Political entrepreneurs, clientelism, and civil society: supply-side politics in Turkey

This article was downloaded by: [Skidmore College], [Feryaz Ocakli] On: 30 March 2015, At: 14:19 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Democratization Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Political entrepreneurs, clientelism, and civil society: supply-side politics in Turkey a

Feryaz Ocakli a

Government Department, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, USA Published online: 27 Mar 2015.

Click for updates To cite this article: Feryaz Ocakli (2015): Political entrepreneurs, clientelism, and civil society: supply-side politics in Turkey, Democratization, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1013467 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1013467

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Democratization, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1013467

Political entrepreneurs, clientelism, and civil society: supply-side politics in Turkey Downloaded by [Skidmore College], [Feryaz Ocakli] at 14:19 30 March 2015

Feryaz Ocakli

∗

Government Department, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, USA (Received 12 June 2014; accepted 27 January 2015) How do citizens in developing democracies launch political careers? Despite the large literature on electoral politics in developing countries, we know surprisingly little about how individuals become political candidates. This article examines an important mechanism of political recruitment in developing democracies: party-civil society organization (CSO) linkages. Existing theories treat CSOs as arenas of civic participation rather than as political agents in their own right, which leads scholars to overlook their impact on electoral competition. This article argues that the distinct resource portfolios of CSOs influence their relative impact on candidate selection, and consequently, local politics. CSOs that represent the material interests of their constituents, such as resource-rich business groups and vote-rich identity groups, have significant influence over candidate selection. Issueoriented CSOs tend to have less impact. Party-CSO relations often facilitate clientelist linkages between parties and voters, weakening democratic governance. Evidence is provided with an in-depth case study of CSOpolitical party relations in the industrial periphery of Istanbul, Turkey. Keywords: civil society; Turkey; AKP; supply-side politics; clientelism; devout bourgeoisie; migration

Democracy requires that all citizens have equal access not only to the ballot box, but also to the ballot. Despite the large and growing literature on electoral politics in developing countries, we know relatively little about how individuals launch political careers. This article explores an important mechanism whereby individuals in developing countries join the electoral process as candidates. Civil society organizations (CSOs) “supply” new politicians to parties, and advocate for their nomination to political office. However, party-CSO relations do not always bolster democratic governance. CSOs often act as conduits for clientelist ∗

Email: [email protected]

# 2015 Taylor & Francis

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bargains between parties and voters. The relations between parties and CSOs influence the quality of democracy in multiple, and often contradictory, directions. This article examines the causes and consequences of party-CSO linkages in the context of local politics in developing democracies. Parties discriminate between different CSOs when placing their members on the ballot. What explains the CSOs’ varying impact on candidate selection? This article argues that the distinct resource portfolios of CSOs influence their relative impact on candidate selection. Political parties often seek to cooperate with associations and organizations that improve their odds of winning at the ballot box. CSOs that represent the material interests of their constituents, such as resource-rich business groups and vote-rich hometown associations, have significant influence over candidate selection. Alternatively, issue-based CSOs do not have as much influence on local politics. Parties that wish to maximize their votes engage in a cost-benefit analysis when apportioning the tickets they can provide to CSO members. As a result, material interests trump ideational considerations in the relationship between parties and civil society organizations. To isolate the impact of CSOs on electoral contestation, this article focuses on a case where civil society is considered weak by traditional standards: Turkey. Turkish civil society lacks broad-based citizen participation.1 However, CSOs play an important role in local politics. In the industrial periphery of Istanbul, CSO-party linkages have resulted in the emergence of a host of new politicians, who could not have otherwise joined the political candidate pool. These political entrepreneurs, or resourceful aspiring politicians capable of changing the direction and flow of politics,2 play significant roles in party-voter linkages at the local level. Despite the low levels of overall civic participation, some CSOs enjoy far-reaching political influence by linking together parties, political entrepreneurs, and voters. The empirical findings come from extensive fieldwork in the industrial periphery of Istanbul. Over 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with civil society leaders and activists, local party officials, and local journalists during five field trips between 2007 and 2014. All interviews were conducted and translated by the author. In addition, more than 60 hours of observation were conducted in the local offices of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – AKP), the secularist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), and multiple CSOs, as well as conversations with their officials and activists. Evidence from the interviews and observations is supplemented with archival material from local newspapers and limited-access government documents obtained from the sub-provincial governorates of Corlu and Gebze. The findings of this article contribute to the literature on civil society, democratization, and clientelism. First, they demonstrate that CSOs can do more than form horizontal ties; they can create opportunities for political entrepreneurs to run for office. By serving as agents that facilitate political recruitment, CSOs provide opportunities for new politicians to run for office, and for political parties to acquire new human capital. Second, the article brings new evidence to shed

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doubt on the optimistic expectations regarding the relationship between civil society and democratization. It shows that some CSOs deviate from programmatic politics3 and facilitate patron-client relations between parties and voters. This article also speaks to the debate on democratization in Turkey by examining local political dynamics. Studies of Turkish politics tend to focus exclusively on the national level of analysis at the expense of systematic studies of local politics. By examining the role of political parties, CSOs, and political entrepreneurs at the local level, this article expands the scope of the debate on Turkish democracy and political institutions. The article follows with a discussion of the significance of civil society in the existing theories of democratic governance and party-voter linkages. It then offers a framework of the conditions under which civil society organizations can help new actors launch political careers. Following this section is a detailed case study of party-civil society linkages and their impact on democratic governance in Turkey, and, lastly, a conclusion. Civil society and political agency The existing literature offers two competing views of civil society’s impact on political outcomes. The first treats civil society as a sphere distinct from political society, where individuals are endowed with the qualities that make them better citizens. The second considers the associational realm as inseparable from and subordinate to political society. The existing studies are, however, noticeably silent on the “supplyside” of civil society. The role of CSOs in promoting individual political careers has not received attention. Furthermore, the existing theories of party-voter linkages, mainly studies of clientelism, have also paid little attention to the role of CSOs in facilitating nonprogrammatic relations between parties and voters. The neo-Tocquevillian perspective associates the vibrancy of civil society with normatively desirable political outcomes. Borrowing from de Tocqueville’s classical analysis, Putnam argues that civil society endows individuals with civic virtues, such as habits of cooperation and public spiritedness.4 By promoting cooperation, civil society helps make democracies work better.5 In post-communist Poland, civil society mobilized collective action in the form of protests, strikes, and demonstrations, which offset institutional weaknesses in political parties and the state.6 It imbued ordinary citizens with civic skills that helped to support and consolidate democratic systems.7 In the Palestinian territories, where the state institutions are in flux, the CSOs that mobilized ordinary citizens led to less polarization in society and more institutionalized interactions between the public and the state.8 In authoritarian regimes such as Egypt and Iran, civil society allowed citizens to form public spaces that are insulated from government intrusion. It led citizens to participate in economic, social, and, to a certain extent, political life, by facilitating uncoordinated and informal survival strategies.9 The neo-Tocquevillian approach treats civil society as a source of good citizenship or a barrier against state intrusion. Accordingly, CSOs lack the agency to

