Introductary commentary on De anima Book 1_draft.pdf
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An introductory commentary on Aristotle’s De anima - Book 1 Table of Contents 1. PROOEMIUM (I.1)
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1.1 PRECISION AND VENERABILITY OF THE TREATISE (402A1-11)
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1.2 THE CHOICE OF METHOD (402A11-22)
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1.3 THE CATEGORIAL GENUS OF THE SOUL (402A23-B1)
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1.4 IS THE SOUL DIVIDED? (402B1-16)
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1.5 THE DEFINITION OF THE SOUL (402B16-403A2)
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1.6 THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL (403A3-27)
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1.7 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFINITION? (403A27-B19)
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2. ARISTOTLE’S DISCUSSION OF HIS PREDECESSORS (I.2–5)
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2.1 MOTION AND PERCEPTION (403B20-405B30)
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2.2. MOTION PER SE ACCIDENTAL MOTION (405B31-406B15)
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2.3 DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO (406B15-407B26)
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2.4 SOUL AND HARMONY (407B27-408A30)
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2.5 MOTION AND SELF-MOTION (408A29-B31)
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2.6 SELF-MOVING UNITIES (408B32-409B18)
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2.7 THE SOUL AS A PRINCIPLE OF PERCEPTION (409B19-411A26)
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2.8 UNITY AND DIVISION OF THE SOUL (411A26-B30)
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1. Prooemium (I.1) The first chapter of book I is complexly structured and raises numerous issues and questions some of which draw on methodological considerations Aristotle discussed elsewhere in his work. First, I will give a brief overview of the questions and explain their mutual relationship. Then we shall turn to the problems and discuss them in more detail. One must bear in mind that many of the issues brought up here will become relevant in the following chapters. The chapter can be divided roughly into seven sections, each raising different questions and discussing interrelated issues: (402a1-11) The first section highlights the particular importance of the book and emphasizes the difficulties in cognizing the soul as object of the inquiry. The importance relies partly on the dignity of the object and partly on the attainable precision. 402a11-22) The second section is devoted to the correct method for obtaining knowledge about the soul. It is therefore necessary first to determine the correct starting point of the inquiry. (402a23-b1) The third section draws attention to the question of the categorial genus of the soul which is required in order to determine the starting point. 402b1-16) The fourth section addresses the question of whether the soul is actually divided or not. If the soul is divided it will become necessary to clarify the differences between the respective parts first. Do they all fall under distinct genera or not? If not, a uniform definition of the soul will be possible. (402b16-403a2) The fifth section deals with the definition of the soul, which in turn requires a determination of its substance and essential properties. Closely related is the problem as to what can earlier be detected: its substance or properties. (403a3-a27) This draws attention to the question of the affections of the soul. The problem of separability of individual capacities becomes relevant again. Given that the soul could only suffer as a composite, the distinct powers of the soul could then exist
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independently from the body. Independent existence, however, requires an independent activity of the soul. (403a27-403b19) The seventh section asks who is responsible for determining the definition of the soul. To answer this question, one must first settle the relationship between body and soul. On the condition that there are no activities peculiar to the soul, it would follow that the body must always be included into its definition. This would however lay support to the position of the natural philosopher, since Aristotle understands physics as a science concerned with natural bodies, that is bodies in motion.
