Unity as a Metaphysical Paradigm (Metaphilosophy, 1985)

METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 16, Nos. 2 & 3, April/July 1985 0026-1068 $2.00

UNITY’ AS A METAPHYSICAL PARADIGM T. F. DIGBY In recent years there has been a growing interest in philosophical holism. In a sense, this paper is about what I take to be the metaphysical background of holism. That is its contemporary relevance, but it looks to the past, indeed to the beginnings of Western phlosophy, to find the theory that constitutes this background. The metaphysical theory I have in mind holds that reality is more importantly one than many. Some of the earliest adherents of this “world monism”, “thing monism”, or “real monism”, as it has variously been called,’ were Parmenides (perhaps), Melissus, Eubulides, and Zeno.2 Later adherents include Spinoza, Hegel, Nietzsche (perhaps), and Bradley. But although this kind of monism has persisted through most of the history of Western thought, it has always been a minority view. Most philosophers seem to have been satisfied that the multeity paradigm which dominates the mundane attitude (“common sense”) is simply, and obviously, the correct view of reality (however construed). The present effort continues the minority tradition, seeking to prompt a recognition of the primordiality of unity and the derivativeness of m ~ l t e i t y . ~ I shall not attempt a “final proof’ of unity, however: I shall not presume to have settled the issue once and for all. Rather, I shall propose unity as a metaphysical paradigm and provide some support for the paradigm. To borrow Carl Wellman’s terminology, I shall offer an “accumulation of reasons” that will call to the reader’s attention a “convergence of evidence” (Wellman 2Q4 in favor of the unity paradigm. The support I shall provide the paradigm will be in the form of a series of independent but synergetic arguments (much like the style of a legal brief). If I achieve my intended result, the reader will

* “World monism” and “thing monism” are the expressions of Elmer Sprague (Sprague 105). “Real monism” is the expression of Jonathan Barnes (Barnes 205). This type of monism is to be distinguished, of course, from what Sprague caIls “kind monism” or “single-stuff monism.” According to tradition, Parmenides held this view; see, e.g., Robinson, and Sprague (105). But Jonathan Barnes (205-207) argues that there is only doxographical testimony, and no primary textual evidence, indicating that the historical Parmenides was a “real monist”; he argues that Melissus was the first philosopher to hold this position. On Zeno and Melissus, see Robinson and Barnes. The arguments of Eubulides have inspired some interesting articles by Peter Unger and Samuel C. Wheeler I11 (see references). For the discussion of a thesis concerning the historical origin of the multeity paradigm, see Feyerabend, Appendix 4. He uses this language in the context of ethical justification, but it seems to me just as appropriate in the context of metaphysical justification. 191

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be led (not forced) by these arguments, not to an inevitable conclusion, but to a realization of the relative strength and vigor of the unity paradigm, in comparison with the multeity paradigm. In other words, I shall try to show that there are more and better reasons for supposing reality to be a unity, than there are for supposing it a multeity. My motivation for approaching the problem obliquely, by way of the recommendation of a paradigm, and for eschewing the goal of coercive proof, has a lot to do with the various well-known problems associated with trying to make sense of reality as a notion. It was despite these problems that Hilary Putnam recently confessed, “But perhaps Kant was right: perhaps we can’t help thinking that there is somehow a mind-independent ‘ground’ for our experience” (Putnam 61-62).’ Many of us can’t help but wonder about the nature of reality, and can’t help but feel, if not think, that this wonder somehow makes sense. Further, it seems that how we understand our experienced world, and how we live our lives, may hinge on how we conceive of reality. Putnam himself goes on to say, “even if attempts to talk about it lead at once to nonsense” (62). I hope that what I have to say will give the lie to this latter comment of Putnam’s. But at the same time I wish to keep my metaphysical commitments as minimal as possible. So when I use the term ‘reality’ I shall mean for it to have the sense of what I conceive to be the least common denominator of meaning of this term in the history of philosophy, including contemporary philosophy, namely primordiality , primitivity, the non-factitious. Thus, my use of ‘reality’ does not necessarily commit me to the suppositions that there is a reality independent of experience and that such a reality can be known. I shall suppose only that reality, as I have broadly construed it, is approachable by means of a paradigm. I shall begin by characterizing the paradigm I have in mind.

