Study Resource, Classical Indian Philosophy

PART 1: NYAYA SUTRA By Gotama

1. What is the highest good according to Gotama? How do we achieve it? OR Write a note on the 16 categories of knowledge according to Nyaya 1

Written in 2nd century CE by Gotama, Nyaya Sutra was commented upon by Vatsyayana

(Bhasya), Vacaspati Misra (Nyaya-vartika-tatparyatika) and Udyayanacarya (Tatparya-parishuddhi). The first sutra of the text is said to be an overview, an enunciation of the whole treatise. 2Nyaya school of philosophy uses the Science of Reasoning- in this method, there is examination of things by means of proofs- that is, inference based on perception and verbal cognition. Here, we review a thing already apprehended by perception or verbal cognition. The science that follows such a method is called nyayavidya, nyayasastra or anviksiki. 3

Nyaya proceeds in the following manner while dealing with a subject: firstly, enunciation;

secondly, definition and lastly, examination or investigation. In enunciation, there is mere mention of the name of categories which we will be shortly discussing. In definition, we talk about the character or properties of the object defined which distinguishes it from others. In examination, we use argumentation to ensure that the definition can be applied to the object defined. In the Sutra 1 and 2, there is enunciation of the Highest Good and the method to attain it, which is defined and examined in detail in the sutra later. 4

In this article, we will begin by defining the highest good and then, we will go on to talk about

the method in which it is said that we can attain it. Consequently, we will talk about the process of attaining true knowledge and the 16 categories of knowledge. 5

What is the highest good? According to Nyayasutra, the highest good is the final release

from transmigration. This release begins with attainment of true knowledge and is followed by the cessation of the following series: wrong notions, defect, activity, birth and pain. True knowledge can be seen as the attainment of that which is contrary to wrong notions. We will shortly be talking about this series. The series consists of (a) Wrong notions; (b) Defect; (c) Activity; (d) Birth; and (e) Pain. (a) Wrong notions: After gaining true knowledge, the wrong notions cease, pertaining to different kinds of objects. For instance: •

Soul: There is no such thing as a soul.

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Non-soul: Considering non-soul to be soul.

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Pain: When pain is regarded as pleasure.

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Eternal: when non-eternal is regarded as eternal.

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Safety: when non-safety is seen as safety.

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Fearful: when fearful is seen as free of fear.

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Disgusting: when disgusting is seen agreeably.

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Rejected: when that which should be rejected is considered as worthy of not being rejected.

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Karma: there is no such thing as a karma or result of karma.

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Defects: there is no such thing as transmigration.

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Rebirth: birth of living things is without cause; transmigration is not due to karma and is only transfer of body, sense organs, consciousness and sensations.

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Highest good: highest good is terrible as it is cessation of all activity.

(b) Defects: Wrong notions leads to attachment to agreeable and aversion to disagreeable. This leads to defects like jealousy, envy or avarice and others. (c) Activity: This is caused by defects. •

Adharma: wrong activity o Bodily- stealing, killing and others. o Verbal- lying, rudeness and others. o Mental- Malice, materialism and others.

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Dharma: right activity o Bodily- charity, protecting, service. o Verbal- Truth, studying of Veda. o Mental- compassion and others.

Activity leads to merit and demerit. (d) Birth: Depending on the activity or karma of the person, they get a respectable or a mean

birth. Birth refers to the collective appearance in one congregated group of body, sense organs and consciousness. (e) Pain: When there is birth, there is pain. Harassment (badhana), suffering (pida) and affection (tapa) are different types of pain. This series of five, which operate continuously, constitute metempsychosis or transmigration. The acquisition of true knowledge leads to clearing of wrong notions leading to cessation of defects, activity, birth and pain. Furthermore, the study of the 16 categories (padartha) of knowledge leads to the highest good. There are also four kinds of objects of cognition, the knowledge of which, assists in reaching the highest good, these are: (i) that which is fit to be discarded (pain) along with its causes (i.e. desire and ignorance, merit and demerit which lead to pain); (ii) that which is absolutely destructive of pain i.e. true knowledge; (iii) Means to destruction of pain i.e. specific treatises; and (iv) the goal to be attained i.e. highest good. 6

True Knowledge: How can one gain true knowledge? One can truly know an object when it is

cognized through the instrument of right cognition (pramana). The process of gaining true knowledge begins with contact between the object cognized (prameya) and the cognizer (pramatr), leading to the gaining of right cognition by the means of right cognition (pramana). How do we know if it is right cognition? When the cognizer cognizes through pramana, it is right cognition and such a cognition results in seeking or getting rid of the object. This effort we make to seek or avoid the object is known as the exertion and when we succeed in seeking it or avoiding it, such exertion is said to be ‘fruitful’. Thus, there are four conditions, the being of which, will allow true knowledge to arise: (i) Cognizer i.e. pramatr- the person stimulated by exertion to acquire or discard an object; (ii) Cognized object i.e. prameya- that which is rightly known; (iii) Instrument of right cognition i.e. pramana (this is the most effective cause) - instrument of right cognition, that by means of which the right cognition of an object is acquired and this results in right cognition (pramiti). In nyaya, true knowledge includes the knowledge of soul and other objects. True knowledge clears up wrong notions and leads to right notions like: •

There is a soul.

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Non-soul is not the soul.

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Pain, eternity, safety, fear, disgust and rejection are also properly cognized.

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There is a thing as karma and it is effective in bringing about results.

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There is such a thing as an animal, a living being, a being, a soul, which having dies, is reborn- a birth has definite cause- cessation of birth has definite cause- death and rebirth is without beginning but ends in final release- death and rebirth is caused by activity (merit and demerit)- connected with soul and operated by disruption and restoration of continuous connection of such things as body, sense-organs, consciousness and sensations.

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Final release: Disassociation from all things and cessation from all activity, it is extremely peaceful- that which is frightful and painful disappears on final release- one is free of all pain and devoid of consciousness of pain- pain and pleasure both are nonexistent in final release (they are like food with honey and poison).

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16 Categories to understand the four kinds of objects of right cognition: The knowledge of

these 16 categories (padartha) leads to the highest good. Why are there 16 categories when all categories from 3rd to 16th can be put under the pramana and prameya? At this point, the bhasyakara responds that for the well-being of man, four studies have been formed, namely, Vedic, Agricultural, Political and Logico-Metaphysical. Nyaya is the Science of Reasoning which falls under the Logico-Metaphysical category. Every study has its unique subject-matter and the distinguishing feature of Nyaya consists in the study of these categories which will make it distinct from Vedas and others. Grammatical note: All the 16 categories are present in one word. The bhasyakara says that the right quantity must be attributed to each category- singular, dual or plural. The compound is copulative because there is a collection of words which in themselves create sense, that is, they are collected words leading to tattva gyan. They are also genitive in the sense that they belong to the tattva gyan by genre. It is accusative as the goal of the compound is in the compound itself. 1. Means of right cognition: Pramana The means of right cognition is that through which an object can be rightly cognized. These are of four kinds, namely, perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. The sutra talks about these in later part of the text.

2. Object of right cognition: Prameya The objects of pramana are of four types: (i) Pleasure; (ii) Source of pleasure; (iii) Pain; and (iv) Source of Pain. There are infinite types of objects of these kinds as there are infinite living beings. What is the real nature (tattva) of things? Being or existence in case of that which is or exists and non-being or non-existence in case of that which is not or doesn’t exist. Real nature of things is said to be known when that which is, is apprehended as being (existent) and not of contrary nature (non-being). How is it that non-entities are apprehended by instruments of right cognition which also cognize existent objects? In nyaya, the definition of non-entity can be understood by the following two quotes: ‘if the thing existed it would be seen- as it is not seen, it must be concluded not to exist’ and ‘if the thing existed, it would be cognized- as it is not cognized, it must be concluded not to exist’. The example of lamp is given to show that that which is visible when the lamp is lit is existent and that which is not visible is nonexistent. By the same instruments of right cognition, we cognize the existence of existents and the non-existence of non-existents. In a footnote, it is mentioned that the only difference between existence and non-existence is that while we cognize the existents directly, the latter is cognized through the existents indirectly. 3. Doubt: samsaya Reasoning deals with that which is doubtful and not that which is unknown or completely known. Doubt is expressed in the form, ‘Is the object this or that?’ This is followed by the process of reasoning where both the sides (this and that) are taken into consideration and then there is ascertainment of the real nature of the object (demonstrated truth). 4. Motive: prayojana That which stimulates or urges a person into action- an exertion- it being acceptance, rejection or indifference to an object. Motive is the basis of all reasoning. 5. Fallacious reasoning: hetvabhasa That inference which is contrary to perception and verbal cognition is called fallacious reasoning. This can be included among the clinchers but is given separately as these are specially indicated in discussion. The other clinchers can be seen in disputation

and wrangling. 6. Discussion: Vada Reasoning that is aimed at acquiring or reaching the truth is called discussion. Here, there is declaration of various theories by different speakers out of which one is decided to the demonstrated truth in the end. 7. Disputation: jalpa Reasoning which is carried out in order to vanquish the opponent is called disputation. 8. Wrangling: vitanda Such a method is used by a person called wrangler who aims at not taking any position in a discussion and considers his job only to prove the position of all opponents untenable. Nyaya point out that even when he is doing this, he is accepting many factors: a. The person showing untenability (himself); b. The person of whose position untenability is shown (the opponent); c. The reasoning by which the untenability is shown; and d. Untenability which is shown. In accepting these factors, he ceases to be a wrangler. A wrangler is one who doesn’t accept any position. But if such is the case, then his purpose of untenabilizing the opponent is meaningless, as he has no basis to start from. And if he has a basis, then he is not a wrangler anymore. The wrangler is said to be a person who speaks a collection of sentences wherein there is no maintaining any definite stand point.

