Uncommon Diplomacy Academia Feb 2017

Uncommon Diplomacy:
Herbert Hoover's Quiet Impact on U.S.-Argentine Relations
By Vivian Hux Reed, M.A.

As Herbert Hoover flew from Santiago to Buenos Aires aboard the Faithfull Cow on 6 June 1946, "the sun was shining and the air was clear as crystal." However, a storm was raging – in Argentina, in Latin America, in the United States State Department, and in the world. The larger storms following WWII and the death of President Franklin Roosevelt gave rise to the storms to be explored here. Against the backdrop of President Harry Truman taking the helm to lead the world from war into peace and recovery, three stories converged in Buenos Aires in June 1946 to produce a compelling argument for the uncommon diplomacy of former President Herbert Hoover and his impact on U.S.-Argentine relations. Because Argentina was the wealthiest and most advanced Latin American country at that time, Hoover's subtle diplomacy played a crucial role in the history of hemispheric relations.
The first story tells why Hoover was in Argentina thirteen years after his presidency and a dozen years of political isolation. Faced with the reality of an impending world-wide famine, Truman turned to Hoover, the most qualified man in the country, for help. Many times over, Hoover had proven himself a master humanitarian since his leadership first brought relief to Belgium in 1914. Throughout World War II, Hoover was again instrumental in providing relief wherever he could. At the behest of Truman, Hoover set out in March 1946 with a team humanitarian relief veterans to survey the world's post-war food needs. They visited thirty-four countries during a three month interval. At each stop, the mission was the same: assess needs, find surpluses, and clear shipping channels to move all available foodstuffs to areas most at risk. Only four countries had been identified with considerable surplus grain: United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Securing Argentine aid was critical to the success of Hoover's humanitarian mission.
The second story traces the personal rivalries, ideological shifts, and numerous changes in top brass within the U.S. State Department. Latin American policy, especially relating to its brightest but most troublesome star, Argentina was high on the list of issues that precipitated the swift changes. During transition from the Roosevelt to the Truman administrations and from World War II to the Cold War, three men served as Secretary of State: Cordell Hull, Edward Stettinius, and James Byrnes. Furthermore, two men of wildly divergent viewpoints, Nelson Rockefeller and Spruille Braden, held the post of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. In particular to Argentina, periods of suspended relations and the bitter rivalry between two U.S. Ambassadors, Spuille Braden and George S. Messersmith, punctuated the various transitions with venom.
The third story exposes the confusion and bitterness of U.S.-Argentine relations which in mid-1946 stood at the lowest ebb thus far. Many eminent scholars have addressed the morass of complications and intrigue which set the stage for Hoover's arrival. Hoover's presence and his subtle but impressive impact are largely absent from these assessments. The background provided here is intended to illuminate the difficulties Hoover faced in securing Argentine aid in averting worldwide famine. Amazingly, he was successful in both securing aid and easing diplomatic tensions during his brief four days in Buenos Aires.
This study seeks to delve into this little known diplomatic episode and assess its impact. The personal papers of the primary actors provide convincing evidence of Hoover's impact at a critical juncture of U.S.-Argentine relations in the face of shifting postwar priorities. Hoover's mission in Argentina was clear and compassionate, but it also serves to highlight his considerable influence on the attitudes and actions of U.S. Ambassador George Messersmith, Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón, and President Truman. The record of Hoover's four days in Buenos Aires reveal his influence on post-war U.S.-Argentine relations. Diaries, letters, dispatches and memoirs provide first hand documentation for this historic transition. The influence exerted by Hoover was clearly of the "referent" type, that of individual integrity and personal relationships, expounded by Bertram Raven.
While history credits Hoover for helping avert global famine, scant attention has been paid to his diplomatic role. Neither the press, which waged an "apparent press boycott on news reporting" about him, nor most later historians would recognize Hoover's influence in revising the diplomatic climate in Argentina. Local coverage of Hoover's Latin American trip, however, was ample at most stops, although slightly lighter in Buenos Aires as the city was abuzz with Perón's inaugural events and many visiting foreign dignitaries. Nevertheless, several Buenos Aires papers, as well as those in other Latin American cities, reported on Hoover's ice-breaking presence in Argentina.
The primary difficulty Hoover faced in procuring much-needed grain from Argentina was the convoluted condition of U.S.-Argentine relations. Perón had just assumed the presidency and represented a new 'wild-card' in international diplomacy. He had gained notoriety during his term as vice-president under President Edelmiro Farrell's administration which had maintained both neutrality and a certain amount of sympathy for Germany throughout much of World War II. Argentina did not declare war on Germany and Japan until May 1945 less than two months before victory in Europe. Argentina's post-war political fortunes were being worked out on two "battle fronts:" would Argentina be admitted to the United Nations and how U.S.-Argentine relations might recover from the singularly intrusive behavior of U.S. Ambassador Braden during his brief stint in Buenos Aires during Perón's presidential campaign. When Braden grudgingly accepted his promotion to Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, his influence could be felt even after his return to Washington.
Braden's exceptionally un-diplomatic approach to his host country was partially due to a persistent popular image of Argentina as a sympathetic haven for Nazi sentiment, resources, and fleeing leaders. There was fear that Nazi espionage would enable the recruitment of Latin America to host a Nazi resurgence and then threaten the U.S. itself. The determination of scholars who have the advantage of hindsight generally agree that: "Argentina was not a Fascist state, Perónism is not easily equated with Nazism or Fascism, and the fantasies of a Nazi plot against Latin America existed only in the minds of a few Nazi émigrés of the kind Hitler had purged from his party in 1934." None of this was yet clear, however, when Hoover stepped off the Faithfull Cow on June 6 while Argentina was in the throes of Perón's inaugural celebrations.
Democracies were realigning their worries from the defeated Nazis to the ascendant Communists and U.S. officials worried about the direction Perón's government would take Argentina. Braden embodied the anti-totalitarian dynamic as "Democracy's Bull." Perón, however, was thoroughly Argentine and vowed to lead his country on a new path, which he called 'The Third Position.' Perón aimed to transform his country by incorporating elements of both socialism and capitalism. He sought a path where a proud and independent Argentina could become equal to, rather than a vassal-state of, the United States, the Soviet Union, or Great Britain. Yet these same great powers vied for a stake in Argentina's future.
The thorniest problem facing Hoover's mission to secure Argentine cooperation in averting famine was the in-fighting within the State Department. Argentine scholar Leandro Morgenfeld points out that despite the "substantive debate" on Argentine-U.S. relations during and immediately following the Second World War, "there was no single U.S. policy towards the Casa Rosada." Rather, policy shifted drastically according to the strong personalities who enacted U.S. policy. Toward the end of Roosevelt's life, the official conjecture of Hull, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, and Ambassador Braden was the "far-fetched as the pretention that if left alone, Argentina would produce the Third World War." So great was Hull's frustration with Argentine policy that on July 26, 1944, he and Morgenthau proceeded to freeze Argentina's remaining stocks of gold on deposit in Washington and forbid American ships to enter Argentine ports. Both of these sanctions proved to be obstacles to Argentina's ability and willingness to increase famine relief aid. As demonstrated below, however, Hoover was instrumental in resolving both issues.
Richard Pattee, a Latin American scholar and part of the State Department's cultural program, proffered this scathing assessment of Hull's actions:
Secretary Hull, in his declarations of July 26, and September 7 of 1944, closed the door on negotiations. The matter seemed settled. Argentina must change her government or we would not deal with her. The unprecedented nature of this attitude is evident. We were not at war with Argentina, yet we dealt with that republic in terms which were more severe and uncompromising that those used with Germany or Japan prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities.

