The Los Zetas Drug Cartel: a threat quickly ignored

The Los Zetas Drug Cartel: a threat quickly ignored

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements for course HLSS500

Gene Souza

American Military University

28 February 2014

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Introduction Since 2008 a Mexican based, narco-terrorist organization known as the Los Zetas rapidly expanded influence and operations into over 276 cities within the United States; like a hurricane gathering strength prior to land-fall, the effect of the Los Zetas operations can be felt across 42 states. “This disparate band of criminals known as Los Zetas is no longer just a concern in Mexico. It has expanded its deadly operations across the southwestern border, establishing footholds and alliances in states from New York to California” (Seper 2011). Numerous Congressional research reports indicate that the Los Zetas have established routine contact with the Lebanese based Hezbollah terrorist group, numerous United States (U.S.) based criminal gangs including the Mara Salvatruch (aka MS-13) gang that actively targets U.S. law enforcement agents, and possibly members of the international terrorist organizations associated with Al Qaeda. Representative Michael T. McCaul, Chairman of the 112th Congress reported in November 2012 that the Iranian “Qods Force and Hezbollah are in Mexico…actively researching human smuggling routes and establishing relationships with drug cartels…these relationships between Iran, Hezbollah and organized crime organizations could potentially assist in strikes against the (United States)” (McCaul 2012). Congressional analysts believe that the Los Zetas is one of the most diverse organized crime organizations on the planet with ties to these terrorist groups (Beittel 2013). Can U.S. government involvement in targeting Los Zetas Drug Cartel members increase security along the U.S. Mexican Border? The power base for the Los Zetas resides in the ability to control financial holdings secured by the lucrative illegal drug market; almost all of this product is sold within the United States. The financial security that the illegal drug industry provides for the Los Zetas allows the leadership to expand operations to include smuggling bulk cash shipments, laundering the illicit

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revenue, weapons trafficking from the United States into Mexico, corrupting public and private business owners, buying loyalty from both Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agents, smuggling other than Mexican (OTM) individuals into the United States, gasoline and oil theft, pirating audio and video merchandize, and engaging in terrorism to expand their power and influence within the Western Hemisphere (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2010). Although these other criminal business ventures are lucrative, the Los Zetas would be unable to financially survive in its current state without the citizens of the United States purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of illegal drugs. The Los Zetas leaders clearly demonstrate that they will respond with extreme violence to any threat on their power-base, including United States citizens, lawenforcement agencies and our government representatives. This paper attempts to define how the Los Zetas could facilitate a terrorist attack against a McAllen, Texas Law Enforcement Agency in order to strengthen their influence over other U.S. law enforcement agents.

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Literature Review Numerous requests to designate the Los Zetas as a foreign terrorist organization since 2007 have fallen on deaf ears in both Congress and the Department of State (United States Congress 2014). Despite numerous testimonies, bills and evidence provided to the civil leadership of the United States, there is resistance to acknowledge a terrorist threat operating unchecked within our borders. Furthermore, intellectuals advising Congress, other civil leadership and security agencies do not adequately define the current situation in Mexico and the United States as narcoterrorism. Terrorism is not clearly defined in United States (U.S.); according to Erickson (2006) each U.S. government agency is free to define terrorism “precisely whatever we choose them to be, and the FBI and other organizations define things as they do to meet the organizational and legal constraints of their activities” (p.314). Coordination concerning “terrorism” and “terrorists” between U.S. Government agencies is therefore problematic. The Department of Defense has been given the task to combat foreign terrorists; henceforth, for the purposes of this paper, terrorists and terrorism will be defined in accordance with Department of Defense, Army Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency: “A terrorist is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result (DOD)... Insurgent terrorism techniques include assassination, arson, blackmail, bombings, hijacking, kidnapping, threats, murder, mutilation, and torture. The insurgent using terrorism often targets economic and political symbols to undermine the legitimacy of the government. Any overreaction by government forces or other authorities adds to the population's resentment toward the government and turns its support to the insurgency... Insurgents using

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terrorism generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare or conventional operations. Inherently, these activities have greater security and lower support requirements. Insurgents using terrorism often select targets for their political and psychological impact. (United States Army 2009) Gordon Knowles, PhD and anti-terrorism officer, provides a definition for narco-terrorism when he states, “Terrorist groups commonly use kidnapping, murder, bombings, stylized execution-even gruesome acts as public disfigurement and desecration of bodies-to achieve their objectives…political terrorists select targets that support a political agenda, while narco-terrorist select targets to further a profit-making agenda” (Knowles 2008). The Los Zetas is a narco-terrorist organization which gathers power and influence through illicit criminal activity. One terrorist tactic the Los Zetas utilize is to release YouTube videos that graphically display violence against target groups. One such video released in 2012 displays “a bald, middle-aged man slump(ing) against the wall in the yard. The blood from his companion's head splatters his shirtless chest. He looks to his left, at the headless corpse lying next to him. The chainsaw continues to roar. The bald man rests his head against the wall once again. He awaits his turn” (Beith 2012). The Los Zetas utilize gruesome violence such as this to intimidate civilians, law-enforcement agents and government leaders to build power and influence to protect their narcotics operations. These tactics clearly fit into the Department of Defense and Dr. Knowles definition of terrorism focusing on select targets for their political and psychological impact; thus the Los Zetas can be categorized as a narco-terrorist organization.