1 . The Nature of Unity Locke’s statement, “Amongst all the Ideas we have, . . . there is none more simple than that of Unity, or One” (11, xvi, I), notwithstanding, it is not at all settled just what the unity ofreality should mean. For example, as a concept, ‘the unity of reality’ would not mean anything different from simply ‘reality’ if by ‘unity’ is meant abstract methematical singleness (one in the sense that any determinable thing, even an aggregate, is a one). The paradigm to be developed here is a metaphysical paradigm, and so mathematical singleness, which carries no metaphysical weight, cannot adequately characterize it: whether there is one reality as opposed to two or three is beside the point, and that there might be one reality consisting of many discrete parts, as a train has many cars, would be trivial. A comment Sprague makes, while lacking in precision, is nevertheless helpful: “ . . . the claim of world Cf. Goodman’s reference to “our intuitive demand for something stolid underneath” (Ways 6 ) .

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monism.. . is that the world is a single thing; and this single thing is not a collection or aggregation, or even an assemblage of parts, but just one thing’’ (Sprague 10.5). ‘The point is that the unity paradigm must say that the oneness of reality is ontological and primordial, something quite different from mere mathematical oneness. Primordiality, or ultimacy, is foundational to the paradigm, for if there were a source of the unity of reality, either the unity would thereby be defeated, or it would consist of mere mathematical singleness. If the unity of reality is in any sense produced, it is thereby destroyed: the production of the unity of reality is a contradiction. Thus, any unification of reality must be excluded from the unity paradigm. In addition to primordiality, three other features characterize the unity paradigm. First, the unity of reality is not mere organicalness; reality may indeed be considered an organism, but its unity requires also that the parts of the organism be internally related. An organism with externally related parts would have mathematical singleness, but not unity in the sense that is under consideration, for its (abstractly) dissembled parts would have the same status as “ones” as the organism itself. The unity of reality requires that relations constitute the relata, so that reality is primordially one and not a merely bound-together plurality. Thus, internal relations do not bind reality together, but rather they constitute reality! hence they raise the organical status of reality from the level of abstraction or interpretation to the level of concreteness. If relations are not internal, then relata are ontologically primitive, making reality a multeity, and reducing the unity of reality to mere singleness; therefore, that relations be internal is a necessary condition for the unity of reality to be concrete. Second, according to the unity paradigm there is a complete lack of (primordial) separation. The practical, mundane stand-point may demand fragmentation and multeity, but these must be derivative if the unity paradigm is to avoid mere mathematical singleness. Third, although the unity paradigm excludes primordial separation, it nevertheless does not make reality out to be an absolute uniformity or void. Rather, it admits of a nebulous qualitative diversity which constrains both action and perception. The delineation I have given of the unity paradigm is far from exhaustive, but should be adequate for the purposes of this paper. 2 . The Non-Primordiali,ty of Individuation Is there a ground for individuation? To say that individuation is grounded in objects is to beg the question, for it is precisely the status of objects that It must be kept in mind that internal relations are by definition not discrete, and therefore do not make up ;a multeity.

