Jacques Maritain on Empiriological and Ontological Sense Knowledge

18



Jacques Maritain on Empiriological and Ontological Sense Knowledge




By
Jonathan M. Jergens




Fr. Tom McQuillen
PH 205: Epistemology




May 3, 2017

Jacques Maritain on Empiriological and Ontological Sense Knowledge
One of the primary issues of epistemological concern amongst Neo-Thomist philosophers is the question of sense knowledge. Specifically, one area of dispute concerns the understanding of empiriological and ontological sense knowledge. At issue is whether the two forms of knowledge are distinct yet complementary, or if they are unified in such a way whereas empiriological knowledge and ontological knowledge are under one domain. However, other epistemological theories such as pragmatism address sense knowledge from a different perspective. The pragmatist position denies any understanding of sensible nature from a purely ontological perspective and runs counter to a Neo-Thomistic understanding of sense knowledge. These three viewpoints on sense knowledge require clarification to understand which solution best answers the problem at hand.
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), an existential Thomist, was the first philosopher to develop an apology for a Thomistic approach towards sense knowledge, answering the objections that modern and post-modern schools of philosophy developed. Maritain advanced the position of a division within sense knowledge, between empiriological and ontological knowledge. Empiriological knowledge is oriented towards the observable and measurable aspects of a being and is typically referred to as a type of empirical science. Ontological knowledge remains oriented towards intelligent being and is understood as natural philosophy, focusing on understanding the nature or essence of sensible beings. Maritain believes that the separation into two independent areas of study is valid, as they are separate and distinct divisions of sense knowledge. Additionally, the inclusion of ontological sense knowledge within the first degree of knowledge was unique in that many believe it belongs to the third degree of knowledge, metaphysics.
Two other philosophers hold diverging opinions. William Wallace O.P., a River Forest Thomist, maintains a more conservative, Thomistic-Aristotelian view. He believes Maritain should never have divided empiriological and ontological knowledge as the two are capable of unification. On the other hand, Larry Laudan, a Pragmatist, does not believe in the ontological understanding of knowledge at all, preferring empiriological knowledge as the primary form of sense knowledge.
Jacques Maritain's Thomistic Position on Knowledge
In the book Degrees of Knowledge, Maritain begins with distinguishing between three degrees of knowledge: the sensible real, mathematics, and metaphysics. The amount of abstraction from matter distinguishes the difference between the three divisions of knowledge:
Some theoretical objects are such that they can neither exist nor be thought of without matter, i.e., apart from the principle which makes things both perishable and observable. Others are such that they can be thought of without any reference to sensible qualities and the principles of mobility, although they cannot exist except in corruptible and observable subjects. Finally, some theoretical objects are determined by such a law of abstraction that they can both be thought of and exist apart from matter.
The first degree of knowledge is sensible real knowledge. Sensible knowledge considers objects which must exist materially and have "empirically and ascertainable qualities and properties." The second degree of knowledge, mathematics, further abstracts from the physical and focuses on "a property that remains when everything sensible is left aside – quantity…" A number is a reality that does not exist in and of itself. It exists in relation to a physical object's quantity, yet the number is independent of the object itself. Mathematicians can work with numbers separately, abstracted from the matter. The third degree of knowledge, metaphysics, is a complete abstraction from physical objects and considers as its object things that do not have a physical reality. "These are objects of thought which not only can be conceived without matter, but which can even exist without it…for example substance, quality, act, and potency." Within each division exists subdivisions, and within the first degree of knowledge Maritain believes there are two – empiriological sense knowledge and ontological sense knowledge.
Sense Knowledge – Two Divisions
Before Maritain, no Thomist philosopher had yet investigated the first degree of knowledge, sense knowledge. No one had made the effort to explore the inner categories of the overall division. Maritain developed the understanding of sense knowledge further, focusing on an internal division between empiriological and ontological types of sense knowledge. Yves Simon briefly describes Maritain's twofold position of sense knowledge:
Every representation concerning the observable world shows a dualistic or bipolar character inasmuch as (sic) it refers to an intelligible object expressing itself through a stream of sense appearances, and to a stream of sense appearances stabilized by a center of intelligibility. This bipolar character of the physical object and its representation is clearly suggested by the traditional definition of physics as the science of the ens mobile seu sensibile. The physical object is both intelligible (ens) and observable (mobile seu sensibile).
Maritain labels this division of sense knowledge with the terms empiriological and ontological. Maritain ascertains that these two forms of knowledge constitute a division that cannot or should not be reconciled. Here he departs from a strict Thomistic understanding of the unity between the two subdivisions. Maritain regards these two forms of knowledge as separate from one another, while at the same time complementary. Maritain portrays the division of knowledge within the first degree as such:
When you observe any material object, that object is, during your observation of it, as the meeting place of two kinds of knowledge: sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. You are in the presence of a sort of sensible flux stabilized by an idea, by a concept: in other words you are in the presence of an ontological or thinkable core which is manifested by an ensemble of qualities perceived hic et nunc…If you come upon a plant during a botanical excursion, you may ask yourself: what is a plant? Moreover, in that case your interest lies in the direction of ontological analysis. Or you may ask: how shall I classify this in my herbarium? Here your interest is in another type of analysis: empiriological analysis.
Maritain identifies the apparent problem, namely that the conflict between "philosophy and science arises in its most significant fashion" within the context of empiriological and ontological knowledge. The divide occurs between the type of knowledge that science investigates, empirical knowledge, and the type that philosophy investigates, ontological knowledge. The division is the basis of many arguments within epistemology amongst philosophers and requires further clarification to understand.
The Empiriological Order: Experimental Sciences
The first type of sense knowledge that Maritain recognizes is empiriological knowledge. Maritain ascribes the term "experimental sciences" to draw a distinction from the ontological "philosophy of nature." Empiriological knowledge consists of knowledge found through observation, measurement, and other sensible analysis. It seeks to reduce the object under consideration to these analyses, descending to the lowest possible observable or measurable attribute.
Other philosophical schools argue that empiriological knowledge can only extend to the observable in an "actual" sense. Some areas of science such as microphysics (dealing with atomic particles) or other modern theories of physics, being as they are unobservable to the naked eye, would not reside in empiriological sense knowledge. Maritain disputes their conclusion, noting that "in each of these cases scientific analysis is dealing with a genuinely possible observation, but one which no longer implies the possibility of representing its object imaginatively."
Empiriological sense knowledge is an essential part of sense knowledge. It seeks to grasp reality; however, it cannot do so alone. Empiriological knowledge, while providing knowledge about objects, cannot investigate unobservable realities that are present in beings. To understand that aspect of sensible nature, philosophers and scientists require ontological sense knowledge.
The Ontological Order: Philosophy of Nature
Philosophy of Nature
The second type of sense knowledge that Maritain recognizes is ontological knowledge. The ontological order of knowledge is also known as the philosophy of nature, in contrast to empiriological knowledge. Ontological knowledge is concerned with intelligible being and in particular, "what" a being is, its essence:
The objective of a philosophy of nature is not merely to reflect on the methods and conclusions of the physical sciences, but to provide the underlying principles. Moreover, the philosophy of nature understands that reality is not reducible to the physical (physical reality). It focuses, therefore, on the essences of things and the (natural) classes to which those things belong.
Ontological knowledge is intrinsically linked to sense knowledge because sense knowledge must be "consistent with verification by the senses." Ontological knowledge "involves a search for the first principles of physical things — i.e., principles that transcend sense." These differences of being, while immaterial, are within the sensible world, "characterized by means of experienced sensations." Ontological knowledge then deals with the unobservable or unmeasurable realities that exist within sensible nature. Ontological sense knowledge moves from the visible data acquired from empiriological sense knowledge to the invisible realities of ontological sense knowledge. In that respect, ontological knowledge is in a way derived from empiriological data; the observable and measurable qualities inherent in a sensible object allow a philosopher to deduce certain ontological realities. The ability to transcend the physical is why many situate ontological knowledge within metaphysics. However, Maritain opposes that interpretation for several reasons.
Ontological Sense Knowledge and Metaphysics
One of the peculiarities of Maritain's divisions is that ontological sense knowledge does not fall within the third division of knowledge, metaphysics, but rather within the first division of sense knowledge. Maritain observes:
First, that the philosophy of nature [ontological sense knowledge] is in a certain continuity with metaphysics, in spite of the essential difference separating them, and that, on this score, it is above mathematics. Second, we note that philosophy does indeed provide a deductive science of corporeal being, but that it is incapable of providing a deductive science of the phenomenon of nature.
Maritain was concerned that ontological knowledge risked either being swallowed up entirely by metaphysics (which modern philosophy rejected outright at the time, and thus would have been discarded in its entirety), or thrown out completely due to the advance of empiriological knowledge. Yet Maritain believes that there is an essential difference between ontological knowledge and metaphysics because ontological knowledge is rooted in sense knowledge. Ontological knowledge, as noted earlier, must be consistent with empiriological knowledge and is derived from the physical world. While it shares similarities with metaphysics, its relation to the physical world determines that it should reside within sense knowledge:
It is close to metaphysics in that it addresses general issues concerning the universe, such as its relation to principles of necessity and contingency, and to a first cause. But it also needs to be completed by a knowledge of the natural sciences, and so is at the same level…
Maritain places ontological knowledge in the first degree with the understanding that "[t]he three degrees of abstraction are not three steps on the same line of ascent, and the first and the third, on[e] (sic) on the one side, the second on the other, require opposite ways of approaching things." The "essential difference" separating ontological knowledge from metaphysics, even while admitting a "certain continuity" resides in the fact that Maritain focuses on being in the context of sensible being, the object of the philosophy of nature. He specifies this as "a properly explanatory science of corporeal being" and that its focus is on material beings, inasmuch as ontological knowledge "[penetrates] inside things, but in the case of empirical science, halted on the surface and at signs."
Unification or Synthesis
Maritain's view of the unification or synthesis of empiriological and ontological knowledge is negative. Maritain believes that the two are separate and distinct, yet inextricably linked. Ontological knowledge is not complete knowledge without empiriological knowledge, and that knowledge of the ontological is impossible without observable and measurable information provided by empiriological knowledge. However, though Maritain appreciates the closeness of these forms of knowledge, he still views them as essentially different from one another:
Experimental Science [empiriological] and Philosophy of Nature [ontological] are two distinct but incomplete knowledges, subject to different controls, the one above all of the intelligible, the other above all of the observable, which complete each other as best they can. They both, thereby, belong to the same degree of abstraction, though from another point of view the Philosophy of Nature, as we have seen, is essentially different from the Sciences of Nature.
Maritain views the empiriological and ontological orders of knowledge as "two specifically different types of knowledge…there is a specific difference between the knowledge which uses empiriological analysis and the knowledge which uses ontological analysis." However, because they both deal with sense knowledge, Maritain keeps them at the same division (sense knowledge) but classifies them as two categories within the degree.
To illustrate this point, Maritain draws a relation between these two types of knowledge with the relation of the body and the soul. Maritain recognizes the "intimate and substantial union" of the two as with the body and soul. However, Maritain describes ontological knowledge as independent of empiriological knowledge, stating that the facts of ontological knowledge are simpler and more fundamental. He describes the analogy as a "separated soul" when the two are divorced from one another. Maritain envisions a much-needed re-establishment of ontological knowledge after the rise of modern philosophy divorced ontological sense knowledge from any form of philosophical discussion.
Counter Arguments: Pure Thomism to Pragmatism
Maritain's position that empiriological and ontological sense knowledge are distinct has drawn criticism from many quarters, from both within and without the Thomistic community. William Wallace holds to a stricter reading of St. Thomas Aquinas and sense knowledge, preferring to keep the two united. From the outside, Laudan's Pragmatism approaches sense knowledge from a pure empiricist viewpoint, negating any ontological understanding of sense knowledge.
Wallace and a Return to Pure Thomism
Maritain's view is clear when he states, "Let us say then that there are experimental sciences of phenomena specifically distinct from the philosophy of nature, and that there is and must be a philosophy of nature specifically distinct from the sciences of phenomena." The philosophy of William Wallace counters Maritain's views. In his book The Modeling of Nature, Wallace sets out to prove through modeling techniques that all experimental knowledge can be integrated and unified with ontological knowledge, as initially developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. While Maritain believes there is a difference between the two, Wallace believes that the division is part of the problem between the philosophy of nature and modern science and seeks to rectify the confusion. Wallace posits that returning to a unity of currently divided philosophies is essential to advance not only the philosophy of nature but also that of the sciences. Wallace states:
As the positivist program has shown, formal logic alone is powerless to supply an epistemology adequate to the needs of twentieth-century science…But without the concept of nature, and the associated concepts of cause, substance, and power, the techniques of the Analytics cannot be made to work in the natural sciences…The coupling of the philosophies is meant to suggest that a renewed philosophy of science needs to be grounded in a philosophy of nature, not in logic alone….
One way to prove that unification is possible is through modeling of empiriological data and translating the information into an ontological model. Once this translation occurs, Wallace then applies the information to areas of science that may not be as far advanced as others, in a more practical application. However, even if not practically applied, understanding the information in both an ontological manner and empiriological manner helps both scientists and philosophers to understand nature in a complete manner.
