Parties and political identification Bulgarian Case

Parties and political identification
Bulgarian Case


The political identity of the Bulgarian always has in itself the need of
an external argumentation of the political power. If we accept the idea of
an external justification of the political presence and biased attitudes,
we should separate two levels of analysis of the party political identity:
an internal and an external one.
1. Internal level of analysis of the political identity. Most interesting
for the analysis, I think, are the following "centre-periphery" relations:
Those within the party, the stratificational, and the territorial
relations.
1.1. Relations within the party
The major political parties in Bulgaria were formed or restored after 1989,
with the mechanisms of organisational functioning undergoing a number of
transformations. From the very beginning a mark of the new democratic time
was the removal of the principle of democratic centralism, a major one for
the communist party. In fact, the change of that party consisted in the
rejection of this organisational principle, in a change of the name, a
change of management and the name of the newspaper. That did not
automatically lead to a democratisation of the socialist party, but it also
did not affect the democratism of the other organisations.
First, because a number of them restored their structures, party
newspapers, and even managements - the most indicative example is that of
Anastasia Mozer, daughter of the leader of one of the prohibited agrarian
parties, who has been leader and deputy since 1990 until today, after
returning from exile.
In fact, those parties rather carry on the archaic traditions from the 19th
century which have not adapted to the contemporary conditions in any way.
A second, because the new parties, which were created over the first months
of change, are not concerned about attaining an effective party
functioning, but are rather interested in getting as further away as
possible from the notion of a party which the Bulgarians have until that
moment. So, during this first period which continued until 1994, none of
the Bulgarian political parties cared about establishing practical
relations between the centre and the party structures. The most important
condition - both for the new democrats and the ex-communists, remained the
condition that their party does not resemble in any way the former BCP
/Bulgarian Communist Party/. It came to paradoxical situations in the
statutes of the Bulgarian parties of establishing disintegrating
organisational principles. In fact, the first 5 years of Bulgarian
transition were implemented by parties lacking and not even recognising the
party mechanisms as a basis for the political integration of society. The
only party which did not give up a distinct centralisation and a pyramidal
connection between the centre and the periphery is MRF /Movement for Rights
and Freedoms/. But this political organisation has an absolute democratic
alibi for the adopted authoritarian style of relations - the national
revival process 2. If we were to name this period, it would be most precise
to call it - anti-party.
One of the first paradoxes of the Bulgarian democracy was thus defined. On
the one hand, those were years during which about 200 political parties
were registered in Bulgaria. One of the main attainments of democracy was
considered to be achieving party pluralism. On the other hand - the
political parties, which obtained the trust of electors and were charged
with the implementation of transition, in fact moved away from setting up
"centre-periphery" relations. Moreover, they objected to the existence of
parties with a clear structure and relations. In fact, during this period
was the start of the anarchistic attitude toward the political party which
underlies the Bulgarian political identity.
The second period - from 1994 until 2001, was marked by the reestablishment
of the role and significance of the centre-periphery relation in political
parties. The basis for that was the transformation of UDF /Union of
Democratic Forces/ from a union of 16 organisations to a political party.
The representatives of the right-wing group in the country have two main
objectives: setting up a stable and clearly defined hierarchical structure
managed by the centre and united enough to oppose the left-wing group. For
its part, the Socialist Party continued to insist on decentralisation both
on an organisational and a political level.
What turned the BSP /Bulgarian Socialist Party/ into a stable and united
organization was rather the traditional political culture of its
sympathisers and members than the clauses in the statutes and the practice
of the organisation. Despite the multilevel management and the division to
the extent of depriving the central management of a practical ability to
impose a policy, the socialists learned from their hundred-year experience
to accept without criticism the decisions of the centre, as well as to
await from management decisions which to abide by.
Two parallel processes gradually developed. Centralisation grew stronger in
the right wing to the extent of a complete rejection of transparency and
control of the leader, and at the end of the period there were even
elements of cult of the personality of Ivan Kostov /founder of UDF/.
Decentralisation grew stronger in the left wing to the extent of a full
disregard of management and the establishment of a number of "local feudal
lords". So in the early 2001, the anti-party nature of the political
identity of Bulgarians was a stabilised feature, though for various
reasons.
Two types of parties operated in the country - the central-authoritarian
(UDF, ВМРО, Euro Left) ones and those focused on their periphery (BSP).
Neither type could give electors identification motives for affiliation,
since they became a permanent source of guilt and shame.
In 2001, after the arrival of Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha 3, started the third
period which had an impact on the Bulgarians' political identity. The
beginning was marked by the nearly complete rejection of the political
parties - about 1 200 000 traditional electors of BSP and UDF voted this
time for Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha's movement which was not even registered
by the law and thus participated in the elections through the registration
of two marginal parties.
