Transcendental Truth

TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTH Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Logical Truth When we commonly or ordinarily speak of truth or the true we mean logical truth, which is the conformity of the mind or intellect (by means of our judgments) with things (with reality). If Joe, for example, says that the lights in the auditorium are turned on when in reality the auditorium is pitch black, he has not made a true statement but rather a false one, since his statement did not conform with what is, with the real state of things. If I say that I am holding an apple when in reality it is an apple I am holding, what I have affirmed is true since it agrees with what is, with reality. Truth always implies a relation between being and intellect, but this relation can be considered from either of its terms, that is, either as based in the intellect or as grounded in being. Based in the intellect we have logical truth, the conformity of the mind or intellect (by means of our judgments) to the thing (to reality): adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Now, logical truth is not given in sense knowledge, nor in simple apprehension (the first operation of the mind), but in the judgment (the second operation of the mind). Logical truth is not given in sense knowledge for the senses are unaware of their conformity to being, that is, to reality. Even though the senses are intentionally conformed to material reality, nevertheless, they cannot know this conformity, are unable to measure their own relationship with what is, the real. Therefore, strictly speaking, logical truth is not given in sense knowing. Llano writes: “Truth, strictly and formally considered – ‘logical truth’ – does not occur in sense knowledge. Naturally, with this I am not trying to say that our senses trick us, or that sensation does not correspond to the thing which the senses know. I only wish to point out that the conformity which happens in the senses is not the conformity of truth, precisely because it is not cognitively possessed as such. To possess the truth means to know the conformity; but the senses do not know their conformity in any way whatsoever; for example, even though the sense of sight possesses the image of what it sees, it does not know that conformity exists between the thing seen and the image which it perceives.1 In every sensation there is awareness of sensing but – since the sense faculty is not reflexive – this is not equivalent to knowing the conformity between the thing and what the senses grasp about the thing.”2 Neither is logical truth to be found in the first operation of the mind, namely, simple apprehension (simplex apprehensio, which is the act by which the intellect grasps or perceives something without affirming or denying anything about it, its material object being the thing apprehended by thought, its formal object being some essence, nature, or ‘quiddity). Llano writes: “The intellect can know its conformity to the thing known. But the intellect does not grasp this conformity at the level of its first operation – ‘simple apprehension’ – by which it knows the essence or quiddity of a thing as it forms the corresponding concept…The conformity between the concept and that which it represents is not formally and explicitly known in the simple mental operation by which the concept is formed and known. If, for example, I think of 1 2

Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 3. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, p. 33.

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what ‘red’ means, there is no doubt that there is in my mind a real conformity with the object of this concept and, ultimately, with whatever the concept has been extracted from: for example, this specific rose which I now see. But to have the concept of redness is not the same thing as formally to know its conformity to a real thing: this rose.3 “The concept is a simple representative species, not a complex one. When one understands or says something uncomplex, the simple aspect grasped is – of itself – neither adequate nor inadequate to the thing. Equality and inequality are said by comparison, and the concept does not contain in itself any comparison with – or application to – the thing from which it was derived. Therefore a concept cannot properly be called true or false. This can only be affirmed of that which is complex, of that which designates the comparison of the simple apprehension to the thing apprehended, by representing composition or division.4 Now simple apprehension, in knowing what a thing is (quod quid est), apprehends the essence of the thing by means of a certain comparison with the thing itself, since it grasps the essence as the quiddity of this – and not some other – specific thing. And therefore we must make clear that even though the concept is not, of itself, true or false, nonetheless the intellect which apprehends what a thing is is said to be always, of itself, true, even though it might be false accidentally (because however simple a concept may be in itself, it always includes some complexity of notes which might not agree among themselves).”5 Logical truth, therefore, is found, properly speaking, in the second operation of the mind, which is judgment.6 Gardeil explains that “though its power of reflection the intellect is capable of passing judgment upon its knowledge by comparing its apprehension with the thing apprehended, and thus it becomes aware of the conformity with its object. So that it is in judgment (the second operation of the mind) that the intellect comes in possession of truth as a known or recognized conformity; which, for the intellect, is obviously a more perfect state of affairs that the unrecognized conformity in simple apprehension. Logical truth is precisely the truth as known, the conformity that has entered the awareness of the intellect.”7 Llano writes: “Just as the truth, formally considered, is found in a more principal sense in the intellect than in things, so too, it is found more principally in the intellect which judges, forming a proposition, than in the act by which the intellect forms concepts, knowing the essences of things. The intellect can be true or false, in the strict sense, when it judges the thing apprehended. And therefore truth is found primarily in the intellect composing and dividing, i.e., in judgment; and only secondarily in the intellect forming concepts.8 “Truth is the identification of the knower in act with the known in act. Now, at the level of simple apprehension, the intellect is still not in act with respect to the complete knowledge of the being of the thing. This complete actualization comes about only in judgment. As Hoenen has pointed out: from this perspective the difference between these two operations of the mind consists in that: ‘During apprehension the mind does not yet know that the content of its 3

