Patterns of Parliamentary Elite Recruitment in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis

13 Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment in Central and Eastern Europe A comparative analysis Elena Semenova, Michael Edinger, and Heinrich Best The initial configuration of elites proved crucial for the process of democratic consolidation across Eastern Europe. The significant differences between individual countries notwithstanding, these former communist satellites all experienced the collapse of their regimes and the rapid delegitimization of their old elites. New elites, however – whether within the nomenklatura or outside the structures of power altogether – could not fully seize power prior to the holding of free elections. In some Central and East European (CEE) countries, new configurations of power resulted from “negotiated revolutions” and “round table” compromises – pacts between the hardliners and reformers of the old elite on the one hand, and the moderates and radicals of the opposition on the other. These reform-minded, yet substantial regime changes have been termed “refolutions” (Garton Ash 1989). For two groups in particular, these regime changes presented a window of opportunity – namely, political dissidents previously excluded from public office, and technically educated secondary or tertiary elites inside and outside of the nomenklatura. The latter, who had dim career prospects under the gerontocratic recruitment patterns of the late-communist period, could use the transition to make the most of their experience and education, and to enter into the halls of political power, e.g., parliament, cabinet, and high-ranking administrative posts. The dissidents, although inexperienced in the practice of politics, found themselves with an unprecedented moral authority and, by the logic of an exceptional situation, became decision-makers almost overnight. Yet in many CEE countries, the regime turnover was marked by a dearth of suitable candidates for the new elite. This increased the likelihood that old communist politicians could “survive” the collapse of their regime, or re-enter politics after a brief absence. The scope of political elite circulation was taken as an indication of the comprehensiveness of the regime change, as well as the legitimacy of the new leadership (Higley and Lengyel 2000). The perceived correspondence between the composition of the new political elite and the durability of its regime reflected serious doubts about whether a democratic order could endure and flourish under the political leadership of the “old guard” (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995).

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 285 The relative power of old and new elites – or rather, the perception of their relative power – largely determined the initial formation of the post-communist countries. Both old and new elites left their imprint on the initial electoral laws, the responsibilities of the president, and the balance of power between legislatures and executive bodies, inter alia (Lijphart 1992). Constitutional decisions on the design of the system of government, the legislative process, and the structure of the courts, as well as policy decisions on how to adapt to a market economy, how to privatize state companies, and how to guarantee protections for political minorities, were left to the post-transitional parliaments. The post-communist members of parliaments (MPs) in CEE have been linked to society in specific ways. Parliamentarians were more than “mouthpieces” for socio-economic interests, or for the political preferences of their constituents. They rather made strategic choices and often followed their own political agendas. Divergence from popular opinion is often a sign of political leadership – and leadership, after all, is the trait that elected representatives are expected to display. Otherwise, the parliamentarian is merely the “puppet” of the volonté de tous, or of a particular faction of voters. As members of the political elite, MPs are expected to serve as decisive agenda-setters and professionals. Especially during the formative years after the fall of communism, the need for parliamentary leadership was acute in post-communist polities (Olson 1994: 13). That, in the early 1990s, groups and individuals formerly excluded from the political process suddenly gained access to parliamentary positions, poses a number of questions about parliamentary elite formation in post-communist Europe. These questions are addressed in the previous 11 chapters. In this conclusion (which also includes analyses on Bulgaria and Slovenia, for which only incomplete data are available), we identify recruitment patterns across national borders, discuss trends in elite development across the post-communist countries, and situate these findings within a broader institutional and theoretical framework.

New elites or old? Elite reproduction re-considered The collapse of Communism presented members of the former nomenklatura with new parliamentary selection procedures – secret, competitive, and usually party-based elections. For the first time ever, these old elites collectively faced the risk of deselection by the voters. That risk was especially acute because in the majority of the CEE countries, politicians’ handling of the communist past was seen as critical (Letki 2002). Strategies for coping with the legacy of Communism varied widely – from the implementation of lustration policies (in, e.g., Latvia, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and legal measures requiring former partisans of the old regime to identify themselves in public to willful ignorance of politicians’ former allegiances (in, e.g., Russia and Ukraine). The different ways in which these countries dealt with their communist past have implications for the quality of information available to contemporary political scientists vis-à-vis their post-communist elites’ affiliation with the old

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regime. In the countries with a formal lustration policy, for instance, MPs could have declined to indicate their affiliation with the old regime (at least during the early 1990s). Thus, the relevant data have been more easily available – and possibly more reliable – for some countries than for others.1 We have sought to be attentive to these discrepancies in our comparative analyses. Since 1990 the overall trend in CEE parliaments has been a decline in representatives with former communist loyalties. Since such experience is contingent on the age of the politician – young MPs recruited during the 2000s, for instance, could not have been affiliated with the old regime – this trend is unsurprising. Yet, in some countries the decline of former communists among parliamentarians has not been linear. In Estonia, for example, the proportion of MPs with nomenklatura positions or former communist memberships peaked in the late 1990s. After the 1992 elections in Lithuania, more than half of parliamentarians were rank-and-file members of the Communist Party (CP) – a 10 percent increase compared to 1990. In all CEE countries there has been little direct reproduction of the former communist elite – it was rare for the communist elite to retain their old positions throughout the course of the transition. Thus members of parliament in postcommunist regimes were almost never legislators in previous regimes. Russia was the notable exception: During the 1990s, former deputies of the People’s Congress comprised 17–23 percent of the State Duma. Slovenian legislative bodies also substantially overlapped before and following Communism: From 1992 to 1996, almost one-third of Slovenian MPs had prior experience in the communist parliament. Yet these two countries were deviant cases, rather than the norm. While such direct elite reproduction was rare, other patterns of elite reproduction were more common. One was vertical elite reproduction, usually timelagged, in which members of the second echelon of the communist elite were promoted to higher positions in post-communist regimes. The recruitment of local and regional communist politicians in Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Lithuania, for example, represents this pattern of reproduction. Similarly, former members of the national nomenklatura retained influence via the horizontal reproduction of power. These former nomenklatura members moved laterally, from different social and economic elite sectors to the sphere of (parliamentary) politics. Their numbers were largest in the early 1990s, particularly in the postSoviet and Baltic parliaments. In general, elite reproduction was a common phenomenon in post-communist countries. Especially in post-Soviet states where political transformations were initiated “from above” (King and Szelényi 2005), there existed a variety of opportunities for former communists to continue their political careers. In contrast, Central European countries that implemented reform “from below” – via a transition process characterized by mass mobilization against the communist regime – experienced a more comprehensive elite circulation (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995). In countries with “negotiated” transitions (e.g., Poland), reformoriented communists received their share of power after the transition.

