Moral Particularism

Dancy, J (2004)
'Audi, R (2008)
Bakhurst, D (2000)
Garfield, J (2000)
Lance, M and Little, M (2008)
Little, M (2000)
Dancy, J (1993)
Ross, W.D (1930)
Hooker, B (2000)
Blackburn, S (1981)
Hooker, B (2008)
Vayrynen, P (2008)
Crisp, R. (2000)
Torbjorn, T. (1995)
MacIntyre, A. (1981)


The concerns raised by Moral Particularism demonstrate the inadequacy of any principled ethical theory.

In this essay I will provide an account of moral judgment that reconciles the apparent incongruity between two components usually included in ethical theories: generality and relativity. In order to be effective in coping with elaborate moral dilemmas, an ideal theory necessarily includes sensitivity of judgment regarding the considerations relative to any particular context. Often considered as equally important are the roles of universally applicable generalised principles that avoid excessive relativity. This essay provides an answer to the question regarding the extent to which we should we include ethical generality into our understanding of morality. I argue that the generalised principles are detrimental to the success of moral judgment; we shouldn't rely on them in an ideal moral theory. Moral particularism is well summarized by the claim that what is most crucial to successful moral judgment is a sensitive attention to the particular features relative to each individual case. To be a successful moral agent, one does not require a relevant set of true principles and context specific judgments regarding particular features take epistemic and methodological priority. In opposition to this view are those who see the inclusion of generalised principles as necessary, considering principles to be the expression of true universalisable moral facts. I will initially identify the type of ethical generality that I consider as objectionable. I will then propose a relativized ethical system, only requiring a certain type of ethical generality that is far removed from traditional principles.

For the sake of clarity I have divided my discussion into two sections, each section discusses a different aspect of ethical thought over which one can be persuaded by the particularist argument. In the first section I will discuss only the methodological and ontological aspects of ethics. I will explain why I disagree with the commonly held non-cognitivist belief that certain identifiable natural properties, wherever instantiated, are linked consistently with moral properties in a way that demands the inclusion of principles. I will do this through comparing the moral pluralism of W.D. Ross and the similar beliefs propounded by his later advocate Brad Hooker with Jonathan Dancy's rival explanation. My main concern here is firstly whether Dancy is correct in his conviction that moral reasons function holistically and secondly whether this revelation leaves no better alternative than moral particularism. I will conclude this section with my own thought experiment of a complex hypothetical moral dilemma that I believe reveals the shortcomings of any generalist conception of ethical judgment.

In the second section I will focus on the concerns of moral epistemology and the rationality of ethics. If an agent accepts reason holism, how does this manifest itself as a reliable means of ensuring right action when an agent only allows particular judgments to sculpt our moral knowledge? One may be able to adequately negotiate moral decisions solely using particular judgments, yet still depend on law-like principles to account for their justification and explanation. Dancy's argument is ontological in character as it concerns the structure of the moral domain, yet this has implications on the structure of our knowledge of this domain. Dancy must show how the particularist can have knowledge of action guiding moral rules without depending on generality. I will focus on the objections raised by Taansjo and Crisp as well as discussing the solutions offered by David Bakhurst. I will then return to my own example used to conclude the first section, as I believe it presents a number of problems for any defender of the model of ethical judgment as promoted by Ross. By providing an extensive analogy between the evaluative domains of aesthetics and ethics I will outline a suitable account of moral psychology that isn't undermined by the problems raised. I will conclude this section by assessing and repairing the flaws in Dancy's particularist epistemology as well as demonstrating its vital accomplishments. I will explain why I consider these accomplishments to demand we abandon all traditional principles. We should adopt a particularist outlook as it the most accurate and practically useful way to incorporate ethical theory into everyday life, ensuring morally right action.

I will conclude by outlining a compensatory account of particularism, retaining its insights without condoning full abstinence of all types of generality. In order for this conclusion to avoid contradiction, I believe the generalizations that are indispensible to moral theory have a far more complex structure and are explanatorily distinct from traditional principles identifying duties and dictating what we ought to do invariantly. I propose that 'defeasible moral principle' is the full extent to which an ethical system requires generality. Any moral principle that aims to make an explicit and necessary connection between natural and moral properties are those that constitutes a misleadingly structured picture of the moral domain. Misleading insofar as principled theories cannot provide adequate action guidance due to their inherent insensitivity to the open texture of the moral domain. They fail to emphasize the sensitivity of judgment that is most crucial moral thought and judgment.