Cf. A. MILLÁN PUELLES, Fundamentos de Filosofía, Rialp, Madrid, 1976, p. 460. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, ch. 59. 5 A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 6 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 2, c. 7 H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St. Louis, 1967, p. 136. 8 Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 3. 4

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representation is in conformity (or not) with reality, with the res; when it judges, however, it does know.’9 “The intellect – in contrast to the senses – can know its conformity with the intelligible thing. However, it does not perceive this conformity when it knows the essences of things, but rather when it judges that the thing really is the same as the form of the thing which it apprehends. This is when it knows and says the truth. And the intellect does this by composing and dividing because in any proposition, what it does is apply to – or separate from – something signified by the subject, the form signified by the predicate.10 “In judgment something new and decisive appears: reference to the real being of a thing. (This reference takes place – although in a remote and indirect way – even in judgments about fictitious beings.) In a proposition there is a comparison between that which is apprehended and the thing, since the proposition affirms (or denies) that the thing really has (in the order of being) the form which is attributed to it in the predicate. In judgment we turn back upon simple apprehension, and that which had been grasped somehow as one (per modum unius) – in a synthetic apprehension – is now analyzed, and the different aspects of the thing are distinguished with different concepts, which are then composed by judgment in accord with the composition which, in the thing itself, obtains between subject and form. “Judgment includes: the construction of a proposition; the knowledge of the conformity between the terms in re; and assent. The force of assent refers the content of the proposition to reality, confering upon it the relevance of truth. Judgment bears within itself an ‘ontological commitment,’ a declaration about the reality of things; therefore it must – in principle – be true or false. “In simple apprehension the human spirit already possesses a similitude of the known thing, but it does not yet know this; while in judgment ‘not only does it have the similitude of the thing, but also it reflects upon this similitude, knowing it and judging it.’11 In a judgment which refers to a simple apprehension the knower acquires a complete knowledge about the real content of the apprehension; he now knows that – in the concept – he possesses a similitude with the thing, and he is aware of the conformity: he knows that what he knows is the thing. And he has acquired this greater intensity of knowledge by means of a reflection upon the act in which he knew a real content.12”13 9

A. HOENEN, La théorie du jugement d’après St. Thomas d’Aquin, Analecta Gregoriana, Rome, 1953, p. 9. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 2. 11 In VI Metaphysicorum, lect. 4, no. 1236. 12 Cf. A. HOENEN, op. cit., p. 5. 13 A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 34-36. Regarding the kind of reflection involved in judgments, Sanguineti states that “in any judgment, the intellect makes an implicit reflection on the content of its own operations. This reflection is concomitant with the first intentional act, and leads the intellect to know whether or not what it thinks is real”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, p. 110). Concerning the concomitant reflection involved in judgments, Clavell explains that “la consapevolezza della sua adeguazione alla realtà, che si dà nel giudizio, comporta che in questa operazione della mente c’è una riflessione. Questa riflessione però è concomitante, cioè non è una nuova operazione che si aggiunga al giudizio. Se per conoscere l’adeguazione fosse necessario un atto di conoscenza diverso, sarebbe anche necessario un altro atto per conoscere la validità o adeguazione dell’ultimo e così via: ci troveremmo in un processo all’infinito. Quindi in ogni giudizio c’è una riflessione concomitante, con cui si avverte l’esattezza del giudizio. Con uno stesso atto conosco una certa realtà e sono consapevole (aspetto riflessivo) 10

