(Undergrad) In Defense of a Timeless God: A Critique of Stephen T. Davis\' \"Temporal Eternity\"

In Defense of a Timeless God:
A Critique of Stephen T. Davis' "Temporal Eternity"















Word Count: 2611
The relationship between God and time has perplexed theistic metaphysicians and philosophers of religion for centuries. Traditionally, God has been believed to exist outside of time but more recently, contemporary philosophers have challenged this notion by promoting a temporal understanding of God. Philosopher Stephen T. Davis does this in his chapter entitled "Temporal Eternity" (from Logic and the Nature of God) by rejecting God's timelessness on three counts: (1) A timeless God cannot create something temporal, for the act of creation itself must be temporal. (2) A timeless God cannot be personal or involved in his creation. (3) The notion of God's timelessness results in absurd consequences with regard to time and his omniscience. It is for these reasons that Davis believes that a temporal understanding of God is a more persuasive and plausible way of thinking about God's relationship to time. In this paper, I will challenge his arguments for temporal eternity and defend God's timelessness. First, I will object to each of his three offered arguments against God's timelessness and show that they are unpersuasive. Secondly, I will show how a temporal understanding of God is itself ultimately inadequate and unsatisfying by offering two arguments against temporal eternity.
Before we begin, it is important to understand what Davis means by timelessness and temporal eternity. According to Davis, God is timeless if and only if he lacks temporal location and temporal extension. If God lacks temporal location, then it would not make sense to say that he existed before the beginning of the universe because that would imply that he is located in time. If God lacks temporal extension, then we couldn't say that he lived during the entire period of St. Augustine's life because that would imply that his existence extends through time. Instead, Davis agrees that God's timeless, eternal existence would be as Boethius' described it: "the complete possession all at once of illimitable life." In other words, all moments in time would be all at once eternally present to God.
Rejecting God's timelessness, Davis embraces both God's temporal location and temporal extension and suggests that God exists temporally. What he means by this is that God exists eternally and that the past, present and future are all experienced by him. That is, similarly to us, God remembers past events and anticipates future events. God experiences one moment of time and then experiences other moments of time everlastingly. So on Davis' view, it would make sense to say that God existed before the beginning of the universe and that he existed during all of St. Augustine's life. Now that Davis' view is clarified, I will now move on to his arguments against God's timelessness and show why I find them objectionable.

God and Causation
Can God timelessly create something temporal? This is the first question Davis raises and ultimately answers to negatively. Davis proposes the following argument in support of temporal eternity:
(1) God creates x.
(2) x first exists at T.
(3) Therefore, God creates x at T.
Davis supposes that if we interchange 'x' for 'the universe' and 'at T' for some temporal location in the past, then we must conclude that God created the universe at some temporal location in the past. God's creation of the universe at a temporal location in the past would imply, according to Davis, that there were other temporal locations before the universe came to exist. For if we describe God's creating the universe as the cause that precedes the effect of the universe coming to exist, then there must have been a temporal location prior to the universe coming to exist. So since God would have been located temporally prior to the beginning of the universe, there appears to be a prima facie reason to accept that God exists in time.
One reason why Davis so strongly rejects God's timelessness is because he so strongly rejects any notion of atemporal causation. For if causes must temporally precede effects, then atemporal causation must be incoherent. But if God is the cause of the beginning of the universe (and hence time itself since time came into existence at the Big Bang), how could God temporally precede the beginning of time? Brian Leftow suggests that, since God existing temporally prior to the beginning of time is contradictory, God's relationship to time must include some other notion of priority. He, instead, suggests that God must be causally prior to the beginning of time. And since God must be causally prior to the beginning of time, and not temporally prior to it, then there must be some type of atemporal causal relationship between God and time. As Hugh J. McCann puts it, "there is no time at which [God] creates the universe, for time itself is an aspect of the world of change and that is what God creates. In a single fiat he produces the entire universe, in all of its history, all of it with equal directness and absolute control." Therefore, we can reject Davis' third premise and the implications he draws from it and instead hold that God timelessly created the temporal universe.