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 287 A different logic applied in those countries where the post-communist transformation was accompanied by nation-building processes. Since certain communist elites supported nationalist movements, and occasionally even led them, their communist affiliations were less of a disadvantage. The predominance of the national question over the divide between communists and anti-communists explains, for example, why communist MPs have been frequently elected in Slovenia. In addition, the liberal political climate of this Yugoslavian republic during the 1980s provided few incentives to exclude former communists from the political recruitment pool (Adam and Tomsic 2012). Even in the Baltic republics, the share of parliamentarians with former leadership positions in the nomenklatura was around 20 percent during the 1990s (see chapters on the Baltic parliaments). While the general prevalence of elite reproduction can be related to the type of transition a country took from Communism, change of these patterns over time requires additional explanation. Fluctuations in the percentage of former communist politicians in CEE parliaments can be closely linked to electoral swings. The success of the Socialists and Post-communists usually led to an increased number of MPs with communist backgrounds. In Poland, for example, these figures peaked in 1993 and 2001, election years that propelled the Left Alliance to parliamentary power. The share of former communists has declined, in contrast, whenever Conservatives or Christian Democrats have fared well in elections. In Lithuania, for example, the number of communist party leaders and nomenklatura members fell by half after the victory of the conservative Homeland Union in 1996. Electoral swings also help explain the presence of former dissidents in CEE parliaments. They have been recruited by Conservatives, Christian Democrats, and Liberals, but rarely by Communists, Socialists or Agrarians.2 Strikingly, however, after the first post-communist elections only one in eight MPs across CEE had a record of oppositional political activity under the old regimes. Thus the prominent role that dissidents and the intelligentsia played during the transition – including, not least, the election of prominent political leaders such as Václav Havel (Czech Republic), Arpád Göncz (Hungary), Janez Janša (Slovenia), Lech Wałęsa, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Poland) – was not reflected in the overall composition of CEE parliaments. Among the countries for which data is available, only the Polish Sejm and the Lithuanian Seimas hosted dissidents in large numbers. By 2009 political dissidents have almost completely disappeared from the parliamentary arena in CEE. This cannot merely be explained in generational terms. Rather, it indicates that dissidents, however crucial in the toppling of ancien régimes, were ill-prepared for lasting political careers (Priban 2005) – a phenomenon that can be noted in earlier transitions as well (von Beyme 1996).

Major trends in elite recruitment and formation As Pareto (1901/1966) has shown, the established elite will inevitably face challenges from outsiders and counter-elites. Twenty years after Communism, we

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can ask how the composition of the post-communist elites has changed structurally, and what such changes imply for politics in CEE. We have divided our findings into three sections. First, we present the social and demographic profile of CEE post-communist parliamentarians. Second, the abolishment of the quota systems and emergence of new occupational groups has led to profound changes in the composition of the parliamentary elites, as we will show. Third, we discuss the professionalization of post-communist parliamentarians after the emergence of multi-party systems. The distinctness of parliamentarians Even before they are elected, parliamentary candidates usually possess distinctive professional and political features (Norris 1997; Cotta and Best 2007). Those MPs who perform well in inner-party races are typically even more distinctive. The net effect of this multilayer selection process has been characterized by Putnam (1976: 33–35) as the “law of increasing disproportion.” Our analysis of the social features of CEE parliamentarians indeed confirms their distinctness. Immediately after the collapse of Communism, the proportion of university-educated parliamentarians was above 70 percent, well over that of the general public. During the 20 years following Communism, this proportion has risen to over 90 percent. Even more than in Western Europe, higher education is a necessary credential for a parliamentary position in CEE. This trend, however, has motivated MPs to search for other intellectual distinctions, e.g., PhD degrees (Gaxie and Godmer 2007). In Russia and Ukraine, for instance, the recruitment of MPs with PhD titles has steadily intensified since the early 1990s. Since CEE parliamentarians tend to have high levels of education, social groups with fewer resources – both cultural and economic – experience insurmountable obstacles to entering parliament. In contrast to Western Europe, where early democratization was characterized by the inclusion of lower social strata (Best and Cotta 2000), few blue-collar or primary sector workers can be found among current CEE parliamentarians. University education is not the only necessary credential for entering parliament, either. In many CEE countries, women have a lower chance of becoming MPs. Although they officially proclaimed gender equality and introduced measures to integrate women into the job market (Millar and Wolchik 1994), communist polities were male-dominated nevertheless. Therefore, the social legacy of Communism “may be expected to dampen both the supply of female aspirants and the demand (among party gatekeepers and voters) for female candidates” in post-communist countries (Matland and Montgomery 2003: 36). After communist quotas were abolished, the proportion of female MPs decreased dramatically. In the early 1990s, women made up less than one-tenth of CEE parliamentarians (Table 13.1). Since the first post-communist elections the proportion of females in parliament has more than doubled, and stood at approximately 19 percent in 2009. The standard deviation of this indicator has also increased, however, suggesting growing differences between nations. The

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 289 Table 13.1 CEE parliamentarians’ social features by country: female members (%), mean age (years), type of university degrees (%) Women Mean agea

Type of university degreeb

All MPs New MPs

Law Humanities

Natural sciences

CZ (1992–2006) HU (1990–2006) PL (1991–2007) EE (1990–2007) LV (1990–2006) LT (1990–2008) HR (1990–2007) SI (1990–2008) RO (1990–2008) BG (1990–2005) MD (1994–2009) RU (1993–2007) UA (1994–2007)

