Peripheral Pressures: Jakarta

Jakarta 9.6 MLN PEOPLE. 6620 HA

4–66,2

800

40

600

30

400

20

200

10

1900

1950

16,6

PAR

4–66,2

2000 800

40

600

30

40 км 2

Administrative City Border City Center Area Territory marked on tourist city maps Urbanized Area of the City

0

2,5

5

10

Peripheral Pressures Deden Rukmana

Jakarta — An introduction Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia and the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia with tremendous population growth and a wide range of urban problems. The overall population of the megacity of Jakarta grew in the 20th century from about 150,000 in 1900 to about 28 million in 2010. The megacity of Jakarta is also called Jabodetabek , taken from the initial letters of the administrative units of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. The center of Jabodetabek is Jakarta, also called the Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta) and covers a total area of 664 square kilometers. The inner peripheries of the megacity of Jakarta include four municipalities (City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang, City of Depok, City of Bekasi), whereas the outer peripheries of Jabodetabek include the City of Bogor, Tangerang Regency and Bekasi Regency. The megacity covers a total area of 5,897 square kilometers (Hudalah and Firman 2007). Jakarta has been the capital of Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era. The population of Jakarta in 1900 was about 115,000. In the first nationwide census of the Dutch colonial administration (1930), Jakarta’s population increased to 409,475. In the next ten years, the population increased to 544,823 with an annual growth rate of 3.30%. After Independence, Jakarta increased by nearly three times to 1.43 million by 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in 1970. The annual growth rates of Jakarta’s population are 10.35% and 5.36% (1950–1960 and 1960–1970 respectively). The modern city of Jakarta was initiated by President Soekarno’s strong vision to build Jakarta into the greatest city possible (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). He gave Jakarta Monas – the 132m high national monument and his most symbolic structure – spacious new government buildings, department stores, shopping plazas, hotels, the sport facilities of Senayan that were used for the 1962 Asian Games, the biggest and most glorious mosque of Istiqlal, new parliament buildings and the waterfront recreation area at Ancol. Such constructions continued under the New Order regime that began in 1967. Under this regime, Indonesia enjoyed steady economic growth, along with a reduction in the percentage of the population living under the poverty line (Firman 1999). From 40% in 1976, the levels declined to the official level of 11.3% in 1996. In 1996 6.9 million people in urban areas and 15.7 million people in rural areas lived under the poverty line. Jakarta grew

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rapidly during this period of the New Order regime. The investment in the property sector, including offices, commercial buildings, new town development, and high-rise apartments and hotels grew substantially. Firman (1998; 1999) argued that Jakarta, by the mid-1990s, was heading towards global city status. Jakarta was the largest concentration of foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia and received US$32.5 billion and IRP68,500 billion from foreign and domestic investment respectively during the period of January 1967 to March 1998 (Firman 1999). Jakarta is linked with other “global cities” in a functional system built around telecommunications, transportation, services and finance. A parade of tall buildings, one after the other, fill the major streets on both sides. They house the offices of Indonesian and multi-national corporations. The economy crisis, which hit Indonesia in 1998 resulted in major disruptions of the urban development in Jakarta. Such monstrous crisis shifted Jakarta from “global city” to “city of crisis”. The crisis – commonly known in Indonesia as krismon - largely squeezed the economy of Jakarta. Domestic and foreign investment dramatically fell off. Many manufacturing and services corporations in the megacity of Jakarta closed and laid off their employees, resulting in the rapid increase of uncontrolled unemployment. In order to survive the krismon, a large number of workers shifted to become food traders or then engaged in other informal sector jobs. Street vendors — commonly known in Indonesia as pedagang kaki lim a – increased rapidly from about 95,000 in 1997 to 270,000 in 1999 (Firman, 1999). In order to mitigate the impact of the krismon, in July 1968 the government along with the assistance of IMF launched a variety of social safety net programs. These programs included food security, employment creation, student scholarships and block grants to schools, targeted health care subsidies and community block grants (Sumarto et al., 2004). Political and economic reforms were also implemented during the recovery process. Civil unrest and political uncertainty heightened during the krismon gradually lowered during the recovery process. As of early 2005, Indonesia’s economic performance was more positive. The rate of economic growth of Jakarta was 5.26% per year over the period of 2001 to 2004 (Firman 2008).

