LEGAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL PROCESS

Ed. Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed, Thomson West Publishers, 2004) p. 912
Ed. Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed, Thomson West Publishers, 2004) p. 862
ibid, p. 1242
Michael Doherty Jurisprudence: the philosophy of law (3rd ed, Old Bailey Press, London, 2003) p. 24
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p. 167
Giorgis & Campbell, Justice- An Historical and Philosophical Essay (1st ed, University Press, Edinburgh, 1952) p.1
(1924) 1 K.B. 259
Also see, Alan Taylor, Principles of Evidence (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2000), p. 13
Evidence Act Cap E4 LFN 2004
Sections 2(1) Evidence Act; Also see, ed. Afe Babalola, Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria (Sibon Books Limited, Ibadan, 2001)P.18
T.A. Aguda, The Law of Evidence (3rd ed, Spectrum Law Publishing, Ibadan, 1989). P. 8
Section 137(1) Evidence Act Cap E4 LFN 2004
Section 137(2) Evidence Act, Cap E4 LFN 2004
Afe Babalola, Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria (Sibon Books Limited, Ibadan, 2001)P.280
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p. 172
Evidence Act Cap E4 LFN 2004
(1935) AC 462, p.481; Also see, Christopher Allen, Practical Guide to Evidence(Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001) p. 108
(1965) N.M.L.R 233
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) pp. 174; Also see, Alan Taylor, Principles of Evidence (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2000), p. 14
M.D.A Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) p. 33. See Also, * Ese Malemi: The Nigerian Legal Method (2nd ed. Princeton Publishers Co., Ikeja, Lagos) p. 6; See Also, * Steven Vego, Law and Society, (5th ed. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, USA, 1891) p. 7; See Also, Wayne Morrison Jurisprudence from the Greeks to post-modernism (Cavendish Publishing, London, 1997) p. 1 where it was stated that the definition of what is law? Has taken about 2500 years with no settled answer to be arrived at.; See also P.J Fitzgerald Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed. Universal Law Publishing Co, PVT. Limited, Delhi India) p. 9;See also, ed. T.O Elias & M.I Jegede, Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence (MIJ Publishers Limited, Ebute Metta, 1993) p.432
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) pp. 176-180
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p. 175
D.A Ijalaye, Justice as Administered by the Nigerian Courts (Justice Idigbe Memorial Lectures Series Five (1992) p.64
John Farrar & Anthony Dugdale, Introduction to Legal Method (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1990) p. 86; Also see, ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) pp. 176-180
ibid,
John Farrar & Anthony Dugdale, Introduction to Legal Method (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1990) p. 86. See also R W M Dias Jurisprudence (5th ed, Butterworth & co Publishers, London, 1985) pp. 126- 165
Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System (5th ed, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001) p. 164
Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System (5th ed, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001) p. 164
Paul C. Ananaba, Essential Principles of Nigerian Law (Agbo Areo Publishers, Ibadan Nigeria, 2002) p. 22
(1999) 9 N.W.L.R Pt. 617, 103
Section 6, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
(1947) A.C. 156
(1917) 244 US. 205
Niki Tobi The Sources of Nigerian Law (MIJ Professional Publishers, Ebute Metta, Lagos, 1996) p. 79
(1932) A.C. 562
R. Cross, Precedent in English Law (3rd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977)pp. 31-32, Also see Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p 179
Niki Tobi The Sources of Nigerian Law (MIJ Professional Publishers, Ebute Metta, Lagos, 1996) p. 83
Ed. A.T.H Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006)p.92
(2005) E.W.C.A Civ. 1609
Ed. A.T.H Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006)p.993; Also see, A.L. Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case" in Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law ( 1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 161
ibid
Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008) p.224
Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008) p.224; Also see, A.L. Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case" in Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law ( 1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 161; Also see, Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p 180

R. Cross, Precedent in English Law (3rd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977)pp. 90-101, Also see, A.O. Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Spectrum Books Publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1979) p.113
ibid
Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008) p.229; Also see, Bensor's case (1956) A.C. 104 HL.
