Obstacles to democratization in Indonesia

Obstacles to democratization in Indonesia
Before 1998, why democratization was so difficult to take place in Indonesia? What were the obstacles to democratization in the state? Several challenges can be traced. First of all, it was the obstacles arising from cultural factors. The Indonesian values itself emphasizing on "harmony and rejection of opposition" made democracy hard to grow. The values can be found especially in Javanese culture (Uhlin, 1995). They also focus on "integralistic" society or unity of the society and the state. In the other word, the people are to be subjected to the state, and violation and opposition to the power of the state is considered as deviance or violation to norms and values of the society as a whole. Moreover, the idea of individualism, which should have supported democracy in Indonesia, was not existed at all, but the prioritization of state and nation was strongly implanted. Thus, as these values were firmly instilled in the mindset of Indonesian people at that time, they were discouraged to rise against the oppression of the military rule of Suharto regime. Besides the historical Indonesian values, the New Order of Suharto, gaining tremendous support at the beginning of the regime, also ingrained another value to the perception of the people. "Liberal ideology" stressing on human rights and freedom was believed to be "foreign culture" or "western product" (Nasution, 2011). Therefore, without the positive view toward "liberal ideology" by the people themselves, it was not easy for democracy to happen.
The second main obstacle to democratization in Indonesia before the collapse of the military regime was the effective strategy of the state in controlling democratic uprising. The regime can be considered to deploy "middle way" in practicing the oppression. On one hand, the government severely suppressed activities challenging to their power and authority. Pro-democracy activists could be arrested and imprisoned, disappeared, or "simply terrorized"; their homes or offices could be "broken into, ransacked, or vandalized"; mass media were controlled; military forces were used to threaten the people, etc. (Nasution, 2011). For example, according to Professor Nasution (2011), first Director of Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) – a civil society group providing legal aid service, he, himself, was accused of "seeking revolt against the government", thus arrested and detained for almost two years without judicial process. Later on, he wrote, he was forced into "self-exile" for seven years in the Netherlands as the government threat against him became more dangerous. On the other hand, the government also allowed some forms of civil society to exist as long as those organizations agreed to some degree of government intervention, and for those that were cooperative with the government, awards were given. For example, according to Aspinall (2004), there were three main categories of civil society during the regime. The first form – sole organization – were those depending on government for survival. This sort of organizations could also criticize the policy of the government, though they did not attempt to overthrow the government. Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI: Indonesian Peasant Harmony Assosiation) was one of the example of this type of civil society. The second category – semi-corporatist organizations – were those that were independent in the origins and aspirations, but they had to compromise with the government and support some policies of the government (meaning at least they could also criticize some other policies affecting their core belief). Sometimes these organizations were also given patronage by the government. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, largest Islamic organizations, could be considered as in the second sort of civil society. The third group – oppositional civil society organizations – were those having greater autonomy than others. They were in opposition to the government; however, these associations also avoided direct and robust criticism of the government. In the other words, they tended not to push for dramatic change. LBH was one of this type of civil society. Hence, the strategy of Suharto during that time was to suppress some degree of opposition but also allow some at the same time. It was effective because as long as people did not feel too repressed, in addition to their ingrained values mentioned above, they would not easily fight against the regime.
The third factors making democratization difficult before Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) struck was economic development. Since having taken office from Sukarno is 1966, Suharto had been working hard on improving economic condition in the nation to secure the support for his regime. For instance, from 1968-1997, the percentage of population in poverty was cut down from almost 60% to only 13%; infant mortality rate decreased; education and health care assessment also improved; so on and so forth (Greenlees, 2008). Later, although the oil crisis in the 1980s occurred, Suharto, still, was able to maintain the growth rate at 5%, by shifting to export-led economy, thus less dependent on oil price (Indonesia Investments, n.d.). Therefore, throughout these years, larger and larger middle class emerged. However, as those middle class, especially the minority Chinese ethnic group, largely enjoyed the benefits and the patronage from the government, in addition to the oppression and cultural factors mentioned earlier, not many were willing to or supported the downfall of the regime. Moreover, since the people enjoyed the economic life because they were lifted from poverty, though they felt unwilling to be suppressed by the government, they had too much to loss shall the stability and security was threaten if they tried to overthrow the government and robustly promote democratization. Only when the AFC struck, and the people, both lower class and middle class, began to suffer and no longer enjoyed their economic life (they have nothing much to loss anymore) that they started to realize that corruption and patrimonialism rooting in the regime was the main cause of the problem and attempted to end the regime. That was why only after the AFC happened that the state was transformed to democracy. Therefore, if the AFC did not occur, the transformation might not have happen since the people would not have suffered and stood up altogether against the regime. In the other word, the economic development during the regime discouraged people to oppose the regime.
Even though Suharto collapsed, democratization in Indonesia still faced challenges. First, the patrimonialism and corruption still persisted. This cause tremendous setback to economic development in the country (Bhakti, 2004). Taxes, for example, were not distributed in accordance with the policies leading to vast poverty or even higher poverty rate than during Suharto regime. The majority of the people even said that they would rather go back to Suharto regime if their economic life could be as good as before. In the other worlds, the people lost hope in democracy, and they were even willing to trade their rights and freedom for better economic life. This problem caused the effort to democratize the country further difficult. Moreover, patrimonialism and corruption also made the compliance to rule of law, important trait of liberal democracy, weak. For example, it was reported that in 2002 by Fionna, Ulla, and Webber, 95% of the court might have been influence by payment, 85% of the judge might have been bribed, and among 60% of the participants in a survey reported that the police would take action only when considerable amount of payment was provided (as cited in Webber, 2006). These activities led the rule of law principle of liberal democracy to become nothing but merely an imaginary concept.
The second main obstacles to further democratization in post-Suharto era was the anti-democratic forces, especially the conservative government officials who still held large power over the government even the military regime ended. For example, groups and individuals from New Order government, such as Golkar, were able to participate in the election in 1999 and won considerable amount of vote. These people presence could not be excluded due to their "important political and economic roles" (Bhakti, 2004). Moreover, as the state was under authoritarian rule for so long, the political participation from the public was not very large as they were firmly suppressed from joining political activities for too long; only the people from the former government were most suitable to participate the young democratic state. Hence, the practice of the new government was still hugely shaped by the authoritarian practice or ideology of those conservative government officials.


References
Aspinall, E. (2004). Indonesia transformation of civil society and democratic breakthrough. In Civil society and political change in Asia: Expanding and contracting democratic space (pp. 61-96). CA: Stanford University Press.
Bhakti, I. N. (2004). The transition to democracy in Indonesia: Some outstanding problems, 195-206. Retrieved from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter12Bhakti.pdf
Greenlees, D. (2008, January 28). Suharto legacy of development and corruption. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28iht-suharto.1.9542684.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Indonesia Investments. (n.d.). Indonesia New Order Miracle. Retrieved from http://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/economy/new-order-miracle/item247
Nasution, A. D. (2011). Towards constitutional democracy in indonesia. Adnan Buyung Nasution Papers on Southeast Asian Constitutionalism. Retrieved from http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/nasutionpaper111020_web2.pdf
Uhlin, A. (1995). The struggle for democracy in Indonesia: An actor? structure approach. Scandinavian Political Studies, 18(3). doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1995.tb00159.x
Webber, D. (2005). A consolidated patrimonial democracy? Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia. Democratization. doi:10.1080/13510340600579284




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Author: Sangsokunthea Cheam 23/07/2015