Quezon\'s Political Philosophy (1998, 2000; reprinted in 2009)

[Published in 1998 in Σοφια: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 46-69. Reprinted in 2000 in my book, Filipino Philosophy: Traditional Approach. Part I, Section 1. Foreword by George F. McLean, OMI. De La Salle University Press. Another edition appeared in 2009 by the C & E Publishing, Inc.]

MANUEL L. QUEZON’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY1 Rolando M. Gripaldo The author argues that Quezon’s political philosophy—defined as a political principle or a set of integrated political principles that serves as a guide for political action—has two strands: one which Quezon uses in the fight for political and economic independence and the other in the attempt to preserve and maintain that independence once attained. INTRODUCTION If by “political philosophy” we mean a guide for political action, then Quezon indeed has such a political philosophy. It is rather interesting to note that a political philosophy can either be a political principle or a “system of integrated principles consistently followed as guide for political action” (Recto 1979:526). Quezon’s political philosophy includes both strands. The first strand consists of the principle called “political pragmatism,” which says that one should fight for ideals and principles, but in case obstacles to an ideal are difficult to surmount, he must be ready to fall back to an alternative that is better than nothing or that is a right step toward the ideal. This philosophy is closely associated with another principle called “political situationalism,” which holds that one should base his political judgments and actuations in light of existing political realities or circumstances. Quezon used this strand of political philosophy in his fight for Philippine independence particularly from 1910-1940. The second strand of Quezon’s political philosophy forms a coherent system that covers such concepts as government and society, nation, citizenship, democracy and dictatorship, nationalism, the constitution, human rights and liberty, partyless democracy, church-state relations, local governments, national political institutions, public instruction, national defense, and foreign relations. Quezon developed this strand in the course of his administration as Commonwealth president. It might be argued at this juncture that since Quezon did not write a book like Plato’s Republic or Aristotle’s Politics, then he did not have a systematic political philosophy. My experience in teaching and studying philosophy for about twenty-one years have taught me that writing political books like Plato’s and Aristotle’s is not a necessary criterion for systematic philosophizing or thinking, or even for system building. A number of philosophers expressed their political views in various works, which when later collated or edited by students, admirers, or editors in a volume or in several volumes, turned out to unfold a coherent system of ideas. These thinkers included Karl Marx and Mao Tse-tung. Quezon’s second strand of political philosophy can be found in his various speeches, letters, articles, and the like. The objective of the first strand is to attain national independence, i.e., political and later also economic independence, while the objective of the second is to insure the preservation and maintenance of that independence once attained. THE FIRST STRAND OF QUEZON’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY The traditional view on Quezon has been the following: that he did not have a guide for political action; that he was a “master political strategist and tactician whose consuming and overriding objective was victory;” that he was an “opportunist” in the sense of knowing “how to take advantage of every opportunity” (Recto 1979:526-27), and that he was an astute, double-faced politician who publicly favored “immediate, complete, and absolute” independence before the Filipino people but opposed such independence privately before the American administrators and businessmen. Claro M. Recto erred in believing Quezon did not have a political philosophy as a guide for political action. The traditional historians like Theodore Friend, Michael Paul Onorato et al. likewise erred

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in thinking that Quezon betrayed the Filipino nation insofar as the desire to obtain “immediate, complete, and absolute” independence was concerned (Recto 1979:526-27).2 The present author believes that Quezon was sincere in that desire but the latter realized the ideal type of independence, under the existing circumstances, was difficult to obtain. He had to settle for a different kind of independence—not ideal—but was better than nothing and the only kind of independence which the American administrations would allow him to secure. It would take many hours and many pages for me to cite all the instances that led Quezon to fall back to his philosophy of political pragmatism. Suffice it to say, I will only discuss three important incidents that will drive home the point: (1) Quezon’s conversations with McIntyre in 1913-14; (2) the Fairfield Bill of 1924; and (3) the dominion status for the Philippines. The Quezon-McIntyre Conversations of 1913-14 On pages 51 and 52 of the book The Philippine reader, edited by Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Shalom (1987), we read “Memorandum No. 1,” dated 29 December 1913 by General Frank McIntyre, the chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the U. S. Department of War. It describes Quezon as saying to McIntyre that he opposed early independence because of the Japanese designs on the Islands. This was also what Quezon said in Yokohama on 12 December 1913 which the American consul general there promptly reported to the State Department (see Wheeler 1963:12-13; Curry 1954:441-42; Salamanca 1968:174; Biedzynski 1990a:70-71). What has not been understood about what Quezon said in Yokohama and the conversations he had with McIntyre is that at this time Quezon was in a very tight predicament. He went to the United States on 24 December 1909. In December 1913, or four years after, no independence legislation was in sight. Jones Bill No. 1, which provided, among others, absolute and complete independence in eight years, specifically on 4 July 1921, was not discussed on the floor of Congress in 1912 because the House was busy with appropriation bills and the friar lands bill. There was a move among some members of the Nacionalista Party in late 1912 to replace him by Teodoro Sandiko as resident commissioner. The American Anti-Imperialist League, through the prodding of Erving Winslow, its secretary, wanted Quezon to fight and obtain a complete independence for the Philippines with a neutralization proviso. Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, would not entertain any discussion with Quezon on “immediate, complete, and absolute” independence. Quezon knew as early as March 1912 that Wilson would not favor Jones Bill No. 1. When he went on 4 March 1912 to see the latter, then the governor of New Jersey, the latter met him for only a few minutes and frankly told him that he (Wilson) did not believe the Philippines should be granted immediate independence because the populace was not homogeneous in civilization, though he was willing to learn more about the Philippines and was open to being convinced. Winslow, who believed Wilson was the most probable Democratic presidential candidate, insisted that Quezon try to win Wilson to their side by sending him (Wilson) a memorandum of information about the Philippines. Quezon must have realized by then how difficult it would still be to obtain complete independence even if the administration would change from Republican to Democrat. Moreover, when Wilson won the nomination as the Democratic standard bearer during the party convention at Baltimore in June 1912, Quezon noticed the Democratic leaders of the House would not introduce an independence bill without the consent of Governor Wilson. Upon the election of Wilson as U. S. president, Quezon eventually made up his mind to change the adversary strategy that he and Winslow used against the Republican administration, i.e., by putting pressure on it in order for it to accede to their demands. He decided to use the strategy of political pragmatism. He must have discussed this decision with Osmeña when he returned to the Philippines in 1912 after the “loss” of Jones Bill No. 1. If he and Osmeña wanted to obtain a workable independence legislation, it was necessary to impress upon the Democratic administration that they were willing to accept an “ultimate” independence as envisioned by Wilson. It was therefore necessary for Quezon to find a convenient reason—Japanese designs, which some congressmen like William Jones discussed in 1912—to show to the American administration he had a change of heart. When Quezon called on General McIntyre in December 1913 in search of a practical solution to the independence problem, his tight predicament consisted in having to contend with three major forces: (1) he must satisfy the clamor of independence by Filipinos back home or reap a critical backlash that he

