Electoral Studies xxx (2014) 1e6
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Notes on recent elections
The 2013 Honduran general election Patricia Otero-Felipe University of Burgos, Political Science Department, Hospital del Rey s/n 09001, 09001 Burgos, Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 7 March 2014 Received in revised form 31 May 2014 Accepted 7 June 2014 Available online xxxx Keywords: Honduras National elections Political parties
1. Background Until the elections of 2009, Honduras used to have one of the most stable party systems in Latin America. This country's late democratization during the 1980s did not alter the historical prominence of its main political parties: the Liberal Party (PLH) and the National Party (PNH). These two parties have headed the government since the first democratic elections of 1981. Moreover, the participation of other political alternatives e such as the Christian Democratic Party (PDCH) and the Innovation and Unity Party (PINU-SD) since 1981, and the Democratic Unification Party (PUD) since 1997 e did not alter the bipartisan structure of electoral competition where the national government, as well as most posts in Congress and the municipalities, were seized by the PLH and the PNH. There are two factors that have fostered this stability: first, the internal fractionalization of both parties has allowed the existence of internal factions within the parties that represent different ideological positions and social groups.1 Therefore, there were no significant differences in the policies that were implemented by the PLH or the PNH when they headed the
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[email protected]. This feature has been more pronounced in the PLH where conservative and progressive factions have coexisted within the party ranks, whereas most of the PNH members have leaned towards the right. 1
national government. The second element is the prominence of clientelism as the source of linkages between parties and citizens in Honduras. Because of the lack of ideological differentiation between the main parties of Honduras, the privileged access to public resources that the PLH and PNH have enjoyed gave them a clear cut electoral advantage over the smaller parties. This long-term pattern of stability was broken in 2009 when a parliamentary coup ousted President Manuel Zelaya (PLH) from power in June 27th, because of his intention to celebrate a non-binding referendum asking whether to include a fourth ballot convening a new National Constituent Assembly (ANC) in the subsequent elections. This event, which was the culmination of several conflicts between Zelaya's administration and the other branches of government, triggered the worst political crisis in the democratic history of Honduras. However, it also revealed that the causes of this crisis were rooted in structural and political factors that were related to unsolved chronic socio-economic problems and the failure of political representation. In fact, four years later the effects of the crisis were still noticeable in the Honduran society, which was divided between those who supported Zelaya's project and those who defended the previous status quo. Subsequently, this polarization was translated to the political arena where the traditional parties experienced several instances of internal
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division. This situation was experienced more intensely by the Liberal Party, which suffered the defection of several of its prominent members. Nevertheless, the most important consequence of this exceptional scenario was the creation of new political parties that received the support of the citizens that were critical of the traditional parties. When Honduran citizens went to the polls on November 24 of 2013, they were able to choose between old and new political options. The former category consisted of the PNH and the PLH, which were situated at the right end of the ideological spectrum, and three small non-traditional parties: Innovation and Unity Party (PINU-SD), Christian Democratic Party (PDCH), both of them centrist parties, and the leftist Democratic Unification Party (PUD). On the other hand, four new political organizations competed. Two of those parties came from the FNRP (National Popular Resistance Front), which was the social movement that supported the restitution of president Zelaya and advocated for a National Constituent Assembly in the aftermath of the coup of 2009. The first and most relevant one was the Liberty and Refoundation Party (LIBRE), which is the party led by former president Manuel Zelaya. It embraced many Liberals who left the PLH after the coup, along with other citizens that came from social movements and labor unions. Composed of five internal movements, this party presents a wide range of leftist positions in the country.2 The other party that emerged from the FNRP was the Broad Political Front in Resistance (FAPER), which was also formed from popular organizations and former members of other political parties. On the other hand, two new conservative forces were created: the Anti Corruption Party (PAC), led by a popular sports journalist Salvador Nasralla, and the Patriotic Alliance, a party that was created by former military Romeo Vasquez.3 Overall, there were nine political organizations vying for representative posts in the general elections which represented several ideological positions from the left to the radical right. For the first time, some non-traditional options had real chances to transform the two-party system and change Honduras' political dynamic. Furthermore, the socio-economic situation of the country was very delicate. On the one hand, and despite relatively modest levels of economic growth of about 2.5%, the Honduran State has experienced an accelerated growth of its debt resulting in a fiscal deficit of 7.7% of the GDP, which will condition the policies enacted by the new government. Moreover, President Porfirio Lobo's administration leaves a high unemployment rate and increased levels of inequality and poverty, which has not stopped growing since 2009 e66% of the population lives below the poverty line (UNDP, 2012). Even more serious is the escalation of violence. The country has experienced a rise of violence linked to criminal gangs and organized drug trafficking organizations. Honduras is one of the most violent
2 Movimiento Resistencia Popular (MRP), Liberales en Resistencia 28 de n Junio, Pueblo Organizado en Resistencia (POR), and Fuerza Refundacio Popular (FRP). 3 Vasquez was the General who executed the arrest warrant on Zelaya in 2009.