Pattee is joined by Carlos Estudé in condemning Hull's "counter-productive" approach, pointing out that it "led to even less Argentine cooperation" and increased Hull's own opportunities for "muscle-flexing and self-righteous castigation of Argentina."
Events transpired in rapid-fire succession in early 1945. Early in January, Nelson Rockefeller received a "suggestion" from "influential Argentines" to send a "confidential mission to Buenos Aires to negotiate a settlement" with Argentine Government of Farrell and Perón." Costa Rican diplomat, Rafael de Oreamuno, was sent to Buenos Aires on January 27 charged with this mission. Before the month was out, Oreamuno reported to Rockefeller that "Argentina was ready and willing to do whatever was required, but that there was no reason for the government or the country to be humiliated." In February, Rockefeller orchestrated the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City, designed to "provide a framework for the reintegration of Argentina" into the Inter-American fold. The U.S. promised to lift war-time embargos against her if Argentina met four conditions: end its neutrality by declaring war on the Axis, stop repression, hold democratic elections, and "eliminate Axis influences within its borders." The Argentine delegation signed the Act of Chapultepec on March 8, 1945, agreeing to these conditions. The next day Argentina declared war on Germany and Japan.
A month later, the world was rocked by the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. The multitude and magnitude of worldwide problems afforded little time to grieve. Truman, finding himself in a weaker political position than his predecessor as the war in Europe came to an end, collected a liberal cabinet inclined towards internationalism. Presiding over the State Department, Byrnes sought "accommodation with Moscow," yet a confrontational environment moved quickly toward the Cold War and created a new set of worries in relation to Argentina.
Argentina's admittance to the United Nations was still hotly contested by Stalin as well as by many in the U.S. government. With the San Francisco Conference set to begin on April 25, Rockefeller dispatched his deputy, Ava Warren, to Buenos Aires. Acting independently from the Embassy, but as a special envoy on an official State Department mission, Warren met with Vice-President Perón April 18-21, 1945. They agreed that "all sanctions would be lifted, including those related to arms supplies, applied by Washington against the military government. One of the objectives was to convince the Argentines to begin establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R as a means of removing one voice of dissention against their admittance to the United Nations. On the occasion of their last meeting, Perón confided to Warren: "We are now convinced that the men who come to us from the United States are of two different types: those who are our friends and win our hearts and those who are not our friends. The Warren Mission has shown itself to belong to the first type." The other type presumably included Hull and foreshadowed Perón's opinion of "diplomat-businessman Spruille Braden."
Braden made no secret of his scorn for the "moral flabbiness of Stettinius and Rockefeller." He was surprised by their invitation for him to accept the ambassadorship to Buenos Aires. "Although my knowledge of Argentine politics and personalities might seem to qualify me for the post, they knew I was far from being an appeaser," Braden records. John Moors Cabot, having served with Braden in Colombia, arrived with him in Argentina to serve as counselor to the embassy. Braden was highly annoyed that Warren's visit had preceded his own arrival by a month. He suspected Rockefeller had dispatched Warren in an attempts to "establish a policy that – as they perhaps thought – I would have to follow after assuming authority."
Not only was Braden critical of the Warren mission, he quickly became "the fiercest enemy of Farrell and Perón." Meanwhile in the U.S., an upsurge of anti-Argentine sentiment, splashed about by the press, whipped up negative public opinion following Argentina's admission to the San Francisco Conference. As one Argentine expert puts it: "Braden rode that wave admirably. Whatever his personal motivations and convictions, it cannot be doubted that his attitude vis-à-vis Argentina helped to advance his career considerably."
During his first month in Buenos Aires, Braden held several private meetings with Perón where he remembers being greeted with a "cordial abrazo." However, by the end of the month, the climate between Perón and Braden had become frigid. Both men record a chilly conversation which included several rounds of childish "You must" versus "I can't." Curiously, both men also claim it was Perón who put an end to each round. Braden quickly determined that the Farrell-Perón government had no intention of meeting its obligations and "launched a public crusade to rid the country of is fascist leaders." The timing of Braden's crusade coincided with the Argentine political campaigns for the elections scheduled in February 1946. Running against Perón's was José Tamborini and his Unión Demócatica who enjoyed Braden's unequivocal support.
As Braden stirred up heat in Argentina, Rockefeller came under fire from Byrnes and other "internationalists." They argued that the Soviet Union could be worked with and that agreements between the Big Three could be maintained. Rockefeller, on the other hand, believed that Soviet Russia had replaced the Axis as the chief enemy of democracy. On a more pragmatic level, Rockefeller encapsulated a certain element in U.S. business thinking that post-war markets would be the antidote to unemployment – and therefore the nations of the Western Hemisphere must sink or swim together. Nevertheless, by August his resignation was announced and Braden was recalled from Argentina to replace him.
Before he left Buenos Aires, Braden "rivaled Perón as the best-known person in Argentina." He made it clear at every opportunity that "his manifest aim was to overthrow the military government and together with the [Argentine] opposition political parties arrange a political solution under USA supervision." At one point, Braden was bold enough to approach Perón in person to ascertain if it might be "prudent" to stay on in Buenos Aires. Perón records his response:
"Leave without hesitation," I told him. "Otherwise we will be obligated to expel you." He left indignantly, without saying good-by to me and forgetting his hat and gloves. Perhaps he understood that I was serious with my advice. He knew that I was capable of dumping him from a rowboat in the River Plate.

Knowing his Argentine days were numbered, Braden crossed diplomatically acceptable lines by "[o]penly intervening in domestic politics." Argentina's "military government, and Perón in particular, were an obstacle, a Nazi-Fascist remnant" which would have to go. "The voice of freedom makes itself heard in this land, and I do not believe anyone will succeed in drowning it. I shall hear it in Washington with the same clarity with which I hear it from Buenos Aires," Braden declared. Cabot records that "it was one of the most extraordinary spectacles I have ever witnessed: in this nationalistic country some seven hundred of its most prominent citizens were wildly applauding a foreigner who had attacked their government."
In Washington, Braden faced challenges to his confirmation and hostility from the business community. There was little doubt that he, unlike his predecessor Rockefeller or his soon-to-be nemesis George S. Messersmith, firmly believed that in 1945 "Germany was still the main enemy and the world should be ruled by the Teheran and Yalta agreements which established the spheres of influence of the two super powers."
When Braden left for Washington in September 1945, Cabot remained Buenos Aires as Chargé de Affairs during the long interim before the new ambassador arrived. Despite his initial support of Braden's approach, Cabot quickly recognized that a "policy of hostility was now doomed to fail." Uniquely aware of Braden's unyielding position, Cabot began to "work on" others in Washington to urge caution. Nevertheless, Braden worked furiously to produce a complete and "factual" account of Argentina's failures in dealing with Nazi influences – the infamous "Blue Book" (published 11 February 1946) which Braden lauded as presenting a "thoroughly documented and convincing picture of Nazi infiltration and designs in Land America and of connivance between the Hitler government and the Argentines." As Cabot had feared, it backfired. Indeed, the Argentine electorate reacted with distaste and undecided voters turned to Perón in droves. Elections were held on 24 February 1946 with Perón winning handily. For his disloyalty, Braden had Cabot "shipped off to Yugoslavia."
In April 1946, Truman appointed a new ambassador to Argentina. Braden "did not think George Messersmith, who represented the U.S. in Mexico at the time, well suited for the post. On the other hand, he had always professed agreement with my Argentine policy." Despite the public impression that Messersmith was "Braden's man," Messersmith's appointment was subsequently considered by scholars such as Roger Trask to be in keeping with Byrnes' move toward normalizing U.S.-Argentine relations with a 'wait-and-see' approach. With a touch of rhetorical flourish, Perón's biographer, Joseph Page, summarizes Messersmith's daunting position: "Little did he realize that he would soon be chafing in the straitjacket of another man's [Braden's] notion of how Washington should treat the incoming [Argentine] administration."
As Messersmith prepared for his departure to Argentina, two other parties made their preparations. A Soviet trade mission had arrived in Buenos Aires in early May, highlighting the conflicting U.S. opinion about post-war Soviet influence in the hemisphere. There was considerable consternation in Washington and London that the Soviets would become a competitor for Argentine agricultural products. The Argentine press reacted favorably to the trade mission's visit, even speculating that a struggle between the two super-powers would benefit their own country. At the same time, Hoover was in Washington reporting the results of the European and Asian segments of the famine survey and preparing for the South American one, with Argentina being the cornerstone. Hoover was honest with Truman that the U.S.-Argentine relations were "bitter and filled with hate" at this point in time and that "it might be impossible to do anything," but Hoover felt "the stakes were so important – a possible increase in supplies by 1,000,000 tons – that I felt I must try." Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton Anderson, seconded the plea, but warned that the "State Department will protest against Mr. Hoover's going." Not to be dissuaded, Truman replied, "We won't give them a chance, I will announce it at once."
Hoover "took the precaution to communicate with the Vatican to secure a special introduction to General Perón from the Pope [Pius XII] to the effect that I was representing not the United States but the starving people of the world and that the success of my mission was of profound interest to the Church." At that time, Perón was in good standing with the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, Perón "mentioned the advices he had received from His Holiness the Pope" and indicated his influence.
Hoover also secured contact with an Argentine businessman, Alberto Dodero, who was "an important shipping man of large wealth, a large financial backer of Perón." Hoover was informed that Dodero would have good access to Perón due to his early and generous support of Perón and the friendship between his wife and Eva Perón. Both wives were former actresses but had won few other friends in Argentine social circles. In his memoirs, Perón records several anecdotes about Dodero, including his penchant for buying jewels for Eva: "For him to give her a diamond necklace was like giving her a box of chocolates." Dodero would prove instrumental in facilitating the meetings between Hoover and Perón.
Hoover also enlisted aid from Latin American officials on their first stop – Mexico City. He requested that Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho "transmit word to Perón that he need have no fears of complications with me and that what I had to suggest might offer a great opportunity to Perón, and that my Party were opposed to intervention as an established principle." Ávila Camacho expressed "conviction that Argentina had every advantage to gain from generous collaboration" with Hoover's mission. Hoover pointed out that his unique position as "a member of the opposition working in full agreement with President Truman might make it easy for Colonel Perón to take a first step, and that this in turn might readily lead to a more general amelioration of relations between" the U.S. and Argentina. Ávila Camacho indicated his agreement with Hoover's assessment and urged caution in relying on Messersmith as they had also worked with him in the past and had developed a similarly disparaging estimation. The Mexican Ambassador in Buenos Aires was recruited and would prove to be extraordinarily helpful in gaining access to Perón.
Messersmith arrived in Buenos Aires on May 22 just in time to receive Byrnes' instructions to expedite Hoover's food survey and facilitate his meetings with local officials. He optimistically recalled a "warm welcome" and a favorable first impression of Perón: He "had obviously done his homework, [and] said all the right things." Perón, on the other hand, recorded less optimism and issued a stern warning not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor, saying: "Always when you talk with me remember these two fundamental premises: that I govern the most delicate and sensitive nation on earth and that I am the president of this nation." Messersmith barely had time to settle in before pre-inaugural festivities went into high gear and duly represented the U.S. at the Perón's formal inauguration on June 4.
Avoiding the official fray of the inauguration, Hoover arrived two days later, hoping the Argentine government would be ready for business. His determination to distance himself from the State Department debacle paid off. Despite Perón's efforts to "improve his image, especially with the United States" many Argentines were openly hostile to the new U.S. diplomatic representation. According to a Time report:
… a million Argentines unleashed their last reserves of enthusiasm. … The packed throngs, who saw Perón as a modern knight in the shining armor of socialistic endeavor, shouted "Perón! Perón!" again and again. The diplomats, too, got cheers – except for Yanqui George S. Messersmith, who got boos and whistles. (Foreign Minister Juan Atilio Bramuglia next day called at the U.S. Embassy to apologize for his countrymen.) … The new President's next move on the international chessboard was his own secret, if even he knew it. Perhaps, as the crowd seemed to think, Perón was going to let Ambassador Messersmith stew in his own State Department's juice – at least for a while.

