Principal Approaches to Counterinsurgency

Principal Approaches to Counterinsurgency

A Chronic Desire to Categorise Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN) The uprising in Syria and the insurgency in Turkey have revived the stimulus for the study of the phenomena of insurgency and COIN. Despite the ostensibly modern character of such conflicts that pertain to the sphere of unorthodox warfare, numerous treatises and monographs have cogently substantiated that insurgency and COIN constitute essentially old phenomena that have manifested themselves throughout the history of warfare: from the rebellion of Sertorius in the Iberian Peninsula in the 1st century B.C. to the insurgency of the Viet Cong in Vietnam in the 20th century A.D.1. The occurrence of the phenomena for thousands of years has instigated academics and nonacademics to categorise and analyse them. However, any oversimplifying classification of insurgencies and COINs -which tend to exhibit an intrinsic heterogeneity in character- only from their operational or tactical perspectives would threaten to overlook the unique historical and political context in which each of the aforementioned phenomena has originated and evolved2. Applying a modicum of caution, the most prevalent strategic responses to the insurgent threats could be studied carefully without de-contextualising the conflicts. After all, the importance of context in the study of war cannot be underestimated3. A. General Characteristics of the Phenomena: Wars Amongst the People4 Insurgency: The Struggle for Population Control

Like every type of war according to the Clausewitzian paradigm5, insurgency possesses an undisputable political quality. Paraphrasing the much-celebrated Prussian general’s classical

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For an analytical exposition of the aforesaid observation, see: Antony J. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood Press, 1996); John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-revolutionary Warfare, from the Romans to the Present (London: Greenhill, 1995); Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977); Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975). 2 Michael L. R. Smith, “Holding Fire: Strategic Theory and the Missing Military Dimension in the Academic Study of Northern Ireland”, in Terrorism’s Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland, edited by Alan O’Day (Aldershot: Dartmouth Press, 1995), 231; Michael L.R. Smith: “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare”, Review of International Studies 29, No. 1, (2003): 23. 3 Colin S. Gray, “Recognizing and Understanding the Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context”, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, (February 2006),15-28. 4 The phrase “wars amongst the people” has been borrowed from the book of Rupert Smith (Sir), The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 3.

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dictum, the journalist Robert Taber remarked pointedly that “Guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict”6. Despite the confusion that surrounds this dynamic and evolving phenomenon, its defining characteristics can be presented succinctly. In irregular warfare, and its sub-category insurgency, the non-state adversary employs a non-regular modus operandi, by exploiting time in particular, against an superior state opponent in a strategy of exhaustion with the aim of obtaining the acquiescence, if not the assistance, of the local population; crucial variables such as intelligence, culture, and ideology determine critically such contests of inherent political nature for the local population’s support and, eventually, control7. Otherwise stated, insurgencies result essentially in what could be termed as “divided or overlapping sovereignties” over the local population8, the majority of whom remains non-partisan throughout the conflict until coerced or convinced otherwise by either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents9.

Counterinsurgency: The Struggle for Population Control II

The centrality of population support for the success of either insurgents or counterinsurgents conditions the policies of the counterinsurgents. On both theoretical and practical levels, the insurgents preoccupy themselves with doctrinal questions, such as the “when” and “how” to open hostilities in order to acquire the vital control of the population; on the contrary, the counter-insurgents encounter the dilemma of whether to apply “coercion” or “persuasion” in their distinct effort to retain control over the local population10. The counterinsurgents, based on assumptions for the causes of the insurgency, have endeavoured to properly identify and overthrow the reputed “centre of gravity” of the insurgents. David Kilcullen, a profuse Australian scholar on the subject of irregular warfare, observed astutely that two principal approaches on COIN have emerged over the centuries: the “enemycentric” and the “population-centric”. The “enemy-centric” approach, first in chronological order, has prioritised the physical liquidation of the insurgents as the only requisite for the

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Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 606. 6 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 1972, ppb. 2002), 26. 7 Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare, One Nature, Many Characters”, Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, No. 2, (2007): 43-44. 8 Alexander B. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counter-Insurgent Strategy”, Civil Wars 9, No. 4, (2007): 420-444. 9 Tom Marks, “Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 3, No. 1, (1992): 43. 10 John Shy and Thomas Collier, “Revolutionary War”, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 820