Wallace proceeds to use typical examples found in science and create models that align with the traditional realist philosophy of nature. As an example, Wallace uses sodium and chlorine, examining them in the context of chemistry. He shows the elemental breakdown of each, and why it is that they easily combine to create normal table salt. Next, Wallace utilizes Aristotle's four causes to understand their nature, why they react the way they do, and to then models it accordingly for application to a different future compound.
As mentioned, sodium and chlorine are the two elements that combine to form salt. Wallace uses salt as an example of a substantial union in nature, and starting from empiriological sense knowledge, builds a corresponding ontological model. He structures the model around "protomatter" (also known as prime matter), the powers associated with inanimate objects, and showing how substantial change affects the individual elements. When dealing with elements, Wallace identifies the protomatter of the elements as quarks and anti-quarks, which combine to form the particles within each element. The forces within each element, specifically "strong force," or the actions of an object that utilize nuclear fusion, fission, and bonding, utilize protomatter and form the elements into what they are as a substance. The strong force keeps them in their natural forms as a unified substance, the specifying form:
[T]he nature of sodium [or chlorine] is such that the specifying form of that element actually informs protomatter in a distinctive way so as to the structure of all of its components – the nucleus and its constituents – into an integral whole that responds in a way characteristic of sodium [or chlorine] to various external influences.
When sodium and chlorine combine, the chemical reaction that takes place is a substantial change in the ontological sense, while empiriologically science explains the reformulation of atoms, protons, and neutrons within the compound. "A new substantial unity has been achieved, with radically different properties, although something of the previous substances remains in the substrate…."
Wallace's model for inorganic natures is the foundation for his further modeling of vegetative, animal, and human natures. These models are causal as well, relating to the Aristotelian causes. The formal cause is the unifying form of the nature, the substance itself. The efficient causes are the various powers of the different natures that act upon the substance. The material causes are the elements which make up the substance, including protomatter. The final cause can be explained in three ways; the end of a process, a perfection attained through the process, or a cognitive end. One way is that it is an end of a process, in the case of inorganic matter when elements combine to form compounds. The second way is that there is a good attained during the process, visible in nature through evolution as just one example. The third is a cognitive end, one that is planned or intended by the agent performing the action, such as a human. Wallace argues that the unification of all four causal realities instead focusing solely on the empiriological causes of material and efficient provides a richer understanding of the object under consideration. Maritain's position would result in incomplete knowledge of the object.
Modeling for Wallace demonstrates that unlike Maritain's position that empiriological and ontological knowledge are separate and distinct divisions of knowledge, they should be viewed as a single division of knowledge. They are in fact compatible with one another and philosophers can synthesize empiriological knowledge with ontological knowledge. His opinion upholds that the ability to maintain unity between the two types of knowledge assists both the philosopher and the scientist if accepted. Thus to Wallace, instead of an independent philosophy of nature and experimental science, both kinds of knowledge are under the philosophy of science, residing within the first degree of sense knowledge. On the other hand, pragmatists hold a different kind of outlook, focusing specifically on empiriological sense knowledge.
Larry Laudan and Pragmatism
Larry Laudan, a pragmatist philosopher of science, presents a different perspective. Laudan believes that within the first degree of knowledge exists only empiriological knowledge. He does not believe that ontological knowledge exists. He argues that
…no philosophy of science is credible which has not stood up to empirical scrutiny on the basis of scientific practice. Members of this school [pragmatism] regard philosophy of science as partly if not thoroughly naturalistic [meaning residing in the physical world] in spirit and always subject to empirical testing.
Laudan's argument is simply the rejection of any ontological knowledge, whether found in the first degree or as a part of metaphysics. The only kind of knowledge found in the first division is what is observable and measurable. This rejection is counter to both Maritain and Wallace and is much more radical in nature.
In his book Science and Relativism, framed as a debate between philosophers of pragmatism, positivism, relativism, and realism, a discussion arises which further shows his lack of identifying ontological knowledge as proper to sense knowledge. During one exchange between the realist philosopher and the pragmatist philosopher (the position Laudan defends) about the rules of the scientific method, the pragmatist philosopher states that "Rules cannot be deduced from empirical evidence, no matter how vast the evidence." The realist philosopher previously points out during the discussion that the "rules" assumed by the pragmatist philosopher have non-empirical origins. These origins are the ontological roots of science that science must accept to function correctly, even within the rules of the scientific method.
