni B. Sala, Lonergan and Kant (Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1994). 21. I.e. if there was immediate knowledge of being, it would be possible to attain knowledge without the cognitional process that synthesizes experience, understanding and judgement, and that this is impossible is one of Lonergan’s main points. 22. Lonergan, Insight, 376. 23. Lonergan, Insight, 399. 24. Dunstan Robidoux has written an interesting paper of the relationship between Aquinas and Lonergan on this issue. Cf. http://lonergan.org/?p=152 25. Lonergan, Insight, 424.

 

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All of this customized philosophical vocabulary can seem, perhaps, somewhat peculiar, but it is the present author’s conviction that the explicit linking of ”how we know” with ”what can be known” that is achieved through it, gives Lonergan’s metaphysics a methodical clarity and rigour that is much needed within the discipline; it also has the potential to give more plausibility to the pursuit of a more traditional metaphysics, in a time when—the emergence of analytic metaphysics notwithstanding26—this project is met with considerable suspicion. 5. Coreth’s metaphysics Lonergan’s project as a whole then, was characterized by a metaphilosophical search for the foundations of philosophy; but a similar exigency is fully exhibited in Coreth’s metaphysical work as well. The main written contribution in this area was originally published as Metaphysik: Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung in 1961. This work is, above all, characterized by the deliberate emphasis on the transcendental method in the outworking of metaphysics; and by the positing of the act of the question as the starting point of its unfolding27. This question is said to contain the pure pre-knowledge (Vorgriff) of being as its condition; thereby Coreth sublates the insight of Maréchal—i.e. the affirmation of being as the point of departure for metaphysics—but refining it by making it less open to question through retorsion28. From the transcendentally secured starting point, Coreth proceeds to explicitate what is implicit in it, advancing dialectically through the performance (Vollzug) and the concept (Begriff), with the latter being what is contained—or co-known—in the first. 6. Comparison: Prima facie similarities; underlying differences In this introduction to this section we will examine the significant points of contact that exist between Lonergan and Coreth’s thought. These are framed as prima facie similarities that, when examined, reveal significant differences. Before proceeding, we will give a preliminary summary of these points—under the aspect of the similarities—so as to set the stage for the explication of the differences that will ensue in the following two subsections. Firstly then, there is the emphasis on methodology; both Lonergan and Coreth share the                                                                                                                 26. On the relationship between Lonergan’s metaphysics and the more recent developments within anglophone philosophy, I refer the reader to the excellent Method in metaphysics. Especially interesting is the affinity between Lonergan’s docrine of the isomorpism of knowing and being and the presuppositions of these analytic metaphysicians. 27. This point is masterfully contrasted with alternative proposed starting points in metaphysics; even Maréchals point of departure is criticized and found lacking. Cf. Coreth, Metaphysics, 31-44, 45-64. 28. I.e. questioning the act of questioning as the proper starting point of metaphysics only reinforces Coreth’s proposal.

 