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eventual atrophy of an insurgency11. Contrariwise, the “population-centric” approach offers an antithetic solution to the insurgent quandary. Perceiving the insurgents as non-state actors who manipulate the regional population’s genuine resentment, that approach advocates the out-manoeuvring and marginalisation of the insurgents through the implementation of socioeconomic and politico-ideological policies; ideally, circumspect security operations would prevent the progress of the insurgents in seizing control of the local population, while at the same time meticulous reforms would separate the insurgents from their “centre of gravity”, their popular sympathisers12. The second principal approach, the “population-centric” paradigm, could be further divided into two sub-categories based on assumptions for the insurgents’ popular appeal: the first subcategory underscores the parameter of “coercion” in relation to the counterinsurgent policies towards the population, and the second on “consent”. The predominant approaches to COIN will be analysed succinctly along with the theoretical and practical debates attached to each approach.

B. The Two Principal Schools of Thought in Counterinsurgency

B1. The Enemy-Centric Approach

The “enemy-centric” approach, though only recently conceptualised as a term and strategy in COIN, practically monopolised the past history of COIN. As a matter of fact, the vicious suppression of rebellions and revolutions in the distant -and even recent- past was the rule rather than the exception13. Essentially, that offensive-orientated paradigm perceives and reacts against the insurgent threat on terms of conventional warfare14. The most prominent representative of the “enemy-centric” approach, Charles Callwell, wrote a treatise on the so-called “small wars” at the apex of colonialism in the early 20th century. Arguing that “tactics favour the regular army, while strategy favours the enemy”, the British army officer synopsised the principal objective of the counter-insurgents: the prompt and resolute annihilation of the irregular enemy through the pursuit, and even imposition, of the decisive engagement, in which the counterinsurgents’ technological and organisational 11

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: C. Hurst, 2009), xv. 12 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, xv. 13 Beatrice D. Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 422-427; Laquer: Guerrilla, 3-49. 14 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, xv; David Kilcullen: “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency”, Small Wars Journal Blog, January 27, 2007, Accessed September 7, 2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency.

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superiority would be used effectively15. Permeated by the racist attitudes of the colonial period, Callwell advocated the devastation of the opponents’ resources and sanctuaries in order to subdue adversaries without any tangible “centre of gravity” to overthrow militarily16. Despite the pioneering character of his work, Callwell offered a less doctrinal and more organisational approach to the “small wars”; the British officer scorned the political character of the insurgent threat and ignored the humanitarian catastrophe incurred upon the local populations, who according to his Victorian worldview were destined to be conquered by the European Great Powers17. “Enemy-Centric” and Regime Type Interestingly enough, the “enemy-centric” approach spotlights the perplexing relationship between the type of a regime and the prospects of success in COIN. Since arguably “COIN mirrors the state” that conducts it18, the military-oriented and offensive-intensive “enemycentric” approach constitutes apparently the preferable weapon of undemocratic regimes to quell resistance with an enviable record of success19. Contrary to such overstated expectations from the proponents of the “regime-type” theory, the hypothesis has yet to succeed in the empirical test of validity20. The authoritarian regimes have not proved in principle more successful than liberal democracies in COIN21, despite the apparent operational and strategic advantages that the autocratic political rule provides the counterinsurgents22. Furthermore, even democracies have employed occasionally “enemy-centric” COIN strategies, as the example of France in Indochina amply evidences.

B2. The Population-Centric Approach: More Sticks Than Carrots

The “population-centric” subcategory that emphasises the application of “coercion” vis-à-vis the local population considers the insurgents as a violent minority that coerces and deceives 15

Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, (London: HMSO, 1906, reprinted by Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 85-91, 97-107 16 Callwell, Small Wars, 40-41 17 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 88; Douglas Porch, introduction to Small Wars, by Callwell, xiv; Ian F. Beckett, “The Study of Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 1, No.1, (1990): 47-48. 18 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), 5-13. 19 Bard E. O’Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington; London: Brassey’s, 1990), 140. 20 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency”, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2010), 51-53. 21 John Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration”, International Organisation 64, No. 1 (2010): 167. ,22 Yuri Zhukov: “Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, No. 3, (2007): 458-460.