Unlike Messersmith's mercurial arrival in Buenos Aires, Hoover and team were disappointed by the dearth of "any welcoming committee … only "only a sad little group composed of Jack Cabot and a naval officer who brought the greetings of President Perón. This is the first time all the way around the world that the Ambassador has not been present to greet the Chief and where there were no members of the Government." Maurice Pate, well acquainted with the diplomacy of relief work from directing the efforts of the Red Cross, noted "the Chief realizes that his biggest job in South American is right here in Argentina, and you do not get things done quickly and rightly without all the amenities and prestige with which Mr. Hoover has entered every country around the world thus far." The Buenos Aires Herald ran the story of Hoover's arrival complete with a photograph with the welcoming party. However, where Gibson and Pate saw a "sad little group" the Herald described a "deafening cheer" from the "waiting crowd" as the Faithfull Cow disgorged its occupants. The article also mistakenly coupled Hoover's mission with that of the United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).
In comparison, other visitors arriving in Buenos Aires for the festivities received far more impressive receptions. To the chagrin of the official U.S. representatives, another American was making a splash:
Bluff, bourbon-drinking Andrew J. Higgins, the New Orleans boat builder, was getting along fine with the boss. He came to Buenos Aires, in a green corduroy suite, determined to do business with Perón, and got a personal glad hand from Perón himself at the airport. Andy Higgins reciprocated by damning, in a press interview, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden's anti-Perón attitude.

Frank Mason, Hoover's press attaché, reported: "It came as a shock to me to learn that Colonel Perón had gone to the airport to meet Andrew Higgins when he arrived in Buenos Aires." Higgins presence and warm welcome by Perón were both symptoms of Braden's legacy. Higgins himself made that point clear when he said, "I, simply as an American citizen, protest that one man – Braden – can involve two great peoples in discord." Higgins' visit to Argentina was in direct opposition to the policy of the State Department and highlighted the confusion over just what official U.S. policy was.
As the Hoover group prepared to drive into Buenos Aires from Moron airfield, it became apparent that "no proper arrangements had been made for our accommodations." An Argentine Foreign Office was contacted. Fortuitously, the "clerk" sent to meet the Hoover entourage was Dr. Ricardo Bunge, Under Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was already acquainted with Hoover and was now attached to the mission for the duration of their visit. Bunge promptly invited Hoover and company to be guests of the Argentine government with a "show of indignation" that neither government's officials had made the proper arrangements.
The entourage was promptly installed at the Alvear Palace Hotel. Hoover's suspicions about Messersmith had been confirmed; he "was not only opposed to me personally but objected to the whole Mission. He obviously sought to isolate himself from it in the eyes of the Argentines by not coming to receive me at the airport and by sending a boy instead." As they settled down to a late lunch, "Messersmith came in with a carnation in his buttonhole and made things no better by explaining to the Chief that he had not come out because it was a long drive and he had a lot to do." Rather than make a scene over the discourtesy shown to him, Hoover simply indicated he was ready to meet with Perón as "promptly as possible." Cabot was dispatched to inquire at the Foreign office. Pate records "I thought our reputedly tough Ambassador indicated a little timidity about how quickly the great Perón might be seen."
Hoover then "called the Mexican Ambassador who arranged the meeting in twenty minutes." The Mexican Ambassador had received "a radio" from Ávila Camacho instructing him to request Perón's "highest cooperation" with Hoover's mission. In response to Hoover's call, the Mexican Ambassador sent "a gaudy colonel with a sword … with a note to say that the Ambassador had arranged an interview for tomorrow morning at 10:30 – and wanted to know if he was to go along, complete with Colonel and sword. It took some firmness to knock that idea out of his head." There was a definite "twinkle in his eye" when Hoover realized that the "ground work he and Hugh Gibson had prepared in Mexico City had borne these constructive results." Messersmith, on the other hand, was "visibly embarrassed" and insisted on accompanying Hoover on his visit to Perón.
Very quickly, Hoover realized that the pessimistic impressions he had received about the status quo in Buenos Aires had not been exaggerated. The situation, he recorded was "just bad" and he blamed Braden for this situation: "Spruille Braden convinced himself that he was the evangel to plant New Deal democracy and philosophy in the Argentine." In the breezy style adopted for the "Dear Julius" letters, the Mason characterized Braden as "a symbol of interference by Washington in the domestic picture of sovereign powers." He reminded his readers that it had been Hoover who began the Good Neighbor policy, although "Roosevelt generally gets credit for initiating" it. For Mason, "the whole situation might be pointed up by signs that we found displayed on some of the walls … BRADEN O PERÓN." Clearly the bitterness of the campaign remained. Hoover's party was informed that "Perón has a deadly hatred for Braden but still retained a sense of humor. He told one of our friends: 'As an Argentine, I resent this interference in our affairs by Braden. As Juan Perón, I am deeply grateful.'"
During their habitual breakfast meeting Friday morning, "the telephone was constantly ringing." Hoover granted appointments with many Argentine business magnates, "men of economic influence," because he had learned "not count on governmental channels alone to get his job done." These men proved valuable "in giving advice and in getting the higher members of government to take appropriate action on food matters." Foremost among them was Alberto Dodero.
Dodero arrived at the Alvear just after breakfast. Hoover sought his advice as to how best to approach the upcoming interview with Perón:
I indicated that if Perón would take some dramatic action, such as declaring a 90-day emergency and appointing a special official to expedite exports, it would enable me to eulogize his actions, but more important it would give hope to the hungry nations of Europe and would stamp him as a man of good-will over the whole of that hungry continent.

Dodero agreed that Argentina's morass of red tape was part of the problem, identifying nine different departments which dealt with related issues. However, he promised that he:
would see Perón immediately after my interview to see what impression I had made and to re-enforce my suggestions and to clarify Perón as to myself. He was not happy over Messersmith being present at my interview as he felt it would couple me with the State Department whom Perón hated bitterly.

Nevertheless, Messersmith was determined to stay in the loop and promptly appeared at the Alvear at 10 a.m. to escort Hoover and Gibson to the Casa Rosada.
Perón was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Juan Bramuglia, as well as his Minister of Commerce and Industry, Rolando Lagomasino. Hoover wasted no time, quickly getting "down to brass tacks." Gibson records that Hoover covered the whole story of their mission and noticed Perón's relief "when it appeared he was not asking for money or gifts of food or trying to dictate where food was to be shipped." Perón was informed that Hoover's hopes included "an additional 1,500,000 tons to the ordinary routine exports." Thirty-five minutes later, Hoover closed his interview with Perón with "expressions of personal good will by way of sympathetic expressions on the difficulty of the tasks which confronted him."
Immediately after the meeting, Dodero made good on his promise to Hoover and met with Perón. Dodero reported that Hoover had "made a fine impression." Dodero himself had pressed the point that it was to Perón's advantage to take "dramatic actions" and described how that might look in practice. All appeared satisfied with the initial interaction between Hoover and Perón. Lunch followed, hosted by Messersmith at the Alvear, offering Hoover an opportunity to mix with both "Argentine authorities" and members of the business community.
Evidence that Perón had been "impressed and disarmed by the old man" soon arrived in the form of unexpected invitations for Hoover and Gibson to attend a "cozy little dinner of 400 in honor of the Special Missions sent to his [Perón's] inauguration." Though pleased by the invitation, Hoover was also "a little perplexed" as to the best response. He harbored "great doubts at accepting this invitation for fear of incidents by super-heated Argentines or unfavorable publicity in the American anti-Argentine press that might interfere with my job." He also "foresaw it would be an enormous melee and not the occasion for accenting the food problem." Both invitees struggled with the disconnect between such formal festivities and their own humanitarian purpose. "Our mission is far too grim to harmonize with banquets. The only question is whether we can convince anybody that this is the genuine reason rather than some political pretext. Above all, we don't want to give offence in return for a friendly reception."
By Saturday morning, Hoover had made his decision. "Maybe we had better go to Mr. Perón's dinner, Hugh. We are here to get the job done and do not wish to ruffle any feelings." Both accordingly attended the banquet accompanied by Messersmith and his wife. Hoover was pleased to note that Messersmith was "steadily losing his fears and becoming more friendly."
Less pleasant was the inaugural dinner experience itself. Hoover grumbled that "I was placed at the 196th place in a dinner of 216 representatives of various governments and of Argentine officials." Always pragmatic, however, Hoover managed to overcome this breech of protocol and his pride. He confides: "I resolved to eat even Argentine dirt if I could get the 1, 600,000 tons" of grain he sought.
Sunday, June 9, began with another impasse with Messersmith. Hoover requested that Messersmith arrange another meeting with Perón. "Messersmith said that nothing could be done on Sundays in the Argentine, that the Argentines never did business that day." He was rather nonplused at being told dryly that "two of the Ministers had been working with me all morning on our plans." Hoover was not wont to waste a moment.
The Sunday afternoon lull offered a good opportunity to meet with members of the business community in Buenos Aires. A lunch meeting was arranged with a group of leading Americans by General Charles Caldwell, recently arrived Military Attaché. The group he invited included top officials from U.S. companies operating in Argentina such as Swift & Co., Goodyear, Standard Oil, General Electric, and the Bank of Boston all of whom expressed uncertainty as to their business prospects under the new Argentine regime. The discussion proved to be "really good and informative." By Gibson's account, once the group "settled down to a good talk," he and Hoover were treated to "an earful:"
They have no idea where the new crowd is heading or what they are going to do to American business. After talking with everybody I have met for the last few days I am in a state of utter confusion – and perhaps the country is as well. I can't get a clear expression of opinion as to whether it is going to the right or to the left.