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Figure 1. Map of DTO Areas of Dominant Influence in Mexico by DEA (Beittle 2013)

The Los Zetas organization was originally composed of former elite airborne special force members of the Mexican Army, trained in counter-terrorism, who defected to the Gulf Cartel and became their hired assassins (Cook 2008). These Mexican ex-patriots quickly established themselves as an elite private security force akin to “Blackwater” (aka Xe Services utilized by the U.S. Government to protect dignitaries). The Los Zetas utilized their position as security forces to gain contacts within the organized crime organizations across the Western Hemisphere and conduct a hostile take-over of drug trafficking through Mexico. “Since February 2010, Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel have been battling in Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and other Gulf territory for control of drug smuggling corridors…creating an environment of urban warfare with

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commando-style raids on state prisons, abduction of journalists, murder of police, and attacks on military posts. They have organized elaborate road blockades during their violent operations to prevent legitimate police from responding (Beittel 2013). Current analysis indicates that the Los Zetas have the largest geographic area of influence in Mexico with expansion continuing in Guatemala and the United States (see Figure 1). Figure 2. Drug Cartel Distribution by Demand Map (National Drug Threat Survey 2007) The Western U.S. prefers methamphetamine (red) while the east prefers cocaine (blue)

Drug related violence is on the rise within the United States. The 10 October 2010 beheading of a Phoenix man is just one example of how the Los Zetas utilize intimidation terror tactics within the United States (Associated Press 2010). According to FBI reporting, additional drug cartel (likely Los Zetas) related beheadings have been reported in Arizona and Oklahoma (Bunker 2013). Representative McCaul cites Texas Department of Public Safety reports that “22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 shootings and five kidnappings in Texas (alone) directly at the hands of Mexican cartels between January 2010 and April 2011” (McCaul 2012). Insurgents are routinely

Souza bursting into Arizona homes creating a “wave of kidnappings, shootings, and home invasions…Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard states that “the number of kidnappings in the city of Phoenix reported has now gone to almost 300 a year.”” (Archibold 2009). In a Law Enforcement Sensitive report issued by the New Mexico Investigative Support Center, analysts state the coercive influence is not limited to Mexico. “The Los Zetas are known to have cells within the United States; Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, Oklahoma and Texas and they are making their presence known in other states as well, including smuggling weapons from Chicago, IL to the State of Florida into Mexico” (Jones 23 April 2009) (see figure 2 for an overview of Mexican drug cartel presence in the United States). Figure 3. U.S. Illegal Drug trafficking routes (DOJ National Drug Assessment 2011) Supply follows the Demand

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The Los Zetas have violently demonstrate their ability to conduct coercive attacks on U.S. Law Enforcement Agents. The Department of Homeland Security office of the Inspector General reports that “since 2007, violence against Border Patrol agents has increased by 35 percent to include 13 deaths…58 incidents of shots fired at Texas lawmen by Mexican cartel operatives since 2009…since 2008 there have been 77 incidents of cartel operatives throwing tire-deflating devices at pursuing law-enforcement vehicles” (McCaul 2012). Not included in this report is the assassination style attack on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) special agent Jaime Zapata and Victor Avila by the Los Zetas on 15 February 2011 (FBI Press Release 2013). The Los Zetas must maintain power and influence over their lines of commerce; the hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit drug sales establish the base of power for these insurgent groups. According to Congressional research, Marijuana sales provide money to purchase the Columbian cocaine for resale in the U.S. when the marijuana crops are dormant. Furthermore, it is estimated that smuggling people into the U.S. earns the narco-terrorists over $2,000 per head (Beittel 2009). Therefore, coercive power is needed by these groups to ensure unobstructed flow of material and resources over the border; the narco-terrorists must demonstrate to the population that the police cannot protect themselves, let alone the civilian population. Los Zetas coercive attacks on U.S. Law Enforcement are essential to maintaining the perception of power of the narco-terrorist group. It is much safer to utilize existing crossing points with a known corrupt U.S. border official that is willing to take cash in exchange for an unimpeded border crossing. One cartel member identified that “a corrupt U.S. border official that is willing to take a bribe…is failsafe, it is (a) secure” method to cross into the U.S. (Frontline, 2008). The Los Zetas are unique in their ability and willingness to use violence to