14.3 9.2 15.9 15.6 13.7 14.1 12.8 12.8 8.4 15.6 14.1 10.7 6.9

46.0 47.4 46.7 47.7 46.9 49.0 48.8 47.0 47.5 45.9 49.3 48.2 47.7

44.8 45.6 45.2 45.9 45.8 46.7 47.5 46.1 46.3 44.4 47.6 46.5 44.9

10.7 21.9 18.7 11.3 13.3 7.1 21.1 14.3 13.2 20.5 13.3 12.9 14.9

23.7 49.2 40.9 42.7 40.5 42.7 46.3 60.7 31.9 44.4 38.1 38.1 42.3

65.9 35.2 41.5 50.0 53.8 50.1 32.6 25.1 54.7 40.6 48.6 53.0 51.4

Mean all

12.7

47.5

45.9

14.9 41.2

46.0

Source: authors’ own calculations. Notes a The first legislative term was excluded because almost all MPs were newcomers. b Entries can add up to more than 100 percent due to MPs having multiple degrees. Country codes: Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Croatia (HR), Slovenia (SI), Romania (RO), Bulgaria (BG), Moldova (MD), Russian Federation (RU), Ukraine (UA).

Bulgarian National Assembly is the only post-communist CEE legislature where women have held more than a quarter of the seats (in the 2001–05 term). While more women have been recruited as parliamentarians with each new election in Moldova, Estonia, and Poland, the share of female MPs in Romania, Ukraine, and Hungary has continually hovered below the CEE average. Over the last 20 years more than 90 percent of the seats in the Ukrainian Rada have been held by male MPs. During communism, quotas also ensured that a proportion of officeholders would be ethnic minorities. But after its collapse, the successor states of the former multi-nation empires (the Soviet Union or post-Yugoslavia republics) faced the challenge of balancing the interests of the majority against the rights of ethnic minorities. In general, parliamentary representation mitigates sympathies for secession (Zimmerman 1994; Diamond 1999) and increases minorities’ levels of satisfaction with democracy (Ruiz-Rufino 2013). Across the multi-ethnic countries of CEE, democratic elections have resulted in surprisingly diverse patterns of ethnic representation. In the parliaments of post-Soviet states (Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova), ethnic minorities have been well represented. Indeed, they have often been over-represented compared to their proportion of the general population (Edinger and Kuklys 2007). Ethnic

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representation in the Baltic states, by contrast, was low during the early 1990s. Amidst the fever of nationalist sentiment that fueled anti-Soviet independence movements, Russophone minorities were discouraged from seeking parliamentary representation – and many of them were not even entitled to vote as a result of the restrictive citizenships laws. Since the late 1990s, however, the share of minority MPs has increased across the Baltic parliaments (Crowther and Matonytė 2007), especially in Latvia (see the respective chapter). In some CEE countries (e.g., Romania and Slovenia), institutional rules that guarantee the representation of ethnic minorities – so-called “reserved seats” – have resulted in more ethnically balanced parliaments. A similar balance has been achieved in countries with ethnic political parties, which deliberately compete for the votes of particular minority populations. In Romania and Bulgaria, these parties have attracted large numbers of votes from their respective ethnic constituencies, guaranteeing them parliamentary representation and, since the late 1990s, often giving them a place in their countries’ governing coalitions. In contrast, Russian law has prohibited ethnic and religious parties since the mid 1990s. The average demographic profile of CEE parliamentarians clearly indicates a process of social closure. For example, middle-aged MPs (45–50 years old) are strongly over-represented in CEE parliaments. Although post-communist parliamentarians differ from their predecessors in many respects, the active recruitment of MPs with degrees in engineering, the technical and natural sciences has remained constant from the old regime to the new. During Communism, a technical or natural sciences degree was perceived as prestigious and relatively nonideological (Fitzpatrick 1979). In the majority of post-communist CEE parliaments, the proportion of MPs educated in the technical and natural sciences has been over 50 percent, on average (Table 13.1). Although a law degree has been common among politicians in the United States (Meinhold and Hadley 1995), only one in seven post-communist MPs has had legal education, and the proportion of practicing lawyers among MPs in CEE countries has always been small. Trends in MPs’ occupational backgrounds An analysis of MPs’ occupational backgrounds reveals a strong connection between certain social strata and parliamentary elites, thereby indicating that some social and professional groups in the (transformation) society have become more politically powerful than others (Putnam 1976). In the long history of Western European parliaments, representatives have typically been associated with public service, agriculture and business (Cotta and Best 2007). In post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, approximately half of the MPs have been drawn among four sectors: education, public administration, business and professional politics (i.e., from political parties, trade unions or other interest groups). In CEE, 14 percent of parliamentarians have been teachers and professors, well below the average for Western Europe (Best 2007). The average proportion

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 291 of MPs with experience in professional politics has been similar to the proportion with experience in education, while the high-ranking civil service and business are the most common occupations among CEE parliamentarians. Among these four societal sectors, only education has fallen in importance over the post-communist period. Over the past six legislative terms, the proportion of teachers and professors has declined from some 20 to 12 percent. Variances in the proportion of academic parliamentarians in CEE were low in the early 1990s and have decreased since, pointing to a process of convergence. Yet, there are notable differences: Whereas in the Baltic states and Bulgaria, educators make up a substantial share of deputies, their proportion in post-Soviet countries has been negligible (Figure 13.1). By contrast, the proportion of MPs with professional experience in political parties and interest groups has nearly doubled over the past 20 years, to approximately 14 percent in the fifth legislative term. It seems that political acumen and proximity to the “political class” have become increasingly important to the selectorates. There are, however, cross-country variances: professional politicians have been frequently recruited to the Czech and Croatian parliaments, but rarely to the Romanian Chamber of Deputies or the Slovenian National Assembly (Figure 13.1). 80 70

Percentage

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

CZ

PL

EE

Politics

LV

LT

HR* Country

Higher administration

SI

RO

Business

BG

RU

UA

Education

Figure 13.1 CEE parliamentarians’ main occupational backgrounds by country (%): education, economy, higher administration, politics (source: authors’ own calculations). Notes * In Croatia most higher civil servants (higher administration) were coded as being recruited from “politics” because they were considered political appointees. Hungary and Moldova were not included due to differences in coding.

