\"Tierra de olivos\": Militarism and Praetorianism in Contemporary Venezuela (2014)

“Tierra de olivos”: Militarism and Praetorianism in Contemporary Venezuela

University of Cambridge Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages Tripos Part II 2015 Year Abroad Project: Dissertation Candidate number 1888K

Contents Introduction A Country in Uniform

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Chapter One El chavismo es su divisa: the Politicization of the Armed Forces

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Chapter Two ‘Enemigos históricos’: Polarization and Social Violence

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Chapter Three ‘Hombres fuertes’: The Cycle of Military Intervention

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Conclusion Venezuela without chavismo?

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Bibliography

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Introduction A Country in Uniform When the current wave of Venezuelan protests began in February 2014, the Internet was quickly flooded with photographs and videos of young demonstrators trying to convince the highly armed National Guard to join their cause and turn against the elected government. Why did citizens protesting against the social and economic problems in a political system designed by an ex-putschist president believe that the solution could lie in yet another case of military intervention? After four decades of civilian rule, direct army participation in politics became thinkable once more soon after Hugo Chávez’s electoral success in 1999. Studies of chavismo, the set of ideological and political beliefs associated with Chávez, have so far attempted to categorize it as a political system and to determine how democratic it is.1 Conventional accounts fluctuate between defining chavismo as a populist, socialist, or authoritarian movement.2 Some critics have even compared it to hybrid regimes elsewhere on the continent, to a “permanent revolution” in a Trotskyist sense, and to an ideal type of participatory democracy.3 Chávez’s inflammatory rhetoric, vociferous antiAmericanism and eccentric public persona have polarized scholarly opinions, resounding with left-wing intellectuals across the globe and alarming political scientists, especially in the U.S. Understandably, most research on Venezuela in the last decade has focused exclusively on

Chávez;

oscillating

between

hagiographies

and

condemnations,

commentators have mostly ignored the ideological ramifications of his credo. Although the militaristic bent of the chavista government has been noticed, a more probing analysis of the political, social and cultural dimension of militarism and praetorianism in Venezuela after Chávez’s death remains a desideratum.4 My dissertation explores these topics, focusing on the presidential terms of Chávez himself (1999-2012) and Nicolás Maduro 1

Corrales, ‘Polarization’, 105. Hawkins, Chavismo and Populism, 5-7; Barrett,,Utopia Reborn, 18; Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy, 9. 3 Corrales, Dragon, 14-16; Ellner , ‘Permanent Revolution’, 252; Canache, ‘The Meaning’, 96. 4 Corrales and Penfold, Dragon, 15; Trinkunas, Crafting, 3-6. 2

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(2013-present), within a historical context spanning from Venezuela’s independence from the Spanish Empire to its forty-year democratic period (1958-1998). My argumemnts are based on the premise that Chávez’s most important legacy was neither the “socialism for the XXI century” nor the “dismantling of democracy”, but rather the institutional and ideological basis for the ongoing militarization of Venezuela.5 The first chapter will investigate the constitutional reforms which embedded praetorianism in Venezuelan politics. Chávez transformed civil-military relations in the country by politicizing the armed forces, expanding their jurisdictional boundaries and eliminating civilian control.6 The last fifteen years have witnessed a steady increase of the responsibilities of the army, most of which have little to do with national defence; the Fuerza Armada today is involved in a host of areas of national development, government administration and internal order.7 The Venezuelan political system manifests both democratic and autocratic tendencies.8 Due to low accountability and transparency, access to state office and the authority of the ruling government depend not only on electoral successes and popular support but also on the cooperation of ruling elites. Admittedly, this is a structure that developed during the democratic period which preceded Chávez’s election; after his ascent to power, the epidemic corruption only changed hands and direction.9 Today, the administration relies both on the wealthy businessmen loyal to the chavista government and, crucially, on the military.10 Indeed, the armed forces comprise the most powerful elite in Venezuela. In the last fifteen years, their political influence has grown to such an extent that the country has begun to resemble what Brian Loveman termed a ‘protected democracy’, a state under the tutelage of the army. 11 The changes in the 1999 constitution and later reforms made by Chávez restricted institutional oversight, increased the political

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Wilpert, ‘21st Century Socialism’,11.06.2011; Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy, 9. Trinkunas, Crafting, 207. 7 Trinkunas, ‘The Crisis’, 64. 8 Corrales and Penfold, Dragon, 2. 9 Sepúlveda,‘Pretorianismo y predestinación’, 150. 10 These businessmen are called boliburgueses by the opposition, a neologism which combines the Spanish word for bourgeoisie and Chávez’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’. 11 Loveman,‘Protected Democracies’, 110. 6

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prerogatives of the Fuerza Armada and assigned active and retired officers to a myriad of influential bureaucratic and political posts.12 Direct political influence is only one way in which militarism manifests itself in Venezuela. The second chapter of this dissertation will explore the social ramifications of the systematic instigation of violence and inculcation with military values of the government. The belligerent discourse promoted by Chávez and Maduro serves to mobilize supporters and ostracize enemies in a radical process of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Among the consequences of this open promotion of jingoism are extreme polarization, acute animosity between political adversaries and consequently, an increase in armed violence. The attempts at militaristic indoctrination by the government are part of the explanation for Venezuela’s phenomenally high crime rates.13 Chávez and later Maduro utilized famous military figures as a legitimizing force of the chavista regime, created positive connotations of martial terms and used aggressive and hostile language to describe their opponents and the capitalist system.14 Chávez offered a revisionist reading of Venezuela’s history, creating continuities between heroes of the past and present and proclaiming ‘historical’ enemies. The third and final chapter will illustrate the militaristic aspects of Venezuelan political culture. It is beyond doubt that praetorianism is a defining element of contemporary Venezuela, where militarism exists not in a conventional, expansionist sense, but as an ideology which has pervaded both government policy and interactions between social groups. Although militarism is an essential part of chavismo, it is not the design of a single charismatic president. Why did Chávez’s radically hostile pathos find such fertile ground in Venezuela in the first place? A myriad of historical, political and cultural factors explain the reasons behind the popularity of military leaders in Venezuela, which often dwarfs that of mainstream parties. The fascination with powerful historical figures, for instance, has a long history in Venezuela. The Caracas-born Latin American liberator Simón Bolívar became a national hero and legend in his own lifetime and was later immortalized in art, films and literature. Since the nineteenth century, when the country 12