Disputation and wrangling are two kinds of discussion. Difference between discussion and these two: Disputation uses casuistry which is not admissible in discussion and wrangling has no purpose. Both these kinds of discussion guard the knowledge of truth which is established by discussion. 9. Example: drstanta Here are the main features of example: a. That which is directly perceived or which cannot fail to be perceived;

b. That which needs no proof or is self-evident; c. Inference and verbal cognition depend on it d. Uses of example: i. When two speakers with different supporting theories agree on an example, then it can be used to show how the opponent’s position is incompatible with the agreement in example; ii. Against nihilistic and atheistic Buddha: If they (Buddhists) agree to an example, then their theory of momentary existence fails and if they do not, then they do not have a way to prove the opponent false. iii. In inference: the use of corroborative instance in the premise to establish the conclusion. 10. Theory- Siddhanta A proposition or a statement of fact asserted in the form ‘this is so...’ is called a theory. The presence of more than a theory allows for different types of discussion. 11. Factors of inference- avayava In an inference, there are five statements; four of which are premises and the last one is the conclusion. The structure of inference in Nyaya system is as follows: a. There is fire on the hill- Thesis b. Because there is smoke on the hill- Hetu/Statement of Probans (Inferential) c. Where there is smoke, there is fire, like in the kitchen, unlike a lakeudharana/corroborative instance (Perceptual) d. The hill is likewise smoky. – Upanaya/application of the premise e. There is fire on the hill- nigama/conclusion (verbal) In the nyaya inference, all instruments of cognition are used. This is considered to be the highest form of reasoning to convince the opponent of the untenable nature of his position. 12. Cogitation: tarka Tarka helps means of cognition or pramana to ascertain its validity or invalidity. Thus, it helps to attain true knowledge. For instance: Consider the doubt:

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Doubt: What is the origin of man? i. Is man caused by an uncaused cause? ii. Is man caused by a caused cause? iii. Is man uncaused?

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Cogitation: Analysis of each option to make space for one’s position i.

If man is caused by an uncaused cause, then man is eternal for the cause which has no cause is unending.

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If man is caused by caused cause, then man will cease as the cause can cease.

iii. •

If man is uncaused, then there will be no cessation of man.

This makes ground to establish the notion of karma

In this way, cogitation helps in analysing and breaking the opponents’ position and helping one’s own. 13. Demonstrated Truth- nirnaya True knowledge reached by pramana assisted by cogitation is called demonstrated truth. This is the final aim of all discussions, which is aided by disputation or wrangling. 14. Casuistry- chala 15. Futile rejoinder- jati 16. Clinchers- nigrahastana These three are discussed later separately. This help the speaker and his opponents to be in check and not make fallacious reasoning.

2. How is perception defined by Nyaya Sutra? What are its features? SENSE-PERCEPTION

1. Definition: Sense-perception is cognition which is 1produced by contact of the object with the senseorgan, 2which is not expressible by words, 3which is not erroneous and 4which is well-defined. Sense organs: eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue and mind. MIND AS A SENSE ORGAN: Mind is also a sense-organ but in a different sense from others. Mind is immaterial, effective on all objects and is capable of acting as an organ without being given any quality. The other organs are compose of material substances, have as object specific objects and act as organs only when they are endowed with certain specific qualities. 2. COGNITION PRODUCED BY CONTACT BETWEEN OBJECT AND SENSE ORGANThe contact between object and sense-organ is exclusive to perception. There are other forms of contact which happen for cognizing the object: Soul --> Mind --> Sense-organ --> Object. But only the contact between sense organ and object is mentioned because it is what distinguishes perception from other pramanas and also defines it. The sutra is not saying that only these factors (that is, contact of object with sense organ) is involved in the cognition but is only highlighting that part of the process which is exclusive to the perception. 3. COGNITION WHICH NOT EXPRESSIBLE IN WORDS The cognition of an object is different from its naming. I might perceive an object that I do not know. This does not mean that I have had no cognition. I have cognition. This perception remains the same even after I come to know the name. In the act of perception, there is no role of verbal expression. We only cognize the object to ourselves. It is only when we have to communicate to others for practical purposes that we use words and name the object. 4. COGNITION WHICH IS NOT ERRONEOUS A perception is erroneous when we apprehend something that is as something that it is not. For instance, mirage of water in desert. Since we have defined perception as being without verbal expression, then we would have to accept such mirages/errors as perception if we did not add this condition.

5. COGNITION THAT IS WELL-DEFINED When I see a person from far, I think, ‘This is either Sita or Geeta’. This is doubt. If we did not add this condition of well-defined-ness, then we would have to consider this perception. But is the sense organ involved in this doubt? We cannot say that this confusion is only because of doubt between our mind and soul and therefore, it has nothing to do with contact between sense-organ and object. Therefore, there is no need to write ‘well-defined’ separately. Nyaya says that it is important to mention this well-defined separately because it is only upon contact between the object and sense-organ that the doubt arises. Therefore, it is important to point out that our definition excludes such perceptions. In all cases of senseperception, the sense-organ of the perceiver is being used. The mind only operates for representative cognition. This can be proved by pointing out that there is no representative cognition in those whose sense-organs do not operate. What about perception of pleasure and pain where sense-organs are not involved? (I) Mind is also a sense organ: Nyaya answers that the mind is also a sense organ. Though there are differences in the nature of mind and sense organs, their function is the same. The differences are: Sense organs (i) are composed of material substances; (ii) they work only on specific objects; (iii) they only have certain qualities they have been give. Mind (i) is immaterial; (ii) is effective on all objects; (iii) is capable of acting as an organ, without being endowed with any quality (like sound, color, taste etc). That is, the object should have a taste for the tongue to be able to sense it but the mind does not need anything like that for its operation. (II) The operation of mind is needed in every act of perception. When we are perceiving, our sense organs are perceiving so many objects at the same time but we have the ability to concentrate them on one object of concern. This is done by the mind. (III) Other schools like Vaisesika also recognize the mind as a sense organ.

PART 2 TARKA-SAMGRAHA By Annambhatta

3. What is perception according to Tarka-samgraha? What are the two types of perception? OR What is determinate and indeterminate perception?

1. Definition of perception- Perception is said to be the peculiar cause of perceptive knowledge. It arises as a result of contact between organ and external object. Though perception also involves contact of mind with organ and of soul with the mind, only the contact between sense organ and external object is mentioned because this contact is exclusive to perception while the other two are also shared by other means of knowledge.

2. Characteristics of perception(i) Avyabhichari- Uncontradicted knowledge- this ensures exclusion of false knowledge (ii) Avyapadesa- Unamable- Nirvikapaka gyan (iii) Vyavasatmakam- Differentiated- Savikalpaka gyan Anambhatta also includes the following two(iv) Memory (v) Manasa-pratyaksam- perception of pleasure, pain and perception of soul- In case of soul, the mind is the sense organ.

3. Types of perception- Perception is first broadly divided into divine and human. Then human perception is divided into undifferentiated(nirvikalpaka/nishprakarak) and differentiated (savikalpaka/saprakarak). Undifferentiated perceptive knowledge is knowledge of a thing without its qualities. For instance- 'this is something'. Differentiated perceptive knowledge is knowledge of a thing with all its qualities. For instance- 'this is Dittha', 'he is black' and so on. Nirvikalpaka- As we approach a thing, we realize that it is something. Here, the cognition of something is not distinct from other cognitions. In this form of perception, we see the object as only having satta- as an existent. At this point, the object is 'something'. We have previous knowledge of the object too. Therefore, there is dual knowledge. From this, we come to identify the object. This happens by combining the

indeterminate knowledge with our previous knowledge of the object. This leads to determinate or savikalpaka knowledge. Savikalpaka- In this category, the object is recognized as a particular cognition with certain properties. Here, the cognition is distinguished from other cognition. For instance, the cognition of jar is different from that of pen. Here, we need to have previous knowledge of the object. We must know the qualification before we can understand the qualified. The prakara of the object is known here- the prakara is the qualities of the object. This type of knowledge is also defined as- 'knowledge which comprehends the relation of the qualified and qualifications like name (nama), class (jati) and others' (said by T.D). The qualifications are of four kinds- guna (quality), sankhya (proper name), jati (class) and kriya (action). Each of these qualifications are perceived separately and then combined together with the object to lead to determinate knowledge. While the determinate knowledge is known, the indeterminate one is only inferred. Thus, at a level, Nyaya meant the nirvikalpaka to be a necessary condition for savikalpaka and not consider it as a different kind of knowledge. Savikalpaka perception- Savikalpaka is classified into laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary). Ordinary perception results from contact between six organs (five sense organs and mind) and external object while extraordinary perception can be further divided into samanyalaksana (universals), gyanlaksana and yogaja. Laukika knowledge is of six kinds, corresponding to the five sense organs and the mind. Alaukika knowledge is of three kinds: The third kind of perception is hypothetical. The first two are associative in nature (from particular to general and from one perception to another respectively), therefore, they can also be rightly placed under knowledge derived from immediate inference. Samanyalaksana- Knowledge of a general notion like jar-ness which is comprehended immediately upon direct perception of the object like jar. Why is this extraordinary? Because the general class cannot be preceived by any sense organ alone. Gyanlaksana- Perception which leads to another perception. For instance, you smell the fragrance of the sandal and know that there is a sandal around. Here, there was no

visual perception but you could perceive the object using olfactory perception. Yogaja- This is the yogin's extraordinary perception. They use their superhuman powers and perceive objects which are not perceptible to others. How we receive savikalpaka cognition? If the cognition is of a real external object, it is perception (pratyaks); if it is a judgement which is obtained by a combination of two or more propositions, it is inference (anumiti); if an analogy is known between objects, then it is comparison (upmiti) and if it is a notion derived from meaning of words, it is verbal knowledge (sabda).

4. Write a note on Anumana (inference) according to Tarka-Samgraha. OR What is paramarsa? Describe its two parts. OR What are the different types of anumana? OR What is vyapti and its types?

