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Land Use Policy 23 (2006) 34–43 www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol
Participatory processes for designing environmental policies Ortwin Renn Center of Technology Assessment, Stuttgart, Germany Received 5 March 2003; accepted 6 August 2004
Abstract How can and should risk managers incorporate public preferences, integrate public input into the management process, and assign the appropriate roles to technical experts, stakeholders and members of the public? Which trade-offs should be used for risk management? Which concerns should be adopted in decisions that may determine life or death of many people? This paper discusses the potential of and requirements for an analytic-deliberative decision-making process in the field of risk management. It addresses the challenges for making public deliberation a part of the risk management process. Moreover, it articulates the requirements for integrating analytic reasoning with deliberation and interpretation. As a result of these requirements, a model of participation is developed that attempts to meet the two major objectives: to enhance competence in the decision-making process and to assign responsibility in managing risks to those who will be affected by the potential consequences. r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Public deliberation; Co-operative discourse; Analytic reasoning
Introduction Inviting the public to be part of the decision-making process in environmental management has been a major objective in European and American environmental policy arenas. As one prominent example, the USNational Academy of Sciences encourages environmental protection agencies to foster citizen participation and public involvement in order to make environmental policy making and risk management more effective and democratic (Stern and Fineberg, 1996). The report emphasises the need for a combination of assessment and dialogue which the authors have framed the ‘‘analytic-deliberative’’ approach. Unfortunately, however, early involvement of the public in deliberative processes may compromise the objective of efficient and effective policy implementation or violate the principle of fairness (Okrent, 1998 focusing on public risk perception; Dietz et al., 1989 focussing on expert perceptions). Another problem is that the public consists of many groups with different value structures and E-mail address:
[email protected] (O. Renn). 0264-8377/$ - see front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2004.08.005
preferences. Without a systematic procedure to reach consensus on values and preferences, the public’s position often appears as unclear (Cross, 1998). Thus participatory processes are needed that combine technical expertise, rational decision making, public values and preferences. The new keywords are trust-building, community development, and co-determination (Renn, 1998). The popularity associated with the concepts of twoway communication, trust-building, and citizen participation, however, obscures the challenge of how to put these noble goals into practice and how to ensure that environmental management reflects competence, efficiency, and fair burden sharing. How can and should environmental managers incorporate public preferences, integrate public input into the management process, and assign the appropriate roles to technical experts, stakeholders (i.e., socially organised groups that are or perceive themselves as being affected by the decision) and members of the public? Who represents the public— the elected politicians, administrators, stakeholders, or all persons who will be affected by the decision? There is a large amount of individual variance when lay
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persons are asked to set environmental priorities (Drottz-Sjo¨berg, 1991; Dake, 1991). This paper analyses the need for public and democratic deliberations in environmental policy making and describes a structured model for citizen involvement in environmental decision making. This model of participation attempts to meet two major objectives: first, to enhance the competence in the decision-making process, and second, to assign a fair share of responsibility to manage environmental affairs to those who are or will be affected by the potential consequences. Special emphasis is given to the link between participation and formal models of decision making.