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is at stake when we talk of individuation.’ The problem of individuation can be elucidated by a consideration of objects that are parts of other objects. Arms and legs are objects that are parts of animals bodies, which are also objects. To say that arms, legs, and bodies are objects is to say that they are individuals - individual objects. Pages and books, light bulbs and lamps, cushions and chairs, leaves and trees, buttons and shirts, silicon chips and integrated circuit boards, all have a relationship similar to that of limbs and bodies: the concept of individuality applies equally to the more comprehensive objects and to their component objects, and the individuality of neither is affected by the gain or loss of the other. Thus, neither the absolute integrity of the more comprehensive objects nor the separability (integrity as separates) of the component objects is requisite for their individuality. Integrity may be relevant to identity, but individuality has no need for it. If I saw a piece of wood in half, its identity may thereby become problematic, but the matter of its individuality is simple: the one individual has become two individuals. I could have sawn only a small piece off the plank, in which case I still would have produced two individuals, although we might want to say that a new individual had been produced alongside the old individual. And, of course, the bits of sawdust produced by the sawing are even more individuals. In a sense these individuals are being produced by the sawing agent, but in a more important sense they are the product of the agent as knower; for the knower (or her culture or language) can ascribe individuality wherever it seems useful, e.g., to complex objects, their parts, their imagined parts, an alternative assemblage of these parts or imagined parts, etc. As agent or as knower, one can analyze individuals into individuals, or construct individuals out of individuals. A room can be considered as an individual, as can a house, a continent, a planet, a galaxy, etc. For there to be individuality, not even stability or consistency through time are necessary: if an object changes radically, its identity may thereby be called into question, but certainly not its individuality. This imposition or ascription of individuality is not arbitrary, of course. We don’t go around ascribing individuality willy-nilly. Rather, individuation is guided by a complex blend of pragmatic and consuetudinary considerations. Among these considerations, spatial factors, e.g., location and physical constraints on separability and combinability , are obviously important, for they are uniquely valuable for getting around in the world. And there are considerations resulting from an interplay of culture and primordiality, such as what Quine calls “appropriate presences” (Quine 8). But there are many logically possible criteria for individuation, and as persons, societies, language-sharers, or species, we must choose or accept certain ones, and the ones we implement will determine what will be allowed to count as an “actual” individual for us. As Quine puts it,

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CF. Quine: One cannot master the individuative use of a term, “except as he gets on with the scheme of enduring and recurrent physical objects” (8).

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When we compare theories, doctrines, points of view, and cultures, on the score of what sorts of objects there are said to be, we are comparing them in a respect which itself makes sense only provincially ( 6 ) . Putnam makes the same point when he says that “what objects does the

world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description” (49). And so does Nelson Goodman - only he makes the point more general, hence I think even more apt: “No organization into units is unique or mandatory” (Mind 34).8 Whether we consider individuals, objects, or units, the conclusion is the same: they are not primordial. The examples I gave above suggest that the patterns of individuation-ascription within, say, a language, are not rigid; indeed, the range of allowable ascriptions of individuality is quite broad. The important point is that there are n o criteria of individuation to which one can point other than pragmatic or consuetudinary ones. And there is no way to justify the practice of individuation in general, a pattern of ascription of individuality, or a particular instance of ascription of individuality, except on the basis of pragmatic or consuetudinary factor^.^ If individuation is in such a manner created rather than discovered, i.e., factitious rather than primordial, then it is not grounded in reality. And if individuation is not grounded in reality, there is no reason for supposing reality to be multeitous, and no reason for supposing it to be other than a unity. Of course, the approach taken here has stayed within a certain linguistic perspective, i.e., the discussion of individuation has been qualified by its own linguistic structures, but that itself is interesting, for it suggests that even this language which purportedly individuates cannot fully succeed at it. In view of this failure of language to fully and coherently individuate, how could we even begin to suppose the sort of primordial individuation entailed by the multeity paradigm? One may object: this is fine for buttons and shirts and pieces of wood, but surely as persons our individuality is assured in reality. It will then be necessary to inquire concerning possible grounds for making this exception to our conclusions about individuation. The fact of embodiment won’t do, for our His statement is ambiguous. He means to say that no particular organization into units is unique or mandatory; but I would say that the other possible meaning of his statement is just as correc:t: no organization into units at aN is mandatory. Goodman rejects this latter view: hje says that “unity is to be sought not in an ambivalent or neutral something beneath these versions [i.e., worlds] but in an overall organization embracing them” (Ways 5 ; see also 4-5, 12); but he gives arguments only against the possibility of taking a particular world as primordial - these arguments would not go against the unity paradigm. And these factors are constantly shifting. Cf. Quine, 24: “Our patterns of thought or language have been evolving, under pressure of inherent inadequacies and changing needs, since the dawn of language; and, whether we help guide it or not, we may confidently look forward to more of the same.”

