Lockean Social Epistemology

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Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2013

Lockean Social Epistemology LISA MCNULTY Locke’s reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. In particular Michael Welbourne, in his article ‘The Community of Knowledge’ (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge, claiming that he ‘could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge’. This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific ‘knowledge’ to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what we would call ‘testimonial knowledge’ in appropriate esteem. This can be shown by his careful distinction between testimony and mere received opinion. Furthermore, this distinction is dependent upon a knowledge community which enables hearers of testimony to access alternative accounts. In view of this, we can consider Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding in a new light. Dedicated to the autodidact adult, The Conduct directs the learner to reason clearly and well. One goal is to render adult students capable of assessing testimony. The advice given is social in nature. The student must not limit his study to ‘one sort of men or one sort of books’. Otherwise, he faces the sort of cognitive isolation which would render him a mere receiver of opinion. The picture of Locke that emerges is not that of a dyed-in-the-wool sceptic regarding testimonial knowledge, but of a philosopher who formed an embryonic social epistemology embedded within a programme of adult education.

INTRODUCTION

Locke’s reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. C. A. J. Coady paints Locke as an extreme example of epistemological individualism; Frederick F. Schmitt argues that Locke regards testimony neither as a source of knowledge nor as a means to justify belief, whilst Michael Welbourne, in ‘The Community of Knowledge’ (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge; claiming that he ‘could not even conceive of the possibility of a © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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community of knowledge’ (Welbourne, 1981, p. 303). This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific ‘knowledge’ to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what we would call ‘testimonial knowledge’ in appropriate esteem. J. J. MacIntosh and Joseph Shieber have recognised this and offered more sympathetic interpretations of Locke on testimony. However, as yet, insufficient attention has been paid to the careful distinction Locke makes between testimony and mere received opinion. This distinction is dependent upon a knowledge community which enables hearers of testimony to access alternative accounts. In view of this, we can consider Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding in a new light. In many ways an extension of Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Locke, 1989), the Conduct is dedicated to the autodidact adult, directing the learner to reason clearly and well about any given area of study. One goal is to render adult students capable of assessing testimony. The advice given is social in nature. The student must not limit his study to ‘one sort of men or one sort of books’ (Conduct, §III). Otherwise, he faces the sort of cognitive isolation which would render him a mere receiver of opinion. This epistemic tragedy is comically exemplified by Locke’s country gentleman, cut off from company likely to provide him with new opinions or new information, and therefore unable to make reasoned political decisions. The picture of Locke that emerges is not that of a dyed-in-the-wool sceptic regarding testimonial knowledge, but rather, of a philosopher who formed an embryonic social epistemology embedded within a programme of adult education.

WHY TESTIMONY ISN’T KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge, in Lockean terms, amounts to certainty. There are two kinds of certain knowledge. There is intuitive knowledge, which is the perception of the immediate agreement or disagreement of ideas; for example, that black is not white. This is the most certain and clearest form of knowledge. There is also demonstrative knowledge, which is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but via one or more intervening proofs, as might be the case with a mathematical equation. Since certainty is extremely rare, we are largely dependent on the ‘twilight state’ of judgement (Essay IV, XIV, §3). Judgement consists in assessing the probability of a proposition being true. Probabilistic belief resembles demonstrative knowledge insofar as it involves perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas via intervening proofs. However, in the case of probabilistic belief, the intervening proofs do not offer a ‘constant and immutable’ connection between the ideas. They offer a connection which is frequent or reliable enough for us to judge the truth or falsity of the proposition (Essay, IV, XV, §1), but nonetheless what they offer falls short of certainty. For example, a student who does not understand the mathematical proof which shows that the angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees, might instead rely upon his mathematics teacher’s testimony. After all, © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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from prior experience he knows her to be competent, and she has no reason to lie. His mathematical education would be improved, if he understood the proof independently. Locke might accuse the student of ‘Laziness, Unskillfulness, or Haste’ (Essay, IV, XIV, §3) for deliberately choosing mere testimony when he could have certainty, but would nonetheless acknowledge that this lazy, unskilful student has good reason to believe that the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees. In a sense, then, Locke is sceptical of the capacity of testimony to produce knowledge. Where there is a choice to be made, it is preferable to attain certain knowledge than to rely on testimony. This claim is neither extreme nor contentious. Yet since certain knowledge is so narrow in scope, our primary epistemic goal is to improve our judgment. The pertinent question, then, is not whether testimony can lead to knowledge; but whether beliefs can be justified by testimony.