Avilés, ‘Policy coalitions’, 1559. P.G., ‘Violence in Venezuela’, 08.01.2014. 14 Alvarado, ‘Violencia social’, 396. 13

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was ruled by caudillos, national values were shaped by military strongmen and battles for power. Most Venezuelan presidents have alluded to such symbols to devise their political campaigns and justify their policies. In Chávez’s case, this was one of the factors which guaranteed him vast popular support.15 Moreover, political violence forms such an essential part of the country’s past that it has occasionally been considered a suitable solution to political and economic crises.16 The period between 1945 and 1958 alone witnessed four coups. This recurring use of unconstitutional force desensitized the population to the expanding role of the army in politics and even created a popular expectation for military intervention. Furthermore, it precipitated a concomitant skepticism of democratic institutions and their ability to provide a quick fix for periods of political instability. This partly explains why the Venezuelan protesters in the 2014 marches attempted to find support from the armed forces.

Fig. 1: A demonstrator talks to the National Guard near Plaza Altamira, Caracas (17 Mar. 2014)

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Ellner, Exceptional Democracy, 121. Myers, ‘Support’, 193.

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In 1919 Laureano Vallenilla Lanz argued in his Cesarismo democrático that countries like Venezuela need a ‘gendarme necesario […] de ojo avizor, de mano dura, que por las vías de hecho inspira el temor y por el temor mantiene la paz’.17 This seems to be a precise diagnosis of Venezuela’s recent history; more than half the country’s leaders since the mid-nineteenth century have been ex-soldiers.18 It became clear during this year’s protests that even those who oppose the legacy of the ‘Comandante Eterno’ are hoping that the solution of the current political crisis will come from army ranks, even if this means that a military officer rather than an opposition leader assumes the presidency.19 President Maduro’s governing style, which has proven even more militaristic than that of his predecessor, will probably ensure that Venezuela remains a tierra de olivos – not least because of the choices of an electorate accustomed to seeing its leaders in army uniform.20

Fig. 2: Chávez in military uniform.

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Vallenilla Lanz, Cesarismo Democrático, 19. Irwin, Militares y civiles, 23. 19 Peñaloza, ‘Vargas Llosa’, 26.04.2014. 20 Olivos is a pejorative term used to refer to Venezuelan military officers for the olive green colour of their uniforms. 18

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Chapter One El chavismo es su divisa: the Politicization of the Armed Forces In 2007, army general Ángel Vivas was arrested and charged with insubordination when he petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the new motto of the armed forces imposed by then president Hugo Chávez. Vivas believed that the slogan ‘¡Patria, Socialismo o Muerte, Venceremos!’, originally created by Fidel Castro, would undermine the apolitical nature of the military institution.21 He was right to suspect the politicization of the Venezuelan armed forces. However, the new motto was only a symptom of a process which had begun with the drafting of the new constitution in 1999. The new legislation dismantled the institutions of civilian control created after the signing of the Punto Fijo pact, which marked Venezuela’s transition to democracy in 1958.22 Chávez expanded the administrative and decision-making authority of the military and incremented their role in domestic policy.23 Neo-militaristic traits in politics are evident in abundance: active and retired officers have been elected to civilian posts in politics and administration; the armed forces are used in numerous areas of national development; and, most recently, from February this year the military, alongside armed civilian groups and the police force, have lead the repression of anti-violence and anti-government protests.24 Contrary to the claims made by Wilpert, this extensive involvement of the armed forces in public matters does not mean that the military is becoming ‘civilized’ but rather that the civilian population is becoming militarized.25 One of the main goals outlined in Chávez’s election program was to convene a Constitutional Assembly and rewrite the 1961 constitution, which he achieved by referendum in 1999. Some of the most significant reforms in the new legislation concerning the armed forces had negative repercussions such as the removal of civilian control, the politicization of the military and the elimination of the state’s monopoly on the use of force 22 Anon., ‘Ángel Vivas’, 01.06.2008. 22

Hawkins, Chavismo, 3. Trinkunas, ‘The Crisis’, 65. 24 Trinkunas, Crafting, 207; Anderson, ‘Where Protests End’, 26.12.2014. 25 Wilpert, ‘21st Century Socialism’,11.06.2006. 23

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in society. In 1961, military institutions were consistently subordinated to civil power, but by 1999 this was no longer the case. The 1999 constitution provided the basis for Venezuela’s military to become a political organization. As Trinkunas points out, even though the document prohibits ‘militancia política’ it does not make it illegal for soldiers to be involved in most political activities short of becoming members of a party.26 More importantly, the armed forces were allowed to interfere in internal order and perform investigative activities, as well as begin a ‘participación activa en el desarrollo nacional’.27 Furthermore, Chávez dismantled the system established during the puntofijismo period which divided the armed forces into separate command structures. Instead, he centralized the institution in a single Fuerza Armada (which replaced the Fuerzas Armadas of the Punto Fijo system), making internal organization and planning easier. This reform had a long-lasting effect on the Venezuelan armed forces. Their involvement in politics has never been greater, and the emancipation from civilian control means that they have acquired new confidence as political actors. The military had a leading role in the two unsuccessful rebellions in 1992; ten years later, during the nationwide strike of 2002, a group of officers deposed the president and then promptly restored him to power, giving in to pressure by other officers. The price for disobedience was high: after the failed military rebellion in 2002, 800 military officers were let go.28 In 1961 the Ministry of Interior controlled the fabrication and distribution of arms, but by 1999, in accordance with Article 324 of the new constitution, this power was delegated to the army.29 This monopoly, combined with a lack of institutional control, has led to significant corruption within the Armed Forces and to involvement in illegal trade, for example in prisons and at airports.30 Chávez removed airport drug control from the tasks of the specialized drug control department of the national police agency, the Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CIPCC) and prison guard duty from the responsibilities of professional correctional officers. He then entrusted both to the 26

Trinkunas, Crafting, 211. Ibid., 212.; Constitución 88. 28 Ibid. 29 Constitución 87. 30 Mayorca, ‘Militarización’,15.09.2014. 27

