New Approaches to Environmental Governance

Chapter 10

Martin Janicke and Helge Jfirgens NEW APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

N e w challenges f o r environmental governance H E CH A L L EN GES FA CED BY environmental policy today differ sharply from those of past decades ‐ both asregards the environmental prob‑ lems calling for attention and the strategies available to tackle them. On the prob‑ lems side, after notable successes in some sub-areas of environmental protection, the focus is n o w on issues where environmental policy has failed to bring about any significant improvement even over a substantial period of time (SRU 2002: 69‐74; Janicke and Volkery 2001) On the response side, there has been continuous growth in both the regulatory repertoire and the range of actors involved. Though they still predominate, traditional forms of hierarchical intervention are increasingly being supplemented by n e w forms of cooperative governance. This can tend to cause a weakening of state authority and democratic legitimacy, and reductions in estab‑ lished institutional problem-solving capacity (Pierre 2000: 2). At the same time, n e w policy instruments offer an opportunity to plug deficits in existing environmental policy and help address so-far unresolved environmental problems. This paper explores how persistent environmental problems can be tackled m o r e effectively against a backdrop of changes in the institutional and policy framework, and what part can be played here by n e w approaches to governance. The focus is therefore on fundamental issues of environmental policy making that c o m e under the general heading of governance in both academic and policy debate. The first part of the paper describes in detail the changed environmental and political situation. The second part, w r i t t e n in the light of experience with the Rio Process begun in 1992 and its ambitious model of multilevel governance, goes on to evaluate four central governance approaches in recent environmental policy: Target orientation, integration, cooperation and participation. New forms of environmental governance are shown to promise improvements in solving

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overload and govermnental failure ‐ challenges which moved Niklas Luhmann (1989: 85) to the acutely sceptical statement that environmental problems make it “quite clear how much politics would have to accomplish and how little it can”. Thirdly, the intractability of persistent environmental problems m u s t be viewed alongside the relatively poor approval ratings for ambitious environmental policy action. The approval gap is partly due to the described need for incisive changes in other sectors of the economy and society. But it also arises because many of today’s pressing environmental problems, such asurban sprawl, climate change and species loss, only make themselves felt gradually rather than immediately and so need to behighlighted by scientists and the media before the public will sit up and take notice (Janicke and Jorgens 1998). This is compounded by the fact that environmental policy successes of recent decades, mostly involving visible problems like smog and surface water pollution, can give a false impression that the m o s t urgent environmental problems are largely under control (BMU and UBA 2002: 34 f .). Finally, environmental policy’s failure to master certain persistent problems has led to palpable resignation among those who have fought to bring attention to them for years or even decades. What was a heated public debate surrounding hazardous chemicals in Germany asrecently asthe 19805 has thus n o w petered o u t . This acceptance dilemma, with one group’s false sense of security feeding the other’s resignation, comes to ahead when industry is asked to accept m o r e rigorous regulation. Its severity is borne o u t by the fierce counterswell experienced by former environmental protection pioneers such asthe USA and Japan in the 1980s and m o r e recently countries like the Netherlands and Denmark. Fourthly, persistent environmental problems are often global in n a t u r e . Because they can transcend national borders, effective problem-solving is only possible on aninternational scale. But heterogeneous interests and the many v e t o opportunities for opponents of radical environmental protection measures often make it harder to properly coordinate the policies of sovereign nation states than to solve geo‑ graphically limited environmental problems at national level. Effectively dealing with persistent environmental problems is therefore closely linked to the difficulties of policy coordination in the multi‐level international system.

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t e r m is used by its authors in an analytical sense and merely denotes the empirical fact that the international system has no superordinate government with binding decision‐making powers and governance therefore relies by necessity on horizontal policy coordination mechanisms (Rosenau 1992: 9). It does n o t infer any value judgement in favour of deregulation and reducing the role of the state.