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the population’s neutral majority; thus, the state must negate the insurgents’ control on the supposedly tractable population by reversing the insurgents’ own coercive weapon. The most prominent representatives of that variant of the “population-centric” approach wrote their works during the Cold War, a historical period that witnessed the so-called “insurgent era” of almost universal “[people’s] revolutionary wars”23. Essentially, the logic of the theory of the “revolutionary wars” upheld the occurrence of a supposedly modern type of war, in which popular political movements –which were conscious of their “revolutionary” objectives and methods- initiated protracted violent struggles to seize power24. Bernard Fall, a prominent French COIN scholar of the Cold War, associated “revolutionary war” with “guerrilla warfare plus political action”25. Despite the fact numerous studies and conferences during the Cold War contrived elaborate analytical schemes to explain the insurgency’s causes, processes, and outcomes26, the Western world correlated to a great extent the “revolutionary war” with a Communist insurgency. The School of the “Guerre Révolutionnaire” Roget Trinquier, a French colonial officer, epitomised with his works the ascendant school of “guerre révolutionnaire” [“revolutionary war”] in the French COIN theory and practice. Influenced by the anti-colonial struggles in the Third World, Trinquier categorically argued that the “sine-qua-non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population”27. Since the subversives terrorised the local populace to submission, the counterinsurgents must prioritise the obliteration of the “armed clandestine organisation”, the lynchpin of terrorism, by resorting to the implementation of repressive-intensive policies that included even the use of torture28. Intending to permanently thwart the insurgents’ sway over the population, Trinquier prescribed two remedies that were typical of the French COIN practice: the establishment of “parallel tight” organisations to supervise rigidly the vulnerable population and a ubiquitous intelligence service29. Trinquier’s war manual suffered, however, from the syndrome of self-mirroring: his prescriptions on the insurgency reflected characteristically his monolithic views on the

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Richard H. Sanger, Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economics, and Social Revolution, (Washington: Potomac Books, 1967). 24 Sam C. Sarkesian, “Introduction” in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Sam. C. Sarkesian (Chicago, Illinois: Precedent Publication, 1975), 7; Shy and Collier, “Revolutionary War”, 817. 25 Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”, Naval War College Review 17, No. 8 (1965): 22. 26 Lawrence Stone, “Theories in Revolution” in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Sarkesian, 27-46. 27 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, transl. Daniel Lee, (New York: Praeger, 1964), 3-5, 6. 28 Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 15-21. 29 Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 27-34.

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insurgency. Attributing the insurgency’s appeal entirely to coercion practised by insurgents, Trinquier resolved to seize control of the ostensibly manipulable population by exercising far more effective coercion30. Trinquier’s work reflected the qualities of the “guerre révolutionnaire” theorists: an association of conservative Rightists, mystical Catholics, and admirers of the French colonial grandeur who devised a coercive-intensive COIN strategy -imbued with an anti-Communist zeal-- and undertook radical policies that unbalanced the sensitive civil-military relations of the French Fourth Republic31. The “Cost-Benefit” Doctrine On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, researchers for the RAND Corporation, advocated the “cost-benefit” COIN doctrine inspired by the deterrence theory of Schelling, which was established in turn on the then popular “game” and “rational choice” theories32. Regarding the populations that underwent a process of modernisation as rationally-motivated players that succumbed to “rebel” terror, they proposed a “contest in the effective management of coercion”33. Ergo, they prescribed a four-staged coercive strategy: Firstly, a watertight “resource quarantine” would prevent the so-called “exogenous inputs” of the insurgency and coercive policies toward the rebel-sympathetic population would reduce the insurgency’s “endogenous inputs”. Secondly, attritional warfare would destabilise the rebel so-called “conversion mechanism” that transformed the insurgency’s “inputs” into “outputs”. Thirdly, an omnipotent intelligence service and a system of rewards-andpunishments for the population and rebels alike would reduce the insurgency’s “outputs”. Fourthly, the transfer of the uncommitted rural population in “strategic hamlets” would impair the rebel’s “revolutionary” strategy34. In spite of the scientific methodology used for the first time in the discourse of COIN, the RAND Corporation researchers committed analytical errors: they assumed the insurgents’ inherent unpopularity and illegitimacy, ascribing their popular receptiveness to the coercion practiced by a violent minority; ergo, they suggested that the “authority” must out-compete the rebels in a contest of coercion for the control of a reputedly malleable population, whose

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Etienne de Durand, “France” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London; New York: Routledge, 2010),17. 31 Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine, (New York: Praeger, 1964), 101-102, 111-122; John S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 216-327, 266-270; Shy and Collier, “Revolutionary War”, 852-854. 32 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 33 Nathan Leites and Charles L. Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, (Chicago: Markham, 1970) 8-16, 29-30, 56, 155. 34 Leites and Wolf: Rebellion and Authority: Analytical, 76-78, 79-83.