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conviction that metaphysics must be scientific, and so both emphasize this aspect29. Indeed, it could be said that some of the greatest strengths in their respective proposals, lies in their mutual concern for methodology. Secondly, there is the significant mutual understanding of what metaphysics is in terms of its general character: both authors attempt, in their own way, to vindicate the scholastic tradition30; this means—at least—that metaphysics is considered to be of prime importance by both of them, and that they see it as a science that is both unifying and normative for other sciences. Thirdly, there is the question of the outworking and structure of metaphysics as proceeding from similar starting points: for Coreth this starting point is the human act of questioning which reveals the absolute horizon of being, and therefore grounds the development of metaphysics; for Lonergan it is the pure desire to know which is the source of the anticipatory notion of being as such, and which drives the inquiring—note the similarity with Coreth’s emphasis on questioning—subject, through the structured dynamism of intentonal consciousness, to anticipate the structure of being in explicit metaphysics. Fourthly, we have the similar use of the term horizon that is such that it gives a further commonality of architectural structure to their philosophies31. Fifthly, both authors emphasize as crucial the philosophical account of the human subject. Sixthly, both Lonergan and Coreth make use of the tools of transcendental method in the outworking of their thought; specifically this regards the use of transcendental deduction and retorsion. Sevently and finally, there is some similarity between the dialectical structure of the outworking of their respective systems, in as much as Lonergan uses a dialectic of position and counterposition to develop his philosophy; and Coreth uses a dialetic of performance(Vollzug) and concept(Begriff) in his. In the following two subsections we will examine some of the different themes that arise in a                                                                                                                 29. For Lonergan, see chapter 16. ”Metaphysics as science” in Lonergan, Insight,; Coreth agrees ”A science is really a science only when it possesses its own method[…]If this rule is binding on all science, it is especially binding on metaphysics" Cf. Coreth, Metaphysics, 31. 30. Lonergan does this under a dictum taken from Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris: vetera novis augere et perficere; to enlarge and perfect the old by means of the new. Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 768. Regarding Coreth’s program, see his introduction in Coreth, Metaphysics, 17-31. 31. The reason that Lonergan titles his review of Coreth’s book ”Metaphysics as horizon”, is, I takie it, to highlight a recognition of commonality with respect to the latter. Further, when engaging Coreth critically, Lonergan uses the concepts of the subjective and objective poles of the horizon of the latter’s metaphysic. For his part, Coreth, answers with the same terminology. Cf. Lonergan, Collection, 188-203, and McShane, Language, truth and meaning, 33-48. For a helpful explication technical and descriptive meanings of horizon in Lonergan see David Tracy, The achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 9-21. Interestingly, Coreth is also mentioned in the chapter as taking over this term from Husserl, together with both Lonergan and Rahner. In the following I will use the term horizon as defined by Lonergan and taken from Tracy’s book: ”A horizon is[…]a maximum field of vision from a determinate viewpoint. It possesses both an objective and a subjective pole, each one of which is conditioned by and conditions the other.” Ibid, 14.

 

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consideration of similarities and differences between Lonergan and Coreth. Because of the compact and interwoven nature of their philosopies, there will be some overlapping between the different themes, and so the whole section should be read as one unit, attempting to tease out the particularities of their respective positions. 6.1. The architecture of metaphysics: cognitional or ontological primacy? One helpful entry-point into this section may be the following question: ”Is it not true that both Lonergan and Coreth participate in that ’turn to the subjective at the beginning of our modern times’32 thereby according primacy to the subject within their philosophical architecture? This question could be posed critically: for example by those subscribing to a more traditional and—ostensibly—object-oriented metaphysic; indeed, Aristotelian-Thomist thought has been regarded by some as exactly that, and so has been seen to be at odds with the accounts of both Lonergan and Coreth33. Now, before attempting to answer this question, there is the preliminary that ”the turn to the subject” will be interpreted as a question of the philosophical emphasis34 on subject in opposition to object. A second preliminary is that this emphasis occurs along the scope of a range of positions: as a helpful exemplary marker of the most subjective pole on this continuum, we can place Kant’s position with its exclusion of the thing-in-itself and therefore—arguably—true objectivity; Kant thus makes knowledge completely conditioned by the subject; his emphasis on the subject was arguably unparalleled up to that point it. But not even the most extreme empiricist would deny that there is some contribution from the subject in the knowledge-making process; therefore, we claim that the present question is one that should be parsed out in terms of the emphasis that particular philosopher’s place on the role and function of the human subject. Having thus noted that we are dealing with a question of degrees of emphasis, we can turn to what we have called the prima facie similarities between Lonergan and Coreth. As mentioned in the third point in the last section, both of these thinkers affirm that the starting point of metaphysics is to be located in an operation of the subject: for Coreth, it is the performance of                                                                                                                 32. A quote by Karl Rahner, referring to the developments in western philosophy after Descartes and Kant. Cf. Ibid, 20. 33. This is, in effect, John Knasas’ criticism of both Lonergan and Coreth in John Knasas, Being and some 20th Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003). 34. The easiest way to explain in this context what is meant by ”emphasizing the subject” is to exemplify it with reference to those who stand in this tradition. The more technical explanation would be to refer to the degree to which objectivity is conditioned by the subject as opposed to the object. This is not meant to be a complete description of what is entailed by ”the turn to the subject” but merely one epistemological aspect that is quite important when making metaphilosophical assessments and comparisons after Kant’s copernican revolution.