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was not doing much for a definite independence legislation; (2) he must satisfy the Anti-Imperialists of America who were vigorously agitating for immediate Philippine independence coupled with neutralization; and (3) he must get the approval of Wilson who favored ultimate, but not immediate, independence. Having this predicament in mind, Quezon told McIntyre—with apparent deliberateness in order to create the impression he agreed with Wilson that immediate independence was out of the question—that an early grant of independence would indeed be a mistake since he was convinced Japan had designs on the Islands. That Quezon was not serious about these Japanese designs can be gleaned from an undated news item (probably 1913-14) titled “Eloquent plea for the Filipinos,” where Quezon (Quezon Papers, ser. V, Philippine National Library; henceforth QP) argued that the Philippines was in no danger from Japan. The communications of 1912-16 from Quezon’s friends—Winslow, Jacob Schurman, William Jones, John Switzer et al.—indicate that there was no danger from Japan. On 7 May 1912 Schurman, e.g., said that Japan’s “development for the future is not . . . southward by way of Formosa, but on the mainland [of] Korea and Manchuria.” On 19 February 1915 Quezon (QP, ser. VI) wrote a Japanese: . . . so far as I am informed, the people of the Philippine Islands do not share the view that Japan intends to seize the Philippines either now or after they shall have been granted independence by the United States. So far as I am concerned, I assure you that after careful deliberation and study I am of the opinion that if the Philippines be granted independence, Japan will not only respect that independence but will refuse to permit any other nation to interfere therewith. If Quezon was convinced in 1915 that Japan posed no danger to the Philippines, why did he not change his position of securing an immediate, rather than an ultimate, independence? The answer is clear. Because by late 1913 and early 1914 Quezon was firmly convinced there would be no legislation obtainable from Congress unless the Wilson administration would support it, and Wilson would support only an ultimate independence. The “Japanese-designs” argument was, therefore, only a convenient reason used by Quezon in his attempt to persuade the Wilson administration that he had agreed with the latter on ultimate independence. That Quezon was in a tight predicament was confirmed in his other conversation with McIntyre in January 1914. He left suggestions to McIntyre for an independence measure he believed would be acceptable (1) to the Filipinos back home, (2) to the Anti-Imperialists of America, and (3) to President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson told Quezon on 19 January 1914 that he would not endorse a bill specifying a date of independence, although “he would entertain a proposition for a bill providing for a further step in self-government and, in this bill, commit Congress to the policy of Philippine independence” (Quezon to Winslow, 19 January 1914, QP, ser. V). On 11 February 1914 Quezon wrote Wilson that “we prefer the Jones Bill [No. 1], but we will take a mere declaration of purpose by the Congress rather than have no legislation at all.” On 12 February Quezon explained to Moorfield Storey, the president of the Anti-Imperialist League, that the issue was not what bill would best suit them, but what bill would suit President Wilson and still could be accepted by them. Quezon insisted that they better accept any kind of bill provided it was in the right direction rather than to insist on what they wanted and get nothing at all. If, Quezon went on, a provision in the bill for a definite time could not be had, then they better secure a declaration that it was the intention of the United States to grant Philippine independence as soon as a stable government was established. Quezon on the Fairfield Bill of 1924 The Fairfield Bill is another instance which is alleged to support the traditional interpretation of Quezon as doubled-faced. Quezon—who was believed insincere with immediate, absolute, and complete independence—together with Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas, negotiated with General McIntyre and Secretary of War John Weeks on the possible passage of the Fairfield Bill, which provided for a transition period of 25 years. Louis Fairfield introduced his bill on the House on 23 April 1924 in lieu of the bill introduced by Congressman Henry Allen Cooper on 9 January 1922 authorizing the Filipino people to form a

