Phenomenology, Givenness and the Gift - Jaques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion

Analyse the debate on the ‘gift’ between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. Who wins in your view and why? The debate on the nature of phenomenology, givenness and the gift between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion represents one of the most momentous philosophical and theological discussions of the twentieth century. This infamous debate, which took place at John Caputo’s Religion and Postmodernism conference at Villanova University in 1997, represented the pinnacle of the ongoing dialogue on the nature of givenness and the gift between French philosophers within the Husserlian phenomenological tradition and their theological counterparts.1 Marion, as a supposedly ‘hyperChristian, hyper-Catholic phenomenologist,’ exemplifies the theological perspective within this discussion and proposes a radical phenomenology of saturating givenness, a phenomenological account of actual or possible events of ‘bedazzling brilliance’ which are ‘given without being’ and leave us ‘stunned and lost for words.’2 Marion terms such phenomena, exemplified by religious revelation, as the ‘saturated phenomena,’ and paradoxically maintains that such excessive phenomena are given directly to the human intuition through saturating and exceeding our intentions. The religious accordingly does not break with the phenomenal but emerges from within it as a saturating transcendence which is firmly within the phenomenal.3 Marion’s radical imagination of phenomenology was staunchly contested by Derrida at Villanova with Derrida, as a ‘quasi-atheistic, quasi-Jewish deconstructor,’ maintaining that Marion’s phenomenology of saturating givenness violates Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’ and cannot, as such, be considered as phenomenology.4 This essay will analyse the debate on the gift between Derrida and Marion and argue that the debate is won by Derrida. In the first section of this essay, I will provide an outline of Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and the nature of the debate between Derrida and Marion. Thereafter, I will argue that Marion’s phenomenology relies upon an erroneous interpretation of Husserlian givenness, that the excess of the saturated phenomenon cannot be constituted within the phenomenological method and, finally, that Marion’s attempt to incorporate the gift and religious revelation within the phenomenal is reliant upon the intentional notions of interpretation and faith. In order to properly analyse the debate between Derrida and Marion it is necessary to briefly outline Marion’s analysis of givenness and the gift, which forms the background to this discussion. Marion had previously, particularly in Étant Donné, endeavoured to dramatically extend phenomenology beyond the characteristic Husserlian focus upon handicapped, quotidian phenomena.5 Marion built upon and transformed Levinas’ focus on alterity to propose a radical phenomenology of saturating givenness, a phenomenology extended beyond the classic, Husserlian focus on phenomena ‘poor’ in intuitive content such as logical or mathematical truth and, instead, focusing upon the givenness of rich, excessive and radical phenomena, upon what Gschwandtner describes as that which is ‘invisible, ineffable and wholly other’ such as works art, the experience of love and religious revelation.6 Marion

1

Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 219-221. For an excellent representation of the broader discussion between phenomenology and Christian theology please see Dominique Janicaud et al, 'The Theological Turn In French Phenomenology', in Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate, 1st edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000). 2 John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 166-167. Also see p. 171. 3 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 219-221. 4 Prusak, Bernard G., 'Translator's Introduction', in Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate, 1st edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 4-6, 8. 5 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). For Marion’s phenomenological extension see particularly pp. 19-24. 6 Christina M. Gschwandtner, 'Jean-Luc Marion: Phenomenology of Religion', in Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion, 1st edn (New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 171-173. For Levinas’ critique of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology see particularly Emmanuel

