Local Government in China\'s West: Intra-state Political Competition over Local Economic Resources

This is Chapter 6 of Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-state Resilience in Rural China. Stanford University Press. 2014.Senior local officials are very active in the private sector despite formal laws prohibiting officials from engaging in business activity. This chapter shows how senior officials use patronage networks to capture profits from a burgeoning service sector. Attention is also given to the the role of patronage networks in facilitating land deals, which have become a major source of revenue and spoils for local governments throughout China. The chapter argues that competition between political rivals has become more intense in recent years as rapid economic development has increased the number and value of economic prizes available in the political arena. The intensification of intrastate competition over the bureaucratic levers of power has reinforced the value of patronage networks as a source of political capital.