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government. The Fairfield bill was prepared by the War Department and New York financiers. When Quezon, together with Osmeña and Claro M. Recto, the Democrata leader, sailed for the United States on 6 April 1924, the Fairfield Bill was modified to 30 years of autonomy with an elective Filipino governor general. An American resident commissioner would represent the U.S. president in the Commonwealth. Knowing that the Calvin Coolidge administration supported the Fairfield Bill in lieu of the Cooper Bill, Quezon fell back to his strategy of pragmatism: if the Cooper Bill could not be passed, then the independence mission would have to settle for the Fairfield Bill. The House Committee on Insular Affairs of Congress accepted a number of amendments from the mission and on 10 May 1924 it favorably reported out the amended Fairfield Bill that would make the Philippines absolutely independent in 1944. There was, however, virtually no support coming from the Filipino press and the Filipino people in the Islands. So the Nacionalista members of the mission (Recto was not around) decided to do some maneuvers, reducing the transition period to 15 years or, if not possible, supporting the 25-year transition provided that if the bill failed to pass Congress, then the president would grant more Filipino autonomy by appointing a Filipino governor general or something similar to this. Why did the mission decide to accept the Fairfield Bill in principle? Because of pragmatic reasons. Since the Coolidge administration would not endorse the Cooper or any bill except the Fairfield (or later the Johnson Bill with the same 25-year transition period), then the mission had to accept the Fairfield Bill as a compromise or pragmatic measure—or as better than nothing—provided that it passed Congress during the ongoing session. Failing in this, both the Coolidge administration and the mission (except Recto who was not present) agreed on a “deal” where Secretary of War Weeks write a letter to the mission, dated 17 May 1924, defining the administration’s position. The mission would then work for the support of the bill by the Philippine Legislature, expecting the negative Filipino public opinion to be reversed thereby. Recto, however, wrecked the deal by divulging it to the public. Quezon’s attitude towards the bill was faithfully consistent with his philosophy of political pragmatism, i.e. a political course of action that is better than nothing. His controversy with Recto, however, had placed him in a position where he had to abandon any desire to support the bill. Quezon on the Dominion Status for the Philippines The third example in the attempt to show that Quezon was insincere with Philippine immediate, absolute, and complete independence is the dominion-status argument. If Quezon was indeed sincere with independence, the argument goes, then why should he negotiate for the dominion status? Quezon initially considered the dominion status as a poor alternative to Philippine independence, but as a better alternative to the Philippine Commonwealth in that while the dominion can negotiate commercial treaties independently of London, the Commonwealth cannot negotiate commercial agreements independently of Washington. Moreover, the dominion has a broader autonomy than the Commonwealth. According to M. H. de Joya (1940), Canada and the other British Dominions are, everything but name, republics. . . They possess tariff autonomy; they regulate their own trade relations with the mother country, and conclude commercial treaties with foreign nations They enact their own immigration laws and others. At the same time, they enjoy the protection of the British Empire. There were two amendments which Quezon wanted effected in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, military and economic. While President Franklin Delano Roosevelt acceded to the military bases amendment, he decided that flaws of the economic aspect of the act be attended to later. Quezon expressed his dissatisfaction with the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act because the act hindered the Filipinos from properly preparing for the future. Nicholas Tarling (1977:201) remarked: Trade agreements with foreign countries were needed, to come into effect in 1946; but the [Tydings-McDuffie] act prevented discussions with other countries. Yet Congress could unilaterally modify existing arrangements as it had those of TydingsMcDuffie itself. An economic plan was impossible. The state of affairs was anomalous,”at variance with the spirit of the Independence Act.”

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Although Quezon believed in the efficacy of the dominion status as an alternative to the Philippine Commonwealth, he likewise believed, under normal circumstances, it would be difficult to sell the idea to the Filipino people. Philippine independence was always primary. If, under abnormal circumstances, Philippine independence would only be a transition to another nation’s colonization of the country, Quezon would prefer the dominion status to Philippine independence. And he would try his best to persuade the Filipino people of its validity under the prevailing abnormal situation. One such abnormal situation was the Great Depression. When American farm and labor interests agitated for Congress to abolish free trade, grant immediate Philippine independence, and simultaneously apply tariff on Philippine products, Quezon thought this American attitude most unfair as it would mean the economic collapse of the Philippines. Another foreign power, e.g., Japan, could easily colonize the country. He was reported to have said in July 1933 that if the Philippines was so unfortunate as to become independent in a year or two, he himself would go to London to ask the British government to admit the Philippines into the British Commonwealth of Nations, if possible with dominion status. Quezon (Tarling 1977:201) believed this would give the country “almost complete freedom, and also security as a unit of the Empire.” Quezon rejected High Commissioner Paul McNutt’s narrow concept of dominion status. Quezon certainly wanted more control of trade relations, tariff, immigration, currency, and public debt than what McNutt envisioned. After 1946 Quezon definitely preferred Philippine independence to McNutt’s idea of dominion. While heading the Commonwealth government-in-exile in the United States, however, Quezon (Biedzynski 1990:87-90) unequivocally said in 1942 that the Canadian dominion status was fully acceptable to him as an alternative to complete independence in view of changing circumstances affecting world peace. THE SECOND STRAND OF QUEZON’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY As president of the Philippine Commonwealth, Quezon had the task of building the foundations of the government and strengthening it. He (1938e:193) said: “We are engaged in the epic task of building our nation, to live and flourish, not for a day, but for all time.” Traditionally, the alpha and omega of a systematic political philosophy depend on the purpose of the book. In Plato’s Republic, for instance, it begins by trying to answer the question “What is justice?” and ends with the rewards of justice in this life and after death. John Locke’s Second Treatise of civil government begins with an analysis of the nature of political power and ends with the dissolution of government. Jean Jacques Rousseau recognized in his book Of the social contract the importance of foreign relations. He considered his work incomplete and in his “Conclusion,” he (1984:135) said: After having set forth the true principles of political right and attempted to found the State on its base, it would remain to support it by its external relations; this would comprise the law of peoples, commerce, the right of war and conquest, the public right, alliances, negotiations, treaties, etc. But all that forms a new object which is too vast for my limited scope. . . The arrangement here of Quezon’s systematic political philosophy will likewise follow more or less Rousseau’s format, i.e., it will begin with the origin of government and end with foreign or external relations. Government and Society Quezon believed in Social Darwinism, which argues that governments and societies come about in various stages of development as manifestations of man’s desire to survive in the struggle for survival. Mankind, in its upward climb toward perfection, met peaks, valleys, and deep chasms in the human landscape. As Quezon (1939i:193) remarked: There is no substitute for suffering and privation to bring out the finer qualities in man, just as physical struggle develops his sinews. This is in accord with biological laws. The battle for existence and the survival of the fittest is [sic] ever the rule of life and nature among men. Stern necessity, the urge that comes from fear of destruction, the