Holism vs. Atomism in the theory of Reasons:

In this section I will discuss two opposing theories of the methodology required to conduct moral judgment. The purpose of ethical theory, it has been thought by some, is to provide us with a reliable and versatile strategy for locating which natural features are of moral relevance, how they form reasons for action and then how to respond to them in a correct and justificatory manner. The particularist asserts that discerning the particular natural properties relevant to each case is the only way of determining their moral status. Conversely, the generalist believes we should use principles, as they are the most appropriate means of identifying natural properties that are always morally relevant. The methodological discussion becomes an analysis of how to establish the right course of action amongst competing yet seemingly equally valid moral reasons. The generalist contends our method should be a 'trade-off' between the general duties at play in each situation; we are obliged to act in accordance with the most pressing duty. This implies each principle must be recognizable in purely natural terms. The overall moral status of an act is determined by the competing principles, each of which always remains a moral reason in itself. I will defend a particularist position that states the true nature of moral reasoning to be holistic. This is a metaphysical thesis stating the particular natural properties upon which moral properties supervene cannot be helpfully made explicit in a principle.

I will also discuss the intimately related normative concerns. 2The 'deontic valence' of a set of natural properties should be understood as whether it counts in favour of or against an action. I argue it is the particular features of any situation that determine the valence of any consideration. This view is directly opposed to those who claim that general duties invariantly retain their normative relevance. It is important to recognise particularism to be asserting two separate concerns: firstly, there is no means of neatly allocating natural properties that make an action accord with the relevant principle. Countless natural properties can be considered 'honest'. Secondly, the 'valence' of honesty, whether its 'being honest' has a positive moral contribution to its moral status is also determined by its surrounding contextual natural properties, it does not do so invariantly. The natural properties which in case A, are that upon which 'is honest' supervenes. These natural properties can appear in exactly the same way in case B, yet because of additional natural properties present in this new case, fail to be 'honest' in a way that contributes to a positive moral status, it can even be detrimental to the acts moral status.

Dancy's project of convincing us to abandon principles first requires us to view moral reasons as functioning holistically rather than atomistically. I will assess the objections to holism presented by non-cognitivist Brad Hooker in order to establish whether any natural properties do retain their normative basis atomistically. If successful then this will fatally wound the particularist position. 7 Therefore, our initial concern is whether Dancy is correct in his assertion that the natural properties forming our moral reasons depend irreducibly on specific contextual natural properties and are capable of variation in terms of their moral valence from case to case.

Each situation, with which we are confronted, is comprised of a multitude of potentially morally relevant natural features forming important considerations. It is how we assess and respond to these features that is the point of departure between the particularist and the pluralist. 6 The generalist position suggests a belief in a structured moral domain, allowing them to offer principles of the form 'If N then M' expressing law-like relations linking the instantiation of a natural property (N) to the necessary supervening instantiation of moral property (M). W.D Ross considered morality to be structured by a plurality of principles, each principle identifying a 'prima facie' duty ('at first glance'). Each principle concerns a specific consideration reliably counting either for or against an action. 'Prima facie' duties are usually expressed in the form of thick moral properties. Thick properties such as cruelty include a normative component and invariantly contribute to an acts moral status. Conflicts occur frequently between these duties and there isn't one duty that demands priority, this accounts for the demand for context specificity of moral judgment when choosing amongst principles. For Ross, this is the full extent to which he saw contextual relativity as a necessary part of ethical judgement. Crucially, the moral valence of each natural feature identified in the principle is invariant; each consideration retains its normative weight despite it being potentially overridden by the relevance of others. Ross can admit to the exception of any individual principle if the demands of competing principles outweigh our duty not to lie, say lying will prevent the deaths of many; the act is still the worse for containing a lie. An agent arrives at their 'final duty' by calculating the varying inputs of each conflicting prima facie duty in a 'trade-off' in order to establish which is most relevant.

6 Alternatively, particularists determine the moral 'valence' or import of any feature through the complex network of interrelating features instantiated by this specific set of circumstances. Blackburn described moral properties as 'shapeless' in their connection to natural properties. There is no useful way of codifying, or providing principles for the vast number of natural properties upon which moral properties can potentially supervene. This complexity cannot be captured in true and informative principles. We cannot use inductive inferences from past experiences of natural properties instantiating moral ones to reliably form moral reasons relevant to a new case. Both theories agree moral properties supervene on natural properties but the particularist denies uniformity amongst these relations. Both theories require sensitivity to the particular details of each case, for generalism still requires an agent to identify the various competing reasons, expressed in 'prima facie' principles, present in this context. Particularism denies we need to take the further step of abstracting beyond each particular instance in order to establish a consistent pattern between natural and moral properties. All we require is that an agent is sensitive to and able to discern the distinction between right and wrong.

