Kant\'s Practical Philosophy: A Hegelian Critique

NOTES

Its principle though higher than that of morality yet contains problems of its own to be resolved, at the end of which, through mutual forgiveness and recognition and the appearance of absolute Spirit, we pass utterly beyond morality to religion and thence beyond this to absolute knowing or cognizant religion ("Spirit knowing itself as Spirit") in which all previous stages or viewpoints are both preserved and transcended at the same time. In my opinion, however, the Phenomenology ends with the resolution of Kantian or western morality, a resolution in which we have absolute Spirit "for-itself" or realized in self-consciousness. In "revealed religion" we have absolute Spirit, in relation to consciousness, "in-itself" and presented to it as a Vorstellung. A careful reading of the first half of "absolute knowledge" will reveal the crowning synthesis to consist in the unification (Vereinigung) of religion's content with morality's form.
"B" refers to the Baillie translation of Hegel's Phenomenology. "H" refers to the Hoffmeister edition of the same work in the original German.

Kant's Practical Philosophy:
A Hegelian Critique


Ken Foldes

www.historyisover.com



Hegel's critique of Kant's practical philosophy set forth in the Phenomenology of Spirit pierces its very heart and attacks it at its most vulnerable point, to wit, the "postulates" of practical reason. What is absolutely essential to recognize, that Hegel's argument may command the fullest respect, is that Kant's postulates are not a mere appendage to a body of reasoning self-complete and independent of itself. On the contrary, they are a most vital and indispensable part of the whole without which it would stand incomplete and ultimately untenable. It is precisely Hegel's belief though, that the very fact the theory is in need of such postulates is a patent indication that it is inherently and for all practical purposes untenable. Therefore, if Hegel can show that the postulates involve us in self-contradiction he will ipso facto have shown that Kant's moral theory itself is based on presuppositions or principles that are self-contradictory.
It should be said that though it seems Hegel, by attempting to disprove a theory designed to save morality from skepticism by providing it with a priori rational foundations, is bent on destroying morality, this is far from his intention. He only wants to complete morality or, if you will, raise it to its truth, a truth which it secretly promises and points to but, due to the defective form in which its principle is clothed, can never deliver. It is my opinion that Hegel is claiming he has performed major surgery on western moral man. His assistant in the operation, to continue the metaphor, was Immanuel Kant whose critical labors by articulating and giving philosophical expression to the principle of common morality, in which the infection lay lodged, made possible a correct diagnosis leading to a successful removal by Hegel of the malignant organ. The 'malignant organ' is none other than a bogus concept of morality, a concept that has been operative in western society since its beginnings and only in Kant's philosophy has surfaced for the first time. The contention, in effect, is that western morality rests on a contradiction or antinomy that when once recognized and thought through leads us beyond morality (the "moral view of the world") or rather leads to a "new" morality (viz., Gewissen: Conscience) whose principle is higher and without the inconsistencies attaching to the former's principle. Needless to say, Hegel regards the form of bad morality (to be superseded.) as necessary for the appearance of true morality, so it is not to be lamented that things could have been otherwise.
In this text I shall try to follow Hegel's argument and assess its validity for Kant's practical philosophy, specifically for the Critique of Practical Reason. A prime task will be to discern what exactly is, according to Hegel, the contradiction contained in the principle of western morality, given thematization in Kant's Critique. By way of anticipation it will be found to be rooted in three basic concepts. They are (1) the concept of "ought-is" or of "pure duty," (2) the concept of morality as "quantitative," i.e., the belief that virtue is constituted by the principle of quantity, and (3) the idea that freedom and nature, or moral law and natural law, are essentially different and independent of each other, held in conjunction with a concept of duty that demands a vital connection or mediation between the moral and natural spheres.

I.