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bodies have the same status as individuals as any other physical entities. Hence, our bodies can easily be considered integral parts of a larger organism, viz. the whole of physical reality, and it has already been established that this reality is not primordially individuated at all, never mind at the particular level where our bodies occur. Perhaps a more likely candidate for ground of the primordial individuality of human persons is their claimed feature of mental privacy. But mental privacy, even though it be granted as a fact, does not imply separation. Mental privacy is the result of the perspectival character of consciousness, which is a product of embodiment. But as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others have shown, body and consciousness are essentially and inextricably merged with the world (and each other). Not that mental privacy is an illusion: it is an undeniable fact, but it does not constitute a strict isolation. Privacy is nothing more than the experience of being conscious in a body; it is being conscious from a certain perspective, and it is of the essence of perspectives that they are not strictly bounded off from each other. If we consider consciousness in (abstract) isolation, the result is even clearer. Whether we consider it as the form of experience, or as the content of experience, it gives no basis for individuation: (1) If we consider consciousness as form - i.e., in itself, abstracted from content - it is pure, undivided, and unlimited, hence giving no basis for separation or individuation. (2) If we consider consciousness as content, although it may be subject to reflective delimitation, it is essentially so involved in the world that any attempt to abstractly separate it out must amount to an imposition, rather than discovery, of separation. (A separation that seems to some extent reliable is of course possible, and its satisfaction of pragmatic interests may be sufficient to create an illusion of primordiality. The illusion desists only in the unlikely event that those pragmatic interests are relaxed, e.g., in certain types of mystical experience.) Hence, the case of persons, no matter how different from other things they may be, constitutes no exception to the theory of individuation I have presented. And so the conclusion stands: there are no primordial individuals. Quine even speculates that human life and thought might be able to get on just fine without individuation at all: It seemed in our reflections on the child that the category of bulk terms was a survival of a pre-individuative phase. We were thinking ontogenetically, but the phylogenetic parallel is plausible too: we may have in the bulk term a relic, helf vestigial and half adapted, of a pre-individuative phase in the evolution of our conceptual scheme. And some day, correspondingly, something of our present individuative talk may in turn end up, half vestigial and half adapted, within a new and as yet unimagined pattern beyond individuation (Quine 24). Whether that is possible or not, it is clear that individuation is not primordial,

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which leaves us with the presumption (not implication, of course) that reality is a unity.

3 . The Non-Primordiality of Boundaries Some boundaries wculd seem to be natural, for example, the skin on an animal body, or wherever land meets a body of water. We are inclined to think that these seemingly natural boundaries inhere in reality. In that respect they are different from boundaries that are more obviously human creations, such as the borders separating countries or other geopolitical units (which are made more convincing if they coincide with “natural” boundaries), or the boundaries that are used to designate ownership of land. But on closer examination, those apparently natural boundaries seem not so absolute. The skin on an animal body turns out not to be impermeable: it does not separate the body from its environment at all; rather, it serves as a medium for the absorption of gas from the enveloping atmosphere and for the emission of moisture and gas into that atmosphere. In fact, the skin could hardly be in a more intimate relationship with what lies on either of its sides. Indeed, the atmosphere itself is a functional part of the body, an absolutely essential part of the organism - not just as a reservoir of needed gases, but as a source of vital pressure. And where the land meets the sea well, there’s more land, only it happens to be covered by water, only not always, for the water is constantly shifting, covering more or less land. But more important, the land and the sea interpenetrate, each containing some of the other, and it would not be possible, logically or empirically, to determine with complete prt:cision where one begins and the other ends. In all cases, close inspection reveals that seemingly natural boundaries are not grounded in reality and have no independence. Rather, their presence always reflects some pragmatic concern (present or past) that requires a delimitation. So the situation with apparently natural boundaries is quite similar to that with legal boundaries, except that we are more aware of our power, under certain well-defined circumstances, to move the latter around, whereas the former are somewhat more firmly established by consuetude, so much so that we are accustomed to treating them as if they were in some way independent or absolute. But they are not: they rely on human imposition. However, like individuation, they are not arbitrary. Both boundaries and individuals are produced and maintained by the same kinds of pragmatic and consuetudinary factors. And as the edge of the water shifts, so all “natural” boundaries may shift as these influencing factors change. Certainly a great many boundaries have shifted, blurred, or disappeared altogether as a result of our developing ecological awareness. Compartments of nature which previously had seemed well and securely bounded off from each other have been discovered to flow into each other, and the source of their boundaries has been found to be human imposition. For example, it was formerly assumed that human bodies ~