Kemp, 1985; Renn and Webler, 1998, pp. 48ff.; Webler, 1995, 1999; Jaeger et al., 2001). All participants are obliged to:
The requirements for deliberative processes
Environmental policy makers are faced with a difficult dilemma: on the one hand, technical expertise is necessary but not a sufficient condition to make prudent environmental decisions. Without consideration of public values and preferences, decisions cannot be legitimised. On the other hand, public perceptions are at least partially based on biases, anecdotal evidence and false assumptions about potential environmental impacts of human actions (Okrent, 1998). We live in a pluralist society with different value systems and worldviews. Who can legitimately claim the right to select the values or preferences that should guide collective decision making, in particular when the health and lives of humans are at stake? One of the answers to this question can be drawn from the theory and practice of discursive deliberation (a more comprehensive analysis can be found in Renn (2003)). The term deliberation refers to the style and procedure of decision making without specifying which participants are invited to deliberate (Stern and Fineberg, 1996; Rossi, 1997). For a discussion to be called deliberative it is essential that it relies on mutual exchange of arguments and reflections rather than decision making based on the status of the participants, sublime strategies of persuasion, or socio-political pressure. Deliberative processes should include a debate about the relative weight of each argument and a transparent procedure for balancing arguments (Tuler and Webler, 1999). In addition, deliberative processes should be governed by the established rules of a rational discourse. In the theory of communicative action developed by the German philosopher Ju¨rgen Habermas, the term discourse denotes a special form of dialogue in which all affected parties have equal rights and duties to present claims and test their validity in a context free of social or political domination (Habermas, 1970, 1987b). According to Habermas and others, a discourse is called rational if it meets the following specific requirements (cf. McCarthy, 1975; Habermas, 1987a, 1991;
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seek a consensus on the procedure that they want to employ in order to derive the final decision or compromise (such as voting, sorting of positions, consensual decision making or the involvement of a mediator or arbitrator), articulate and criticise factual claims on the basis of the ‘‘state of the art’’ of scientific knowledge and other forms of problem-adequate knowledge (in the case of dissent all relevant camps have the right to be represented), interpret factual evidence in accordance with the laws of formal logic and analytical reasoning, disclose their relevant values and preferences, thus avoiding hidden agendas and strategic game playing, process data, arguments and evaluations in a structured format (for example a decision-analytic procedure) so that norms of procedural rationality are met and transparency can be created.
The rules of deliberation do not necessarily include the demand for representation of all possible viewpoints and varieties of opinions. There has been an intense debate about the inherent rationality concept that Habermas promotes in his writings. Habermas believes in universal rationality and rejects the post-modern notion of plural rationalities rivalling for power, influence, and significance. In contrast to the rational actor paradigm, Habermas does not interpret rationality as means-ends relationship (Habermas 1991; Jaeger et al., 2001). His idea of rationality builds upon the ability of humans to reach agreement through communication and reasoning. This ‘‘ideaslistic’’ idea of universal normative validity has been criticized from a postmodernist as well as feminist viewpoint (see for example Twedwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). One should acknowledge, however, that the belief in universal reasoning is not justified by domination based on power, prescription or interest. Reasoning is derived from a communicative process in which equal partners negotiate about truth claims in absence of power relationships relying solely on arguments and the power of evidence. This situation may be detached from reality (more like a thought experiment), yet it shows that in real negotiations such an ideal type may inspire the communication partners to yield results that have validity on their own universal reasoning rather than relying on social or situational circumstances. The advantage of applying Habermas to real participation is that the theory provides a forceful justification as well a visionary benchmark for making people co-determine their own destiny. Post-modernism often leads to either destructive cynical viewpoints or to pure egocentrism—
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both weak motivations to engage in any deliberative action. However, the criticism of Habermas’ work should be taken seriously when it comes to the selection of participants in the deliberative circles. Variety of viewpoints, representation of all possible perspectives and inclusion of less privileged groups are essential for transforming the Habermasian vision into reality. The competition of arguments is insufficient if those who may have problems to articulate these arguments are left out. In principle, deliberation can be organised in closed elite circles (such as conferences of Catholic bishops, where the term has indeed been used since the Council of Nicosea) as well as in public forums. It is therefore mandatory that those whose interests and values are affected by the respective policy action are not only included in the discourse but also given all assistance possible to make their voice heard and convincingly framed before entering into the exchange of arguments (providing equal opportunities). I suggest the use of the term ‘‘deliberative democracy’’ in referring to the combination of deliberation and equitable involvement of all affected parties (see also Chess et al., 1998; Cohen, 1997; Rossi, 1997). What is the importance of deliberation to decision making? First, deliberative processes are needed to define the role and relevance of systematic (scientifically derived) and ideosyncratic (derived from experience and familiarity with local conditions) knowledge for making choices that may affect large populations (cf. Cramer et al., 1980; Dietz, 1987). Second, deliberation is needed to find the most appropriate way to deal with uncertainty in environmental decision making and to set efficient and fair trade-offs between potential overand under-protection in the face of uncertain outcomes. Third, deliberation needs to address the wider concerns of the affected groups and the public at large. Why do we expect deliberative processes to be better suited in dealing with environmental challenges than expert judgement, political majority votes or reliance on public survey data? Deliberation can produce common understanding of the issues or the problems based on the joint learning experience of the participants with respect to systematic and anecdotal knowledge (Webler et al., 1995; Pidgeon, 1997). Deliberation can produce a common understanding of each party’s position and reasoning and thus assist in a mental reconstruction of each actor’s argumentation (Warren, 1993; Tuler, 1996). The main drive in gaining mutual understanding is empathy. The theory of communicative action provides further insights in how to mobilise empathy and how to use the mechanisms of empathy and normative reasoning to explore and generate common moral grounds (Webler, 1995).