I will compare Dancy's particularism with the generalism introduced by W.D Ross through the medium of his more recent advocate Brad Hooker.7 I believe moral reasons, similarly to practical and theoretical reasons, function holistically as opposed to atomistically. Holism, when applied to moral reasons, may immediately cause alarm due to the dangerous consequences this may have. Some natural properties seem to be inherently negative; lying and stealing intuitively seem to always function as reasons to refrain from action. The moral status of each natural property is in each case determined by its contribution to a particular context. Therefore, even the most intuitively immoral natural properties are not necessarily going to count as a moral reason invariantly across all contexts. What is even more concerning for the likes of Hooker is that those same features, in some contexts, will constitute a reason in favour of an action.

Brad Hooker considers certain natural properties, wherever instantiated as inherently right or wrong making. Dancy is implored to demonstrate how there is no necessary connection between N 'being a reason for' M in one instance and N 'always being a reason for' M. His argument for holism claims the moral contribution of a natural feature to be determined holistically by the whole set of natural properties specific to this instance. 7 He defines the set of natural properties as one of the following: a contributory reason or an enabler, a disabler, an intensifier or an attenuator. In using these distinctions, Dancy is able to separate a reason from the rest of the relevant natural properties that determine its moral status. It is this distinction I will later defend through use of my own example.

Imagine I have promised to meet my friend for dinner, on the way I am flagged down by a woman whose husband has gone into cardiac arrest and requires my assistance by driving him to the hospital. I will be unable to keep my promise if I do. Hooker sees our judgment to consist of two competing duties, keeping promises and to also benefit others. A conflict in duties requires me to make an exception to at least one; I can only override the negative valence of breaking a promise if I see the demands of benefiting another to be my more pressing final duty. The generalist can admit of exceptions to any individual principle only for the sake of another. Despite the duty being outweighed if I choose to help the woman, the promise retains some moral weight. In making a distinction between a reason and other relevant conditions, Dancy is able to explain why natural properties in one case can contribute to the moral status of act whilst the same natural properties fail to contribute, due to the addition of a disabling condition.

7 Dancy asserts 'I promised' is a contributory reason in the initial case, before I was flagged down, but this is determined as such by the network of relevant natural properties affecting the normative force of this reason. It is the other co-present features of this situation that holistically determine the reason. For example when considering the initial reason as 'I promised', the enabling or disabling conditions for this reason are whether I was or was not coerced into promising. An example of an intensifier would be it being the last chance to dine with them before they emigrate. An attenuator would be that I am but one of fifty people invited. By separating reasons from enabling and disabling conditions, my initial reason loses all normative relevance due to the woman more urgently requiring assistance. The importance of the new reason is a disabling condition of the reason-giving force of my initial promise. It is not the normative relevance of 'I promised' being outweighed but disabled. The new reason is 'assisting those in need'; its enabling conditions are the fact I own a car. A disabling condition would be not having enough petrol to reach the hospital. The intensifying condition of this new reason is the severity of this man's situation. The reason giving force any natural property is determined by the whole complex set of relevant natural properties which are specific to the context, making them impossible to capture in principles. Moral reasons function holistically because what counts as a reason in one context does not count in another. The consideration 'I promised' does function as a reason but not in virtue of being subsumed by a principle stating keeping promises is a consistently right- making natural property.

In order to be atomistic, thick concepts are used as principles in order to abstract away from particular judgments. They can only be of the highly abstracted nature such as 'be just' or 'be honest' if one wants to claim reasons retain their normative weight atomistically. If 'be kind' is not the right action, say I am guarding a child-murdering prisoner, this retains its valance but is outweighed by the demands of justice. It wouldn't be just to tuck in the murder at night but it would be kind. 11 Hooker uses two strategies to explain why moral reasons function atomistically. The first, as mentioned above, is to create very abstract principles like 'be just'. The second is to suggest principles contain within them an implicit list of subjunctive conditionals, by including the entire list then this principle will without exception. This is how Hooker denies Dancy's distinction between reasons, enablers, disablers etc. is really a distinction at all as he encompasses them as part of the true principle. The principle of fidelity or promise keeping contains within it conditions for its efficacy. The examples of conditionals he gives are: I wasn't forced into the promise, I wasn't insane when I promised etc.