At the very beginning of the chapter "The Moral View of the World" Hegel clearly states that the main difficulties of the attitude to be examined derive from the fact that it is based on a dualism that ought not to remain one. Moral freedom, one of its vital postulates or assumptions, presupposes absolute independence from nature and natural causality and the mutual indifference of natural laws to moral purposes. Yet the two sides cannot remain isolated and indifferent, for the Idea of morality or "duty" requires ("commands") that it be actualized in the world and that natural purpose be one with moral purpose, i.e., actuality or nature is (in the present) non-moral but it ought to be moral. Hegel goes on to say that the moral view of the world is nothing but "the development of the moments of this relation of such entirely antithetic and conflicting presuppositions" (B.616; H.425).
Before we turn, to Hegel's arguments proper it may be helpful to anticipate a possible confusion that may arise when it is seen that two of the three postulates of which Hegel treats have forms different from Kant's. Kant's postulates are that of "freedom," "the immortality of the soul," and "the existence of God" and, what can also be considered a necessary element in Kant' theory, "the highest good." Hegel's postulates are "the harmony of morality and nature (or happiness)," "the harmony of morality and sensibility (or will in its sensuous form)," and "the existence of God (or a Holy Moral Lawgiver)." It can be easily shown that the first two of Hegel's postulates are alternative expressions for and can be directly derived from Kant's postulates of immortality and the highest good and, hence, are in fact bona fide postulates of the Kantian practical philosophy. Briefly, the harmony or connection between morality (virtue) and happiness is a necessary condition for the possibility of the highest good, and the harmony of morality and the will (qua sensibility) is necessary, i.e., must be assumed both for the possibility of the highest good and as a premise in the argument for the soul's immortality. It is important to see the necessity and interrelatedness of the Kantian postulates. The first, freedom, follows directly from man's consciousness of the moral law (the categorical imperative), i.e., man can only be under a moral obligation if be has a free will. Although Hegel does not take this as one of his postulates proper he does regard it as the basic assumption or principle of the moral attitude and it is used as a premise in all of his arguments. The second and third postulates, on which Hegel bases his postulates, are necessary for the highest good to be possible, the highest good being a requirement flowing from the moral law. Simply, man can achieve virtue, a vital component of the highest good, only if he is immortal; and he can promote the highest good only if God exists, i.e., to secure the connection between happiness and virtue, a connection integral to the highest good.
According to Hegel the contradiction and "folly" of which Kant is guilty is "Verstellung," which can be translated "dissemblance" or "displacement" or, simply, "shifting." In terms of the language of the Phenomenology it means to posit first one thing as the Ansich or object then immediately, without hesitation, that thing's opposite as the essence, and in so doing to declare them in fact both to be "moments" or transcended (aufgehoben). In simple language it means to contradict oneself, or to not be in earnest (Ernst) with what was just stated to be the truth, i.e., by constantly "shifting" from one position to its opposite, each position being the absolute contradiction of the other. Let us examine several cases of actual "displacement" and see if Kant is indeed guilty of this type of flagrant contradiction, if the principles and postulates of his moral theory, i.e., its very premises, are incompatible with one another.
II.