famously terms such phenomena as ‘saturated phenomena’ and asserts that such phenomena, whose fulfilling givenness is revelatory and excessive, communicate directly to the human intuition. Marion departs significantly from both Husserlian and Kantian phenomenology and fundamentally holds that such numinous phenomena, exemplified by the revelation of Christ, give an overflowing intuition, what Marion describes as a ‘flood of intuitive content,’ which saturates the intention as an excess of givenness, as an excess which the idea, intention or concept simply cannot contain, yet nonetheless communicates directly to the intuition.7 Marion’s argument accordingly holds that the givenness of religious phenomena is not a wholly distinct, separate form of givenness but is directly retractable to the realm of non-religious appearance.8 The Husserlian notion of givenness, (Gegebenheit) is accordingly transformed by Marion from a neutral term denoting simply that something exists to a term which, as summarised by Davies, is suggestive of distinctively Christian or religious associations of createdness.9 Within Marion’s imagination of phenomenology religious phenomena, such as the Eucharist, are given directly to the intuition and are, as such, not only conceptualised as a gift but are located precisely within that which can be grasped and described through the phenomenological method. The perspective outlined by Marion was, of course, heavily disputed by Jacques Derrida at Villanova. Derrida, who was introduced as both an ‘opponent of the phenomenology of the gift’ and the ‘poser of an aporia’ that produces a ‘disturbing effect,’ fundamentally contested Marion’s attempts to preserve a link between Gegebenheit and the phenomenal structure of the gift and include religious revelation within the phenomenological method.10 Derrida opened his argument by asserting that the excepts from Husserl concerning givenness to which Marion referred in his argument, when positioned in relation to Husserl’s philosophy as a whole, could not be transformed in accordance with Marion’s ‘extraordinary extension’ of Gegebenheit without damaging the integrity of the phenomenological method itself.11 Derrida accordingly accentuates the distinction between the gift (en gabe) in Heidegger and phenomenological givenness (Gegebenheit in Husserl), claiming that he is simply ‘not convinced’ that there is any ‘semantic continuality’ between the use of Gegebenheit in phenomenology and the problem of the gift.12 Marion’s transition from the phenomenological concept of givenness – that is, givenness to intuitive consciousness either as a giving intuition in the Husserlian sense or as intuitus derivativus, the datum or factum of the phenomenon in the Kantian sense – and the problem of the gift is fundamentally problematized by Derrida. For Derrida the gift, in contrast to givenness, represents a particular and highly aporetic class of phenomena, one characterised by intentional notions such as generosity and gratitude and one that, as such, is simply not equivalent to the intuitive ‘givenness’ of something.13 The garden chair, for example, may be given to the intuition but it does not begin to annul itself from the moment that it is given as, for Derrida, does the gift. Derrida suspects, as noted by Caputo, that lurking behind Marion’s phenomenological

Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Also see Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht and Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1978). 7 John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 174. 8 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 221. 9 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 223. 10 John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 183. 11 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 222. 12 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 57. 13 John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 184.

gesture – which would ultimately render every phenomenon as a gift – is a theological motive, one inspired and informed by a Christian theology of the whole of Creation as a divine gift of grace.14 Derrida additionally objects to Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and the gift through his insistence that the gift does not admit to a strict phenomenology. Derrida not only problematizes Marion’s transition from Gegebenheit to the gift, but additionally maintains that the very structure of the gift is such that, far from offering a ‘saturated givenness,’ is never given and to the extent that it is given and identified as such invariably annuls itself as a gift. Derrida, as summarised by Davies, expresses a fundamental desire to preserve both the gift and human otherness as precisely something that cannot be contained within the phenomenal.15 Derrida accordingly not only disparages Marion’s attempt to position the ‘excess beyond conceptuality’ generated by the ‘saturated phenomenon’ within the phenomenological method, but additionally reiterates his famous analysis in Given Time and hypothesises that the gift stands as a paradoxical figure of the impossible. Derrida claims that if the gift is something that is ‘given to another out of generosity, without an interest or concern in reciprocation’ then ‘as soon as the gift is identified as a gift, with the meaning of a gift, then it is cancelled as a gift.’16 The recognition of the gift as such, within Derrida’s analysis, naturally inscribes the gift within an economic circle of exchange, leading to a sense of self-satisfaction in the giver and of gratitude or debt in the recipient which results, as summarised by Carlson, in the gift ‘disappearing in a web of calculation, interest and measure.’17 Derrida accordingly maintains that the very things that make it possible for the gift to appear and acquire phenomenality – that is, recognisable generosity, gratitude and an indefinable gift-object – tend to make the gift impossible, and annul it as a gift.18 The construction of a phenomenology of the gift as donation advocated by Marion is thus presented as an impossibility by Derrida, who maintains that whilst the gift is there to be thought, desired and indeed longed for, it is nonetheless ‘wholly heterogeneous to theoretical identification’ and simply cannot be engaged with on a phenomenological level.19 Marion responds to Derrida’s objections through fundamentally accentuating the need to reconfigure the gift beyond the ‘horizon of economy’ and towards what Marion describes as the ‘horizon of givenness.’20 Whilst Marion agrees with Derrida that we can neither explain nor have access to the gift within the horizon of economy, Marion nonetheless maintains that it is possible to ‘describe the gift as a phenomenon’ whilst ‘taking seriously the aporias on which we agree’ through reconfiguring the gift within the ‘horizon of donation.’21 Marion accordingly accentuates the need to bracket the gift, to remove the gift from the constraints imposed by the ‘horizon of economy’ and instead reduce the gift to the ‘horizon of givenness,’ where phenomenological description is possible. Marion argues that phenomenology can deliver the gift, what Marion describes as the ‘enacted phenomenon,’ by 14