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Transcendental Truth Logical truth, as was already mentioned, is the conformity of the intellect to the thing by means of judgment. But though truth primarily (per prius) is said of the intellect, logical truth or truth of the understanding must depend upon real being (ens reale): veritas supra ens fundatur. For example, when I say that the thing in front of me is a tall pine tree, it is clear that the actual, real thing in front of me is presupposed by the truth of the understanding and is the measure of my intellect. So logical truth has a foundation in the truth of things or what is called ontological or transcendental truth. Truth per prius has a foundation in truth per posterius. Individual beings (entia), in fact, have a truth in themselves. If logical truth is adequatio intellectus ad rem, the conformity of intellect (by means of judgment) to thing (to reality), ontological or transcendental truth (also called the truth of things), on the other hand, is the conformity of thing to intellect: adaequatio rei ad intellectum. Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: “a) The truth of things is the basis and measure of the human intellect: natural things, from which our intellect draws its knowledge, measure our intellect. As St. Thomas states: ‘any being is known to the extent that it is actual, and consequently the actuality of each thing is a sort of light within that being.’14 This inner light (which is, in the final analysis, nothing but the act of being) is what makes it true and intelligible. Hence, the relation of beings to man’s intellect is merely a relation of reason; things do not acquire any new (real) relation when they are understood by man. Their truth does not depend on whether or not man knows them; on the contrary, our intellect has a real dependence on ontological truth. “The truth attributed to things in reference to the human intellect, is in some way accidental to them, since they would still exist by themselves (in their essence) even assuming that man’s intellect did not or even could not exist. But the truth attributed to things in reference to the divine intellect is inseparable from them, since their very subsistence depends on God’s Intellect, which gives them the act of being.15 “Being cannot, therefore, be reduced to its intelligibility for man: being is not the same as being understood, or being perceived as Berkeley claimed (“esse est percipi”). Immanentist philosophies consider intelligibility as the basis of being, thus seeing everything the other way around. For instance, idealism considers things only insofar as they are objects of knowledge. But ‘object’ in idealism does not mean the thing exterior to man’s intellect; rather, it is the thing as represented in the intellect. In short, truth in idealism is no longer the conformity of the intellect with the thing; rather, it is conformity with its ‘object,’ which is only another way of saying that the intellect ‘knows itself.’ di conoscerla: «L’intelletto riflette sul suo atto, non soltanto in quanto lo conosce, ma in quanto conosce la sua conformità con la cosa; il che, certamente, non potrebbe essere conosciuto senza conoscere la natura dell’atto stesso, il quale non è conoscibile senza che si conosca la natura del principio attivo che è lo stesso intelletto, alla cui natura appartiene il conformarsi alle cose; onde secondo questo conosce la verità l’intelletto che riflette su se stesso»(De Veritate, q. 1, a. 9). Tutto questo avviene in un unico atto e la spiegazione si trova nel fatto che proprio nel momento in cui l’intelletto conosce, diventa lui stesso conoscibile, perché è in atto (Cfr. In I De Anima, 9 e In XIII Metaph., 8, n. 2539)”(L. CLAVELL, La verità dell’essere, in L. Clavell and M. Pérez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 222-223). 14 In De Causis, lect. 6. 15 Idem, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5, c.