 

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questioning; for Lonergan, it is the structures of intentionality; both of these starting points are then unfolded into an explicit metaphysic; these accounts represent the subjective poles of the corresponding metaphysical horizons. Given this commonality, one would perhaps expect agreement when it comes to the basic structure of their respective horizons, but in actual fact, this is one of the main points of contention in their exchange, which we must now turn to. We will quote a particularly salient passage from Lonergan’s review—one, where he critically reflects on Coreth’s work—and see if we can draw out the roots of the disagreement. Lonergan asserts: I should not equate metaphysics with the total and basic horizon, the Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft. Metaphysics, as about being, equates with the objective pole of that horizon; but metaphysics, as science, does not equate with the subjective pole. In my opinion, Fr Coreth's subjective pole is under a measure of abstraction that is quite legitimate when one is mediating the immediacy of latent metaphysics, but is to be removed when one is concerned with the total and basic horizon. In the concrete, the subjective pole is indeed the inquirer, but incarnate, liable to mythic consciousness, in need of a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from. The incarnate inquirer develops in a development that is social and historical, that stamps the stages of scientific and philosophic progress with dates[…] The critique, accordingly, has to issue in a transcendental doctrine of methods with the method of metaphysics just one among many and so considered from a total viewpoint. For latent in the performance of the incarnate inquirer not only is there a metaphysics that reveals the objective pole of the total horizon but also there is the method of performing which, thematized and made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature.35

(italics mine) The distinctions made by Lonergan in this passage are very subtle, very intricate, and even somewhat abstruse. We will therefore try to untangle them to some extent before attempting to utilize them for the comparison with Coreth. There is then, the question of the distinction between horizon and science; and between metaphysics as about being and as a science. Coreth writes that metaphysics is the total and basic science (Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft), which should probably be taken to mean that in the outworking of metaphysics, a full description of what can be known is made explicit. In contrast to this, Lonergan makes a distinction between ”metaphysics, as about being” and ”metaphysics, as science”; in horizon-language, he also agrees to correlate the former with the objective pole,                                                                                                                 35. Lonergan, Collection, 203-204.

 

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but the denies that the latter is to be correlated with the subjective pole. What Lonergan seems to be protesting against here, is that Coreth—according to him—accounts for the horizon of the subject, so to speak, within the discipline of metaphysics; but the distinctions he uses to make this point raises some questions. Firstly, does Lonergan mean that metaphysics ”as about being” does not include the existence of the subject? This seems highly unlikely; even though he writes that metaphysics, under this aspect, equates with the objective pole—thereby giving the impression that metaphysics does not account for the existence of the subject—it certainly does not follow that he wishes to exclude from the metaphysics the ground of the subjective pole, i.e. the subject-existent itself. It seems more likely that he is making a different point; that he is driving the discussion towards an epistemological-cognitional analysis of the subjective pole. This is driven home more clearly in the next sentence: ”metaphysics, as science, does not equate with the subjective pole.” What is meant by this is probably that the epistemological account of the horizon of the subject is not developed by giving an ontological—therefore metaphysical—account of it; for this, another method is needed; this seems to be the main point Lonergan is making. To the present author, the conflict seems rooted in the following: both Lonergan and Coreth unfolds metaphysics from the starting point of the human subject. But Coreth subsumes this process in itself in metaphysics, while Lonergan begins with cognitional theory—and thus accounts for the human subject separately—by a different method—before proceeding from this ground to the unfolding metaphysics. While Coreth says that metaphysics—as a science—can account for the total and basic horizon, Lonergan sees the more basic—or prior—horizon as that which is generated by the epistemological account of the subject and its corresponding subjective pole. When considering Lonergan’s first remarks in the quoted passage then, we would like to suggest that Lonergan seems to perceive Coreth as equivocating metaphysics with being; i.e. as failing to distinguish between the extension—or subject matter—of metaphysics, viz. being, and the practice of metaphysics qua science or philosophy. That this interpretation is reasonable can be illustrated by quoting Joseph Donceel36, who—in the preface to Coreth’s                                                                                                                 36. Coreth’s editor for the English translation of Metaphysik. This quote was chosen purely for economical reasons because it illustrates the point I am making nicely; it should be observed though, that the argument could be supported by a number of passages from Coreth’s reply as well; such as when the latter writes in objection to Lonergan’s emphasis on cognition over ontology: ”I wish to say: every cognition—whether it wants to be or not—is cognition of being.” McShane, Language, Truth and Meaning, 36.