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loss of honor or of freedom, reacting upon latent human faculties brings out the best that is in man. Governmental Stages of the World Quezon viewed the world to have gone through four stages in governmental development: (1) the tribal system, the outgrowth of family rule, and the basis of society; (2) the imperial system, the city-state which later became an empire; (3) the monarchical system (in nation-states), the offshoot of feudalism which followed the fall of empires; and (4) the republican system, the government when people began to assert themselves. The world of his time, Quezon stressed, was entering the fifth stage which was still in ferment. At least two movements were visible: (a) the despotism of one man as in Italian fascism (Mussolini) and (b) a people’s despotism as in Russia. It was necessary, Quezon thought, to preserve the foundation of the Filipino political system, viz., the family and the democracy of the people. Types of Society According to Quezon (1973c:96; see also Rodriguez 1940: v and 107), a society may be capitalistic, communistic, or distributive. The capitalistic society or state allows unlimited wealth accumulation and recognizes the sacredness of property. It does not intervene in wealth production and accumulation by property owners even at the expense of the masses. The communistic society completely denies property ownership by owning all modes of production and supervising the distribution of wealth so produced. In the distributive society the government assumes and exercises the prerogative to curb the right to private property whenever public welfare demands it. Quezon favored the distributive state and called it “democratic socialism.” In Quezon’s thinking it can be a representative form of government, which promotes social welfare and happiness, and which safeguards the people’s liberty. Concept of a Nation A nation for Quezon (1939i:195, 280-81) is like a man made up of soul and body: that which concerns man’s relationship with his fellowmen is the domain of the soul while that which concerns his struggle for livelihood is the domain of the body. In the former lies the moral and spiritual forces needed to build a great nation, in the latter lies the strength to build the national economy. According to Quezon, “It is not wealth, but the happiness of the common man that makes a nation strong.” Even if a nation is like a man, it is also “nothing more nor less than its citizenry.” It is like a family multiplied a thousandfold. As such, the strength of a nation can only be built on character. It is important for a leader to awaken the people to become what of right they should be: “morally strong, virile, hard-working, refined, enterprising, persevering, [and] public-spirited” (Quezon 1938e:195). In time of danger it is the duty of the nation to preserve itself by all means. Quezon contended that even if Spain has laid the foundations of the country’s unity through religion and education, it does not justify any nation to have a right to meddle with another’s internal affairs. Citizenship Duties of Citizens Quezon (1936b:43 and 1937b:87) declared that a person “can only call himself a worthy citizen if he learns his duties before he demands his rights.” Among the duties of citizenship embodied in the Code of Citizenship and Ethics are: love of country and readiness to defend it, obedience to laws and respect for the government and the constitution, payment of taxes, protecting the purity of suffrage and abiding by the decisions of the majority, living up to the noble traditions of the people, doing one’s work well, promoting social justice, patronizing local products, and developing and conserving wisely the natural resources. Quezon (1937a:45; 1939b:69; and 1939c:238) emphasized that a citizen must not only defend the nation in time of war, but must also be “useful and law-abiding . . . in time of peace.” National discipline, or what Quezon otherwise called “heroic patriotism,” must be the ideal. It is “a patriotism that is devotion, loyalty and courage, and [that] rises to heights of self-sacrifice.”

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Women as Citizens If women are not to be treated as slaves, Quezon argued, then they should be granted the right to vote. If women, who have no say in government (through suffrage), are bound to follow the laws of the land, then that is tantamount to treating them as slaves. Besides, it is unfair to assume that men can always speak for women in vital political issues. Quezon (1937d:110; 1939g:270) considered the Filipino woman as equal to the best in the world and must therefore enjoy all the rights and privileges of women in more progressive countries. Filipino women have the same mission as citizens of the country as men. Their paramount duty as citizens is “to educate, direct, and shape the character of their children.” Taxation The first duty of a man in time of peace, after securing the basic necessities of life, like food and raiment, is to pay his taxes to the government, which is his expression of patriotism during peacetime. Any person, Quezon (1938a:159) maintained, “who says that he is a patriot, that he loves his people and is ready to die for his country, but does not pay his taxes, is a liar and not a patriot.” Taxes after all are used for the public interest, “to keep peace and maintain order; to repel invasion; to improve the living conditions of the people; to educate them; to promote agriculture, industry and trade.” It is interesting that Quezon found it necessary to insist on the oneness of the government and the people. According to him (1936b:42), it is a mistake to think that the people and the government are distinct and separate since the former have created the latter by means of a constitution. “It is foolish to speak of independence, of liberty, if one cannot maintain that independence, that liberty” through taxes. Peace and Order Quezon (1939d:247) contended that the “maintenance of peace and order is the joint obligation of the government and citizen” because without peace and order there can be no progress. It will be “impossible to promote education, improve the condition of the masses, protect the poor and ignorant against exploitation, and otherwise insure the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.” Elsewhere, Quezon (1939b:12) said: “Peace is the basic foundation of democracy. Without peace life is only a burden and men can do nothing either for their country or for themselves.” Once government has been set up, Quezon (1939a:4 and 1939e:191) believed it is necessary to safeguard it against possible internal and external dangers. Effective defenses should be erected against “subversive movements, the possible tyranny of aggressive minorities, or the danger of mob rule.” Democracy and Dictatorship Democracy Quezon said that the starting point in a democracy is reverence for law as the expression of the popular will. The survival of democracy presupposes that those at the helm of the government believe in the people’s right to rule and have faith in their inherent capacity to decide rightly important public questions. If the Filipinos want a democracy they must have faith in the men they select to represent them in the Legislature until by these men’s acts they (the representatives) lose their right to the people’s confidence and trust. Among the inherent democratic rights are free speech, freedom of the press, equality of everyone before the law, and freedom of religious worship. Quezon thought that a revolution always brings more evil than good. As such he believed in political reforms. The safeguard of democracy is neither the constitution nor the written laws, but the self-restraint in the exercise of political power, especially by the people, by not whimsically tinkering on the constitution. In the event that the people fail to exercise this political self-restraint, it is the duty of the chief executive to exercise his own self-restraint. Dictatorship