J.N Egwummuo, Dynamics in Nigerian Legal System ( Academic Publishing Company, Enugu, 2003)p. 143
Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008) p.229
Niki Tobi The Sources of Nigerian Law (MIJ Professional Publishers, Ebute Metta, Lagos, 1996) p. 85; Also see the case of Babalola v. Babalola , WACA/69/1955 reported in (1956-84)
Alhaji Yusuf v. Egbe (1987) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 56) 341
In Ifediorah & Ors v. Ume & Ors (1988) 2 N.W.L.R (Pt. 74) 5, it was held per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. That "although what is ordinarily binding in a case is the ratio decidendi and not the obiter dictum, yet, an obiter dictum by the ultimate court on an important point of law is one which is binding on and followed by all he lower courts
A.O. Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Spectrum Books Publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1979) p.114
J.N Egwummuo, Dynamics in Nigerian Legal System ( Academic Publishing Company, Enugu, 2003)p. 146
(1976) 6 ECSLR 330
(1970) 1 NLR 93
(1952) 14 WACA 111, 115; Also see, Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008) p.231
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006) p. 187
Cardozo v. Daniel (1986) 2 N.W.L.R (Pt. 20) ; See Also, Muhammad Tawfiq Ladan, Introduction to Jurisprudence: Classical and Islamic, (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, 2006) p. 108
(1992) 7 SCNJ p. 366
(1983) NSCC p. 225
Muhammad Tawfiq Ladan, Introduction to Jurisprudence: Classical and Islamic, (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, 2006) p. 108
(1944) K.B. p. 718
(1988) 11 N.W.L.R pt. 574, p. 408
(1961) WNLR 293
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18
LEGAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The art of reasoning is an art employed by virtually (or nearly) all the people of varying profession. Man will always reason because he was created to reason. For instance, to the logicians, reasoning is very essential to their trade, that it has been defined as the trade of man. However, stupid our reasoning faculty may be, we all reason. Reasoning has been defined in varying ways at varying time.
This work will try has much as possible to discuss reasoning from the legal perspective. This means, the work will be talking about legal reasoning. This work would not just be talking about legal reasoning as a whole construct but will discuss how legal reasoning is applied to judicial processes in court. This will include the shifting of law and facts. When discussing about shifting of fact, an analysis would be made to the shifting of fact in the civil cases and in the criminal cases, then precedent and case laws would also be examined. The application of precedent in the hierarchy of courts would also be explained for a proper ascertaining of how precedent works in the Nigerian Courts of law.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The above question is the combination of phraseology which embeds four (4) concepts which needs analysis and comprehension. They are, "legal, reasoning, judicial and process".
On the first concept, legal it has been defined in the following was as "of or relating to law; falling within the province of law, established required and permitted by law, of or relating to law as opposed to equity". On the second concept, reasoning, it has been defined as "the way of thinking in a logical pattern to arrive at a judgment. It could also be defined as the systematic and methodological pattern of thinking in sequence so as to harness the follow of meaning capable to be deduced from an argument or statement".
On the third concept, judicial, it has been defined "of relating to, or by the court or a judge, in court, legal, of or relating to a judgment". Process has been defines as the proceedings in any action or prosecution. Legal reasoning has been defined as nothing more than a smokescreen for a political decision.
Synthesizing the whole concept together, one can say that legal reasoning in judicial process can be defined as "the process of careful thinking by a judicial officer in the course of resolving legal issues presented by parties to a legal action before his court for determination".
Legal reasoning in judicial process should be preoccupied with the administration of justice. The concept of Law has generated much controversy but still greater are the doubts and discussions, which surround the concept of justice. Giorgis and Campbell wrote in their book An Historical and Philosophical Essay that justice is sometimes taken as synonymous with or equivalent to Law, sometimes, to be distinct from Law and superior to it. Justice is one of its aspects is held to consist in conformity with Law, but it is also asserted that Law must conform to Justice. Also in the case of Rv. Sussex that justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done and next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the importance of appearing to be so.