As for the Argentine business community, Gibson did not offer much sympathy:
Perón is also out for the old gang which has so long been in control in this country. Any shake-up they get is long overdue and I can show a good deal of fortitude about it as they are probably the most selfish, the most entirely mercenary I have ever seen.

Both the international and the Argentine business communities stood to gain from the normalization of relations with the U.S. They were orienting themselves to the new political realities in Argentina, and in a rush to acknowledge the "charms and virtues" of Perón's wife, Eva. Only recently, she had been shunned by the "old gang." They hoped to make amends, but as Gibson notes, "it may be too late."
In addition, Argentina's recent recognition of the Soviet Union, announced the day of Hoover's arrival, and establishment of "formal diplomatic, consular, and trade relations" between the two countries caused a "hullaballoo." Hoover had no doubt that "the Argentines will use the Russian bogie in their blind striking out against past wrong on our part." The alarmist reports circulating in the State Department show the concern over the possibility of secret deals and the "possible effects of Soviet-Argentine ties on trade relations." Gibson, on the other hand, attached "little or no significance" to the Argentine recognition of the Soviets, as most Latin American countries had already done so. With only two weeks of experience in Argentina, Messersmith expressed certainty that "Perón did not in any way endeavor [to] use the Russian efforts here as [an] indirect means [of] applying pressure upon us."
A fresh flurry of activity began with the new work week. Expecting no aid from Messersmith, Hoover again called on Dodero to arrange another meeting with Perón, "hoping to button up… [his]…proposals." It was promptly arranged that Hoover should join Perón for "luncheon alone for a confidential talk with him." Dodero made it clear that Perón "did not want Messersmith" in attendance. Dodero and Dr. Julius Klein, acting as translator, attended the lunch, as well as Lagomasino. Klein recorded the meeting in a memorandum dated 10 June. Perón expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to discuss "Argentine relations with the United States fully and frankly" with Hoover. Hoover was careful to point out that he was not in power at this time, but a "leader of the Opposition." He acknowledged that the democracies of the United States and Argentina were "the two with dominant influences in each of the Continents" and that relations between them should be normalized as quickly as possible. Perón was advised that he should pursue his agenda through "the American Ambassador, who he indicated was most desirous of securing solutions" and this was the proper diplomatic course of action."
Although Perón outlined for Hoover his list of complaints against various U.S. sanctions and restrictions, he refrained from mentioning Braden or the "personal campaign of the State Department" he perceived. Instead, he focused on the "freezing of Argentina's gold in the United States Federal Reserve Bank (approximately $250,000,000)." Perón stated that this "disturbed their currency and credit" and constituted a "major embarrassment." Hoover sympathized and noted that before the war began, Argentina "carried its gold reserve in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and the Argentine banks had large balances in American banks – all of which had been impounded during the war and was still withheld."
The discussion included the shortages of machinery, rubber, and other supplies necessary to meet Hoover's request for increased food exports from Argentina. Hoover had been forewarned by Rafael Torres in Mexico City that the shortage of trucks and tires was limiting Argentine ability to ship food abroad. A document from the Banco Central, provided by Dodero, by was also discussed. It pointed out the striking inequity in the trade balance between the United States and Argentina. While Argentina continued sales to the U.S. with virtually no restrictions, the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., primarily through the work of Hull, Braden, and Morgenthau, made it difficult for it to buy. "The inference was that delay in the negotiation of sale of linseed and oil, among other products, was largely due to this obstacle." In response to Perón's concern over the "shortage of agricultural help, Hoover urged that he look into the possibilities of bringing in some of the 300,000 displaced Poles, who would be thoroughly acceptable as farm hands and co-religionists of the Argentines. This seemed to interest Perón particularly and he said he would follow it up promptly."
While Klein translated the exchanges between Hoover and Perón, Hoover used the time by "examining the furniture of Perón's mind." He came to the conclusion that Perón might be somewhat naïve of governmental housekeeping, but was certainly an ambitious opportunist. However, Hoover also recognized that Perón possessed a:
pleasing personality, a good intellect and [was] a man of courage. I am convinced that he is anxious to pursue two real policies. First, collaboration with the United States; and second, a real program of social reforms which are badly needed. His is anti-Communist, anti-Socialist, he represents the military as against the social and landed aristocracy, the superficial elements of which are rotten. He is demagogic, but without any ideological philosophy, nor do his followers have much of any such philosophy. He is intensely nationalistic, but probably driven so, partly because of his demagogic personality but also partly from American intervention attitudes. He could with guidance be made into a constructive leader, as he is neither vindictive nor malicious, but very proud, being pure Spanish.

Perón's potential as an ally was clearly recognized by the experienced elder statesman. Hoover offered his aid where he felt it was both possible and appropriate. However, Perón was urged to "maintain close contact with the United States Ambassador and not be diverted by unauthorized parties," such as Higgins. Hoover complimented Messersmith as "not only very competent, but most eager to advance Argentina's best interests." Rather than usurping Messersmith's authority or making improbable promises, Hoover augmented the nascent working relationship between Perón and the Ambassador and encouraged cooperation.
Eva Perón joined the gentlemen for luncheon and presided as hostess for that part of the meeting. She easily earned Hoover's praise as an "intelligent woman and very cordial." With gracious style, she insisted on helping Hoover with his coat. Both she and Perón accompanied him to the car. Later Hoover recalls Eva as "a cross between Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Miss Hedy Lemarr, with the brains of the former and the good looks of the latter." At the end of the meeting, Hoover received Perón's assurance that "he was going to issue the necessary decrees (regulations in American terms) at once." Hoover indicated his desire to give a press conference later in the day praising the cooperation he received from Perón. "Perón was pleased at this idea." The press conference was scheduled for late afternoon.
Waiting at the Alvear, Gibson kept his "fingers crossed as this was the high spot of all the Latin-American trip and it was important it be a success." He reported that Hoover and Klein "came back beaming." The team agreed that "the Chief did a superb job and has opened the door for G.S. [Messersmith] to get things back onto a sound basis." Later that evening, Gibson received word "through underground Argentine channels" that "Perón was greatly impressed by the Chief and relieved at the perspectives he had opened." The report from Dodero was also positive. He described Perón as "very enthusiastic" over Hoover's visit.
During the promised press conference, Hoover praised Perón and Argentina for their "utmost cooperation with my mission. …It is a great service that President Perón is undertaking for all the hungry of the world." In addition to pledging to expedite exports, Perón had authorized the "free gift of some 350,000 tons of cereal." With this announcement, the cool audience "showed a distinct mellowing" and a "little burst of applause." When asked about "tangible results," Hoover responded with humility: "It is utterly impossible to measure the problem in those terms." Hoover saw that being free of "written authority" allowed him "give no orders and therefore I have no failures." And yet, as outlined below, those tangible results were promptly forthcoming.
At the behest of Frank Mason, U.S. Legal Attaché James. P. Mahon attended the press conference and was introduced to Hoover. They dined together at the Alvear before embarking on a private conversation, which McMahon records in his report to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on June 11. Hoover stated that Perón had "confidentially advised Mr. Hoover that he was fearful of the possibility of Communist infiltration into Argentine labor unions which might result in Perón losing control of the unions" over which he now had "complete control." In addition, "Hoover stated that Perón gave the impression of being an anti-Communist and … Hoover … believes that Perón was sincere in this instance." Hoover mentioned Perón's disgust over Braden's behavior and suggested that Braden be assigned to a place like Liberia to encourage his resignation. At this point, "Hoover stated that he plans to exert all his influence in the United States Congress to block any further appropriations of the UNRRA, as he considers it Communistic from top to bottom."
Hoover's stay in Buenos Aires concluded and the Faithfull Cow revved her engines for the next segment of their journey. This time, Messersmith graciously accompanied them to the airport. Pate, who had been active in Hoover's relief efforts since WWI, concluded:
I have never seen the Chief handle an intricate picture more determinedly and more understandingly than these last four days in B.A. Starting at zero with the American Ambassador's initial lack of cooperation, Mr. Hoover rose in stature every day both with the Americans and Argentinians.