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were somehow naturally bounded off from their environment, secure from contamination by what are now considered environmental hazards. As our experience and knowledge grew, the boundary on the hither side of which we had felt invulnerable disappeared. The safety of the human body turned out not to lie in insularity (which had been illusory), but in harmonious interaction with the rest of nature, to which it is internally related. Strict isolation is impossible, for it requires absolute, that is to say primordial, boundaries, and there are none. Indeed, the upshot of our consideration of boundaries, and individuals as well, is that, even within this linguistically-structured world, the superimposition of ‘individual’ and ‘boundary’ as purportedly primordial categories does not fully and consistently work. This (linguistically-structured) world accepts those categories only on a temporary, “as if’, basis, in the context of projects of limited scope. And surely it is inconceivable that there could be an alternative language better equipped to structure reality for the reception of those categories better equipped, that is, than this one, in which the categories already occur. So even if we think of reality as necessarily lingustically-structured, primordial status seems available only to unity. 4. The Perceptual Ground as Access to Primordiality

Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists have called to our attention the figure-ground structure of perception. Through their descriptions we have come to realize that every perceptual event exhibits a fundamental structure: it consists of a figure, on which attention is focussed, and a ground (background). My main present concern is with the perceptual ground, but it will be a help in understanding the ground to contrast it with figure. Aron Gurwitsch describes the perceptual figure thus: The contour [the boundary of the figure] confines, demarcates, and bestows form upon the figure. The shaping of the figure by the contour must not, of course, be understood in the sense of a process but rather as an expression of a static phenomenal feature of the figure. Owing to the shape the figure derives from the contour, it appears as a self-contained unit, detached from the ground. In such emergence from the ground of a closed and cohesive unit, consists the ‘figure character’ of the unit . . . In conformity with the function of the contour as the boundary of the figure, the latter presents some properties characteristic of things: shape, cohesion, individuality . . .(1 11). Gurwitsch’s struggling description can be attributed to the fact that we are not normally accustomed to thinking of perception in this way. The figure is always and essentially the object of one’s perceptual attention, so any reflection on perceptual experience, philosophical or otherwise, will almost

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certainly focus on figure, neglecting whatever other content there might be in perceptual experience. The figure, after all, is that at which one looks (in visual perception), and so naturally it is what one recalls and reflects on. The difficulty in describing figure as a structure in perceptual experience lies in the fact that perceptual experience is normally considered to consist in nothing but figure - that is, figure and perceptual experience are not even distinguished from each other. But not only is there additional content in perceptual experience, figure itself turns out to be something like a product made out of this additional content, which is called ‘ground’. Gurwitsch says that