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genuine needs and will received minimal attention35. Moreover, coercion did not warrantee theoretically and operationally the deterrence, let alone, the elimination of the insurgents in spite of the logic of their scientific models36.

B3. The Population-Centric Approach: More Carrots Than Sticks

An opposing sub-category of the “population-centric” school of thought, better known as the “hearts and minds” COIN paradigm, emphasises the application of “consent” in obtaining the required popular support. Permeated by a collaboration-incentive rationale, the “hearts and minds” COIN paradigm ascribes the popular appeal of the insurgents to the manipulation of the population’s genuine grievances and emphasises the imperative of redressing the cause of popular rancour. From Machiavelli onwards, circumstantial and superficial conceptualisation of a “hearts and minds” orientation in the discourse of revolution and counter-revolution could be unearthed in the works of prominent European strategic thinkers37. For example, a respected military and diplomatic official of the 16th century Spain, Santa Cruz de Marcenado, wrote the first ever systematic treatise on COIN. Marcenado valued prevention more than cure of the insurgent malady and propounded numerous prescriptions to preclude, or at least contain, any rebellion against authority38. The Tache d’Huile Method Almost four centuries after Marcenado’s work, Joseph Galliéni and Hubert Lyautey, French colonial officers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, elaborated a “pacification” doctrine that epitomised the apogee of French imperialism. They theorised the “tache d’huile” method that has been termed justly a “Colonial RMA”, a revolution in the operational –yet not in the technological, sphere39. 40. Galliéni adumbrated a pacification scheme where authority for the 35

Michael D. Schaffer, “The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency”, Political Science Quarterly 103, No. 1 (1988): 73-74. 36 Richard Schultz, “Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare”, Western Political Quarterly 32, No. 4 (1979): 450-465. 37 Heuser, Evolution of Strategy, 427-428. 38 Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Reflexiones Militares, twenty-one books variously bound, (Turin: Juan Fransisco Mairesse, 1724-1727 and Paris: Simon Langlois, 1730, reprint. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2004), 125-30, in The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz, ed. Beatrice D. Heuser (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2010), 135-136. 39 Christopher Griffin, “A Revolution in Colonial Military Affairs: Gallieni, Lyautey and the Tache d’Huile”, Paper prepared for the 2009 International British Studies Association Conference, Leicester, December 14-16, 2009 40 Joseph-Simon Galliéni, Neuf Ans à Madagascar, (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1908), 47.

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counter-insurgents would expand outwardly from centre to periphery. Static defences in the periphery would quarantine an insurgent-infested geographical zone, while a network of static defences in the interior would extend methodically their territorial scope through a combination of military and non-military methods, primarily the infrastructural and socioeconomic progress for the population41. Galliéni’s disciple, Lyautey, contrived a grandiose version of the “tache d’huile” methodology. Lyautey’s envisioned methods of “progressive occupation” professed that the military, “an organisation that marches”, would use military prowess, offensive propaganda, administrative efficiency, and “economic penetration” to convince the local population of the superiority of the counter-insurgents42. Despite the fact that the French colonial heroes proposed innovatively the knowledge of the “human terrain” (or “idiosyncrasy”)43, they presupposed with the aura of their Victorian supercilious thinking that the insurgents and the insurgent-sympathetic populace ought to be convinced, and coerced sporadically, to submit to an allegedly unstoppable progress engineered by the European Great Powers44. The “Tache d’Huile” Method Revisited In the first decades of the Cold War, the credo of a dawning “age of revolution” in every aspect of human life owning to modernisation induced an explosion of doctrinal publications on the issues of “revolution” and “counter-revolution”45. It is not a haphazard fact that almost all the important COIN theorists, with the exception of Frank Kitson, published their works during 1964-1966. Decades after the innovative works of Galliéni and Lyautey, another French colonial officer named David Galula elaborated additionally on the “tache d’huile” method influenced by its most celebrated apostle, Lyautey46. The recent rediscovery of Galula by the U.S. military and academic establishments influenced profoundly the U.S. Field Manual on COIN47. Galula upheld that the counterinsurgent should identify accurately the insurgency’s stage before devising the appropriate strategy. For “cold revolutionary war”, the period of legal and peaceful activism, Galula prescribed four remedies: a) “direct action” against the insurgent