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As well asa m o r e varied actor spectrum, the governance concept also denotes an increase in reciprocal influence between policy levels and their respective state and non‐state actors. This effect is seen at global level with the various inter‑ national institutions and environmental regimes, and also at EU level. These policy levels above the nation state have steadily gained in importance in line with the amount of policy they originate. Yet this by no means spells less influence for nation states, including EU member states. Instead, interdependencies that have arisen between the different policy levels make nation states, though no longer entirely

free in their actions, indispensable as the source of power and legitimacy for international arrangements (Janicke 2003a). The environmental policy agenda of EU member states, for example, is n o w largely determined by the need to imple‑ m e n t prevailing European law and to anticipate and actively shape European meas‑ ures and action plans (Héritier et al. 1994; Demmke and Unfried 2001). An array of international conventions and multilateral agreements must also be taken i n t o account when shaping national environmental policy (Jacobsen and Brown‐Weiss 2000; Lalferty and Meadowcroft 2000). Conversely, the enactment of European and international environmental measures requires input from participating nation states. Their positions and interests in t u r n are influenced to a large degree by national and international lobby groups and transnationally operating networks of environmental activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and environmental scientists (Haas 1992). Environmental governance is therefore increasingly caught up in a complex web of state and non‐state actors operating and interacting at different policy levels. Environmental issues also affect policy at the subnational levels of regional and local government. The role of the world‐vvide Local Agenda 21 process is just one example of this. Finally, citizens t o o are party to the multi-level environmental policy system (for a detailed discussion see SRU 2002: 86‐122). Also, greater emphasis is n o w being laid on citizens’ role as voters, consumers and members of nongovernmental organisations. N o t only is environmental policy undergoing a proliferation of policy levels: the individual levels a r e gaining in importance. Policy instruments

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that draws upon environmental expertise, and this in t u r n demands professional management and a suitable institutional framework. Moreover, it is essential that the target setting process beproblem-oriented. ‘Creeping’ , persistent types of environ‑ mental problem in particular call for an input of knowledge to confront those involved with the long‐standing trends. Without this, the necessary debate regarding innovations, win-win solutions and best practices cannot generate broad consensus. Tobeeffective, target-oriented approaches to environmental governance should build upon stakeholder interests. In View of the acceptance dilemma mentioned earlier, they need primarily to comprise target formulation processes in which a minimum of problem-related communication is assured and the arguments of the affected groups are heard. From the standpoint of industry, they need to set stable targets that provide a predictable framework for R & D processes and investment decisions while allowing flexibility to adapt, for example in line with investment cycles (SRU 2002). Unlike short‐run, reactive and hence unpredictable environ‑ mental policy intervention, target-oriented approaches of this kind generally m e e t with a better reception from target groups in industry (see UNICE 2001: 5). In the debate surrounding a system of tradable emission permits for greenhouse gases, for example, industry circles have stressed the importance of long-term policy targets in allowing businesses to plan for the future. Priorities from an administra‑ tive standpoint include clear lines of responsibility, high-ranking institutional mandates and sufficient resources. For policymakers and the public, the emphasis is on evaluation of planned action and success monitoring. Aswe have seen, target-oriented approaches to environmental governance are anything but undemanding. They require a realistic stance on dealing with foresee‑ able obstacles. Calls for target and results‐oriented policy are by no means new, and have accompanied public sector reform attempts at least since the 19605. The fact that they are repeatedly voiced testifies equally to their importance and to the difficulties of implementing them. It is no coincidence that environmental policy actors to date have found it easier to agree on policy instruments than on targets. Target-oriented, MBO‐style environmental policy n o t only tends to impinge on vested interests, it also assigns monitoring powers that strong policy sectors and their economic constituencies soon try to escape. The resulting evasion tactics range from outright rejection of targets and dispensing with deadlines to adopting of various types of targets that are either irrelevant or nonbinding. Then there is always the option of subjecting unexceptional, routine tasks to a meaningless target with correspondingly little effect. In this latter scenario, targets paradoxically legitimise a status quo whose inadequacy was the reason for setting them in the first place. Developing and implementing an appropriate target hierarchy, then, takes considerable effort. In addition to deriving operational-level targets, any target formulation process should therefore be accompanied by a capacity needs assess‑ m e n t . Especially with reference to persistent environment problems, target setting is mostly associated with a need to raise capacity (see below). Policymaking processes r u n on scarce resources. They must therefore be allowed to focus on key targets, especially when addressing m o r e intractable prob‑ lems. Where substantial capacity gains are unfeasible, it is better to focus on a limited number of strategic goals or on problems whose potential impact or indeed intractability pose special challenges to society. Based on experience gained in the