1.1 Precision and venerability of the treatise (402a1-11) At the outset of the investigation Aristotle emphasizes the special status of the investigation into the nature of the soul. The importance is based primarily on two aspects: first the special venerability of the object and second the degree of precision that is achievable. We shall first look more closely at the venerability and then turn to the alleged precision of the investigation. Already the first sentence establishes a remarkable (general) relationship to knowledge and thus links De anima to the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Physics. As is well known, Aristotle’s Metaphysics begins with the observation that all men are by nature seeking for knowledge (Met. 980a21). The Physics, however, is concerned with knowledge of causes, elements and principles of natural bodies (Ph. 184a10-11). Aristotle emphasizes a different aspect in his De Anima; for even though all knowledge is valuable, this applies to “one more, the other less” (An. 402a1-2). It is therefore important to notice a particular hierarchy of the objects of knowledge. The ranking follows either from the attainable precision in knowledge (Top. 157a8-10) or from the goodness and venerability of the knowable object. Aristotle illustrates his idea with the help of an example: He assumes that astronomy, being devoted to heavenly bodies, is better than all those sciences which are dealing with sublunary things
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(Part an. 644b32seq.). For the same reason it follows that one must ascribe a higher status to the investigation into the nature of the soul in comparison to other sciences, granted that the soul ranks above inanimate objects. But how can the particular degree of precision be explained that is attainable by the inquiry? The following two points are crucial: (i) First, one must note that for Aristotle all objects are composed of form and matter. Knowable, however, is only the form which is realized in matter as only the form is responsible for the formal determination of the object which in turn can be discriminated through reason as a discriminatory capacity. Without going too much into the depths of the underlying Aristotelian metaphysics here, the idea can in short be illustrated by the following: One can only fully recognize the nature of a statue through its formal determination that is its concrete shape and not through its material substance. Because a mere look at the copper reveals nothing or very little about what a statue in general is or even whose image is realized by this concrete statue. Later we will see that the soul is to the body as form is to matter. But given that it is the form which alone can be cognized in each and every case whereas matter merely provides the conditions for the formal determination, it follows that it is only the soul (even if it might sound paradoxical) which is knowable at the body. As a consequence, the study of the soul must be granted an excellent degree of precision compared to other inquiries. We will later return to the Aristotelian definition of the soul as well as to the preconditions of cognitive thought. (ii) The second reason for the particular precision of the study is based on a consideration that Aristotle has pointed out in the Posterior Analytics (An. Post. 78b35ff .; 87a31ff.). Accordingly, one science ranks above the other with respect to the attainable precision when it grounds the principles of this other science. Under this perspective, the science of nature can attain a higher level of precision than, for instance, medicine since the principles of medicine are based on the science of nature. However, this second justification raises a problem: What are the consequences for the
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relationship between the De anima and the Physics? It was already noted that the De anima adopted some of its crucial conceptions from the Physics, most importantly the form-matterdistinction. However, Aristotle did not escape the difficulty which is why he discusses the relationship between the two books at numerous places in De anima. Again we will have to return to the problem later. Once Aristotle assured that the investigation into the nature of the soul merits a special place among the potential objects of knowledge, he even emphasizes its contribution to truth in general that is all possible knowledge (πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν, An. 402a5). ‘All
knowledge’ at this place refers to philosophy and its sub disciplines: Metaphysics, Ethics, Natural Philosophy. The importance for ethics bears on the fact that virtue and its development are based in human capacities which is why they immediately depend on knowledge of these capacities. Theology (or metaphysics) benefits from the investigation because it deals with forms separated from matter. Separated, or intelligible forms, however, are objects of intuitive cognition and therefore require a foregoing discussion of the underlying human capacity for several reasons. Special importance merits the investigation also with respect to knowledge of nature that is the object of physics and related inquiries: As was already said, the Physics deals with causes, principles and elements of bodies in motion, which is why Aristotle, in anticipation of the subsequent inquiry, recognizes a similarity with the inquiry of the soul, because the latter is defined as a “first principle of animals” (An. 402a6-7). However, since animals are in a way bodies in motion, the knowledge of this principle will also contribute greatly to the knowledge of the principles of bodies in motion in general. Because this last definition will gain some importance in the further inquiry it deserves to be taken more closely into view here: The soul is a principle of the animal inasmuch as the peculiar activities and characteristics associated with life are to be explained with reference to the soul. These activities include locomotion, perception, imagination and also human
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intellective understanding. Aristotle will elaborate this idea in the following (An. 413b11-13) and explain exactly how the soul can be considered as the source of life (An. 415b8-16a18). In the next sentence, which further specifies the scope of the inquiry, Aristotle takes up the idea; for the focus of the investigation of the soul lies on its “nature and essence” (An. 402a7-8). Even though Aristotle often uses ‘nature’ and ‘essence’ (or sometimes substance: οὐσία) interchangeably (Ph. 193a9; Met 1014b36, 1019a2, 1064b11), ‘nature’ in particular refers to things equipped with an inner source of motion (Ph.192b13-15; Met. 1015a13-15, 1070a6-9.). His usage of ‘Nature’, however, already indicates special problems that will occupy Aristotle for the rest of the chapter: the question of the possible definition of the soul, on the one hand, and, consequently, the question of the appropriate method of investigation, on the other. We will see that the problem of the correct definition of the soul is a matter of exceptional importance for its cognition because it offers an answer to the question what the soul is. This makes it necessary not only to determine the nature of the soul but also its properties (An. 402a8). When Aristotle speaks about properties, one must note that this does not include all kinds of properties or accidents. Instead, from the subsequent explanation it becomes clear that Aristotle at this point asks for “affections peculiar to the soul itself” (An. 402a9). They are however peculiar insofar as they follow from its essence, such as, for instance, the capacity to reason which is essential to human beings (because it distinguishes humans from other animals, and thus constitutes the specific difference in its genus). It remains open at this point, however, whether these qualities are peculiar merely to the soul or the entire living being that is the union of body and soul.