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National Guard, who not only lacked the necessary training to deal with these duties but were also exempt from institutionalized civilian oversight. Currently, tons of illegal drugs are transported annually through Maiquetía airport with the help of the National Guard, and Venezuelan prisons have become centers for drug and arms trafficking.31 Finally, the reforms in the new constitution and the legislation approved during Chávez’s term subordinated the army exclusively to the interests of the incumbent. Chávez abolished the institutions of civilian control created after Venezuela’s transition to democracy in 1958. As a result, the legislature formally conserves the power to make the laws which regulate the functions of the armed forces as well as the military budget; however, the tasks and administration of the Fuerza Armada are de facto not subject to civilian control except that of the president.32 After the reforms made by Chávez in 1999, the army is no longer obliged to obtain civilian authorization except that of the president when penalizing or promoting officers; consequently, only favorites rise through the ranks.33 The military elite was courted by Chávez since the early months of his presidency, and those sympathetic to his cause were rewarded with membership of luxurious country clubs, large bonuses and vacations on islands exclusively available to the armed forces. In a system where military ascension is only possible with approval from the president, proving loyal to him, rather than merit or seniority, becomes a prerequisite for career advancement. This is why the internal organization of the Guardia Nacional, for instance, could not be further removed from its founding motto, ‘El honor es su divisa’. The symbiotic relationship between the military and chavismo becomes obvious as soon as one examines local and countrywide administration under Chávez and then Maduro. Active and retired army officers have been assigned to political and bureaucratic posts in both regional and national governments. Eleven of twenty-three Venezuelan states are ruled by governors who are retired military officers, and eight of thirty-one ministers, not to mention ten vice ministers, the president of the National Assembly, the vice president, and a significant number of mayors and ambassadors are ex-soldiers.34 Maduro has even outdone his predecessor in employing military officers to chief government 31

Meza, ‘Corrupt military’ 26.09.2013; Lopez ‘Gangster’s Paradise’ 5.02.2013. Constitución 88. 33 Irwin, Militares y civiles, 65. 34 Claremboux,‘Militares toman control’, 20.01.2014. 32

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positions. Chávez employed 1 246 new army officers in fifteen years; Maduro employed 368 in the first eight months of his term.35 The Venezuelan military has recently acquired economic as well as political power. The armed forces have been responsible for incursions of large sectors of private property, which resulted in army officials managing some of the largest businesses in the country. After expropriating and nationalizing enterprises such as the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Chávez put officers in charge. Most recently, under the Maduro administration, the military have been given even more political and economic power: a military bank (Bancofanb), a construction firm (Construfanb) and even a TV channel (TVfanb). The military in other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil have finally retreated from politics after decades of military dictatorship; indeed, they have even experienced budget cuts.36 In Venezuela, exactly the opposite has occurred. Despite official data from The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which show that military expenditure in Venezuela is only responsible for about 1.6 to 2% of GDP, new studies have proven the unreliability of these figures.37 Due to extra-budgetary expenses, low accountability and a budget based on a price of USD 55 per oil barrel (when in fact it has fluctuated between USD 75 and USD 110 in the last four years), Venezuela’s military expenditures are 20-70% higher than indicated by official reports.38 Finally, the social function of the Fuerza Armada has also gained prominence in the last decade. The armed forces’ role as a ‘partido militar’ is evident in the diverse social functions they have assumed under Chávez.39 Since the implementation of the Plan Bolívar 2000 and the Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada in 2002, they were involved in both the management and the on-site supervision of most government programs, such as food distribution to the poor, infrastructural repair, and price control. In fact, ever since Plan Bolívar, the duties assigned to the military in the constitution have risen from six to 35

Lozano, ‘Maduro consuma la militarización’, 26.01.2014. Trinkunas ‘Civilian pretorianism’, 397. 37 Colgan, ‘Military expenditure’, 547. 38 Ibid. 39 Trinkunas,‘Civilian control’,105. 36

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eighteen.40 These government ‘missions’, according to data from 2012, had at their disposal half the budget of PDVSA, the state oil company responsible for 96% of Venezuela’s production.41 As Trinkunas points out, this kind of military participation had the potential to bring about positive change, had it come at the expense of civilian involvement.42 It also caused ubiquitous corruption and deprived local governments and civilian organizations of funding for their own programs. One highly controversial question is why the Armed Forces are used in so many areas of national development such as infrastructural repair, poverty relief and price monitoring, yet not in the one area which has the most urgent need for the intervention of a large, well-equipped and trained force – rampant crime. The answer is complex and reveals the extent to which the Chávez and now Maduro administrations co-govern with the military. Firstly, common criminals are not officially enemies of the regime; on the contrary, they are accepted by the official government discourse of inclusion since crime in chavismo is considered the result of social inequality produced by the rule of ‘oligarchs’. It is the ‘oligarchs’ (wealthy owners of private enterprises) and the ‘fascists’ (opponents of the regime), who are the official enemies of the people; if armed members of the National Guard were to march into the shantytowns or government housing projects where common criminals (malandros) usually reside, it might seem like the guardians of the Bolivarian Revolution were attacking the ‘common people’ whom they claim to defend. Secondly, the military are themselves involved in organized crime, especially selling contraband gasoline and drug and arms trafficking at the border with Colombia, at airports and in prisons. Any serious measures against crime would affect their own private benefit. The presence of the military is evident in all aspects of public life in Venezuela. They have powerful posts in public administration, manage some of the largest enterprises in the country and supervise government programs. After the election of Nicolás Maduro in 2012, it became increasingly obvious that he would involve the military to an even greater extent than Chávez. It is clear, then, that the army is both one of the main pillars of power in the incumbent government and a key cause of the current political crisis. 40

Trinkunas, Crafting, 215. Corrales and Penfold, Dragon, 48. 42 Trinkunas, Crafting, 215. 41