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“b) The truth of created beings is based on God’s Intellect. Creatures have a real relation of dependence with respect to God’s creative Intellect. Things are measured by God’s Intellect in which all creatures are present, as artifacts are present in the artisan’s mind. In other words, the truth of things is predetermined in God’s Mind, which is their exemplary cause. Hence to be open to the truth of things is to subject oneself to God.”16 If truth per prius is said of the intellect, truth per posterius is said of the thing. Aquinas writes: “Since ‘the true’ is in the intellect in so far as it (the intellect) is conformed to the thing understood (rei intellectae), the abstract aspect of the ‘the true’ (ratio veri) must needs pass from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.”17 If the former truth per prius is called formal or logical truth, this latter truth per posterius is called transcendental truth or ontological truth. In transcendental truth one speaks of a thing as true when it corresponds to the idea of its maker. The Angelic Doctor explains: “For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are said to be true in so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way, natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception of the divine intellect.”18 So, transcendental truth is the conformity of a thing to an intellect to which it is related. This is so, for St. Thomas states: “A thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially (per se) or accidentally (per accidens). It is related essentially (per se) to an intellect on which it depends as regards its act of being (esse).”19 Hence, transcendental truth or ontological truth essentially (per se) means order to God’s intellect since every creature depends upon the divine intellect as regards its act of being (esse). It is related accidentally (per accidens) to an intellect by which it is knowable. Aquinas adds: “Now we do not judge of a thing by what it is accidentally, but by what it is essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true essentially, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends.”20 Finite creatural beings are true because of their relation to the divine intellect. The artificial things made by man depend on the divine intellect absolutely (simpliciter) by reason of their actuation in the order of being, although these artificial things made by the work of man depend on the human mind of the artist, architect, or artisan in their being ‘such.’ Such dependence refers not to efficient causality, but rather to exemplar or exemplary causality, which is in the order of formal causality, albeit extrinsic. Llano explains: “(1) The human, practical intellect of the artisan is the cause of the becoming (fieri) of artificial things and is the measure of their truth (but only inasmuch as they are artificial, not inasmuch as they are beings). Effectively, the artisan produces his work in accord with the exemplary idea which he has of it in his mind. The truth of the artifact, therefore, depends upon its conformity to its paradigm.

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T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 153-154. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 1, c. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 17

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“(2) The speculative intellect of man gets its knowledge from things and is, in a certain sense, moved by them, and thus things measure it. In speculative knowledge, the intellect contemplates things as they are, so these things are the measure and the rule of the truth of the speculative human intellect. “(3) The divine intellect measures things radically because it is the origin of their entire reality. In the divine intellect are found all created things as in their cause, just as all of his artifacts are in the mind of the artisan. Thus the divine intellect has a certain similarilty to (1), but differs from the practical intellect of man in that the divine artisan is the cause of the entire being of things, whereas the human artisan is only the cause of their fieri (coming to be): since the human artisan acts always on some particular matter, he is not the origin of the being of the finished product, but only of the process by which this matter comes to acquire its new form. “Thus: the divine intellect (and its truth) measures and is not measured (it is mensurans non mensurata); the thing (and its truth) is measured by the divine intellect and, in its turn, measures the human intellect (the thing is mensurata et mensurans); our intellect is measured (mensurata) by natural things which it knows speculatively; it is only the measure (mensura) of the coming to be of artificial things.21”22 The Convertibility of Being and Truth Truth23 is a transcendental property or aspect of being (ens), identical in reality with being (ens). Transcendental being (ens) and transcendental truth or ‘the true’ (verum) are the 21

Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2. A. LLANO, op. cit., p. 21. 23 Studies on transcendental truth in Aquinas: G. SÖHNGEN, Sein und Gegenstand. Das scholastische Axiom ‘ens et verum convertuntur’ als Fundament metaphysischer und theologischer Spekulation, Münster, 1930; R. J. McCALL, St. Thomas on Ontological Truth, “The New Scholasticism,” 12 (1938), pp. 9-29; J. VAN DE WIELE, Le problème de la vérité ontologique dans la philosophie de saint Thomas, “Revue philosophique de Louvain,” 52 (1954), pp. 521-571; R. B. SCHMITZ, Veritas rerum. Sein-Wahrheit-Wort. Thomas von Aquin und die Lehre von der Wahrheit der Dinge, Münster, 1984 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, “Review of Metaphysics”, 43 (1989), pp. 295326, 543-567; J. PIEPER, Living the Truth. The Truth of All Things and Reality and the Good, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1989; J. A. AERTSEN, Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas, “Topoi,” 11 (1992), pp. 159-171 ; L. DEWAN, St. Thomas’s Successive Discussions on the Nature of Truth, in Sanctus Thomas De Aquino: Doctor Hodiernae Humanitatis, edited by D. Ols, O.P., Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp. 153-168 ; L. DEWAN, A Note on Metaphysics and Truth, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 143-153 ; H. SEIDL, Metaphysics and Truth, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 154-160 ; E. FORMENT, Verdad y metafísica, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 169-191 ; E. BERTI, Osservazioni a proposito di verità e metafisica, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 161-168 ; J. AERTSEN, Truth in Aquinas, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 50-54 ; Y. FLOUCAT, La vérité comme conformité selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, “Revue Thomiste,” 104 (2004), pp. 49-102 ; L. DEWAN, Is Truth a Transcendental for St. Thomas Aquinas?, “Nova et Vetera (English edition),” 2.1 (2004), pp. 1-20 ; J. AERTSEN, Is Truth Not a Transcendental for Aquinas?, in Wisdom’s Apprentice: Thomistic Essays in Honor of Lawrence Dewan, O.P., edited by P. A. Kwasniewski, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 3-12 ; J. F. 22