The conversation continues between the four until another moment which highlights a significant issue that addresses Laudan's approach. At a point in the conversation, the pragmatist (Laudan) accuses the relativist of not being able to distinguish between justified true belief and belief. The inability to differentiate between a justified true belief and belief puts the relativist in a bind. It results in the relativist making knowledge itself relative, even to the individual. The relativist then responds, saying "epistemology has failed to produce any convincing, non-question-begging way of distinguishing sound beliefs from unsound ones," essentially accepting knowledge as relative.
Without an ontological starting point for empirical knowledge, the statement by the relativist philosopher is a legitimate point, and Laudan does not have an answer to the objection. Circular reasoning follows when setting up a system of rules in science without an ontological basis. While the relativist cannot reasonably defend his position without ontological sense knowledge, neither can the pragmatist defend his position, because he rejects ontological knowledge in any form. When philosophers utilize these arguments in the realm of ontological and empiriological knowledge, Maritain's position and realism, in general, can withstand such an attack by appealing to ontological knowledge as the base for empiriological knowledge.
Critique
Maritain's view of the distinction between empiriological and ontological knowledge seems to have resistance from those within the Thomist community. While philosophers criticize Maritan for keeping empiriological and ontological knowledge as distinct and separate, in other places he is less clear about exactly what that means. For example, he writes that "We believe that Nature ought to take over the entire material supplied by the Experimental Sciences," which is confusing. It seems to run counter to his previous statements. At times, it appears that the distinction he draws is more practical than it is a "line in the sand," yet he is adamant that the two types of knowledge are distinct.
While at times it does appear that Maritain equivocates in different writings between assessing the division as merely practical versus separate, Maritain asserts several times that the division is fundamental and that the two approaches are necessary. The gap between the two separate areas of sense knowledge is what moves Maritain to take up a more intrinsic separation rather than a functional or academic separation. Empiriological areas of study can move so deeply into the infinitesimally observable and measurable that ontological realities take on the appearance of an entirely different area of study to Maritain. The division attempts to deal with the fact that the more empiriological a science is, the more difficult it is to reconcile the two types of knowledge.
In the past, the effects of separating the two have had unfortunate, wide-ranging consequences. As Charles Hollencamp in Science is Philosophy noted during a section outlining the history of the debate, the rise of modern philosophy in the 15th and 16th centuries and the subsequent advancement of the sciences brought about a rift that exists to the present day. It paved the way for such theories as Positivism and Pragmatism to deny ontological knowledge, especially when applied to modern science. The division unintentionally creates the space for a wholesale disregarding of ontological knowledge, even if accidental.
Fortunately, Wallace shows an ability to reconcile the two, as he repeatedly proves through his modeling of various types of physical phenomena. The ability to reunite these two through modeling reinforces the traditional realist philosophical position that modern philosophers should have never separated the two, including Maritain. Wallace proves that while difficult, it is possible to unify the two divisions. If possible, this invalidates Maritain's position, as there would be no reason to keep Maritain's proposed divisions.
Conclusion
Jacques Maritain divided sense knowledge into categories: empiriological and ontological. He believed that the division was necessary to explain modern science within a realist philosophical tradition. Empiriological sense knowledge consists of knowledge obtained through measurement and observation. Ontological sense knowledge focuses on the unobservable attributes and qualities found within sensible beings, such as their natures and essences. Maritain believed that unification and synthesis between the two was not possible nor relevant for both types to flourish.
Wallace critiqued this division of knowledge because in his view empiriological and ontological knowledge belonged together as one science, as Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas understood sense knowledge. Wallace objects to the division that Maritain introduced as unwarranted. Through demonstrations and modeling of simple scientific examples, Wallace shows that such a synthesis is possible. Laudan, as a pragmatist, rejects an ontological understanding of sensible being and focuses purely on empiriological knowledge. The rejection of ontological sense knowledge is what Maritain fought to retain by separating it from the empiriological.
In general, Jacques Maritain's division of sense knowledge into empiriological and ontological invigorated debate. Maritain developed a distinction between the two that was novel in its time, seeking to respond to the rejection of ontological knowledge during his lifetime. Splitting empiriological and ontological knowledge allowed Maritain to strengthen the realist approach to science and account for the increasingly rapid progress that science was making in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even though Wallace's modeling casts serious doubts whether the separation is necessary, it does serve to facilitate debates on how humans obtain knowledge, and what importance philosophers and scientists should place on both empiriological and ontological sense knowledge. Philosophers and scientists alike will continue to discuss the division of Maritain's approach to sense knowledge, weighing its merits and difficulties for years to come.