 

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book—comments on Lonergan’s criticism: The reader himself will have to decide whether Fr. Lonergan is right when, at the end of his review, he prefers not to "equate metaphysics with the total and basic horizon." On this point the editor of the present English translation sides with Fr. Coreth  against Fr. Lonergan, for it seems to him that "metaphysics, as about being", equates with absolutely every being, including the "subjective pole."37

(italics mine) Now, apart from the fact that this objection seems to miss the distinction in question—that between ”metaphysics, as about being” and ”metaphysics, as science”—we can begin to see the difference in emphasis between Lonergan and Coreth emerging somewhat clearer. Coreth (and Donceel) wants to vindicate the universality and the primacy of metaphysics; this amounts to an emphasis on ontology. Lonergan, for his part, clearly accepts the uniqueness of metaphysics within philosophy—one thinks of his formulation that ”metaphysics is not the whole of knowledge, but the whole in knowledge”38 —but nevertheless, he prefers to make room for a separate epistemological account of the subject and its operations; thus having more of an emphasis on the cognitional. Now, what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, is meant to speak to the title of this subsection, which asked about ”Cognitional or ontological primacy?”; the reason for this title should by now have emerged more clearly. The argument we are making is that the difference between Lonergan and Coreth, when it comes to their relative emphasis on the human subject, reveals a fundamental disagreement in their understanding of the scope and function of metaphysics; and one that can be most adequately understood by reflecting on by differing accounts of the relationship between the cognitional and the ontological. The implications of this difference will continue to unfold in the following subsections. 6.2. Metaphysics and the critique of knowledge: mediated-immediate realism vs. critical realism Lonergan and Coreth’s difference of emphasis regarding the subject is closely related to issues that we will examine in this subsection. Going back to Lonergan’s criticisms, we find him highlighting the need for ”a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from.”

                                                                                                                37. ”Editors preface” in Coreth, Metaphysics, 12. 38. Paraphrased from Lonergan, Insight, 416.

 

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We also have another part of Lonergan’s review, not part of the earlier quote, where he states that my operation is not altogether in accord with Fr Coreth's exclusion of an Erkenntniskritik, his aim of presuppositonless metaphysics, his projected inclusion within metaphysics of an Erkenntnismetaphysik.39

(italics mine.) And—to clarify the terms used here—also: Kant wrote an Erkenntniskritik: the conditioned is the objective pole, the condition is the subjective pole. Fr Coreth is writing a metaphysics: his subjective pole, questioning, is the conditioned; and his objective pole, being, is the condition. Hence, Fr Coreth's transcendental inquiry is just the inverse of Kant's.40