Hegel takes up as the first position, to be subsequently abandoned or displaced, the postulate of the harmony of morality and nature. It is assumed that "there is an actual moral consciousness," as this is the basic premise of morality. It means simply that the moral life is a valid life-style (vocation), or that there is a consciousness that is pursuing morality as a real possibility, actively realizing it in the world and taking its commands and oughts as self-consistent. The reason why the harmony of morality and nature has to be postulated in the first place is that in the present is found only the opposition or unconformity of natural to moral law. If it were not postulated, if it were not a possibility, it would be ridiculous to command the moral subject to bring it about. Thus, the first position is that the harmony of morality and nature is not present but is to be postulated, and this is something essential to Kant's theory for the concept of moral freedom entails that moral law be distinct and independent of natural law, and also if the harmony were present moral action would be rendered superfluous, i.e., morality would lose its raison d' etre.
However, Hegel goes on to say, no sooner is this position "placed" than it is immediately "displaced" by its diametrical opposite. For moral consciousness is primarily an active one and its activity is what constitutes its actuality. But its activity is nothing other than "the production of an actuality constituted and determined by its moral purpose" (B.630; H.435), that is, the production of the harmony of morality and nature itself. Hence Hegel says, "action thus as a fact fulfills directly what it was asserted could not take place at all, fulfills what was to be merely a postulate, was to lie merely 'beyond"' (B.63l; H.435). And Kant is forced to admit, upon pain of contradiction, that moral actions have results and can actually accomplish the harmony of moral purpose and nature as this is one of its commands (pure duty impels that it be actualized and not remain a mere thought or universal). Even if it is granted that a perfectly moral act has never been performed by a finite rational being and perhaps may never be performed, yet it must be possible to perform one, otherwise duty cannot command. Hegel's argument only requires the possibility of moral action not its de facto existence. Thus, since the harmony is brought about and made present by action it seems that moral consciousness was not really "in earnest" in making the postulate.
One may think that the two positions are not really incompatible and can be construed so as to complement one another. But a little reflection will prove the contrary. The two positions are logically inconsistent with each other and cannot be held at the same time. The moment a moral action is completed, is in actuality, the postulate is no longer good and is without ground for it presupposes that the harmony is not present.
Thus moral consciousness' present position is that it is in earnest with regard to action and its capability of actualizing morality. But Hegel is quick to point out that it is not even serious about this position and immediately proceeds to displace it, to posit something else as the Ansich or essence. For the final end of morality, the "highest good" (here Hegel uses Kant's expression), is nothing short of the entire world, the reign of virtue on earth. It is this that is the essence and what is to count. But in the face of the immensity of this final purpose the individual's contingent and isolated deed, just performed, becomes insignificant and is reduced to "nothingness." The final purpose "goes far beyond the content of this individual act, and therefore is to be placed altogether beyond anything actually done" (B.63l; H.436). And, as Hegel points out, "because the universal best ought to be carried out nothing good has been done" (B.63l; H.436). Thus, whereas it was previously held that moral action is of significance, it is now held that action qua individual action, before the task of realizing the highest good, is of no value and utterly devoid of significance.
However, this goal or Ansich is just as directly displaced inasmuch as pure duty is taken as the absolute purpose and as the essential. For in the individual moral act as the actualization of pure duty the entire absolute purpose is accomplished, hence, on this score, the act is imbued with infinite significance. But, again, if we take Kant's dichotomy and absolute indifference of natural to moral law seriously, moral consciousness is forced to admit that it is not really in earnest with duty as such and its accomplishment as the essence. For actuality or nature, upon completion of the action, remains unchanged and displays the same indifference towards moral purposes as it did before. On the other hand, the concept of morality itself is very explicit with respect to the necessity of action in that it obliges us to realize duty in the whole of nature so that moral law may become one with natural law or, equally, so that universal (i.e., the thought of) duty may become concrete or actual duty. Thus it seems that moral consciousness is not completely in earnest with the dichotomy of natural and moral law. Perhaps this presumed dichotomy can be understood as the main reason for postulating the existence of a Supreme Being, viz., to solve the many problems and contradictions that are entailed by the initial bifurcation of the whole into moral purpose and natural necessity.
Here it becomes obvious that in Kant's moral theory the universal and particular, thought and actuality, can never get together. If they ever did it would mean the complete abolition of morality. This is what Hegel goes on to show in his summing up of the displacements or contradictions implicitly involved in the first postulate of the harmony of morality and nature, which is here explicitly connected with the Kantian "postulate" of the highest good.
In the concept of the highest good, virtue combined with proportionate happiness, an object moral acting consciousness desires to achieve above all else, is implied the absolute harmony of morality and reality as a whole (nature plus the sensuous will), the coincidence of moral law and natural law. Hegel then poses the fateful and forbidden question, What would ever happen if this goal were reached, if this harmony were present? The answer is forthright and devastating. Moral action would cease and morality be no longer. This would be so because moral action, as defined by Kant and implicitly by Western man, can only take place so long as there exists an opposition, a non-moral element, that is to be cancelled or "moralized" as the result of an action. Hence the absolute irony here is that the supreme goal of moral action is that there be no moral action, or in Hegel's words: "because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is—that moral action does not take place at all" (B.632; H.437). One of the many absurd corollaries of this position Hegel pounces on is that, for the sake of moral action it would be wisest if we refrain from acting altogether, since every moral action performed would bring us closer to our goal and to the abolition of moral action as such.
In the following passage Hegel in a lucid manner traces and summarizes for us the series of displacements bound up with the first postulate:

Consciousness starts from the position that for it morality and reality do not make a harmony; but it is not in earnest with that, for in the moral act it is conscious of the presence of this harmony. But neither is it in earnest with this action, since the action is something individual; for it has such a high purpose, the highest good, This, however, is once more merely a dissemblance of the actual fact, for thereby all action and all morality would fall to the ground. In other words, it is not strictly in earnest with moral action; on the contrary, it feels that really what is most to wished for, the absolutely desirable, is that the highest good were carried out and moral action superfluous. (B.633; H. 437)

III.

But what would Kant say to all of this, surely there is some defense that can be offered on his behalf? Indeed, Kant does believe that there is an acceptable solution to this most perplexing situation. Quite simply he contends that it is possible for one to have his cake and eat it too. In his Critique of Practical Reason where be postulates the immortality of the soul Kant reasons as follows. The moral law commands that the highest good be promoted and realized, hence implying that the highest good is possible for man. A condition for the highest good to be realized is that man have attained virtue (i.e., worthiness to be happy) which is complete fitness or adequacy of intentions to the moral law. But complete fitness is holiness (virtue), something which cannot at any moment be possessed by a rational being in the world of sense (presumably because sensuous existence is governed by physical laws and can never fully be made to conform to the moral law). Yet if the highest good is not to be jettisoned, and with it morality, it must be allowed that a good or holy will is attainable by man. But attainable only in an endless progress to the complete fitness required. However, endless progress is only possible on the condition that the existence of a rational being is unlimited or infinite, hence we must postulate the immortality of the soul. Thus morality is saved as the highest good is realizable in virtue of the fact that virtue or holiness is a possible attainment for man and is apprehended "in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings" by God, who sees in their endless progress "a whole conformable to the moral law" (Critique, p. 127).
What this amounts to, in effect, is a situation in which the highest good is attained yet moral action not thereby done away with. That is, to us finite rational moral beings there is always further work to be done and an opposition of sensuous impulses to the moral law to be overcome, yet to God this interminable existence of moral struggle and striving is equivalent to virtue and thus to him the highest good already exists. In this way Kant manages to "stuff" all the many questions, problems and inexplicable contradictions flowing from its conception into a God who, safely located in the noumenal world, is beyond the reach of our categories and limited "finite" understanding, an understanding or reason that is capable of producing a concept (viz., God) of whose nature and inner workings it knows nothing about. The inadequacy of the "to us—to God" distinction is quickly seen. It is not sufficient to say that the highest good is (or can be) a present fact to God but cannot be a present fact to us. For in that case the notion of "progress"—a notion whose validity for morality is now crucial—would be meaningless as it implies a getting-closer to a preestablished goal, but there can be no getting-closer to a goal which can never be a present fact. Hence, if no progress can actually be made by the moral subject he has every good right to just sit back on his haunches, shoot the breeze and give himself over to the contemplation of moral actions rather than to their performance. And, on the other hand, the moment we allow that the highest good can be a present fact to us two things happen. First, morality goes out the window, as the subject has attained a holy will having subdued all opposition to the moral law thus rendering moral action superfluous. Second, the subject himself goes out the same window, i.e., his lease on immortality comes to an abrupt end. For immortality was postulated for the sake of the highest good, i.e., to give the subject enough time to get his will to adequately conform to the moral law; ironically enough, with the highest good achieved, a present fact, the subject no longer has need of additional time, hence he is banished to limbo or simply extinguished. It would seem that the true motive Kant had, for postulating immortality was not to protect morality and the highest good—for it is conceivable that virtue can be reached by man in a finite number of lives or moral acts as Kant admits progress possible—but simply to ensure eternal existence. And what this amounts to saying, something Hegel also will shortly say, is that in this regard (viz., with respect to immortality) Kant was more concerned with happiness than with morality.
On the other hand even if we would grant Kant the "to us—to God" distinction there is no way, in my opinion, he can escape the contradiction and absurdity involved in the idea of a morality whose highest object is its own dissolution. Admittedly the highest good is the end of the moral law and of moral action, yet what is implied in this highest good is literally the "end" of the moral law and of moral action, i.e., the moral law wishes its own destruction or at least wishes there be no need for it (which may not be all that bad, except then it would be difficult to distinguish the moral from the immoral). Even if "pure duty" and not the highest good is taken (as is held by many) as the true and sole object of morality, that alone which is commanded and which "ought" to be carried out, we are enmeshed in the same contradiction, and on two counts.