With his mission successfully completed, Hoover and company continued their journey through South America and home to Washington to follow through on promises made. It is precisely in the follow through, rather than the promises, that Hoover's impact can best be appreciated. Hoover's entourage, all experienced professionals in diplomatic, humanitarian, and public relations, were highly pleased with the results. Having entered the Argentine scene at a crossroad between hostility and cooperation, Hoover had tilted the balance positively on all sides. Aside from generating good will and good intentions, the concrete impact of Hoover's diplomacy appeared immediately following his departure.
As the Faithfull Cow left Buenos Aires, Perón issued the decree recommended by Hoover. Decree No. 353 was signed by Perón and Lagomarsino on June 11. Setting a tone of international cooperation, it called for the Argentine government to "intensify in every way the action which it is taking in aiding the stricken countries of Europe." Perón acknowledged that good intentions "requires [sic] minute attention to all those factors which enter in the mechanism of its execution so that maximum efficiency is assured." In Article One, the "Secretary of Industry and Commerce is authorized to obtain preference and priority for those transportation facilities of any type required in the exportation of products destined to aid the countries affected by the war." Dodero forwarded a copy of Decree No. 353 to Hoover through Klein on 18 June. Confirmation that action had followed words was received one month later. On 18 July, Dodero sent word to Klein through William Pawley (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil) that "Transportation to the seaboard has been expedited to maximum. Besides Europe, we are now loading wheat freely to Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia."
For his part, Hoover lost no time in making good on his promises. Perón had followed Hoover's advice and dealt with Messersmith. Messersmith, on his part, made a formal request to release Argentine funds. During the scant ten days it took Hoover to complete his South American mission and return to Washington, the press was already buzzing about possible action. Argentina's frozen assets (totaling approximately $643,866,000 in 1946 held at a New York Federal Reserve Bank) were a critical test of both Hoover's ability to deliver and of U.S. intent to soften Braden's approach to Perón. The New York Times ran a story on June 20th indicating that the funds in question were "likely to be released shortly as a result of the Argentine Government's request to Ambassador George S. Messersmith."
Hoover met with President Truman the morning of June 20th and brought him up to date on both the Argentine response to the food crisis and the political conundrums created by the aggressive State Department policy. Hoover presented the clear and uncompromising conclusion that there:
is only one course to pursue – and that is to end at once this interference… The seizure of their earmarked gold was not only illegal but immoral. …The continuation of this blockade and the combination of the black list one year after the Germans are licked is only for pressure. The whole of these actions, and others, were to force the opposition into power. In this we were properly licked, and should properly realize it.

Truman appeared surprised that Argentine assets were still being held. "Truman had not known the whole truth of our goings on in maintaining these pressures thirteen months after the war was over." Speed was imperative, stressed Hoover, to secure Perón's most positive response.
Truman "picked up the telephone and called the State Department, reciting these matters, and asked if this were true. I heard only one side of the conversation, but that was sufficient. The President directed that these restraints on gold and trade be dropped at once." Hoover records flatly: "my recommendations were put into action within 48 hours." With Truman's approval, Hoover then sent a telegram to that effect to Perón, through Dodero, adding that "this was a gesture of personal good will from Truman." On June 25, Messersmith called on Bramuglia, "in order to present a note informing him of our release of the Argentine gold in the United States." Bramuglia expressed Argentine appreciation and Messersmith recorded the conversation in his dispatch of the same date.
Confirmation of Hoover's influence can also be found in the telegram from Klein to Dodero, dated June 25th, which reads:
My friend [Hoover] has been vigorous in action with top man [Truman] and secondary officials on subject of memorandum you gave June tenth STOP Definite progress on gold situation will be settled as indication of food will at early moment. Other steps to follow. Kindest regards. Julius Klein

Dodero responded the same day, telegraphing his thanks and remarking that Messersmith is "now in close touch with top man [Perón] here STOP Trust matters progressing satisfactorily." In a memorandum to Hoover, dated July 3, Klein reports that it was "generally recognized in informed official circles that the clearing up of this gold-freezing situation was due in considerable measure to your friendly intercession." Klein goes on to declare that "even [Under-Secretary of State Dean] Acheson has intimated this to inquiring journalists." The observations by both Klein and Dodero verify Hoover's behind-the-scenes influence.
Hoover's positive influence on Perón and intimate access to Truman led to quick, concrete results. His positive impact on Messersmith is slightly more obscure but nonetheless important. As demonstrated above, Hoover was disinclined to appreciate Messersmith's abilities. For his part, Messersmith was opposed to Hoover's mission in principle and in fact, illustrated by his behavior upon Hoover's arrival in Buenos Aires. In his dispatch of June 15, Messersmith complained to Byrnes that he did not approve of Hoover's visit. Messersmith's opinion was well-known in the diplomatic community. William Dawson, U.S. Ambassador in Uruguay (the Faithfull Cow's next stop), confirmed Hoover's suspicion that Messersmith "was not only opposed to me personally but objected to the whole Mission. He obviously sought to isolate himself from it in the eyes of the Argentines by not coming to receive me at the airport and by sending a boy instead." For the first two days of Hoover's stay in Buenos Aires, Messersmith's behavior outlined above corroborates this assessment.
Although Messersmith had already begun to distance himself from Braden's abrasive policies before his arrival in Argentina, he clearly did not relish Hoover's involvement any more than did Braden. Hoover's arrival in Buenos Aires came at a critical turning point for Messersmith. His inherently awkward position is outlined above. The two week interval between Messersmith's arrival in Argentina and Hoover's were overshadowed by inaugural festivities. Perón made a favorable first impression on Messersmith. From his letters and dispatches, it does not appear that Messersmith realized that he had not made a comparable impression on Perón. In fact, Perón's recollection indicates Messersmith was initially approached with defensiveness. Clearly, Hoover's diplomatic finesse tilted the balance more than Messersmith realized. As demonstrated above, Hoover was beyond the political fray, intent on his humanitarian mission. He was horrified by Braden's un-diplomatic activities, but unfailingly promoted gracious diplomacy on all sides. While producing concrete humanitarian and diplomatic results, Hoover facilitated the relationship between Perón and Braden's successor. Perón was repeatedly advised to work with Messersmith, whose competence Hoover praised, and allow the normal diplomatic channels to do their job.
As Messersmith set about doing his job, very much along the lines Hoover advocated, an epic battle ensued between himself and his direct supervisor, Braden. More than any other scholar, Roger Trask focuses directly on the head-to-head confrontation between Messersmith and Braden which resulted in the resignation of both men by 1947. Trask identifies a volte face during the first month of Messersmith's tenure in Buenos Aires. Just after Perón's election in February, Messersmith denounced the election as dishonest and warned that collaboration with Perón would contradict the values fought for in WWII. Trask points to Messersmith's dispatch of June 15, cited above, as evidence that he had come to believe, after two short weeks in Buenos Aires, that the Argentine elections were free and honest, that Perón was genuinely interested in good relations with the United States, and that good progress was being made regarding Argentine compliance with the Act of Chapultepec. While Trask states it is impossible "to document the reasons for Messersmith's apparent transformation," Hoover's timely and unexplored visit to Buenos Aires provides a missing piece of the puzzle.
Oddly enough, a clue to Messersmith's puzzling change of heart and evidence of Hoover's positive influence on him may be found buried in a twenty-seven page dispatch to Byrnes. In his own voice, Messersmith's corroborates Hoover's influence on both himself and Perón:
I, for example, did not particularly welcome the visit of Mr. Hoover to Argentina as I did not believe it particularly proper, nor did I believe it would be particularly productive as far as food is concerned, but I must say that the contact which Mr. Hoover had with President Perón was most helpful, for Mr. Hoover in all his conversations with the President was most correct and most helpful and I think he helped get President Perón to have a better perspective on the whole situation.

Clearly, Hoover's presence and comportment contributed to the reversal in Messersmith's thinking. According to his own insights, Hoover also contributed to Perón's shift in attitude towards both the United States and to the office of U.S. Ambassador.
Messersmith's assessment of Perón, as expressed in the same dispatch, is much closer to Hoover's than to Braden's:
He is an intelligent man, but he is not a well-informed man concerning the rest of the world. His only experience, outside of the Argentine was in Fascist Italy where, I believe, he was Military Attaché, or on some mission. He has no knowledge really of other countries or peoples but, so far as our country is concerned, I think he has real admiration for our achievements in the economic and military field. He has few friends outside of his own country and the few he has are not the best. …If Perón cannot have good friends, he will have bad ones.

Messersmith goes on to make an early pronouncement on his opinion of the proper course of action for the United States to follow in regards to its relationship with Argentina:
In my opinion, we have to forget the past as much as we can and to take him [Perón] at his word and his expressions of good faith and desire for friendship and collaboration at their face value, for if we do not we will lose the one opportunity which we have. To lose this opportunity at this time would be fatal for the Argentine, and in many respects, make more difficult our whole collaboration program in this hemisphere.