SHIFTING OF FACTS AND LAW IN COURT
In every adversarial system of law, a party whether in a civil or criminal proceeding must do two things in order to win his opponent; it must adduce sufficient evidence in order to satisfy the tribunal of law; and it must do this in such a way as to ultimately convince the tribunal of fact to the extent required using the applicable law.
SHIFTING OF FACT
The term fact has been defined by the Nigerian Evidence Act, section 2(1) to include:
Anything, state of things, or relation of things capable of being perceived by the senses
Any mental condition of which any person is conscious
The principle of shifting of fact is based on a principle that whoever desires any court to give judgement on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exists.
CIVIL CASES
It must be stated that when we talk of shifting of fact in civil proceeding, it is only "facts in issue" that are necessary to be proved. Facts in issue have been defined as including "any fact from which either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right liability or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceedings necessarily follows". Aguda has defined fact in issue as:
"All such facts that a plaintiff in a civil case must prove in order to establish his claim. If they admitted expressly or by implication by the defendant".
The burden of proof for civil cases has been provided for by Section 137 of the Evidence Act. It says that the burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleading. If such party adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy a jury that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced; and so on successively until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with. Where there are conflicting presumptions, the case is the same as if there were conflicting evidence.
The burden of proof is not static. It fluctuates between the parties. In civil action, the party with the burden of proof is generally, but not always, the plaintiff. The Latin maxim Affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio meaning the burden of proof lies on the one who affirms not upon one who denies, is applicable in that when the defendant denies the facts stated, then the burden is shifted on the plaintiff to prove.
If the defendant confesses the truth of the allegation but proceeds to supply new facts, which puts a different complexion on the case, thereby destroying the effect of the admitted facts, the onus lies on him to prove the new facts. This is called confessing and avoiding the plaintiff's averment.
CRIMINAL CASES
On the issue of criminal cases which normally has the state as the prosecution, Section 33(5) of the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that "every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty". To prove the guilt of an individual, the Evidence Act gives us the basic rule.
The basic rule was laid down by the Evidence Act (Section 137(2) Evidence Act, "that the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is,, subject to section 140 of the Evidence Act, on the person who asserts it whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action". Also, in the English case of Woolmington v. DPP by the court per Viscount Sankey LC that "throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt". In the case of Okagbue v. Commissioner of Police, the court trying to lend credence to this principle of law, asserted that it was not for the accused to prove his innocence but for the prosecution to prove the accused guilt.
Just like nearly every principle in law, where there are principles or general rules, they most likely would be exceptions to this general rule. In lieu of this, the following have been asserted as exceptions to the general rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
Where the accused raises a defense of exemption or qualification from the provision of the law creating the offence with which he is charged.
Where the onus of proving certain facts is specifically imposed on the accused by statute.
Where special facts are within the knowledge of the accused.
Where the accused raises the defence of intoxication or insanity.
Once the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proving his innocence then shifts to the accused.
SHIFTING OF LAW
The Latin maxim states that Ignorantia facit excusat: Ignorantia juris non excusat which means ignorance of fact excuses but ignorance of the law is no excuse. It has been asserted that there is no acceptable definition of law, however, for the sake of this work; the definition provided by Sanni would be our starting point. It has been defined as a body of rules for regulating human conduct within a community and which by common consent of this community shall be enforced by external power. The shifting of law arises in occasion where a party relied on a law not knowing that such law has either been amended or repealed. The burden of informing the court of the amendment or repeal of such law shifts to the person who has knowledge of the repeal or amendment.