Only a year later there was a tendency towards regaining the positions of
2001. The main question regarding that "party" identification indicator was
to what degree tradition would be decisive.
The political practice in Bulgaria after 1989 was a factor acting
destructively on the party identification. A basic feature of the Bulgarian
political identity was the anti-party feature. The impossibility to "see"
themselves in any one or other political party made Bulgarians oppose the
parties and reject them as subjects of the political action. The main
results of this fact were positive for the development and functioning of
civil society. A relationship of competitiveness in politics was motivated
and of supporting the right that politicians should protect the interests
of citizens.
At the same time, anti-partiness as a behavioural model could not lead to
positive practices, since in the Bulgarian society the ties at social level
were broken.
1.2. Stratification relations. It is banal to say that social relations are
multi-dimensional. But it is true. Thus, though in a few words, it is
necessary to justify the at-first-sight one-way approach to them.
A key factor for the political identification of citizens is the influence
of their economic interests. This means that the stratification structure,
built mainly on the economic condition and behaviour of the social groups,
expresses the possible political identifications.
What is also important for the analysis is the state of stability of the
social ties. It is determined not only from the actual condition of the
economy, but also from the self-evaluation of the people, as well as from
their optimism with respect to the future.
In 1990, Bulgarians were some of the greatest optimists about the future of
democracy in the country. As opposed to the pessimistic Poles and
Hungarians, over 60% of the Bulgarians considered that within the next
years the democratic transition would lead to the increase of prosperity
and to development of the country.
In 1994, about 47% of the Bulgarians declared that they had a difficult
life, about 25% - barely made ends meet, and just about 1% lived "very
well". At the end of the same year, the Socialist Party won the elections
and formed a government of the majority.4 While in 1994 life was very hard
only for the pensioners and the unemployed, at the end of 2000, income was
insufficient for about 70% of the population. One must add to that the data
about the increasing social group of those living in conditions of natural
exchange or barter. The people living "a normal life" dwindled from 67% in
1991 to 14% in 2000.
How did the economic collapse and the increasing corruption affect the
process of political identification? First, after ten years of hesitation
of the electorates of the two major parties, with in 1991 the socialists
having about 2 000 000 electors and in 1997 - the right-wing group
obtaining the same level of support, the hard cores melted to about 700 000
people.
Second, the economic interests are not decisive in the political
identification of the Bulgarian. The electoral analysis highlights certain
differences in the electors of the right wing and of the left wing, but at
the same time it clearly proves the presence of representatives of all
economic groups. Third, the right wing and the left wing in Bulgaria
compete at a power level, not at a policy level. Indicative of that
conclusion are the analyses of the party platforms and the political
language of BSP and UDF. They contain on equal terms market economy and
social policy, there are no differentiated values, as well as a specific
attitude towards the separate social groups. Thus a number of paradoxes
emerge, such as that of 2001 when the socialists' main focus was the
preservation of the large-scale business, while the right wing's focus was
raising the standard of life.
The transformation of property in Bulgaria is characterised by two
peculiarities. The first is that restitution was the main goal of the right
wing, whilst privatisation - of the left wing. The second peculiarity is
the expansion of the corruption practices and affinities. Eight years after
the beginning of transition in Bulgaria, for 65% of the Bulgarians
corruption was an effective manner of social action.
The resignation and the perception of corruption as a political practice
turned into an argument of the political debate. The result was a return to
the passive resistance - a method used effectively in the 45 years of
communist rule. Only the forms were new but the essence remained - the
purpose was to deceive the state. In the economy that meant a high share of
the grey economy, low productivity, squandering of resources. In politics
the result was a lack of a clear and stable stratification structure, as
well as a broken social tie. Most dangerous was the loss of a national
thinking. Hence, the determinant features of the political identification
were no longer group but individual interests.
The problem was not in the growing negative attitude towards politics and
the political parties. We are talking about something like a political
disorientation of the Bulgarians. In periods of transition society
instinctively turns to two certain mechanisms of stability - the
traditional values and the community.
In Bulgaria those mechanisms do not operate: the property was not returned
to its owners; for what you possess - a house and a qualification, there is
no market; the economic transition changed the ties completely, including
the social roles of the sexes. As to the community - it was unable to
function due to the overall change of the interests and goals of society.
In fact, for the last 12 years, the Bulgarians have been living in two
completely separated realities. In the social one they were deprived of a
community, values, and even a prospect of a career. In the political one -
they were in a democratic, market society joining the European standards.