countries in the world with 90 homicides per 100,000 residents, e in 2005 it was 46 per 100,000 (UNODC, 2013). In this sense, the 2013 Honduran elections have certainly been the most important and complex ones since the establishment of democracy. Despite the novelty of the new contestants, the rules that regulated these elections did not undergo major changes. National and local elections took place the last Sunday of November 2013, like every four years. The president was elected by simple majority, along with the three “Designados Presidenciales”4 (re-election is not permitted), and in the same ballot the Hondurans voted for the PARLACEN candidates. The 128 members of Congress were selected in 18 constituencies or “departamentos” with a district magnitude that ranges from 1 to 23. Since 2005, these legislators are elected from an open-list with a panachage ballot in which voters can vote for as many candidates as their district magnitude. The formula to translate votes into seats is the Hare method with largest remainders, except in two single-member constituencies where a majority rule is used. This system has allowed small parties to achieve representation, although they had never threatened the dominance of the Liberal and Nationalist parties. The Electoral Law was amended in 2012 in order to increase the female quota, which was moved from 30% to 40%, for members of the party structures and positions in candidate lists.5 However, given the open list system in the primaries, there is a discrepancy between the percentage of female candidates that run in the primaries and the proportion who actually achieve a candidacy. For example, the percentage of female candidates in legislative primaries was 45.1%, 45.1% and 44.5% for the National, the Liberal and LIBRE parties respectively, but only 35.9%, 35.1% and 31.2% of women appeared in the final ballot. 2. Candidates and campaigns In Honduras, the formal campaign starts 90 days before the Election Day. However, those parties with internal factions, such as the PNH, PLH, and LIBRE, start their informal campaigns one year before the voters go to the polls when they carry out their primary elections. In these processes, which took place on November 18 of 2012, Hondurans voted in open primaries to select municipal, legislative and presidential candidates, while party sympathizers' were called to elect partisan authorities that would control the party structures. Apart from resulting in the allocation of candidacies and party leaderships, these internal elections also provided a first assessment of the true electoral strength of LIBRE. The primaries also showed the ability of the PNH to mobilize their party machine, since it was the party with the highest turnout in the presidential, legislative and municipal primaries. Juan Orlando Hernandez e then president of
4
They are similar to vice-presidents. Articles 105 and 116 of Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas (2004). This female quota will be 50% in the next primaries and electoral processes. 5
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Congress and known as the Dauphin of President Lobo e and his movement “Azules Unidos” won the presidential nomination of the National Party. They defeated Ricardo Alvarez, the Major of Tegucigalpa, and his group “Salvemos Honduras”. The internal elections also confirmed the triumph of the traditional Nationalism over the more modern factions of the party. As regards the PLH's primaries, they were a test to its resilience and capacity of recovery from the internal division generated after the crisis of 2009. Mauricio Villeda Morales, a representative of the most conservative wing that supported the destitution of Zelaya, won the presidential nomination and the presidency of the party. With respect to LIBRE, their presidential candidate was Xiomara Castro e Manuel Zelaya's wife e who was supported by all five internal factions of the party in the primary. More significantly, the support for the candidates of LIBRE in the legislative primaries showed that this party could displace the PLH as the second political force in Congress (Otero-Felipe, 2013). After the primaries, the efforts of the two main traditional parties focused on the unification of the different factions and pointing out the danger of a leftist government headed by LIBRE. Hernandez joined Alvarez in a successful strategy which provided the votes of the Nationalist urban supporters. He also distanced himself from president Lobo, due to his low popularity levels. During the campaign, numerous episodes of violence and intimidation were reported, especially against candidates and activists of LIBRE (Spring, 2013; FIDH et al., 2013). Public safety and violence were the main issues in all party programs and political discourses because the country had experienced a rise in homicide rates and