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Similar to professional politicians, the proportion of high-ranking civil servants has grown over time. By 2009 approximately one in five CEE MPs had previous occupational experience as a high-ranking administrator.3 This proportion has been highest in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The parliaments of the post-Soviet and Baltic countries have been very accommodating for highranking bureaucrats as well. In Western European parliaments at the beginning of the twentieth century, businessmen were often recruited; later, they were displaced by professional politicians, lawyers, and educators (Best and Cotta 2000). Conversely, in CEE parliaments, the proportion of businessmen has increased over time, and by 2009 stood at 23 percent. More specifically, Russia and Ukraine have witnessed the highest percentages of business MPs in CEE, followed by Latvia and Lithuania. Changes in MPs’ occupational backgrounds point to important trends in the nature of CEE parliaments. Political parties do not only control access to parliaments, but also supply a pool of new recruits. The increasing recruitment of party employees indicates a growing degree of political professionalization. In contrast to Western Europe, educators’ initial access to parliaments was situ– ational; over time they have been substituted by occupational groups closer to the axes of political power. The civil service has also become an important pool for parliamentary recruitment, underscoring the politicization of the postcommunist CEE bureaucracies (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012). Finally, growth in the representation of businessmen indicates three important developments. First, political parties have become increasingly dependent on private financiers to fill their coffers. Second, a position in parliament also provides distinct advantages – including social networks, lobbying opportunities, and legal immunity – for businessmen. Third, we can observe that the growth of businessmen in CEE parliamentarians is inversely related to the process to political professionalization. In countries where parliaments are low professionalized and political parties remain weak (e.g., post-Soviet countries), businessmen have particularly good chances for entering the parliamentary arena (Semenova 2011, 2012b). Parliamentary professionalization and its limits The concept of parliamentary professionalization refers to two distinct developments. First, the institutional professionalization of legislatures implies the consolidation of the financial, personnel, and organizational resources to which parliamentarians have access, as well as an increase in the occupational demands that legislatures place on representatives (Squire 2007). In this sense of the term, post-communist parliaments have been professionalized since the early 1990s. In all CEE countries, a position in parliament is, in practice, a full-time job with considerable benefits. This form of professionalization accompanies increased political specialization among parliamentarians. Second, professionalization can refer to the growth of careerism in a legislative culture (Schlesinger 1966) and the emergence of a “political class” (Borchert and Zeiss 2003). In this sense, the

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 293 extent to which a parliament is professionalized can be assessed via the prior political experiences of parliamentarians, as an indicator for their “closeness” to the political process. When a parliament professionalizes in this sense, the insider–outsider differential widens, sometimes evolving into a form of social closure (Best and Cotta 2000). After the first post-communist elections, CEE parliaments were filled (mostly) with “political amateurs” – MPs without any political experience. Since these elections, however, CEE parliamentarians have gradually professionalized. In general, the proportion of newcomers – i.e., parliamentarians elected for the first time – has decreased. Whereas two-thirds of representatives were newcomers in the second post-transition elections, by the fifth legislative term their share had declined to half. This decline, however, has been accompanied by an increasing standard deviation (Figure 13.2). Whereas CEE parliaments were homogeneous vis-à-vis the influx of newcomers until the late 1990s, they have diverged since the turn of the century. In addition to the declining proportion of newcomers, the length of the average parliamentary career has increased (to approximately two terms of service, as of 2009). Post-communist legislatures have been gradually populated by longstanding MPs with three or more electoral victories. These MPs are the most experienced, and serve as socializing agents for newcomers. We distinguish between long-standing MPs who served three or more consecutive terms – core group I – and those whose careers were interrupted – core group II. In the fifth legislative term after the regime turnover, core group I accounted for 16 percent of CEE parliamentarians, while approximately 20 percent of representatives belonged to core group II. This indicates some stabilization and professionalization 80 Means

70.8

Standard deviation

70

Percentage

60

53.9 55.5

50

51.9

45.4

40 30 20

13.7 10.1

10 0

5.5 Term 2 (N
13)

6.5 Term 3 (N
13)

6.4 Term 4 (N
13)

Term 5 (N
13)

Term 6 (N
10)

Figure 13.2 The proportion of newcomers in CEE parliaments by term (%) (source: authors’ own calculations).

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among parliamentary personnel. A long tenure allows MPs to specialize in certain policy fields, to build stable professional relationships, and to “learn” the practical mechanisms of parliamentary decision-making. Prior political experience is another indicator of parliamentarians’ degree of professionalization. The fraction of “political amateurs” has substantially decreased over the last two decades. In the early 1990s almost 60 percent of the first elected MPs had no prior experience in politics. By the 2000s, this proportion had declined to approximately 34 percent. A high degree of political experience among MPs indicates the presence of career paths in a political system (cf. Borchert and Zeiss 2003). Among CEE parliamentarians, the most important type of prior political experience has been a leadership role in their political party or regional political office (Table 13.2). After the collapse of Communism, approximately one in four MPs had prior leadership experience in their political party. In the fifth legislative term, this proportion has increased to 34 percent. This increase has been most pronounced in Poland, Croatia, and Romania. During the same period, the proportion of parliamentarians with experience in local and regional political offices almost tripled, to 39 percent. The higher proportion of MPs with local and regional political experience indicates growing professionalization in regional political offices, and the formation of a vertical career ladder from one territorial level to another. There are noticeable crosscountry differences with respect to professionalization, however. Estonian parliamentarians, for example, have often gained prior experience at the local level. By contrast, such local experience has been of little importance for Bulgarian and Slovenian MPs since the collapse of Communism. In general, parliamentary professionalization in CEE has grown steadily over the past 20 years. Nevertheless, this process has had a limited scope (Edinger 2010). The average level of parliamentary turnover, for instance, has remained high. In Romania and Croatia, turnover has constantly remained over 50 percent, one of the highest in CEE. At the other extreme, the Czech and Hungarian parliaments have been characterized by low levels of turnover since the late 1990s and by high proportions of incumbents. Yet they have not reached the Western European level of elite stability (see the discussion of patterns of elite convergence below). Because of this turnover, the proportion of politically inexperienced MPs has remained substantial in at least some CEE parliaments (in Slovenia and Russia, inter alia). Unlike Western European and American legislators (Praino and Stockemer 2012), long-standing MPs have not always enjoyed career advantages within CEE parliamentary structures. In Lithuania and Estonia, long-standing MPs’ chances for assignment to parliamentary leadership roles (e.g., chair of a committee) have not been greater than those of newcomers (Crowther and Matonytė 2007). In addition, the recruitment of businessmen has weakened parliamentary professionalization. In many CEE countries such as Russia and Slovenia, political parties have unapologetically nominated businessmen without prior political