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shape the political sphere intentionally or strategically. However, the political efficacy of CSOs often goes beyond that of passive facilitation. CSOs can actively interact and bargain with political actors, take sides in elections, and directly influence political competition. Other scholars have developed a contrasting view of the relationship between civil society and democracy by drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci. The neoGramscians claim that CSOs facilitate the penetration of society by political actors rather than insulating it against authoritarian state practices. It is a “transmission belt” between political agents and the public.10 Associationalism is not always a force for democratization; it can also lead to the strengthening of authoritarian parties.11 The neo-Gramscians treat CSOs as instruments of other political forces. Their exclusive focus on authoritarian politics should be expanded to democratic and semi-democratic settings. Mainstream political parties in both advanced and new democracies also seek associational support. CSOs do not always behave as passive instruments at the hands of party elites. They often bargain with and extract benefits from political parties in return for their support. However, the existing studies have mostly ignored the “supply-side” of civil society in electoral competition. Political resource distribution in developing democracies is often nonprogrammatic, whereby parties distribute some resources according to private and partisan criteria. In contrast to programmatic party-voter linkages,12 these practices foster hierarchical relations between politicians and citizens.13 However, the existing studies have focused on a relatively narrow form of clientelism conceived as vote-buying:14 an exchange of goods, services, and preferential treatment in return for votes. The extensive literature on clientelism has, consequently, overlooked the role of CSOs in facilitating pork-barrel politics, or the biased distribution of benefits to collective groups, and patronage, the provision of benefits to party members.15 This article focuses more broadly on the supply-side of politics: how CSOs facilitate political recruitment and newly minted politicians enable the CSO members to gain privileged access to state resources. In contrast to the neo-Tocquevillian arguments described above, some CSOs foster nonprogrammatic linkages between parties and voters which favour insiders at the expense of the general public. As strategic actors that pursue their own interests, CSOs need to be included in the debate over party-voter linkages.

CSOs and supply-side politics One of the primary expectations of a healthy democracy is that it inspires citizens to serve their communities by running for political office. Doing so constitutes “the ultimate act of political participation”.16 Studies of electoral competition in developing democracies focus extensively on the ideological, ethnic, and religious roots of political parties.17 However, we know relatively little about who competes. How

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do those who compete in elections join the political candidate pool? How are these “political elites” made? This article argues that CSOs can provide an important mechanism for citizens to launch political careers. Civil society organizations, associations, and groups outside the state and the market, pursue a variety of goals. They seek to attract attention to a cause, change public attitudes, and advance the economic and political interests of their constituencies. In pursuing their objectives, CSOs often ally with other CSOs, lead publicity campaigns, and lobby political authorities. CSOs also “link” with political parties, as parties can provide them with a democratic platform to advance their agendas. Most individuals weigh the costs and benefits of becoming political candidates.18 The decisions to run and to campaign for office are largely structured by electoral institutions. In contexts where elections are party-centric and publicly financed, individuals are obliged to join political parties to further their political careers. CSOs can act as the connective tissue that links political entrepreneurs to parties. Those who have the institutional support of a CSO that commands valuable assets can receive a significant boost. The logic of electoral competition leads parties to behave strategically about whom they nominate for political office. Parties are more likely to form partnerships with CSOs that could supply scarce resources and help to improve party performance at the ballot box. CSOs possess a variety of assets that are useful to political parties in electoral competition. The type of assets controlled by the CSO determines, whether and to what extent its members will receive material benefits, nominations to political office, and influential positions in party organizations. This article proposes an original classification of CSOs based on their resource portfolios: headcounts, capital, and ideas. The votes, material resources, and ideological legitimacy some CSOs command make them valuable partners to parties. At the same time, CSO representatives seek to maximize the benefits they will receive from political parties in return for their group’s support. Thus, the relationship between the CSOs and parties often takes the form of explicit or tacit negotiations, where each aims to maximize their benefits in return for their contributions. The first group of CSOs comprises of associations that leverage their “headcounts,” or the large number of citizens they claim to represent.19 These associations are organized around relatively stable social identities, such as ethnicity, kinship, region, or nation of origin. Parties that seek to appeal to these vote-rich groups have incentives to nominate candidates from their CSOs. Although parties may adopt a number of different electoral strategies to build identitygroup support, recruiting politicians from such groups and promising benefits to their CSOs are common tactics. The second group includes the CSOs that represent the owners and interests of economic capital, such as business associations. Close ties to business associations provide parties not only with material resources, but also elite human capital.

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Economic elites tend to be better educated and better connected than the general population. Business elites also stand to benefit from close cooperation with successful political parties in the form of municipal contracts, reduced bureaucratic friction, and the ability to influence municipal policy. The third group consists of issue-oriented associations that represent particular ideologies, beliefs, or positions on social issues. These are the archetypes of civil society organizations. Formed by freely participating citizens who share common ideas, issue-oriented associations cooperate with parties that are sympathetic to their ideological positions. This is a broad category that could include environmental groups, human rights associations, Islamist charity foundations, and Christian reading clubs, among many others. By linking political entrepreneurs to parties and helping to launch their careers, CSOs pursue their own interests in the political arena. They are often as ingrained in political matters as parties, without the ability to hold political office. Instead, they supply new candidates to parties, (explicitly or tacitly) negotiate returns to their investment, and extract benefits from parties.