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Galliéni, Neuf Ans, 45, 326-327. Hubert Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar, 1894-1899, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933), 634639. 43 Lyautey, Lettres de Sud, 249-307; Galliéni, Neuf Ans, 45, 47. 44 Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 393 45 Sam C. Sarkesian, preface in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Sarkesian, xi. 46 Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, The Journal of Strategic Studies 33, No. 5, (2010): 754-755 47 Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army”, Parameters 39, No.3 (2009):11-15 42

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leadership, b) “indirect action” against the insurgency’s prerequisites (attractive cause, weak state authority, propitious geography and external assistance), c) “infiltration” of the insurgent organisation, and d) reinforcement of the state apparatus48. For “hot revolutionary war”, the actual insurgency, he proposed four universal laws. First, popular support is the sine-qua-non for victory. Secondly, the “permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population” brings victory since insurgents represent only an “active minority” that convinces or coerces the population’s neutral majority. Thirdly, popular support depends cardinally on the provision of security by the state, an assignment that precedes the implementation of any political and socio-economic reforms. Fourthly, “intensity of efforts and vastness of means” guarantees success49. Unlike other influential theorists of “guerre révolutionnaire”, Galula refrained from uttering an anti-communist hysteria or obsession with control. Although Galula’s prescriptions have been highly valued by the U.S. military, his theory revealed a propensity for a centralised and paternalistic authority, evident in the numerous categorised principles. The prescription for “more government” may not, however, translate absolutely into “better government” when the government behaves illegitimately or abusively in the eyes of the population’s neutral majority50. The U.S. Counterinsurgent Era John McCuen, an American military officer, codified Washington’s version of the “hearts and minds” COIN paradigm at a time when the study of “revolutionary wars” had been upgraded to the centre of the U.S. national strategy51. Influenced by the theories of Mao, the prophet of worldwide revolution, McCuen recognised four typical stages in an insurgency (organisation, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare), and radically propositioned the application of the “revolutionary strategy and principles in reverse”52. McCuen advocated five universal principles that could be employed invariably in “revolutionary” and “counter-revolutionary war”: the prompt liquidation of the opponent, the securing of the “base areas”, the obtainment of the vital popular support, the elicitation of foreign intervention in support of the state, and the application of unity of effort; naturally, the aforesaid principles should be implemented

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David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York; London: Prager, 1964), 44-47. 49 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 52-54, 54-55. 50 Schaffer, “Unlearned Lessons”, 68. 51 Frederick J. Swartzm “Doctrines of Defeat, La Guerre Révolutionnaire and Counterinsurgency Warfare”, (MA Thesis, Indiana University, 1992), 58-68. 52 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: the Strategy of Counter-insurgency, (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 30-39, 78-80.

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holistically in the context of an COIN strategy that has been “tailored” specifically to each stage of the insurgency53. McCuen’s writings reflected, however, the self-conceited analysis of the Cold War as an era of universal and inescapable “revolutionary wars” in the Third World –reputedly due to the dynamic advent of modernisation- that the Soviet Union either masterminded or strived to manipulate54. Attributing the success of the insurgents only to their excellence in propaganda, coercion, and organisation, McCuen proposed the inverted appliance of “revolutionary strategy” to control the supposedly vulnerable and malleable populations; hence the terminological jargon on COIN that revealed an “obsession with administering and manipulating the masses”, which ignored the population’s genuine needs55. The British School of COIN Britain vaunts to possess an enviable record of victories in “small wars”56, spanning from the age of “imperial policing” to the époque of colonial “emergencies” as the British military’s structure and rationale predisposed critically a British distinctive response to the insurgent threats57. Sir Frank Kitson, an British senior officer with experience in the insurgencies of the decolonisation era, synopsised the four cardinal principles for COIN: a) establish a militarycivil “coordinating machinery at every level”, b) obstruct the insurgents from winning “the war for the minds of the people”, c) and d) institute “an intelligence organisation...and a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment”58. Sir Robert Thompson, another seminal British theorist and practitioner on COIN, summarised the British classical approach to COIN in a five-principled paradigm: a) engineer “a clear political aim” that warrantees a state’s politico-economic survivability as well as stability, b) “function in accordance with law”, c) devise “an overall plan” that encompasses integrated civil-military operations, d) assign “priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas”, and e) “secure ... base areas first” during the guerrilla phase59. Though attractive on the surface, the British COIN perspective occasionally exhibited a discrepancy between the COIN theory and practice, as the case of the Kenyan Emergency demonstrates; moreover,