If we were to accept the statements of various international subjects: the
World Bank, IMF, EU at a state level, the country was in a process of
adaptating to the democratic standards. At the same time at the individuals
level, it moved farther away from them. One can cite a great number of
figures, but I will limit myself to one - 23% of the children in Bulgaria
do not go to school (at that, we are not talking only about children of the
Roma origin). The sorrowful social picture is not a basis for progress of
the left formations. The support for them does not increase, on the
contrary, it diminishes. At the same time one does not see a movement of
support towards the right political sector. The main problem of the
political identification remains the problem of identification.
The political parties did not manage to turn into parties orienting the
behaviour of the citizens. Today, over 50% of the Bulgarian voters do not
have clearly established preferences for a political party. This means that
the growing problems of people are not finding a solution in the political
proposals of the parties. This identification disorientation is one of the
explanations for the results of the parliamentary and presidential
elections in Bulgaria in 2001.
In his desire to orient himself, the Bulgarian voter has chosen to rely on
the morals, electing once an ex-monarch and a second time a leader of an ex-
communist party, but both times persons with undoubted moral qualities.
The problems of the political identification are rather looking for a
solution which is not in the least undoubted. Part of it is about to be
found in the elections for local authorities where there are also a number
of specificities.

1.3. Territorial relations. The Bulgarian political parties are
characterised by a specific territorial identity. There are two cases that
are most interesting during the years of transition. The Socialist Party
had a "peripheral" nature. It was strongest in the villages and the small
towns. It had an influence in the local media and traditionally won the
local elections. The right wing, on the contrary, drew its strength from
the capital and the large cities, controls the national media and dominates
in "the central powers" - the legislative, the executive, and the judicial
ones. As to the economic power, it is not easy to make definite
conclusions. The domination of owners related to the socialists until 1995,
after the rule of the right wing (1997-2001) was gradually balanced by the
process of privatisation. But the lack of transparency, the corruption, as
well as the lack of a decision to legalise the capitals make the analysis
of the economic positions of the left and the right wing in Bulgaria
impossible.
If we trace the actions of certain lobbies in the legislative power - for
instance, the lobby on gambling, we can establish that the interests of the
large business are being protected by representatives of various political
parties. The results from the elections in 2001 as well as the sociological
data show that the territorial face of the parties has changed. The
villages and the small towns are no longer party territories. In them the
influence of the previous two factors - the rejection of parties and the
political disorientation, have a negative impact on the political
identification. This "territory" is increasingly getting away from the
influence of the strong parties and is not taken by a particular political
force. At the same time the capital and the large cities are showing a
tendency towards refusing to have a preference. In them each political
party has its own opportunities. The trend, marking the territorial
relations, is a growing local patriotism. The break up of the social ties
appears to have resulted in the restoration of the significance of the
territorial community. The reduced mobility (during the last 5 years, about
40% of the Bulgarians have not travelled outside the settlement where they
reside) and the limited economic means led to the rejection of a national
centre and its replacement with individual centres.
As a number of researchers claim, in Bulgaria one can observe a
disintegration of the national picture. This way, one's own home, the
village, the town turned into the centre of the Bulgarian's life. Hence the
next paradox of the individual reality in a global context. The centre
turned into a foreign one, it expressed the otherness, it was remote,
inaccessible, and even hostile. Because it was inevitable and dominating.
2. External level of analysis of the political identity. Thus far we
outlined a quite a curious profile of the Bulgarian's political identity.
He is neighter "left" nor "right", but individual. He refuses to accept the
benefit from the political parties, tries to punish them for his
disorientation by motivating his choice by means of "the lesser level",
convinced that there is nothing good in politics. He shuts himself in his
own world, taking every centre as target of the enemy. The common thing,
not just among the supporters of the various parties, but also among those
who refused to vote, is related namely to the external factors.
First, the conviction that the Bulgarian policy is dependent on external
interests is a characteristic feature. It is helped by more than the
country's historical experience. Following the changes of 1989, a main
argument for the political decisions taken is the interest of an external
partner. Most often, this is an imaginary subject - "the democratic
community", "Europe", "the United States". A basis for the Bulgarian
political decisions is "the herd instinct", the idea that we have to do as
the other democratic countries do.
Second, each economically unpopular decision is justified with requirements
coming from without. The Bulgarian parties and politicians persistently
developed their image by opposing the external factors, not as positions,
but as the impossibility for them to have a position. In this manner the
external factors were used to accustom the civil society to a passive
position. In fact, instead of the democratic countries being a standard and
model for the country to adapt and come closer to, they turned into an
external centre with regard to which the Bulgarian was feeling different
and a representative of the periphery. The result will most probably be
moving away from the adopted standards of political identity.