Case selection and methods Both the neo-Tocquevillian and the neo-Gramscian approaches agree that civil society influences political outcomes, for better or worse, when associations connect large groups of ordinary people to unfamiliar others in public life. This article argues that civil society can also influence political outcomes more directly: by enabling new politicians to join the political competition and by extracting benefits from parties in return for their support. This article provides a least likely20 case study to demonstrate how the proposed causal mechanisms work in practice. It focuses on the industrial periphery of Istanbul, Turkey. Traditional theories would deem Turkey an unlikely site for the effectiveness of civil society. It has a weak associational sphere, membership in CSOs is low, volunteerism and community engagement is uncommon, and a strong state has kept civil society divided and subservient.21 As one observer noted: “What Turkey is experiencing is not only a fragmented civil society, but one consisting of voluntary associations that are better at rivalry than mutual cooperation”.22 Turkey is also located at the intersection of two regions characterized by weak civil society: post-communist Europe and the Middle East. The World Alliance for Citizen Participation ranked Turkey 72nd out of 109 states in 2013 (below Moldova, Ecuador, and Tanzania) for failing to enable civil society.23 Studying the influence of CSOs on political competition in a country where the level of civic participation is low helps to isolate the impact of the proposed causal mechanisms. If CSOs are able to affect political outcomes in such an unfavourable environment, they are likely to have the same, or perhaps even a stronger effect, in contexts where civil society is more vibrant.

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In order to make more valid observations of party-CSO linkages, this article scales down to the subnational level.24 Political entrepreneurs may enter either national or local politics. Entering national politics often requires significant wealth, education, or access to elite networks that are unavailable to most citizens. However, the number of political offices at the local level is significantly higher than those at the national level. Focusing on local electoral competition is more likely to provide cases of both successful and unsuccessful attempts by new entrants to launch political careers. Consequently, this article draws on two, closely linked, cases from the industrial periphery of Istanbul. Gebze and Corlu, which represent the industrial periphery of Turkey, share numerous economic, demographic, and cultural similarities that make them suitable for comparison. They border Istanbul on east and west, respectively. They are both economically vibrant, industrialized cities that have received hundreds of thousands of migrants since the 1970s. In each city, urban migration led to the development of shantytowns colloquially referred to as the gecekondu (built overnight). Furthermore, small- and medium-sized businesses linked to global supply chains proliferated in both cities, turning them into industrial powerhouses of north-western Turkey. In addition to economic, demographic, and cultural similarities, Gebze and Corlu also share institutional features. In both cities, the local branches of the same political parties interact with CSOs in similar ways. Overall, Gebze and Corlu are appropriate cases for analysis due not only to their extensive similarities, but also because they are important centres of industry that have significant economic and demographic growth potential in the future. Corlu and Gebze jointly support and benefit from the emergence of Istanbul as a global metropolis. Table 1 summarizes the key macro-social similarities between Gebze and Corlu. Social life in Gebze and Corlu is based predominantly on private ties. Civil society is limited to a small subsection of the society. However, compared to the rest of Turkey, the industrial periphery of Istanbul hosts a relatively large number of CSOs (see Istanbul on the map in Figure 1). Focusing on Gebze and Corlu increases the number of observable instances of party-CSO linkages, which allows us to examine the mechanisms at work. Within this delimited geographic region, this article examines the relationships between the AKP, the CHP, and 13 civil society organizations. The CSO cases were selected according to the following criteria: First, each CSO was identified by local party officials, political activists, and journalists for its salience in the cultural sphere of Gebze and Corlu. This selection criterion helps distinguish the CSOs that may have some political impact from others that exist in name only: the socalled “signpost” CSOs. Second, the case selection maximizes the variation on the dependent variable: relative impact on candidate selection. Some of the CSOs in the sample produced mayors and high-ranking party officials, while others had no effect on local politics despite being identified as a relatively active CSO in the local community. Third, the selected cases exhibit significant variation in the CSOs’ resource portfolios. The cases include CSOs rich in material

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Table 1. Macro-social characteristics of Gebze and C ¸ orlu.

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Macro-social characteristics Geographic location Ethnic composition Religious composition Religious orders Population size in 1970 Population size in 2013 Migration Origin of migrants Economy Dominant economic sectors Types of industry Level of private investment Prominent political parties Active CSOs Political impact of CSOs

Gebze

Corlu

Northwestern Turkey

Northwestern Turkey

Heterogeneous (Turks, Kurds)

Heterogeneous (Turks, Kurds)

Majority Sunni Muslim, Minority Alevi Muslim Active, particularly the Gulen movement 46,981

Majority Sunni Muslim, Minority Alevi Muslim Active, particularly the Gulen movement 59,346

329,195

225,540

Net migrant receiver Anatolia, Balkans (Mainly Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece)

Net migrant receiver Anatolia, Balkans (Mainly Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece) Vibrant Industry and services

Vibrant Industry and services Consumer and industrial chemicals, consumer durables, auto industry High

High

AKP, CHP

AKP, CHP

HTAs, Business Associations, Issue-Oriented Associations Business, HTAs (High) Issue-Oriented (Low)

HTAs, Business Associations, Issue-Oriented Associations Business, HTAs (High) Issue-Oriented (Low)

Textiles, leather processing, packaging

Note: Data obtained by author through fieldwork. Population data is available at www.turkstat.gov.tr. Economic data available at the Sub-Provincial Governorates of Corlu and Gebze.

resources (for example, business groups), headcounts (for example, migrant associations), and ideational resources (for example, issue-based associations). Each CSO-political party relationship examined in this article illustrates the broader pattern of links between parties, civil society, and the citizens they claim to represent in Turkey.