unprecedented levels of violence related to drug trafficking during President Lobo's administration. Other relevant themes were poverty, corruption, institutional and economic crisis, which were recurrent topics from previous elections. However, this time the presence of new contenders enhanced the range of positions in the policy agenda from more progressive (LIBRE, FAPER, and PUD) to more conservative (PNH, PLH, and PAC). Still, the candidates did not delve into specific policies or solutions for the endemic problems. The pre-electoral polls, which are permitted until 30 days before the elections, showed that there was a close two-way race between Xiomara Castro and Hernandez since summer. On the other hand, Villeda and Nasralla stalled in third and fourth place respectively. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding who would win the presidency and the majority of Congress remained until the day of the election. The legislative campaigns presented some special features that resulted from the establishment of the open list system in 2005. Since the candidates are now less dependent on the party to win their (re)election, and the independent voters are growing every election, the candidates now focus their campaign messages on their constituency service and legislative work. As a result, these campaigns have become much more expensive and longer, which has raised questions about the origin of their funding. 3. Results of elections It seems that the presence of new political parties and new faces in the presidential race augmented the interest
3
in this election as pointed out by the increase in the levels of voter turnout, which rose to 60.38%. It was the highest level of participation ever registered in a presidential election in this country, breaking a long time trend of declining turnout. The day of the election was relatively peaceful, and international observers reported that the elections were fair and clean. However, they pointed out several irregularities related to voter registration, the lack of transparency on campaign funding, the inequality of media access between big and small parties, and the use of institutional advertising by the governing party. Moreover, it was also indicated there were negative effects of a politicized Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) where not all parties are included. Other reports mentioned several problems that cast doubts about the transparency and fairness of these elections.6 On The 30th of November the TSE proclaimed Juan Orlando Hernandez the winner of the Presidential election with 36% of the total votes. Nevertheless, PAC and LIBRE claimed that there was fraud in the election. In fact, both parties asked for a recount of all votes in the presidential race, but the TSE declared their claims unfounded. LIBRE submitted an appeal to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court about the presidential elections, but it was dismissed (La Prensa, 2013). Hernandez was the most voted candidate in 13 of the 18 departments of the country, and he also won the majority of votes in all the USA cities where Hondurans voted.7 De Castro, from LIBRE, was the second most voted candidate with 28.79% of the votes, obtaining strong results in the Eastern part of the country. Villeda (PLH) placed third, showing that he did not retain support among the traditional liberal bases, and his party had the worst electoral results in its history. In fact, the vote concentration of the two traditional parties, PNH and PLH, was much lower. Whereas in the elections that took place between 1981 and 2009 both parties got 90% of the votes in the presidential races, in this election they just obtained 57% of the votes. The data also show that the PLH lost a lot of urban votes, which were seized by the PNH and LIBRE. Salvador Nasralla from the PAC was fourth, but he achieved good results in the second largest department, Cortes, and the cities of the United States. The four minor candidates, Jorge Aguilar s Pavo n (alliance PUD-FAPER), Orle Solís (PINU), Andre squez (Patriotic Alliance), together (PDC), and Romeo Va attracted less than 1 percent of the total vote. As it was expected, the legislative election produced a fragmented Congress, which points towards the possibility that Hondurans did not split their tickets once again; but more importantly, the results confirm the transformation of the traditional two-party system. The Nationalist Party won 48 of the 128 seats available; although it increased its number of votes, it lost 23 seats with respect to the 2009 election (Taylor-Robinson, 2011). LIBRE was the second
6 Besides bribery and vote-buying outside voting centers, it was reported that some small party delegates sold their votes in the polling places. 7 Miami, New Orleans, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Atlanta, and Washington.