6 The first objection stems from a biased attitude preferring the methodology of the natural sciences and an over-estimation of the scope of the doctrine of supervenience. Every principle requires it admit of exceptions. Every time an exception is identified by a counter example the principlist explains this by expanding the range and complexity of the natural properties upon which moral properties supervene. 'Be just' may be atomistic in terms of its positive contribution but this in no way identifies what we should find significant in terms of those natural properties upon which justice supervenes. There may well be a small handful of exception-less true principles, but they are useless in terms of providing adequate action as I'm only equipped with my intuition as to what constitute justice. If I consider an act, in terms of its natural properties, to be a just action, it is true justice, being a right-making moral property, explains the moral status of this act. I believe the natural properties, which in this instance make the action just, do not invariantly ground this moral status. The way the moral status supervenes on the natural properties is determined holistically by the context. Attempting to provide a list of true subjunctive conditionals is to embark on a Sisyphean task, I will expand on this more conclusively later when analogizing between ethics and aesthetics.

The duty of fidelity seems easier to capture in terms of the natural properties it identifies as inherently wrong making. For example, this principle can be understood in terms of natural properties such as intentionally misleading some or making promises without intending to keep them.6 True moral principles could possibly defy exception if one fixes them with 'ceteris paribus' clauses ('all things remaining constant'). The argument for atomistic moral reasons is strengthened if we think of examples that isolate the natural properties constitutive of a lie, change only this variable, and see if it affects the overall moral status of an act. This aims to establish the invariant normative valence of a lie by isolating it and analysing the change in moral status this isolated feature causes. I consider this way of showing lying to have an invariant normative valence to be unsatisfactory.

I will provide my own example which aims demonstrate why we should accept the holistic nature of moral reasons in a number of ways. Firstly, this dilemma aims to debunk the practice of isolating individual natural properties from their open-textured background in the hope that altering this property will indicate their invariant moral import. It demonstrates the inadequacy of ceterus paribus clauses, as one can isolate and alter any one natural feature so it appears as the inherently wrong making natural property. Secondly, I argue the natural properties relevant to this moral dilemma are such that they cannot be subsumed under relevant 'prima facie' principles. This is why I believe this example poses a problem for the generalist position: if, as moral agents, they are only sensitive to the moral relevance of natural properties identified by principles, they may well disregard the importance of other seemingly non-moral conditions if not 'prima facie' in their apparent moral relevance. I will show this insensitivity to be detrimental to moral judgment as the natural properties being ignored are conditions crucial to the moral status of the act. This example aims to show that in this case, it is not that the negative contribution of a lie is permissible only if it is outweighed by other more pressing duties. Instead it shows how the moral contribution of a lie is determined holistically by other natural properties that don't appear as being obviously subsumed under a principle. Yet if these properties are altered, their variation demands we make an exception to the principle of honesty. Whether or not the lie is morally relevant depends not on the demands of another principle but instead on its particular contextual appearance:

Professor 1 has dedicated the majority of his life to the pursuit of solving theorem x. Theorem x, if solved will massively improve our scientific understanding and will be hugely beneficial to the scientific community. He and his younger assistant, professor 2 are the only two people deemed to possess both the intelligence and creativity required to solve this abstract problem by the wider scientific community. Professor 1 has been attempting to solve the problem for far longer than professor 2 and has only a year left before he retires. He calls a meeting with professor 2 to discuss how they should plan to move forward with their research without him. Prior to this meeting Professor 1 spends an evening contemplating what to say in this meeting. He knows of the following natural properties all of which are all relevant to he will say in the meeting.

1). I cannot conceive of any avenue left unexplored in the pursuit of solving Theorem x. Throughout my career I believe I have explored all possible solutions of which I can comprehend.
2). To my knowledge, this problem is unsolvable insofar as it would require someone of far greater intelligence even to think of a possible way to solve it.
3). I believe Professor 2 is of far greater intelligence than I ever was, there is every chance he could locate a new means of inquiry potentially solving theorem x
4). Having worked with professor 2, I know him to be very insecure about his own abilities and he thinks I am the only one capable of solving this issue.
5). The theory, if solved, will bring great joy to professor 2 as he will win a Nobel Prize as well as improve scientific understanding.
6). Despite having found no solution, my life as a professor has been stimulating and isn't made overly negative by the lack of solution.