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Chapter Two ‘Enemigos históricos’: Polarization and Social Violence On 6 January 2014, former Miss Venezuela Monica Spear and her husband were shot dead in front of their five-year-old daughter by a gang of as many as eleven people who sought to steal small personal items such as cameras and mobile phones. The incident caused journalist Andrés Oppenheimer to criticize Venezuela’s ‘culture of violence’.43 The country’s soaring crime rates, he argues, are in part the result a government rhetoric that glorifies bloodshed.44 Indeed, Chávez was infamous for his aggressive discourse and so far his successor Maduro has only followed in his steps. The verbal belligerence of Venezuela’s last two leaders combines several aspects: the glorification of war heroes, the distortion of history and the militarization of language. The tense and polarized society that is contemporary Venezuela is in no small part a product of this top-down praetorianism. This chapter is based on the premise that contemporary Venezuelan society displays characteristics reminiscent of war. Soaring rates of armed violence, frequent cases of gender violence and low tolerance of political and ideological differences display a trivialization of the right to life, property and freedom of expression. The country is replete with illegal arms, and private property and life seem to have little value; indeed national newspapers report murders which occur during the theft of belongings such as shoes and mobile phones on a daily basis.45 In fact, throughout the last decade there have been more violent deaths in Venezuela each year than in any part of the world currently at war.46 Violence against women is ubiquitous in the country, with as many as ten thousand incidents every three months.47 Finally, Manichean generalizations and violent components are evident in the discourses of actors on both extremes of the political spectrum; 43

Oppenheimer, ‘Culture’, 8.01.2014. Ibid. 45 Lugo, ‘Robo de celulares’, 28.05.2014. 46 Fuentes, ‘El triste récord’, 9.01.2014. 47 Anon.,‘Violencia contra las mujeres’, 23.05.2013. 44

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Venezuela is the most polarized country in Latin America since Nicaragua in the 1980s during the Sandinista regime.48 The following pages will explore the role of chavismo in promoting hostility between social groups. Contemporary Venezuela is a Leyden jar of tensions: political, economic and social. It currently suffers the world’s highest inflation (60.9%), a record-high percentage of scarcity of basic goods (over 30%) and rapid devaluation (one bolivar - the national currency - is worth over ten times more when exchanged officially than on the black market.49 However, Venezuela’s most serious problem is undoubtedly social violence. Murder rates rise rapidly, with 24 763 homicides in 2013.50 Of course, a myriad of factors contribute to these phenomenally high figures, such as widespread impunity, a corrupt judicial and a dysfunctional penitentiary system, very low wages for the police force and unrestricted access to illegal arms. Yet the underlying issue is also in part the social divide and aggressive antagonism that were galvanized by the martial rhetoric of Venezuela’s chavista rulers. It is hardly coincidental that crime levels have quadrupled since Hugo Chávez became president in 1998.51 One of the main aspects of Chávez’s militaristic discourse consists in the construction of personality cults around military heroes. The glorification of war leaders under Chávez was particularly centered on Simón Bolívar, Venezuela’s national hero. Bolívar has historically been a central element of Venezuelan culture. Leaders before Chávez such as Guzmán Blanco, Juan Vicente Gómez and López Contreras have also used his legacy for political purposes.52 Since Chávez’s ascent to power, references to Bolívar have once again transcended the cultural sphere and abounded in political discourse. For instance, he created a parallel between himself and Simón Bolívar and between his political project and the independence movement. Chávez often referred to himself as the son of Bolívar, changed the name of the country to The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and called his political program Bolivarian Revolution.53

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Corrales, ‘Polarization’, 105. P.J. ‘Venezuela suma’, 11.01.2014; Hidalgo ‘Escasez’, 16.04.2014. 50 Vales, ‘Marcada por la violencia’, 12.01.2014. 51 Devereux, ‘Murder-rate quadrupled’, 11.03.2013. 52 Neire,‘El culto’, 28. 53 Anon.,‘Hijo de Bolivar’’, 17.12.2011. 49

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Fig. 4: Chávez seated in front of a portrait of Bolívar.

At the same time, the idealization of Chávez himself became a cult during his own lifetime.54 Chávez utilized facts such as his incarceration and health problems to present himself as a martyr who had sacrificed himself for the people comparable with Jesus Christ (hardly an incidental allusion in a country as religious as Venezuela). He consistently presented himself as a self-sacrificing sufferer for justice, as a model for disciplined, selfabnegating behavior and the embodiment of patriotism; one of his most frequently cited phrases is ‘Mi vida es de ustedes, no me pertenece, es del pueblo venezolano’.55 Chávez’s huge expropriations and generous programs for foreign aid in turn made him appear as a romanticized Robin Hood.56After his death, Maduro displayed a religious devotion of his predecessor in order to appeal to the masses and justify his newly acquired position of authority.57 Chávez’s chosen heir won the 2013 elections with a margin of a mere 1.5% and has subsequently been experiencing very low popularity, even among the 54

Rueda, ‘The Cult’, 01.11.2013. Zúquete, ‘Missionary Politics’, 97-8. 56 Corrales, ‘Hugo Boss’, 4.01.2006. 57 Estrada, ‘Magic Socialism’, 07.11.2013. 55

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chavista rank and file.58 Lacking his predecessor’s rhetorical skills, military rank and political deftness, Maduro has resorted to a never-ending homage to Chávez as the ultimate legitimizing force of his rule. He posthumously awarded Chávez the title of ‘Comantante Eterno’, proclaimed himself his son and mentioned him in virtually all his frequent public addresses on television and radio, up to 6 600 times in just two months or as many as 216 times a day.59

Fig. 5: Maduro gives a speech with a poster of Chávez in the background.

58 59

Forero, ‘Presidential election’, 15.04.2013; AFP, ‘La popularidad de Maduro’, 02.09.2014. Corrales, ‘Venezuelan Earthquake’, 06.15.2013.

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Fig. 6: Maduro addresses the public while an image of Chávez is projected onto a screen in the background.