This view is diametrically opposed to Braden's virulent policy to oppose Perón at all costs. It is also predictive of the impending confrontation between Messersmith and Braden that was about to engulf the U.S. State Department. Messersmith's dispatch unmistakably advocates a change in official policy.
Subsequently, Messersmith chose to challenge Braden, "firing off to Truman, Byrnes, and Acheson packets containing a lengthy critique" of Braden's continued opposition to Perón. Messersmith advocated embarking on a campaign to improve U.S. relations with Argentina by showing respect for her choice of leadership. Unfortunately, the ensuing conflict partially discredited each man, leading to both of their resignations in June 1947. Relations between the U.S. and Argentina did, of course, normalize. Perón went on to exercise a colossal political impact on his country. The diplomatic climate continued to relax, albeit with spurts of aggravation, during the course of his first term in office.
One question remains to be addressed. Why has Herbert Hoover's impact on the personalities, issues, and events that comprised U.S.-Argentine relations immediately following World War II received such scant attention from scholars? The evidence presented above indicates Hoover did indeed influence the people and events involved. One possibility rests in the political climate of the United States which had relegated Hoover's work to insignificance. Another factor is the increased accessibility of personal and public papers by the principal players. In a 1999 article in Clarín, a Buenos Aires journal, Alberto Amato cites the recent "declassification" of the Hoover Memoranda and claims the reason for the dearth of Hoover studies is due to the inaccessibility of these documents. Despite a small error, Amato's was the first mention of Hoover's 1946 visit to Argentina for almost half a century. Indexing errors and selective extracting add to the possible reasons for the silence.
Notwithstanding the lack of scholarly attention, Hoover and his companions aboard the Faithfull Cow clearly had a subtle influence in Buenos Aires on several fronts, even if that role has remained obscure in diplomatic history. On the food front, Hoover obtained a degree of humanitarian cooperation that was not possible for the U.S. Ambassadors nor for the UNRRA representatives who had preceded him. On the personal front, Hoover was able to overcome Messersmith's reluctance to accept Hoover's involvement and Perón's distrust of Braden's successor and envoy. On the diplomatic front, Hoover soothed Perón's smoldering resentment of U.S. interference and redirected him to conventional diplomatic channels. By reporting directly to Truman, Hoover avoided the pitfalls of State Department bickering and skepticism. Hoover's personal character, the tone he set, as well as his immediate access to President Truman all contributed to his successful mission.
The evidence above clearly establishes that Hoover exerted a perceptible and understated influence in the relations between the United States and Argentina. Hoover's insightful assessments of people and situations demonstrate a similarly subtle influence on the thoughts and actions of Messersmith, Perón and Truman. By facilitating a working relationship between Messersmith and Perón, Hoover's influence was felt throughout the State Department. By speaking with authenticity and following through with concrete action, Hoover positively influenced Argentine public opinion. A period of productive cooperation between the U.S. and Argentina was initiated. Given that Argentina was the strongest, most developed nation in Latin America at the time and the fact that several Latin American leaders were instrumental in facilitating Hoover's success, it can justifiably be argued that his impact was felt throughout the hemisphere. Thus, although Hoover's work was outside of formal diplomatic relations and was greeted with muted appreciation, his uncommon diplomacy and quiet influence left a discernable trail of changed perceptions and improved cooperation between the United States and Argentina.