The Professor wants the meeting to produce the best possible outcome for everyone. In light of all these facts we can use a Ceterus Paribus clause to indicate the moral import of lying. All aforementioned facts remain constant, the question concerns which facts ought he lie or be truthful about.

I will negotiate the problem by initially adopting the position of a generalist before using particularism to see which theory is more successful. For the generalist, lying about all seven would be morally wrong, as I would be making an exception to the principle of honesty whilst also failing to meet the demand of the benefitting others. But would complete honesty about all seven be the right moral decision? It could be argued that complete honesty is right as it avoids telling him a lie ending in years of fruitless research (6, despite me being honest, could potentially not apply to the professor 2). For the generalist, this problem presents a trade off, potentially solved by two actions. We are able admit an exception to the principle of fidelity only because it is overridden by the benefit to others caused by the solution of theorem x. The first generalist response is to be honest about all seven and hope for the best results, my own hands are clean, as I haven't made any exceptions to the principle. I believe honesty about all seven would not be right, because no matter how much I try to convince him of my belief in 3, 5, and 6, 4 being true, means theorem x will remain unsolved because I chose to be honest about 1, 2. This poses no threat to the generalist as they can make an exception to the principle by lying about few facts as it will be of great benefit to all if he solves theorem x. I believe this way of analysing the situation to be mistaken. I argue that lying about 1-4, whilst remaining honest about 5 and 6, is the morally right course of action. Crucially, lies such as these aren't only permissible when justified by more important duties: these lies are not of the type that is negative in valence.

The moral status of a lie is determined by the co-present natural properties (1-6) being held constant. The thick moral properties of 'benefiting others' and being 'honest' are identified as distinct from the other natural properties by the generalist. How we are to 'trade-off' these duties requires careful attention to the contextual features, yet the ceterus paribus clause is holding the content of these features as constant. Therefore, the particularist and the generalist can agree, the moral status of this example, as a given context, is determined by changing the lied about facts in order to promote the solution of theorem x. Yet this trade-off only seems to be an effective means of establishing a moral reason for this unique particular context. This is why ceterus paribus clauses are misleading and cannot show the moral import of any isolated variable. The variable we are changing from honesty to a lie seems to show lying to be the wrong-making feature as it is capable of dramatically altering the acts overall moral status. Any one of the natural properties, if varied in this manner, has the same effect as when honesty is changed to lie: the moral status of the lie as positive or negative is shown to be determined holistically by the whole set of context specific facts. If we change the conditions of 3 to:

3b). I believe Professor 2 is of far less intelligence than I ever was, there is no chance he could locate a new means of inquiry to solve theorem x.

If we change condition 3, keeping the rest constant, the moral status of being honest about all seven is now definitely negative; we are required to make an exception to the principle of fidelity. The morally right action is to lie about or withhold information concerning 3b, 5 and 6 yet be honest concerning 1, 2, and 4. Choosing the lie to be the variable we alter presupposes its moral significance, the above example of a generalist solution seems effective but only if one constructs the context in a certain way. In changing 3, the generalist solution of complete honesty about all seven is no longer a possibility. In this adapted context, our sensitive attention of 3b now seems to be the crucial non-moral feature, not the lie, which is responsible for the acts moral import. The generalist can now only justify the lie for the sake of benefitting others. However, if I don't believe he is of great enough intelligence to solve theorem x, there is no benefiting others, as he will not provide a solution by virtue of which I can justify my exception to the principle of fidelity. Yet we should still lie to professor 2 about 3b, 5 and 6. The lie is wrong making initially but changes moral valence when we change 3 to 3b. This should be understood holistically, lying being wrong making is determined by the complex and contingent natural properties, these interrelations cannot be helpfully captured in any codifiable law. This shows the inadequacy of claims that suggest by keeping everything constant, we can measure the normative weight of lying by changing it as a variable. This example hopefully shows how any natural property can be made to appear as if it were the moral property of crucial relevance. It also shows how the moral imports of natural variables are determined by the other natural properties and not by virtue of a principle.