1.2 The choice of method (402a11-22) It is the declared aim of the inquiry to determine the essence of the soul. This raises the question of the correct method to apply. However, Aristotle wonders whether one method is
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sufficient or if several distinct methods will become necessary. What is the exact nature of the needed method? Moreover, the correct starting point of the investigation is also open (An. 402a21). Even though Aristotle does not want to rule out at this point that there is only one method “for all of the objects of inquiry whose essence we wish to ascertain” (An. 402a1314). But if this were the case it would only be necessary to seek out this way to determine the nature of the soul. However, Aristotle brings two possible methods into play: demonstration and division. What is connected with the respective methods is elaborated elsewhere and need not worry us here; for at this point Aristotle does not decide about their suitability. Instead he stresses that a decision would not even make it easier for us to determine the essence, “for different fields have different starting points (principles), just as for example the fields of numbers and planes do” (An. 402a21-22). Here principle or starting point refers to the unproven preconditions of each science. For Aristotle these starting points are not only better understood as all that what follows from them, but they are also accepted as axiomatic by the relevant sciences. When Aristotle therefore refers to number and plane in this context, he means that even though both fall under the category of quantity, yet the former does so as a discrete unity whereas the latter is continuous (Cat. 4b20-25). Aristotle pursues two objectives with this remark, on the one hand, he refers to the immediately following determination of the category under which the soul falls, and, on the other hand, he points to a further problem that he will address at the end of the first chapter: for granted that the category under which the soul falls could be determined, this would nevertheless not yield the principle from which the determination of the nature of the soul could be obtained. Why not? Admitted we know that the soul is a substance, it would still be open into whose responsibility the study of the soul falls, either the natural philosopher or the metaphysician. Because in order to do this it is necessary to understand the starting point or principle, from which the essential determination is carried out.
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1.3 The categorial genus of the soul (402a23-b1) The preliminary consideration was primarily employed to underscore the particular difficulties in the determination of the nature of the soul and the correct choice of method. Now Aristotle proceeds to define the following procedure itself: “It is presumably first of all necessary to determine the genus of the soul and what it is.” (An. 402a23-24) Aristotle has set out the genera in his Categories. In view of the positions of his predecessors different possibilities arise. This is why Aristotle at first leaves it open under which category the soul falls. It is therefore not completely settled at this point that the soul is a substance. We will see in the following that some took the soul to be a number, while others suggested that is some kind of harmony. For this reason it cannot be excluded that the soul falls under either the genus of quantity or quality. But because all the categories can be considered under the two aspects of potentiality and actuality this must also be applied to the soul (At. 402a25-26). Notice, however, that this does not mean that the soul exists only possibly or actually; for even what is merely in potentiality does actually exist in another respect. Accordingly, someone can potentially know a foreign language without actually being competent in any other than her native English language.