Maurice Pate, "Diary," Post-Presidential File, Famine Emergency Committee, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, March 17 and June 6, 1946. The Faithfull Cow, so named because of the mooing sounds made by her wings, was a Douglas C54-E plane provided for Hoover's use by the Air Transport Command and a sister plane to the Sacred Cow which acted as Air Force One.
Timothy Walch and Dwight M. Miller, eds., Herbert Hoover and Harry S. Truman: A Documentary History (Worland, Wyoming: High Plains Publishing Company, 1992), 61-66.
Hoover's colossal success in managing the massive emergency operation providing food to blockaded Belgian citizens during World War I. By the end of the war, Hoover's organization staved off starvation for much of Europe. See George Nash, The Humanitarian (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988) and Master of Emergencies (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996). As his work in Russia in 1921 following the Russian Revolution demonstrates, Hoover believed providing food to be a helpful political tool while withholding food was a political and moral anathema. Bertrand Patenaude, The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002).
Hoover was instrumental in the Commission for the Relief of Poland and many other war time relief organizations. Herbert Hoover, An American Epic, Vol. 4: The Gun Cease Killing and the Saving of Life from Famine Begins 1939-1963 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964). See also George Nash, ed., Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2012); Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
Hoover's team included Hugh Gibson (a retired ambassador with wide international and humanitarian experience), Maurice Pate (currently Director of Relief to American and Allied Prisoners of War for the American Red Cross, later founder or UNICEF), Dennis Fitzgerald (Director of Requirements and Allocations of the Department of Agriculture), Frank E. Mason (Press Attaché, as a Reserve Colonel in the U.S. Army Intelligence), and Dr. Julius Klein (Communication Attaché, formerly Secretary of Commerce).
Hull held the office of Secretary of State from 1933-1944; Stettinius from late 1944 to June 1945; and Byrnes served from July 1945 to January 1947.
Rockefeller held the post of Assistant Secretary of State from December 1944 to August 1945. Braden assumed this position after being recalled from his ambassadorial post in Argentina, October 1945 to June 1947. See Gerard Colby with Charlotte Dennett, Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995).
Braden served as Ambassador from May to October 1945. After a tense interlude, Messersmith served from April 1946 to June 1947.
George I. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Robert D. Crassweller, Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1987); Guido diTella and D. Cameron Watt, eds., Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939-1946 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990); Glenn J. Dorn, Peronistas and New Dealers: U.S.-Argentine Rivalry and the Western Hemisphere (1946-1950), (New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2005); Joseph Page, Perón: A Biography, (New York: Random House, 1983); Alberton Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy, 1930-1962 trans. John J. Kennedy, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966); Mario Rapoport, "Argentina and the Soviet Union: History of Political and Commercial Relations (1917-1955)," The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 1986); Mario Rapoport, Politica y diplomacia en la Argentina: Las relaciones con EE.UU. y la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1987); Raanan Rein, In the Shadow of Peron: Juan Atilio Bramuglia and the Second Line of Argentina's Populist Movement, trans. Martha Grenzeback (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 1987); Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Albert P. Vannucci, "The Influence of Latin American Governments on the Shaping of United States Foreign Policy: The Case of U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1943-1948," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Nov., 1986), 357; Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).
The best sources of information about the intricacies of Hoover's South American journey come from the diaries and letters of Hoover and his companions. Hoover's diary (Hoover Presidential Library) entries from June 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1946 are crucial for understanding how the complicated threads of this story are interwoven. Frank Mason chronicled both the European and the Latin American segments of Hoover's humanitarian travels with his witty and engaging "Dear Julius" letters (Hoover Presidential Library). Pertinent here are those dated June 6-11, 1946. Providing both color and corroboration are the diaries of Hugh Gibson (Hoover Institution), Frank Mason and Maurice Pate (Hoover Presidential Library), also covering the June 6-11 dates. The papers of George Messersmith (University of Delaware) add perspective and provide confirmation of Hoover's influence. Spruille Braden presents his own case in Diplomats and Demagogues, (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1971). John Moors Cabot adds the depth and perspective of his experiences in Buenos Aires, First Line of Defense: Forty Years' Experiences of a Career Diplomat, (Washington, D.C.: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1979). Juan Perón discusses his view of recent events (1944-1946) in U.S.-Argentine relations in Yo, Juan Domingo Perón, edited by Torcuato Luca de Tena, Luis Calvo, and Estban Peicovich (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1976).
Bertram H. Raven, "Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power," Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1990): 493-520.
"Scope and Content Note," Frank E. Mason Papers, Hoover Presidential Library, http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/historicalmaterials/other/mason.htm. Mason recruited Neil MacNeil of the New York Times to take the lead in breaking this boycott.
Illustrative of the Latin American press (including reports from Argentina, Chile and Peru) are the following articles from the Famine Emergency Committee file at the Hoover Institution, Palo Alto: "Gestiona Envios de Alimentos," La Epoca (Buenos Aires: 7 de Junio de 1946); "La Responsabilidad de Salvar al Genero Humano Gravita Seriamente Sobre El Mondo," El Mercurio (Santiago: 6 de Junio de 1946); "Tres Meses, de Julio a Setiembre Durará lo MásIntenso de la Crisi Alimenticia en Europa," La Prensa (Lima: 4 de Junio d 1946); "Hay que agotar todo esfuerzo en pro de los pueblos necesitados para defender la civilización europa," La Cronica (Lima: 4 de Junio de 1946); "La Visita de Seňor Hoover," El Comercio (Lima: 4 de Junio de 1946); "Mr. Herbert Hoover Expected To-Day: Investigating and Planning for U.N.R.R.A." The Buenos Aires Herald, (June 6, 1946); "Herbert Hoover Due To-Day," The Standard, (June 6, 1946). See also "There is No Southern Block, There is Only Continental Solidarity: Messersmith is the Ambassador Who Discovered Peron," Democracia (Buenos Aires: August 5, 1946), translation located in Messersmith Papers.
Two examples from the collection of clippings housed at Hoover Institution and the Hoover Presidential Library are illustrative: "Gestiona Envios de Alimentos," La Epoca (Buenos Aires: 7 de Junio de 1946) and "UNRRA's Investigator Arrives: Herbert Hoover Returns to B.A. After 18 Years," The Buenos Aires Herald, (June 7, 1946).
Mario Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Argentina During the Second World War," Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939-1946, eds. Guido di Tella and D. Cameron Watt (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 86. Rapoport reports that U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, among others in U.S. diplomatic circles, acknowledged "Peron would probably be the next president" as early as April 1945.
Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1971); Gary Frank, Juan Peron vs. Spruille Braden: The Story Behind the Blue Book (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980); Ruth and Leonard Greenup, Revolution Before Breakfast: Argentina 1941-1946 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1947; John C. Kesler, "Spruille Braden As A Good Neighbor: The Latin American Policy of the United States, 1930-1947," (PhD diss., Kent State University, 1985); Jose Vicente Pepper, I Accuse Braden (Trujillo City, Dominican Republic: Editora Montalvo, 1947); Shirley N. Rawls, "Spruille Braden: A Political Biography," (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1976).
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," 91.
D. Cameron Watt, "Introduction," in Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939-1946, eds. Guido di Tella and D. Cameron Watt (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), x-xi. Watt states that this distorted image of Argentina and Peronism was "spread assiduously by the Latin American Left and possibly by the British Secret Intelligence Service."
"Spruille Braden: Democracy's Bull," Time, 5 November 1945. Cover story.
Leandro Morgenfeld, "Nelson Rockefeller and the normalization of Argentina-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1945," (2011), 5. www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/morgenfeld.pdf.
Carlos Escudé, "US Political Destabilization and Economic Boycott of Argentina during the 1940's," in Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939-1946, eds. Guido di Tella and D. Cameron Watt (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 61.
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 2, 1402.
Richard Pattee, "The Argentine Question: The War Stage," The Review of Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1946), 476.
Escudé, "US Political Destabilization," op. cit., 60.
Morgenfeld, op. cit., 7. These were Alejandro Shaw and Carlos Tornquist.
Ibid., 8.
Dorn, Peronistas, 38.
The Act of Chapultepec, the final resolution of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (held in Mexico City in March 1945), was designed to "provide a framework for the reintegration of Argentina" into the Inter-American fold. Messersmith was U.S. Ambassador to Mexico at this time. Dorn, op. cit., 38. The Argentine delegation to Chapultepec signed the resultant Act of Chapultepec on March 8, 1945 (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chapul.asp). The Argentine government ratified its commitment to compliance with Decree No. 6945/45, signed by President Edelmiro Farrell and countersigned by several government officials including Juan Perón. ("Argentina Declares War Against Japan and Germany, March 28, 1945" Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/argentinawar.htm).
Escudé, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 93.
Fraser Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Winter, 1981-1982), pp. 623-639.
Carlos Escudé, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinacion argentina, 1941-1949 (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983), 177, quoted in Morgenfeld, 15. Perón was widely regarded as the "power behind the throne."
Escudé, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 87.
Morgenfeld, op. cit., 9.
"Summary of Conversations with Vice President Peron." Warren Report, April 24, 1945, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Department of State 20, Rockefeller Archive Center. , quoted in Morgenfeld, op. cit., 15.
Schoultz, Beneath the United States, op. cit., 309.
Braden, op. cit., 318.
Ibid., 319.
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service List (GPO: 1 July 1945 and: 1 October 1945), 1-2.
Braden, op. cit., 320.
Morgenfeld, op. cit., 15, n. 10.
Escudé, "US Political Destabilisation," op. cit., 62.
Braden, Dipolmats and Demagogues, op. cit., 325. Abrazo describes a distinctly Latin American form of embrace.
Braden, op. cit., 328-330; di Tella, Yo, Juan Domingo Peron, op. cit., 71-76.
Schoultz, op. cit., 321.
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 93.
Morgenfeld, op. cit., 10.
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 92.
Schoultz, op. cit., 321. Also see "Spruille Braden: Democracy's Bull," Time, 5 November 1945.
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 93.
diTella, Yo, Peron, op. cit., 82. Translated by John Rector.
Schoultz, op. cit., 321.
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 93.
"Argentina: In Plain Words," Time, (Sept. 10, 1945).
Cabot, First Line of Defense, op. cit., 25.
Braden, op. cit., 340.
Rapoport, "Foreign and Domestic Policy," op. cit., 98. It is interesting to note that Peron perceived Braden as working with the communists against him; Di Tella, Yo, Peron, op. cit., 77.
Braden, op. cit., 342.
Schoultz, op. cit., 322.
Braden, op. cit., 357. The Blue Book is discussed at length by all of the scholars cited above.
Schoultz, op. cit., 322.
Schoultz, op. cit., 325; "Argentina: Messersmith Arrives." Time (Jun. 3, 1946); "Career Man's Mission." Time (Dec. 2, 1946).
Braden, op. cit., 359. Braden made this statement despite a letter from Messersmith, dated 16 March 1946, expressing waning support. Jesse H. Stiller, George S. Messersmith: Diplomat of Democracy, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 241.
"Foreign Relations: Messersmith's Nose." Time (Apr. 15, 1946).
Dorn, Perónistas, op. cit., 88.
Page, Perón, op. cit., 182.
Rapoport, "Argentina and the Soviet Union," op. cit., 254.
Herbert Hoover Diary, June 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1946, South American Trip, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Hoover Diary, (South American Journey, prologue).
Richard Cavendish, "Juan Peron Overthrown." History Today. Vol. 55, No. 9, (Sept., 2005), 53. Cavendish also reports Peron's falling out with the Catholic Church and his excommunication in June, 1955. Perón's Catholic background and the Church's support of his Presidential campaign is also attested to in Joseph Page, Perón: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1983), 146-147. For more on Peron's relations with the Church, see Austen Ivereigh, Catholicism and Politics in Argentina 1810-1960 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