John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 184. For Derrida’s remark on the ‘deepest ambition’ of Marion’s thought please see 'On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 66. 15 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 223. 16 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 59. Also see p. 62. 17 Thomas A. Carlson, 'Postmetaphysical Theology', in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Philosophy, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 74-75. 18 John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 185. 19 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 59. 20 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 61. 21 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 62.

bracketing and setting aside the metaphysical schema by which a donor produces an effect in a recipient through the material and formal cause of a gift-object and, instead, observing the extent to which these three elements of the gift can be reduced, suspended and put out of play.22 Marion holds that it is possible to describe the gift without implying a recipient when, for example, an individual gives something to an enemy who rejects the gift, that it is possible to describe a gift without implying a giver when, for example, a donor makes an anonymous gift, and finally, and for Marion most significantly, it is possible to describe a gift when nothing is given such as when we give time, when we give our word or when we give our life.23 This phenomenological reduction to givenness functions, for Marion, to remove the gift from the schema of causality that implicates it in metaphysics and, as such, acts to render phenomenological description possible. Derrida’s claim that Marion’s attempt to present the pure givenness of the gift as communicating to the intuition moves beyond phenomenology is thus dismissed by Marion, who argues that through re-inscribing the gift within the horizon of givenness it becomes possible to ‘describe the gift as such’ and ‘as long as description is possible, we remain in the field of phenomenology.’24 The debate may be accordingly presented as revolving fundamentally around Derrida and Marion’s contrasting understandings of impossibility and the limits of phenomenology. Marion fundamentally desires to maintain that the religious experience of the world, as an excess and divine gift, falls legitimately within the phenomenological method. The supposed impossibility of positioning the gift and religious revelation within Husserlian phenomenology is accordingly dismissed by Marion, who maintains that phenomenology is capable of sustaining the givenness of phenomena that cannot be contextualised according to Kantian categories and that religious revelation can accordingly appear within reason as an excess or transcendence.25 Marion’s subsequent use of the term ‘intuition’ to describe our perception of the transcendence of the saturated phenomenon clearly represents, as summarised by Davies, his attempt to find a place for religious experience in the common experience of humanity, which phenomenology takes as its concern.26 Derrida, in contrast, fundamentally maintains that we can only speak phenomenology about the gift and religious revelation when we realise that they are, from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology, impossibilities. Whilst the gift is nonetheless there and demands to be thought and desired, through the gift we long for that which necessarily eludes both thought and description. This longing for the gift is accordingly structured as a religious desire, constituted as a form of religious subjectivity which represents the totality of what Husserlian phenomenology can engage with. The gift is, as such, discussed by Derrida in terms of disappearance and absence, with phenomenology and philosophy, when properly conceived, able to grasp the subjective human desire and yet unable to grasp that to which the desire points.27 The division between Derrida and Marion is thus fundamentally inspired by Marion’s refusal to acknowledge the impossibility to think what we desire and his impassioned affirmation that religious revelation can appear within reason as an excess which, of course, contrasts with Derrida’s commitment to the traditional, albeit limited, Husserlian phenomenological method.

22

'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 62. 23 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 63. 24 'On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 62. 25 Robyn Horner, 'Aporia Or Excess? Two Strategies for Thinking R/Revelation', in Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments, 1st edn (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 228-229. 26 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 225. 27 Derrida’s critique here is explored excellently by Horner. Please see Robyn Horner, ‘Aporia or Excess? Two Strategies for Thinking R/Revelation', in Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments, 1st edn (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 331-332.