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Table 1 Election results. Party (presidential candidate)
Presidential election
Legislative election
#Votes
%
#Votes
%
Seats
Parlacen Seats
Municipal election Majors
National Party (Juan Orlando Hernandez) LIBRE (Xiomara Castro) Liberal Party (Mauricio Villeda) PAC (Salvador Nasralla) PDC (Orle Solis) Alianza Patriotica (Romeo Vasquez) PINU (Jorge Aguilar) FAPER (Andres Pavon) ePUDa
1,149,302 896,498 632,320 418,443 5194 6105 4468 3118
36.89 28.78 20.30 13.43 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.10 e 95.12 3.30 1.58 100 60.38
48 37 27 13 1 0 1 0 1 0
183 31 83 0 1 0 0 0
e 3,115,448 108,171 51,727 3,275,346
33.64 27.51 16.97 15.15 1.62 0.99 1.83 0.47 1.71 0.11
6 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indep. Valid vote Null Blank votes Total Turnout
9,255,904 7,568,392 4,670,157 4,169,245 444,734 272,398 504,684 128,488 469,825 28,971
27,512,798
100
128
20
0
298
a PUD and FAPER were in coalition for the legislatives in three departments (Copan, Gracias a Dios, and Intibuca). Source: La Gaceta, Republic of Honduras, Declaratoria Final of the TSE 12 December 2013 and TSE webpage
most voted party with 37 seats, capturing the electoral support of former liberal voters. The Liberal Party was relegated to the third place. It was not able to improve its results of the 2009 election when it got 45 deputies; in this election they won just 27 seats. The Anti-Corruption party (PAC) successfully entered in Congress with 13 seats. The three smallest traditional parties (PDC, PINU and PUD) obtained one seat each, which saved them from losing their right to be registered as a party. Since FAPER and Alianza Patriotica failed to get a minimum of 2 percent of votes at the presidential level, and they did not get any Deputy either, they disappeared because they did not fulfill the requirements established in the Law on Elections and Political Organizations. As regards female representation, which had dropped in 2009 to 19.5% of the seats in Congress, it rose in this election to 25.78%. Although 33 women were elected, it is still far from the goal of 40% of the available seats (see Table 2). This time Hondurans supported the new parties and voted for new faces: in the 2014-18 Congress only 48 deputies were re-elected (37.5%), 29 of them belong to the National Party, 14 to the Liberal Party, 1 to the Democratic Unification (UD), another to the Christian Democrats (DC) and two to LIBRE - former liberals Eleazar Juarez, and Denis Sanchez. This was a very similar percentage of incumbents as in 2009 (39.4%). Despite the results of the presidential and legislative elections, the municipal races kept the bipartisan pattern shown in previous years. Most of the elected mayors belong to the National and Liberal parties (see Table 1). The historical roots of PLH and PNH, along with the ability to mobilize their party machines, have allowed them to keep their dominance at the local level and they have also hindered the territorial penetration of small parties. The PNH won both the political (Tegucigalpa) and the economic capitals (San Pedro Sula). However, LIBRE swayed some Mayoral victories from the Nationalists and the Liberals in the most urbanized regions. Finally, in the elections for the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), which were included in the presidential ballot, the PNH won 6 deputies,
LIBRE 5, PLH 3, PAC 2, PINU 1, UD-FAPER 1, and Alianza tica 1. Patrio 4. Discussion President Hernandez took office on January 27of 2014, leading a consecutive Nationalist administration for the first time in the democratic history of this country. He presented a cabinet of 15 ministers, with only 3 women, some of whom had worked in the administration of former President Lobo (El Heraldo, 2014). It is important to note that, during his last months as President of Congress, Hernandez launched his policy agenda, which included controversial measures regarding security (military police force), and fiscal policies. However, much of his presidency will be tested in Congress because the parliament is no longer dominated by the two traditional parties. In this sense, the PNH and Hernandez have less power compared to the amount they enjoyed in the previous term. As a result of this election, the Honduran Congress shows a very interesting conformation that permits different coalitions in order to pass legislation, but all of them point at the PLH as the key party in the parliamentary bargain. Hernandez can look for support of both the Liberal Party and the Anti-Corruption Party, and hold the 86 votes needed for the qualified two-thirds majority in extraordinary legislation, or just get enough votes to achieve a simple majority with the PLH.8 Conversely LIBRE can negotiate with PAC and the small parties, in order to achieve certain legislative goals.9 However, they need an alliance, formal or not, with the PLH in order to get the necessary votes, and that is very difficult to happen due the recent past of Zelaya and the Liberals.
8 Although it is less likely, the PNH could also look for an alliance with LIBRE and other small parties in order to get the qualified majority. 9 See the pact “Gran Acuerdo por la Gobernabilidad de Honduras” between LIBRE-PAC and PINU signed on 15 January 2014.