OUTLINE: 1. Inference •

Definition and parts

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Gotama's Classification: Purvavat, Sheshvat, Samanyatodrsta

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Types of Anumana- Kevalanvayi, kevalavyateriki and anvayavyateriki + basis from linga

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Svartha and Pararthanumana (with pancavakya)

2. Paramarsa•

Definition

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Linga-Paramarsa

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Paksata

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Paksh-dharmata

4. Vyapti •

Definition- Concomitance and Invariability

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How is vyapti obtained? Contradictory Instances ◦ Agreement in Presence: Induction ◦ Agreement in Absence

INFERENCE (ANUMANA) 1. DEFINITION AND PARTS Inference (anumana) is the specific cause of a judgment. Judgment is the knowledge which arises from consideration (paramarsa). What is consideration? Consideration is the knowledge of reason- it is the knowledge of invariable concomitance. For instance, consideration is the knowledge that the mountain has smoke is invariably accompanied by fire and the knowledge that arises from it- that the mountain is fiery- is judgment. Invariable concomitance is the certainty of association that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Linga is the thing which has invariable concomitance with another thing which we infer. Vyapti is the invariable concomitance between the linga and the inferred thing (sadhya). An inference, therefore, consists of three terms: that which is inferred from/linga (smoke), vyapti (relation of invariable concomitance between fire and smoke) and sadhya (that which is inferred- mountain is fiery). Sadhya is always proved. We must know the linga and vyapti before inferring. 2. GOTAMA'S CLASSIFICATION OF ANUMANA: Purvavat, sheshvat and samanyatodrsta •

Purvavat- Reasoning from cause to effect. For instance, an inference from the appearance of the thick clouds that a shower of rain will come because clouds are known to cause rain.

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Sheshvat- Reasoning from effect to cause. An inference of a past shower of rain (that it must have rained earlier today) from the perception of overflow of river now because river is known to overflow after heavy rains.

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Samanyatodrsta- All other inferences which are neither from cause to effect or effect to cause.

3. MOST IMPORTANT DIVISION OF ANUMANA ON BASIS OF POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE NATURE OF VYAPTI: kevalanavyi, kevalavyateriki and anvayavyateriki. •

Anvayavyateriki (affirmative-negative) is inference where the vyapti is observed by a combination of a large number of instances of: agreement in presence and agreement in absence like in the case of concomitance of smoke and fire [wherever there is

smoke, there is fire & where there is no fire, there is no smoke]. •

Kevalanvayi (purely affirmative)- This is a purely affirmative concomitant relation. This involves sadhya, the thing to be inferred to be present everywhere the hetu is. For eg: 'the jar is nameable because it is knowable' because nameability is everywhere in the hetu, since whatever is knowable is nameable.

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Kevalavyateriki (purely negative)- Inference which is solely based on negative invariable concomitance. Eg: God is omnipresent because He is the creator. The vyapti for this is purely negative: 'whoever is not omnipresent is not the creator'.

IMP: Vyaterikavyapti is the converse of anvayavyapti. If there is co-existence between the vyapak and vyapaya, then there would also be co-existence between their negations taken in inverse order. In anvayavyapti, the sadhya (conclusion- fire) is the vyapak and hetu (smoke) is the vyapaya. In vyaterikavyapti, the sadhya is the vyapaya and smoke is the vyapak (All cases of smoke are cases of fire: No cases of non-fire are cases of smoke). The conversion that occurrs is the obverted conversion or contraposition, as in logic. Eg of obvertive conversion: All X is Y. Obversion (Changing the quality and negating the predicate): No X is non-Y. Converstion No non-Y is X. Thus, All men are mortal becomes No non-mortal are men. LINGA: This distinction is based on the nature of linga: The linga is the middle term of the syllogism and is called 'mark'. For instance, the smoke on the mountain. This marks the character of the syllogism and also makes the inference valid or invalid. The linga is either true or false. If it is true, then it is certain and if it is false, it is non-certain and it also called hetvabhasa. There are three types of linga:

◦ Positive and negative (anvayi-vyateriki) ◦ Purely positive (kevala-anvayi) ◦ Purely negative (kevala-vyateriki) 1. Positive and Negative: That which pervades both positively and negatively is called positive-negative. For instance, smoke-ness when the fire has to be proved. ◦ Positive concomitance: Where there is smoke, there is fire as in the kitchen. ◦ Negative concomitance: Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in the lake. 2. Purely positive: That where there is only positive concomitance. Eg: pot is nameable because it is knowable like the cloth. Here, there can be no negative concomitance because all things are knowable and nameable. The properties of nameability and knowability resides in all things, thus there is no need for negative concomitance. Here, the sadhya exists in the whole class of existing things. The sadhya (nameability) must exist in all the things. It is not necessary for the hetu (knowability) to exist. While some might object that there are things which we do not know or cannot name, the Nyaya says that we are not talking about the limited capacities of the human beings here but of the absolute capacities. Though a thing might be unknown or unnameable to us, it is still the object of omniscience of God. 3. Purely negative: That which has negative concomitance only.For instance: What is not different from other elements has no smell; The earth has smell; Therefore the earth is different from other elements. 4. CLASSIFICATION OF ANUMANA ON BASIS OF ITS EXPRESSION: There are two kinds of vyapti: one's own and for another person. In the former, we make the inference for ourselves. This division was probably created by Vaisesikas. ONE'S OWN: (svartha anumana) Inference intended for oneself: I see from my own experience that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. I am visiting a mountain and see smoke there. I suspect fire.

I remember the generalization that smoke and fire are concomitant invariably. Then I apply the generalization to this case (paramarsa). Then, I infer that there is fire in the mountain. When I put this mental operation into a syllogism, we get pararthanumana. FOR ANOTHER PERSON: (paratha anumana) This is intended for another. This is a five-membered syllogism: This is done for the knowledge of others. 1. Mountain is fiery. 2. Because it smokes. 3. Whatever smokes is fiery, like in the kitchen 4. Mountain smokes. 5. Therefore, it is fiery. Relation between svarth and pararth anumana: •

Svarthanumana is inference based on one's own experience. This ascertains the existence of sadhya for myself. I do not need to clearly articulate it as I understand it in my thought. But pararthanumana is intended for another person and has to be precisely laid down to make sure it is not misunderstood (due to ambiguity or preconceived notions of the other). For this reason, the syllogism is used.

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Pararthumana is based on svarthanumana. It is only when my doubt is cleared and I am convinced that I can impart the knowlege of inference to you. Thus, svarthanumana is called primary while pararthanumana is called secondary. PANCAVAKYA: Used in pararthanumana ◦ The five members of syllogism used in inference are: ◦ Proposition: Mountain is fiery. (pratijna) ◦ Reason: Because it has smoke. (hetu) ◦ Examples- Whatever smokes is fiery like in the kitchen. (udharana) ◦ Application- This is like it. (upanaya) ◦ Conclusion- Hence, the mountain is fiery. (nigamana) The order of the propositions: First the proposition/thesis is mentioned with the

reason to ensure that the speaker knows what to expect. We do not start with the vyapti directly because there can only be disputation if there is a doubt. There can be no doubt about the vyapti because it is an undisputed generalization. Once the thesis is put foward, the question arises in the mind of the hearer as to what the evidence for the same is. To show this, the vyapti is expressed. When the hearer asks how this is relevant to our case, it is applied to the perception (of smoke). Lastly, the conclusion is put forward where all the propositions are united into one proposition and the hearer can know the result at once. Thus, the sanskrit nyaya syllogism is made in such a way that a doubt is arisen and is consequently answered. PARAMARSA (CONSIDERATION) 1. DEFINITION Inference is the instrument which results in judgment and consideration (paramarsa) is the intermediate operation. Judgment, thus depends on consideration. Why is paramarsa important? Because once we know that there is an invariable concomitant relation between two objects, then the judgment necessarily follows. For instance, the cloth is produced as a necessary conclusion of motion of the loom. Thus, Nyayikas deal mainly with paramarsa and its two components, namely, vyapti and linga/hetu. Definition of paramarsa: Paramarsa is the combination of two distinct terms- the hetu and vyapti. They are united by joining them inseparably as vishesya and visheshan- that is, as subject and attribute. This relation of subject and attribute is the closest relationship between two things and is indissoluble. Thus, the perfect unity of paramarsa is done by making vyapti the attribute of hetu. Thus, paramarsa is not simply the knowledge of combination of hetu and vyapti but of vyapti-vishist-hetu. Conclusion: Paramarsa consists of two parts- namely, vyapti (the invariable concomitant relationship between hetu and sadhya- also called vishesya and visheshan) & that the hetu is confined to a particular place. Consideration of the sign is alone the cause of both Judgment for one's own and that for another's. Hence, consideration is inference. 2. LINGA PARAMARSA Linga-paramarsa: Annambhatta pointed out that paramarsa is actually linga-paramarsa, and

is the cause of anumana. It is the application of paksa-dharmata. Without the inclusion of the cause (smoke) and paksa (that particular mountain), there could be no inference. Thus, Nyaya say that the cause of anumana is linga-paramarsa. 3. PAKSATA AND PAKSH-DHARMATA Annambhatta says that paramarsa is knowledge of vyapti-vishist-pakshdharmata. Pakshdharmata means that we have to know hetu/linga (the smoke) to be a dharma residing in a paksa (particular locus). Like- in Aristotelian system- they say: All men are mortal and Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is a mortal. Here, after the major premise which is general, we have to particularize it by confining it to a certain person like we did to Socrates in this. This particularization is the paksh-dharmata of the hetu. Thus, we not only need to know that there is invariable concomitance between the hetu and sadhya but also that in this case, we are talking of a particular place (paksa). PAKSATA Paksata: Inference is the application of general truth to a particular instance. The particular instance to which we apply the general truth is paksa (for instance, mountain B has smokePaksa is mountain B). The paksa could be an individual, place or substance to which we can apply a predicate. Paksata is the characteristic which that distinguishes the paksa for the time being from the things of same or different nature. (The characteristic in Socrates- tall, fat, hairy and so on- which distinguishes him from other human beings and animals). Annambhatta's definition of paksata: Paksata is the characteristic that a particular place or substance or individual possesses of being the subject of interest in the inference as long as the sadhya in it (fire) has not been ascertained and we have the desire to infer it. Paksa (the locus) --> Paksata (the characteristics of the locus like green mountain with tower etc on which the sadhya fire has not been ascertained and there is desire to infer it) --> Paksa-dharmata PAKSH-DHARMATA: The knowledge of paksa-dharmata is paramarsa. Paksa dharmata is the residence of hetu

(like- smoke) on paksa (like-mountain). It is important to mention the hetu so that it is not confused with other things which exist on the paksa. There might be other things which can also lead us to think that there was a fire like ashes, soot but these are not invariably concomitant with the fire. Smoke is the particular hetu. And it is imporatnt to see this line of smoke in the mountain which would lead to the inference of fire. Knowledge of vyapti is only useful when one perceives this line of smoke on the particular mountain and then infers the sadhya. Thus, paramasa is the knowledge of paksa-dharmata and not of hetu alone- because it is not smoke alone but when it is seen as dharma (part) of the paksa (mountain) that leads to the inference. VYAPTI: 1. DEFINITION: CONCOMITANCE AND INVARIABILITY Vyapti has been defined by Anambhatta as 'invariability of concomitance'. We will take the example of: 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire' We will talk about how we find that two events are invariably concomitant to each other and under what conditions this relation is valid. There are two parts in vyapti: concomitance or co-existence & universality or invariability. •

CONCOMITANCE: This refers to the co-existence of the hetu and sadhya at one and the same place.