Nevertheless, this burden is mitigated by the maxim Juria novit curia which means, it is for the court to know. Therefore, the judge is expected to know the law at all material time. Hence, in a situation where the party fails to cite the relevant case, the burden shifts to the judge. Emphasizing the need for judges to be acquainted with the law at all times, Ijalaye noted that:
"Judges should be able to catch up with the dynamics of our ever changing society and they should therefore recharge courses bearing in mind the famous words in the Justinian Institute Ignorantia judicis est Calamitas Innocientis (the ignorance of the judge is the calamity of the innocent"
PRECEDENT AND CASE LAWS
Case Law is the product of judicial reasoning in deciding cases in particular fact situations. As a source of law, it is like a mosaic where the pattern emerges as the work develops. Judicial precedent emanates as case law has been defined as reasoning by rules. According to Farrar, English case law is the product of practical reasoning emerging, from decision-making and combining the attributes of reasoning with those of reasoning by rules. The operation of the rules of precedent appears, at first sight, to involve a similar operation of deductive logic to that applied in statute law: the judge merely applies the legal principle established in the precedent to the facts in hand to determine the outcome of the case. For instance:
Precedent: in Case A involving particular circumstances, legal principle B was applied leading to conclusion C.
Instant Case: in case Y similar circumstances to those in X have occurred.
Therefore, principle B must be used to reach conclusion C.
However, a closer look at the actual procedure involved in precedent, however, will reveal that it is not totally accurate to categorize precedent as a form of deductive reasoning.
The term "judicial precedent" is a practice whereby judges are to follow previously decided case, provided that the material fact of subsequent or new cases before them are identical with or similar to those of the previously decided case. In the case of Alao v. Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, it was held that Nigerian courts preserve and follow, stricto sensu, the common law doctrine of stare decisis which literally means that lower court must for all times hold itself bound by the decisions of a higher court, or better still, by the decisions of the highest court of the land, until they are seen to have been overruled.
The application of the doctrine of judicial precedent once gave rise to the controversy "whether judges do make laws or not". Before we answer this question or controversy, we must also remember the reverenced principle of separation of powers which says that no organ of government must interfere with the responsibility of another organ, and we know that the function of the judiciary is to interpret the law.
In answering the controversy, many jurists have held some of the following. For instance, Lord Macmillan advised in the case of Read v. J. Lyons and Co. Limited that the court should not to dabble into the law-making function. In his words, he said
"Your Lordships' task in this House is to decide particular cases between litigants and Your Lordships are not called upon to rationalize the laws of England. That attractive, if perilous field may be left to other hands to cultivate"
In spite of this advice, we discover that there are in fact cases when the court makes law whilst performing his interpretation of law duties. This may occur where the judge in the course of interpretation, either widens or restrict the scope of the statute relevantly or contextually. This point was made in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen where Holmes J. said, "I recognize without hesitation that judges do not and must not legislate, but they do so only interstitially… the vindication of the obvious is sometimes more important than the elucidation of the obscure".
Another situation that may arise is where there are no laws (statute or case law) regarding the specific issue in question. In such occassions the judge would be helpless in the face of the novel situation and the best thing for him to do is to make a quick decision, which has in turn been defined as law-making. In the case of Packer v. Packer, Lord Denning said
What is the argument on the other side? Only this: that no case has been found in which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand still whilst the rest of the world goes on and that will be bad for both.
Summarizing the controversy in the words of Cross, in his book Precedent in English after carefully examining the notions of people like Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Esher, Willes J etc. and the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson said
"Judges must decide cases as they arise; when the facts are not clearly covered by a statute; when there is room for two views concerning the meaning of statutory word; and when no past decision is clearly in point… what can our judges do but make new law".
Judicial Precedent could be of two types namely; persuasive, and binding precedent. The precedent is said to be binding on an inferior court because it must as a matter of law follow that precedent of the superior court. But a precedent is said to have only a persuasive authority if a court has an option, in the hierarchy of the court structure, either to follow or reject it.in other word, a court is free to depart from the decision of another court because that decision is not binding on it.
There are two elements in a decision of a court and they are: ratio decidendi and obiter dictum.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The courts are held to be bound to follow previously decided cases based on the principle of stare decisis. However, the part of the previous case that is followed is not all but the ratio decidendi (reason for the decision) of the case.