Deliberation can produce new options for action and solutions to a problem. This creative process can either be mobilised by finding win–win solutions or by discovering identical moral grounds on which new options can grow (Renn and Webler, 1998, p. 64ff.). Deliberation has the potential to show and document the full scope of ambiguity associated with environmental problems. Deliberation helps to make a society aware of the options, interpretations, and potential actions that are connected with the issue under investigation (Wynne, 1992; De-Marchi and Ravetz, 1999). Each position within a deliberative discourse can only survive the cross-fire of arguments and counter-arguments if it demonstrates internal consistency, compatibility with the legitimate range of knowledge claims and correspondence with the widely accepted norms and values of society. Deliberation clarifies the problem, makes people aware of framing effects, and determines the limits of what could be called reasonable within the plurality of interpretations (Skillington, 1997). Deliberations can also produce agreements. The minimal agreement may be a consensus about dissent (Raiffa, 1994; Renn and Webler, 1998, p. 64). If all arguments are exchanged, participants know why they disagree. They may not be convinced that the arguments of the other side are true or morally strong enough to change their own position; but they understand the reasons why the opponents came to their conclusion. At the end the deliberative process produces several consistent and—in their own domain—optimised positions that can be offered as package options to legal decision-makers or the public. Once these options have been subjected to public discourse and debate, political bodies such as agencies or parliaments can make the final selection in accordance with the legitimate rules and institutional arrangements such as majority vote or executive order. Final selections can also be performed by popular vote or referendum (Wehrli-Schindler, 1987). In addition, deliberation creates ‘‘second order’’ effects on individuals and society by providing insights into the fabrics of political processes and creating confidence in one’s own agency to become an active participant in the political arena (Dietz, 1994; Brulle, 2000). Deliberation may result in consensus. Often deliberative processes are used synonymously with consensus seeking activities (Coglianese, 1997). This is a major misunderstanding. Consensus is a possible outcome of deliberation but not a mandatory requirement (compare van den Hove in this issue). If all participants find a new option that they all value more than the one option that they preferred when entering the deliberation, a ‘‘true’’ consensus is reached (Renn and Webler, 1998, p. 69). It is clear that finding such a consensus is the exception rather than the rule. Consensus is either based on a win–win solution (examples in Waldo, 1987) or a solution that serves the ‘‘common good’’ and each
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participant’s interests and values better than any other solution (examples in Renn, 1999). Less stringent is the requirement of a tolerated consensus. Such a consensus rests on the recognition that the selected decision option might serve the ‘‘common good’’ best but at the expense of some interest violations or additional costs. In a tolerated consensus, some participants voluntarily accept personal or group-specific loss in exchange for providing benefits to all of society. In our own empirical work deliberation has often lead to tolerated consensus solution, particularly in siting conflicts (one example in Schneider et al., 1998). Tolerated consensus is difficult to explain in terms of the rational actor paradigm but is quite compatible with the theory of communicative action. Consensus and tolerated consensus should be distinguished from compromise. A compromise is a product of bargaining where each side gradually reduces its claim to the opposing party until they reach an agreement (Raiffa, 1994). All parties involved would rather choose the option that they preferred before starting deliberations, but since they cannot find a win–win situation or a morally superior alternative they look for a solution that they can ‘‘live with’’ knowing that it is the second or third best solution for them. Compromising on an issue relies on full representation of all vested interests. In summary, many desirable products and accomplishments are associated with deliberation (Chess et al., 1998). Depending on the structure of the discourse and the underlying rationale deliberative processes can (Fiorino, 1990):
enhance understanding, generate new options, decrease hostility and aggressive attitudes among the participants, explore new problem framing, enlighten legal policy makers, produce competent, fair and optimised solution packages and facilitate consensus, tolerated consensus and compromise.