CAN TESTIMONY JUSTIFY OUR OPINIONS?

The most damning interpretations of Locke’s epistemology suggest that Locke not only rejects testimony as a means of attaining certain knowledge, but also as a means of justifying our beliefs at all. Prime among these is Michael Welbourne’s account of Locke. Welbourne himself regards knowledge as ‘essentially commonable’, easily transmittable from one person to another via speech or writing. The concept of a ‘community of knowledge’ is central to Welbourne’s account, as ‘it is only to the extent that we think of ourselves as belonging to such a community that we can engage in acts of transmitting and receiving knowledge’ (Welbourne, 1981, p. 303). There is a necessary bond of trust between members of a knowledge community. This trust encompasses a willingness to make assumptions about what our fellow members already know (which makes communication easier), and also a ‘faith in the reliability of our fellows as purveyors of knowledge’ (p. 303). Locke, who argues that the beliefs we take upon trust ‘are but shreds’ which cannot amount to knowledge (Essay, I, III, §24), seems to be opposed to this view. Welbourne therefore rejects Locke’s account, claiming that ‘he could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge’ (p. 303) and thus misunderstands a central fact about the human condition. Frederick Schmitt’s interpretation of Locke in ‘Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy’ echoes that of Welbourne. Schmitt initially suggests a moderate interpretation of Locke, according to which he regards ‘belief on testimony [as] inferior because unaccompanied by understanding’. This would be illustrated by the case of the mathematics student, who does not understand that the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees. However, Schmitt goes on to offer a more ‘potent’ and damning reading, namely that Locke: [M]eans to deny the possibility of knowledge on testimony on the ground that it entails that the subject must forego the source’s reason © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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for the belief, whether that reason be understood as a set of beliefs, or an experience, as in the case of witnesses (Schmitt, 1987, p. 44). It is this second interpretation which Schmitt chooses to regard as the Lockean view on testimony. Schmitt’s defence of this move is to claim that this more extreme view is entailed by Locke’s inferential account of knowledge. Schmitt’s reasoning is that, according to Locke, all knowledge is arrived at either through intuition or the senses; and that since we cannot have either intuitive or sensitive knowledge about the reliability of testimonial sources, testimonial knowledge is ruled out altogether. Technically, Schmitt’s interpretation is accurate: Locke would not consider it possible that we could attain knowledge via testimony, since ‘knowledge’ is so narrow in scope. However, this is compatible with testimony having a key role to play in improving our judgment. C. A. J. Coady’s influential book Testimony, a Philosophical Study takes much the same line on Locke as is espoused by Welbourne and Schmitt. Coady’s position is that ‘our trust in the word of others is fundamental to the very idea of serious cognitive activity’ (Coady, 1992, p. vii) and indeed that ‘an extensive commitment to trusting the reports of others was a precondition of understanding their speech at all’ (1992, p. 176). He presents Locke as a representative, indeed as an archetype, of postRenaissance individualism, and in particular offers extensive criticism of Locke’s account of historical testimony. Again, we find the defence of a social epistemology and the rejection of Locke’s account of testimony to take place almost in the same breath. Whilst the three examples above represent the consensus on Locke’s theory of testimony, there are exceptions to the general rule. Notably J. J. MacIntosh and Joseph Shieber both offer more charitable interpretations. J. J. MacIntosh (2005) defends Locke, and indeed the Enlightenment in general, from Alvin Plantinga’s accusation that the movement ‘looked askance at testimony and tradition’ and that Locke in particular saw both as ‘a predominant source of error’ (Plantinga, 2000). MacIntosh places Locke’s account of testimony in relation to the scientific methodology developed by his friend and contemporary Robert Boyle, whose influence on Locke is well known. He argues compellingly that Boyle is concerned ‘not only to argue that testimony is acceptable, but to show that the standards of acceptable testimony can be clearly met in science’ (MacIntosh, 2005, p. 11). Whilst Locke’s narrow use of the term ‘knowledge’ seems to place him at odds with his contemporary, ‘there is no suspicion of [testimony] in Locke any more than there is in Boyle’ (MacIntosh, 2005, p. 11). Indeed Locke, like Boyle, insists on the value of testimony, whilst also sensibly insisting ‘that the testimony in question should meet certain standards’ (MacIntosh, 2005, p. 2). Joseph Shieber (2009) offers both historical and philosophical evidence against Locke’s reputation as an epistemic individualist. He raises the point that the Enlightenment era brought with it a drastic increase in the circulation of books, with scholars purchasing ‘treatises on astronomy, physiology, geography, travel, history . . . in ever-increasing numbers’ (Shieber, © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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2009, p. 21). Far from denigrating this dependency upon testimony, Locke was an avid bibliophile. Shieber quotes Woolhouse’s recent biography to show that in 1691, Locke owned ‘about two thousand titles, a number that would nearly double before his death’ (Woolhouse, 2006, p. 302). Locke even developed a new indexing method for notes, as expounded in A New Method of a Common-Place Book (Locke, 1706). This would seem to be the behaviour of a man who recognised the epistemic value of testimonial sources. Shieber also argues that the traditional view of Locke on testimony fails to acknowledge that ‘Locke’s notion of knowledge is simply not co-extensive with contemporary notions’ (Shieber, 2009, p. 24) and fails to place Locke’s concerns about testimony in their proper context. Indeed, the interpretation of Locke on testimony tends to take place in a very narrow context. Welbourne, Schmitt, and Coady all focus much of their attention on the following passage, taking it to be representative of Locke’s account on testimony: The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. . . . In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds . . . Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use (Essay I, III §24). The standard interpretation of this passage runs roughly as follows. We gain our knowledge through experience. When we believe something because of what we have heard from a testimonial source, we are reliant not on our experience but on the experience of the speaker. Yet the speaker can no more pass on their knowledge than they can pass on their actual experience. Therefore, the listener gains no knowledge from testimony. Welbourne contrasts this to his own theory that ‘knowledge is essentially commonable’ (Welbourne, 1981, p. 303), and applies a reductio ad absurdum. Surely, he argues, this would mean that it is impossible to know that the Persians were defeated at Marathon, since we would merely be assenting to ‘the reverend name of Herodotus’ (Welbourne, 1981, p. 302). This passage is certainly a passionate defence of intellectual independence, and it does not seem perverse to interpret it as endorsing epistemic individualism. Shieber, who rejects this interpretation, points out that Locke precedes this passage with an insistence that he does not ‘want a due respect to other Mens opinions’; and in a section commonly excised from the passage, tells us that ‘Aristotle was certainly a knowing Man, but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another’ (Essay, I, IV, §23). Replace these lines, Shieber argues, and Locke’s account on testimony already shifts from epistemic individualism to mere prudence. © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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However, I believe we can go further than this protest that Locke is being taken out of context. This passage is not a simplified or misrepresentative account of Locke on testimony. This passage actually makes no mention of testimony whatsoever. Locke is describing ‘the floating of other men’s opinions in our brains’, which are ‘taken on trust’, since the reader has not ‘employed their own reason’. This is not how Locke characterizes testimony elsewhere. Instead, it is how he characterizes its poor relation, ‘received opinion’. The distinction between the two is highly significant for Lockean epistemology. Any account of Locke which fails to distinguish between testimony and received opinion will tend to brand Locke as a sceptic regarding testimony; but in fact it is received opinion which comes under fire. What then, is received opinion, and how does it differ from testimony? We meet the concept in the Essay, where Locke warns us that ‘giving up our assent to the common received opinions’ is a wrong measure of probability, which keeps a great many people in ignorance or error (Essay, IV, XX). The assumption that an opinion which is shared by our friends, or our country, or the members of our profession, will necessarily be true supposes falsely that ‘honest or bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude’ (Essay, IV, XX). We meet a similar warning in the Conduct. Listing several ‘miscarriages of reason’, Locke criticises those who seldom reason for themselves but instead ‘do and think according to the example of others . . . for the saving of themselves the pain and trouble of thinking and examining for themselves’ (Conduct, §III). If you believe something to be the case simply because one individual has given you testimony, or because the majority of some group of which you happen to be a part believes it to be the case, then you are in possession of the ‘fairy money’ Locke described (Essay, I, III §24). Yet Locke immediately lists another defect in reasoning, just as significant: [There are] those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but for want of having that which one may call large, sound, round-about sense, have not a full view of all that relates to a question and may be of moment to decide it . . . How useful it is to talk and consult with others . . . For since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different . . . positions to it, it is not incongruous to think nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notion of things which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of if they were to come into his mind (Conduct, §III). In quick succession, then, Locke makes offers two recommendations. The first is to avoid ‘thinking according to the example of others’, to stop relying upon them to do your reasoning for you. The second is to seek out the opinions and experiences of others when reasoning about any given topic, without which you will have woefully limited perspectives on any given object of investigation. Do not think according to the example of others. Yet do not think without the example of others. How can these two guidelines not contradict one © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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another? My answer is this: the first calls upon the reader to avoid received opinion, whilst the second calls upon them to seek and assess testimony.