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McCuen, The Art, pp.50-76. Schaffer, “Unlearned Lessons”, 59-61 55 Eqbal Ahmad, “Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency”, in National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World, ed. Norman Miller and Roderick Aya (New York: Free Press, 1971),185-186. 56 Thomas R. Mockaitis: “Low Intensity Conflict: The British Experience”, Conflict Quarterly 13, No. 1, (1993): 8 57 Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture”, Military Review 85, No. 3, (2005): 53; Mockaitis, “Low Intensity Conflict”, 11 58 Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 290-291. 59 Robert Thompson (Sir), Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, (London: Macmillan, 1987), 50-58. 54

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the prescribed reinforcement of the state’s political apparatus could prove unsuccessful when an authority exhibited illegitimate and abusive behaviour toward the population it supposedly protects from insurgent coercion60. The Dominance of the “Hearts and Minds” Paradigm Nowadays, the “population-centric” COIN paradigm has prevailed both doctrinally and theoretically in the military and academic establishments of the Western world. In general terms, the theorists of the “hearts and minds” approach have repeatedly prioritised prevention of over response to an insurgent menace61. In case prevention fails, the “population-centric” theorists generally agree that the counterinsurgents, irrespective of their regime type62, should react promptly and resolutely63 under the direction of sound intelligence64 in order to contain and suppress the insurgency. Moreover, culture determines significantly the counterinsurgent responses to the insurgent threat65. The “population-centric” approach advocates the employment of selective violence as the catalyst for success. Stathis Kalyvas, a prolific scholar on the subject of civil wars, reviewed systematically the copious literature on civil wars and uncovered that indiscriminate violence caused counterproductive results66. It should be noted, however, that indiscriminate violence does occur, and occasionally, does bring victory under very specific conditions67. Notwithstanding the advantages of the “population-centric” approach, that COIN paradigm has been reprimanded for ignoring or oversimplifying the war’s coercive parameter68. As a matter of fact, a balanced, or situation-dependent, approach in COIN would prove suitable for

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Schaffer, “Unlearned Lessons”, 69-70. Alan J. Vick et al., “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions”, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 2006), 70—74. 62 Michel J. Engelhardt, “Democracies, Dictatorships and Counter-insurgency: Does Regime Type Really Matter?”, Conflict Quarterly 12, No. 3, (1992): 58. 63 Eric Jardine: “Why Time Works Against a Counterinsurgency”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11, No. 4 (2009): 1-34 64 David J. Clark, “The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations”, (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006). 65 Marc R. DeVore:“Institutions, Culture and Counterinsurgency Operations: Why Do States Fight Similar Insurgencies Differently?”, Paper presented at the 2011 Meeting of the International Studies Association, 3-10, Accessed September 7, 2012. 66 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press), 151-160. 67 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, pp.160-171; Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul Huth and Dylan BalchLindsay, “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare”, International Organization 58, No.2, (2004): 375-407. 68 Gentile: “A Strategy of Tactics”, 11-15; Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino, Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?: Three Monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011). 61

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diverse types or even phases of insurgent threats69. In general a wavering population will obey that minority which employs effectively four principal weapons: coercive force, economic incentive and disincentive, legitimizing ideology, [traditional] authority”70.