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INVARIABILITY: When it is observed that these two things always accompany each other, then their co-existence is said to be invariable. Here, one object is said to be the vyapak of the other. For instance, fire is the vyapak of smoke. Since smoke is not always there with fire like in red-hot iron (there is fire but no smoke), smoke is not the vyapak of fire. The vyapti is of fire on smoke. Vyapti means literally- 'complete pervasion'. Thus, since fire completely pervades smoke but smoke does not always pervade fire, there is said to be vyapti of fire on smoke. The fire is vyapak of smoke and smoke is vyapaya of fire. Generally, the vyapak is greater in extent/scope than vyapaya. But there can be cases where they both have same scope. Thus, Nyaya simply says that vyapti is 'invariable co-existence'.

2. HOW IS VYAPTI OBTAINED?- CONTRADICTORY INSTANCES

Eurpoean scholars often complain that Nyaya school did not account for inductive reasoning. However, Nyaya has pointed out that induction is simply a tool they used to reach inference proper. Every generalization is based on a generalization and this generalization is obtained by accumulation of particular instances by a process called induction. Mill says that induction is that operation of the mind by which we infer what we know to be true in particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respect. This is also the basis of svarthanumana, where one personally experiences that cases of smoke are accompanied by fire. But this is simply co-existence. We do not yet know that it is invariable. Observation of fact does not guarantee against the possibility of existence of a contrary fact. How can we make sure that it is invariable? Even if smoke and fire occurred together 99 times, it is possible they won't co-exist the 100th time. And moreover, one cannot know all the instances of their co-existence in all time-periods. The invariability of this connection is made valid by the absence of contradiction in their co-existence. There should not be even a single instance where they both do not co-exist. This method is called the method of agreement and method of difference respectively. The latter is subservient to the former. They both together form the joint method to validate vyapti. To Prove the Agreement in Absence: Contradictory Instances: If we are suspicious that there is contradictory concomitance between two objects, then our reasoning can be well-grounded or ill-grounded. If it is well-grounded, then there is no validity of vyapti. But if it is ill-founded, then we can use reasoning or intuitive knowledge to know about the concomitance. •

Reasoning is when we use reductio ad absurdum method, also called tarka in Nyaya. ◦ Reductio ad absurdum: What is reductio ad absurdum? It is the method where we take as hypothesis the contradictory of what we want to prove and show that the conclusion from the contradictory hypothesis is false based on previous knowledge. Thus, the hypothesis is wrong and that which had to be originally proved (vyapti) is right. For instance: if this is not true, then its contradictory- that smoke is sometimes not accompanied by fire- must be true. In cases where there is smoke and no fire, there must be some other cause for the smoke. But we know that fire is the sole cause of smoke. Thus, our assumption that there are cases where smoke is not accompanied by fire must be wrong. Thus, the vyapti between fire and smoke is valid.

◦ Law of causality: we can use the law of causality to show that fire is the cause of smoke and therefore, they are invariably concomitant. But this has to be given up as it has the fallacy of circular argument. •

Intuitive knowlege is what we would call necessary truths or axioms of geometry- which are self-evident and do not need any proof.

To Prove the Agreement in Presence: There are two points that have to be proven here: (i) We cannot observe all the cases at present of the concomitance between smoke and fire to say that it is invariable; (ii) We cannot guarantee that it will be so in the future. Nyaya uses the method of extraordinary perception (alaukika pratyaksa) to prove these two points. In extraordinary perception, we perceive an individual thing like jar and then at once, we cognize its genus (jati) jar-ness by law of association. According to this law, when two things are closely associated then the perception of one necessarily leads to the immediate apprehension of the other. This is not inference, as there is no hetu or paramarsa. It is not ordinary perception as there is no perception of smoke in all cases. This extraordinary perception is between perception proper and inference proper. It is also an immediate inference and in this way, since it is immediate like perception, it is closer to perception than to inference.

5. Write a short note on Upamana (Comparison). Comparison is the immediate cause of analogy. Analogy is the knowledge of connection of a name with an object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its proximate cause. The recollection of an authoritative direction is the intermediate operation. Process of Analogy: 1. Sabda: A who does not know what a guinea pig is, is told by B that guinea pig looks like hamster. A knows about hamsters well. B is a truth-worthy person, who is acquainted with guinea pigs. 2. Perception: Now, A goes to a pet store and sees an animal whom he does not know but it looks like a hamster. 3. Rememberance: At this point, he remembers what B had told him, that there are animals which look similar to hamsters and are called guinea pigs. 4. Rememberance + Perceptual knowledge: At this point, he concludes that the animal is guinea pig. The last cognition- 'this is a guinea pig' is the upamiti. It is a knowledge of the denotative relation of the word 'guinea pig' with the object perceived. Thus, a relationship of denotation exists between the name and the object. The Cause and Accessories to Upamiti: What is the specific cause of upamiti? What is only an aid? The two former cognitions, that of perception of guinea pig and the word of A, is critical to analogy. There are two views in this concern: •

Ancient Nayayikas: the verbal knowledge provided by B is the cause while the knowledge of similarity between the guinea pig and hamster is the accessory.

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Modern Nayayikas: The similarity between the guinea pig and hamster is the cause while the verbal knowledge by B is an accessory.

Both agree that the rememberance of this knowledge provided by B is the intermediary. The similarity between two objects is not the sole cause of analogy. Analogy could also have been caused by pecuilarity or knowledge of dissimilarity.

Types of Upamana: Upamana is of three kinds- (i) a similarity; (ii) a pecuilar property; (iii)a dissimilarity. The above example is of the first kind. The second kind would be of a rhino has one horn adorning his nose which is its pecuilar property. The third kind would be 'a camel does not possess a level back and a short neck like a horse'. Other schools on Upamana: Upamana and sabda are considered to be separate sources of knowledge in Nyaya school. The Vaisesika and Sankhya do not accept upamana as a separate proof. They include it under anumana. While Vacaspati believes that vyapti is important for upamana, nyaya replies that vypati is not required and is not necessarily true for the knowledge that a certain word denotes an object. Hence, upamana is different from anumana. Upamana is very useful in practical life and therefore, should be considered a separate proof. The certain knowledge of the relation between word and denoted object is the result of an independent proof upamana because such a knowledge cannot be derived from any other proof like perception.

6. What does the Nyaya school say about Sabda as a source of knowledge? Write with reference to Tarka Samgraha. Definition: Word is a sentence spoken by an authority. Authority is a person who speaks truth. Sentence is a group of words like 'bring a cow'. Word is a thing having power (of conveying meaning). Power is a convention made by God that a certain sense be understood from a certain word. The verbal knowledge of truth is the representation of a thing just as it exists. A proposition which conveys this true verbal knowledge is truthful-word (yathartha-sabda). The person who conveys this is called aapt or yathartha-vapta. Thus, the verbal knowledge does not become true because it is said by an authoritative person but because it is in harmony with the external reality. Mimasaka theory of sabda: •

The verb is the most important word in the proposition. Why? Because it acts as the copula that connects the words in the sentence. 'Ram apple' makes no sense. But when we add the verb, 'Ram is eating apple', then the meaning of the sentence is conveyed.

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Significance of the verb: ◦ Ram- Name- is only used to limit the application of the verb ◦ Apple- also used to only point out that the particular object of interest.

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Only the verb acts as the chief characteristic to join these two ideas/notions, while the other two are only limiting qualifications.

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All the words of a sentence are interdependent, but the most important part is the verb which connects all the words to make a meaning of it.

Criticism by Nyaya: Nyaya says that there is no need to understand each word separately in a sentence before we make the sentence itself. What is the need to divide the sentence when the sentence as a whole is pragmatically used? The Nyaya believe that the meaning of an entire sentence is present in the whole sentence itself and not in the connecting words. According to the Nyaya, there are three requirements for being able to understand a

sentence/for a meaningful sentence: expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition. A sentence is a collection of significant words. The meaning of the sentence will be understood even though there is no verb in it. For instance, The King of Magadh. We can understand what is being talked about without the need for a verb. Power of Word (shakti): •

Ancients: Langauge of Divine Origin: Language is said to be the creation of God and each word conveys a particular sense because God willed it. This is the view of the ancient Nayayikas.

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Modern: Creation of man: The modern Nayayikas believe that even men can create significance for words. While the ancients did not deny this type, they called it simply conventional while those by God were divine.

However, it was realized that there is no difference between them, as the main funciton of the word remains to denote an object. Moreover, the coming up of many languages throughout the world have made philosophers doubt the divine origin of the language itself. To avoid these conflicts, a new definition is introduced: Power is relation of the word and object, that always serves to revive the memory of that object (whenever the word is spoken). This could now include both the types. Mimasakas consider shakti to be a separate category itself as they believe that power is neither a substance, nor a quality or an action. It is said to reside in genus and other categories. However, the nyaya school refutes that shakti cannot be a separate category because each substance is the object of many shaktis (powers). If we went on to recognize each of these substances as separate category, we would end up with infinite regress. What is the power of a word (pad)? Does the word like 'jar' denote the object jar or the common property jar-ness that resides in it or does the word denote both? This question determines the position of many schools. There are four main answers to this question: 1. Mimamsakas: Kevala-Jati 2. Modern Nayayikas: Kevala-Vyakti (where vyakti=entities) 3. Ancient Nayayikas: Jati-vishist-Vyakti

4. Buddhists: Apoah 5. Vedanta 1. Mimasakas: Kevala- Jati The term 'jar' denotes purely the abstract class (jati) of jar. 2. Modern Nayayikas: Kevala-Vyakti When a person says 'jar', he wants the thing 'jar' to be brought to him and not jar-ness. For this to happen, for the hearer to get the jar when 'jar' is pronounced, there must be a relation between the object jar and the word 'jar'. Thus, when someone says 'jar' (says= sankaet karna), the word 'jar' primarily denots the object 'jar'. OBJECTIONS: •

If the word 'jar' denotes one particular object 'jar', then we would need infinite number of terms for different jars, assuming there is no jar-ness but only a mere connection between the word and object.