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integration already featured in the Third ECEnvironmental Action Programme, i.e. asearly as1982 (Knill 2003: 4-9). There are reasons why little of this early insight fed through to environmental policy. The integration principle runs, prima facie, contrary to the internal logic of ultra‐specialised policy sectors and their economic constituencies. The bias towards ‘negative coordination’ (Scharpf 1991) that impinges as little as possible on the vested interests of affected sectors can only be overcome with considerable insti‑ tutional effort. This is certamly t r u e when it comes to integrating environmental concerns i n t o policy areas close to the interests of environmentally relevant indus‑ tries. There are therefore also reasons why specific sectors such as mining, trans‑ port and farming can exert severe pressure on the environment, reasons that involve considerable lobbying power and path dependencies. Sectors such as heavy industry and energy w e r e thus first compelled ‐ after some delay ‐ to adopt end-of‐pipe technologies. There followed m o r e efficient technologies which prevented some of the environmental impacts from the outset. So far, sectoral environmental strategies have been primarily limited to effecting technological change. As soon as there is a need for structural change, a need to intervene n o t only in the technological structure but in the actual substance of sectors, their markets and even their role in society, there is a tendency for marked obstacles to emerge. Examples include traffic avoidance and power saving asenvironmental strategies. Achieving structural change to reduce the environmental impact of such sec‑ tors thus entails m o r e sweeping policy instruments than the technology‐based environmental policies used to date. Environmental policy integration is therefore n o t only a potential solution: it is a process with major initial political and c o m ‑ munication challenges that demands significant upgrading in its management and capacity. The importance of institutional groundwork to this end can be seen from how Canada found it necessary to back up the (advisory) Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency with a special policy integration post, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, who reports to parliament and appraises on an annual basis the development and implementation of sectoral sus‑ tainability strategies (for a detailed discussion, see OECD 2002: 49; SRU 2000: 97). Sectoral strategies are backed by the arms of government apparatus responsible for them and by corresponding sectoral policies. But for such strategies to bite, sectoral departments must sway their organised stakeholder constituencies in favour of environmental policy integration. One option is dialogue strategy, where sec‑ toral policymakers and environmental experts hold a methodologically carefully prepared, results‐oriented dialogue on the joint economic and environmental long‑ r u n outlook. The objective is effectively managed discourse for long-term sectoral structural change. Examples in Germany include the consensus-based initiative to phase o u t nuclear power (Mez and Piening 2002) and efforts to confront the coal industry and its customers in the power generation sector with the long‐standing climate trend. In the course of such endeavours, it is appropriate and necessary for sectors to be confronted with the long-term problems they cause (see SRU 2000, 2004-). Sectoral strategies need this condition in place to stand a significant chance of success, although relevant scientific input is also necessary. A sectoral stake‐holder dialogue is conducted, among other things, to identify the economic risks associated

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Figure 10.1 From horizontal to vertical environmental policy integration. (Source: Janicke 2000.) Cooperative governance