(italics mine.) It is to the meaning of these remarks we must turn to at present. Building on the issues that were unearthed in the previous section, we may ask whence this fundamental difference in the conception of metaphysics comes? Returning for a moment to the question posed in the beginning of the previous section, about the emphasis on the subject, we can recall the continuum on which Kant was placed at the most subject-oriented pole. This highlights the connection between the critique of knowledge and the architecture of the relation between metaphysics and epistemology. The similarity between Kant and Lonergan it that the latter approaches the philosophical structure of the former by positing experience and understanding as the conditioned, and the subject as the condition. The relevant difference— or one of them at least—between the two is that the Lonergan’s subject achives unconditioned objectivity through the act of judgement, while this is denied by Kant. This point further illuminates the comparison that we are presently concerned with, inasmuch as the inverse relationship between condition and conditioned that is claimed by Lonergan to obtain regarding Coreth and Kant, also obtains regarding Coreth and Lonergan. The former is in one sense an immediate realist—even though insisting that objectivity has to be mediated41— while the latter is a mediate—or critical—realist; for Coreth there is the immediate preknowledge of being that grounds the realist outlook of the subject; for Lonergan there are the                                                                                                                 39. Lonergan, Collection, 203. 40. Lonergan, Collection, 203-204. 41. It is important to note that this does not mean that Lonergan would see Coreth as a naive realist; the former clearly recognizes the importance of the mediation of objectivity to the latter’s thought.

 

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immediate givens of the notion of being and the structures of consciousness, but these are neither knowledge nor objectivity, and thus the distinction becomes clear: Coreth posits being as the condition, Lonergan posits the intentional subject. This explains the problems Lonergan has with ”the exclusion [from metaphysics of] an Erkenntniskritik”. The critique of knowledge that Lonergan has in mind is built into his own cognitional-epistemological theory, which—as we saw previously—has a certain methodical priority with respect to metaphysics. This would explain his disagreement with Coreth’s ”presuppositionless metaphysics” seen in the quote above. In closing then, the disagreement can be formulated as follows: How are disputes in metaphysics to resolved? For Lonergan they are to be resolved by going back to the cognitional and epistemic root of the unfolding of metaphysics. Cognitional theory thus adjudicates on metaphysical questions. Lonergan’s worry may be that this procedure is not methodically available to Coreth. The argument made in this section serves to further develop the fundamental differences between Lonergan and Coreth that we outlined in the previous one; together both sections reveal the interdependence within the two philosophies in question between epistemology and metaphysics. We can also see some of the different of outcomes that result from the differences in metaphysical method; to the question of method we will return in the discussion below, which will follow after our conclusion. 7. Further discussion This thesis has sought to explore some of the similarities and differences that obtain between the metaphysics of Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth. To save space we chose simply to introduce presumptive similarities between them, before proceeding to discuss some of the quite fundamental differences at more length. But this scheme should not be taken to try to explain away the prior similarities. This final discussion will continue to discuss some similarities and differences, but here we will have more of an emphasis on the former. Firstly—and maybe surprisingly—there is the fact of the overlapping nature of their basic conception of metaphysics, notwithstanding—or denying—their fundamental disagreements. Indeed, when reviewing both the definitions of metaphysics in the works of both Lonergan and Coreth, one is struck by the resemblance of some of their formulations. Coreth writes

 