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When we learn the word 'jar', we learn its characteristics. Once we know the characteristics, we apply it to all the jars. Thus, it cannot be said that there is only a connect between the word and object, with no significance of its characteristics. The word 'jar' stands for its properties as well which are shared by the class of jar.

3. Ancient Nayayikas: Jati-Vishist-Vyakti This is also one of the prime objections to the above view. The word 'jar' does not have a simple connect with the object. The word 'jar' implies three things: points out to the particular object 'jar', it signifies that the particular jar is similar to all the jars in the world and it distinguishes the jar from all other things like stones, trees and walls. The viewpoint that a word denotes the object, its class and its distinction from all other objects is that of ancient nyaya school. 4. Buddhists: Apoah The Buddhists held that the main function of a word is only to distinguish the object from all other objects. They say, when a word is said like 'jar',

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It does not refer to the object (vyakti): Because we never really know the external objects.

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It does not refer to the class (jati): Because jati is a mere construction of our mind imposed upon what we call the external objects.

Thus, all that the word 'jar' does is to distinguish the object from all other objects. We never really know what jar or jar-ness is, but only that it is different from stone or trees. We only have negative knowledge of things. 5. Vedanta: The power of the word resides in both jati and vyakti. It is active/expressive in jati and passive/latent in vyakti. The power of the word is primarily jati. But this power to signify a particular class through a word is derived from the connection with the concrete objects of the class. Causes of Knowledge of Meaning of Sabda/authoritative word: What leads to our knowledge of meaning of word? How does a word make meaning to us? Sabda has been defined as a vakya. An intelligible sentence cannot be formed by any string of words. In order to convey meaning, these three conditions have to be fulfiled: Annambhatta provides three conditions which are 1, 2 and 3. Visvanatha goes on to add a fourth condition. 1. Expectancy (aakanda) Expectancy is the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence because some other required word is missing. So, the word is expecting another word to produce meaning of the sentence. A sentence which does not have expectancy or compatibility or juxtaposition is unauthoritative. The words 'cow', 'man' or 'horse' separately are not authoritative because they have expectancy. 2. Compatibility (yogyata) Compatibility is the non-contradiction of sense. The sentence 'Sprinkle with fire' is unauthoritative because of lack of compatibility. 3. Juxtaposition (sanidhaya) Juxtaposition is the consecutive utterance of words. The sentence 'bring a bow' said at

intervals is also not authoritative because of lack of juxtaposition. 4. Knowledge of intention of the speaker (tatparya-gyan): This is required for the right understanding of the sentence. A sentence can have two different meanings at a time. Thus, to know what the speaker wants to convey, we should understand the context and thus, what the speaker intends. While Annambhatta saw the necessity for this condition, his definition of it is faulty. He says that the intention of the speaker is present in the very act of him saying it. But parrot can say something without meaning anything or a fool can say something intelligible to others without understanding it himself. But people read Vedas without understanding what it means. Does this mean that it doesn't mean anything? Definitely not. It has a meaning which is not understood by the reader or hearer. For this reason, Vedanta gives a different definition for this part and says that 'it is the fitness of words to express a particular meaning while there is no utterance with an intention to convey a different sense'. Thus, we place the utterance in the context and see that there is no other utterance which is not compatible with it.

1. EXPECTANCY: Expectancy is simply defined as 'non-completion of sense due to absence of some other word or words'. Annambhatta defines it as: 'inability of a word to convey the whole meaning of the sentence, which inability is caused by the absence of some other word'. For instance: If I say 'cow', then the desire arises as to what about the cow. This desire is called aakandsha. Thus, when I say 'bring the cow', I am talking about four things: the object 'cow', the objective relation, the act of bringing and the command. If any of these four things is not present, then the sentence will not make sense. 2. COMPATIBILITY: Compatibility is defined as 'non-contradiction of sense'. A word has compatibility with another word when the meanings conveyed by them are not inconsistent with each other. Thus, we cannot say 'burn the water' because it is inconsistent to use burn and water together. 3. JUXTAPOSITION:

This is defined as, 'the utterance of consecutive words one after another without interval between any two of them'. The sense of a sentence contains in the combination of the meanings of the words contained in it. Thus, if there are long intervals between the saying of the words, the previous meanings vanish and the sense is not complete. Thus, what constitutes juxtaposition is the unbroken apprehension of all the words. Such an apprehension can be written (like while reading a book) or oral. TWO TYPES OF VAKYAM: There are two types of vakyam: sacred (vedic) and profane (laukik). The sacred is pronounced by God and is always trustworthy while the profane sentence is trustworthy if pronounced by a credible person. Any other is untrustworthy. VEDIC: There is a hierarchy in which the vedic sentences are placed (types of vedic sentences- shruti, smrti, itihasa and purana. The shruti has the highest authority with the authority lowering with each. The shruti is said to be composed by god while others are by human beings. Shruti is also called the Vedas. It is of four types: rig-veda, yajur-veda, samana-veda and arthra-veda. Each veda is divided into three parts: samhita, brahmana and aaranyak. Smrti is an authority only when the shruti is silent or is consistent. Itihas and purana are used only when smrti or shruti is not available. PROFANE: The conditions mentioned in the preceding sections apply only to profane sentences. They are already present in the Vedas. Are the vedas eternal or are they simply compositons of god? Both mimamsakas and nyaya agree that the Vedas are composed by God. Being eternal means that they were not composed by God. Mimasakas say that the Vedas are eternal because of two reasons: (i) No tradition talks about the authorship of vedas to any individual. The rishis are only known to have seen the hymns and not composed them. (ii) The Vedas declare themselves to be eternal. Nyaya says that the Vedas are created by God due to presence of contrary information in texts. To this, the Mimasakas answer that the arguments from the text can only apply to those works whose authors are known. The Nayayikas answer that the authorship of the Vedas is

known from the word of Rishis like Gotama by tradition of teaching. It cannot also be eternal because if it were eternal, then all the words would be co-existent. That is, there would be no order of words. This would mean that since only the words keep echoing over the time, there can be no desire to understand them. The Vedantins say that the Vedas are eternal as to the substance while they are non-eternal as to their form. Is sound eternal or non-eternal? Sound is quality of akasa and is said to be eternal like it. We hear it at times only because of our own limitations and accidental causes. The sound is noneternal, according to Gotama, because: (i) it has a beginning; (ii) it is perceived by organ of sound; and (iii) the attributes of a product are ascribed to it.

7.

Write a note on Aprama (Misapprehension).

In order to understand true apprehension, we must also understand what wrong knowledge/misapprehension is. Misapprehension is defined as: 'the cognition of a thing as possessed of an attribute which in fact it does not possess.' Misapprehension can be certain or uncertain. Certainty about a misapprehension (that is, I believe that it is certainly a post when indeed it isn't) can be conscious or unconscious. If it is consciously/deliberately assumed, then it is called tarka and the second where one is unconscious of it being a misapprehension is called viparyay. Doubt (sanshay) is always involuntary because as soon as the error is perceived, the doubt disappears. Wrong knowledge is of three kinds: doubt, error and false assumption. Doubt is the apprehension of various contrary properties in one object- Is it a man or a post?. Error is false knowledge- silver in a conch-shell. False assumption is the deduction of a wider thing by wrong hypothesis of a narrow one: if there be no fire, there would be no smoke. DOUBT: Knowledge of various contrary properties in one and the same object. Doubt has three characteristics: that the knowledge must be of several properties, that they must be irreconcilable with each other and that they must be apprehended in the same thing. However, it is not easy to define which properties are contrary to one another. We can thus say that if a properties and its negations are present in one object, then they are irreconcible. Because, if we say that those properties are irreconcible which have never been seen to exist together then it would mean that even fictions like half-horse and half-man would be doubted, when indeed, since they are fictitious such categories shouldn't be applied to them at all. ERROR: It is misapprehension proper. This is also called tarka. The fallacy is called reductio ad absurdum. This means the imposition of a more extensive thing through the assumption of a less. Tarka is not the process of hypothetical reasoning in which we deduce a false conclusion due to assumption of a wrong hypothesis. What is reductio ad absurdum? Suppose I say that there is smoke in the mountain because there is fire. A person B says no, there is no fire in the mountain, even though there is smoke in the mountain. In order to prove B wrong, I can use reductio ad absurdum where I show that what B says deduces a false conclusion. So, I agree that there is no fire in the mountain and

then, deduce from nature of fire, that there should be no smoke too in the mountain. But this contradicts our perception which shows that there indeed is smoke in the mountain. At this point, B is proved wrong. The absurd conclusion we reach- that there is no smoke in the mountain when we agree to the fact that there is no fire in the mountain- is called tarka. In tarka, one knows that the conclusion would be false and goes on to prove it. The Ancient Nayayikas accept five kinds of tarkas: Ignortio Blenchi, Dilemma, Circle, Regressus ad Infinitum and Reductio ad Absurdum.