The limits of hierarchical regulation in addressing intractable problems have long been a subject of enquiry for social scientists (Schimank and Werle 2000; Prittwitz 2000; Willke 1997; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Depending on the theoretical standpoint, the argument centres around the prohibitively high cost of obtaining information for the desired level of fine control, the inner logic and limited reson‑ ance capacity of social subsystems in response to central government policy impetus (Luhmann 1989), or difficulties faced by interdependent actors in arriving at a mutually acceptable solution by negotiation. Where command and control comes up against real or assumed limits, cooperative policy instruments ‐ that is, ways of exerting influence that state actors agree upon with private‐sector target groups as essentially equal partners ‐ are increasingly discussed asan alternative. Efléctiveness of cooperative policy instruments in practice

Cooperative policy instruments are n o t effective per se. Their skilful application has been identified both in environmental policy research and elsewhere as a key success criterion (janicke 1996; Knoepfel 1993; Ricken 1995; Wilti 2003). Their assumed benefits include the following:

departments and target groups often results in better‐targeted policy than regulation by legislative decree, Direct consultation between government

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speaking, negotiated solutions can usually be reached with industry associations having few major actors ‐ as in the energy, chemicals or automotive industry ‑ while environmentally relevant sectors with abroad and diffuse membership ‐ for example agriculture, car drivers or consumers ‐ can be better influencedby means

of traditional regulation. Requirements of democracy theory regarding cooperative negotiation systems are only to be mentioned here in passing. They relate to the desirable aim of linking negotiations back i n t o the parliamentary process. Government departments should be prevented from constraining parliament with the agreements they enter into. The imperatives of transparency, pluralism and protecting bystander interests must also be observed. In the light of the potential drawbacks of cooperative policy instruments briefly outlined above, a general reorientation towards this type of approach would n o t be helpful in environmental policy terms. Cooperative approaches are at best useful as a supplement to direct regulation. Participation, self‐regulation and the ‘enabling state’

Under the heading of participation, the Agenda 21 governance model and also the Aarhus Convention aim to exploit the full potential of civil actors by involving them in policy formation and enforcement processes. They thus go beyond the participation envisaged by cooperative approaches, where the policymaking process takes industry on board but n o t environmental lobbies or interested private indi‑ viduals. The aim of participatory approaches is to place policy programmes (and in particular the sustainability process) on abroad social base and to mobilise hitherto unused supporters and knowledge repositories. Involving citizens and NGOs thus offers untapped potential for environmental policy. Examples of self-regulatory influence being brought to bear on environmental pressures include activities of nature conservation organisations in designating protected areas under the Habitats Directive and buying up land, plus environmental NGOs working directly to influ‑ ence planning approval decisions or the product range of retail chains (Conrad 1998: 161‐182). Citizens acting in their capacity asconsumers constitute a further form of participation.

Participation in environmental policy issues, like the other n e w policy instru‑ ments presented here, is highly demanding in its o w n right. It presupposes an enabling state (SRU 2002: 86‐122). Citizens serving as an added resource for

environmental policy need a system of incentives and an infrastructure of rights and information. This includes transparency regarding the environmental creden‑ tials of products on the market, and rights of information, participation and access to justice for citizens and environmental groups. The will to participate also pre‑ supposes a minimum of accurate and problem‐focused environmental reporting in the media. There is again awide‐ranging need for capacity building. Participation for civil organisations is a management challenge requiring personnel and skills that can by no means be taken for granted. Another manage‑ m e n t challenge is to shape participation processes so that key interests are included, sufficient expertise is present among those involved and their motivation

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Success criteria for n e w policy instruments

The key environmental governance concepts outlined here a r e potentially able to deliver improved problem-solving capabilities. Ashas been seen, however, they are highly demanding in their o w n right, to the extent of being counter‐productive unless certain preconditions are in place. In the following we shall explore three important success criteria:

Capacity building. Clearer definition of the role of state influence, in particular regarding guarantee mechanisms for ‘soft’ forms of governance. Improving the role of the nation state in the global and European multi-level system.