Although, there has been no universal definition on what the ratio decidendi of a case means, yet, there have been various definition proffered by various jurists. In the case of Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence it was defined as follows "the ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him. It has also been defined as "the material fact of the case plus the decision therein".
Using a formula to explain the concept of ratio decidendi, it was held that suppose that in a certain case facts, A, B and C exist; and suppose that the court finds B and C are material and A immaterial, and then reaches conclusion X (for example, judgment for the claimant, or judgement for the defendant). Then the doctrine of precedent enables us to say that in the future case in which facts B and C exist, or in which facts A, B, C and D exist, and fact D is held material, the first case will not be a direct authority, though, it may be of value as an analogy.
There are various theories advocated for determining the ratio of a case. For example there is the classical theory, where it has been stated that, the principle for which the case is a binding authority is to be found in the reasons given by the precedent judge for his decision, i.e. what he said. We also have the Wambauch's Mechanical Theory which states that to discover the ratio of a case; one should carry out the following exercises
State those reasons on which you think the judge based his decisions
Insert one word which reverses the meaning of the proposition
Then ask whether the court could have reached the same decision between the parties if it relied on this altered proposition. We also have the American Realist theory and the Goodhart theory.
The Goodhart theory states that to determine the ratio decidendi is derived from the judge's decision in the light of the facts which the judge treated as material. Goodhart also enunciated principles for identifying the ratio and they are as follows:
If the judge expressly states that certain facts are material or immaterial, they must be treated as such. However, such statements are rare. Even if the judge goes wrong in his statement of facts, the material facts must be taken as stated by him
If the judge treats any facts as impliedly material or immaterial, they should be accepted as such.
Where, as between material and immaterial facts, no distinction is possible all the facts mentioned by the judge are to be treated as being material. However, it should be noted that the more facts that are included, the narrower the resultant principle of law will be.
Where several opinions reach the same conclusion but differ on material facts, only those facts held to be material by the majority are to be so regarded.
Where, as between material and immaterial facts stated in the several opinions of judges, no distinction is possible, all the facts mentioned by each of the judges are to be treated material.
Hypothetical facts: if the judge states a fact hypothetically, such fact is not material and does not influence the principle of the case. This is so even if the fact is actually hypothetically stated.
FINDING THE RATIO DECIDENDI IN APPEAL CASES
It is sometimes difficult to find the ratio decidendi of a case determined by a court consisting of more than one judge, or where the decision is in an appeal case. It was held that where the court is divided and the majority judgments are consistent with one another even though each majority judge relies on a legal principle different from that relied upon in the majority judgment constitute the ratio decidendi of the case. However, where there is no majority, e.g. where there are five justices, two among them favour one reason, the other two favour a second reason, while the last is unclear, Professor Stone suggests that the case be treated as having two rationes.
OBITER DICTUM
This is the second element that is in a decision is known as obiter dictum. It has been defined as the statement of the law which the judge states, apart from the ratio decidendum of a given case i.e. a statement made in passing or by the way. It has also been defined as pronouncements of law that fall outside the ratio, and is not binding. It has also been defined as a statement of an illustrative nature or based on hypothetical facts. It could also be an observation made by the judge on issues which do not fall for determination, considering the state of the parties pleading.
As a general rule, obiter dictum is not binding. However, there are occassions when it may have binding effect. For instance, where it has been repeated a number of times by a court which is highly recognized in the judicial hierarchy of the legal system
The main problem regarding obiter and ratio decidendi is the inability to determine where one ends and the other begins. Like a Siamese twin they are so joined that an unskilled dissection could be precarious and hazardous to the determination of either of them.
DISTINGUISHING
The decision of a court in a case is not a binding precedent for any court in any subsequent case if the cases are different from each other in terms of material. It has been described as a very important tool in an advocate's arsenal.