8. Write a note on Abhava (negation). ABHAVA 1. Antecedent negation has no beginning but has an end. This exists before an effect is produced. Destruction: Once the effect is produced, there is destruction which has a beginning but no end. Absolute negation exists during these three times (past, present and future) and has a counter-entity determined by connection with another object. For instance, there is no jar on the ground. Reciprocal Negation is that whose counter-entity is determined by relation of identity. For instance, a jar is not a piece of cloth. 2. Types of negation (abhava): 1. Antecedent negation (pragabhava) - Has an end but no beginning. This is the nonexistence of a particular pot before (prag) it was made. This is known as antecedent negation. This has no beginning because this particular pot was always non-existent before it was made. But this pragabhava ends as soon as the pot is made. Therefore, it has an end. This is also the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before it is produced. The time before the production, the act of producing the object and the future of the object are considered to be three divisions of eternal time. The eternal time is past, present and future. The past has no beginning and the future has no end. Between these two divisions, the act of production lies limited by both the ways (creation on one end- past and destruction on the other end- future). However, if an object just like one which gets destroyed is reproduced, then they both would not be considered to be the same object because different materials hav been used and were produced in a different space and time. 2. Consequent negation or destruction (pradhavamsa abhava) – This negation has a beginning but no end. Pradhvamsa means destruction. This is known as annihilative non-existence. This begins as soon as the pot is destroyed. But it has no end as the destroyed pot can never come back. 3. Absolute negation (atyantabhava)- No end or beginning. It is eternal and has a

counter-entity (pratiyogi) determined by some connection with another thing. The nonexistence of a connection between two thing at any time in the past or future. For instance, a jar in the clouds wherein the jar exists and the clouds exist- but there is an absence of connection between the jar and clouds. Hence, the jar may be chracterized as being in a relation of 'absolute non-existence' with the clouds. There are two types of atyantabhava: in the first type, we talk about the adjunct i.e. jar as a property residing in a substance like jar-ness (samavaya) and in the other, it is a property that is redicing in many things. 4. Reciprocial negation (anyonabhava) - No end or beginning. This has the counter-entity determined by relation of identity between two objects. This is the difference of one thing from another. Like 'a pot is not a cloth'. This is also known as mutual nonexistence. The nature of abhava is determined by the form of the denial.

EXPLANATION: Relation between objects- The most common type of relation between two entities is samyoga i.e. contact relation where A is in contact with B. Like, fire or smoke on the mountain is a contact relation. Thus, fire or smoke is qualified by its contact with the mountain which is its locus (smoke= that smoke which is on the mountain). A pot which is on the table or a table with a pot on it- here, the qualified and qualifier keep changing depending on subject we choose. The second type of relation is samavaya (relation of inherence). The generic characters, jati have inherent relations with their loci. For instance, man-ness in a man, horse-ness in a horse and others. These are inherent characteristics which cannot be separated from their loci, unlike the case of smoke and mountain. Example: Take for example, the fire in the mountain. First, there is fire-ness in fire and mountain-ness in mountain. These inhere in their loci. In addition, the fire and mountain have contact relation, since the fire is in contact with the mountain but they do not inhere in each other.

Adjunct (pratiyogi) and subjunct (anuyogi) : Relations can be expressed in terms of pratiyoi and anuyogi. Adjunct means something that is joined as an extra part and is not part of the main. In case of a contact relation, like fire on the mountain, fire is adjunct (fire is not originally a part of the mountain) and mountain is the subjunct. This can also be put in negative format as 'there is constant absence of fire in the lake'-Here, the fire is called absential adjunct since the fire is not present in the lake at any time. This is in contrast to the presence of fire on the mountain. Sansarga is the connection by which one thing may reside on another. Thus, jar resides on the ground by contact-relation and not by samvaya-relation while the odor in the ground is a samvaya-relation. The jar is pratiyogi (adjunct) of the ground without jar. Odor is the pratiyogi of a ground without odor. Thus, when we talk about atyantabhava (absolute negation), then the absolute negation is about the absence of contact in a connection between the objects like the jar and clouds. In absolute negation, we say that there is no connnection between the pratiyogi and anuyogi. In reciprocal negation, we only say that they both are not identical (jar is not cloud). OTHER SCHOOLS ON ABHAVA: V.IMP 1. Vaisesika- Add a fifth kind of abhava called samyikabhav- 'temporary absence'. That is, the non-existence of jar exists on the ground as long as the jar is not there. Once the jar is brought there, the non-existence vanishes. The temporary absence of the jar is what is referred to here. 2. Saundandopadhyaya- put forward a new kind of abhava which referred to cases like 'the jar does not exist on the ground as a cloth'. Nyaya school considers this a kevala-anvayi anumana and not a case of abhava. This is only used for dialectical purpose and does not have much use in pragmatic life. 3. Prabhakara school of Mimamsakas & Vedantins- Mimamsakas did not recognize abhava as a separate category from its counter-part bhava. According to Mimamsakas and Vedantins, non-existence is simply a substratum and nothing more. Nyaya rejects this view by saying that we cannot know what the substratum is. That is, we cannot know non-existence as a substratum. Mimamsakas say that if the abhava is to be a separate category, then

'nothingness' (anavastha) would also have to become a category. Why? Because we will have to see jar as different from non-existence of jar, the non-existence of jar will be different from jar itself and so on, leading to infinite regress. To solve this problem, •

Ancient Nayayikas said that the non-existence of the non-existence of jar is equal to and identical with object jar. (Use of double negation: ~~existence of jar=existence of jar). Annambhatta supports the ancient Nayayikas.

•

Modern Nayayikas say that the non-existence of non-existence of jar as different from jar and existence of jar itself. (i.e. ~~existence of jar is not equal to object jar or existence of jar). The non-existence of non-existence of non-existence of the jar (~~~existence of jar) was identified with the first non-existence of jar (~existence of jar). Why? An abhava is a negation and it can only be identical with another negation or abhava. It cannot be equal to a bhava like existence of jar.

PART 3 DIGNAGA- PERCEPTION

9. What is the epistemological position of Nyaya school? How does Dignaga and Dharmakriti reply to them? PART ONE: NYAYA SCHOOL The Nyaya system was one of the most important philosophical schools in ancient India. Similar to the place of Aristotle's categories in western philosophy, Nyaya methodology grew to such popularity that students were prescribed to study Nyaya (literally- logic or reasoning) before they continued to pursue a particular Indian philosophical school. NYAYA REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION (i) Nyaya realism: We can define realism, in Nyaya system as: (a) Ontological meaning- Acceptance of the reality of external object, in contrast to idealism (maintains that they are mentally created) (b) Asserts reality of general and abstract entities or universals like being a cow or being impermanent, in contrast to nominalism and conceptualism which say that universals are linguistically or mentally created (c) Realism is seen as putting objects of common sense over those of abstract thoughts (ii) Nyaya believes that our reality is characterised by six categories. six Nyaya categories are: substance, qualities, actions, universals, individuations and inherence. To this list, absence is often added. These categories are not simply concepts but the 'necessary divisions of our cognitive schemata' which provide the form but no content to our discourse. Dharmakriti believes that the six categories are not representative of reality. These only reflect one's predispositions and are not objectively present in the world. (iii) These categories are considered to be real and exist in the way we conceive them. For instance, when we see a red object, we are not just encountering a particular but grasp it through the universal of being red. Dignaga was the predecessor of Dharmakriti. They believed that these categories are our conceptual constructions. NYAYA CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE What is the status of common-sense objects? These objects are also called middle-order entities, which are neither too small like atoms, nor too large like galaxies. They affect our lives the most. Are these objects real? Nyaya holds an extreme realist viewpoint to these questions. Nyaya believe that universals,

cross-time identities and duration are all real. Universals and cross-time identities are under the category of universals and duration under universals. Nyaya believe that lake has a reality which cannot be reduced to that of its parts. Identities are said to exist separately from the elements it unifies. Concrete spatio-temporal identity of substances- Substances are concrete unitary wholes that we observe empirically as being spread over space and time. For instance, jar is a substance characterized by particular qualities (color, shape etc.), universal attributes (jarness) and others. The jar is a unitary whole which is made by the aggregated partless atoms which cohere to form a larger unit. Finally, the two halves of jar are put together to bring forth the jar. This jar is not a mere collection of its parts but has a unitary identity of its own which is distinct and separate from that of its parts. The object is considered to be a synthetic whole over and above the collection of its parts. Nyaya also believes that the new unity is not pre-existent in its causes. In order to make sure that they do not assert that causes and effect are completely different, they are correlated by saying that they exist in the same space and though they are different, they are bound by relation of inherence (samavaya). Abstract identity of universals PART TWO: ANTI-REALIST RESPONSE OF DIGNAGA AND DHARMAKRITI (i) Commonality between Nyaya and Dharmakriti: Dharmakriti and Nyaya believe that one of the main tasks of philosophy is to explain and justify the validity of human practices. Their commitment towards asserting the reality of these objects is strong and they believe it is not bound by human context but goes beyond it. Thus, both Dharmakriti and Nyaya agree that common-sense objects exist. What they do disagree about is nature of the objects, which determines their ontological status in their respective systems. They question the identity of objects, in themselves. What does this mean? We form an identity for different objects. For instance, you see an orange today and recognize it as an orange (with particular form/shape). Then you see another object of same form and call it an orange. We now commonly call a set of objects with these certain characteristics as orange, objects which are spread across time and space. How do we do this? What is this commonality? We also need to find unity between a plurality of similar objects. We have already discussed how Nyaya justifies this commonality.