Whilst Marion’s phenomenology of the gift may seem persuasive prima facie, it is nonetheless clear that Marion’s approach is fundamentally reliant upon an erroneous interpretation of the Husserlian notion of ‘givenness.’ Through Marion’s redefinition of Gegebenheit in relation to gift Marion’s phenomenology, as observed by Derrida, ultimately renders ‘everything that is given to us in perception, in memory, in phenomenological perception’ as ‘a gift to a finite creature,’ a ‘gift of God.’28 It is abundantly clear that this interpretation of Husserlian givenness as indicating a Christian givenness, one suggestive of God and creation, dramatically misconstrues the neutrality that characterises the Husserlian meaning of the term.29 The structure of the gift – that is, an act of generosity involving a giver, a recipient and a gift-object – is an economic structure, one that has a particular phenomenality and is positioned within the world by its very nature. Husserlian ‘givenness,’ in contrast, is a fundamentally neutral term that is wholly separate from the human world of specific, delineate meanings. It is subsequently clear that Derrida’s initial and indeed simplest objection – that he is unsure that Husserl’s references to Gegebenheit have ‘any sort of obvious or intelligible relationship to the gift’ – is compelling.30 The gift as a phenomenal and theological event is simply not homogenous with Gegebenheit in Husserl. Marion’s response to this accusation – through asserting that only one of the traditional triad of giver, gift and gift-object need to be present, and thus avoiding the question of an economic order of exchange – clearly and indeed rather bizarrely fails to address the point.31 Derrida has made the surprisingly simple observation that Marion has merely chosen to interpret Husserlian ‘givenness’ in a particular way through the incidental associations of the word, which leads to the uncomfortable conclusion that had Husserl used another word than Gegebenheit to denote the neutrality of the phenomenological method then Marion would have been simply unable to advocate the re-reading of phenomenology as the ‘science of the given,’ and bridge the gap between the ‘gift’ as religious thinking and the neutral being of things, as accessible to philosophy. 32 Marion’s attempt to position the excess of the ‘saturated phenomenon’ within the phenomenological method similarly fails. Whilst such phenomena of ‘bedazzling and incomprehensible’ givenness, exemplified by religious revelation, clearly represent an intensely important aspect of the human experience it is nonetheless clear that, in contrast to the protestations of Marion, the description of the ‘excess’ of such phenomena clearly moves beyond that which can be constituted within the phenomenological method. Within phenomenology the intuition, of course, has a specific meaning and exclusively refers to the intuition of an object, of something phenomenal.33 Marion’s attempt to use the term intuition to describe an excess over and beyond the object, to describe an excess which is not itself spatiotemporal, clearly violates the integrity of the phenomenological method. This problematic is, of course, eloquently captured by Derrida, who asserts that it is ‘difficult’ for him to ‘understand how we can describe something not as an object, as something other than an object, and to claim that we are still doing phenomenology.’34 Marion’s attempt to position such bedazzling and excessive phenomena within the phenomenological method is accordingly misconceived, and erroneously disregards the specific meaning of the term intuition within phenomenology. Whilst 28

‘On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 67. 29 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 226. 30 ‘On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 58. 31 ‘On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 60-62. 32 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 226. 33 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 223. 34 ‘On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 58.