Building and ‘conserving’ capacity The Rio process and ambitious governance approaches such asthe development of sectoral strategies show that every strategy must begin with a capacity needs assess‑ m e n t from which conclusions can be drawn asto available capabilities (Bouille and McDade 2002: 192‐200). More ambitious policy instruments need correspond‑ ingly greater capacity on the part of the state. This is imperative for strategic approaches at the level of importance of a sustainability strategy, but it is also a precondition for sectoral strategies. It should berecalled in this context that capacity building already featured in t w o chapters of Agenda 21, which also used the con‑ cept of capacity evaluation (UNDESA 1992: Ch. 34 and 37). These recommenda‑ tions mostly relate to capacity building in developing countries, but the need is n o t unique to the developing world. Environmental policy integration and participation presuppose added capacity, as has been shown. Neglecting the need to build cap‑ acity or to improve management is a major cause of the identified difficulties (Janicke 2003b). Capacity shortfalls do n o t relate to the type of measures chosen, but to what Luhmann terms the “conditions of practicability” (Luhmann 1989: 89). Capacity cannot be precisely measured, but it is noticeable by its absence: The best choice of policy instruments is to no avail if knowledge, material, personnel or political resources or institutional preconditions are wanting. In such instances, capacity building or development is inescapable unless the situation allows targets to be lowered instead (see Bouille and McDade 2002; Weidner and janicke 2002; OECD 1995). Environmental policy capacity and the capacity to effect sustainable development operate along three dimensions (UNDP and OECD 2002: 92):

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A human dimension, comprising the capabilities of the actors involved An institutional dimension, for example the ability to coordinate conflicting interests or to perform monitoring A systemic dimension (associated with the ‘enabling environment’), for example the legal framework, widespread access to information, and n e t ‑ working capabilities.

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process are by no means mutually exclusive. The latter can also be promoted by clear assignment of decision-making powers ‐ something that is particularly import‑ ant in the intricacies of a federal system like Germany’s (Benz and Lehmbruch 2001). Creating manageable decision‐making structures ‐ along with restricting the number of veto points in decision-making processes (Tsebelis 2002) ‐ is a key capacity-related precondition for solving persistent environmental problems, but it is also one that can become compromised in a system of cooperative multi‑ level and multi-sector governance. The intensity of competition n o t only relates to cooperation with industry associations. The adversarial political style observed in the German party system especially from the 19905 constitutes another obstacle to overcome: Strategic capacity in the parliamentary system requires a minimum of consensus on basic issues (consensus that is usually further developed in smaller EU member states), otherwise long‐term targets will n o t survive changes of government. The tensions between ambitious environmental governance patterns and the corresponding capacity requirements raise overall questions that need resolving. In particular, the search should be stepped up for forms of governance that conserve capacity and so relieve the burden on the state and can be squared asfar aspossible with notions of lean government (see below). Examples (J ‘capacity conserving’ policy instruments

All varieties of “negotiating in the shadow of the hierarchy” (Scharpf), which often make it possible to bypass elaborate institutional decision-making processes. Specifically, early signposting of problems by the state to give environmentally relevant sectors a reliable indication of impending government action while leaving them the opportunity to adapt (see Section 2.3.2). Operating with provisional standards that continue to apply until explicitly revoked. Concentrating on strategic targets. Reprogramming existing environmental sections in sectoral ministries (economy, transport and agriculture) from monitoring on behalf of the environment ministry to systematically championing environmental concerns. Using and promoting decisions at other policymaking levels. Exploiting opportunities for action, from environmental crises (e.g. BSE) to sudden price rises (e.g. oil prices). Adopting best practices from other countries (where transferable). Making use of the Internet, for example asan aid to participatory consultation.

Any solution addressing the causes of a problem rather than the symptoms naturally releases capacity. Above all, the governance approaches focused upon here ‐ n o t only environmental policy integration, but also target orientation, cooperation and participation ‐ can potentially help release state capacity. This was one of the reasons why they w e r e introduced in the first place. From experi‑ ence gained with them so far, however, it m u s t be stressed that these approaches

have their o w n capacity needs, neglect of which is a recipe for failure.