. . . the ground, unaffected by the shaping influence of the contour, exhibits features approaching those of stuff or ‘matter’: shapelessness, indefiniteness, lack of individuality (1 11). Merleau-Ponty’s description of the perceptual ground is also helpful. He describes it as “having no bounds, being of indefinite coloring, and ‘running on’ under the figure” (Merleau-Ponty 13). The ground can be noticed only indirectly, in reflection. One notices in reflection on perceptual experience that there were unrealized possibilities for attention in the perceputal field, and that those unrealized possibilities were shapeless and indefinite precisely because one’s attention was not on them. And if one tries to actualize these indefinite possibilities in a present experience, i.e., if one tries to attend to the ground, one finds that the figure has just shifted. It is of the essence of ground that the perceiver’s attention cannot be on it. The effect of perceptual attention is analytic - it defines and individuates, i.e., it produces figures. And whenever it shifts, it must shift to another figure. This understanding of perceptual functioning helps us to understand how we individuate our world through figuation. But more importantly for our present purposes, it lends support to the unity paradigm by calling to our attention the fact that such individuation does occur, i.e., that individuation is not primordial in our perceptual experience. What is primordial in our perceptual experience is ground. -As Sartre has pointed out, ground, and not figure, is fundamental to perception (316). Gurwitsch’s description is more precise: he says that the ground is “more primitive than, and prior to” the combined figure-ground structure (1 13). It is out of the ground that the figure emerges, merging back into the ground upon the emergence of another figure. This is why Merleau-Ponty characterizes the ground as “ ‘running on’ under the figure” (13). The ground is the primitive experience out of which the analytic, attention-focussing functions of the mind extract individual items which then constitute the multeitous world of mundane experience. Our most primitive perceptual experience, i.e., ground, is a unity. If one supposes that phenomenal reality is the only meaningful sense

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of 'reality', and primitive experience is, as was just shown, a unity, then reality, in the phenomenal sense, is aptly characterized by the unity paradigm. If one has a Kantian conception of a noumenal reality, a reality that is independent of experience, then to the extent that experience constitutes evidence for the nature of that independent reality, there is evidence for the unity paradigm. Whether experience can serve as evidence of the nature of an independent reality is a point of controversy. Nevertheless, it is often, perhaps generally, supposed that most or all of us have some sort of intuitive belief that our experience does tell us something about the nature of an independent reality, and that it tells us that reality is a multeity." I mean here to correct the latter part of the common belief. For if we have perceptual access to an independent reality at all, our most primitive perceptual experience, i.e., ground, is presumably our best guide to the nature of that independent reality, which suggests that, if reality can be known through perceptual experience, reality is a unity.

5. The Perspective of Contemporary Physics The relationship between physics and metaphysics is a topic far too complex t o be adequately considered here, but I shall suppose it safe to assume that the conclusions of theoretical physicists are not necessarily irrelevant to the metaphysical concerns of this essay. Many contemporary physicist-s conceive of physical reality in a way that is consistent with the unity paradigm. Representative of this group is David Bohm, who states in Wholeness and the Implicate Order that

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itself is demanding a new, non-fragmentary world view,. . [The] present approach of analysis of the world into independently existing parts does not work well in modern physics. . . [Both] in relativity theory and quantum theory, notions implying the undivided wholeness of the universe would provide a more orderly way of considering the general nature of reality (xi-xii). Bohm says that our accustomed division of reality into separate entities is necessary to make practical problems manageable, but that we have tended to overlook the limits to the usefulness of this fragmentation, predicating it of reality itself.

In essence, the process of division is a way of thinking about things that is convenient and useful mainly in the domain of practical, technical and functional activities . . . However, when this mode of thought is applied more broadly to man's notion of himself and the world in which he lives (i.e. to his self-world view), then man ceases to regard the resulting divilo

Cf. Sprague, 110-116,and Schacht, 86-88.