Turkey: party-association linkages in local politics The roots of Turkey’s strong state and weak civil society date back to the Ottoman era. The Ottoman polity developed prebendal characteristics during the classical

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Figure 1. The number and distribution of civil society associations in Turkey. Note: Data available at: http://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/Anasayfalinkler/illere-gore-faaldernekler.aspx.

period in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In contrast to Western Europe, the Ottoman society witnessed less class conflict in the form of peasant rebellions or violent uprisings.25 The path to power and prosperity went through the state, not in opposition to it. The dominant position of the state at the centre of all political activity continued throughout the reforms of the nineteenth century and the upheavals following the collapse of the empire.26 The strong state tradition in Turkey has resulted in a weak and repressed civil society organized around informal networks in the periphery.27 The religiously inspired nodes of resistance to state authority were the only autonomous civil society groups in Turkey during the single-party period between 1923 and 1950.28 The socio-political cleavage between the secularist and Islamist groups also crystallized during this period. The secularist-Islamist cleavage pitted the bureaucratic elites and westernized urban dwellers against the provincial masses and religious networks, or the “centre” against the “periphery”.29 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party – CHP) and the armed forces emerged as the custodians of the Kemalist ideology, which emphasized secularism, westernization, and nationalism. In the period after 1950, a succession of centre-right and Islamist parties assumed the mantle of Islamic resistance to state-mandated westernization and secularization. The transition to democracy in 1950 and the rise of class conflict and mass politics in the 1960s led to new forms of civil society, particularly labour unions and leftist youth groups. Repeated military coups and the anti-communist and antileftist nature of the military interventions resulted in the repression of the labour

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union movements and their partial co-optation into the dominant Kemalist coalition.30 The period following the 1980 military coup provided a new opening to secular and religiously inspired CSOs. Globalization and economic liberalization produced new spaces for the self-organization of associations in the secular civil society.31 Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union led to financial, know-how, and political support by the EU for the introduction of more civil society in Turkey. Secular CSOs reciprocated by supporting the Europeanization process and the pursuit of EU membership.32 The “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” ideology of the 1980 military coup encouraged the growth of Islamic groups as a counterweight to the communist threat of the 1970s.33 Similar to their counterparts in other Muslim-majority states, the Islamic associations in Turkey organized outside of state intrusion.34 The actors and organizations affiliated with Islamist parties, trade unions, and civil society during this period displayed significant diversity and complexity. They included Islamist party-linked activist networks, such as the Milli Genclik Vakfi (Foundation for National Youth), various charity foundations, such as the Hizmet Vakfi (Service Foundation), business associations, such as the Mustakil Isadamlari Dernegi (Association of Independent Businessmen – MUSISD), and human rights groups, such as the Mazlum-Der (Association for Human Rights and Solidarity with Oppressed People). The Kemalist civilian and military bureaucracy sought to reassert the power of the state and to curb the influence of the Islamic groups in 1997 through a coup-bymemorandum. However, the political success of the AKP revitalized and moderated the Islamic groups. The AKP was established by the young cohorts of the Turkish Islamist movement after they splintered away from the senior leaders of the banned Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party – FP). The reformist Islamists led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul declared their intention to make peace with the existing state institutions, thereby moderating their political ideology.35 The Islamic social networks that had challenged state authority during the 1990s became adjuncts to the AKP when the latter formed a single-party government. Since the rise of the AKP, formal organizations of civil society (for example, associations) remain unable to mobilize the general public. However, this does not mean that CSOs lack political relevance. They interact regularly with political parties and municipal administrations in order to safeguard the interests of their constituencies. Furthermore, individuals who launched their political careers with the support of local CSOs hold municipal council seats and mayor’s offices across the country. Even the associations thin in membership have played an important role in making it possible for ordinary citizens to launch careers in public service. Due to the weakness of democratic procedures within Turkish parties, political positions at the national level often require personal connections to party leaders. However, the large majority of elected offices are at the municipal and neighbourhood levels. More than 34,500 municipal positions were contested in the 2009 local elections: 2950 were mayor and 31,790 were municipal council seats.36 If the village and neighbourhood muhtar (headman) and ihtiyar heyeti (council of elders) positions are included, this number increases to more than 300,000. Most

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of these positions are filled by amateur politicians, who receive small or no salaries and meet only occasionally. Citizens who are interested in politics may decide to run in local elections and serve their communities. The road to political office, however, passes through parties. Particularly at the municipal level and above, parties determine who will run for which office, and when. Civil society organizations serve as mechanisms that enable citizens to connect to parties and advocate for their candidacy in local elections. This allows individuals who lack direct links to party officials to start their local political careers. The CSOs also stand to benefit, if their members occupy positions of authority in municipal administrations and local party branches. The following study of the industrial periphery of Istanbul shows that CSO leaders have used their group’s assets strategically to boost their political influence. Hometown associations bargained with political parties to nominate their members to elected office. Business associations formed close partnerships with the moderate Islamists. Issue-oriented CSOs sought to influence municipal policy through their ideological ties to Islamist, nationalist, and secularist parties. Hometown associations Urban migration remade the greater Istanbul area. The demographic transformation was unparalleled in Turkey’s history. Between 1980 and 2012, Istanbul, Gebze, and Corlu’s urban populations increased around fivefold, sixfold, and more than fivefold, respectively.37 The migrations were a response to the economic growth and industrialization of the region. The emerging neighbourhoods on the edges of the cities filled the unoccupied spaces and connected previously distinct urban areas to form a metropolis that stretched uninterrupted for more than 80 miles. With the migrants came a new type of association. The migrants’ hometown associations (HTAs) play a significant role in the local politics of their host cities. HTAs are civil society organizations formed by migrants from the same town in a host city, who congregate primarily for social and mutual aid purposes.38 Approximately 10% of civic associations in Turkey are HTAs and more than half of all HTAs are located in the greater Istanbul area.39 HTAs perform some of the participatory functions of civil society organizations. They provide charity, arrange picnics, dinners, and other social events. Despite the large number of HTAs, they follow the general pattern of associationalism in Turkey: they inspire little civic participation. On a normal day, most HTAs operate as small businesses. They are kahvehanes, or coffee houses, where small congregations of elderly men sip tea and play cards or backgammon. However, their political efficacy belies their participatory torpor. In both Corlu and Gebze, the political entrepreneurs in migrant communities pursued leadership positions in hometown associations to build their political careers. The HTA leaders in Corlu negotiated with political parties before local elections. They convinced party officials to endorse HTA members as candidates to elected office and to supply material benefits to the HTAs.