16.5 44.8 20.0 27.7 14.0 7.1 14.8 12.2 20.8 3.3 20.0 27.1

53.5 58.1 69.6 73.3 45.0 45.4 45.4 11.1 50.3 17.9 19.0 36.9

16.5 18.7 79.4 45.5 17.0 9.2 60.0 14.4 48.7 18.2 32.0 32.1

37.0 27.6 64.6 17.8 37.0 11.3 73.0 5.6 74.3 23.3 12.0 38.0

50.5 80.1 87.2 71.3 38.0 16.3 77.8 41.1 59.2 22.3 75.5 53.3

1994* 67.5 79.0 91.3 86.1 71.0 52.5 88.2 21.1 82.9 40.4 50.2 62.7

2009** 38.0 –*** 19.3 19.8 36.0 16.6 36.6 41.1 2.6 13.6 24.1 28.3

1994*

35.0 –*** 13.5 32.7 36.0 37.4 55.0 13.3 23.1 29.6 26.9 38.7

2009**

Notes * In the case of general elections in 1994: parliament elected in 1994; in all other cases: acting parliament as of 1994 (usually elected in 1992 or 1993). ** Acting parliament as of 2009; Bulgaria: parliament elected in 2005; Moldova: parliament elected in 2009 *** Hungary was not included due to differences in coding.

Source: authors’ own calculations.

CZ HU PL EE LV LT HR SI RO BG RU UA

2009**

1994*

1994*

2009**

politics and/or higher administration

in party politics

in local/regional politics

in at least one function

through occupation

in political offices . . .

Political experience

Table 13.2 CEE parliamentarians’ political experience in 1994 and 2009 (%)

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experience. In Ukraine, however, businessmen nominees have often held some prior political appointment. Such businessmen-politicians have especially been recruited by the Party of Regions, which has its stronghold in Eastern Ukraine (see the relevant chapter). The limits of professionalization in CEE may also be caused by institutional and structural impediments. The volatile party system in some post-communist countries has not only impacted the chain of delegation, but also stimulated destructive party dynamics – such as rapid changes in parliamentary party groups (PPGs) that often accompany party realignment among MPs. Since the 2000s many CEE countries have adopted legal measures – for example, increases in the electoral threshold, or limiting and even prohibiting party realignment among MPs – in order to minimize volatility. Concurrent with the increasing role of political parties as career gatekeepers, parliamentary volatility has decreased as a result of strengthened intra-party discipline and new renomination practices (cf. Heller and Mershon 2009). Professionalization has also been aggravated by the personalization of politics, which has been particularly widespread in post-Soviet countries (e.g., in Russia and Ukraine). The common practice of nominating candidates for their personality traits, celebrity status, financial resources, or ties to key selectorates (Semenova 2011) has served as a disincentive for candidates to gain prior political experience in these states.

Regional differences and country-specific patterns Our sample group can be categorized in different ways. We have suggested a combination of political, geographic, and historical criteria for distinguishing between them (see the Introduction). The first political distinction is between EU member states and post-Soviet nations without mid-term membership prospects (Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova). Among the former, we can further distinguish between those that joined the EU in 2004, and latecomers like Bulgaria, Romania (both 2007), and Croatia (2013). With regard to geography, history, and culture, the EU member states can be grouped into the Visegrád (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), the postYugoslav countries (Croatia, Slovenia), and Southeastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria). Some patterns of parliamentary recruitment are specific to certain country groups, while others hold across country groups. Parliamentarians in the Visegrád countries have been the most professionalized: upon their entry into parliament, MPs usually had leadership experience in local offices and in their political parties. Among these parliamentarians, the proportion of MPs recruited from political parties and interest groups is higher than the CEE average. The parliaments of these countries also share the highest levels of incumbency (on average, two electoral mandates per MP since 2000). On the other extreme we can place the post-Soviet countries. Over the past two decades their parliaments have contained the highest proportion of politically inexperienced MPs: They have rarely served in local offices or in the party

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 297 leadership. Moreover, business people and civil servants have dominated the post-Soviet parliaments. Despite having a substantial turnover rate, the level of political reproduction in the post-Soviet parliaments has also been very high. In terms of their recruitment patterns, the Baltic parliaments can be placed between the post-Soviet and Visegrád parliaments. Like their Visegrád colleagues, Baltic MPs often have gained local political experience. The proportions of female parliamentarians in the Baltic and Visegrád parliaments have been higher than those in the other CEE parliaments. At the same time, like the post-Soviet parliaments, technical and natural scientists have been overrepresented in the Baltic legislatures. Other parliaments have shown less distinct recruitment patterns. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, share some recruitment patterns with their post-Soviet counterparts – for instance, the high levels of politically inexperienced MPs, and high rates of turnover. In addition to similarities across countries, we discovered some recruitment patterns particular to specific parliaments. One trend specific to Russia, for instance, is the recruitment of MPs from the military and security services. Although military candidates were actively recruited during the 1990s, their representation in the parliament has intensified under Putin (since 2000). The political involvement of this group has stimulated many debates. Whereas Krystanovskaja (2004) has suggested that Russian politics are being increasingly “militarized,” Gaman-Golutvina argues in this volume that ex-military personnel do not comprise a coherent political bloc.