The conditions identified in 3 can be also be described as a right/wrong making feature of moral significance if its variation can dramatically alter the overall moral status of the act. I believe my example shows the complexity amongst the natural properties morally relevant to a decision and how they holistically determine our reasons. Moreover, there is no 'prima facie' general principle to apply to 3 or 3b; it doesn't appear as intuitively morally relevant, yet it is a consideration that calls for us to make an exception to the principle of fidelity. Any position similar to Ross's cannot adequately negotiate my example, despite being able to initially establish a clear trade-off, when we alter the variables which are initially kept constant we can see how suddenly the telling of lies becomes right-making. There is no general principle to guide action concerning 3, yet is a morally significant natural property capable of demanding we breach our principle of fidelity. Exceptions to moral principles are not always due to their being outweighed by a more prevalent duty as seemingly amoral natural facts can be of overriding moral relevance. Only through use of Dancy's distinctions between contributory reasons, enablers, etc. can we understand the holistic formation of our moral reasons.

Dancy's position can successfully negotiate the initial set of conditions as well as being able to adapt with the variations amongst these conditions. Our contributory reason in this example is 'benefitting others by solving theorem x'. 1, 2 and 4 are disabling conditions for this reason, 3 is an enabling condition, 5 is an intensifier and 6 is an attenuator. Understanding these natural features as such explains the great importance of 3; a lie should be deployed to preserve the enabling conditions. The disabling conditions are the ones to lie about in order guide our action in accordance with our reason. When 3 is changed to 3b, this change determines a change in the whole set of conditions. My contributory reason now becomes 'informing professor 2 of my pessimistic outlook without harming him': 1 and 2 now become enabling conditions, 3b and 4 are now disabling conditions, whilst 5 and 6 are intensifiers which ought to be lied about, If I believe 3b then 5 and 6 will only serve to encourage him toward a goal I believe to be unreachable, thus intensifying the potentially negative outcome. I have chosen a deliberately complex and subtle example, as I believe it best reveals the shortcomings of a Rossian position. The valence of the contribution made by lying is dependent on the context; given some contextual backgrounds the 'trade-off' technique seems applicable, yet it remains insensitive to holistic nature of the moral domain as the differences can be subtle additions which are also defeating conditions. As we complicate the natural conditions outlined in the example, the generalist way of responding to them also becomes less and less satisfactory. The two situations only need to differ very subtly in order for the moral valence of any natural property to switch.

Epistemological Particularism: An analogy between Ethics and Aesthetics

So far, I've demonstrated how one can holistically determine reasons and moral judgment doesn't require being subsumed under a relevant principle. The force of this conclusion will be minimal unless Dancy can also provide a particularist account of explanation, moral knowledge and justification. 7 Dancy's own account of explanation by 'resultance' is unsatisfactory and quite rightly attracts criticism, he is ultimately wrong to claim there are no moral rules. Roger Crisp argues moral knowledge can only consist of knowledge of universal moral rules. He, like Hooker, believes the ontology of moral reasoning is governed by principles; therefore our moral knowledge must be structured in a similar fashion. If morality is uncodifiable, no moral outlook could plausibly be rational since rationality requires consistency. Crisp claims Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to have no implication concerning which ethical theory to accept, I'll argue it does. Torbjorn Tannsjo's denies the internalist position cannot sufficiently define the structure of moral justification. 3 The disposition prescribed by Dancy must include a subset of invariantly forbidden actions; a constraint of certain acts such as 'rape' must require some form principle. I will defend a particularist account of moral knowledge and justification; one can know justifiable and explanatory moral rules without the inclusion of principles.


David Bakhurst combines the thoughts of virtue theorist MacIntyre with Dancy, providing the particularist with a plausible structure of moral justification in the form of a coherent self-narrative. We shouldn't search for justification in terms of objective moral facts acting as foundations upon which we justify moral knowledge. MacIntyre points out that in every contextual moral dilemma, of the type we've been discussing, it's not only a matter holistically determining what I have reason to do, but also how my action reflects on the type of agent I am. We can therefore justify any moral judgment by providing a narrative, what natural properties I saw to be of moral significance and why. Moral justification can only occur contingently in terms of being consistent with my own past actions as well as the moral culture in which we are situated.