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The chairman of the Sinop Mutual Help and Solidarity Association in Corlu explained that he joined the HTA in order to integrate his community into local politics. During his tenure as HTA leader, the association focused its activities on building ties to political parties. He organized a meeting with the opinion leaders of his community, where they decided to position the HTA as an intermediary institution between the migrants from Sinop and the local political parties: “We told our hemsehris [co-townsmen] to come to us before they go to any party for membership. We support them as an association if they want to be candidates in local elections”.40 His strategy worked. In the 2009 local elections, five different parties nominated eight members of the Sinop association to the municipal council, two of whom won. Their election ensured not only better representation of the Sinop community in Corlu’s political life, but also enabled the migrants to profit directly from municipal resources. What followed was a clear example of pork-barrel politics: provision of benefits to groups without public criteria. The Silahtarag˘a and Nusratiye neighbourhoods, where most migrants from Sinop reside, had their roads paved and infrastructure completed ahead of schedule. The members of the Sinop Association also received preferential treatment by the local bureaucracy: their petitions and permits were handled with priority.41 The leader of the Samsun Mutual Aid Association also negotiated with parties before the local elections. He served on the municipal council for four years from the CHP ticket.42 The leader of the Balkan Immigrants Association (BISADER), Mehmet Cebeci, served on the municipal council from the CHP ticket when he was a member of the competing HTA, the Balkan Turks Association. When his relations with the CHP soured, he switched over to the BISADER and got elected to the municipal council from the Islamist ticket.43 The fluidity with which Cebeci switched between parties and HTAs illustrates the strategic nature of the interaction. Material benefits were at the heart of the party-CSO transactions in Corlu, without which the HTAs would serve as little more than coffee houses for the migrant community. The party-HTA relations in Gebze were very similar to those in Corlu. The political entrepreneurs that led the HTAs sought nominations to elected office and material resources for their respective communities. The leader of the Balkan Turks Association in Gebze, Rahim Bey, stated that parties were interested in collaborating with his HTA because of its role in representing the “muhacir” community (Muslim migrants from the Balkans). The Gebze chapter of the Balkan Turks Association supplied five municipal councilmen to three different parties in the 2009 local elections.44 The bond between the Balkan Turks Association and the municipality was solidified through the latter’s generous financial support of the former. For example, the municipality had donated a plot of land in a prime real-estate area for the CSO’s Gebze headquarters.45 Leaders of the Erzurum Association, and Kars, Ardahan, and Igdir Association in Gebze also reported that their members have held municipal council positions from the AKP and the CHP tickets.46 Party officials corroborate that members of HTAs often get nominated by parties for local political office. The deputy chairperson of the AKP branch in

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Gebze views the municipal council as an appropriate institution to demonstrate her party’s inclusion of different migrant communities: “When deciding on our nominees for the municipal council, we are careful about ethnic and geographic distribution. The HTA members get nominated to make sure there is representation”.47 A former official with the CHP in Gebze agreed: “The cadres of the municipal council are like regional coalitions”.48 The municipal council is the elected decision-making body of the local government. It is presided over by the mayor and is responsible for making decisions on crucial issues, such as municipal debt, strategic planning, and zoning.49 The relationships between parties and HTAs in the industrial periphery of Istanbul have transformed the municipal council into an organ whose seats are partially reserved for members of migrant associations. The efficacy of HTAs in getting parties to nominate their members to the municipal council is also significant when we consider that civil society organizations in Turkey are prohibited by law from explicitly supporting any political party. CSOs have to maintain political neutrality, at least officially. Despite this restriction, HTAs cooperate closely with one or more political parties before every local election in Turkey. The HTA acts as an institutional base which allows its leaders to launch political careers. The management of an HTA provides the political entrepreneur with social status in the field of local politics. In return, the political entrepreneurs use their position to advocate for their association. Bargaining is central to party-HTA relations. HTA leaders leverage their association’s social ties to the vote-rich migrant groups with promises of electoral support. In return, they demand tickets to elected office, better municipal services to the migrant neighbourhoods, and seek to attract municipal support for the HTA’s social and mutual-aid activities.50 Figure 2 describes the relationship between political parties, hometown associations, and political entrepreneurs. HTA-party relations benefit new migrants who lack the social ties to thrive in an urban economy. The HTA leaders use their party connections to find employment for their co-townsmen. A former CHP official explained: “New migrants tend to look for jobs through their hemsehris [co-townsmen]. They see parties as a source for jobs”.51 Allocating jobs in return for political support is a quintessential case of clientelism. A young factory worker explained: “if you want a job at the municipality or another state institution, you absolutely need party connections.” He recounted how his friend’s wife looked for a job at the state hospital: She applied to be a cleaner, or an orderly; whatever she could find. They told her that all applications have to go through the AKP party organization in town. If you don’t know anyone at the party, don’t even bother applying. So she went to the [migrants’] association for help.52

The quid pro quo relationship between the HTAs and the political parties takes place under the condition of low citizen participation in civic life. When HTA leaders use their ties to specific migrant communities to bargain with parties,

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Figure 2. The links between hometown associations, political entrepreneurs, and political parties.