God and Personal Involvement
Another objection that Davis briefly raises in his paper relates to God's inability to be personally involved in time if he exists timelessly. Davis argues that the Judeo-Christian God is depicted as a god who acts in history and, because of this, seems to exist in time. Most notably, Davis points out that God seems to act in temporal sequences, as he first rescued the people of Israel from Egypt and then gave them the Law. Also, the Judeo-Christian God is a god who is said to answer prayers and respond to acts of repentance. If God acts in respondence to the actions of humans, as theists believe, then it would seem to be correct to conclude that he must exist in time. For God's acts of respondence would seem to occur after certain human actions are committed. And if God responds after human actions are committed, then God exists temporally.
It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how a timeless God could personally interact with persons or respond to them, but God's involvement does not necessarily imply that he exists temporally. A distinction between temporal sequences and causal sequences must first be made in order to understand how God could timelessly respond to the actions of humans. A temporal sequence would involve an event happening after another event and a causal sequence would involve an event happening because of another event. In their paper entitled "Eternity" Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann draw on this idea, by claiming that "something constitutes an answer to a prayer only if it is done because of the prayer". In other words, God's answer to a prayer or response to a human action need not come after the prayer or action, it would simply happen because of the prayer or action. Stump and Kretzmann also make the point that, if God is timeless, both the prayer and the answer to the prayer are simultaneous to God's life. So, if God timelessly wills that a certain person's prayer be answered a month after the request was made, then God's answer to the prayer can be seen as a response to the person's request. Thus, contrary to Davis' criticisms, God can be interactive in the temporal world even though he exists timelessly.

Timelessness and Omniscience
The third objection that Davis presents in regards to God's timelessness relates to, what he believes to be, a probable incoherence between the doctrines of timelessness and omniscience. He argues that, if God is timeless, he would be unable to fully know the truth or falsity of tensed statements. In others words, God wouldn't know whether or not statements such as 'today is Friday' or 'my birthday was last week' were true or false. For it would seem that God could only know the truth or falsity of statements like 'today is Friday' if he was temporally experiencing today just as I could be. Also, a timeless God has been traditionally thought to be both immutable and omniscient. But if God knows that 'today is Friday' then tomorrow he would know something else, namely that 'yesterday was Friday' and 'today is Saturday'. Thus, God's knowledge would change and if God's knowledge changes, then he changes. And if God changes, then he must be temporal and not timeless.
Contrary to Davis' assumptions, the apparent incoherence between God's timelessness and his knowledge of tensed propositions isn't all that incoherent. A similar argument, involving spatially tensed propositions could be raised to show that Davis' argument is unsatisfying. Hugh McCann puts the argument this way: "Suppose I assert that it is raining here… And surely if God is omniscient and it is raining here, he must know that. Yet no one argues on these grounds that God must be located in space or in any way subject to its limitations." Understandably, McCann's point does not demonstrate that Davis' point is incorrect, but it does seem to suggest that something could be wrong with the argument that a timeless God could not have know the truth or falsity of tensed propositions. However, Paul Helm, in his book Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, argues that Davis' objection is incorrect. He claims that in a situation in which someone says 'it is raining now' on December 1, 2014, a timeless and omniscient God could know the following: (1) It is raining on December 1, 2014 and (2) someone living on December 1, 2014 can, and does, proclaim the true statement 'it is raining now'. So on Helm's more satisfying view, tensed propositions are the same for a timeless God, in regards to truth and falsity, as their dated and tenseless equivalents. Thus, there appears to be no incoherence between God's timelessness and omniscience, even with respect to tensed and tenseless propositions.