If to the European conservatism is identified with the right wing, to the
Bulgarian it is identified with the left wing. If to the European wealth is
connected with the ideas of liberalism, to the Bulgarian liberal is a
synonym of a political loser. If solidarity and fraternity are values of
social democracy, to the Bulgarian social democracy is related to wealth
and division.
The constant presentation of democracy as a process of approaching certain
democratic standards presents several issues. One of them is the obligatory
moving of the Bulgarian. Of course, we are talking about a symbolic action,
but it requires serious efforts since there are no internal standards.
The two parties, representing the left wing and the right wing, in fact
draw their identity from outside. The point to their presence in the
Bulgarian political life, the need for support for their policy, the
importance of their leaders - all is based on their recognition by and
presence in the European left and right wings. And if to the socialists,
which are heirs of a quite a long but also quite an extreme political
tradition, that is explainable with a view to proving their present-day
democratic nature, to the right wing the explanation lies in the desire to
create the lacking history.
Ultimately, both make up for the lack of authority in the country with
external sources. The problem to the electors is that they do not have
clear references for such identification. Their information and political
experience have as a source the specific political subjects in Bulgaria. At
the same time there is a requirement for identification with unfamiliar and
unclear political subjects from the outside.
The second issue is at the root of the presence of an objective
contradiction between the required movement towards the democratic
standards and their change. The west democracy itself has a number of
problems and contradictions, transforming itself as a result of
modernisation and globalisation. It is only natural that a paradox should
arise for anyone who is trying to identify himself with a changing object.
The only steady characteristic, according to the Bulgarian, is the economic
standard. All the other norms and standards seem dual and conflicting.
Hence, the main argument is an identification with the standard of life,
perceived as self-sufficient. Democracy turns into money and goods. Through
this image, deformed in a caricature way, we reach the beginning of
political nostalgia. The resurrection of former communist leaders through
democratic elections fully fits the outlined scheme.
3. The future. The fact that the political identity is so unclear and in
fact amorphous means with certainty one thing only - the presence of equal
opportunities for different political scenarios to come to life. The
Bulgarian political parties are unable to control or direct the selection
process between the alternatives. The external influence is increasingly
perceived as pressure. The economic pragmatism does not lead to realism of
the political behavious. It rather incites towards attempts to search for a
chance for luck through constant change.

Bibliography:
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Press.
2. KAPLINSKI J. The Future of National Cultures in Europe. The Future of
Nation-State in Europe. Ed. By Jyrki IIOVONEN, 1993, Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, London
3. MITEV P. Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility in the
Everyday Life of Cristians and Muslims in Bulgaria. In: Relations of
Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Cristians and Muslims in
Bulgaria, Sofia, 1994
4. JENKINS R. 1996, Social Identity. Routledge, London.
5. ELIAS N. 1991, The Society of Individuals, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
6. GENOV N. and A. Krasteva (dir. by) Social Change in Bulgaria 1985-
1995, McQeens Press, 2000.

Notes:
1. Following 1948, all political parties were prohibited in Bulgaria
with the exception of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and the Bulgarian
Agrarian People's Union which ruled in coalition until 10 November 1989.
After the beginning of change, at the end of 1989 and in the early 1990, a
number of traditional political parties were restored - such as the Social
Democratic Party, the People's Party, and other parties were formed - such
as the Green Party, Ecoglasnost etc. A large part of those parties (new and
restored ones) united in a Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Thus, in the
elections during 1990, for the Greater National Assembly the main parties
were the Bulgarian Socialist Party (successor to BCP), UDF, and the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) - party of the Turkish minority.
2. In 1985, BCP made the decision to change the names of the Bulgarian
Turks and prohibit the public use of the Turkish language, education in
this language, practicing a number of traditions, including the suneta.
This led to clashed which ended with casualties. Many Turkish boys died due
to poor hygiene since it was prohibited in teh hospitals to perform the
suneta. In 1987, the expatriation of the Turks wanting to leave Bulgaria
was allowed, and it was called "the big excursion", during which about half
a million Bulgarian Turks left for Turkey. The current leader of MRF Ahmed
Dogan was arrested and did time for being a member of a terrorist
organisation which had placed bombs in the train station of the city of
Plovdiv.
3. Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha is heir of Tsar Boris, who at 9 years of age
was extradited from Bulgaria. On 6 April 2001, during his next visit to
Bulgaria after the changes of 1989, he addressed the people, declaring his
wish to become involved in the country's political life. His desire was to
take part in the presidential elections. With the intervention of the then
President Petar Stoyanov, the Constitutional Court denied such an
opportunity due to the fact that he had not resided in the country for the
5 previous years. That forced Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha to run in the
parliamentary elections with a hastily formed movement. He won the
elections with about 43% of the votes.
4. The information is taken from surveys conducted by BBSS-Gallup
International.