ASSESSING TESTIMONY

The distinction between received opinion and testimony rests on whether an individual has critically assessed the views of others rather than merely accepted them. Those who fail to critically assess the views of others will merely gain ‘received opinions’, not beliefs justified by testimony. Locke lays out what ‘critical assessment’ of testimonial sources consists of: . . . In the Testimony of others, is to be considered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses. 4. The Design of the Author, where it is a Testimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Consistency of the Parts . . . 6. Contrary Testimonies (Essay, XV, §4, italics mine). Part of this assessment relates to the virtues of the witness, both moral and cognitive. Is the witness known to be dishonest? Are they lazy, unwilling to put in the necessary research to ensure that their report is well-informed? Either would make us more cautious about believing their testimony. Are they a skilful witness? By ‘skill’ in this context, we might reasonably infer ‘the ability to interpret the evidence accurately’. The distinction between ‘skill’ and ‘background knowledge’ is necessarily blurred here, for two reasons. The first is that skills are often acquired alongside knowledge or information. The second is that observation skills are often required in order to gain more information. Suppose, then, that I were to visit Kew Gardens accompanied by a friend, who is a botanist. Whilst I enjoy the visit, I am barely capable of identifying whether a plant is a grass, a tree or a bush. Meanwhile, my friend is capable of identifying the species, genus, and country of origin of any plant I care to point out. Her skill of identification depends upon her background knowledge: she has encountered these plants before and has already learnt a great deal about them. However, even if I were to point out a rare plant which she has not encountered before, her training in observing plants is such that she would be able to uncover a great deal more about the plant than I could, purely by examining the plant’s structure. Indeed, were she to discover a new plant, that is exactly what she would be expected to do. Her skill, then, lies both in her knowledge and her ability to apply that knowledge to a new situation. However, a ‘skilful witness’ need not be an ‘expert witness’. For example, suppose that I was asked by a member of the police for details of a violent incident which happened on my local high street at 9pm the previous Saturday. My qualifications as a skilful witness would in this © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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instance be: my presence at the scene, my ability to see what was going on, and my ability to accurately remember what happened. This is modest knowledge and skills compared with that displayed by my botanist friend, but they are sufficient in this instance to make me a skilful witness. In the case of testimony from a book, we must consider the ‘design’ of the author and the purpose of writing the book. If that purpose is to persuade the reader of a particular opinion on a matter, they might be guilty of presenting the reader with an unrepresentative account of the evidence, which the reader must balance out by seeking alternative testimonies elsewhere. Requirements 2, 3, and 4, directly concern the cognitive virtues (or otherwise) of the person giving the testimony, whilst 5 concerns the internal consistency of the testimony. (If there is a contradiction within the story we can suppose the witness to be lying or mistaken). Thus far, then, our evaluation of the testimony has focused primarily on the individual providing us with the testimony. However, Locke’s further requirements (1 and 6) pertain to the existence of alternative testimonies. We may have confirmed the various cognitive virtues of our witness, but we have not completed our assessment until we have also ascertained whether there are contradictory testimonies and how many (we might better say, what proportion) of the testimonies available agree with our witness. Therefore, when receiving testimony, our cognitive responsibilities include assessing not only our witness, but also alternative witnesses, where they exist.