The model of co-operative discourse How can and should environmental managers organise effective deliberative discourses on environmental issues? Deliberations among experts, stakeholders, regulators, and the public at large can be organised in many different forms. Practical experiences have been made with advisory committees, citizen panels, public forums, consensus conferences, formal hearings, and others (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984; Crosby et al., 1986; Burns and U¨berhorst, 1988; Susskind and Fields, 1996: see reviews in: Renn et al., 1995; Creighton et al., 1998).
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This is not the place to discuss these models in detail. I would like to focus on one hybrid model of citizen participation that Thomas Webler and I have termed ‘‘co-operative discourse’’. With several modifications, we have applied this model to studies on energy policies and waste disposal issues in West Germany, for wastedisposal facilities in Switzerland and to sludge-disposal strategies in the United States (Renn, 1999; Renn et al., 1993; Renn and Webler, 1998). The model entails three consecutive steps: (1) Identification and selection of concerns and evaluative criteria. The identification of concerns and objectives is best accomplished by asking all relevant stakeholder groups to reveal their values and criteria for judging different options. It is crucial that all relevant value groups be represented and that the value clusters be comprehensive and include economic, political, social, cultural, and religious values. To elicit the values and criteria for such a list the technique of value-tree analysis has proven helpful (Keeney et al., 1987; von Winterfeldt, 1987). The resulting output of such a value-tree process is a list of hierarchically structured values that represent the concerns of all affected parties. (2) The identification and measurement of impacts and consequences related to different policy options. The evaluative criteria derived from the value-tree are operationalised and transformed into indicators by the research team or an external expert group. These operational definitions and indicators are reviewed by the participating stakeholder groups. Once approved by all parties, these indicators serve as measurement rules for evaluating the performance of each policy option on all value dimensions. Experts from varying academic disciplines and with diverse perspectives on the topic of the discourse are asked to judge the performance of each option on each indicator. For this purpose, a modification of the Delphi method has been developed and applied (Webler et al., 1991). This method is similar to the original Delphi format (Turoff, 1970), but based on group interactions instead of written responses. The objective is to reconcile conflicts about factual evidence and reach an expert consensus via direct confrontation among a heterogeneous sample of experts. In addition, the Delphi process facilitates the development of a creative and cooperative atmosphere in a group. The desired outcome is a specification of the range of scientifically plausible and defensible expert judgements and a distribution of these opinions among the expert community with verbal justifications for opinions that deviate from the median viewpoint. (3) Conducting a discourse with randomly selected citizens as jurors and representatives of interest groups
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as witnesses: The last step is the evaluation of potential solutions by one group or several groups of randomly selected citizens (Dienel, 1989; Dienel and Renn, 1995; Renn 1999). These panels are given the opportunity to evaluate and design policy options based on the knowledge of the likely consequences and their own values and preferences. The participants are informed about the options, the evaluative criteria, and the performance profiles. The representatives of interest groups and the experts take part in the process as witnesses; they provide their arguments and evidence to the panels who ultimately decide on the various options. This deliberation process takes time: citizen panels are conducted as seminars over three to five consecutive days or over a longer period of up to 6 months. All participants are exposed to a standardised program of information, including hearings, lectures, panel discussions, videotapes, and field tours. The process is similar to an US-American jury trial with experts and stakeholders as witnesses and advisers on procedure as ‘‘professional’’ judges (cf. Crosby et al., 1986).