Elite convergence across Europe? Having identified the major patterns of parliamentary recruitment in CEE, we now turn to consider these developments vis-à-vis those in Western Europe over the past two decades (Best and Edinger 2005). Can we observe a process of elite convergence – as indeed one might expect after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the corresponding upturn in economic and political interdependence on the continent? Or were the initial differences between East and West perpetuated during this period? Three convergent trends in the development of the parliamentary elite – identical both in their direction and numerical strength – have held across Europe over the past 20 years. First, the average age at the time of their first election for both Eastern and Western European parliamentarians has been 45–50 years. Middle-aged MPs continue to dominate parliaments across Europe, as the small standard deviation indicates. Second, the declining recruitment of educators to parliaments in CEE parallels the same development in Western Europe. Although educators were approximately 20 percent of Western European parliamentarians from the 1970s to the 1990s, the proportion of educators had declined to under 15 percent by the 2000s (Best 2007). The same trend can be observed in CEE parliaments, where less than 12 percent of parliamentarians were educators in the 2000s. Finally, since 1990, the proportions of MPs who are professional politicians – drawn from political parties and trade unions – has fluctuated

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between 10 and 15 percent in both Western European and CEE parliaments. Differences in the recruitment of professional politicians have become more pronounced, however, as the rising standard deviation across Europe indicates. Moreover, many developments in post-communist elite formation have been appropriated from Western European parliaments. One obvious example is the rise in levels of female representation. Although the proportion of female MPs in CEE remains less than that in Western Europe (Paxton 2011), a slow convergence is underway. Over the 20 years since Communism, CEE parliaments have reached a level of female representation (almost 20 percent) approximate to the level that existed in Western Europe in the late-1980s. Across Europe, however, the standard deviation has increased. The parliaments of Western Europe have been more stable than their CEE counterparts. Further, with respect to parliamentarians’ level of prior political experience, CEE now stands at approximately the same stage that Western Europe reached shortly after World War II (Best 2007). Finally, while the average West European MP has enjoyed a long legislative tenure over the past 50 years (Cotta and Best 2007) – between two and three electoral mandates – the average tenure of post-communist parliamentarians stood at two mandates in the most recent elections covered by our data set. The high (but decreasing) levels of incumbency common in Western European parliaments have thus not yet reached CEE. In general, CEE parliaments have grown to resemble Western European parliaments over the last 20 years. There have been, however, three patterns of the parliamentary recruitment that have remained specific to CEE. The first has been the high level of formal education among parliamentarians. While the proportion of university-educated MPs in Western Europe reached 70 percent only in 2005 (Gaxie and Godmer 2007), the average in CEE has fluctuated around 90 percent since 1990, possibly due to higher rates of university graduates. The second unique feature has been the growing numbers of businessmen in CEE parliaments since the collapse of Communism. The proportion of Western European MPs with a business background has stood between 10 and 15 percent (Best 2007). In contrast, the proportion of businessmen in CEE parliaments was 23 percent as of 2009. While West European parliaments have been dominated by party officials and trade unionists, many CEE parliaments have been “captured” by private and state-owned businesses. Finally, the third difference has been the lower level of professionalization in post-communist parliaments.

The determinants of parliamentary elite development in CEE How are we to explain the differences in elite development within CEE, and how can we explain divergences between Western and Eastern Europe? One is tempted to point to the different institutional frameworks of these various contexts, which shape both the candidates, selectorates, and electorates (Norris 1997; Best and Cotta 2000).

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 299 Institutional configurations and electoral volatility Various institutional configurations influence politicians’ career paths (Borchert and Zeiss 2003). Changes in the electoral systems may help explain the composition of post-communist parliaments. On average, countries with proportional electoral systems have recruited more females and ethnic minorities to parliaments (Zimmermann 1994; Salmond 2006). Professional politicians have also been more frequently elected in these countries. This pattern was even evident in Russia and Ukraine, after these countries switched from a segmented electoral system to a proportional one. The abolition of single-member districts in both countries has strengthened political parties as gatekeepers of parliamentary careers. Some developments in parliamentary recruitment have not been affected by changes in electoral systems, however. In Ukraine and Russia, the recruitment of ethnic MPs has remained rather constant under different electoral configurations. Similarly, the change in the Estonian electoral system did not affect the increasing proportion of female MPs. Like electoral systems, the existence of an upper chamber of parliament is an important element of the structure of opportunities, as it increases the career choices available to MPs. In CEE countries with bicameral parliaments, the relevance of the upper chamber has varied widely. In Russia and Slovenia, the upper house has been less professionalized and is less powerful than the lower house. There has therefore been very little movement between the Russian Council of Federation and the State Duma (Semenova 2012a). Similarly, Slovenian MPs have rarely viewed entry into the upper chamber of parliament as a career goal. The Romanian and Polish upper chambers, by contrast, have developed into political arenas with distinct paths of entry. In both countries, a small proportion of lower house MPs began their political careers in the Senate. Perhaps the most interesting pattern can be observed in the Czech case, where parliamentarians have vacillated between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Moreover, movement from the upper to the lower chamber has become more frequent over time, indicating the growing attractiveness of the Chamber of Deputies to MPs and political parties (see the Czech chapter). Electoral volatility is another factor that influences parliamentary recruitment. Rapid changes in the electorate’s preferences can terminate the parliamentary existence of a party, just as it can put an abrupt end to a parliamentarian’s political career. At the same time, changing voting behavior may usher new political parties and their candidates into parliament. In either case, electoral swings determine the relative strength of a party vis-à-vis its competitors. Depending on the recruitment patterns of various party families, the composition of the parliamentary elite can be highly volatile. Changes in party representation have had a profound effect on elite formation. For example, the influx of educators and liberal professionals (e.g., doctors and artists) to CEE parliaments in the early 1990s sprang – at least in part – from

