No es la Constitución la norma suprema

As developed in accordance with the patterns and strictures of legal positivism, modern juridical science has set up a theoretical frame wherein a certain norm, the constitution, is staunchly laid down as an incontrovertible axiom, whence all other norms would spring through the channels af a dynamic legal system. Such a construction crumbles under investigation. For one thing, ascribing axiomatic value to the constitution is ungrounded. In order for it to be legally mandatory a reason is needed, which a letimitating norm can alone provide. Such a norm can lie neither in the purportedly legitimacy of the constituent power nor in any social covenant or rule of recognition, but only in the fact that the legal system is mostly beneficial for the common good, which of course is a matter of degree. For another, no constitution can be applied unless supraconstitutional canons are invoked, viz. those allowing nomological inferences and those constraining valid interpretations according to the function and the ends of the legal system. Chiefly among them are the axioms of nomological logic and the ruling-out of any arbitrariness, all of which are bound to be in legal effect whatever the law-giver's will. Hence there are juridically valid norms belonging under natural law which are not lower than the constitution.