Special Powers How Agents Determine the Bounds of Action Carla Bagnoli & Andrea Borghini In this paper, we consider the case in which actions change metaphysical and normative status because of the agent’s acquisition of special powers. This case is ordinary and pervasive, but problematic. Our aim is to develop its philosophical implications and our claim is that special powers shed light about the relation of agential authority, that is, the authority that agents claim on their actions. Our argument starts with an examination of two rather different examples. In section 1, we consider the practice of kosher meat processing, to point out that a certified butcher makes actions that count as kosher cuts, insofar as she is a certified butcher. We start off by noticing that in butchery in general, and in kosher butchery in particular, there are some general principles, but no codified norms; hence, the importance of apprenticeship and development of expert skills to the professional development of a kosher butcher. This suggests that, in the case of kosher butchery, agential authority is attributed on the basis of complex patterns of skill acquisition and professional development. An agent is not deemed an expert kosher butcher on the basis of a single action of carving; rather, any single action is examined as part of a pattern of agency, which forms a context of evaluation including other occasions of carving, conversations, and display of expert knowledge (Collins 2013). Each action in the pattern is a hint to the agential authority of the carver; but none of the actions in the pattern suffices by itself to ground the judgment that a single cut is well made, unless the agent is bestowed the ‘special power’ associated with being recognized an expert kosher butcher. Once the power is bestowed, the agent changes in status and, as a consequence, there is a change in kind of the actions that the agent can deliver. In section 2 we consider the case of moral expertise. We define moral expertise in terms of the analogy with craft that is prominent in ancient ethics. Moral knowledge is the result of a communal endeavor, achieved through efforts, experience, and practice under the guidance of the wise. This model implicitly acknowledges the characteristic incompleteness of practical reason, and conceives of moral education as a sort of apprenticeship. While moral education aims at providing moral discernment,it is not about expanding or perfecting a body of knowledge. It is about gaining the right
1
sort of experience, by practicing under the guide of the wise (Aristotle, NE 1143a 31). One key aspect of practical wisdom is the capacity to immediately understand one’s situation and determine what to do effectively, timely, efficiently, and coherently (Aristotle NE 1142a 23-30, 1109b 23, 1126b 4, Annas 1993, pp. 89-91). While the novices are uncertain and perplexed, the wise swiftly navigate their way through difficult situations. The wise are like the good meat carvers, who discern the specificities within a body, aim and hit the right target with no hesitation. It is crucial to link the moral expert’s discernment with her capacity to determine the right action. We contend that the capacity for determining what is right should be understood primarily in the ontological sense of the term: agency that requires expertise is ontologically indeterminate; its determination rests on rational deliberation and experts serve as the standard of right action (Aristotle, NE 1094 b13). In section 3, through a comparison of the two cases, we show that the shift in metaphysical and normative status of expert agency ultimately depends on the agent’s special powers. We call it “the special powers claim” and we offer a tentative account of how such powers are conferred or generated. By becoming a certified butcher, the agent acquires a status that grants her the power to produce wellmade cuts that deliver kosher meat; without such status, the action of cutting would not comply with the intuitive requirements of well-made cuts. Analogously, by doing the right thing, we become moral experts. In section 4, we focus on the claim that special powers are conferred by membership in the community of experts, and we indicate some issues that arise about the basis of this membership. We call this cluster of issues “the special powers problem”, and we will focus especially on how we acquire and lose special status, which entitles to special powers. The change in status brings to light the question of the autonomy of an agent and, consequently, of her actions. Granted that novices do not rely on the expert (i.e. the master carver or the wise) passively and blindly, the question arises whether and how they gain the sort of reflexivity that distinguishes mindless drill from practicing under normative guidance. A related question is how this normative guidance is delivered. Presumably, the wise exhibit not only discernment and understanding of the subject, but a reflective articulation of their expertise. We maintain that self-reflective articulation of
2
moral expertise makes use of principles. In the moral case, the “expert making” practices face two important objections. First, the objection of dogmatism. If the expert set the standards of correctness of the community, their confidence in such standards suffices to warrant their own pronouncements. This means that the verdicts of the expert admit of no rational or epistemic defeaters. The objection accordingly is that they are dogmatic decrees bearing no rational authority. Second, the objection of unfairness. Privileged groups that serve as the standard of agency are inclined to preserve such standards, at the risk of reiterating forms of exclusion and ostracism against outcast and outsiders (Nussbaum 1994, p. 104). Analogous objections hold in the case of kosher butchery, where the risk is that allegedly dogmatic standards are enforced by privileged groups to promote economic and social advantages. We argue that the core of the dispute is whether – and, if so how – the standards conveyed by experts gain rational authority. Finally, in section 5, we argue that an adequate account of the special powers case and a solution of the special powers problem should endorse a constructivist account of agential authority, understood as a principled relation of normative authority between agents and actions. The constructivist account vindicates the claim that agents are ontologically and explanatorily prior to actions, where the priority is compatible with the simultaneous constitution of agent and action. The view we propose challenges some fundamental ontological presumptions about agency that are current in action theory. In particular, it counters the view that actions are states of affairs brought about by agents in the pursuit of their goals, interest, and ends. We contend that such traditional views fail to deliver a satisfactory explanation of the relation of agential authority. References Annas, J., 1993, The Morality of Happiness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Annas, J., 2001, “Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge”, Social Philosophy and Policy 18/2 (2001): 236-256. Aristotle, Aristotelis Opera ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, Berlin: De Gruyter 1960. Collins H. 2013. "Three Dimensions of Expertise," Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 12: 253273. Nussbaum, M.C., 1994. The Therapy of Desire Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marglin F.A and Marglin S.A. 1990. Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture, Resistence, Oxford: Clarendon Press
3
CONTACTS Carla Bagnoli Professor of Theoretical Philosophy University of Modena & Reggio Emilia and Professorial Fellow Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas University of Oslo Address Largo Sant'Eufemia 19 41121 Modena Italy e-mail:
[email protected] Personal page: http://unimore.academia.edu/CarlaBagnoli Andrea Borghini Associate Professor Department of Philosophy College of the Holy Cross Address 1 College Street Worcester MA, 01610 e-mail:
[email protected] Personal page: http://college.holycross.edu/faculty/aborghin/
4