Personality cults in the discourse of chavismo are intrinsically linked to the repeated reinterpretations of history promoted by Chávez. Chávez manipulated the history of the Latin American Liberator to two main effects. On the one hand, the constant mention of Bolívar in the oficial discourse of chavismo is ‘un recurso eminentemente legitimador de las políticas del presidente y de sus acciones de gobierno’ and, on the other ‘deslegitimador de sus adversarios’.60 Anyone who opposed the Chávez administration could therefore easily be branded a traitor to Bolívar’s cause, one of the fatherland’s ‘enemigos históricos’.61 He claimed that ‘…Bolívar fue traicionado en vida por la oligarquía depredadora […] esta misma oligarquía que ahora amenaza de manera ridícula al gobierno revolucionario…’ and ‘nuevamente se divide a los venezolanos en dos grupos polarizados: el pueblo bolivariano que constituye una fuerza popular indetenible y la oligarquía que antaño intentó asesinar a Bolívar y que ahora pretende destruir la República’. 62 Chávez not only claimed that the ‘oligarchs’ of today were Bolívar’s enemies in the nineteenth century, he also defended the notion that Bolívar had been assassinated despite scientific evidence to the contrary. Even after the exhumation of Bolívar’s body in 2010 and the ensuing forensic

60

Arreaza, ‘El discurso’, 92. De Antonio, ‘Enemigos históricos’, 05.05.2013. 62 Romero, ‘Discurso político’, 358. 61

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examinations, which concluded that he had not been murdered, Chávez asserted that Bolívar had been poisoned.63 Chávez vindicated and ennobled his unsuccessful coup attempt on 4 February 1992, describing it as a ‘rebelión cívico-militar’ comparable with Bolivar’s wars and commemorating it annually on the Día de la Dignidad Nacional. 64 By emphasizing historical continuity he aimed to create a collective identity which would unite his supporters and exclude his opponents.65 Bolívar was not the only military figure whom Chávez used to distort the past. Venezuela’s ex-president also challenged the infamy of famous military leaders such as Cipriano Castro and his own great-grandfather, Pedro Pérez Delgado, usually referred to as ‘Maisanta’, and claimed they were heroes rather than villains.66 Finally, the official regime’s overexploitation of military heroes can sometimes border on the absurd. For instance, in 2011 a chavista mayor supervised the exchange of the sword of a statue of Bolivar for a machete in a small town. The enthusiastic bricoleur attempted to converge the image of the Latin American liberator with that of an indigenous warrior and create an even more saturated, if artificial, symbol of military heroism.67 State-financed art can also seem farfetched in its visual depictions of historical predetermination. For example, the huge murals which adorn walls in all Venezuelan cities often portray Chávez as a descendent of Bolívar and Jesus Christ.

Fig. 7: A mural in the state of Barinas depicting Maduro, Bolívar and Chávez. 63

Lopez, ‘Exhuman restos’, 17.06.2010. Fionda, ‘Venezuela Celebrates’, 05.02.2014. 65 Romero, ‘Discurso político’, 326. 66 Ellner, Exceptional Democracy, 10. 67 Anon., ‘Alcaldía sustituye’, 06.07.2010. 64

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Fig. 8: A mural in Caracas depicting Chávez, Christ and Bolívar.

The third aspect of the praetorianism of Venezuela’s government is evident in the language of its leaders. Chávez himself was a lieutenant colonel with an undisguised fascination with the army and famous military leaders. His personal heroes were seditious personalities such as Ezequiel Zamora and Fidel Castro, he often made public appearances in military uniform, and frequently called himself ‘un soldado’ in his public addresses. 68 It is hardly surprising, then, that martial phrases should dominate the rhetoric of his regime. For instance, Chávez’s social programs aimed at poverty relief, cheap government housing and affordable healthcare are all called ‘misiones’.69 Moreover, phrases such as ‘lucha’, ‘batalla’, and ‘guerra’ abound in his speeches, usually in a positive connotation.70 Bellicose language is also used to describe phenomena less favorable to the regime. The persecution of shop and supermarket owners who, in the face of nationwide scarcity, hide goods in short supply in order to sell them later when scarce again has been termed ‘guerra económica’.71 As always following his predecessor’s example, Maduro termed the dispersion of anti-violence pamphlets by the opposition during this year’s protests ‘guerra mediática’.

68

Romero, ‘A Polarizing Figure’, 05.03.2014. Rodríguez, ‘Empty Revolution’, 52. 70 Alvarado,‘Violencia social, 395-6. 71 ‘Guerra mediática’, 09.09.2014. 69

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Chavismo is in essence a movement ‘based on a radical social discourse of inclusion’, yet paradoxically it coexists with an equally influential discourse of exclusion.72 The regime’s explanation for common crime claims it is caused by the social inequality produced by capitalism, removing blame from the actual culprits. Chávez and Maduro have both on occasion defended violent behavior. In 1999, Chávez famously asked the then president of the Supreme Court rhetorically if she would not steal if she or her children were hungry, implying that crime is not always unacceptable.73 In November 2013, Maduro called for the ‘ocupación’ of shops that had refused to comply with government price controls, which led to mass lootings.74 The regime’s lenient attitude towards crime and its repercussions is also evident in the lack of serious initiative both Maduro and Chávez have displayed when tackling the issue. Their refusal to solve or even acknowledge Venezuela’s crime problem, although it might seem comical, has serious consequences. In 2009, Chávez blamed soaring crime levels on video games. He spent significant government resources on persecuting vendors and criminalizing the distribution of violent video games, making it nearly impossible to buy them.75 Maduro, in a similar project, recently blamed crime in Venezuela on popular Latin American soap operas, or ‘narconovelas’.76 The glorification of military figures and violent repudiation of the opposition ‘atiza las diferencias sociales y promueve abiertamente la división entre los miembros del colectivo’.77 The ensuing polarization of Venezuelan society and tension between ‘el pueblo’, ‘los pobres’, ‘los héroes de la revolución’ (Chávez’s supporters) and ‘la oligarquía’ and ‘los fascistas’ (his opponents) have led to violent conflict. With Chávez and, in the last year, Maduro’s heavy use of martial language, this conflict has been glorified, draped in noble-sounding military terms and openly encouraged.

72

Corrales and Penfold, Dragon, 27. ‘Por qué tanta violencia’, 20.01.2014. 74 Anon., ‘Maduro ordena ocupación’. 75 Aradas, ‘Venezuela prohíbe’, 30.10.2009. 76 ‘Narconovelas’, 17.05.2013. 77 Arreaza, ‘El discurso’, 35. 73

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Fig. 9: Maduro salutes from a tank.