First, not only does "ought" imply "can" or free-will but, more significantly, possibility or realizability. That is, that which we "ought" to do, viz., our duty, must be something that can be realized or made a fact. However, once we have fulfilled our duty, have actualized pure duty, the "ought" is no longer binding on us, as the "ought" has now become an "is." In the realized act, in duty fulfilled, where what "ought to be" has become "what is," it is senseless to demand of us that we do our duty, we have done it and did all that was asked of us. It is no use to introduce the concept of quantity in an effort to save duty and keep us "continuing to do our duty" (whatever this expression means). To make it a question of "how much duty (or duties)" equals the one true complete Duty is only to put off the inevitable. This is tantamount to saying that "x" amount of duties or moral actions is equivalent to "Duty," in the sense that upon accomplishment of the said amount we are then entitled to say that we have fulfilled our duty. And thus, as before, having fulfilled our duty (and one of the stipulations of duty or "ought" is that what is demanded be possible) the command that we should still fulfill our duty drops and becomes meaningless: our duty is done, we cannot be asked to still do our duty. It is the same here as in the case where someone asks me: "Tie your shoe!" After having tied my shoe I cannot be asked: "Well, tie your shoe!" The request is unreasonable—as is the concept of "ought." Here again we find that the goal of duty is its elimination.
Secondly, "pure" duty (reine Pflicht) or duty as such, construed as an idea or universal that must be actualized or made concrete, has always to remain an unactualized universal. This is because on the one hand all duties are particular and determinate, and on the other, actuality or nature is made up exclusively of individuals or particulars. If pure duty wants to become actual it must come down from its throne and come to terms with the particular as such. This can also be expressed as the problem of the relation of form and content, a problem that Hegel charges Kant with not having solved. It is that of relating the many particular determinate duties (the content) to the one abstract pure duty, the universal form; because the content is not connected organically with the form any content ultimately can become "justified" as a duty (see "Postscript").
The earth-shattering realization that Hegel is bringing to us in all of this is that there is no such thing as morality. Morality, or the moral attitude, as was the case with "sense-certainty," is nothing but the history of its movement, the passing through of its disparate moments, here the various displacements, and the grasping of them as moments within a conceptual unity (Begriff). Morality did not exist from the start, it was merely an idea, a universal, that demanded its actualization, an actualization which proved to be impossible. At this point someone may object that morality is not a thing or static being but an activity or process, that morality and virtue (or holiness) are two different things, the latter not necessarily being what the former aims at and not constituting the former as such (i.e. as morality). Hence it is possible to be moral without necessarily being virtuous (i.e., morality does not require virtue qua goal to justify itself), and a moral person can be defined as a person who simply obeys the commands of the moral law and who one day may (or may not) expect to achieve virtue. But this will not do either. For even if morality is taken as a vocation having no purpose beyond itself, i.e., beyond the performance of moral actions for their own sake, it still remains impossible to give the concept of "moral action" as used by Kant any intelligibility, as Hegel's arguments have made plain. This is fundamentally because it is a "bogus" concept, one absolutely untenable and self-defeating. Any moral theory that bases itself on the principle of a command or an ought on the one hand, and on the concept of an a priori standard to which actions are to conform on the other, is inherently unstable and for two basic reasons. First, an "ought" can only preserve itself by commanding at once that it be carried out and that it not be carried out and this is obviously contradictory, for if it merely commanded the former alone it would become meaningless or invalid upon its actualization. Second, it is impossible to conform a will to a standard that as such is purely universal (in our case "pure duty"), for the only means available to the will (itself a particular) to effect this conformity is action, something which can only relate to manifold actuality in particular and determinate ways. That is, "pure duty" can never make an appearance in actuality, for what appear there are only particular duties. To say that the universal has achieved actuality insofar as the maxim of a particular action conforms to the moral (universal) law is to forget that it is the content which harbors the connection with actuality not the mere form. Also, for the same reason as above, granted the conforming possible, all moral action would cease at that point at which there was nothing more to conform. The expedient of defining morality as an ongoing and endless process of conformity is useless as the command to "conform" presupposes the possibility of conforming, i.e. of finishing the action, and hence contains the "seeds of its own destruction." Let us now briefly turn to Hegel's exposure of the displacements involved in the postulate of the harmony of morality and sensibility and further observe how these spurious principles come into play.