1.4 Is the Soul divided? (402b1-16) With the question of divisibility of the soul Aristotle takes up a point that is important, first, for the determination of the essence (since the answer is crucial also for the possibility of an essence specifying definition of the soul) and, secondly, it bears some relevance for the Platonic understanding of soul which makes it important in order to distinguish Aristotle's position from previous positions. Aristotle recognizes and lists various possibilities: First, either the soul is divisible or not. If it is divisible, the division can be between similar or dissimilar parts. But if the soul
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comprises dissimilar parts, these parts could then differ according to their species or their genus. In the subsequent chapters Aristotle identifies the historical representatives of these possibilities and discusses them in more detail. However, already at this point, Aristotle draws attention to a general problem they are facing and that he intends to avoid with his approach, for they all pay attention only to the human soul. Aristotle initially considers the problem of divisibility under two perspectives. First, he is concerned with the possibility of a definition that determines the essence of the soul. This consideration succeeds the foregoing. Given that the soul is divided, a uniform definition would require that its parts fall under a genus. Do animals and humans share one kind of soul then or are there different types? On the answer to this question depends also the decision whether there is only one concept or one definition of the soul or more than one. Secondly, the problem is relevant for the methodically correct starting point of the inquiry. Given that the soul were actually divided, one should not only ask whether “it is necessary to inquire first into the soul as a whole or into its parts” (An. 402b9-10), but also how the parts can be distinguished from each other. Especially the latter exerts a decisive influence on the structure of the whole study. Suppose the soul is divided based on its powers, with respect to the methodologically correct procedure of the inquiry, it will be questionable whether one has to examine the powers first or their functions that is their activities or rather the objects that depend on these activities. We shall see that Aristotle chooses the last option and takes the starting point (with one important exception) in the determination of the individual powers in their objects.
1.5 The definition of the soul (402b16-403a2) This puts the focuses of the inquiry again on the possible definition of the soul. If one cannot attain such a definition without having first gained clarity as to whether and how the soul is
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actually divided, then one will have to choose a different path to determine the definition. It is for this reason that Aristotle recalls that the definition will not only help to reveal the substantial accidents or better attributes, but also the opposite way is possible. How to understand this is illustrated by an example: For instance, one can see by starting with the definition of a triangle, that the three angles must give 180 degrees. At the same time the clearly recognized attributes of the triangle also contribute to the determination of the definition. This methodical move is based on a fundamental assumption of Aristotelian philosophy, which becomes relevant at this point. Aristotle is in fact convinced that an investigation needs to start with what is more accessible to the knower and therefore already known in order to proceed to what is first with respect to the nature of a thing (An. Post. 71b9-72a5). Consequently, the determination of the first principles must pursue this path too (Ph. 184a1618). Most accessible to the knower is her presentation of a thing that is its appearance,1 which is therefore to be regarded as an important starting point in determining the definition.2 Of course, the appearance cannot yield all attributes of a thing. However it will provide a first impression of those attributes that are evident and as such not only immediately cognized bust also generally admitted. Starting from the evident appearances it will become possible to make more specific statements about the underlying substance of a thing (An. 402b24-25). What is evident (or the appearance) is provided by perception. Accordingly, that something is given is provided by perception. It remains however open what this something is. So this is not a kind of demonstrative knowledge. The latter is made possible only by the determination of the substance which alone can provide a starting point of a demonstrative argument (An. 402b25-26). 1
The underlying Greek term φαντασία (An. 402b23) is ambiguous and can mean both presentation and appearance or even imagination.
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For the important methodological function of appearance see Shields 2013.
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But as soon as one attains the definition of a thing, one can also gain knowledge about its properties in a scientific way, namely by taking the definition as a starting point. Consequently, one can infer the qualities from a correctly determined definition (given that the definition is not empty). This too suggests that Aristotle does not mean mere accident but something like the essential attributes of a thing because mere accidents escape the definition of a thing in virtue of their accidental nature: Whether her hair is red or black, does not say anything about what makes her a human.