OF POLICEMAN AND PERSIANS

With Locke’s evaluation of testimony in mind, let us turn back to Michael Welbourne’s account. Citing the common recommendation that ‘if you want to know the time, ask a policeman’ (Welbourne, 1981, p. 304), he claims that whilst his own theory endorses this advice, Locke’s theory rejects it. Welbourne intends this to be a demonstration of the absurdity of Locke’s approach to testimony. Yet we can see, by reading through Locke’s list for evaluating testimony, that he would regard it as perfectly possible to judge the correct time from the testimony of a policeman. Several of Locke’s evaluations can be applied here. If one asks a member of the police force for the time, one has already tested the integrity of the person giving the testimony, by deliberately choosing an individual who has been trained, tested and granted that position of authority. This is of course not a foolproof evaluation, but it is a useful evaluation nonetheless. As regards the skill of the witness, in this case the ability to tell the time, surely Welbourne would not claim that the inquirer could know the time as the result of the testimony of a police officer who had no watch? Furthermore, if it was especially important that we learn the exact time, then it would not seem strange to ask several people, in order to reveal any watch which was noticeably fast or slow; in short, we would seek out alternative testimonies. Admittedly, many people would not take this final step; but they would be © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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happy to admit that as a result, their justification in believing the time is not as strong as that of a person who had done so. Welbourne’s other challenge to Locke is that his account is not compatible with our knowing that the Persians were defeated at Marathon; not only because we are reliant on testimony, but specifically because we are relying on a chain of testimonial sources reaching back centuries. Since we surely know that the Persians were defeated at Marathon, Locke’s account must be rejected. Similarly, Coady criticises Locke’s position on historical testimony, in particular his claim that ‘the further off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has’ (Essay, IV, XVI, §10). Coady refers to this theory as ‘the disappearance of history thought’ or DOHT, and argues that were it true, we ought to be less certain that the Second World War happened than people were twenty, thirty or forty years ago. However, Locke’s account presumes a single chain of testifiers, ignoring the possibility for corroboration. In fact, there can be multiple chains of testimony accessible by one person:

In the above diagram, ‘a’ stands for ‘assent’. So, A assents that p, which B hears; then B assents that p, which C hears, and so on until E assents that p. Locke’s theory would apparently commit him to the claim that E is less justified than, say, B, in believing that p. Yet, Coady shows here that due to the effect of corroboration, the plausibility of the testimony may actually rise over time. In the example given, E is surely more justified in believing that p than D, T, Z, C, S, Y, B, R, or X are. E may even be more justified than A, Q, or W are, since: We can imagine circumstances in which A is more confident that he has correctly observed that p when he knows that Q and W have also, so if he can be better placed by corroboration then surely the hearsay corroboration that E receives may put him in a better epistemic position than A in his uncorroborated state (Coady, 1992, p. 213). Coady is correct that Locke seems to focus, in this example, on the case of a single chain of testifiers. In circumstances where we are in fact reliant on a single, long chain of testifiers, Locke’s concern seems justified. Yet this case is, as Coady claims, an atypical one, and his conclusion that the final recipient of testimony may be more justified in his belief than even the original testifiers were strikes me as entirely plausible. However, I do not regard this as incompatible with Locke’s overall account of testimony. Indeed it may serve to illustrate Locke’s goals. Since the assessment of testimony, as opposed to the mere receiving of opinion, requires access to as many alternative testimonies as possible, Locke is effectively © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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encouraging people to ensure that, as often as possible, they are in the position of ‘E’: willing and able to access alternative testimonies. Unfortunately, not everyone is in the position of E; not everyone makes an effort to attain it, and some even actively resist it.