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sions as merely useful or convenient and begins to see and experience himself and h s world as actually constituted of separately existing fragments (2). In this way we have developed, according to Bohm, a universal habit of supposing our fragmented (and fragmentary) thought about reality to be an accurate description of reality; so when we consider divisions, separate objects, etc., we take them to be “real”, i.e., inherent in reality. We have taken a useful way of looking at reality and made it into reality itself. Scientists in particular have done this, basing mechanistic theories of a fragmented reality on what they take to be primitive experience, failing to take into account that “nature will respond in accordance with the theory with which it is approached” ( 6 ) . It is no surprise that their theories are confirmed, for they are self-confirming; that is, when the multeity assumption is integral to a theory, the confirmation of that theory will involve the (unnoticed) imposition of multeity on the area that is tested. In effect, reality is thus proved to be multeitous by assuming it to be so without acknowledging the assumption; the failure to acknowledge the assumption lies in the ingrained view that it is not an assumption at all, but rather “the way things are.” Thus, habit has ploduced in scientists (and the rest of us) an entrenched illusion which feeds and. is fed by a deeply held prejudice. Proving that this is the case is not easy, as Bohm acknowledges. The difficulty lies partly with nonrational factors, especially the consuetudinary inertia that is normal to human thinking and which functions as a formidable barrier to the consideration of new or different ideas. Especially is this a problem when the different ideas offer a radical challenge to the way we relate to the world and each other, for that kind of challenge is not just a challenge to philosophical and scientific beliefs - it is a challenge to styles of living. The beliefs being challenged are so deeply embedded in our everyday life and thought that it is virtually impossible even to uncover them,” never mind to consider them without prejudice. Scientists are no exception; despite their claims to objectivity, they too can and usually do fall prey to this powerful existential prejudice. The tendency of the multeity paradigm to be reflected back, once it has been projected onto experience, diminishes the likelihood that it will be noticed, so there is normally no occasion in the course of scientific and phdosophical activity to question it. This situation can be illuminated using an analogy from Wittgenstein’s TrQCtQtUS: Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate ’I Cf. Hume (18; section 4, part I, paragraph 8): “Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to tak:e place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.”

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as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world (137-139). What Bohm proposes is an attempt not to use a net at all. The obvious objection is that this attempt cannot succeed, for every description requires a system of description - one’s only choice is among various “meshes.” That is of course true as long as one adheres to the multeity assumption. It is that assumption that makes us think of systems of description as nets. But if one manages to dispense with the multeity assumption, even with no predilection for the unity paradigm, one is nevertheless inexorably driven toward the latter’s acceptance, thinks Bohm. The diminution of the influence of pragmatically-rooted description, i.e., description oriented according to the multeity paradigm, can only lead to adoption of the unity paradigm. Bohm claims support from both relativity theory and quantum theory. According to relativity theory, he says, This field [of the whole universe] is continuous and indivisible. Particles are to be regarded as certain kinds of abstraction from the total field, corresponding to regions of very intense field (callled singularities). As the distance from the singularity increases, the field gets weaker, until it merges imperceptibly with the fields of other singularities. But nowhere is there a break or a division. Thus the classical idea of the separability of the world into distinct but interacting parts is no longer valid or relevant. Rather, we have to regard the universe as an undivided and unbroken whole. Division into particles, or into particles and fields, is only a crude abstraction and approximation. Thus we come to an order that is radically different from that of Galileo and Newton - the order of undivided wholeness (124-125). This undivided whole includes whatever instruments of observation are used, as well as the human observer. Both the instruments and the observer are constituted by singularities in the field, and just as particle-singularities merge with each other, they also merge with the singularities constituting the instruments and the observer. Thus, there are no ultimate divisions between the observer and the observed. Quantum theory, says Bohm, arrives at a similar conclusion:

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The ‘quantum’ context . . . calls for a new kind of description that does not imply the separability of the ‘observed object’ and ‘observing instrument’. Instead, the form of the experimental conditions and the meaning of the experimental results have now to be one whole, in which analysis into autonomously existent elements is not relevant . . . A centrally relevant change in descriptive order required in quantum theory is thus the dropping of the notion of analysis of the world into relatively autonomous parts, separately existent but in interaction. Rather, the primary emphasis is now on undivided wholeness, in which the observing instrument is not separable from what is observed (133-134). Bohm says that from the quantum view an atom is best regarded “as a poorly defined cloud, dependent for its particular form on the whole environment, including the observing instrument” (9). He then concludes: Thus, one can no longer maintain the division between the observer and observed . . . Rather, both observer and observed are merging and interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is indivisible and unanalysable (9). Thus, according to Bohm, current physical theory requires us to view the physical world in terms of the unity paradigm. Now I agree with Goodman that physics is not an ultimate world-version to which all others must be reduced or reducible (Ways 4-5). But surely it is uncontroversial to suppose that metaphysical theory must, to some extent, be constrained by physical theory - at least to the extent that it must be considered irrational tlo affirm a metaphysical belief contrary to one’s beliefs about the physical world. For example, one could hardly accept Bohm’s characterization of physical reality, and also suppose that ordinary physical objects are, in the nature of things, discrete, except on pain of contradiction. There may be twcl (or more) worlds (in Goodman’s sense) involved here, but they are not unrehted worlds. In the everyday world, perhaps one can act as if objects were discrete, but one cannot rationally affirm their discreteness in that world, while affirming their non-discreteness in the world of theoretical physics. (Similar points could be made with respect to other worlds.) Thus, any rational person who accepts contemporary physical theory, as Bohm as characterized it, will surely be inclined toward acceptance of the unity paradigm in metaphysics. And this inclination can only be strengthened by the other arguments contained in this essay.