Formal decision making tools in the co-operative discourse model Within this three-step procedure, we use a variety of formal decision-making tools. During the first step of the process we use value-tree analysis, during the third step multi-attribute utility techniques. The two procedures are described below: Value-tree analysis: A value-tree identifies and organises the values of an individual or group with respect to possible decision options (Keeney et al., 1984, 1987). In the process of structuring a value-tree, representatives of different stakeholder groups are asked to identify their criteria and objectives for evaluating different options. Values in this context are abstractions that help organise and guide preferences (von Winterfeldt, 1987). A value-tree structures the elicited values, criteria, and corresponding attributes in a hierarchy, with general values and concerns at the top, and specific criteria and attributes at the bottom. Depending on the political context and the nature of the decision to be made, the values of the various stakeholder groups may vary considerably. By giving each group the right to assign a weight of zero to each criterion that they regard irrelevant, it is possible to construct a joint or combined value-tree that accounts for all viewpoints and can be verified by all participants (Keeney et al., 1984). In opposition to many users of the value-tree technique (i.e. von Winterfeldt, 1987), we perceive little benefit in having the stakeholder groups do either the performance measurement of each option on each
criterion or the assignments of trade-offs between the various independent criteria. Both tasks are extremely prone to strategic game playing and would likely end in a process by which each group would rationalise its latent preference for one of the decision options available. We prefer to have the participating groups leave the actual measurement to a group of independent experts (in step 2) and the weighting to an unbiased jury of uncommitted citizens (in step 3). However, stakeholder groups may inform the experts about potential impacts that they expect as a result of any one option and they can contribute their evaluation of these options to the citizen panel in their testimony. Multi-attribute utility (MAU) analysis: The second major component for using formal decision-making tools refers to the elicitation of values, criteria, and attributes and the assignment of relative weights to the different value dimensions. The procedures used for this purpose are derived from multi-attribute utility theory (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). The respondents are first asked to use the criteria of the joint value-tree to rate each decision option on each criterion. The participants are free to add new values to the tree, but they may not delete any of the criteria elicited from the stakeholder groups. They can also modify the presented option or add a new option to the list. The rating of each option then proceeds on the basis of the profiles that the experts generated during a workshop organised according to the Delphi process. Finally, each criterion is weighted against the other, resulting in a matrix of relative weights and utility measures for each option and each criterion. Both tasks, the transformation of the expert data in utilities and the assignment of trade-offs, are performed individually and in small groups. Deviating from the established MAU (multi-attribute utility model) procedure, the numerical results (i.e. for each option the sum of the utilities of each dimension multiplied by the weight of each dimension) of the decision process are not used as expression of the final judgement of the participants, but as a structuring aid to improve the participants’ holistic, intuitive judgement (Renn and Webler, 1998). By pointing out potential discrepancies between the numerical model and the holistic judgements, the participants are forced to reflect upon their opinions and search for potential hidden motives or values that might explain the discrepancy. The final recommendations are always based on a holistic judgement by individuals or groups. This revised version of the MAU model has enjoyed successful application in citizen panels of West Germany, the US and Switzerland (Renn et al., 1985, 1993). The major advantage of the MAU model—to decompose a complex problem and to structure a productive discussion—is utilised to its full extent without accepting the rigid rule of amalgamating the scaled results into a single dimension.
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As the editors point out in their introduction to this volume the combination of participation and multicriteria decision aids promises potential to improve the resolution of environmental conflicts (Wittmer et al., in this issue). The inherent complexity of environmental issues demands a structured approach to decision making which can best be performed by a decisionanalytic technique. The inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of environmental conflicts demand fair representation of viewpoints and future perspectives. It is the combination of both which gives environmental policy making its legitimacy.