Under Maduro, the official government discourse has become even more militaristic than during Chávez’s presidency.78 Because he is not himself a military man, Maduro feels more strongly than Chávez the need to prove his worth to the military institution in Venezuela. After handing the armed forces even more power than they had before, he has echoed his predecessor in glorifying military heroes and using bellicose language. These recent developments are alarming in the face of Venezuela’s elevated crime rates, which are partly caused by the constant calls to arms, glorification of violence and verbal defense of criminals and criminal activity. Maduro is creating a country in which military men are worshipped and the people are constantly called upon to wage war against their enemies. Unfortunately, this strategy has proven highly effective and has succeeded in breeding militarized hatred and armed violence in Venezuela.

78

Corrales, ‘¿Un Maduro más duro?’, 01.04.2013.

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Chapter Three ‘Hombres Fuertes’: The Cycle of Military Intervention Not long after lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez Frías was imprisoned for attempting a putsch in 1992, many Venezuelans rallied to demand his release.79 Six years later, he was elected president with 56.20% of the vote. Why did such a large part of the population support a military officer who had attempted to unseat a democratic government? Chávez filled an ideological vacuum in a society enthralled by its past and disillusioned by its present. In the early nineties, between economic instability, political unrest and perceived government corruption, an army officer offering a radical solution to the crisis resonated with the nation’s fascination with the heroic leaders of Venezuela’s history. However, the lure of military rule did not end with Chávez’s death in 2012. In the protests between February and May 2014, many of the demonstrators insisted that an army coup was necessary to depose the Maduro administration. Support for military intervention is a natural continuation of a series of historical, political and cultural factors. This chapter will investigate the developments that influenced the diffusion of praetorianism in Venezuelan political culture. Periods of civilian rule are rare in the history of Venezuela, a country where 67% of all governments since the declaration of its independence from Spain in 1811 have been led by individuals holding a military rank.80 The political role of the military began to expand soon after Juan Vicente Gómez came to power in 1908. Gómez allowed army promotions exclusively on the basis of favoritism, surrounding himself with armed cronies and appointing loyal officers to influential posts in public administration.81 His successors, López Contreras (1935-1941) and Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945) did not manage to establish the same level of control of the armed forces, allowing them relative autonomy.

79

Canache, ‘Bullets’, 73. Irwin, Militares y civiles, 152. 81 Trinkunas,Crafting. 32-33. 80

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This made military intervention possible in the putsch following the succession crisis after the end of Medina’s term.82 During the three-year democratic experiment (the Trienio) that followed, President Rómulo Gallegos did not discontinue the trend of military self-government, which made coordinated action in the army possible while the coup against him was planned. During the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948-1958), in contrast, the autonomy of the military was restricted and their jurisdictional boundaries were narrowed. The term of general Pérez Jiménez also ended with a coup assisted by the military. However, civilian actors and political parties also contributed to the planning and following through of the deposition and took control after it was over.83 Failure to establish institutionalized civilian control of the armed forces has inevitably led to the use of unconstitutional force in the history of Venezuela since 1945. For this reason creating institutions that guaranteed civilian control of the military was a priority achieved early in the transition to democracy after the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in 1958. The effectiveness of these reforms, which factionalized the army and made it difficult to self-organize, was proven by the failure of the 1992 coup attempts. During the forty year period of democracy, the military was successfully divided and subordinated. Still, after four decades of civilian rule, Venezuelans organized protests to demand failed coup leader Hugo Chávez’s release from prison in 1992.84 Moreover, opinion polls conducted in 1996 indicate that in June that year an astonishing 67.4% of Caracas’s inhabitants sustained a positive image of the lieutenant colonel.85 Chávez’s brief apparition on national television shortly after his arrest, in which he announced ‘por ahora, los objetivos […] no fueron logrados’, captured the imagination of a considerable number of Venezuelans.86 Indeed, just a few days after the attempted coup, during the Carnival celebrations of 1992, hundreds of parents dressed up their children as rebel soldiers and paraded them on a central Caracas boulevard, illustrating the huge psychological impact of

82

Trinkunas, Crafting, 35. Trinkunas, Craftting, 80. 84 Canache, ‘Bullets’, 73. 85 Ibid. 86 Anon.,‘Por ahora’, 4.02.2014 . 83

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the coup attempt.87 As the image of the traditional parties crumbled, the message of the insurgent paratroopers brought Venezuela’s nostalgia for military order to the fore. These early demonstrations of popular support for the leader of Movimiento V República were the first of a series of political developments which played an important role in his electoral success in 1998.88 Damarys Canache argues that Chávez’s growing popularity is explained by two premises: one of converted militancy (the electorate’s belief that Chávez would be able to adhere to democratic principles despite the coup attempt) and one of democratic ambivalence (the vote of individuals who did not value democracy at all).89 The number of voters who had little or no regard for democracy indeed increased with the steady deterioration of economic conditions and the disillusionment with the two traditional parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI).

The crisis of the early nineties, exacerbated by the memory of the violent Caracazo riots in 1989, precipitated a sense that the political system had failed to sustain the economic prosperity Venezuela had experienced in the sixties and seventies. Middle-class Venezuelans had enjoyed high living standards since the dismantling of Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorship in 1958. Relatively stable oil prices and political cohesion had guaranteed high quality of life and made Venezuela stand out as an apparent model democracy, especially compared with other Latin American countries such as Argentina or Chile, which experienced electoral fraud, polarization and military dictatorship.90 These factors generated a sense of Venezuelan ‘exceptionalism’ and privilege – a premise sustained not only by domestic and internationals observers, but also among ordinary citizens.91 When the Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-1993) and Rafael Caldera (1994-1998) governments failed to meet popular expectations, the need for a complete break with the seemingly dysfunctional democratic system gained prominence.