1.6 The affections of the soul (403a3-27) If we starting from the phenomena try to come to a definition of the soul, a particular problem arises. Because the affections of the soul do not exhibit whether they are grounded only in the soul or the composite of soul and body (An. 403a4-5). Affection is used by Aristotle to designate in general any kind of activity of the soul. This draws attention to the clarification of the relationship between body and soul in order to correctly define the soul. Given that the soul uses the body merely as an instrument and produces all its activities through itself, it would not be necessary then to include the body into the definition of the soul. The ancient commentators illustrate this by pointing out that the ax does not complete the definition of a carpenter. Had the soul on the other hand no peculiar activities, but they would always depend ultimately on the body, then the body would play a special role for the definition of the soul too. Under this condition the activities “are accounts in matter” (An. 403a25). But as it appears indeed the soul “neither is affected nor acts without the body” (An. 403a6-7). Good examples are, according to Aristotle, “being angry or confident or appetitive, or generally, with perceiving” (An. 403a6-7). It is clear that perception depends on a physical body which must be affected in some sort by a material object (Sens. 436b6-10). Without
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physical affection nothing will be perceived. We will talk in more detail about the mechanism of perception later. In addition to these activities, there are perhaps some that are possible without an accompanying physical activity and that might therefore be peculiar to the soul. One candidate for this would be the activity of reasoning (An. 403a8). For at least prima facie, reasoning does not rely on external stimuli; one may think whatever and whenever one wants. But should it turn out that reasoning “is a sort of imagination, or not without imagination, it would not be possible for even this to be without a body” (An. 403a8-10). Why not? We will see that this is related to the nature of imagination because for Aristotle imagination is intrinsically linked to perception, and, as was already said, the latter essentially depends on the body. Consequently, reasoning too would only be possible for a composition of body and soul. Given however that all mental activities are substantially connected to the body, they would also conceptually be related to matter (An. 403a25) and this would have both an immediate effect on the possible seperability of the soul from the body and the definition of the soul and its activities. For the definition would then have to comprise both aspects: the psychic (or formal) aspect and the physical (or material). Aristotle illustrates this by the example of anger. Because “being angry is a sort of motion of a body of such a sort, or of a part, or capacity of a body brought about by this for the sake of that” (An. 403a26-27).
1.7 Who is responsible for the definition? (403a27-b19) This draws attention to the question of who might be responsible for the definition. Aristotle distinguishes at this point between the natural scientist, the dialectician, the mathematician and theologian (metaphysician). The distinction depends on the focus that is placed in the determination of the thing, as well as on the underlying matter. The natural scientist, according to this first approach, only considers matter. The dialectician, on the other hand,
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merely focuses on the formal aspect. From the example of being angry it follows that the natural scientist primarily considers the “boiling of the blood” (An. 430a31), whereas the dialectician pays heed to the “desire for retaliation” (403a30-31). Provided the correct determination of the soul requires to take account of both aspects (form and matter) alike, then both approaches would fail (at least according to this first understanding). However, at this point Aristotle is unsure about the possibility as to whether the natural scientist takes both aspects into account or not. If the former were true than the investigation of the soul would consequently fall in his purview of inquiry. At this point, a second differentiation becomes relevant. One must not only focus on form and matter in general, but it becomes important to see in what kind of specific body the form is realized. Accordingly, the subject of the natural scientist is a specific sort of body (An. 403b11-12), whose form is inseparable from the body. The mathematician, on the other hand, is also concerned with inseparable affections of bodies, but unlike the natural scientist he is not concerned with "so and thus arranged bodies" (An. 403b14-15). The mathematical bodies are a special kind of body, which differ substantially from those of the natural scientist, because they are not moving individual bodies. Yet from both the natural scientist and the mathematician differs the first philosopher (or theologian), because he alone deals with separated affections or forms. With respect to the fact that, at least what we know so far, affections of the soul are not separable from a natural body, we have to assume that it cannot be a task for the mathematician or the first philosophers to deal with the soul. It is open, however, and deserves further investigation whether the inquiry falls within the remit of the natural scientist.