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same in reality, they are convertible or interchangeable: ens et verum convertuntur. Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain: “Are the transcendentals realities or notions? We have to say that they are both. As real things, they are absolutely identical to being (ens). Unity, truth, goodness, and the other transcendentals, are not realities distinct from being (ens) but only aspects or properties of being (ens). “They are, so to speak, ‘common properties’ of every being (ens). Just as all the individuals of a given species have certain common properties as a result of belonging to the species (men have understanding and will, lions are mammals, snow is white), all things, by the fact of their being beings (entia), are good and true and endowed with unity. “Two short clarifications are necessary in this respect. In the first place, ‘properties,’ in the more technical sense, flow from the specific essence. The transcendentals, on the other hand, flow from the act of being (esse) and can, therefore, be attributed to everything that in some way is. Secondly, properties are accidents, whiteness, for instance, is something inherent in snow, and the will is an accident proper to all men. The transcendentals, however, are not accidents, but are identical with the subject itself. “Consequently, when we say that being is good, or that it has unity, we are not adding anything real (a substance, a quality, a real relation). We are merely expressing an aspect which belongs to every being (ens) as such, inasmuch as it has the act of being (esse). Because being is being, it is good, has unity, etc. Being (ens), the good (bonum) and the true (verum) are identical realities. This is usually expressed by saying that ens et unum (et bonum, et verum) convertuntur: that being, unity, and the other transcendentals are interchangeable or equivalent. “This equivalence is shown in the possibility of predicating one transcendental of another. We can say, for instance, that ‘every being is good, one and true.’ We would never dare say, however, that ‘every being is an animal,’ or ‘every being is a plant.’ Besides, the term being (ens) and the other transcendentals can exchange their roles as subjects and predicates in a sentence. We can say that ‘that which is good, to the extent that it is good, is being (ens).’ But we could just as well say that ‘any being (ens), to the extent that it is being (ens), is good.’ This interchangeability is a sign of the real identity of the transcendentals.”24 How Being and Truth are Distinct Nevertheless, although ens and verum are the same or identical in reality, they are distinct notions: truth adds to being a relation of conformity with an intellect capable of knowing it. There is added to being a reference to an intellect. “Truth which is in a thing itself is nothing else but the entity as it is related to the intellect, or relates the intellect to itself.”25 Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: “As far as our knowledge is concerned, the transcendental notions are not synonymous with the notion of being, since they explicitly express aspects which are not expressly signified by the notion of being. Though they are interchangeable as predicates of the WIPPEL, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, in J. F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 65-112. 24 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op cit., pp. 135-136. 25 De Veritate, q. 1, a. 4, c.