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facilitate their will upon law enforcement agencies. In fact, according to FBI Law Enforcement Sensitive reporting, the Los Zetas blazingly threatened the lives of FBI and DEA agents in Laredo, TX in 2008 and planned large scale retribution attacks on local law enforcement agents in McAllen, TX in 2009. The Los Zetas are a learning, adaptive organization. “If you cut off a spider’s leg, it’s crippled; if you cut off its head it dies. But if you cunt off a starfish’s leg it grows and new one, and the old leg can grow into an entirely new starfish” (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006, 35). The recent “successes” by U.S. and Mexican government forces to target the “head” of the Los Zetas have created a “starfish” like organization. Without an authoritarian figure, or treasurer, the remaining members of the Los Zetas are relatively free to conduct operations as they see fit, and to utilize the resources at their disposal to ensure continued prosperity. In summary, the Los Zetas are a narco-terrorist organization freely operating within the borders of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. This group utilizes terror tactics to maintain power and influence over government and security forces to secure their primary base of power, the narcotics flowing from South and Central America into the high-demand areas of the United States. The citizens of the United States are funding this terrorist group through the purchase of illicit drugs, a multi-billion dollar industry; Los Zetas members have clearly proven their willingness to utilize extreme violence to protect their lines of supply and income.

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Methodology The approach utilized for this document is the “What If? Analysis” as outlined by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies in the Red Team Handbook. This technique assumes an event has already occurred with some potential impact (positive or negative) and explains how it might have occurred. This method is best used to challenge an audience with a strong mind-set that event will not happen; it is similar to the High Impact/Low Probability Analysis, but does not dwell on the consequences of an event as much as accepting the significance and moves directly to how the event might have occurred (University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies 2009, 164-165). The “What If? Analysis” method shifts “focus from whether an event could occur to how it may happen” (University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies 2009, 165). The fact that the Los Zetas have already lethally targeted United States Law Enforcement Agents, made numerous threats specifying McAllen, Texas as a geographical focus area, and have been recently targeted by Mexican authorities with the assistance of U.S. intelligence agencies provides sufficient plausibility that the Los Zetas must demonstrate their resolve in order to maintain power and influence over local law enforcement officers. The hypothesis for this work is that the next inter-agency disaster is just as likely to be caused by narco-terrorists as it is by a violent hurricane landing in the Gulf of Mexico. A qualitative analysis with the dependent variable of how current law enforcement operations have impacted the Los Zetas reported activities since 2009 would help determine if these operations are achieving measures of effectiveness verses measures of performance. Unfortunately this data is not readily available outside of classified intelligence channels. Furthermore, a qualitative or quantitative approach is not appropriate for this research project; although several works cited in

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the literature review utilized these methods, the intent of this project is to be predictive in determining how the Los Zetas will respond to the loss of “El Chapo”. Thus a non-standard approach is required to clearly articulate the “What If? Analysis”. Samuel Logan of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is one of few analysts who is willing to be predictive in his work. In his 2012 analysis, he addresses the impact of the loss of a key influential leader within the top tier of the Los Zetas organization. Logan utilizes a model similar to the Stakeholder Mapping model. Logan rationalizes the criminal entrepreneurship of the several drug cartels and predicts that the “various power factions will leverage their current relationships to work alongside one another in a decentralized, networked fashion under the Los Zetas brand to traffic narcotics, control territory, and fight off rivals. The collective will behave more like a leaderless, self-organizing network than a structured organization with a clear leader, defined accounting structures, and precise goals for the future” (Logan 20012). The elements of Logan’s methodology express a clear articulation of the situation, and utilization of rationalization to explain a prediction based upon the “Stakeholders” anticipated “rational” response to Law Enforcement targeting of key leaders within the organization.

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Findings and Analysis Given that the Los Zetas is a narco-terrorist organization that has clearly expressed lethal threats to McAllen, Texas area law enforcement agents, possess an economic need to preserve their established influence over the United States based illegal drug trafficking multi-billion-dollar industry, and have limitless resources available to intimidate U.S. law enforcement agents, the Los Zetas must take action to retain control of the economic back-bone of their power. A wellplanned attack by the Los Zetas on a McAllen, Texas local law enforcement icon will unlikely be disrupted prior to execution due to limited resources available under a fiscally constrained local government. In the scenario presented as the basis for this research paper, an assumption is made that the Los Zetas international narco-terrorist organization is facing a noticeable impact on their economic income due to operations supported by McAllen, Texas local law enforcement officers. McAllen, Texas is a key border town along the Los Zetas primary narco-trafficking route into the United States. The Los Zetas must adopt a course of action which will strengthen their control over narco-trafficking routes within the vicinity of McAllen, Texas. Below is an excerpt of a possible attack conducted against U.S. law enforcement agents within McAllen, Texas in an attempt to retain the Los Zetas power-base. Speculation: The son of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman of the Los Zetas international narcoterrorist organization paid United States MS-13 gang members to carry out an attack on the McAllen, Texas Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) District Office for retribution to the loss of over three tons of cocaine and the capture of his father by Mexican and U.S. officials on 22 February 2014 (Licon, Caldwell and Stevenson 2014). The Los Zetas will utilize their expertise in biological and chemical manufacturing to weaponize a biological toxin (anthrax) in