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2. Aristotle’s discussion of his predecessors (I.2–5)
Once the extraordinary value of the inquiry has become clear, but also its particular difficulties, Aristotle begins his study by considering the evident affections of the soul. We have seen that it is essential for Aristotle’s method to start with what is closest to the knower and proceed from there to what is first with respect to the nature of a thing. But what “is ensouled seems to differ from what is not ensouled chiefly in two respects: motion and perception” (An. 403b25). Since both are evident and present in appearance it is not surprising that these two aspects are already dealt with by Aristotle’s predecessors. This is one reason why Aristotle discusses their views in his own investigation. This way the discussion of previous philosophic positions is embedded in overarching methodological considerations. In addition, discussing traditional views on the soul will enable Aristotle to further specify the scope of his inquiry and the applied terminology. This is, on the one hand, important for developing and shaping the terminology required for the study of the soul (notice that also the leading questions of the second and third book are formulated in these terms). On the other hand, it is in virtue of the discussion of the predecessors that Aristotle also carries out a first substantive definition of the soul. We will see exactly how Aristotle takes this discussion as a basis for his own inquiry: At this point he maintains to reject what appears absurd to him, but accept (and transforms into his own theory, for example, through terminological transformations) what makes sense or is commonly accepted. Aside from Plato and Democritus it is mainly Anaxagoras (as we will see in the third book) who plays a crucial role for the development of Aristotle’s position. With respect to the reconstruction of the pre-Socratic positions, however, the Aristotelian presentation is admittedly problematic in many respects. Even tough Aristotle is in many cases a key witness - the positions of some of the philosophers treated by him are completely lost otherwise - his
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reviews are yet to be treated with caution and often testify that he is first of all guided by his own objectives. Let us bear in mind first that Aristotle adopted from his predecessors many of the questions he addresses. Second, and this was already indicated by the ancient commentators, even though none of the approaches discussed will be as such true for Aristotle, yet they all contribute in some ways to the truth. For both reasons, it makes sense to take a closer look at these positions and their discussion. The study of his predecessors’ positions covers a large part of chapter two to five of the first book. The second chapter primarily deals with the presentation of relevant views whereas chapter three to five offer Aristotle’s criticism. We can and need not go into the details of all views. Important for our purposes is especially that which is relevant to the development of the Aristotelian position. The discussion can be broken down into eight sections, which build up on one another: (403b20-405b30) First Aristotle provides a detailed report of the views of his predecessors on the soul. Already in this report the two properties of the soul that will mainly occupy Aristotle in the following come to the fore: motion and perception. (405b31-406b15) The second section introduces an important distinction with respect to motion. Accordingly, one must distinguish between motion per se and motion in a mere accidental sense. (406b15-407b26) Third, the positions of two particularly important predecessors are discussed and rejected: Democritus and Plato. From the Aristotelian discussion emerges that both theories share some significant aspects. (407b27-408a29) Fourth, Aristotle turns to the prominent view that soul is some kind of harmony. He highlights the difficulties of this assumption, but also the benefits that need to be taken into account and even be incorporated into a coherent position in order to attain an adequate understanding of the soul.
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(408a29-408b31) Fifth, Aristotle discusses one of the main difficulties that he identified with his predecessors’ views, namely their assumption that only what is itself in motion can cause another to move. He points out the different types of motion, which are summarized or subsumed under the same concept. Then with respect to the individual activities of the soul it is shown that these cannot be reconciled with the general characterization of the known types of motion. (408b32-409b18) Sixth, Aristotle considers two positions according to which the soul is a self-moving unit, most notably that the soul is a self-moving number or atom. Aristotle exhibits the similarities between both and points to insoluble contradictions (aporiai) following from them. (409b19-411a26) Seventh, he discusses one assumed precondition of his predecessors relevant to perception according to which only like can cognize like. This was taken as a ground to argue that the soul had to consist of all possible elements of things. Aristotle discusses both the dilemmas arising from the principle itself as well as from the adoption of the elemental composition of the soul. We will see, however, that the principle too will later play a crucial role in Aristotle’s own position albeit in a modified form. For Aristotle it is true that only what is similar in some respects, even though different in others, can have an effect on each other. (411a26-b30) Finally Aristotle takes up the question of the division of the soul again: This time, however, the aspect of unity is paramount. From this it clearly emerges that even if there are different parts of the soul, which differ with respect to their activities, it cannot be a mere spatial division. In addition, a certain priority among the parts of the soul slowly comes to the fore.