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P. Otero-Felipe / Electoral Studies xxx (2014) 1e6
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Table 2 Representation of Parties by Department, # of seats won by female candidates (f) and reelected deputies (r). Department (# seats) Atlantida (8) Colon (4) Comayagua (7) Copan (7) Cortes (20) Choluteca (9) El Paraiso (6) Francisco Morazan (23) Gracias a Dios (1) Intibuca (3) Islas de la Bahia (1) La Paz (3) Lempira (5) Ocotepeque (2) Olancho (7) Santa Barbara (9) Valle (4) Yoro (9)
Reelected Female candidates Total
PNH
PLH
3 (1f; 2r) 1 (1r) 3 (2r) 3 (1r) 5 (2f; 3r) 4 (1f; 1r) 3 (1f; 2r) 8 (1f; 5r) e 1 (1r) e 1 (1f; 1r) 3 (2r) 1 (1r) 3 (1f; 2r) 4 (1f; 3r) 2 (1r) 3 (1f; 1r)
2 (1f; 1r) 1 (1r) 1 (1f) 2 (1r) 3 (2r) 2 (2r) 1 (1r) 4 (3f; 3r) 1 1
29 10 48
LIBRE 2 (1f) 2 (1f) 2 (1f) 2 (1f) 5 (2f) 2
PAC
PDC
PINU
PUD
FAPER
ALIANZA
1 (1f) 0
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
1 (1r) e
e
e
e
e
e
e
1 (1f) 0 6 (1f) 1
2 (1f) 6 (1f) e 1
0 3 (2f) e e
1 (1r) e e
1 (1f) e e
e
e
e
e e
e e
e e
1 1 (1r) e
e 1
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
2
e
e
e
e
e
e
1
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
1 (1r) 1 (1r) 1 (1r) 2 (1f)
3
e
e
e
e
e
e
4 (1f; 1r) 1 (1r) 3 (2f)
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
15 6 27
2a 11 37
e 5 13
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
e e 0
e e 0
a Before PLH. Source: Compiled by author from TSE.
In this sense, the first sessions at the National Congress have shown the potential legislative dynamics that we can expect during this term: the composition of the Congress Directorate was agreed between the PNH, PLH, PUD, PDC, and a deputy from LIBRE (who was subsequently expelled from the party) (La Prensa, 2014). This episode revealed that, despite their differences, the alliance of Nationalists and Liberals may be a common practice in order to boost their government plan and curb some of the reforms that may be proposed by representatives of LIBRE and PAC. This situation is not surprising, considering that both have alternated in power and have held pacts during the last 30 years, and the conservative wing now controls the PLH. On the other hand, the long term consolidation of the change in Honduras' party system will depend on both new forces, LIBRE and PAC. Internally, LIBRE must deal with the diversity that comes from being the political arm of a heterogeneous set of social organizations (FRNP). Regarding the PAC, it must face the challenge of structuring a discourse beyond the fight against corruption. Moreover Salvador Nasralla, will have to exercise an effective leadership in order to control an inexperienced legislative
group. For both of them it is important to consolidate a social base, and to organize the party structure along the entire country. In such a clientelistic context as the one found in Honduras, the Liberals and the Nationalists not only have better linkages with powerful groups, but they also retain a strong party machine. In any case, it is obvious that the political crisis of 2009 has changed the political and social landscape, but this new situation does not eliminate the serious economic, institutional and security challenges that President Hernandez's government will face. However, Honduras' political forces have the opportunity to build a common front and undertake policy and institutional reforms.
References Declaratoria Final of Tribunal Supremo Electoral, 12, December. El Heraldo, 2014. JOH completa su gabinete de gobierno, 30, January. n Internacional de Derechos Humanos (FIDH), Centro de Federacio n y Promocio n de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), Investigacio de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (COFIDEH), 2013. Comite n y grave atentado contra el Elecciones en Honduras: Militarizacio Poder Judicial.
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La Prensa, 2013. Corte Suprema rechaza amparo interpuesto por Manuel Zelaya contra elecciones generales, 2, December. La Prensa, 2014. Mayoría elige directiva en propiedad del Congreso Nacional de Honduras, 26, January. Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas. Decreto No 44-2004. Otero-Felipe, P., 2013. El sistema de partidos de Honduras tras la crisis política del 2009: ¿el fin del bipartidismo?”Colombia Internacional, N 79.
Spring, K., 2013. Context of the Honduran Electoral Process 2012-2013: Incomplete List of Killings and Armed Attacks Related to Political Campaigning in Honduras. In Risk Action.org. Taylor-Robinson, M., 2011. The Honduran general elections of 2009. Elect. Stud. 30, 369e372. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2013. Global Study on Homicide. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2012. Statistics.
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