IV.

The outcome of the preceding dialectic of displacement is that moral action has been abolished, has proved untenable. But as this result is entirely unsatisfactory as morality is the essence, in order to preserve it the position must be adopted that the final end of the world cannot be carried out; perhaps morality will be able to maintain itself in this new posture. There must therefore always be a nature opposing moral consciousness to keep it active. The harmony of morality and sensibility (the nature within it), what is equivalent to "virtue," must then be postulated, for if it existed moral action would cease. Thus moral consciousness takes up a hostile or negative attitude towards sensibility which is to be sublated or made to conform to the moral law. This attitude is taken because the latter's pure purpose is opposed to the impure purposes of impulses (Triebe) and inclinations (Neigungen). However, this negative attitude towards sensibility is directly displaced, for sensibility is essential to moral action. Without it, as the mediating element between pure purpose (duty) and reality, moral consciousness cannot act. Thus the latter cannot wish to do away with them or even to transform their many particular purposes into the one purpose, pure duty, for action requires particular purposes. Hence sensibility must retain its particular purposes, opposed to pure duty.
Yet on the other hand moral action itself is nothing other than the realization of the harmony of sensibility and morality, a harmony which was not to be present. Yet, again, from still another side, another premise of Kant's theory can be implemented, viz., the independence of nature and her laws. That is, impulses have laws and purposes of their own and hence if their union or cooperation were to be thought at all it would be one in which morality would be conforming to sensibility and not vice versa, a situation absolutely repulsive to morality. Hence this harmony between the two must again be postulated, and such as occurring somewhere in the dim distance of infinitude. But in fact, as Hegel goes on to say, this harmony cannot even be thought, "it has proved to be impossible" (B.634; H.438).
There seems to be no escape for Kant from this dilemma. Kant realizes that virtue (the harmony of sensibility and morality) must be a possible attainment for man, otherwise the highest good and the moral law would be "fantastic" and "false." He also seems to realize that this harmony can never for a finite being be a present harmony (which shows he was aware of the difficulty in conceiving this harmony). But since there must be a harmony—and a virtue, and a happiness—he finds a place for it in the infinite duration of a finite moral being seen as a whole by a divine intuition. What Kant doesn't realize, however, is that since the harmony or conformity of sensibility to the moral law cannot exist in the present and in fact, as Hegel shows using Kant's premises or postulates, is impossible to conceive, then, since this harmony alone constitutes morality or an action as moral, the only infinite finite life God can intuit as a whole is the life of an immoral being, i.e., a being who has performed no moral acts whatsoever. In this case, as Hegel goes on to say, concluding his treatment of the second postulate, the "moral" subject can only demand or expect happiness as a matter of "grace" and not because be would be deserving of it. Furthermore the criticism and judgment: "the man without morality comes off well" given out by Kantian moral man due to the "injustice" of his situation, is at bottom an expression of envy, and one which "covers itself up in the cloak of morality" (B.636; H.440).
Thus, as a result of the displacements found in the first two postulates it is seen that what really is of ultimate importance (or is the "essence") for Kantian moral man is the middle state of incomplete or im-morality. In the following Hegel makes it clear that it is not really in earnest with morality's completion, i.e., the conformity of sensibility to morality, or the complete fitness of intentions to the moral law:

In point of fact morality would be really giving up itself in that completion, because it is only consciousness of the absolute purpose qua pure purpose, i.e. in opposition to all other purposes. Morality is both the activity of this pure purpose, and at the same time the consciousness of rising above sensibility, of being mixed up with sensibility and of opposing and struggling with it. That this moral completion is not taken seriously is directly expressed by consciousness itself in the fact that it shifts this completion away into infinity, i.e. asserts that the completion is never completed. (B.635; H.439)

Hegel goes on to ridicule the notion of "progress" of the incomplete moral consciousness to completeness, the last stronghold left to it; that is, since it takes itself as incomplete, hence immoral, it can only justify itself by pointing to a future condition when it will be complete, a condition justifying all its prior incomplete states. His attack is two-pronged. On the one hand, because the goal of morality implies its abolition qua an end to the opposition and struggle which is of its essence, "advancing" towards this goal would rather mean approaching morality's disappearance, Thus instead of "progress" we would have "regress," instead of "advance" "decrease." On the other hand, to speak of morality in terms of "advancing" and "decreasing" or to apply the category of quantity (Grosse) here would be out of place. Morality cannot be made a matter of degrees, especially when it is such a thing as pure duty with which we are dealing. As Hegel says, "there is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality" (B.635; H.439). It makes no sense to say of a person, act or thing that it is only partly moral, only participates in that predicate to a certain degree. The "moral" is either there all at once or it is not there at all, either the action just performed was dutiful or it was not, there are no shades in between. Apparently, since he assumed there can be progress in morality, Kant did hold that morality is quantitative or quantifiable. But then this would seem to conflict with his doctrine that only pure duty, and an action expressive of this, can have any moral worth, i.e., the slightest admixture with an impure motive would be invalidating and issue in heteronomy. Obviously then, Kant must have thought that virtue or completed morality consisted in an addition or summation of particular instances of dutiful actions. But we immediately become aware of the inadequacy of quantitative distinctions in the moral sphere when confronted by the question: How are we to determine the number of dutiful acts sufficient for virtue? A little reflection will show that a criterion to determine this cannot be formulated, that one number is just as arbitrary as another. To say that this number is infinity is absurd and an outrage to Reason as well—it is equivalent to saying virtue is unattainable.

V.