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2.1 Motion and Perception (403b20-405b30) At the beginning of the second chapter Aristotle makes clear what, both with respect to appearance and the unanimous opinion of the majority of predecessors, must be considered as the two main differences between animate and inanimate objects: motion and perception (An 403b26-27.). It is not accidental therefore that almost all take motion and (or) perception as excellent properties soul. We know from the previous chapter that the determination of the properties or attributes is essential for the definition of a thing. Setting out these attributes thus provides an important step towards a first (and we shall see merely general) definition of the soul. Why are perception and motion excellent qualities of the soul? One must notice that Aristotle proceeds very carefully in his formulation. It merely “appears” (An. 403b25 and 403b26 again) at first that the animate differs from the inanimate in virtue of these two activities. This too indicates that we are dealing with a generally accepted opinion (that is an endoxon), which, at least in some sense, proves the actual existence of a thing and thus serves as a starting point for further inquiry. On closer inspection, however, problematic consequences may result, notably if these opinions are understood or even admitted undifferentiatedly. Indeed the following discussion will show that both motion and perception are not to be accepted as essential attributes of the soul unrestrictedly. There are parts of the soul that are not moving with respect to the intended meaning of Aristotle’s predecessors and it is not possible to identify all activities of the soul with perception. A little later Aristotle adds life to perception and motion (An. 404a15-16). This way the connection between life and soul will be stressed; a connection that will become essential for the further inquiry. But since even life appears to be linked fundamentally to motion, Aristotle first concentrates on motion. His discussion of motion essentially bears on the results of the Physics. We need not go into details at this point. It is however important to bear in mind that the Greek term for motion (κίνησις) is ambiguous. Aristotle primarily uses it as a
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generic term for change. In addition to change in location (that is locomotion) it includes also change of properties or alteration (such as, for instance, colors) as well as growth and diminution. This too indicates that one must understand motion (as excellent criterion for animate beings) in a fairly broad sense, even though Aristotle will attribute a special role to locomotion at many places. One reason for this is that his predecessors have not differentiated sufficiently between the different forms of motion. We will see that this is one of the main reasons for many of the problems arising from their views. Aristotle will discuss this in the following chapters. It will turn out that the assumption that only that which is itself moved can cause motion with another thing is particularly problematic. Accordingly, if the soul is to be responsible for movement, it will have to be moved itself (An. 404a24-25). Consequently, it will by nature dispose of a special mobility, which in turn immediately affects its material quality. Aristotle cites as an example Democritus, the founder of ancient atomism, for whom the soul is “a sort fire and heat” (An. 404a1), because fire supposedly consists of round and thus extremely moveable atoms. The composition or nature of the soul is not only determined by its apparent ability to move. Its second significant property (that is perception) also contributes greatly to the material composition of the soul. Here, a further requirement becomes relevant, which is embraced by most of the predecessors: like is known by like. From this follows however that the soul too must be composed of the same elements or principles as perceptual objects (which are the natural, perceivable bodies); for otherwise cognition of these bodies would be impossible. This is the reason why the composition of the soul is based on such principles, from which all things supposedly emerge. Aside from Empedocles, who takes the soul to comprise all elements (An. 404b11-12), Aristotle also points to Plato here. In the Timaeus he apparently agrees to this precondition, which is why he composed the soul of the same elements as the cognizable things (Tim 34c-35a;. 37a-c, 41d).
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The relationship between soul and number (Xenocrates?) is apparently grounded on the same reason, since a connection between numbers and the respective cognitive faculties of the soul is assumed. If one relates this assumption with the first one, according to which the soul is responsible for motion, the reasons for assuming that soul could be a self-moving number become apparent (An. 404b29-30).3 This way perception draws attention to the question of principles or starting points of things and the soul; for the same principles must be responsible for perception and motion. If at the end of the second chapter Aristotle summaries that all have defined the soul in virtue of three aspects: motion, perception and incorporeality, one must notice that incorporeality is not meant in a strict sense. Rather, it is assumed that the soul, on account of its special movability, is made up of extremely fine or small particles, which can almost count to be incorporeal.