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Quezon opposed dictatorship, specifically communism. In the Philippines anything may happen including revolution or chaos, but never a dictatorship. Quezon (1936d:53) argued: Even if I tried to be a dictator I couldn’t be because the Independence law which is the Supreme Law of the land today, gives the President of the United States power and duty to take over the government of the Philippines the moment a constitutional government has disappeared. All this talk of dictatorship is not true. Nationalism Nationalism as Attachment to Country Nationalism for Quezon (1939c:231) is an “emotional attachment and conscious allegiance to one’s country rather than to a dynasty, a monarch or a ruler.” Rightly conceived, “it is a tremendous force for good.” Not only that “it strengthens and solidifies a nation,” it makes active community interest, preserves the best traditions of the people, encourages the ambition to enlarge the people’s heritage, and dynamically urges the people to continuous self-improvement. National Symbols Nationalism is closely related to national symbols. “The mystery of symbols,” Quezon averred, “lies deep in human nature.” The national flag is one among these symbols in modern times. To quote Quezon (1938d:187): The signs and emblems of great movements have always laid hold of their followers with more vigor and tenacity than the history and written rescript of the movements themselves. Attachment to the flag has been quite potent as loyalty to the law as a factor of national stability. National Language Imitation of what is alien without knowing whether it is good or bad is due to an evil, viz., the lack of a real national soul. According to Quezon (1937g:151), a “national soul cannot exist where there is not a common language.” Genuine national pride is anchored on one’s own native language. Until we have a national language, Quezon argued, we shall not be a people: we shall always have the sign of inferiority. For Quezon, to copy is all right, but “we must copy only what is good, what is adaptable to our idiosyncrasy, and reject what is bad.” It does not matter for Quezon (1937g:152; 1937h:158-59) whether the national language be Tagalog, Ilocano, Visayan, or “any other vernacular tongue so long as we can have a language that can be spoken by all.” Quezon was even willing to adopt the Mangyan tongue should language experts propose it to be the best for the Filipinos. No foreign tongue can replace a native language as a medium of national expression because the national thought is embedded in a common language that develops and grows with the progress of the nation. We may borrow a foreign tongue but “we cannot truly possess a national language except through the adoption, development and use of one of our own.” Since English and Spanish, Quezon (1937g:159; 1937h:149-51) held, cannot be a national language, we may retain them as official languages. The Spanish language will preserve for the Filipinos the Latin culture while the English language will allow the Filipinos easy access to the wealth of knowledge treasured in this tongue. Quezon believed the Filipinos must have a language of their own, a language based on one of their “own languages.” The Constitution The constitution, as the expression of the sovereignty and the aggregate will of the people, is the supreme organic law of the land. It contains the entire governmental framework. Quezon (1936c:45) contrasted the political philosophies underlying the United States and Philippine constitutions. In the

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American case, the individual is placed above everything: “His inalienable right to life, property and the pursuit of happiness is the main objective of government as interpreted by the framers of the American constitution.”3 In the Philippine case, the reverse is true: what is paramount is not the good of the individual but the good of the state, i.e., the good of the largest number of individuals. Any amendment of the constitution, Quezon (1939c:248-49) believed, must be based “upon the high plane of principles rather than upon considerations of personal character.” In a democracy, the essence of constitutional government is not that the constitution should remain unchanged for all time, but that its changes be done in the manner it has prescribed itself. Thus the constitution, though it must not be amended arbitrarily, should not be taken as immutable because social and political conditions are dynamic. Human Rights and Liberty Quezon firmly believed in human rights and would upheld them. To quote him (1935a:2): I will hold inviolate and will defend to the utmost the individual rights and liberties. I shall safeguard free speech, the freedom of the press, and the equality of every man before the law however poor or ignorant. But human liberty has limitations. It does not consist in doing what one pleases. As a right it has the corresponding duty to promote not only a person’s own happiness and welfare, but also those of his fellowmen. Partyless Democracy “What makes a government stable,” Quezon (1937g:150) noted, “is the existence of a responsible majority and a minority party which was not born to be in the minority but which happens to have been defeated in the last elections.” Political parties must have constructive objectives. They must be established on an affirmative, a positive idea. No party must be established for the negative purpose of obstructing. Quezon favored the formation of an opposition party only if “those who are to compose that party do not agree with the principles, doctrines, and practice of the party in power.” If the opposition party has a platform for their objectives, then it is all right, since they would be presenting an alternative program of government. If, as Quezon (1937c:134) observed, the opposition starts by being divided amongst themselves, since they are only joining together because of their hatred of the Government or against me, nothing good can come out of it. The only tie that can produce good is the tie of love. . . .Love can produce good things. Hatred can only destroy; it can never build up because hatred is not creative, it is destructive. It is love that is creative. Quezon’s practical experience with Philippine politics disillusioned him, for he found the opposition without principles significantly different from those of the dominant party, but organized themselves only for the main purpose of opposing the party in power. Quezon (1939f:274: 1939h:255-56) then aimed at “absolute national unity,” i.e., the putting together of “the best elements of the country” in the common effort of preparing the nation for independence. Elsewhere, Quezon asserted that by “unity” he did not mean that everyone must think alike, or accept as gospel truth the leader’s ideas and opinions, or follow blindly his advice. What Quezon condemned was not “differences of opinion honestly held and properly expressed,” but a “division founded on partisan spirit” or the “belief that we must have different political parties, issues or no issues . platform or no platform, just so there may be an opposition party.” Gradually the idea of a partyless democracy formed in Quezon’s mind. According to him (1940a:271), there are three historical precedents of what in effect may be called partyless democracy: (1) during the 1906 elections of provincial governors when political parties had just been newly established and partisan spirit was virtually nonexistent, the governor elected in every province was generally the best man; (2) during the elections of the first Philippine Assembly where most of the people were for immediate independence, and consequently most of the candidates belonged to the party of the people, the ones elected to the Assembly were generally the best irrespective of party affiliations; and (3) during the initial years of the existence of the U.S. government when political parties were not yet