Bibliography
Hollencamp, Charles H. Science Is Philosophy. Carthagena, OH: Messenger Press, 1973.

Laudan, Larry. Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Laudan, Larry, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard, and Steve Wykstra. "Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research." Synthese, 1986.

Maritain, Jacques. Philosophy of Nature. Translated by Imelda Byrne. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951.

———. The Degrees of Knowledge. Translated by Gerald B. Phelan. The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.

Sweet, William. "Jacques Maritain." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Last modified 2013. Accessed 4/25/2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/maritain.

Wallace, William A. The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996.

Yves, Simon R. "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences." Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 5, no. 81 (1943): 85-102. http://search.proquest.com.dtl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1291769364?accountid=10143.




Jacques Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, trans. Imelda Byrne (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 75.
Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan, The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 38-39.
Simon R. Yves, "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 5, no. 81 (1943): 87, http://search.proquest.com.dtl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1291769364?accountid=10143.
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 38.
Ibid.
Ibid., 39.
Yves, 88-89.
Ibid., 89.
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, 74.
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 147.
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, 45-71. Maritain describes Positivism as one such school of Philosophy in Chapter 7 "Positivistic Conception of Science." Pragmatism also ascribes to the same notions, as described by Lauden in Science and Relativism
Ibid., 78.
William Sweet, "Jacques Maritain," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 4/25/2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/maritain.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, 80.
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 41.
Sweet, "Jacques Maritain."
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 43.
Ibid., 40.
Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 189-90.
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, 89.
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 99.
Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, 93.
William A. Wallace, The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), xiii.
Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 49-50.
Ibid., 57.
Ibid.
Ibid., 16-17.
Larry Laudan et al., "Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research," Synthese, 1986, 147.
Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 104.
Ibid., 107.
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 193-94.
Charles H. Hollencamp, Science Is Philosophy (Carthagena, OH: Messenger Press, 1973), 38.
Ibid., 46-47.