Since, it has been explained that for decisions to be binding on all other courts in Nigeria, they must have similar fact. Distinguishing is the activity of differentiating the facts of the former case with the latter case. In the case of Ifi Izieme & Ors v. Ijeome Ndokwu & Ors, where distinguishing was appropriately applied, the Supreme Court reiterated that every case must be decided on the facts before a court. As stated by Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as he then was) "we have been referred by counsel for the defendants/appellant to a number of decisions in support of his contention. We have examined both of these cases and are satisfied that none of them is in pari material".
PER INCURIAM
The term per incuriam literally means something done or omitted to be done by the court through advertence. Judicial decisions reached per incuriam are those decisions which a court has reached inadvertence or ignorance of an applicable or rule of law having statutory force or a binding precedent. Although, the Supreme Court is not bound to in any case to follow its own previous decisions, it will nevertheless depart from its previous decisions if it discovers that it had been reached per incuriam. Therefore, in the case of Ngwo v. Monye, the Supreme Court refused to follow its decisions in Bamigbose v. Daniel
It should however be reminded that although, the Supreme Court can say that a decision was reached per incuriam, the lower court is not bound to depart from the decision, even if it was reached per incuriam.
THE FACTORS THAT AFFECTS THE WEIGHT OF PRECEDENT
There are various factors affecting the weight of a precedent. They could however, include the following:
Age: generally, the greater the weight of a precedent, the greater would be reluctance for the court to discard or depart from such precedence.
The status of the court and its composition are also of essence as to the value of the case as a precedent. In Nigeria, the decision of the Supreme Court is accorded with more respect and may carry greater weight.
The adequacy of law report is another factor that affects the weight of precedents. Early cases are often inadequately reported due to lack of modern standards of law reporting.
The history of the precedent is also another factor to be considered. First, the acceptance of the precedence. Secondly, the ingenuity of the counsel's argument and the authorities relied upon
Where there is a unanimous judgment, there is a possibility that there would be greater weight on that precedent.
The application of the precedent over time.
HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND PRECEDENT

SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court is the highest court in Nigeria and its decision absolutely binds other courts in the country, but it is not absolutely bound by its previous decisions. In the case of Abdulkarim v. Incar Nigeria Ltd, the Supreme Court held that although it will respect its previous decision, as a court of last resort which is not bound by precedent, the court will not hesitate to overrule any decision of its own which she is satisfied was reached on wrong principle, since this is the only way to keep the stream of justice pure.
There are times when the Supreme Court will depart from its previous decisions. In the case of Bronik Motors Ltd. & Anor v. Wema Bank, the Supreme Court held that it would not depart from a precedent unless three conditions are satisfied:
There is a breach of justice;
On grounds of Public policy
A question of legal principle such that the retention of the decision will amount to a perpetuation of justice.
THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeal has divisions in various parts of the country as Abuja, Lagos, Kaduna, Benin, Jos, Enugu, Ibadan, Ilorin, Calabar and Port-Harcourt. As to how the doctrine of stare decisis is to be applied, no mention was made, neither in the Court of Appeal Act, nor the Handbook and Rules of Act. However, the practice adopted in England as established in the case of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane which has been established as an authority to the effect that the Court of Appeal is bound by its previous decisions. However, some exceptions to this rule have been listed namely:
The court of Appeal is entitled and bound to decide which of its conflicting decisions it will follow
The court of Appeal is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its which though not expressly overruled cannot in its own opinion stand with a decision of the House of Lords
The Court of Appeal is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it was given per incuriam
FEDERAL HIGH COURT
The court was formerly known as the Federal Revenue Court. The decision of the Federal High Court binds all Magistrate and District Courts in Nigeria. The Federal High Court is in turn bound by the judgment or precedent of Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The Federal High Court is apparently of the same rank with the High Court though given exclusive jurisdiction in specific matters.