THE PARABLE OF THE COUNTRY GENTLEMAN

Testimonial ‘knowledge’ (or let us say, justified belief) is possible so long as the hearer of testimony performs a critical assessment. However, whether or not the hearer will be capable of this is not only dependent upon their own ability to assess the character of the speaker and the coherence of their story, but is also dependent upon their access to alternative testimonies. It relies, then, on the scope of their studies and the breadth of their social interactions: [S]ome men of study and thought, that reason right and are lovers of truth, do make no great advances in their discoveries of it . . . they are very often mistaken in their judgements: the reason whereof is, they converse but with one sort of men, they read but one sort of books, they will not come into the hearing of but one sort of notions (Conduct, §III). Suppose, for example, that I exclusively read left-wing newspapers and watch left-wing media. All my friends have left-wing opinions on issues such as the welfare state and immigration. If I meet someone with rightwing views, I tend to feel a little uncomfortable and avoid political conversations with them, and perhaps end by avoiding their company altogether. In such a situation, I am at an epistemic disadvantage. I may genuinely protest myself to be a lover of truth. Yet my judgment is limited because I have limited my company and my studies to ideas with which I already agree and people with whom I feel politically comfortable. If we are to improve our judgment, then it is not only necessary that we talk to other people in general, but also and in particular that we talk to others who hold different ‘sorts of notions’ to ourselves. At this point, Locke moves beyond endorsing testimony to emphasising the importance of developing certain social structures. The right social structures aid the development of reasoning by providing our reasoning skills with plenty of ‘exercise’. Locke defines ‘exercise’ as interaction with other individuals who are knowledgeable (Conduct, §III). With this in mind, he sketches a brief hierarchy of human reasoning. A ‘day labourer in a country village’ is at the bottom, since he has little knowledge and no interaction with individuals who have more knowledge. He is surpassed by ‘porters and cobblers’ in cities. This is because their lives in the city provide them with access to more information through testimony; and also because they are more likely to come across various different opinions and different perspectives on a given matter, thus giving their reasoning skills more exercise. With this contrast in mind, Locke criticizes: © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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A country gentleman who, leaving Latin and Learning in the university, removes thence to his mansion house, and associates with neighbours of the same strain, who relish nothing but hunting and a bottle; with these alone he converses, and can away with no company whose discourse goes beyond what claret and dissoluteness inspire. Such a patriot, formed in this happy way of improvement, cannot fail, as we see, to give notable decisions upon the bench at quarter sessions, and eminent proofs of his skill in politics, when the strength of his purse and party have advanced him to a more conspicuous situation. To such a one truly an ordinary coffee-house gleaner of the city is an errant statesman, and as much superior to, as a man conversant about Whitehall and the court is to an ordinary shopkeeper (Conduct, §III). This country gentleman’s judgment is severely compromised. Whilst the gentleman was somewhat informed of ‘Latin and Learning’, he is geographically cut off from the cities where information flows freely (just as the country labourer is). He also deliberately keeps the company least likely to challenge his ideas or provide him with new information. Their views, their perspectives, are insufficiently different from his view, both in terms of opinion and in terms of information, to provide alternative testimonies. Therefore, when the ‘country gentleman’ is called upon to make political decisions, he is ill equipped to do so, and inevitably makes them badly. Whilst Locke focuses here (for amusement) on the weaker case of a gentleman who is not particularly interested in developing his reasoning capacities, his analysis would also apply in the case of an individual who genuinely was interested in doing so. The central point is that the cognitive isolation of the country gentlemen diminishes his capacity to reason well and to make appropriate decisions. The country gentleman perfectly illustrates Roberts and Wood’s assessment, in Intellectual Virtues, that Locke is providing a regulative epistemology. His concern is to guide epistemic practice, responding to ‘deficiencies in people’s epistemic conduct’ in a way that is ‘strongly practical and social’ (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 21). The key virtue Locke espouses is a love of truth which enables us to resist our own prejudices. To an extent, we bear individual responsibility for developing this virtue: the country gentleman is a blameworthy figure, not merely a victim of circumstance. Yet developing this virtue is not a project we could ever tackle alone. If we are to avoid limiting ourselves to ‘one sort of notions’, there are two warnings in the Conduct that we should heed. The first is to broaden the information to which we have access. Do not read only the ‘one sort of books’ which address our favourite subjects. Do not keep company exclusively with people who share those interests. Embrace such monodisciplinarity, Locke warns, and you will find yourself seeing the world exclusively from the perspective of whatever field is your obsession. ‘A metaphysician will bring plowing and gardening immediately to abstract notions; the history of nature shall signify nothing to him. An alchymist, on the contrary, shall reduce divinity to the maxims of his laboratory . . .’ © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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(Conduct, §XIX). Secondly, we should broaden the spectrum of opinions to which we are exposed. This means being aware of controversies regarding empirically discoverable facts; it also means ensuring that you expose yourself to a range of different opinions regarding moral, aesthetic, and political values. Only then can we effectively assess testimony; only then can we evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of conflicting positions. Only then can we trust our own judgment. CONCLUSIONS