Suburbanization in the Megacity To understand the suburbanization in the megacity of Jakarta, it is essential to recognize the socio-economic dualism pervading Indonesian urban society. The manifestations of this dualism are the presence of the modern city and the kampung city in urban areas. The kampung (‘village’ in Indonesian) is associated with informality, poverty and the retention of rural traditions within an urban setting. Firman (1999) argues the existence of kampungs and modern cities reflect spatial segregation and socio-economic disparities. The growing numbers of migrants to Jakarta and poor Jakarta

Jakarta's megaregion population 1980–2010 (MLN PPL.) ТERRITORY

1980

1990

2000

2010

CENTRE OF REGION

6,50

8,39

8,26

9,60

JAKRARTA

6,50

8,39

8,26

9,60

INNER PERIPHERY

—

—

—

—

TANGERANG

—

—

1,33

1,80

SOUTH TANGERANG

—

—

0,80

1,29

DEPOK

—

—

1,14

1,75

BEKASI

—

—

1,66

2,38

OUTER PERIPHERY

5,41

8,88

7,31

11,20

BOGOR

0,25

0,27

0,75

0,95

TANGERANG DISTRICT

1,53

2,77

2,02

2,84

BEKASI DISTRICT

1,14

2,10

1,62

2,63

BOGOR DISTRICT

2,49

3,74

2,92

4,78

MEGAREGION

11,91

17,14

20,63

28,02

natives have produced new squatter kampungs on the periphery of Jakarta (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Many construction projects in the central city also caused some residents of kampungs to be evicted and relocated to the periphery (Silver, 2008). The periphery also attracted migrants because of its improved infrastructures and facilities in (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). Leaf (1994) has identified the rapid growth of suburban enclave housing in Jakarta during early 1990s. The residential enclave for narrowly targeted moderate and high-income families characterized Jakarta’s suburban area (Firman, 1998; Leaf, 1994). Located on the periphery of the city, these settlements were built in automobile-accessible areas with various high-quality amenities such as modern golf courses. High-income families in the central city also moved from the city in search of better living quality (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). The high cost of houses and the need for automobiles restricted low-income families from the suburban housing market. In addition to residential zones, the periphery of Jakarta is also made up of specialized zones of commercial and industrial enterprises. These areas complement the other districts of Jakarta: the central business districts on Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, the government offices around Medan

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Merdeka, the international seaport of Tanjung Priok, and the growing network of freeways. Since the end of the 1980s, no new industrial parks have been developed in Jakarta (Hudalah et al., 2013). Initiated by a collaborative project of Bumi Serpong Damai in the early 1980s, the periphery of Jakarta was also the location of several new towns. The first new town of Bumi Serpong Damai was planned for an eventual population of 600,000 in a total area of 6,000 hectares; a project developed by several private developers and led by the largest private developer – the Ciputra Group. In a number of these new towns, the State Housing Provider Agency (Perumnas) joined with private developers to assure some housing was targeted for low- and moderate-income families (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Most of the new towns offered relatively few employment opportunities. Their initial concept was to create self-contained communities but this was barely implemented. Instead, the new towns became “bedroom suburbs for citybound commuters” (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). The new towns were still heavily dependent on the central city (Firman, 1999; Silver 2008) and the development of large-scale housing projects intensified the daily interaction between the fringe areas and the central city of Jakarta. This worsened the traffic problems in metropolitan Jakarta. The development of industrial zones in the peripheries of Jakarta also indicated a spatial restructuring that shifted manufacturing from the central city to the periphery. Firman (1998) reported that the central city attracted disproportionate investment in service industries, trade and hotel, and restaurant construction. The peripheries attracted most of the industrial construction. These include textiles, apparel, footwear, plastics, chemicals, electronics, metal products and foods (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). The massive development on the outskirts of the megacity of Jakarta resulted from a series of deregulation and de-bureaucratization measures enacted by the Suharto government in the 1980s (Winarso and Firman 2002, p. 488). The subsidized housing finance program and municipal permit system for land development also contributed to policies that have most benefited some developers strongly linked to the New Order regime (Leaf, 1994).

Flooding and Land Subsidence Jakarta the megacity has experienced a tremendous population growth and faced a wide range of urban problems in the last few decades. Two major problems are traffic congestions and floods. Despite several programs to alleviate traffic congestion and flooding, the severity of traffic and flooding in Jakarta and its peripheries has not decreased. Floods have become a threat and bring increasing woes for Jakarta residents every year. In 2007, the worst floods in memory inundated about 70% of Jakarta, killed at least 57 people and sent about 450,000 fleeing from their houses. In 2008, floods