How Temporal Eternity Ultimately Fails
I have argued that Davis' objections to God's timelessness, while thought provoking, are not all that convincing. But although I have defended the timelessness of God, I have not quite shown how a temporal understanding of God is unsatisfactory. Here, I will argue that (1) a temporal God could not be an omniscient God and (2) a temporal God could not be a perfect being.
Davis argues that a timeless God could not possibly be omniscient, however, I cannot see how a temporal God could be omniscient. For example, God's omniscience would seem to require of him that he knows every true proposition about my life, regardless of whether it occurs in my past, present or future. Furthermore, how could a temporal God know the exact date of my death if he is experiencing time simultaneously with me? It is possible that a temporal God could have foreknowledge of all future events, but it appears that the only way God, if he is temporal and omniscient, could know the exact date of my death would be if he made a lucky guess. Surely we would not say that a God who merely guesses correctly about future events is an omniscient God. For even if God made a correct prediction, it would not follow that he knew the exact date of my death. On the contrary, a timeless God would have no difficulty knowing the exact date of my death because my death occurs simultaneously with any other event in my life, according to God's timeless perspective.
A second, yet more serious, reason for believing that a temporal understanding of God ultimately fails is due to the fact that a temporal God could not be a perfect being. The medieval philosopher Anselm of Canterbury in his work Proslogion defined God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Many theistic philosophers have endorsed Anselm's definition and have concluded that God must be perfect, being maximally great in all aspects of his nature. If God exists temporally though, I cannot see how he could be perfect. A temporal God would be bound by time, being unable to break free from the restrictions and limitations of time. God would be unable to see all events simultaneously and would be forced to only anticipate future events and remember past events. Furthermore, a temporal God could only live moment to moment and would be unable to possess his future life or his past life. If God is perfect, it would seem as though he would necessarily exist beyond the restrictions and limitations of time, seeing and experiencing all events at once. And by contrast, a timeless God would possess the entirety of its life all at once and wouldn't be forced to experience existence moment by moment. Thus, a timeless God appears to be much greater than a temporal God.

God, as Anselm stated, is a being perfect and maximally great. Being perfect, God exists timelessly and is unrestricted or confined by the reality of time. We have seen the inadequacies of Davis' arguments against God's timelessness and how they are easily objectionable when considering the plausibility of God existing outside of time. And we have seen how Davis' temporal understanding of God ultimately fails to allow for God's omniscience and perfect nature, whereas a timeless perspective of God doesn't. It is for these reasons that I believe God must exist timelessly.









Bibliography

Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Bk. 4, sec. 6.
Davis, Stephen T. "Temporal Eternity." In Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (4th Edition), 209-216. Edited by Louis J. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.
Ganssle, Greg. "God and Time." In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/#H4.
Hawking, Stephen. "The Beginning of Time." In Stephen Hawking: The Official Website. http://www.hawking.org.uk/the-beginning-of-time.html.
Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, 80-82. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. Closer to Truth. Video. 2014. http://www.closertotruth.com/series/how-does-god-relate-time#video-4043.
McCann, Hugh J. "The God Beyond Time." In Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (4th Edition), 217-230. Edited by Louis J. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.
Sandler, Greg. "Anselm." In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/anselm/.
Stump, Eleonore and Normann Kretzmann. "Eternity." In The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 8, (Aug., 1981): 429-458.



1. Stephen T. Davis, "Temporal Eternity," in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (4th edition), ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 209-216.
2. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, sec. 6.
3. See note 1 above.
4. Stephen Hawking, "The Beginning of Time," Stephen Hawking: The Official Website, http://www.hawking.org.uk/the-beginning-of-time.html.
5. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Closer to Truth, video, 2014, http://www.closertotruth.com/series/how-does-god-relate-time#video-4043.
6. Hugh J. McCann, "The God Beyond Time," in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (4th edition), ed. Louis J. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 217-230.
7. See note 1 above.
8. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 8 (Aug., 1981), 429-458.
9. See note 1 above.
10. Greg Ganssle, "God and Time," in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/#H4.
11. See note 6 above.
12. Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 80-82.
13. Greg Sadler, "Anselm," in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/anselm/.
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