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organized, “people were elected because of their personal worth and known patriotism and ability, and not because of their loyalty to any party.” Quezon observed that political parties are selfish. They seek their own good at the expense of the interest of the people. Party politics, party opposition, or party spirit causes inefficiency in the government, causes delay in the execution of needed reforms, and makes the government incapable of facing difficult situations. Quezon (1940b:289) argued: This concept of the need of a majority and minority party is as wrong as saying that in order that a home may be governed well, it is necessary that there should be fighting all the time in the family. . . . just as it is impossible for a family to be happy or to make progress when there is a division among its members, when father and mother and children are at cross-purposes, so it is impossible for a nation to grow strong and accomplish great ends if the people are always divided, if they are taught to believe that patriotism means division. In a partyless democracy, Quezon contended the fiscalizers are the press, organizations like the Civil Liberties Union, and universities like the University of the Philippines. There is no need for an opposition to fiscalize. As Quezon (1940b:289) remarked, “. . . as far as the ‘fiscalizing’ of the opposition is concerned, it makes no more effect on me than a dog barking at the moon.” Is partyless democracy feasible?4 Quezon argued it is not impossible, but for it to be feasible it must presuppose (1) an educated citizenry where the vast masses of the people are endowed with more than ordinary virtues that will enable them to take interest in the political affairs of the nation; (2) an independent and honest press and radio service, neither controlled by the government nor by a special interest group; and (3) a community with the same national ideals—without privileged classes. Church-State Relationship Jesus Christ himself enunciated the church-state separation doctrine when Christ replied to those who asked whether they should pay taxes to the Roman government in order to show him as a false prophet: “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s.” Ever since the American rule, under the Jones Act and the Commonwealth constitution, the separation of church and state and the freedom of worship had been guaranteed. Quezon likewise accepted the doctrine of separation of church and state. Quezon (1936e, 1938c:183) argued that as an individual he worships his God, but as a head of state he has “no more to do with the Catholic Church than [he] can with a Protestant denomination, the Aglipayan, the Mohammedan, or any other religious organization or sect in the Philippines.” Though an ecclesiastic as a citizen can exercise his right to express his opinion on any public issue, he is not permitted by law as an authority of the religious organization, Church or Faith, “to try to influence the Government or any of its branches, in the determination of its policies.” The separation of church and state will safeguard religious liberty (Quezon 1938b:178; 1938c:182). Local Governments Quezon believed that in order to serve the common good, appointive city government officials must be preferred to elective ones so that local governments can be freed from the influence of partisan politics and thereby ensure efficiency and impartiality in the administration and execution of laws and ordinances. The city council should remain elective, however, apparently to enable the local people to exercise their right of suffrage on the city level. The appointive city mayor and even the appointive municipal board began as early as the time of the American commissioners when Manila and Baguio had appointive officials. In the United States the City of Washington was governed by a board appointed by the United States president and the city residents did not vote on a presidential election. During the French Republic, the prefects or provincial governors were appointive. In addition to Manila and Baguio, the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga, and Davao had appointive officials. When Quezon became the Commonwealth president, he added some cities with appointive local officials.5 National Political Institutions

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Quezon believed in the efficacy of a republican government consisting of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the three branches of government from each other, Quezon argued, are intended precisely for the protection of the rights and liberties of the people. It is the duty of every branch of government not only to perform its functions under the constitution but to check each other from misusing its constitutional powers. The Executive The president is the chief executive. Civilian authority in government is supreme and the military must be under it. Since the chief executive has distinct duties and responsibilities under the constitution, he cannot delegate them to another person or to other branches of government. The president who leaves his country for an official business should continue to assume his responsibility and exercise his executive powers. This should not be interpreted as the president’s lack of confidence in the vice president. If prior to the Commonwealth the governor general left his duties and responsibilities to the vice governor, it was because they were appointive officials whose main function was to carry out the policies of the U. S. president. So it did not matter whether the one who carried it out was the governor general or the vice governor. In the case of the Commonwealth, however, or in many democratic countries abroad, Quezon argued that the chief executive should continue to exercise his powers even when he travels abroad. There are at least three precedents of this in the United States: (1) When President Theodore Roosevelt visited Panama and the Canal zone, the vice president was not the acting president, since the president continued to exercise his executive powers while in another territory; (2) when President Woodrow Wilson took part in the deliberations over the Treaty of Versailles in Europe, neither the vice president nor any member of his Cabinet acted as president in his stead; and (3) when President Franklin D. Roosevelt went to Buenos Aires he continued to exercise his executive powers. Even in Europe, Quezon said, or in countries under constitutional monarchies, the prime ministers who left their countries did not delegate to any Cabinet member the power individually conferred upon them. Quezon then set some guidelines for the vice president and the Cabinet to follow in cases where the president leaves the country: (a) the Cabinet will function freely and normally in the president’s absence, and whenever his approval is needed, it can be obtained by cable; (b) the Cabinet under the chairmanship of the vice president is authorized to receive questions submitted to it, except questions of national policy which will first be submitted to the president for consultation before the Cabinet decides on them; (c) the vice president will represent the president in all acts and occasions in which the latter should be present, that is, the former should be the head of government only in this regard; (d) the Cabinet should consult the vice president on questions, which during the president’s presence, are usually referred to the president, but if no decision is reached, the vice president should submit the discussion to the president for his consideration and decision; and (e) the secretary to the president will continue to sign papers by order of the president. The Legislative The legislative may pass measures that the executive recommends and in certain cases it may increase the presidential powers as in authorizing the president to exercise emergency powers. In this sense, the cooperation of the legislative is vital to an executive in the successful realization of government goals. Quezon favored a bicameral legislature. In countries where the unicameral system prevails, Quezon (1939e:251) said, it is viewed as an experiment. He likewise favored the Senate to be elected at large in that (1) it would represent the nation’s interests; (2) it would offer “greater opportunity for the formation of national leaders;” (3) it would have a nationwide electoral campaign based on principles and not on personalities in that the candidates are nominated by national political parties; and (4) it would improve the impeachment procedure in the sense that while the House would initiate the proceedings, the Senate would try and pass judgment on the charges. During Quezon’s time the National Assembly served as the Commission on Impeachment which simultaneously initiated and passed judgment on impeachment cases.

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The Judiciary No man is above the law. In order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, Quezon (1936a:35-36) said that it is important to provide “security of tenure and compensation of . . . judges.” Quezon believed that the success of government depends to a large extent on the administration of justice. It is necessary that the people shall have faith in the courts, in the protection of their rights and liberties. The judiciary regulates the excesses and tempers or the vehemence of the executive and legislative departments. Among the three branches, the judiciary for Quezon is the most powerful: firstly, because the members of the judiciary hold office for life, and secondly because they can render decisions that run counter to public opinion. There is just no way of counteracting or annulling their decision. The executive and legislative powers are subject at all times to the rules and dominions of the people because they do not hold office for life. Quezon (1936a:36) hoped that with its tremendous power, the judiciary would be guided by the “canons of judicial self-restraint.” It is important that the men appointed to run the courts must be of high integrity so that the people would have confidence in the courts. A corrupt and incompetent judiciary renders the common man insecure and helpless. Public Instruction The state, according to Quezon, is duty-bound to maintain a complete and adequate system of public instruction, provide at least free public primary education, and hasten citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools have the responsibility of developing moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and of inculcating vocational efficiency and citizenship duties. In order not to prevent poor gifted young men and women from developing their talent, Quezon believed that the government should create for them a large number of scholarships in all branches of learning. Vocational and agricultural training would be emphasized in the intermediate and high schools. The “instruction would always be in keeping with the economic conditions of each region and of the country as a whole” (Quezon 1936e:48). While the army is for the country’s defense, the schools are for the training of the students for the service of the country. Regarding private education, though Quezon initially did not know whether to abolish it, he ultimately retained it. He created the office of the Director of Private Education. Only those intellectually gifted, Quezon (1939c:230) said, should have the ambition to follow a college or university education. The average student, especially the poor, should be satisfied with a vocational education. He need not be ashamed of it because “the true worth of a man is measured not by a diploma but by his proficiency in his chosen line of work.” Quezon guaranteed that colleges and universities shall enjoy academic freedom, but this does not mean the license to teach antisocial and subversive doctrines. Academic freedom carries with it the imposition of self-restraint: no man is allowed to preach, e.g., theories or philosophies destructive of Filipino democratic patriotism. National Defense Quezon (1935c:14 and 1939a:205) maintained that in general there are two fundamental concerns of the state: (1) to promote the welfare and happiness of the people, and (2) to safeguard their liberty. To achieve the first concern is to afford those “willing to work the opportunity to earn a decent livelihood,” or to promote social justice. The defense of the state is the best way to protect the people’s liberty. If a nation wants to stand alone, Quezon (1937f:145) said, “it must be self-reliant and capable of self-defense.” It must be able to balance its earnings against its expenditures,6 educate the citizens, raise their standard of living comparable to other countries, and develop its natural resources for the benefit of all. Military Training The primary objective of the government in training or educating the Filipinos is not so much “that they may have a means of livelihood,” but so that they “may better serve the nation” (Quezon 1936a:47;