Experiences with the co-operative discourse model Applications of the co-operative discourse model in Germany, Switzerland and the United States emerged from the early experiences with citizen panels in urban planning in different German cities and communities (Dienel, 1978). From the 1970s to today approximately 26 cities or communities used citizen panels as a method of local planning. More than 2600 adults were involved in these panels for an average of 3–5 days each. Based on these experiences, the author and several of his colleagues experimented with the co-operative discourse method, first in Germany and later in other countries. The following paragraphs describe several full run largescale applications in three countries:
The most comprehensive study dealt with the evaluation of national energy policies in Germany. In August 1982, the German Ministry of Research and Technology initiated a large research project to investigate the preferences of the German population with respect to four energy policy options developed by a parliamentary commission in 1979 (Renn et al., 1985; Renn, 1986). The study was financed by the German government and cost approximately $ 1.2 Mio. The Government was interested in eliciting reliable information on which energy scenario was most appealing to the population and on what basis citizens would evaluate the policy options laid out in each scenario. A research team directed by the author conducted a 3-year study to collect data on public preferences and to analyse the motivations and underlying reasons for the judgement process of evaluating the predefined energy scenarios. The study operated with 24 citizen panels (each including approximately 25 participants) drawn from seven communities in different parts of West Germany. The panels unanimously rejected a high-energy supply scenario and opted for an energy policy that emphasised energy conservation and efficient use of energy. Nuclear energy was perceived as non-desirable but—at least for an intermediate time period—as
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a necessary energy source. The panellists recommended stricter environmental regulation for fossil fuels even if this meant higher energy prices. They developed a priority list for policies and drafted recommendations for implementing high-priority policies. A regional study was conducted from 1994–1996 in the Northern part of the Black Forest (Southern Germany). The study was commissioned by the three counties of the Northern part of the Black Forest and the city of Pforzheim and financed by the foundation of the Center of Technology Assessment in Baden– Wu¨rttemberg. The cost amounted to approximately $800,000. The objective was to have stakeholders and citizens take part in planning a waste-management program (Schneider et al., 1998). A round table with 16 major stakeholder groups was organised in 1994 to develop waste reduction policies and to assess the recycling potential of the area (using the method of value trees). The same group was also asked to find the most suitable technical solution for waste processing before final disposal. After these decisions were made, 200 randomly selected citizens from potential host communities were asked to find the most appropriate site for the types of facilities that had been previously chosen by the representatives of the round table. The most outstanding result was that panellists were even willing to approve a siting decision that would affect their own community. All ten citizen panels reached a unanimous decision which involved the recommendation to construct a small state-of-the-art incinerator in the centre of the most populated town within the region. The reason for this surprising recommendation was that citizens wanted to present a visual reminder to their fellow citizens not to forget the need to reduce waste, to burden those who contribute most to the problem and to put the incinerator near the political power centre as a ‘‘clever’’ means to assure compliance with the environmental standards. (‘‘Since the mayor resides right next door to the facility he will make sure that nothing harmful will happen.’’) The decision was given to the regional planning board which approved the recommendations with some minor modifications. The responsible county parliaments and the city council of the largest city within the region, however, have been reluctant to accept the recommendation as of now. In 1992, The Building Department (Baudepartement) of the canton Aargau (Northern part of Switzerland) asked the author (at that time affiliated with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) to organise a cooperative discourse for siting one or several landfills in the eastern part of the canton. The study was jointly financed by the Swiss Institute of Technology and the Building Department of the canton Aargau.
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The cost for the study amounted to approximately $ 370,000. The mandate of the research team was to organise a co-operative discourse with four citizen panels. These panels were asked first to develop criteria for comparing the different sites; second, to evaluate the geological data that were collected during that period; third, to eliminate the sites that should not be further considered; and fourth, to prioritise the remaining sites with respect to suitability to host a landfill (Webler, 1994; Renn and Webler, 1998). Four citizen panels were formed, each consisting of two representatives from each potential site community. With the exception of one community, every town sent eight people to the panels. Not one of the participants dropped out during the process. Between January and June 1993 the panels met 7–9 times before they attended a workshop of 2 days to come up with a final decision. All participants rated each site on the basis of their self-selected evaluative criteria, their personal impressions, the written and oral information, and the results of consultations with experts on the basis of a Group Delphi. All four panels composed a list of prioritised sites for the landfill. The most remarkable outcome was that each panel reached a unanimous decision. In December of 1993, the result of the participation process was made public. The canton government approved the results and entered the next phase of the licensing procedure. As of today, the selected site is still considered but the erection of a landfill has been postponed as the amount of waste has sharply decreased over the last few years. There has been one major attempt to implement the original version of the co-operative discourse in the United States.1 In July 1988 the Department of Environmental Protection of New Jersey asked a research team of Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, directed by the author, to apply the model to sewage sludge management problems (Renn et al., 1989). The objective of the project was to give citizens of Hunterdon County, New Jersey, the opportunity to design the regulatory provisions for an experimental sludge application project on a Rutgers University research farm located in Franklin Township (New Jersey). Although much smaller in scale (project cost summed up to $ 80,000), the project provided many new insights and experiences that partially confirmed the European observations and
1 Using randomly selected citizens for policy making and evaluation is not alien to the United States. The Jefferson Center in Minneapolis has conducted 14 projects with citizen panels similar to the planning cells (Crosby et al., 1986). Several community planners have experimented with citizen panels which were composed to reflect a representative sample of the population (cf. Kathlene and Martin, 1991).