87

Centeno, ‘Militarist Revolution’, 13.03.2013. Canache, ‘Bullets’, 69-71. 89 Ibid, 71. 90 Hawkins, Chavismo, 3. 91 Ellner,Exceptional democracy, 10. 88

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Chávez utilized the prevalent distrust of Venezuela’s bipartidista system. He criticized AD and COPEI aggressively throughout his electoral campaign and constructed an image of himself as an ‘antiparty’ president.92 He thus set the stage for chavismo, a personalistic regime par excellence. Chávez also understood that populist regimes can easily gain ground in times of crisis, which partly explains why he did not adopt a hard-line approach to combat crime and inflation during his presidency. Instead, he consistently asserted that only the chavista government could guarantee stability and presented the opposition as a destabilizing agent.93 This is partly the reason why he often claimed to have discovered U.S. conspiracies to invade Venezuela and opposition plans for a coup. 94 His successor Maduro adopted a similar strategy, claiming that the U.S. government was responsible for Chávez’s cancer and that he had revealed opposition plans to organize a coup to depose him.95 Chávez’s popularity also had a cultural dimension. He managed to captivate parts of the electorate with his personal charisma and rhetorical skills, which tapped into a plethora of national values. Chávez created an image that embodied the historical figure of the strong and authoritative leader who can provide the economic prosperity that traditional democratic forces have failed at achieving. This image is composed by a convergence of nineteenth-century Positivist ideals of the caudillo as ‘la única fuerza de conservación social’ and the cult of legendary ‘hombres fuertes’ such as Simón Bolívar, José Antonio Páez and Francisco de Miranda. 96

Chapter Two discussed how Chávez instrumentalized the mythical figure of Bolívar; but what made this such a successful strategy? The cult of Bolívar is widespread not only in Venezuela but throughout Latin America. His importance is illustrated by the fact that the main square in capitals such as Bogotá and Lima is invariably called the Plaza Bolívar. In Venezuela, the memory of the Latin American liberator is even more present: every town and village in the country has a Plaza Bolívar. Venezuela is also the place 92

Corrales, ‘Hugo Boss’, 04.01.2006. Ibid. 94 Zúquete, ‘Missionary Politics’, 93. 95 Ibid. 96 Lanz, Cesarismo democrático, 24. 93

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where just a few months apart, two Bolívar features were released. In 2013, a historical epic was produced: Bolívar, el hombre de las dificultades (2013), directed by Luis Alberto Lamata. It was immediately followed by another biopic, the Venezuelan film with the highest production value of all time, Libertador (2013) directed by Alberto Arvelo, which has been put forward for this year’s Oscar selection. Luis Castro Leiva asked: ‘¿Es possible pensar a Venezuela fuera de Bolívar?’, a question which can only reasonably be answered in the negative. 97 But what are the origins of the cult of Bolívar in Venezuela? History suggests a few possible explanations: Bolívar was Venezuelan, and so was Francisco de Miranda, another hero of Latin American independence; the Spanish American wars of independence began with the Caracas rebellions in 1819; and finally, retaliation for the revolts was much more severe in Venezuela than anywhere else on the continent.98 These factors created the basis of a national culture which incorporates a sense of past glory and sacrifice embodies a spiritual need for modern-day heroes, a culture in which ‘la constante derogación y crítica abusiva de todo lo anterior, el desconocimiento de los logros alcanzados, responde a una lógica nihilista devoradora, que tiene su origen en la nostalgia por una gloria pasada y perdida, y en una constante utopía de reencarnarla’.99

Reflection on past achievements has shaped Venezuelan culture, in which history and heroism are the most significant national values. History offers a consolation to resort to in times of crisis, witnessed by the continuing popularity of historical novels in the country such as Arturo Pietri’s Las lanzas coloradas (1931). History is also immortalized in heroic statues and monuments. Caracas’s enormous park Paseo Los Próceres is dedicated to the leaders of Venezuela’s independence movement. The aesthetics of the park are overtly militaristic, with neo-classical style statues of larger-than-life armed men and women. Parque El Calvario in Caracas is also military-themed. The vertical steps leading to the park reach the statue of Simón Bolívar; they are designed as a physical calvario intended to represent metaphorically the hardship Bolívar encountered while fighting in the 97

Leiva, Gran Colombia , 276 Torres, Herencia, 22. 99 Ibid., 15. 98

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wars for the liberation of Latin America. The marks of militarism visible in popular public spaces for sport and recreation define and form everyday life. The real-life military on guard near the monuments, patrolling the streets and occupying spaces traditionally reserved for civilians (polling stations, supermarkets, hospitals) create a sense of history repeating itself, allowing the heroes of the past and present to converge in public spaces.

Fig. 10: Parque Los Próceres, Caracas.

Popular culture also reveals the role of militarism in the country’s national values. ‘Disfrázate de militar, para que tu mamá te quiera’, says a little girl to her eight-year-old friend in Pelo Malo (2013), a critically acclaimed Venezuelan drama. Military symbols and the cult of armed men are ubiquitous in Venezuela, a society dominated by the cultural ethos of machismo in which a hyper-virile and aggressive man is a model to be respected and emulated. Violence is closely linked with masculinity in patriarchal societies such as Venezuela, where nonaggression is often interpreted as weakness.

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Fig.11: A scene from Pelo Malo (2013). María Sulbarán advises Samuel Zambrano to dress up as a military officer to impress his mother.

Guns and uniforms are historical status symbols, and a profession in the military has traditionally been considered among the most desirable in Venezuela. This is even more the case today, thanks to the financial injections of Chávez, and during the last year, Maduro. In contemporary Venezuela, military salaries are significantly higher than those in most sectors and continue growing despite the economic downturn.100 The attraction of a military career is so great that even the civilian population has assumed voluntary military roles. The government has assembled a national militia of reservists, Guardia Territorial, which has more than a million members.101 Moreover, the paramilitary organizations loyal to the government wield considerable power. Called colectivos, these voluntary militant groups are the self-proclaimed guardians of the Bolivarian revolution.

One of the most haunting images of Caracas is the huge mural in the public housing project ‘23 de enero’ which portrays an armed Christ, the symbol of the infamous colectivo La Piedrita, next to the Virgen del Coromoto, also armed. Many of the national values and symbols of Venezuela converge in this image – guns, religion and a feeling of historical predestination. As

100 101

Anon., ‘Anunciaron incremento’4.10.2013. Corrales, ‘Hugo Boss’, 4.01.2006.

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surreal as it seems, it is actually an accurate illustration of the sublimation of militaristic imagery and violence which dominates everyday life.

Despite the corruption, political instability and repression associated with authoritarian rule by army officers, military leadership seems almost pre-ordained in Venezuela. A history of military intervention makes unconstitutional force an attractively simple solution in times of crisis. The skepticism of traditional party politics encouraged by Chávez, and cultural factors such as the generalized need for heroes and martyrs make Venezuelans even today forget that lacking effective institutional control, an army that can depose a president can also easily claim power for itself. This is the essence of the Venezuelan cycle of authoritarian rule – political crisis - military intervention - authoritarian rule.