C. The Challenge of the Modern Era

New Insurgencies in the Post-Cold War Environment? While the Cold War’s termination definitely closed the chapter of “[people’s] revolutionary wars”, a new chapter opened at the same time for insurgency, arguably the most prevalent type of warfare at the dawn of the 21st century71. Modern variables, offshoots of a process of globalisation with a Protean character, have transformed the insurgency’s character in ways that revived academic interest on this critical subject72. According to the proponents of the radical “new insurgencies” theory, the insurgencies of the modern époque have superseded the so-called “classic insurgencies” of the Cold War as the manifestation of far more complex war phenomena73. The most ardent supporters of the theory have proceeded to announce that even “new wars” have reputedly arisen74. Concurrent with the “new insurgencies” theory, the modern insurgent threats require updated or even ultramodern COIN doctrines75. The “Three-Pillar” Model Kilcullen epitomised the modern school of thought influenced heavily by the War on Terror. He argued that, contrary to the “classical” archetype, a “contemporary insurgency” exhibited 69

Nathan R. Springer, “Stabilising the Debate between Population-Centric and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach”, (MA Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 38. 70 Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition”, Military Review 86, No. 1, (2006):13. 71 John R. Galvin, “Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era” in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.): Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, (Boulder, Colo; Oxford: Westview, 1992), p.61; Bard E. O’Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 2-8. 72 John Mackinley, Globalisation and Insurgency, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002). 73 Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency, (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 1993), 11-16; Steven Sloan: “The Changing Face of Insurgency in the Post-Cold War Era: Doctrinal and Operational Implications” in Saving Democracies: U.S. Interventions in Threatened Democratic States, ed. Anthony J. Joes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 67-80. 74 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Organised Violence in Globalised Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2004). 75 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising Threat and Response (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), 16-18; Max G. Manwaring, “The New Global Security Landscape: The Road Ahead” in Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, ed. Robert J. Bunker, (London: Routledge, 2005), 32-34.

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an apolitical, non-revolutionary, reactive character while the informational and technological quantum leaps have remedied the insurgents’ structural weaknesses76. Adopting a “strategy of disaggregation”, the counterinsurgent would isolate and minimise the violence of the substate challengers within a chaotic “conflict ecosystem” by “marginalising and out-competing” the non-state players in a contest for population control77. Kilcullen propounded a “three pillar” COIN doctrine with “a base (information), three pillars (security, political, economic) and a roof (control)”, while the principles of “effectiveness” and “legitimacy” permeate throughout the theoretical structure78. The Persistent Importance of the Old Wisdom The “new insurgency” thesis suffers, however, from a faddism similar to the “revolutionary war” vogue of the Cold War. Insurgency, “an essentially political problem and a contest for legitimacy”, emanates from the genuine, albeit occasionally manipulated, grievances of the population; therefore, the phenomenon of globalisation caused new grievances, which in turn produced original and reinforced, surprisingly, older patterns of insurgency79. The use, and abuse, of innovative terminology for the “new insurgencies” vogue could, in essence, create confusion rather than cognitive clarity80. The insights extracted from the works of the former COIN theorists and practitioners could be revised instead of being outright rejected81; after all, COIN theory has produced far more constructive results as a positive critique of the precedent COIN theoretical models rather than as an uncritical regurgitation of previous COIN axioms82. The prescriptions of previous COIN theorists should be studied within their unique historical context lest their true meaning should be impaired83. Last but not least, it should be emphasised that the true nature of war remains unchanged even after the Cold War as the renowned Prussian general had averred centuries earlier 84. 76

David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux”, Survival 48, No. 4, (2006/2007):112-114. David Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency”, Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., September 28, 2006, Accessed September 7, 2011, 3, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf 78 Kilcullen, “Three Pillars”, 4. 79 Ian F.W. Beckett: “The Future of Insurgency”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, No.1 (2005): 33-34. 80 Smith, “Guerrillas”, 20; Gray, “Irregular Warfare”, 36-38. 81 Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?”, Parameters 37, No. 2, (2007): 84-85; Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare”, Parameters 34, No. 1, (2004): 28. 82 David H. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency and its Discontents: Assessing the Value of an Divisive Concept”, (SWR Research Paper, Berlin, April 2011), 15, http://swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP06_uck_ks.pdf 83 James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare” in Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. David Jordan et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 264-265. 84 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 145; E.A. Henderson and J. D. Singer, “‘New Wars’ and Rumours of ‘New Wars’”, International Interactions 28, No.2, (2002): 171-172. 77

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