partially documented the need for adjustments to the US political culture. In summary, the applications of co-operative discourse method provided some evidence and reconfirmation that the theoretical expectations linked to this method can be met on the local, regional and also the national level. It is a valid instrument to elicit preferences and educated responses of citizens in a rather short time period. Evaluation studies by independent scholars confirmed that the objectives of fairness and competence were met in the Swiss as well as German case studies, i.e. the main interests and value groups were adequately represented and the outcomes of the process were judged as reasonable suggestions by technical experts (Buser, 1995; Vorwerk and Ka¨mper, 1997; Roch, 1997).
Conclusions The objective of this paper was to address and discuss the need and potential for participatory processes in environmental management. Organising and structuring discourses for environmental policies goes beyond the good intention to have the public involved in decision making. The mere desire to initiate a two-way-communication process and the willingness to listen to public concerns are not sufficient. Discursive processes need a structure that assures the integration of technical expertise, regulatory requirements, and public values. These different inputs should be combined in such a fashion that they contribute those types of expertise and knowledge that can claim legitimacy within a rational decision making procedure (von Schomberg, 1995). It does not make sense to replace technical expertise with vague public perceptions nor is it justified to have the experts insert their own value judgements into what ought to be a democratic process. The much cherished solution of the past has been to have expert panels feed in the facts and have democratically elected representatives reflect these facts on the basis of public values and make informed decisions (Webler and Renn, 1995). This the so-called decisionistic model of communication has several major flaws: the selection of facts relies largely on the choice of concerns, and the value preferences of the elected representatives are at least partially dependent on the knowledge about the likely consequences of each decision option. Separating facts from values by division of labour leads to a vicious cycle. In addition, uncertainty about consequences, ambiguity of the knowledge base, and dissent among experts make it necessary that decision makers interact directly with experts and get an impression of the present state of the art. At the same time, those groups and individuals who are exposed to
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the risk demand that their values and preferences are taken into account directly by environmental managers without the detour of activating the often only remotely affected political representatives. These arguments have motivated many recent attempts to promote and develop analytic-deliberative approaches to risk management and environmental policy making (Stern and Fineberg, 1996; Tuler and Webler, 1999; US-EPA, 2000). Organising a common platform for mutual exchange of ideas, arguments, and concerns does not suffice, however, in order to assure fair and competent results. Mixing all these knowledge and value sources into one implies the danger that each group trespasses its legitimate boundary of expertise. If perceptions replace assessments and the rhetoric of powerful agents replaces value input by those who have to bear the potential impacts, the discourse goes into the wrong direction. An organisational model is needed that assigns specific roles to each contributor but makes sure, at the same time, that each contribution is embedded in a dialogue setting that guarantees mutual exchange of arguments and information, provides all participants with opportunities to insert and challenge claims, and to create active understanding among all participants (Webler, 1995). The model of co-operative discourse is one among other candidates that has been designed to meet that challenge (other candidates are described in: Chess and Purcell, 1999; Chess, 2000; Rowe and Frewer, 2000). It may be too expensive and cumbersome if the stakes are rather low. There are other procedures of participation that are less sophisticated and costly (see for example Freeman, 1992; Cramer et al., 1980). But the model can serve as a benchmark that can be used to calibrate simpler and faster processes. Far from being an established planning tool, the method of co-operative discourse has proven its viability and feasibility in different contexts and constitutes at least a serious alternative to other forms of public involvement.
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