they cannot make credible promises that their community will vote overwhelmingly for that party. Mehmet Emin Akin, the former secularist mayor of Gebze, claimed: “no hometown association can instruct all its members to vote for a single party. All parties compete for those votes”.53 This observation is held across ideological lines. The former chairman of the AKP’s Gebze branch, Yilmaz Bayram, explained that his party is: “very well informed about the hometown associations. We know how many members they have, and their general political inclinations. You cannot trust what an association leader says he can deliver”.54 If so, why do parties collaborate with HTAs? The local political influence of hometown associations stems in large part from their perceived ability to spoil elections. Party officials and activists believe that not appeasing the HTAs is politically imprudent. If parties refuse to share resources with HTAs, they fear the costs will be greater than the costs of cooperation. In order to appease the HTAs and to protect their reputation vis-a`-vis migrant groups, party officials enable migrants to enter into local politics and provide HTAs with material benefits. However, the particularist links between parties and HTAs weaken democratic governance by promoting hierarchical relations between politicians and voters. The neo-Tocquevillian and neo-Gramscian perspectives on civil society fail to note the tension that lies at the heart of party-CSO linkages. Hometown Associations in the industrial periphery of Istanbul do not merely build social capital or act as passive ancillaries to political parties. They bargain with them in order to advance their own interests. In doing so, they enable political entrepreneurs to initiate their careers in local politics and reinforce hierarchical relations between parties and voters.

Business associations As opposed to working class urban migrants, businessmen are better positioned to affect local political outcomes. Business associations, as representatives of local capital, enjoy substantial influence over local politics in Gebze. They provide

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parties with access to capital, elite human resources for leadership positions, and influence in the business community. The devout bourgeoisie that was shut out of privileged networks by the secularist Kemalist regime elites established close connections to Islamist parties.55 Their influence is felt particularly acutely over the moderate Islamists. The close collaboration between the religiously conservative business associations and the AKP shaped Gebze’s municipal administration in terms of its composition and policies. The seed of all home-grown business associations came from the local chapter of the MUSIAD. Some of the founders of the MUSIAD’s local chapter were also active in the establishment of other local business associations as well as political parties. A board member explained that his father was among the founders of MUSIAD. His father also helped to establish the Gebze Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Gebze Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi – GESIAD), was a founding member of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP), and was one of the founders of the AKP’s Gebze branch. The interviewee was enthusiastic about the role of business networks in Gebze’s municipal politics: “Five hundred businessmen run Gebze,” he claimed. “Business associations determine the direction of policy. Just as you cannot overcome the influence of clans in the [Kurdish] east, you cannot override the business associations here”.56 The relationship between religiously conservative business associations and the municipality went beyond interest group politics. The members of business associations constituted the leadership cadres of local party organizations to a significant extent. This was particularly true for the AKP. The AKP’s local chapter was founded in 2001 by the young, reformist Islamists who had splintered off from the more radical FP.57 The new party organization immediately established close links to the local business associations. In addition to MUSIAD, party officials reached out to the GESIAD and the Association of Young Businessmen (Genc Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi – GENCSIAD). Some members of the local business associations joined the AKP and acquired high-powered positions within the party organization.58 Among the AKP’s early recruits from the business associations was Adnan Kosker, a well-known industrialist and board member of the GESIAD.59 His company, Koskerler Steel Rope and Machines Industries, had grown during the 1990s with a successful portfolio in the export markets. Upon joining the AKP, Kosker became the Deputy Party Chair for Economic Affairs. He maintained a dual public career in the civil society and the AKP, eventually receiving his party’s nomination for the highest local political position in 2009. Kosker got elected as Gebze’s mayor in two consecutive terms, in 2009 and 2014, and maintained his professional ties both to the AKP and to the business association that had launched his political career.60 Other businessmen in Gebze also launched political careers with the help of business associations. Zafer Kilic, a young business owner and the deputy chairman of GENCSIAD, is a case in point. He explained that he met the chairman of the local AKP branch through the business association, and decided to join

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the party in 2005.61 He started volunteering for the youth wing of the party. Within two years, Kilic was promoted to replace the leader of the AKP’s youth wing in Gebze. He claimed that his background with the GENCSIAD helped him become a better manager in political life. He organized a youth congress, multiple poetry competitions, youth meetings with the members of the parliament, symposia on education, and community outreach efforts in Gebze’s neighbourhoods. The local business associations leveraged their material and human resources in their relationships with political parties and enjoyed direct influence over the AKP and the municipality. The AKP’s local party organization benefitted from this relationship by acquiring elite recruits for leadership positions and influence over the local business community. In return, the businessmen gained privileged access to municipal contracts, as well as more lenient bureaucratic oversight on their economic investments. Interviewees consistently referred to what they considered “shady deals” between party organizations, the municipality, and local businessmen. They often used indirect language to explain how these arrangements worked: as something that happens in other parties and that benefits other politicians and businessmen. When asked about clientelist practices, a former AKP official and local businessman explained: “When the party became more comfortable in its position, rant [rent-seeking] became more acceptable . . . People made a lot of money, without any consequences”.62 He went on to emphasize that he fought against the rent-seekers as much as he could during his time at the party: “All my friends called me stupid for not taking advantage [of rant]. Other people got rich, while my business barely survived”.63 There were others at the local AKP organization who did not agree with this characterization. A current party official claimed that “he [the former official] was the chief rantci [rent-seeker]” but refused to discuss the matter further.64 Patronage, or profits that accrue to insiders, is most often acquired through entrepreneurship. Municipal services that are contracted out to private companies are significant sources of patronage and the politically connected local businessmen have privileged access to this resource. A former labour union organizer explained that an AKP politician who lived in his neighbourhood considerably expanded his carpeting business after he rose in the party ranks: He used to be a run-of-the-mill carpet seller. After the AKP won the municipality, demand for his carpets began to rise. For example, the Sultan Orhan Mosque [a historic mosque in the city centre] underwent renovation and needed new carpets. There are many mosques, schools, and municipal buildings in Gebze, which means big opportunity for a carpeting business.65

A local factory worker recounted a similar story about a municipal contractor: I know the manager of a local garbage disposal company that has a municipal contract for waste management. He bought a pickup truck and leased it to the municipality. The municipality gave the truck back to him to use in his waste management