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same subject, they are distinct notions. The transcendentals add new facets to the notion of being (ens), not because they add new realities to being (ens), but rather because of our way of knowing reality. We call one and the same thing being (ens) because it has the act of being (esse); and we call it true because it is knowable; we call it good because it is desirable, and we call it one because of its internal cohesion.”26 Truth and the Act of Being (Esse) Finite being (ens) has intelligibility in so far as it has a participated act of being (esse as actus essendi). The act of being (esse) is the root of all intelligibility; a being (ens) is knowable to the extent that it has esse. Aquinas writes in Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 16, a. 3, c: “As good has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has esse, is to that extent knowable”(“sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile”). Regarding the act of being (esse) as the foundation, the root, of truth, Llano explains: “Being (ens) is internally structured as essence and act of being, as constitutive coprinciples of any concrete reality. Basing himself on this metaphysical doctrine St. Thomas clearly affirms: ‘Truth is founded more on the act of being (esse) of the thing, than on its quiddity, just as the name of being (ens) is derived from the act of being (esse).’27 On formulating this important thesis, St. Thomas reveals the original nucleus of his gnoseology, which already goes beyond all immanentism, and even all formalism and logicism. Being as act (actus essendi) is the foundation of truth. Formalism is surpassed from the moment that every form – whether real or known – is seen to have its ultimate foundation in the act of being, which is not a formal content, but rather the purely actualizing act of all determinations. The actus essendi is not a position of the subject, as Kant would have it when he considers thought to be the foundation of being. Nor is it reduced simply to existential reality, to mere fact, corresponding – as a particular case – to a logico-formal structure, as in the neo-positivist theory of truth. The act of being is…the root of the truth of knowledge, since truth is given in the operation with which the intellect grasps the being of the thing (esse rei) just as it is. “Effectively, all knowledge terminates in the existent, in the reality which participates in the act of being (esse); and thus the esse rei is the cause of the true appreciation which the mind has of the thing.28 “It could be objected that truth is found in the study of logic and of other strictly formal fields of knowledge, in which there does not seem to be any reference to real things. Nonetheless, logical relations – secundae intentiones – are beings of reason cum fundamento in re: they have a less proximate foundation in things, but they do not completely lack this foundation. If – as in the positivist trends in contemporary philosophy – one defends a ‘logic without metaphysics’ or a purely self-sufficient analysis of language, the language of truth becomes tied up in insoluble difficulties.”29 26

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 136. “Veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur”(In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ; cf. In In Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). 28 In II Met., n. 298; In Divinis Nominibus, c. 5, n. 625; In Epistolam ad Colosenses, lect. 4. 29 A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 27

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There are various degrees of intelligibility and truth corresponding to the various degrees of act of being (esse) of a being (ens). The more a being (ens) has an intensive degree of act of being (esse), the more is it ontologically intelligible and true. God, being Pure Act of Being, Ipsum Esse Subsistens, is maximally intelligible and true (but due to the imperfection of the human intellect what is in itself maximally intelligible, God, is more difficult for us to understand, like the brightness of sun blinds us when we attempt to look at it due to the limitation of our sense of sight). God is Maximum Perfection and Maximum Truth. As regards the source and origin of truth, Llano writes: “The source and origin of truth is the act of being (esse). Finite things participate in the act of being (esse), whence they also participate in truth. It is not that they are act of being (esse), but only that they have act of being (esse), partially; nor are they truth, but they participate in truth. Every being is a composite of potency and act, and therefore it is less true as it is more potential. Only pure act, subsistent being, is the full and unrestricted truth, the ultimate cause of all truths. The search for truth comes to an end only in Being-by-essence.”30 In his explanation of Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 5, c., Gilson writes that “things are true in themselves to the extent that they are conformable to an intellect, and the intellect itself is true according as it apprehends a thing such as it is. Now, in the unique case of God, it is not enough to say that His knowledge apprehends its object such as it is; His esse (the pure act of being that He is) is His very understanding: esse suum…est ipsum suum intelligere. Moreover, all other beings are true in themselves in so far as they are conformed to the knowledge God has of them, for God’s act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being, and He Himself is His own act of being and of understanding. In this perfect coincidence of a being, of its knowledge, and of the object of its knowledge, is found the identity of absolute being with its own truth. Because God is suum esse et intelligere (which is God’s esse), it must be said of Him, not only that truth is in Him, but that He Himself is the supreme and the prime truth. Thus, with the theology of esse, the conclusion of the De Veritate of Saint Anselm was finally receiving, along with its proper limitation, its full justification. Each and every thing has its own truth as it has its own being, but there is one truth according to which all things are true. Things are true inasmuch as, in themselves, they are conformed to their model in the divine intellect. Here as always things are called true from a truth found in an intellect; in the last analysis, truth is said of things from the truth of the intellect which God is, because His act of understanding and His act of being are one and the same act.”31

30 31

A. LLANO, op. cit., p. 31. É. GILSON, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, pp. 166-167.

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