3 The importance of sensitivity of judgment emphasized by Dancy must be understood as practical skill developed over time; a disposition to discern what is the most virtuous way to influence proceedings. The skill of being able to discern which particular natural properties are relevant to holistically determine a moral reason is analogous to aesthetic knowledge. Aesthetic judgments are capable of switching valence; natural properties in one instance can be considered as ugly, yet in another context actively contribute to the beauty of the work. If we consider the 'The Snail' by Henri Matisse, this work consists of cut out blocks of coloured paper loosely representing the helix of a shell. At the time, visual arts were considered as governed by rules of symmetry and exactness; art was dominated by accurate representations. 'The Snail' defies these rules yet is still a judged to be beautiful artwork, the audience of this work were forced to revaluate the aesthetic valence of crude blocks of colour. Blocks of colour sharply contrast with his previous artworks as well as popular art of the time causing it be considered as a new category with its own aesthetic qualities determined by its location in the social and cultural context of what qualifies as good art. If crude blocks of colour appeared in da Vinci's 'Virgin Of The Rocks' they would be detrimental to its beauty, but in this new context they contribute to 'The Snail's beauty. I believe these observations to assist Dancy's position, as natural properties in both aesthetic and ethics, are capable variation in valence. When we recognise the aesthetic beauty of 'The Snail' we do not suddenly consider our previous judgments of da Vinci's work to have been irrational. To deem something as morally good is crucially similar to the psychological judgment involved in deeming a painting as aesthetically good. In the same way our aesthetic judgments require an attention to particulars, as opposed to applying rules of significant form, we should also attend the particular features within ethics, refraining from mechanically applying generalised principles.

Through the analogy to aesthetics we can see how valence switching is entirely non-problematic. Therefore, I believe the case to be entirely similar for ethics, Dancy's suggestion that moral valence is capable of variation isn't undermined as irrational. We only need to look at how judgments are rationally capable of switching valence in the domain of aesthetics. The aesthetic analogy also extends to the justification of our moral judgment through a narrative. If 'The Snail' had been created in the seventeenth century there would be no means of providing a justifying narrative as to why this new artwork is has aesthetic worth. The narrative of 'why this is a good piece of art' of can be criticised or praised but must cohere the aesthetic knowledge absorbed from our culture in terms of viable categories of artwork. If the art world hadn't been focused on accurate representation then the justificatory narrative for why 'The Snail' is a good artwork doesn't exist. It is justified as being aesthetically valuable only by providing a narrative, the criteria of assessing it requires it to be coherent in terms of all art preceding it.

3 I believe the analogy to aesthetics shows why Tannsjo's objections no longer damage the strength of the particularist doctrine. Similarly to aesthetics, in ethics we are able to make rational judgments about natural properties that don't have a consistent valence. In aesthetics, we are at no point enticed into deeming this judgment or our contrary past judgments as irrational. We are able to justify and debate our aesthetic judgments by means of a narrative. I argue we should consider Dancy's particularism similarly. The particularist can have the wealth of background knowledge necessary to be able to discern moral reasons; he is also able to justify those judgments. I will now analyse Dancy's own unsatisfactory account of explanation and justification by 'resultance'. The solution to these criticisms can be found by utilising a Wittgensteinian account epistemology.5 Dancy's mistake is to claim there aren't any moral generalisations that play an indispensible epistemological role in moral judgment. His own account of particularist epistemology suggests natural properties function as reasons when they stand in a 'primitive metaphysical relationship' he calls 'resultance'

On his account, moral knowledge is discerned from the particular complex interrelation amongst the natural properties relevant to a specific case. Why is 'The Snail' of aesthetic value? His 'resultance' seems to state we discern this relation between the relevant natural properties and the beauty of the work. It just pops out at us as a reason; A is reason for B as a result of discerning A and B. It seems if this is to play the epistemological role of a genuine explanation it has to be generalizable to some degree. Not necessarily of the type all A's are reason for B's, but there is an important difference between one of infinitely many subjective explanations and an one that genuinely explains A being the reason for B. Dancy cannot explain in an isolated case why dishonesty explains why it makes the act morally wrong. His 'resultance' seems to be just like stating it 'it just does'. 'Resultance' adequately accounts for one entirely subjective reason yet; in the case of an artwork's aesthetic value it could be the result of any number of reasons. The interplay of light and dark colour, the varied brushstrokes or the fact I'm not colour blind. In order to establish which, of many resulting reasons, are capable of playing the epistemological role of genuinely explaining its aesthetic value. The solution to these criticisms can be found in utilising Wittgenstienian epistemology.