We will unfortunately have to forgo Hegel's treatment of the third postulate, viz., that of the existence of God or a Holy Moral Lawgiver. However, the main thrust of his argument is as follows. Since the result has been arrived at that there is no moral consciousness that is actual, the actual being merely the incomplete or immoral consciousness, if morality is to have any meaning at all then it must be postulated that morality exists in completed form in a consciousness other than that of the moral subject, viz., in that of a Holy Moral Lawgiver. But now the contradiction implicit in morality becomes evident to moral consciousness itself. For a being or consciousness far removed from actuality and the opposition and struggle between reason and sensibility can in no wise be considered moral. The contradiction lies in the concept of a morality whose essence is to be an opposition that must not remain one yet at the same time must remain one. This is why the attempts to locate morality within actuality and beyond actuality both have to be unsuccessful. In actuality we always have a sensibility whose purposes are opposed to morality; beyond actuality we are beyond sensibility as well, hence are without that element vital to the opposition essential to morality.
As is evident, the conclusion of our analysis is that Hegel's arguments are indeed valid and relevant to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, as the contradictions that they bring to light are legitimately derived from premises that are its own. Although Hegel's arguments are specifically directed against the section of the Critique entitled "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" and not the first part or "Analytic" whose purpose is to show both that pure reason can determine the will and that a priori practical principles (moral laws) are possible, because, as was noted at the start, the former and its postulates are absolutely essential to the latter a repudiation of the one is at the same time a refutation of the other. It may be argued, in defense of Kant, that the Critique contains not one but two distinct conceptions and aspects of morality in which case Hegel's arguments may be applicable to the one but not the other, The "Analytic" concerns itself with the formal aspect of morality and its mere possibility, it is not directly concerned with the universal actualization of virtue (the highest good) and the complete eradication of non-moral elements; indeed, a moral act or duty actualized is found simply in my choice to obey the moral law rather than inclination. On the other hand, the "Dialectic" is concerned with the concrete aspect of morality and alone deals with the question of the highest good and its realizability and the elimination of sensibility. Although a thorough consideration of the above contention can not be taken up here, what is decisive is the fact that it is Kant himself who states that the Critique stands or falls with the viability of the postulates of pure practical reason.


Postscript

The demonstration of the Kantian dissociation of form and content, universal and particular, is to be found not only in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume III, p.460f (the Haldane-Simson translation), but also in his 1802 essay on Natural Law where Hegel shows that the categorical imperative's form of abstract universality ultimately allows any and every content to be made into a law or duty, thus revealing its impotence as a legislative principle of the will. There Hegel writes:
"'That the commonest untutored understanding can' engage in this easy operation and 'distinguish what form of maxim is or is not adapted for universal legislation,' Kant shows by an example: I ask whether my maxim to increase my fortune by any and all safe means can hold good as a universal practical law in the case where appropriating a deposit entrusted to me has appeared to be such a means; the content of this law would be that "anyone may deny having received a deposit for which there is no proof." This question is then decided by itself, "because such a principle as a law would destroy itself since the result would be that no deposits would exist." But where is the contradiction if there were no deposits? The non-existence of deposits would contradict other specific things, just as the possibility of deposits fits together with other necessary specific things and thereby will itself be necessary. But other ends and material grounds are not to be invoked; it is the immediate form of the concept which is to settle the rightness of adopting either one specific matter or the other. For the form, however, one of the opposed specifics is just as valid as the other; each can be conceived as a quality, and this conception can be expressed as a law.
"If the specification of property in general be posited, then we can construct the tautological statement: property is property and nothing else. And this tautological production is the legislation of this practical reason; property, if property is, must be property. But if we posit the opposite thing, negation of property, then the legislation of this same practical reason produces the tautology: non-property is non-property. If property is not to be, then whatever claims to be property must be cancelled. But the aim is precisely to prove that property must be; the sole thing at issue is what lies outside the capacity of this practical legislation of pure reason, namely to decide which of the opposed specific things must be lawful. But pure reason demands that this shall have been done beforehand, and that one of the opposed specific things shall be presupposed, and only then can pure reason perform its now superfluous legislating." (From Natural Law, G.W.F. Hegel, trans. by T.M. Knox, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975, p. 77f.)