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this attack resulting in a multi-agency response that will place public doubt in the ability of U.S. law enforcement to protect itself against future narco-terrorist attacks. The Los Zetas organization can easily identify the local DEA District Office at 1200 Commerce Center Street, McAllen, TX as a viable target for retribution (see Figure 4). Although physical security measures are in place, the McAllen, Texas DEA District Office is still vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Source: GoogleMaps The McAllen, Texas Drug Enforcement Administration District Office can be observed without detection from numerous locations. The office is located in an industrial area in the northern portion of the city directly adjacent to the RGV Warehouse (a general grocery wholesaler) with constant traffic and activity. E. Laurel Avenue along the southern perimeter is a busy thoroughfare with large trucks routinely parking along the route awaiting loading or unloading. One block east of the DEA District Office is a vending machine distribution center.

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The physical and demographic environment surrounding the DEA District Office allows for unlimited access to observe everyday activities of the individuals that interact with the office at all hours. Within walking distance of the DEA office is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) McAllen Intelligence Center where employees focus resources to identify the activities of the Los Zetas and other criminal groups; an attack on the DEA District Office would negatively impact both organizations. It is a known fact that the Los Zetas have the ability to pay gang members to conduct operations within the United States. The MS-13 gang members are very familiar with U.S. law enforcement facilities and service providers. Gang members are U.S. citizens and can easily acquire jobs within the companies that provide food services to numerous law enforcement agencies. It is assumed that the Custom Food Group (CFG) that services all of Texas is an organization that can be easily infiltrated by new gang members; CFG supplies/services vending machines to the McAllen, Texas DEA District Office. Once the gang member is employed by CFG, the individual(s) are likely to have access to supplies, routes and delivery dates to the DEA district office. With this information the Los Zetas influenced gang members will be able to gain access to routine deliveries to the DEA District Office by being assigned to the route, or through tampering with a scheduled shipment to the office. Replacing a few bags of Lays Sour Cream potato chips with anthrax laced bags would be very easy. As illegal drug manufacturers, members of the Los Zetas have expertise in chemical and biological manufacturing. A chemical or biological attack by the Los Zetas is not unlikely with their employees being masters of manufacturing illegal drugs; the ability for the Los Zetas to acquire a biological agent such as anthrax is clearly plausible with their vast resources and biological expertise. The Los Zetas are also experts in camouflaging their product for

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transportation into the U.S. without detection; therefore, it is assumed that the Los Zetas could easily lace vending machine items with a biological agent for delivery to the DEA district office. The biological agent can be inserted into several products ranging from chips and peanuts to soda. The anthrax laced products could be easily introduced in transit from the distribution warehouse directly to the vender location. An attack of this nature would result in the employment of the Center for Disease Control and Federal Emergency Management Agency as well as creating panic among the McAllen, Texas law enforcement agency population; this attack has potential for crowding local hospitals as was observed in the anthrax attacks of 2001. As of 27 February 2014 the Los Zetas have not responded to the 22 February 2014 capture of one of the current established leaders of the organization, “El Chapo”. The Los Zetas are not known for their patience, it is likely retribution is already in the planning stages with the resulting attack to be publicly displayed before the summer begins.

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Conclusion The Los Zetas narco-terrorist organization presents a clear and present danger to United States Law Enforcement Agents; the Los Zetas leaders clearly demonstrate that they will respond with extreme violence to any threat on their power-base, including the assassination of United States citizens, law-enforcement agencies and our government representatives. Los Zetas coercive attacks on U.S. law enforcement are essential to maintaining the perception of power for the narco-terrorist group. The “What If?” scenario presented in this work presents a plausible threat to U.S. law enforcement that cannot be easily detected. The Los Zetas narco-terrorist organization has adequate resources to conduct an attack on U.S. law enforcement agents through third or fourth parties in order to prevent a direct connection to their organization. Furthermore, the Los Zetas have demonstrated that they are an adaptive group; with the loss of “El Chapo” it is likely that the group will become more radicalized as the group further develops from a “Spider” organization into a “Starfish” (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006).

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