(ii) Argument against concept of unitary identity of a substance: When we move one hand, the whole body does not move. Therefore, there is no way in which we can say that the body as a whole is over and above the parts. When something happens to one part of the body, it doesn't happen to all the parts. (iii) What does Dharmakriti believe? Dharmakriti believes that reality consists of causally connected individual thing-events. For Dharmakriti, substance is an effective phenomenon which is more of an event, than a thing. The individuals are specifically characterized phenomena. This is distinct from our conceptually characterizing this phenomena. (iv) ANTIREALISM: Like Quine, Dharmakriti and Dignaga reject the concept of commonality or universals. Unlike Quine, they do not even admit cross-time identities. Time is divided into infinite slices which is not perceivable to human mind. For pragmatic purposes, we transcend this infinity and attribute to a set of these slices a unified identity. We give them a stable identity, which is not real (because they momentarily exist and are continually changing). Thus, this practical usefulness does not make it real. It is only a product of our conceptualization. Duration is also a conceptual construction due to quick arising of discrete moments which look alike. This position is much like Hume's who says that the identity we attribute to objects, is only succession of parts, which are connected through resemblance, contiguity or causation. This view of Dharmakriti has been criticized by many, from within and outside Buddhist tradition. Q2. What are the means of valid cognition, as accepted in Buddhism? Why? Define perception and explain, in detail, the definition mentioned by Dignaga. (I) MEANS OF VALID COGNITION IN BUDDHISM In Buddhism, there are only two means of cognition, namely, perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana). They are immediate and mediate respectively. These two sources of cognition correspond to the two aspects of every object, namely, sva-lakshana (particular) and samanya-lakshana (universal). Perception cognizes the particular while inference cognizes the universal. In cases where you cognize both aspects of an object at the same time, we cognize the particularity and the universality together. Then the mind (manas) operates and color-ness is related to universal and is cognized as being noneternal and

you conclude/judge that 'the thing of color is noneternal' (II) PERCEPTION 1. Definition: COGNITION DEPENDENT ON SENSE ORGANS (1 TYPE)+ COGNITION OF DIRECT AWARENESS (3 TYPES) In Buddhism, the term 'perception'- 'pratyaksa' is interpreted as 'pratigatam aksam' which means 'depending on the sense organs'. Here, the term 'sense organs' refers to those which are common-sensically or ordinarily regarded as sense organs- eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge which arises out of them is called perception. This definition is the epistemological analysis of term 'perception'. In its applicational analysis of the term (i.e. in what ways the term can be used), one understands perception as being immediate/direct cognition and thus it includes the three other kinds of perception as well- mental perception, self-cognition and yogin's intuition. 2. Why is perception said to be dependent on sense organs and not to objects of cognition? (i) Dignaga- with reference to Abhidharma school- perception is closely related to sense organs and the sense organs are the specific causes of this variety of cognition, so it is named after the sense organs. (ii) Vasubandhu- in Abhidharmakosa- Sense organs are also the locus/basis for variety of cognition which takes place during perception. # Dignaga preceeded Dharmakriti. 3. Dignaga's definition of Perception in Pramanasamuccya Perception is that which is free from conceptual constructions that is from the association of name,class, character and others. - Dignaga Perception is that which is free from conceptual constructions and which is non-erroneous. -Dharmakriti Dharmakriti adds the 'non-erroneous' aspect to the perception. Dignaga probably did not see the need to add it, for he might have considered erroneousness to be excluded once the conceptual constructions are excluded. However, he did not take into account defective sense organs. While some philosophers have said that Dignaga intended to include erroneous cognition in perception, as there could be incorrect cognition (like thinking a

rope to be a snake), Dharmakriti believed otherwise and went on to add 'nonerroneousness' to the definition. 4. ANALYSIS OF DEFINITION: (i) Perception is indeterminate. It is free from conceptual constructions (kalpanapodham). Prior to Dignaga, other definitions of perception existed and this definition he introduced was heavily criticized. Dignaga went on to provide a logical base for this definition by saying that perception deals with svalaksana of the object of cognition. In svalaksana, the object is a bare particular without any property or character (because any property or character is one imposed by the cognizer). Thus, perception is free from conceptual constructions. (b) Criticisms- Primarily from Nyaya philosophers itself * Uddyotakara- If perception is devoid of any character, it cannot be expressed through the property 'kalpanapodham' or by the word 'pratyaksha' itself or by the sentence 'pratyaksa kalpanapodham'. * If kalpanapodham means 'inexpressible in its specific aspect(svalaksana)' i.e. 'cannot express svalaksana', then anything in the world would be pratyaksa since a word can only express the generic character (samanyalaksana) of the object and not its specific character. * Just because we cannot express its svalaksana, it is not correct to call it completely inexpressible. Why not? Because when we see a person, we can call him 'man' or 'woman', even though it is not his/her svalaksana. Therefore, we can express something about the object of cognition in perception and it is not completely inexpressible. * To call perception 'indescribable' is self-contradictory. * If the term 'kalpanapodham' means nothing, then it is useless. Reply from other Nyaya advocates of the definition like Kamalasila- The expression kalpanapodham does not mean that perception is ineffable (inexpressible)- it means that it is free from conceptual constructions. If we take it to mean the latter, then the above criticims will not hold. (ii) Kalpana DignagaWhat is kalpana? When a thing cannot be expressed in itself, then we express it through words by associating it with names and other factors. Kalpana or conceptual construction is

the name of this process of associating a name and other factors with a particular individual. Conceptual constructions can be placed under five categories: (a) Nama- Proper name (yadrcchasabda) (b) Jati- Common Noun (jatisabda) (c) Guna- Attribute (guna) (d) Kriya- Activity (kriya) (e) Dravya- A substance word (dravya) (iii) Non-erroneousness of perceptionWhy are determinate cognitions erroneous or invalid? Perception is that knowledge which directly reveals the nature of the object. Once there is determinate cognition, there can be confusions regarding these determinations. During perception, the object is the direct cause of the knowledge. It leaves its image in the cognition. In determinate cognition, our conceptual constructions (of the past and others) play a role. This can occur in the absence of the object also. Here, the object cannot be said to be the cause of the cognition. There can be determinate cognition when the object is there too. Here, the conceptual constructions are imposed on the object and it is recognized with a name and other factors. Thus, there can be errors in these determinations. Determinate cognition is accompanied by verbal expression while indeterminate cognition is not. The moment we use a word to talk about an object, we are conceptualizing it. 4. VARIETIES OF PERCEPTION In Buddhism, there are four types of perception: (i) Sense-perception (indriya-pratyaksa); (ii) Mental perception (manasa-pratyaksa); (iii) Self-consciousness (svasamvedana); and (iv) Yogic apprehension (yogijnana). The order of the types of perception must be followed. Why? Durveka Misra- There is a gradation towards certainty in this order: from least to most certain. Sense perception is part of all our activity (thus it is stated first). Mental perception originates through dependence on sense perception (thus second). Self-cognition is comprehensible in itself

and is certain. Yogic apprehension is the apprehension of an omniscient person and occurs as a whole. This is the ultimate goal of all human beings. (i) SENSE-PERCEPTION (indriya-pratyaksa): Perception by or due to senses The variety of cognition that arises by depending on the five external sense organs like eye and others and has its object five external qualities like color and others is called senseperception. Cognition-object Visual cognition- color Olfactory-smell Gustatory-taste Auditory-sound Tactual-touch (b) Valid sense-perception cognition: A sense-perception is said to be valid cognition if it gies rise to determinate cognition a moment later which corresponds to the sensation. A sense-perception is valid if it has capacity to generate conceptual knowledge of its indeterminate cognition later. (ii) MENTAL PERCEPTION (manasa-pratyaksa): Mental perception is that cognition which is generated by sense-perception. Senseperception immediately precedes it and is the homogeneous cause of mental perception. It is indeterminate perception. Dignaga says that there are two kinds of mental perception: awareness of external objects and self-awareness of mental activities like desire and others. These are free from conceptual constructions. (a) The object of mental perception is that which is immediately generated by senseperception. Thus, the object of sense-perception and mental perception is not the same. (b) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense perception. The mental perception deals with that which is generated by sense-perception. Thus, both are not completely unrelated. (c) Mental perception differs from yogin's intuition in the sense that the former is conditioned by the sense perception while the latter is not. (d) Mental perception is at some level the intermediary between sense-perception and

conceptual construction in the pramana vyavastha set-up. Sense-perception and pramana vyavastha, in Buddhist epistemology, are at two extremes in the apprehesion of the object. * Sense-perception grasps the bare particular which is indescribable. * Conceptual construction deals with the universals which are mental objects without any external reality. So, the mental perception helps to collect the data of the sense-perception and and combine it with these concetpual constructions. (iii) SELF-COGNITION (svasamvedana): In this perception, the object is apprehended in its general aspect only. The mind apprehends the specific aspects of the object and this leads to either pleasure, pain or indifference towards these aspects. For instance, you cognize something blue and you have now the cognitio of something blue. In self-cognition, you are aware of this cognition. And thus, you need nothing but this cognition alone. Thus, the cognition cognizes itself as it cognizes the object- like the lamp illuminates itself while illuminating the object. All mental states can be cognized. Self-consciousness is that cognition by which the mind and all its mental states can be apprehended. How does self-consciousness come about? Every cognition is produced in two-fold appearances- appearance of the subject to itself (svabhasa) and that of the object (visayabhasa). Thus, self-cognition is result of cognitive act. This is indeterminate as it is free from conceptual constructs and is unerring because it involves direct intuition of one's own nature. There have been objections to the idea of self-consciousness of cognitions and feelings that the subject and object of cognition are always distinct from each other (like a dancing boy cannot climb on his own shoulder, a fire cannot burn itself). Responses: (a) DignagaPramanasamuccya- if there had to be another cognition in itself to cognize the cognition, then it would lead to infinite regress; (b) Moreover, if the subject did not cognize its own knowledge, then it would not be possible to know if an object has been cognized at all. I have to know that I know, in order to ensure that I know an object. For instance, how can I know that A is a stick-holder until I know what a stick is. Same way, until I know that I know an object, I cannot talk of it as known. To this, some (like Trilokana) object that you can see without having to apprehend that there is a sense organ involved. But this is visual

consciousness itself. To talk of being able to see in itself presupposes the existence of a self which cognizes the color/sight. Moreover, we cannot say that sense organs are the cause of us knowing that there is a cloth because sense organ is only the efficient cause while the cognition reveals the object that sense organ allows us to perceive. (iv) YOGIC APPREHENSION (yogijnana) Yogic apprehension is said to be that which is unconditional and free from conceptual constructions. It is unassociated with the teacher's instructions. The yogic apprehens the thing in itself. This is indeterminate and unerring also. Why indeterminate? That which is unerring cannot be determinate for it will lead to confusions about determinations. Confusions which involve comparison of present cognition with previous one and attempting to determine its nature. Who is a yogi? Yoga means concentration (samadhi) and also wisdom (prajna)- it is characterized by intent alertness of the mind on a true object. The true object is that which is derived through valid cognition. Meditation or bhavana means the repeated ascription of the mind. This wisdom is that which discerns the truth of all objects totally without any termination. A person with such concentration and wisdom is called yogi. It has also been added that yogi also has the ability to distinguish between momentary particulars. The knowledge which originated after the termination of intensive mediattion of the true nature of object is called Yogic apprehension. This apprehension is free from conceptual construction and is non-erroneous. The true nature of the object is the fourfold noble truth, suffering, the cause of suffering, extinction of suffering and means of such extinction (eight-fold path/ashtangamarg). The meditation involves concentration of the nature of object as constituted by five skandhas, as momentary, as void, as devoid of any soul but full of suffering. This is compatible with the truth that 'what is real is momentary'. There are said to be three stages in this process of mediatation by Dharmottara in Nyayabindu: (a) Yogin's vision begins to become clear; (b) Yogin contemplates the object as though through a thin cloud; (c) Object is perceived clearly as it were a small grain in his palm- in this stage, he has clear idea of nature of all objects. Q3. In Dignaga's view, what is erroneous perception? What are its types? Perception can lead to erroneous representation of its object. There are two types of erroneous perception:

(i) Illusion- Perception of one object as another; and (ii) Hallucination- Perception of an object in a place where there is no object at all. DIGNAGA In his Vrtti on Pramanasamuccya, Dignaga explicitly mentions three types of erroeous perceptions, to which later philosopher Jinendrabuddhi adds a forth one: (i) Hallucination- 'erroneous cognition is not perception because it conceptually constructs such object as water out of vapour'. (ii) Cognition of empirical reality (samvrttisajjnana) is not perception- why not? Because it superimposes on empirical reality something else. That is, it conceptually constructs the empirical reality as absolute reality. (iii) Inference and its results are also not true perceptions because tey are conceptual constructions of past experience. (iv) (pointed out by Jinendrabuddhi)- satimiram- cognition due to defective sense organs (i),(ii),(iii) are because of conceptual constructions while (iv) has no involvement of conceptual constructions. There has been much confusion as to whether Dignaga really meant for (iv) to be a type of erroneous perception. Why? His comment on Nyaya definition of perception (arising from contact between object and sense organs, inexpressible, non-contradicotry & determinate) where he says that there is no need to mention attributes like avyabhicari and avyapadesya (because since the perception is always produced by sense -object contact, it is always free from error while illusion is caused by conceptual capacty of the mind for the object) indicated that he meant erroneous perception to be primarily those arising out of conceptual constructions and not sense organs. What if defect of sense organs was not taken to be a type of erroenous perception? What if there were considered to be only conceptual errors? Dharmakriti mentions four absurdities which will arise due to this: When a person does get an erroneous perception due to defective sense organ: (i) The error would be removed without curing of the defective sense organ; (ii) The error would remain even after the sense organ has been cured; (iii) A person with non-defective sense organ would also have this erroneous perception after hearing about it from others even though he has no defect; and

(iv) It will not be immediate to sense organs but mediated by memory. The inclusion of the forth type of erroneous perception is also in line with the addition of 'non-erroneous' by Dharmakriti to the definition, for now, it would exclude all possible errors in perception, which would not have happened if the definition of perception only included 'free from conceptual constructions'. DHARMAKRITI Dharmakriti holds that there are four types of erroneous perceptio. Three arise because of conceptual constructions and the last one because of defect of sense organs. (i) Erroneous cognition- superimposing water in mirage; (ii) Empirical cognition- superimposing reality to empirical objects; (iii) Inferential cognitionarising through the cocept of identity between present object and previous one; and (iv) Erroneous perception due to defective sense organs. (a) Defective vision (b) Rapid movement (like rapid circling of fire makes us think there is a fire circle) (c) Travelling on fast-moving vehicle (d) Physical disorder The first three, where the error is to think one object to be another, is clubbed together and called kalpanajnanam i.e. conceptual cognition by Dharmakriti.

10. Write a note on Samanya Laksana and Sva Laksana, as presented by Dignaga. One of the basic tenets of Buddhism is selflessness (anatmanvada). In order to justify this counterintuitive doctrine, the Buddhist philosophers refute the idea of personal identity by analyzing it into aggregate of five skandhas and by following this with presentation of their own thesis. Abhidharma Kosa is generally used as a standard text to understand the Theravada point of view of Buddhism. Before we go on to talk about Samanyalaksana and Svalaksana, it is important to under the two view points we will be dealing with. 1. Theravada- Sarvastivada/Vaibhasika The theravadins were realists. The main school of Theravada is the Sarvastivada who believe in the existence of 75 dharmas in the past, present and future. This view is mentioned in the Abhidharma Kosa written by Vasubandhu. 2. Sautrantika The Sautranika rose in critique of Theravada and believed that the dharmas exist only in the present, in accordance with the theory of momentariness, thus the 'dharmas are empty' is their doctrine. Vasubandhu wrote the critique of Sarvastivada with the Sautrantika point of view. He himself propagated the position of Yogacara, a school of Mahayana. In this article, we will begin by talking about the view of Vasubandhu first and then of Dignaga and Dharmakriti.

PART ONE: SARVASTIVADA On dharma- Sarvastivadins say that dharmas are the ultimate existents which exist in the present, past and future. There are said to be 75 different types of dharmas and each of these types have sub-types. Therefore, at a level, there are innumerable dharmas. Svalaksana- Every dharma has a svalaksana (though these are momentary). In the sense that, the dharma is the bearer of this svalaksana. Svalaksana is variously translated as svabhava or essence. It is the 'atemporal underlying and defining nature'. Since this

svalaksana is inherent and atemporal, it is present in all the three time periods. It is also said to be the 'defining property' or 'defining characteristic' by Vasubandhu. When an object exemplifies the dharma, it does so through sharing the svalaksana of the dharma. SVALAKSANA OF OBJECT A = SVALAKSANA OF DHARMA X Samanyalaksana- There are many objects which share this svalaksana in empirical world. This set of objects are said to be exemplifications of the dharma. The abstractions of this generality between the objects is called the samanyalaksana. SVALAKSANA OF DHARMA X = SAMANYALAKSANA OF OBJECTS {A,B,C,....n} Let us take an example: Consider dharma = perceptual cognition Svalaksana of dharma= Providing the specific representation of the concerned object This svalaksana which belongs to one dharma (perceptual cognition) is samanyalaksana when it belongs to all the objects (all perceptual cognitions) which share the svalaksana. That is, 1. Perception is a dharma. 2. Representating an object is the svalaksana of this dharma. 3. The perceptual acts A, B, C, D exemplify this dharma. 4. All these perceptual acts share the svalaksana of the dharma 'perception'. 5. In this sense, the svalakasana of a dharma becomes the samanyalaksana of the exemplifications of dharma. (Svalaksana for one dharma = samanayalaksana for exemplifications of the dharma)

Critique of Sarvastivadins by Sautrantika: Sarvastivadins say that it is because this svalaksana is atemporal and the inherent nature of the dharma that they can be said to exist in present, past and future. But Sautrantika say that these svalaksanas are abstract and that there is no requirement to say that they exist in present, past and future. Vasubhandu says that the defining characteristic of a dharma is their essence. Thus, the svalaksana or svabhava of a thing is its being as it is. The use of this difference between a

dharma and its essence is only conventional. As we will see, we will realize that dharmas-initselves have no essence and if they do, this essence in itself is the dharma. The very idea of properties and its bearer is a conceptual construction not acceptable to Dignaga. PART TWO: DIGNAGA AND DHARMAKRITI Dignaga initiated what can be called the Buddhist Foundationalism. Dharmakriti saw his words as commentaries on Dignaga's Pramanasamuccya. Before we go on to understand what they say about dharmas, we have to understand the concept of perception according to Dignaga. Dignaga's Representationalism 1. Cognition- The object of cognition is mental phenomena. That is, in cognition we not not directly observing the object but imposing our mental constructions on it. Then, Dignaga is saying one of these two things: either he believes in idealist metaphysics (that only ideas exist) or in representationalist epistemology (that there are external objects but we only cognize ideas). 2. Representationalist Epistemology: Representationalism says that the immediate object of knowledge is not the external object, but an idea in the mind and that the external object is only simply perceived physically. 3. Perception: The conventional objects are made up of dharmas. We do not perceive but infer these conventional objects. We can perceive svalaksanas which are not definable. The moment something becomes definable, it is within the realm of langauge and thus, a conceptual construction. So, Dignaga advances a form of representationalism where the external objects exist but are mentally and physically analysable (into samanyalaksana by inference) and therefore, are only conventionally existent. What is is the ultimate existents (svalaksanas) which are pointinstances and are radically momentary. These unique particulars are the instances of the infinite dharmas. These are not definable and are object of our perception. Since each of these ultimate existents is unique and particular, it is not possible to interpret it at all. Once we interpret it, we have overrun their nature and started inferring. Dignaga says that perception is free of conceptual constructions. Thus, it is in itself non-linguistic. 4. Difference between perception and inference: Inference deals with all forms of conceptual

constructions like name, form, genus and others. The phenomenological content of perception and inference differ. The object of perception is the object itself- as a bare particular while for inference, it is associated with a set of properties which constitutes the samanya-laksana. While the object of perception is unique, the object of inference is associated with many other objects. Perception cannot lead to knowledge characterized by propositional calculus while inference can. DHARMAS 1. Dharmas exist but are infinite and indefinable. They are also irreducible. 2. We perceive svalaksanas which are radically momentary. Thus, there is no samanyalaksana except for in the conventional world. 3. Samvrtisat and paramarthasat: The main importance of the notion of svalaksana and samanyalaksana is that understanding the svalaksana of dharma of which the experienced objects are exemplifications means to say that everything can be reduced to these 'ultimate existents' (paramarthasat) while those set of objects which are reduced to these are 'conventionally existent' (samvrtisat). This division is also analogous to their idea of two truths (samvrtisatya and paramarthikasatya). Thus, we can say that samvrtisatya consists of set of all the things which are reducible to what is ultimately real while the paramarthika satya talks about the set of irreducible ontological primitives (dharmas). These ontological primitives cannot be mentally or materially analysable. They are irreducible. So, those objects which can be analyzed physically and mentally into other basic parts have 'conventional' or 'derivative' existence while the more basic parts to which the former can be reduced are the 'ultimately existent' things. The latter are the dharmas and are known through their svalaksana. This svalaksana is equal to their svabhava. The dharmas are momentary but in each moment, they have ultimate existence. The definitions themselves when applied to objects in the empirical world are abstractions (samanyalaksana). 4. Nirvana- According to Dignaga, it is when we remove the linguistic and cognitive defilements that we can see things as they really are. Thus, once we remove our conceptual constructions, we will realize that there is no self and its non-existence over which we have imposed the concepts. One will know that only the momentary episodes are real and to interpret these as self or event is in itself a conceptual construction.