phenomenology is, as admitted by Janicaud, ‘less a school than an abundance of heresies,’ 35 it is nonetheless clear that Marion’s attempt to describe the non-spatiotemporal excess generated by the saturated phenomenon clearly moves beyond the realm of phenomenology, which necessarily takes as its concern ‘the fullness of intuition, the presence of something.’36 Although an exasperated Marion seems to almost recognise this, declaring that it ‘does not seem very important’ to him as to whether his project is classified as phenomenology or not, it must be nonetheless maintained that Marion’s misguided attempt to position the saturated phenomena within the phenomenological method fails. Transcendence and the intuition of excess, far from being precisely within the phenomenal, simply cannot be constituted within the phenomenological method. Marion’s radical phenomenology of givenness is, finally, extensively reliant upon the intentional notions of interpretation and faith. The identification of the excess generated by the saturated phenomena as constitutive of religious revelation, as eloquently argued by Caputo, clearly moves beyond that which can be deduced phenomenologically and necessitates interpretation, as an intention that is not fulfilled.37 The Neo-Platonic hyperessentialism that permeates Marion’s phenomenology is clearly elucidated when he concedes, in Étant donné, that the saturated phenomenon is too dazzling for phenomenology to decide with any assurance precisely what it is bedazzled by. Marion is accordingly forced to envisage paradoxical ‘conditions’ that are imposed upon the reception of something ‘unconditional,’ describing an ‘imminent decision’ where we are ‘condemned to decide about a saturated phenomenon.’38 The subsequent creation envisaged by Marion is, as observed by Caputo, a hermeneutical circle, one which we must not try to escape but rather learn to enter by way of love, trust and faith.39 The choice created by Marin’s religious phenomenology – that is, the decision to give ourselves to its unconditional giving – ultimately depends upon the individual’s trust and faith that what they are faced with in the saturated phenomenon is not simply binary nothingness but is, instead, the revelation of the face of love.40 It is accordingly clear that Marion’s phenomenology of excess, of surpassing givenness, is wholly dependent upon the believer, who is able only by the ‘gift of faith’ to determine precisely what is given so excessively and to identify that what is given is not the khôra but a radical love that surpasses all understanding.41 This critical, Kantian analysis of the relationship between philosophy and theology draws Marion back to precisely where Derrida and indeed Kierkegaard maintain that we are all along: back with faith, with the necessity of interpretation and, for Husserl, with an intention that is not fulfilled. Marion’s religious phenomenology accordingly relies upon an intention that intends something that is not given, upon what Husserl terms Auffassung and fundamentally cannot, as such, be presented as constitutive of phenomenology.

35

Dominique Janicaud, 'The Theological Turn in French Phenomenology', in Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate, 1st edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 96-98. 36 ‘On The Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion', in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 1st edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 71. 37 For Caputo’s critique of Marion’s recourse to interpretation please see John Caputo, 'Derrida and Marion: Two Husserlian Revolutions', in Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 116-120. 38 John Caputo, 'Derrida and Marion: Two Husserlian Revolutions', in Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 117-119. 39 John Caputo, 'Derrida and Marion: Two Husserlian Revolutions', in Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 118-120. 40 John Caputo, 'Derrida and Marion: Two Husserlian Revolutions', in Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 117-119. 41 John Caputo, 'Derrida and Marion: Two Husserlian Revolutions', in Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 117-119. Also see Robyn Horner, 'Aporia Or Excess? Two Strategies For Thinking R/Revelation', in Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments, 1st edn (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 334.

To conclude, Jacques Derrida clearly emerges as the victor from the debate on the gift. Whilst Marion displays an understandable concern to position religious experience within the collective experience of humanity which, of course, occupies the central focus of phenomenology, Marion’s attempt to reconcile religious revelation within a robustly phenomenological reasoning is misguided and inappropriate. Marion’s transition between Gegebenheit and the gift, which forms an imperative aspect of his attempt to reconcile theology with phenomenology, is extensively reliant upon an erroneous manipulation of the Husserlian notion of Gegebenheit. The gift as a phenomenal and theological event is simply not homogenous with Gegebenheit in Husserl and Marion’s phenomenology, as noted by Janicaud, makes use of the terms ‘very ambiguity’ in order to bridge the gap between the theological notion of the gift and the neutral being of things, as accessible to philosophy.42 Marion’s attempt to position the saturated phenomenon within the phenomenological method similarly fails. Whilst the enigmatic phenomena of incomprehensible givenness which Marion describes clearly represent fundamentally important aspects of the human experience, the attempt to describe the supposed non-spatiotemporal excess of such phenomena clearly moves beyond the phenomenological method, which necessarily focuses upon objects and the present.43 The identification of the excess generated by the saturated phenomenon as constitutive of religious revelation is, finally, extensively reliant upon the intentional notions of faith and interpretation. The unfortunate irony implicit in Marion’s thought is that when faced with the saturated phenomenon, with a bedazzling phenomenon of excess and surpassing givenness, it is only the believer who, through the affirmation of faith, can recognise the saturated phenomenon as constituting religious revelation. Marion’s phenomenological revolution consequently maintains that givenness requires an intention that intends something not given and, as such, provides an illustration par excellence of the limitations of the phenomenological method, which necessarily takes as its concern the phenomenal and is accordingly inherently limited, as recognised by Derrida, to describing the human desire for transcendence rather than transcendence itself.

42

Dominique Janicaud, 'The Theological Turn in French Phenomenology', in Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate, 1st edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 65. 43 Oliver Davies, Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 226-228.

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