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1939c:233). The Philippine system of military training will be patterned after the citizen army system of Switzerland, i.e., “an army that in time of peace will be devoted exclusively to the arts of peace and agriculture, to industry and trade, to letters and sciences, to every activity that makes progress, for harmony and good will, for human advancement and well-being” (Quezon 1937a:70). The military training will not be limited to the effective use of arms but will include the effective inculcation of civic virtues. The soldiers will be given vocational training to make him self-supporting. Self-Defense The Philippine military is intended only for self-defense. According to Quezon (1935dc:14-15), the goal for military preparation is peace—“permanent peace” or “domestic tranquility.” There are three principles that a plan for national defense must have: (a) that every citizen is obligated to the nation’s defense; (b) that the national security system must provide actual security; and (c) that there is an insistent need for current and future economy. Consistent with the third principle, the country must develop only the army and preclude the development of a naval fleet. As Quezon (1935c:17) said, “our lack of sea power will confirm before the world our earnest intent to develop an army solely for defensive purposes.” To safeguard world peace Quezon (Biedzynski 1990b:88-89) believed in a commonwealth or an association of nations. What was needed in the Philippines after independence was superiority in air power. There was no need for a powerful navy. The thrust of Philippine defense, which was organized without reference to any particular foreign aggressor, is to make it so costly to the invader that this alone will serve as a deterrent. To quote Quezon (1937a:74): “Conquest, in our materialistic age, is only motivated by national self-interest. We are then amply protected if our defense is sufficiently strong to give no inducement to the greedy.” International Treaties Quezon (Rodriguez 1940;107) believed in the efficacy of international treaties as in Philippine neutralization, but he would not rely on them exclusively for national defense. As he said, “I am not opposed to the neutralization of the Philippines. I simply say it is not enough. The neutralization of Switzerland has been effective because Switzerland had trained its citizens to bear arms.” Even if the country cannot be protected, Quezon would still go ahead with his defense program because he would not renounce voluntarily the people’s birthright to be free and independent. As he (1937a:74) said: This right I deem the greatest, the most sacred right of every people, and would not abjectly surrender it. I would fight a desperate, a losing fight to defend it. We might be vanquished but we would keep our self-respect: we would at least show that our people deserve to be free because they love freedom and love it enough to accept the supreme sacrifice for it. Foreign Relations During the Commonwealth Philippine foreign relations during the Commonwealth were under the control and supervision of the United States. The American government had likewise the final say on tariff, currency legislation, and other financial matters. Our task, Quezon (1935a:6) said, is “to lay the foundations for our future relations with foreign nations,” by promoting friendly relations with them and by being mindful of their rights. As such, he went on, we must initiate both political and trade relations with other countries by training our diplomatic corps in American legations and embassies with permission of the U. S. Department of State. After Independence After having attained the full stature of independence, Quezon affirmed that the Philippine foreign policy would be fair and just to all nations, without granting special privileges to anyone and without seeking one for ourselves. Since we are in and must live with the world, Quezon believed our national

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policies must be devised, adopted, and executed in accordance with the realities of the current state of international relationship. In cases of conflict, the Philippines is “willing to submit to arbitration or to an international court for the adjudication of any and all controversies that may arise” between itself and other countries (Quezon 1939c:231). CONCLUSION Quezon succeeded in obtaining some legislations on autonomy or ultimate independence that laid down the foundations of Philippine independence by using the first strand of his political philosophy. He likewise succeeded as Commonwealth president in ensuring to a large extent the foundations of a forthcoming independent republic by using the second strand. The havoc that the Japanese occupation caused on the Filipino psyche may have somehow waylaid the thinking of some of our Filipino leaders during the Third Republic, but a retracing of our political bearings during the Commonwealth may probably help the present generation in correctly plotting 7 its future political directions. NOTES 1. Paper presented during the “Symposium on Filipino Political Thought: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives” on 4 March 1992 at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila. It was sponsored by the Philippine Political Science Association, the Philippine National Historical Society, and the Institute of Social History of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. An earlier version of the first strand of Quezon’s political philosophy was published as “A second look at the Janus-faced Quezon” (Gripaldo 1992:13-17). 2. Theodore Friend (1969) and Michael Paul Onorato (1972). They have also a number of articles published in Philippine Studies, Solidarity, Journal of Asian Studies, Historical Bulletin, Bulletin of American Historical Collection, Filipinas, and Philippine Historical Review, among others. The view generally perpetuated in these works is that Quezon was double-faced or insincere in the sense we have identified, i.e., publicly in favor of independence before the Filipinos and privately against complete independence before the Americans. 3. According to Quezon (1936c:45), the political philosophy embodied in the U. S. Declaration of Independence has two versions: those of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. It is, however, the latter version—the primacy of the individual’s interest over that of the state—which has been followed, except perhaps in the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Second World War. 4. Ricardo Pascual (1952, passim) tried to demonstrate the feasibility of partyless democracy in his book entitled Partyless democracy. 5. Quezon did not think of increasing “his direct control over local politics by the creation of chartered cities whose mayors and councilors became executive appointees,” as Alfred W. McCoy alleged. Certainly, Americans did not have this in mind when they created chartered cities in the Philippines and the United States. Quezon avowed that he intended to serve the common good by freeing some local government officials from the influence of partisan politics through appointments. The point here is that McCoy did not have evidence for his allegations. 6. Earlier when there was a need for more money than what was available, especially in implementing the defense program of the government, Quezon (1936d:50) felt a deficit budgeting was necessary. Since American Commissioner Francis Sayre wanted a balanced budget, succeeding speeches of Quezon carried this imposition of Sayre. 7. We may not agree with some of Quezon’s ideas. The point of this paper, however, is not to critically examine Quezon’s philosophy, but to show how his philosophy has tried to accomplish its dual objective of (1) obtaining a measure of political autonomy that would enable us (2) to lay down the foundations of an independent republic.