4 Principles articulating universal moral rules are not, as Crisp suggests, the solution to this problem. Moral rules can rationally guide action without being considered as the consistent application of a principle. Wittgenstein shows two different ways a rule can be applied, ones with determinate content capable of mechanical application. Rules can determine action in this sense but are far removed for the indeterminate structure of moral rules. In order to demonstrate the crucial implications of Wittgenstein's rule following considerations I will use an analogy between two types rule, both of which are able to adequately guide the action of Premier League referees whilst being different in their determinate content. The first type concerns the disciplinary action taken in the occurrence of fouls and misconduct. The second type of rule those rules entrusted unto the linesman. If Crisp believes Wittgenstein's insights to have no implication on the normative ethical theory we accept, he has to assimilate moral rules to the latter. I will demonstrate how moral are in fact of the former type.

A red card is issued if a defending player commits a foul denying an obvious goal scoring opportunity to an opponent. This rule seems to have determinate content; however, players have been known, on occasion to score from inside their own half. What is a goal scoring opportunity for a player especially adept at scoring from long range is different to another more defensively orientated player. This rule crucially requires sensitivity of judgment on behalf of the referee; he must develop a disposition to discern which particular features are relevant to the rules application. Conversely, the rule of whether the ball crossed line is a different type of rule it terms of its applicability. The linesman could well be replaced by technology. We can clearly see how this type of rule is different in how they adequately guide the action of officials.

4 If we treat moral rules as the former type, attempting, as Hooker does, to provide a list of true subjunctive conditionals would be to embark on a Sisyphean task. Such a list would be almost infinitely long. Conditions influencing a goal scoring opportunity would require the inclusion of the technically ability of each individual player, their constantly changing spatial locations etc. This list would in no way afford the referee with a better grasp of the rule, how to apply it and how to let it adequately guide his actions. One can gain full knowledge linesman rule without every having watched a football match whilst the other crucially depends on experiencing particular instances of goal scoring opportunities in order to comprehend its counterfactual conditions. Both types of rule have seemingly determinate content yet require entirely different rule-following considerations. A referee can rationally discriminate between instances through similarity judgments in comparison to a paradigmatic instance. Rules of this type can be applied rationally and respond to the complex open-textured domain they are supposed to govern. Wittgenstein provides a particularist epistemological structure of how moral rules operate successfully within ethical interaction without requiring being subsumed under a universal rule; the epistemic priority is of judgment of particular instances. Crisp's consistency is the same way consistency is established by linesman. I argue this is dissimilar to how moral rules are known and applied by moral agents.



Conclusion

In this essay I have provided an account of moral judgment that reconciles the discordance between generality and relativity. My answer to the question regarding the extent to which we should we include ethical generality into our theory is: minimally. Generalised principles are detrimental to the success of moral judgment as they aren't versatile enough to reliably negotiate the open textured moral domain. The type of ethical generality that I consider as objectionable is that of W.D Ross. The 'Two Professors' demands subtlety of judgment unavailable to the generalist, only using particularism can the seemingly amoral, yet crucial natural properties be appropriately included in our reasoning. We should be particularists and utilise the distinction between reasons and enabling conditions etc. to explain the exception-ridden nature of our generalised principles far more convincingly than suggesting exceptions are solely permitted by other overriding duties.

5 Despite this success he ultimately strays into error by failing to provide an account for the important epistemological role of genuine explanation.5 Defeasible principles have a distinct epistemological role. They allow of exceptions in a way that is preferable to the 'trade-off' between general duties that can only outweigh each other. We conceive of a paradigmatic example, understood as the 'privileged conditions'. I argue that this is the full extent to which we are required to include generality in an ideal ethical system. It is through deviation away from the paradigm or its privileged conditions that allows us to make exceptions to any defeasible principle. This provides the only type of generality that is appropriately sensitive the holistic structure of the moral domain. I believe it is a fundamental mistake try to base ethics on rationality, as defined by Crisp, Hooker and Ross, abstracting from our intuition about cases and universalizing them will make us insensitive to what is most crucial to ethical judgment. Unlike ethics derived as from principles of pure reason or a plurality of principles, particularism forces responsibility upon our decision-making ability and us as agents.

As well as beneficial insofar as it encourages ethical responsibility, it also strikes me as a theoretically and descriptively accurate as to the nature of moral judgment. 6Some reasons, like the reason not to murder another, seem invariant due to the likely scenarios anybody in our society encounter, meaning the privilege conditions are robustly in place. We shouldn't let this imply, like it did for Ross, law-like morality. The culture we live in is unavoidably contingent, if for some awful reason we reverted back to a violent state of nature of the type be or be killed, the privileged conditions for this reason and its seeming invariance would sadly diminish. The generalism that promotes invariant valence is misleading and should be replaced predominantly by a relativized particularist understanding.



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