Locke stands accused of an extreme form of scepticism regarding testimonial knowledge, incompatible with any conception of a knowledge community. On this charge, I have protested Locke’s innocence, insisting that his views are compatible with common sense. Admittedly, testimony cannot produce knowledge on Locke’s account, simply because it cannot produce certainty. The deeper accusation, though, is that testimony cannot provide any justification whatever for our beliefs. My defence is based on a key distinction between received opinion and testimony. We receive opinions passively, perhaps without even noticing that we have done so. ‘Testimony’, though, deserves the name not because of the status of the speaker, but because of the critical assessment on the part of the hearer. Thus, what to one person is testimony, to another will merely be received opinion. Learning to be an assessor of testimony, rather than a mere receiver of opinion, is a key message of the adult education that Locke provides in the Conduct. The would-be receiver of testimony must expand their company and their studies to ensure that if there are dissenting voices, they shall hear them. This is an embryonic social epistemology. Locke’s account is not only compatible with a community of knowledge, it demands it, and creates it. Correspondence: Lisa McNulty, Regents American College London, Inner Circle, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4NS, UK. Email: [email protected] REFERENCES Coady, C. A. J. (1992) Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New York, Oxford University Press). Locke, J. (1892) Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding (Oxford, Clarendon Press) [cited as Conduct within text]. Locke, J. (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford, Clarendon Press) [cited as Essay within text]. Locke, J. (1989) Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Oxford, Clarendon Press). Locke, J. (1706) A New Method of a Common-Place-Book, in Posthumous Works of Mr John Locke (Oxford, printed by W. B. for A. and J. Churchill). MacIntosh, J. J. (2005) Boyle and Locke on Observation, Testimony, Demonstration and Experience, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5.14, pp. 1–14. Plantinga, A. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford, Oxford University Press). Roberts, R. C. and Wood, W. J. (2007) Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford, Oxford University Press). © 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

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Schmitt, F. (1987) Justification, Sociality and Autonomy, Synthese, 73.1. pp. 43–85. Shieber, J. (2009) Locke on Testimony: A Reexamination, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 26.1, pp. 21–41 Welbourne, M. (1981) The Community of Knowledge, Philosophical Quarterly, 31.125, pp. 302–15. Woolhouse, R. (2006) Locke: A Biography (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

© 2013 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.