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the part played by the state, particularly in the interest of enabling m o r e flexible solutions (see SRU 2002). Jordan et al. (2003a: 222) conclude along the same lines that “environmental governance is at best supplementing, and m o s t certainly n o t comprehensively supplanting, environmental government by regulatory means”. That cooperative policy instruments are by no means a general substitute for classical command and control is suggested by the fact that even in the light of n e w governance patterns after the environment summit at Rio, some 80 percent of all EU environmental policy measures w e r e of the command-and-control variety (Holzinger et a1. 2003: 119). The role (3f the nation state

The general function and importance of the state is n o t the only issue in the c u r r e n t debate on environmental policy instruments to be in need of basic clarification. It is also necessary to elucidate the role of statehood at the specific level of the nation state ‐ because whether including nation states in global or European multi-level governance hinders or even helps in environmental policy problem solving remains a highly contentious issue. There is also the parallel controversy regarding nation states’ scope for action in the light of economic and social globalisation or Europeanisation. The German Advisory Council on the Environment explored this aspect in detail in its Environmental Report 2002, “Towards a New Leading Role” (SRU 2002), concluding that it provided advanced industrialised nations like Germany in particular n o t only with major chances to score with environmental technologies in the international innovation race and so hasten the greening of international markets, but also with n e w opportunities and necessities for environmental policy action. In the following, we aim to recall this position and set it o u t in a series of propositions in an attempt to take some of the complexity o u t of the confusing field of environmental governance. Both global competition and the internationalisation of policymaking are unquestionably seen to limit the capacity and sovereignty of nation states. Taxation of mobile emission and discharge sources, global economic govern‑ ance, wage levels and welfare benefits are all examples of adaptational pressure at the expense of national policies. Similar examples are known for environ‑ mental policy ‐ for example with a view to the W T O or to EU grant aid. Nation‐state environmental policy is nevertheless neither one of the ‘losers’ of globalisation n o r has it so far been significantly obstructed in its problem‑ solving capacity in the framework of the EU. Indeed, the opposite experience has also been recorded. This has to do with regulatory competition becoming possible in the EU and with (technological) aspects peculiar to environmental concerns.

logical product of integration into European or global decision-making structures. They should not, however, be equated with a loss of problem-solving capacity. On the contrary, collective action by nation states can raise the capacity to solve environmental problems. Such action is also inescapable where problems are potentially global in nature Limits to national sovereignty are a

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Conclusions New approaches classified under the heading of environmental governance contrast

with the traditional, hierarchical rule-based governance that still accounts for nearly 80 percent of environmental policy in the EU. The motives for seeking n e w approaches to governance are ambivalent. On the one hand, there is the objective of raising the effectiveness of environmental policies, which despite par‑ tial successes had failed to stabilise the state of the environment for the long t e r m . On the other, there are the objectives, both appropriate and problematic, of reliev‑ ing the state and of deregulation. There are major overlaps between these t w o positions: The search for m o r e effective policy instruments is essential considering the special nature of persistent, intractable environmental problems. In principal, it is the right direction to take. However, it requires m o r e rational management of state capacity ‐ a topic already covered in Agenda 21 (1992) but so far blatantly

neglected. An overall conclusion emerges that it is n o t only the ambitious targets of a sustainability strategy or governance approaches based on environmental policy integration that stand to fail at a shortfall in state and administrative capacity. Other governance approaches ‐ mostly of a cooperative nature ‐ whose primary aim of reducing the burden on the state likewise imposes substantial requirements in terms of administrative capacity. This raises the question of what relief for the state n e w policy instruments have delivered so far and how their performance may

be improved, particularly asregards persistent environmental problems. The proliferation of international environmental policy arrangements has n o t so far reduced the influence of the nation state. On the contrary, nation states n o w play a multiple role: in solving national environmental problems and in negotiating and implementing international agreements, and in aligning national policies to increasing quantities of international law. Within the multi-level global system, nation states possess a number of important properties that have no functional equivalent at other policy levels.

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