inundated most parts of Jakarta including the Sedyatmo toll road and nearly 1,000 flights in the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were delayed or diverted, with 259 being cancelled. In 2012, floods inundated hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways including the Ciliwung, Pesanggrahan, Angke and Krukut rivers and displaced 2,430 people (Jakarta Globe, April 5, 2012).  However, annual flooding is not the only threat to Jakarta’s sustainability — land subsidence has become a major threat and the exploitation of groundwater is one of the contributing factors that continued for many years. Land subsidence in Jakarta was first identified by researchers when the Sarinah bridge at Jalan M.H. Thamrin was found cracked in 1978 (Djaja et al., 2004). Since then, the measurement of land subsidence in Jakarta has been conducted and the rate of land subsidence has been increasing over years, particularly in the northern part of the city. In addition, the Jakarta Mining Agency reported variances over a 12-year period, from 1993 to 2005; the largest rate of land subsidence occurred in Central Jakarta. The above sea-level height of Central Jakarta was 3.42 meters in 1993. This dropped by 102 cm in 2005. The height of North Jakarta was only 1.46 meters above sea level in 2005, dropping from 2.03m in 1993. During the same period, West Jakarta, East Jakarta and South Jakarta have sunk by 2.11, 11.45 and 28.46 centimeters respectively (Jakarta Post, 28 April 2007). The Jakarta Mining Agency data showed that 80% of the city’s land subsidence is caused by building particularly high-risk towers, 17% by groundwater exploitation and 3% by natural causes (Jakarta Post, 23 August 2007). It also indicated about 5,100 hectares of land in North Jakarta would be submerged in 2020 and another 6,000 hectares in 2050 if no action was taken to mitigate land subsidence (Jakarta Post, February 7, 2011). The economy of Jakarta dominates its peripheral areas. In the daytime, the total population in Jakarta is much more than its population in the nighttime; the number of daily commuters in Jakarta is estimated at 5.4 million ( Suara Pembaruan , March 9, 2011). Jakarta is estimated to lose US$3 billion a year because of traffic congestion which can’t be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership (9 to 11 percent per year), unsupported by road development (less than 1 percent a year). Motorcycles are ubiquitous and can be acquired with a down payment of as little as $30. The daily jams in Jakarta are getting worse; the peripheries are a “bedroom suburb” for the daily commuters of Jakarta, the center of government and corporate offices as well as commercial and entertainment enterprises. Most commuters go to Jakarta to work, study in universities, and for entertainment and cultural activities. The acute traffic congestion has also prompted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to revisit the idea of the capital relocation outside of Jakarta. Relocating the capital out of Jakarta could reduce urbanization and the rate of car ownership in Jakarta and its surrounding areas, but it will not completely address the traffic congestion in Jakarta. Most metropolitan areas in the world with the population of over 10 million have operated metros for years. The main idea behind developing a mass transportation system, including the TransJakarta busway and the monorail and Mass Rapid Transit projects, is to reduce the number of motorists and motorcyclists on Jakarta’s streets. Drivers would be expected to use the mass transportation and reduce traffic, whereas new roads only attract more motorists. Not only would elevated roads stimulate induced demand and worsen traffic congestion, they could also jeopardize the livability of neighborhoods along them. However the new roads will only undermine the efforts to develop a mass transportation system in Jakarta.

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In order to address traffic congestion, two flagship projects are underway, including the development of Cilamaya Seaport and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project. For at least 20 years, the proposed MRT has been under discussion by the Jakarta administration and the government of Indonesia. Activists and non-governmental watchdogs have seen the MRT proposal as a possible bonanza for corrupt politicians and contractors (Economist , 4 February 2010). One MRT train will consist of six cars and be able to transport a maximum of 1,200 passengers per trip. The MRT Jakarta will operate 16 trains and transport 1.5 million passengers a day. The first MRT tract will connect Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta and the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle with six underground stations, seven elevated stations and a capacity of 173,000 passengers per day (Jakarta Globe, October 11, 2013).

Peripheral Pressures The megacity of Jakarta is home to 28 million people. Nearly two-thirds of the population live in the peripheral areas, still highly dependent on the center of the megacity. They commute to the center for most of their needs including jobs, schools, healthcare and entertainment. The main infrastructures that connect the center and the peripheries are three highways including the Jagorawi, the Jakarta-Cikampek and the Jakarta-Merak toll roads. There are very limited public transportation infrastructures connecting the peripheral areas and the center of the megacity of Jakarta. For years, traffic congestion has become a chronic urban problem. Unless there are reliable, accessible and affordable public transportation modes that connect the center and peripheral areas, the traffic congestions in the megacity of Jakarta will not be resolved. As long as Jakarta remains the primary growth machine of the nation, the economic growth of Jakarta will be strongly associated with the pace of Indonesia's economic growth, and will correspond to rapid urbanization in Jakarta. In addition, rapid urbanization in Jakarta was generated by an influx of migrants from other parts of the nation, particularly from poorer regions of Java Island. From 1995 to 2005, the average number of people who migrated to the peripheral areas of Jakarta was 1.6 million people per year. Poverty in rural areas of Java became a factor that pushed people from rural areas to urban ones. There is an inextricable link between the rapid urbanization in Jakarta and poverty in Java's rural areas. Alleviating rural poverty in Java will address not only the problems of the rural poor, but also reduce the pressures in and on Jakarta and its peripheries.