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that, ”metaphysics is the science which investigates the ultimate ground of absolutely everything[…]Metaphysics proposes a final answer to a total problem.”42 While Lonergan for his part holds that ” [Metaphysics] is the original total question that moves to the total answer by transforming and putting together all other answers.”43 That these statements coexist with the previously discussed disagreements only serve to emphasize the subtlety of the issues we have examined. Secondly, there is the—potentially therapeutic—admittance from both Lonergan and Coreth of a certain flexibility in the expressions of metaphysics that they are willing to accept. On the meta-metaphysical (sic!) question of the grounding of metaphysics in transcendental method, Coreth writes, ”It is not a crucial issue for me whether the transcendental grounding should already be called metaphysics or not.” Correspondingly, Lonergan actually seems to accept— at least to a certain degree—the priority of metaphysics over cognitional theory as long as this is sufficiently accounted for within the account. Thus Lonergan’ editors paraphrase him as saying ”start where you please, but complete the circle from cognitional to metaphysical and back to cognitional, or metaphysical to cognitional and back to metaphysical; further, one must go round the circle over and over, expanding and deepening one's understanding.”44 Thirdly, there is the similarity-in-difference on the topic of philosophical methods. On the basic level, there is the transcendental method. This is—roughly—understood by Coreth to amount to the use of transcendental deduction and retorsion.45 Lonergan would not disagree completely with this, but it is clear that Lonergan different view on what the most basic constituents of this method is. For him, the method is the cognitional operations of the subject itself; it is the very dynamism of the intelligent mind as a transcendental condition; thus, method is what underpins any and every philosophical or intellectual endeavor. But the method must be adverted to; it must be made explicit if it is to function as a method. Every thinking person uses this transcendental method implicitly, but what is needed is an account of this method that thematizes its acts, structure and dynamism so that it may be appropriated and put to good use.                                                                                                                 42. Coreth, Metaphysics, 17. 43. Lonergan, Insight, 416. 44. From Editor’s note b to ”Metaphysics as horizon” in Lonergan, Collection, 286. The paraphrase is from Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and being: an introduction and companion to INSIGHT : the Halifax lectures (Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 220-221. 45. As witnessed by his deduction of the pre-knowledge of being from the act of questioning, and by his validation of the same by retorsion.

 

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In addition to the core transcendental method there is also the axuiliary method of dialectic, central to both Lonergan and Coreth, and ostensibly there is some affinity between Coreth’s dialectic of Vollzug and Begriff and Lonergan’s position and counterposition. The former uses the dialectic methodically in unfolding his metaphysic transcendentally; as a way of making explicit in concept what is implicit in performance; the latter uses the dialectic positively to establish which positions are live options for the philosopher, and negatively to establish which are ruled out by the positive positions. Fourthly and finally then, it is pertinent to revisit the degree to which many of the commonalities between Lonergan and Coreth seems to converge genetically in their common inheritance from Maréchal. The integration of the Maréchals act of judgement as referring to being in Lonergan, and the refinement of judgement as a starting point in Coreth; the way both of them make use of transcendental method—even though reintepreted in Lonergan—in general, and its corresponding deduction and retorsion in particular; the use of dialectical method; all of this can be reasonably presumed to trace back to Maréchal, thus somewhat rehabilitating their identification as transcendental Thomists. 8. Concluding summary The central point of this thesis has been the comparative contrasting of Lonergan and Coreth; introduced through a rundown of a number of prima facie similarities; through the analysis of the complex issues that followed in the succeding two subsections. By outlining the structure of their respective metaphysics in term of the emphasis on subject and object, we found that the disagreement over the scope of the metaphysical horizon could be explained in terms of a difference in the positing of either cognition(Lonergan) or ontology(Coreth) as having primacy. This disagreement were substantiated and developed in the next subsection where the reasons behind it were suggested to be related to Lonergan’s stress on the critique of knowledge(Erkenntniskritik) and Coreth’s inclusion of the same within metaphysics. The interconnection of epistemological presuppositions, metaphysical architecture, and the function and limitation of metaphysics is demonstrated by the account. What is gained from this analysis, hopefully, is some initial comparative data from which an appraisal can proceed.

       

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Coreth, Emerich. Metaphysics. New York: Herder and Herder, 1968 John Knasas, Being and some 20th Century Thomists. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003 Lonergan, Bernard. Insight: a study of human understanding. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1975 Lonergan, Bernard. Collection. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967 McShane, Philip. Language, Truth and Meaning. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame press, 1972 Muck, Otto. Transcendental method. New York: Herder and Herder, 1968. Sala, B. Giovanni. Lonergan and Kant. Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1994. Tracy, David. The achievement of Bernard Lonergan. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

 

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