Fig. 12: Mural in ‘23 de enero’.

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Conclusion Venezuela without chavismo? Maduro’s campaign promised to continue Chávez’s policies. Yet his leadership style is proving to be markedly different from that of his predecessor. Venezuela under Chávez was never, as some have argued, a fully-fledged dictatorship. Elections were held regularly, and despite frequent irregularities the outcome was usually accepted by both the opposition and international observers, with few exceptions.102 The opposition was allowed to take part in elections and make public statements, even if it was denied funding and a voice in policy making. The media could criticize the government despite some restrictions. The military wielded considerable political power, but the regime stayed semi-authoritarian. Under Maduro, however, Venezuela is rapidly beginning to resemble a military junta. Part of Chávez’s legacy was the creation of an institutional basis for military rule, censorship and repression. The armed forces hold powerful government positions, control commerce and communications. Their jurisdictional boundaries have been expanded resulting in low horizontal accountability and ever-growing political prerogatives. Reforms in legislation legalized censorship and repression. The system of checks and balances was consciously debilitated, which allows the regime to commit irregularities in every aspect of public policy, including elections. Nevertheless, Chávez was an extremely popular leader who was re-elected three times; as long as he was able to win democratically, he did not need to ban the opposition or use coercive force against critics. Maduro’s popularity, in contrast, is low, even among chavistas. What, then, are the prospects for Venezuela in the near future? First of all, Maduro’s leadership style is becoming increasingly authoritarian, a trend that can be expected to continue and intensify.103 The less electorally competitive the regime becomes, the more the president will look for other ways to stay in power, such as

102 103

Corrales and Penfold, Dragon, 28-30. Rodríguez, ‘Émpty Revolution’, 61.

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criminalizing the opposition and censoring the media.104 Symptoms of this tendency were displayed during the February 2014 demonstrations: TV channels were closed; protesters were repressed with disproportionate force; political opponents were imprisoned. Alternatively, if democratic elections are held the opposition could win. Yet the opposition president would have to strike a delicate balance between establishing immediate civilian control of the armed forces and placating them by preserving most of their privileges, at least in the beginning. He would have to find a way to co-govern with the military in his ministerial cabinet and half the country’s governorships. Even if he is successful, he would be put in charge of a country in the midst of an extremely severe economic and political crisis. In the past, similar circumstances have provoked military deliberation on politics. Action against civilian leaders is all too common in Venezuelan history, and the armed forces could easily depose the new president and replace him with an army officer. Historical, political and cultural factors have converged to make military intervention a viable option for many Venezuelans. Throughout the last century, an undemocratic political culture and a widespread fascination with military figures and values have meant that regimes have frequently been overthrown by coups supported by the civilian population. If these trends continue, they might well precipitate a swift return to authoritarianism.

104

Corrales, ‘¿Un Maduro más duro?’, 10.4.2013.

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Torres, Ana Teresa, La herencia de la tribu: del mito de la Independencia a la Revolución Bolivariana, (Caracas 2011) Trinkunas, Harold A., ‘Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 77-109 Trinkunas, Harold A., ‘The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic’, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2002), p. 64. Trinkunas, Harold A., Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective, (University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Vales, José, ‘Venezuela, marcada por la violencia’, El Universal 12 Jan. 2014, at http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2014/impreso/venezuela--85539.html Vallenilla Lanz, Laureano, Cesarismo Democrático: estudios sobre las bases sociológicas de la Constitución efectiva de Venezuela (Universal, 1929). Wilpert, Gregory ‘The Meaning of 21st Century Socialism for Venezuela’ Venezuelaanalysis.com, 11 Jul 2006, at http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1834 Zúquete, José Pedro, “The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 91-121 Images: Title page: ‘Maduro recuerda legado de Chávez en la atención a la familia militar de Venezuela’, available at http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/inicio/maduro-recuerdalegado-chavez-atencion-a-familia-militar-venezuela/ Fig. 1: ‘Una manifestante opositora (izquierda) discute con un partidario del gobierno en la Plaza Altamira, en Caracas. Los simpatizantes progubernamentales llevan escobas para limpiar los escombros de enfrentamientos anteriores’, available at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2014/03/17/muere-militar-en-medio-de-protestas-envenezuela-2512.html Fig. 2: ‘Hugo Chávez participa en acto en la Academia Militar de Caracas’, available at http://www.martinoticias.com/content/hugo-chavez-militares-transicion-cuba-/18013.html

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Fig. 3: ‘El presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, junto a una pintura de Simón Bolívar en el palacio presidencial de Miraflores en Caracas’, available at http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2010/07/16/actualidad/1279231207_850215.ht ml Fig. 4: ‘El vicepresidente de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro anunció en rueda de prensa, que investigarán una posible “inoculación” del cáncer al presidente Chávez’, available at http://diario16.pe/noticia/22774-venezuela-maduro-dice-que-chaavez-fue-atacado-porenemigos-histaoricos Fig. 5: Untitled, available at http://www.leanoticias.com/2013/01/24/nicolas-madurochavez-esta-en-el-mejor-momento-del-postoperatorio/ Fig. 6: Untitled, available at http://www.as-coa.org/articles/why-venezuela-doesnt-deserveseat-un-security-council Fig. 7: ‘Chávez en innumerable cantidad de murales por todo Caracas’, available at http://www.diariobae.com/notas/6344-el-primer-ano-sin-chavez.html Fig. 8: ‘Nicolás Maduro saluda desde un tanque’, available at http://www.abc.com.py/fotos/maduro-participa-en-maniobras-militares-639325.html Fig. 9: Untitled, available at https://www.flickr.com/photos/visrec01/8390142070/ Fig. 10: Untitled, available at http://sinchacharas.com/agenda/pelo-malo-de-marianarondon-se-estrena-en-mexico/ Fig. 11: ‘Los soldados civiles de Chavez’, available http://www.theclinic.cl/2012/03/06/la-piedrita-los-soldados-civiles-de-chavez/

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