6. Conclusion One way to lend support to a paradigm is to use it in solving theoretical difficulties that have resisted solution under competing paradigms. So I

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should like to briefly suggest how the unity paradigm might be useful in dealing with a traditional metaphysical problem, namely causation. Ordinarily, theories of causation assume something like ultimate ontological status for objects, i.e., they presuppose the multeity paradigm. This creates an insuperable difficulty for understanding the causal relation (or any relation). If objects are primordial individuals and have independent status, relations between them must be external. Thus, any explanation of causation must take into account three elements: two objects and whatever relates them together in such a way that there can be causation. On this account, causation is essentially mysterious. But if one understands that, as Putnam puts it, “we cut up the world into objects [and, I would add, events] when we introduce one or another scheme of description” (52), so that objects and events are understood as being carved out of a flowing unity, then one understands that objects are essentially, that is, internally related to each other, and causation is no mystery - it is as much a matter of abstraction as objects themselves. Any particular instance of “causation” is simply a complex abstraction out of an undivided, flowing unity. From the point of view of the unity paradigm, relations, including causal relations, between objects are not separate elements requiring explanation - they are not “between” objects at all, for they constitute objects.12 1 I do not pretend that either this application or any other arguments I have given make a coercive case for the unity paradigm. I do not think it is appropriate to demand such a case. There are additional arguments that could be given - I have in mind linguistic, moral, and pragmatic ones - but they are sufficiently complex as to require separate treatment. Neither have I attempted to explicate the relationship between philosophical holism and the unity paradigm - that is much too large a task to include here. I have raised considerations that should give “common sense” (and philosophers influenced by it) pause concerning its allegiance to the.multeity paradigm. Common sense, Richard Schacht has said, finds the unity paradigm “counterintuitive” and “strange” (86). In light of the arguments given in this paper, that indicates a deficiency in common sense.13

Transylvania University Lexington, K Y 40508 USA References Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). ‘Objects’ should not be understood here as primordial individuals, of course. This paper has benefited greatly from comments and criticism by John Carnes, Edwin Hettinger, Phyllis Kenevan, Paul J.W. Miller, Wesley Morriston, John 0. Nelson, Thomas Peard, Robert Rogers, and the editor of Metuphilosophy. l2

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Bohm, David. Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method (London: Verso, 1978). Goodman, Nelson. Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). Goodman, Nelson. Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). Gurwitsch, Aron. TheField of Consciousness(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964). Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977; reprint of the 1777 edition). Locke, John. An Essizy Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Merleau-Ponty, M. The Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Quine, W.V. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Robinson, John Manley. Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968). Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). Schacht, Richard. Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). Sprague, Elmer. Metaphysical Thinking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). Unger, Peter. “There Are No Ordinary Things”, Synthese, Vol. 41 (1979). Unger, Peter. “Why There Are No People”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. IV (1979). Wellman, Carl. Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971). Wheeler, 111, Samuel C. “On That Which Is Not”, Synthese, Vol. 41 (1979). Wheeler, 111, Samuel C. “Megarian Paradoxes as Eleatic Arguments”,American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20 (July 1983). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).