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Biedzynski, James C. 1990a. The McIntyre-Quezon conversations of 1913-14. Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 18. __________. 1990b. Quezon’s views on post-war Philippine-American relations. Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 18. De Joya, M. H. 1940. Dominion form of government or Canadian political system. Tribune, 28 March. Curry, Roy Watson. 1954. Woodrow Wilson and Philippine policy. Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41. Friend, Theodore. 1969. Between two empires. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House. Gripaldo, Rolando M. 1992. A second look at the Janus-faced Quezon. Pantas 5. McCoy, Alfred W. 1989. Quezon’s Commonwealth: The emergence of Philippine authoritarianism. In Philippine colonial democracy. Edited by Ruby R. Paredes. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Onorato, Michael Paul. 1972. A brief review of American interest in Philippine development and other essays. Manila: MCS Enterprises. Pascual, Ricardo R. 1952. Partyless democracy. Quezon City: University of the Philippines. Quezon, Manuel L. 1914. Letter to Erving Winslow. 19 January. Quezon Papers, Philippine National Library, Manila, ser. V. __________. 1914. Letter to Woodrow Wilson. 11 February. Quezon Papers, ser. V. __________. 1915. Letter to Ruibi Tanaka. 19 February. Quezon Papers, ser. VI. __________. 1935a. Accepting nomination as president of the Philippines. 20 July. In President Quezon: his biographical sketch, messages and speeches. Edited by Eulogio E. Rodriguez. Manila: Publishers, 1940. [Henceforth PQBMS]. __________. 1935b. Inaugural address. 15 November [PQBMS]. __________. 1935C. National defense: First National Assembly message. 25 November [PQBMS]. __________. 1936a. An honest and efficient judiciary. 28 March [PQBMS]. __________. 1936b. Good and efficient government. 17 April 1936 [PQBMS]. __________. 1936c. Changes in government and political philosophy. 22 May [PQBMS]. __________. 1936d. Functioning of the government. 4 June [PQBMS]. __________. 1936e. Separation of church and state. 4 September. In Primera asamblea nacional, tercer periodo de sesiones. Camilo Osias Papers, Philippine National Library. __________. 1937a. The Philippine national defense. 18 Jaunuary [PQBMS]. __________. 1937b. Status of the Commonwealth and national defense. 20 February [PQBMS]. __________. 1937c. Philippine constitution and policies of the Commonwealth government. 3 April [PQBMS]. __________. 1937d. Woman suffrage and Philippine independence. 4 April [PQBMS]. __________. 1937e. Appointments and elections: The civil service law. 29 September [PQBMS]. __________. 1937f. Philippine Army Air Corps. 30 October [PQBMS]. __________. 1937g. Separation of powers, Franco hymn, and national language. 7 November [PQBMS]. __________. 1937h. Filipino national language. 30 December [PQBMS]. __________. 1938a. Social justice and taxation. 24 Jaunuary [PQBMS]. __________. 1938b. Amendment of the election law recommended. 26 July [PQBMS]. __________. 1938c. On the separation of church and state. 30 July [PQBMS]. __________. 1938d. U.S. flag brought new concept to orient. 14 August [PQBMS]. __________. 1938e. New nationalism. 20 August [PQBMS]. __________. 1939a. Making democracy work. 28 January [PQBMS]. __________. 1939b. University of the Philippines commencement address. 4 April [PQBMS]. __________. 1939c. Social justice, national defense related. 4 April [PQBMS]. __________. 1939d. Peace based on social justice: Rice festival speech. 18 July [PQBMS]. __________. 1939e. Constitutional amendment. 16 August [PQBMS]. __________. 1939f. Evils of partisanship. 19 August [PQBMS]. __________. 1939g. Men and women share citizenship equally. 30 October [PQBMS]. __________. 1939h. Need for Philippine unity. 2 November [PQBMS]. __________. 1939i. Nationalization of the retail trade. 15 November [PQBMS]. __________. 1940a. Essence of democracy. 16 July. In Partyless democracy. Edited by Ricardo R. Pascual. 1952. Quezon City: University of the Philippines. __________. 1940b. A partyless government in a democracy. 7 August. In Partyless democracy. Edited by Ricardo Pascual. 1952. Quezon City: University of the Philippines.

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Recto, Claro M. 1979. The political philosophy of Manuel Luis Quezon. In Quezon: Thoughts and anecdotes about him and his flights. Edited by Juan F. Rivera. Quezon City: By the Editor. Rodriguez, Eulogio E., ed. 1940. President Quezon: His Biographical Sketch, messages and speeches. Manila: Publishers. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1984. Of the social contract. Edited and translated by Charles M. Sherover. New York: Harper and Row. Salamanca, Bonifacio. 1968. The Filipino reaction to American rule. Hamden: Shoestring Press. Schurman, Jacob. 1912. Letter to William Jones. 7 May. Quezon Papers, ser. V. Schimer, Daniel B. and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds. 1987. The Philippine reader. Quezon City: KEN. Tarling, Nicholas. 1977. Quezon and the British commonwealth. Australian Journal of Politics and History 23. Wheeler, Gerald. 1963. Manuel Quezon and independence for the Philippines: Some qualifications. U.P. Research Digest 2.

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