Hoover, American Epic, vol. 4, 211.
Hoover Diary, (Argentina June 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1946), op. cit., 1.
Hoover Diary, 1. For more information on Dodero, see "Faithfull Down to Rio" Time, (Dec. 10, 1945) and "Abdication of a Tycoon," Time, May 16, 1949.
diTella, Yo, Peron, op. cit., 106. My translation.
Hugh Gibson, Memorandum (Mexico City, May 27, 1946), Hoover Institution Archives, Famine Emergency Committee, Box 12, File 10.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946.
J. Byrnes, "Extracts," Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. 9. The list of recipients was confirmed by Matthew Schaefer, Hoover Presidential Library, e-mail message to author, Sept. 24, 2009.
Stiller, Messersmith, op. cit., 237. Stiller describes the "conspicuously" numerous U.S. flags along the route between the U.S. Embassy and the Casa Rosada on May 23, 1946 as Messersmith crossed Buenos Aires to present his credentials to the outgoing Argentine government. That Braden left ill-will behind in Argentina is demonstrated by the indictment against John Griffiths in the 1948 assassination attempt on the lives of Juan and Evita Perón. Articles published by Time ("Argentina: To Defend the President," 10/4/1948) and Der Spiegel ("Something Went Crooked" 10/10/1951) link Griffiths, Braden and Messersmith with anti-American hyperbole.
Stiller, Messersmith, op. cit., 237. Stiller describes the "conspicuously" numerous U.S. flags along the route between the U.S. Embassy and the Casa Rosada on May 23, 1946 as Messersmith crossed Buenos Aires to present his credentials to the outgoing Argentine government.
diTella, Yo, Peron, op. cit., 82. Original: "Siempre que hable conmigo tenga presente estas dos premisas fundamentales: que gobierno el pueblo mas delicado y sensible de la tierra, y que yo soy el gobernante de ese pueblo." Trans. by John Rector. Another sign of Peron's lack of regard for Messersmith is that his name is incorrectly recorded as "Ambassador Miller."
Stiller, Messersmith, op. cit., 238.
Rein, Shadow of Peron, op. cit., 105.
"Latin America: Great Day," Time, 17 June 1946.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., 6 June 1946. Gibson's diary, as well as that of Hoover, Pate, and Mason, is replete with grand receptions around the world.
Pate Diary, op. cit., 6 June, 1946.
"UNRRA's Investigator Arrives: Herbert Hoover Returns to B.A. After 18 Years." Buenos Aires Herald, June 7, 1946.
"Latin America: Great Day," Time, June 17, 1946. The New York Times carried several stories regarding the incidents reported above: "Peron sends Plane for Andrew Higgins," NYT, June 3, 1946; "Braden Sows U.S.-Argentine Discord, Says Higgins, "Humiliated" by Slur to Peron," NYT, June 5, 1946; "Peron Aide Offers Apologies to U.S.," NYT, June 6, 1946
Mason, "Dear Julius" Letters, op. cit., (June 11, 1946), 3.
"Braden Sows U.S.-Argentine Discord, Says Higgins, "Humiliated" by Slur to Peron," New York Times, June 5, 1946, 11.
S. Braden, Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas, Dept. of State, Publication 2640, Inter-American Series 32, GPO. Address delivered before the Executive's Club of Chicago in Chicago, Ill. On Sept. 13, 1946, 11. This policy may have been formed partially in response Higgins' performance in Argentina.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 2.
Gibson, Diary, op. cit., June 7, 1946; Pate, Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946, 114. Bunge was related to the influential Bunge family with whom Hoover had worked in Belgium after the First World War
Hoover, American Epic, vol.4, op. cit., 210.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 2.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946.
Pate Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946.
Idem.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 2.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946.
Pate Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 3.
Idem, 1-2.
The "Julius" in this salutation refers to Dr. Julius Klein, an economist, historian, and Hoover's Latin American expert. He remained in Washington for the European and Asian segments of the trip. He received and shared Frank Mason's letters with mission-members' families. Although Klein was present on the South American trip, the tradition was continued.
"Dear Julius" Letters, June 11, 1946, Famine Emergency Committee Collection, Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, 1.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 9, 1946.
Pate Diary, op. cit., 115.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 4.
Idem.
Idem.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 7, 1946.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 4.
Idem.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 5.
Smith, Uncommon Man, op. cit., 359.
Pate Diary, op. cit., June 7, 1946.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 7, 1946.
Pate Diary, op. cit., June 8, 1946.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 5.
Idem.
Although Hoover's entire Argentine visit has been under-studied by Latin American scholars, Hoover scholars and scholars of WWII relief efforts have reported this comment with relish. For examples, see: Hoover and Truman: A Presidential Friendship, "Feeding the World," http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/world.htm; Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 359; and Mark Wyman, DP's: Europe's Displaced Person, 1945-1951 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 171.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 6.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 9, 1946. Gibson lists these guests: Fred Six of Swift & Co.; William Reece of Electric Bond and Share; H.A. Arnold of AT & T; David Hastings of Goodyear; Herman Metzger of Standard Oil; Charles C. Barchedlder of General Electric in Argentina; and Hilary A Driscoll of the Bank of Boston Corporation. All of these people held top positions within their respective organizations.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 9, 1946. On June 24, the New York Times ran an article entitled "Americans in Argentina Suggest U.S. Place Trade Over Politics," suggesting that the views of the American business community in Argentina were similar to those reported by Hugh Gibson. "Americans in Argentina Suggest U.S. Place Trade Over Politics," New York Times, June 24, 1946.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 9, 1946.
Idem.
Rapoport, "Argentina and the Soviet Union," op. cit., 255.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 10.
Rapoport, "Argentina and the Soviet Union," op. cit., 257.
Gibson, Diary, op. cit., June 6, 1946. Frank Mason recorded a classic response from Perón, when doggedly questioned about which side he would choose in the event of war between the United States and Russia. According to the account Mason heard, Perón responded that the "Argentine would pursue an Argentine policy." Eva Perón was present when this story was told and smilingly interjected: "And remember, the United States has the atomic bomb." Gibson notes that Perón was "pleased with this bit of repartee and repeated it often." (Mason, Dear Julius, June 11, 1946).
Messersmith, (May 29, 1946), op. cit., 2.
Hoovey Diary, op. cit., 6.
Idem. Another sign of Peron's lack of regard for Messersmith can be found in diTella, Yo, Peron. After describing his fury at Braden, Peron does not even record Messersmith's name correctly, calling him Ambassador Miller (page 82).
Julius Klein, "Memorandum of Mr. Hoover's luncheon conference with President Juan D. Peron, at the President's Residence – Buenos Aires," (Monday, June 10, 1946). http://media.nara.gov/media/images/28/19/28-1898a.gif (accessed 4/14/2009).
Idem.
Hoover, American Epic, vol. 4, op. cit., 213.
Frank Mason, "Confidential Remarks of Rafael Torres at a Meeting in Mexico City 10 A.M., May 27, 1946" (May 27, 1964), 1. Torres commented on the plethora of aid requests being made to Argentina and the competency of the UNRRA "grain man" there. He also remarked that the Argentines "just would not talk to anybody in the [U.S.] Embassy and reported being informed by "the State Department" that "you won't get one boatload of food out of the Argentine." (p 2).
Idem.
Klein, Memorandum, op. cit., June 10, 1946.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., (June 23, 1946), 1.
Klein, "Memorandum, op. cit., June 10, 1946, p 3.
Hoover Diary (June 6-10, 1946), op. cit., 7.
Hoover, American Epic, vol. 4, op. cit., 213.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., June 6-10, 1946, 6.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., June 10, 1946), 1.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., 7.
Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road, 1945-1948, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949), 252-253.
Gibson Diary, op. cit., (June 10, 1946), 1.
Hoover, "Memorandum of Press Conference," Buenos Aires, op. cit., June 10, 1946.
James P. McMahon, Legal Attaché, Embassy of the United States, Buenos Aires, Argentina, to J. Edgar Hoover, June 11, 1946, file 62-65153-26, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.
Hoover, "Memorandum of Press Conference," Buenos Aires, June 10, 1946.
Pate Diary, op. cit., (June 11, 1946).
Decree No. 353 signed by Peron and Rolando Lagomarsino (Secretary of Industry and Commerce), Buenos Aires, June 11, 1946, forwarded by Dodero on June 18, 1946. Copies of both the cablegram and decree are located in the United States Presidents Famine Emergency Committee Collection, Box 22 Folder 11, Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, California.
Cablegram from William Pawley to Julius Klein, July 18, 1946, Rio de Janeiro. U.S. Presidents Famine Emergency Committee Collection, Box 22 Folder 11, Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, California.
"U.S. Likely to Free Argentine Funds," New York Times (June 20, 1946).
Hoover Diary, op. cit., June 23, 1946, 2.
Herbert Hoover, An American Epic (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1964), 4:213-214. The assertion that Hoover was instrumental in Truman's action is verified by the introduction to the online version of Hoover and Truman-Chapter 2: "Feeding the World" located on the Truman Library website. The telling portion reads: "Peron agreed to ship surplus food to Europe if Hoover would persuade Truman to lift U.S. restrictions on the return of Argentine gold deposits in American banks. Both men kept their word; Hoover convinced Truman to lift the banking restrictions and Peron had grain moved from Buenos Aires to Europe in a matter of weeks." www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/world.htm.
Hoover Diary, op. cit., June 23, 1946, 4.
Dodero and Klein maintained a link between Hoover and Perón. At 5:44 p.m. Klein received a forwarded message from Dodero indicating Argentina's "warmest welcome." Telegram from Woodward to the Secretary of State relaying Dodero's telegram message to Klein (Habana: June 20, 1946), Hoover Institution Archives, Famine Emergency Committee, Box 6, Folder 8.
Hoover Diaries, op. cit., June 23, 1946, 4.
Messersmith to Byrnes, June 25, 1946. United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1946. The American Republics, Vol.11, GPO, 1946, 266.
Julius Klein, Telegram to Alberto Dodero, June 25, 1946. Hoover Institution, Famine Emergency Committee, Box 6, Folder 8.
Alberto Dodero, Telegram to Julius Klein, June 25, 1946. Hoover Institution, Famine Emergency Committee, Box 6, Folder 8.
Julius Klein, Memorandum to Herbert Hoover, July 3, 1946. Hoover Institution, Famine Emergency Committee, Box 6, Folder 8.
Messersmith to Byrnes, (June 15, 1946, 19), Messersmith Papers. In the May 29, 1946 telegram to Byrnes, Messermith reported Peron's willingness to share Argentina's "considerable grain" were it not for the lack of trucks and tires which were unavailable due to Braden-inspired restrictions. From Messersmith's point of view on that day, Hoover's visit was superfluous.
Hoover Diaries, op. cit., June 23, 1946, 3.
Roger R. Trask, "Spruille Braden vesus George Messersmith: World War II, the Cold War, and Argentine Policy, 1945-1947," Journal of Interamerican Studies, Vol. 26, No.1 (Feb., 1984), 69-95.
Ibid, 80.
Messersmith to Byrnes, June 15, 1946, 19, Messersmith Papers. Messersmith had a reputation for lengthy reports. In the Time cover story on him (Dec. 2, 1946), he is described as having "snowed Washington under voluminous surveys." He had earned the moniker "Forty-Page George." On his reputation for lengthy writings, see Stiller, Messersmith, 76-78.
Ibid, 20. The difficulty in accessing this passage was exacerbated by the fact that "Hoover, Herbert" was not included in the indexing of Messersmith's papers. Personal communication from Rebecca Melvin Johnson of the University of Delaware Archives in an email dated August 17, 2009.
Ibid, 18-19.
Ibid, 19.
Stiller, Messersmith, op. cit., 246.
Whitaker, United States and Argentina, op. cit., 221.
Alberto Amato, "Perón y Hoover: los duelistas," Clarìn, Jan. 24, 1999, http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1999/01/24/i-01001e.htm. (accessed 5/9/2009) Translated by Stephen Yant, 5/19/2009.
The Hoover documents actually have been available to the public in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library for over forty years as they are considered "personal papers" rather than "official government records and … therefore not subject to legal restrictions." Spencer Howard, Hoover Presidential Library archivist, email to author (May 19, 2009).
The omission of Hoover's name in the index of the Papers of George S. Messersmith, housed at the University of Delaware, obscured Messersmith's personal response to Hoover's visit. Rebecca Johnson Melvin, University of Delaware archivist, Email to author (August 17, 2009). The reference to Hoover, cited above, was found buried in the middle of a paragraph near the end of a lengthy letter chosen for this paper by its date (June 15, 1946, just after Hoover's visit).
Volume XI of the Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics, reproduces "extracts" of Messersmith's 15 June. Again, the reference to Hoover had been omitted, rendering it unfindable short of scrutinizing the document itself.