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work. The lease payments were seriously inflated, which helped him to repay the car loan in a year or two. Then, he continued to receive his salary, the lease payments for the truck, and got to keep the truck as well. The municipality even pays for gas and maintenance, although he often uses the truck at home. I asked him if I could get in on this type of deal, but he didn’t give me a straight answer. You have to be well-connected for this business.66

Insiders can be quite creative in finding opportunities to benefit from their connections. A junior-level AKP activist cited his frequent experiences with rentseeking businessmen as a reason why he felt disillusioned: “I joined this party because of my convictions, but I also see how some people are using it for personal enrichment. I am still here because I believe in one man – Recep Tayyip Erdogan” he claimed. When asked to elaborate, he explained: Assume you own trucks, or that you could afford to buy trucks. The party is rightfully proud of all the roads it is building across the country. Each kilometre of road construction produces tonnes of dirt that needs to be transported. You could get a contract to transport that dirt and make a good profit. But this is not enough for some people. If you could convince the other contractor who is building the road to dig more earth than he needs to, then you have more dirt to carry. I have seen so much of this behaviour, it disturbs me deeply.67

These examples suggest that party-business relations go beyond typical interest group politics. Members of business associations acquired influential positions in the AKP, actively shaped municipal policy, and benefitted from local patronage in the form of municipal contracts.

Issue-oriented CSOs Issue-oriented associations also seek to influence electoral competition and municipal policy through their links to political parties. They represent ideas and leverage their advocacy of ideological positions in order to affect the political process. However, in the context of weak civic participation, these organizations typically lack the influence enjoyed by business groups and hometown associations. Issue-based associations exercise the least leverage over political parties and subsequently have the lowest impact among CSOs on local politics. This weakness holds across the secular-Islamist ideological divide. Two major organizations stand out in the secularist civil society: The Ataturkist Thought Association (Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi – ADD) and the Association for the Support of Modern Life (Cagdas Yasami Destekleme Dernegi – CYDD). The ADD is focused on the maintenance of Kemalist ideology in the political and social spheres.68 The CYDD seeks to advance the issues of education, women’s rights, and ecological consciousness, together with the preservation of Kemalist principles.69 Despite the ideological proximity between the CHP and

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the secularist civil society, neither of these associations have direct impact on electoral competition. In Corlu, the leader of the CHP’s youth wing joined the party after having been a member of the ADD’s youth wing. He explained that his Kemalist ideology matured during the time he spent with the ADD, which was an important factor in his decision to join the CHP. However, he explained that he no longer followed the association’s activities.70 The former chairman of the ADD in Gebze pointed out that the ties between the association and the secularist party were weak: “The CHP does not interact with the ADD in Gebze. They are more interested in hometown associations than the Ataturkist ideology”.71 He also noted that the HTAs may be more influential in local politics compared to issue-oriented CSOs, because of the material benefits they provide: “As the Ataturkist Thought Association, what can you give to someone? You don’t have anything to give. The hometown associations at least give people iftar dinners or place their kids in a job. This is something tangible”.72 The influence of issue-oriented civic associations is similarly weak among Islamist groups. The emergence of Islamic civil society during the 1990s was encouraged by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), the ideologically more radical predecessor of the AKP. The Welfare Party collaborated with charity organizations and youth groups to penetrate Gebze’s expanding suburbs and to deliver social services.73 However, the AKP deemphasized its connection to civil society at the local level after its predecessors were banned by the Constitutional Court. In an effort to distance themselves from their radical past, the moderate Islamists dissociated their party from religiously inspired CSOs. Although the AKP enjoyed close ties with business associations in Gebze and hometown associations in Corlu, none of the interviewees identified an issue-based civic association that had deep ties to the local AKP branch in either of these cities.74 Issue-oriented CSOs are uniquely positioned to influence municipal policy due to their advocacy of ideologies that political parties share. However, they have considerably less impact on local politics compared to other, materially oriented, CSOs. Both secularist and Islamist parties tend to take the support of issue oriented CSOs for granted. These associations do not reach across the aisle and fail to make a tangible difference in local politics.

Conclusion This article shows that civil society organizations can influence political contestation by providing a mechanism for citizens to launch political careers and by extracting benefits in return for their contributions. The cases drawn from Turkey illustrate the conditions under which civic associations bargain with political parties and sponsor new candidates, which adds to our understanding of supplyside politics. By exploring the impact of civil society organizations on political contestation in an environment where civic participation is low, the evidence

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provided in this article expands the scope of the existing theories of civil society beyond their typical domain. CSOs possess political agency, and they use it strategically to increase their impact on electoral competition by leveraging the assets in their resource portfolios vis-a`-vis political parties. Business associations have significant influence over local electoral competition due to their material and human resources. CSOs that claim to represent vote-rich groups with specific social identities, such as migrants’ hometown associations, negotiate with parties on behalf of their community. Even though they often cannot guarantee to deliver votes, parties cooperate with them to avoid alienating identity-based groups. Issue-oriented civic associations are uniquely positioned to influence the policies of ideologically proximate parties; however, they tend to be ineffective at doing so under the condition of low civic participation. The neo-Tocquevillian and neo-Gramscian perspectives disagree on whether civil society leads to democracy, but they both share the underlying assumption that CSOs lack political agency. The evidence presented in this article challenges this assumption. Associations do act as political agents, even under the condition of low citizen participation, in a context where they are legally prohibited from officially proclaiming their support for political parties, and where civil society is generally considered weak. CSOs’ political agency results in the facilitation of political recruitment. On the other hand, CSOs may also foster clientelist relations between parties and voters, potentially weakening the quality of democratic institutions. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Yelena Biberman, Melani Cammett, Roy Ginsberg, Ron Seyb, Quinn Mecham, the editors and anonymous reviewers of Democratization, and the participants of the 2013 Northeast Middle East Politics Workshop.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID Feryaz Ocakli

http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5057-4940

Notes 1. 2. 3.

Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey; Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey”; CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index, 2013. Schneider and Teske, “Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur.” See Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, 7, for a useful distinction between programmatic and nonprogrammatic distributive strategies. For distribution to be programmatic, criteria of distribution should be public, and these criteria should actually shape the distribution of resources.