STATE HIGH COURT
The doctrine of Stare decisis dictates that a Trial Judge or a High Court being a lower court in the judicial hierarchy is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeal, even if the decision of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal may conflict as decided in Oshinowo v. National Bank of Nigeria. Although one can submit that since the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are given the choice to choose which of their conflicting decision they wish to follow, then the High Court should also be given the choices to choose.
The High Court is not bound to decisions of sister court i.e. court of coordinate decisions. However, it was decided in Barclay Bank v. Hassan it was held that the ratio of a High Court is binding on all the magistrate court within the territorial jurisdiction of the particular high court but this decision is merely persuasive on the other high courts.
CONCLUSION
In the light of the foregoing, it can be said that the aim of legal reasoning in judicial processes is to attain the goal- justice. Justice is the aim of every judicial process that the court undergoes. The process of shifting of facts and law is another way in which the Law Court aims at achieving justice. Since, Nigeria as a country operated the adversarial system of law, the two contenders must produce evidence to put forth their claim. More so, he who assert something must prove it.
Going down, there was also an exploration into the concept of precedent and case laws. Precedent is a system where the decision of the higher court is binding on the lower courts to follow. The idea of precedent when used does not suppose that all the decision of the higher court is binding on the lower court. What in fact is binding has been referred to as ratio decidendi. Then an exploration or examination was done to the concept of obiter dicta and other important terms.

REFERENCES

Ed. Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed, Thomson West Publishers, 2004)
Michael Doherty Jurisprudence: the philosophy of law (3rd ed, Old Bailey Press, London, 2003)
ed. Sanni Abiola , Introduction to Nigerian Legal Method (2nd ed, Obafemi Awolowo University Press Limited, Ile-Ife, 2006)
Giorgis & Campbell, Justice- An Historical and Philosophical Essay (1st ed, University Press, Edinburgh, 1952)
Also see, Alan Taylor, Principles of Evidence (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2000),
ed. Afe Babalola, Law and Practice of Evidence in Nigeria (Sibon Books Limited, Ibadan, 2001)
T.A. Aguda, The Law of Evidence (3rd ed, Spectrum Law Publishing, Ibadan, 1989).
Evidence Act Cap E4 LFN 2004
Christopher Allen, Practical Guide to Evidence(Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001)
Alan Taylor, Principles of Evidence (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2000)
M.D.A Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008). Ese Malemi: The Nigerian Legal Method (2nd ed. Princeton Publishers Co., Ikeja, Lagos)
Steven Vego, Law and Society, (5th ed. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, USA, 1891)
Wayne Morrison Jurisprudence from the Greeks to post-modernism (Cavendish Publishing, London, 1997)
P.J Fitzgerald Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed. Universal Law Publishing Co, PVT. Limited, Delhi India)
ed. T.O Elias & M.I Jegede, Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence (MIJ Publishers Limited, Ebute Metta, 1993)
D.A Ijalaye, Justice as Administered by the Nigerian Courts (Justice Idigbe Memorial Lectures Series Five (1992)
John Farrar & Anthony Dugdale, Introduction to Legal Method (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1990)
R W M Dias Jurisprudence (5th ed, Butterworth & co Publishers, London, 1985)
Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System (5th ed, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001)
Paul C. Ananaba, Essential Principles of Nigerian Law (Agbo Areo Publishers, Ibadan Nigeria, 2002)
Niki Tobi The Sources of Nigerian Law (MIJ Professional Publishers, Ebute Metta, Lagos, 1996)
R. Cross, Precedent in English Law (3rd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977)pp. 31-32, Also see
Ed. A.T.H Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006)
Ed. A.T.H Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006)
A.L. Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case" in Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law ( 1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 161
Funso Adaramola, Jurisprudence (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, South Africa, 2008)
A.O. Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Spectrum Books Publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1979)
J.N Egwummuo, Dynamics in Nigerian Legal System ( Academic Publishing Company, Enugu, 2003)p. 143
Muhammad Tawfiq Ladan, Introduction to Jurisprudence: Classical and Islamic, (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, 2006)