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the successes of the umbrella movements in the Baltic states (see the relevant chapters). The Socialists/Social Democrats and Communists – the successor parties of the pre-transformation communists – have recruited far more nomenklatura members than any of other party families. Furthermore, CEE Communists have had a high share of experienced politicians among their ranks. The Liberal party family across CEE has favored civil servants and managers as their representatives. Moreover, Liberals have recruited lawyers more frequently than other party families. While teachers and professors have been an important source of recruitment for Conservatives in CEE, Extreme Right parliamentarians have often been drawn from legal professions (e.g., judges). In all of these instances, electoral volatility has impacted the social, occupational, and political composition of the CEE legislatures – directly, by increasing turnover, and indirectly, due to the different recruitment preferences of the various CEE party families. European integration and Europeanization In the introduction to this volume we presented the interaction of parliamentary elites with the European Union in two ways: as a bottom-up process of European integration, and as a top-down process of Europeanization. European integration – the transfer of authority from national institutions to the supranational level – is an ongoing project that was accelerated with the Eastern enlargement of the EU. This process was paralleled by Europeanization, an important element of which was the gradual implementation of the acquis communautaire. The pre-accession process spurred a rise in females and ethnic minorities in most of the parliaments of those countries that became EU members in 2004. Official EU bodies, as well as pro-European political parties and PPGs, have encouraged CEE parties to recruit women in larger numbers. As a result, a number of (mostly left-wing) parties has introduced female quotas in the selection of their parliamentary candidates. The recruitment of female MPs has continued to rise after accession into the EU. Moreover, EU officials pressured the Baltic states (mostly Estonia and Latvia) to liberalize their citizenship laws, and which could be expected to lead to more ethnically balanced parliaments. Minority representation in the Baltic parliaments increased in the late 1990s, and continued to rise after accession. In Latvia, for example, approximately 20 percent of the 2006 parliamentary elite were members of the Russophone minority (see the chapters on the Baltic states). The transnational links of Western European national parties and the European PPGs also helped bring the norms of European integration to CEE, and alerted CEE party leaders to the dynamics of interparty competition (Pridham 2002). While European integration has led to some convergence among elites, it has also provoked a counterreaction and become an object of interparty conflict in some accession countries. Examples of such counterreaction are the emergence of anti-EU or Euroskeptic parties in Poland, or the growth of right-wing parties such as ATAKA in Bulgaria or Jobbik in Hungary.

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 301 Theoretical approaches In the introduction we sketched four theoretical approaches with which to explain parliamentary recruitment in CEE: modernization theory, elite theory, path dependency, and the notion of representation. In the following section we examine whether the above empirical analysis of our longitudinal data matches these theoretical approaches. Furthermore, we consider the extent to which these theoretical approaches facilitate comprehension of the mechanisms of parliamentary recruitment during the post-communist transformation. Modernization in a broader sense is understood as a progressive process through which less developed societies acquire the characteristics of developed societies. Political differentiation, the extension of political participation, and the rationalization of the elite selection mechanisms are characteristic of modernization (Huntington 1968). On the basis of modernization theory, one may therefore expect the recruitment of elites to become more competitive and merit-based; professionalization would increase, and parliaments would reach a higher degree of institutionalization. These unidirectional developments would lead toward a convergence of elites across CEE. Empirically considered, CEE parliaments have become more heterogeneous over the post-communist period, especially vis-à-vis the representation of women and ethnic minorities. Heterogeneity has been limited, however, as selectorates have favored highly educated candidates and those with prestigious professional backgrounds (e.g., civil servants). Limited social differentiation of elites has been accompanied by their limited professionalization. An increase in the proportion of MPs with prior political experience, as well as the growth of parliamentary tenures, have both been noteworthy. But even these developments have not been uniform across CEE. The majority of CEE countries have made some progress toward democratic consolidation over the past two decades – as modernization theory predicts. By 2011 the CEE member countries that joined the EU in 2004 were fully consolidated democracies, and the 2007 EU member states (Romania and Bulgaria) and Croatia were semi-consolidated democracies. In contrast, Ukraine and Moldova exhibited some undemocratic features, and Russia remained an authoritarian regime (Freedom House 2011). Path dependency theory emphasizes the importance of the initial situation for further political developments (Pierson 2000). Path dependency describes a process whereby a path established in the past holds an advantage over current alternatives. In most post-communist countries, elites chose democratization as the new path for their societies. According to the logic of path dependency, democratization should result in the stabilization of a democratic political regime over time because it becomes more difficult to change direction or to switch to a different path in the course of the transformation. Yet, this seems unlikely for the countries that were not fully committed to democracy after the breakdown of Communism. We might also expect parliaments with early signs of stability and professionalization to consolidate quickly, while unstable parliaments would reproduce existing deficiencies.

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The empirical evidence suggests that path dependency indeed explains the survival rates of former communist politicians in different CEE countries. Where the transition to democracy was initiated from “below” (e.g., in the Czech Republic), communists were forced to leave the representative elite. By contrast, in post-Soviet countries that experienced a transition from “above,” communist politicians maintained positions of power. More generally, different patterns of regime change often are later paralleled in patterns of parliamentary recruitment. In Romania, for instance, a violent and chaotic transition to democracy has been perpetuated in the limited professionalization of the parliament and continued parliamentary volatility. The Velvet Revolution in the Czech Republic, by contrast, produced another pattern. Compared to Romania, professional politicians have been recruited to the Czech parliament earlier and in greater numbers. Like the Czech Republic, other Visegrád countries had more experienced politicians in their initial post-communist legislatures than their CEE parliaments. This initial professionalization has become self-reinforcing over time, rendering relatively stable parliamentary cultures in these legislatures. In contrast to theories of modernization and path dependency, elite theory emphasizes the importance of ruling groups in democratization. According to this theory, so-called elite settlements – sudden and deliberate agreements between rival elites – and the emergence of consensually united elites are favorable conditions for democratization (Higley and Burton 2006). Countries with elite settlements should democratize faster, because elites agree on democratic principles of governance and are open to different socio-political groups. Higley and Lengyel (2000: 12–13) have argued that of all the CEE transitions, Hungary’s and Poland’s were the most successful because of the elite settlements behind them that contributed to the emergence of consensual elites in these countries. Our analysis suggests that initial elite settlements indeed stabilized parliamentary development, encouraging professionalization and the emergence of career politicians. Among CEE countries, those with elite settlements have recruited more professional politicians to their parliaments. Recruitment patterns in countries with consensually united political elites have proven more stable than other CEE countries. Yet as recent developments in Hungary and Poland suggest, initial elite settlements can be later challenged by parties excluded from power-sharing arrangements or by radical groups seeking to redesign “the rules of the game” (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010; Wasilewski 2010). Finally, concepts of representation link the elites to their electorates. The key actors in this linking process are political parties, which crystallize and articulate conflicting interests of different social groups on the basis of political cleavages (Rokkan 1970). In contrast to Western Europe – where class and religion have historically influenced electoral and party systems – different cleavages have proven to be important in CEE, such as the post-communists versus anticommunist divide and ethnic cleavages (Whitefield 2002). Since party cleavages represent “a form of social closure of social relationship” (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 216), traces of this process can be found in the

Patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment 303 composition of parliaments. The cleavage between communists and anticommunists manifested itself in the recruitment patterns of the communist successor parties. Unsurprisingly, contemporary Communists recruit the highest proportion of former old regime politicians. Cleavages between rural and urban electorates manifest themselves in the character of post-communist Liberal parties – which rely on cosmopolitan voters in urban areas – and Agrarian parties – which unsurprisingly enjoy high levels of support in rural areas (Berglund et al. 2004). Agrarians have recruited the largest proportion of MPs from the primary sector: 19 percent, against a CEE average of 3 percent. Agrarian MPs have usually been deep rooted in their constituencies, and most were politically engaged at a local or regional level before their nomination. The dissolution of multi-nation empires with the collapse of Communism triggered national movements in CEE. In some countries, ethnic divisions have been transfigured into parliamentary conflicts through the introduction of socalled ethnic minority parties. These parties usually contain few former communist politicians. The compact settlement of ethnic minorities in some CEE countries (e.g., Ukraine and Romania) means that ethnic MPs often gain local political experience prior to their national careers. In general, parliamentary representation in CEE has been shaped by political divides rather than by genuine political cleavages: here we use the definition of “cleavages” as the result of institutional, structural, and attitudinal differences, whereas “divides” are constituted by two of these three differences (DeeganKrause 2007). Some of these divides are reflected in parties’ recruitment mechanisms: Communists, Agrarians, and (to some extent) ethnic minority parties all selected MPs along these social faultlines. Although religious divides have engendered particular political parties (e.g., Christian Democrats), their recruitment patterns have been less specific. To summarize: these four theoretical approaches all contribute to a better understanding of the formation of the post-communist parliamentary elites in CEE. Moreover, as theories are not mutually exclusive, different empirical findings can be explained by different theories, or even multiple theories. The increasing recruitment of professional politicians, for instance, conforms to the expectations of elite theory as well as modernization theory. Likewise, differences in political stability of a country can be explained vis-à-vis the different paths taken at the moment of regime change, or from the character of the postcommunist elite settlements (or the lack thereof ). Some shortcomings of these theoretical approaches should be noted, however. The data partially support modernization theory, but we could observe neither linear nor universal convergence in recruitment patterns across CEE in the years since the regime change. This theory also makes it difficult to capture crosscountry differences in elite formation. Similarly, some of the expectations of path dependency were confirmed by our data, but this theory cannot explain diverse recruitment patterns across CEE countries with similar founding arrangements. The concept of representation properly captures some differences between the political parties that correspond to social divides. Yet in many CEE countries,

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political parties are weakly rooted in society, despite their status as selectorates for parliamentary positions. Finally, the elite theory finds empirical support in MPs’ professionalization in countries with initial elite settlements. This theory does not, however, account for reformulation of elite settlements by forces excluded from initial negotiations. Despite its limitations, it does add an actororiented perspective to analysis of parliamentary recruitment, emphasizing the power of elected officials to impact the polity, politics, and policies of their countries during periods of transformation. The empirical findings presented in the 11 country chapters and in this conclusion analyze the dynamics of elite recruitment in CEE over the last two decades, noting achievements to date and pointing to future problems. CEE parliaments have come a long way since 1989, and the parliaments of today have little in common with those of the communist period. Overall, their composition has become more similar to the parliaments of Western Europe during this transformation. However, the relative volatility of CEE parliamentary politics may continue to entice aspiring politicians with little interest in representing their constituents, and discourage MPs from working toward long-term political goals. The increasing representation of the business sector in CEE parliaments is even more problematic. While the parliamentary personnel might be expected to grow more economically competent, the sphere of economics continues to penetrate that of politics, and former managers directly participate in legislative politics. At its “worst,” this configuration may lead to the representation of private economic interests over voters’ interest. It is important to note, however, that these perils exist in CEE countries to various degrees. CEE assemblies are not monolithic but diverse (compare Olson and Ilonszki 2012). The end of the observation period in our study coincided with the emergence of a new challenge – the world financial crisis. It strongly affected economic developments in CEE, although its impact has varied across countries. Poland, for example, weathered the crisis relatively well. Many other CEE countries experienced a substantial decline in GDP. The Baltic states had been in recession before 2008, and therefore suffered a double-digit reduction in economic activity. These negative economic developments had profound consequences – from protests against austerity measures to the dissolution of governments in Latvia (2009) and Bulgaria (2013). Media reports have centered on the role of political elites in this crisis: their alleged “recklessness” and their problem-solving strategies. The crisis not only created a divide between Northern and Southern Europe, but also decreased the scope of practicable action for parliamentary elites, particularly in countries most affected by the crisis and forced to implement strict austerity measures. Moreover, external pressures from supranational institutions (to implement budget cuts, etc.) and the political interests of MPs have clashed, increasing parliamentarians’ risk of deselection. We may expect that the financial crisis has an impact on parliamentary recruitment in some CEE countries, although certainly less so than in Southern Europe.

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Notes 1 No data on communist affiliation was collected in the Czech Republic and Hungary. 2 Dissidents, on average, can be found three times more often among Conservatives and Christian Democrats than among Communists and Socialists. 3 In some CEE countries, civil servants have been political appointees. For the purposes of our analysis, we have chosen not to count appointed civil servants as professional administrators. Thus, in the data on Croatia, for example, the proportion of MPs with careers as civil servants appears to be very low, precisely because most Croatian civil servants are political appointees.

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