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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

F. Ocakli Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” Ekiert and Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society. Howard, “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society.” Jamal, “Democracy Promotion, Civil Society Building, and the Primacy of Politics.” Bayat, “Un-civil Society”; Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East.” Riley, “Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe.” Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic.” Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies; Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities.” Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization; Cox, “Swing Voters, Core Voters and Distributive Politics.” Stokes, “Pork, by Any Other Name”; Hicken, “Clientelism”; Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, 13 –14. Lawless and Fox, It Still Takes a Candidate. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Thachil, “Embedded Mobilization.” Black, “A Theory of Political Ambition”; Jacobson and Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. See Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed, for an examination of ethnic headcounts in Indian party politics. Least likely case studies are particularly useful when probing for new explanatory factors or causal mechanisms. For recent reviews of case study methods, see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences; and Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research.” TUSEV, Civil Society in Turkey; I˙c¸duygu, “Interacting Actors”; Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey.” Kalaycioglu, “State and Civil Society in Turkey.” CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index. Snyder, “Scaling Down.” Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations.” Ibid.; Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey; Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey”; Angrist, “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East”; Angrist, Party Building in the Modern Middle East. Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?” Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations.” TUSEV, Civil Society in Turkey. Keyman and ˙Ic¸duygu, “Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey”; S¸ims¸ek, “The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey”; Toros, “Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation.” Go¨ksel and Gu¨nes¸, “The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process”; Diez et al., “File”; ˙Ic¸duygu, “Interacting Actors.” ¨ zler and SarkisYavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”; O sian, “Stalemate and Stagnation in Turkish Democratization.” Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?”; Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East”; White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey; Kadıog˘lu, “Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey.” Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light.” Directorate General of Local Administrations, Turkey (2012). http://www.tbb.gov.tr/ belediyelerimiz/istatistikler/genel-istatistikler/ [in Turkish]

Democratization 37. 38. 39. 40.

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41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

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Istanbul’s urban population was 13,710,512 in 2012, compared to 2,909,455 in 1980. Gebze’s urban population rose from 58,318 to 304,283, and Corlu’s urban population rose from 47,086 to 235,354 during the same period. www.tuik.gov.tr Levitt, “Transnational Migration”; Caglar, “Hometown Associations, the Rescaling of State Spatiality and Migrant Grassroots Transnationalism.” Turkish Ministry of Interior, Department of Associations. www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/ AnasayfaLinkler/dernekler-grafik-tablo.aspx Yunus Bey, Chairman of the Sinop Association. Interviewed by author, Corlu, 16 May 2009. Ozan Tugran, Local journalist, Avrupa Yakasi Gazetesi. Interviewed by author. 11 November 2014. Yilmaz Tasdemir, Chairman of the Samsun Association. Interviewed by author. Corlu, 7 May 2009. Mehmet Cebeci, Chairman of the BISADER. Interviewed by author. Corlu, 7 May 2009. Rahim Bey, Chairman of the Balkan Turks Association. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 16 May 2009. Member of the Trakya Sports Club, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 11 January 2015. Yasar Bey, Member of the Erzurumlular Association. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 16 May 2009; Fehmi Tazegul, Chairman of the Kars, Ardahan, Igdir Association. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 16 May 2009. Deputy Chairperson of the AKP’s Gebze branch. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 15 January 2013. Sedat Tuze, former member of the CHP’s central administrative committee in Gebze. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 19 May 2009. Turkish Municipal Law 5393, The Duties and Authority of the Municipal Council. Ruhsar Kulaber, Leader of the CHP Women’s Organization. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 16 May 2009. Sedat Tuze, Former member of the CHP’s central administrative committee in Gebze. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 19 May 2009. Factory worker in Gebze, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 13 January 2015. Mehmet Emin Akin, Former mayor of Gebze. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 21 May 2009. Yilmaz Bayram, Chairman of the AKP’s Gebze branch. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 23 May 2009. Gumuscu, “Class, Status, and Party”; Somer, “Does it Take Democrats to Democratize?”; Nasr, Forces of Fortune; Onis, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey”; Tug˘al, “Islamism in Turkey”; Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”; Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey. Board member, MUSIAD. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 23 May 2009. Metin Gokce, founder of the AKP’s Gebze branch. Interviewed by author. Gebze, July 2007; Ekrem Ozenir, former president of the AKP’s Gebze branch. Interviewed by author. Gebze, July 2007; Mehmet Ali Okar, former president of the AKP’s Gebze branch. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 18 May 2009. Metin Gokce, AKP. Interviewed by author. Gebze, July 2007; Ekrem Ozenir, AKP. Interviewed by author. Gebze, July 2007. Ibid. Kosker’s personal website www.adnankosker.com/baskan.php Zafer Kilic, Former Youth Wing Leader of the AKP. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 16 May 2009.

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67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

F. Ocakli Former AKP official, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 22 June 2014. Ibid. AKP Neighborhood Representative, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 23 June 2014. Former Labour Union Organizer, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 13 January 2015. Factory worker in Gebze, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Interviewed by author. Gebze, 13 January 2015. Junior-level AKP activist, anonymous due to the sensitive subject. Quote is from author’s conversation with the activist during field observations. ADD Declaration of Formation, 1989. http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=52&Itemid=74 [in Turkish] CYDD website http://www.cydd.org.tr/?sayfa=biz [in Turkish] Ismail Bey, youth wing leader of the CHP. Interviewed by author. Corlu, 14 April 2009. Sendogan Tezyuksel, former chairman of the Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi (ADD). Interviewed by author. Gebze, 5 May 2009. Ibid. Celal Bey, Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party – SP). Interviewed by author. Gebze, 20 May 2009. Interviews with Islamist and secularist party activists in Corlu and Gebze.

Notes on contributor Feryaz Ocakli is an Assistant Professor of Government and International Affairs at Skidmore College. His research focuses on Islamist and ethnic party politics, local party strategies, and coalition building. His current book project is entitled Embedded Islamists: Local Elites and Electoral Strategies in Turkey.

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