2.2. Motion per se accidental motion (405b31-406b15) After this initial overview of the predecessor’s positions about the soul (which primarily focused on the inferences drawn from two evident qualities of the soul: perception and movement) their results and preconditions are now subject to a more critical examination. First, Aristotle directs his attention to the nature of motion associated with the soul. It is open whether the soul must necessarily be considered to be in motion after all if indeed it is the origin of motion. Aristotle recalls that he has shown elsewhere that a mover need not be moved (most likely Ph. 259b18ff.; 224a27ff.). Thus, his predecessors would erroneously assume this as a necessary precondition of the soul’s capacity to move the body. According to his own theory of the unmoved mover, it can cause motion without itself being moved, but 3
Either the cognitive aspect or the moveability is highlighted here. The inference comprises both by attributing particular numbers to the cognitive faculties of the soul and stressing that the soul can account for motion. Both, however, is found in Plato. For motion see, in particular, Phdr. and for cognition Tim. This could be one reason why merging both properties was obvious for the successors of Plato in the Academy.
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instead as a kind of desired end of motion. Aristotle does not take it to be necessary to elaborate the idea at this point and it won’t play any role in the following - at least not explicitly.4 It is however important to bear in mind the distinction between motion in itself and one that is merely accidental. Aristotle explains the distinction with the help of an example: A sailor sits on a moving ship. In some way, the sailor as such (that is to say considered in itself) is in rest. However, he is admittedly being moved in some other respect, namely accidentally; for the sailor is moved only insofar as he is on a moving ship, whereas the ship itself is moved. Given that soul too is supposed to be moved per se (that is not only insofar as it is in a moving body), a couple of consequences follow for Aristotle, which are mostly based on assumptions about motion carried out elsewhere (see Physics). First, Aristotle claims that it is necessary to distinguish between four types of motion (per se): “locomotion, alteration, decay, and growth” (An 406a13.). All these forms of motion presuppose a certain place at which they happen. Accordingly, if the soul were moved in one of these respects, it would also have to be at a place. But in addition it would have to be a natural body, as these forms of motion are changes to natural bodies only; for all four types of motion, Aristotle sets out to explain in his Physics, only happen to natural (sublunary) bodies, in contrast to geometrical bodies, which are not moved at all or heavenly (superlunary) bodies, to which he ascribes a special type of motion (circular). If the soul were a natural body, however, “then it would be moved by force” too (An. 406a22-23) or it must have a natural state of rest. Why? One must know that for Aristotle the elements have natural places to which they naturally gravitate and to which they move back, if they have been replaced by force. The latter simply means indeed that some one or something took them from their naturally ascribed place. If someone takes, for example, a stone from the ground and throws it into the air, the element earth that is dominant in the stone will strive to its natural location. As a 4
Even if the soul is to be regarded as a final cause.
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consequence, the stone falls again to the ground. Fire, however, will strive upward, which is why the soul can be considered to be rather fiery be nature if its moves up or earthy when it strives downwards. But since natural bodies bear the goal of their striving in themselves, according to Aristotle, it is also essential to them to be not only the principle of motion, but also of rest, which comes about when the aspired state has been achieved. Accordingly, as soon as the stone reaches the ground it will remain there until, of course, it is moved again by force. Aristotle lays out these consequences in some more detail since they are hard to imagine in view of the soul. Equally problematic however are the conclusions that can be drawn from the assumption that anything, which causes motion, must itself be moved too. Accordingly, the soul, as the recognized ground per se of locomotion of the organism, would also change location. Then it could not even be excluded that the soul possibly leaves the body and returns to it; thus a resurrection of the same body would in principle be possible. Instead, Aristotle contends that the first cause of motion must itself not necessarily be in motion. If it were, for example, an incorporeal first cause (what Aristotle indeed argues elsewhere), it would not be moved itself as it moves the body. Therefore, Aristotle here points to what is “by itself good” (An. 406b9) which as a first mover moves the whole universe, even though it is as such unmoved. So if we assume that motion substantially belongs to the soul as a property, in particular in the sense that the soul is responsible for the motion of the body, then it is implausible to assume at the same time that it were also moved in itself. However, this does in the end not exclude the possibility that it is moved in an accidental sense (insofar as it is related with a body).
2.3 Democritus and Plato (406b15-407b26) After these more general considerations Aristotle addresses two particularly influential positions on the relationship between motion and soul that were set out by Democritus and the
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Platonic Timaeus. We will later see that Aristotle recognizes significant similarities between both. As was said Democritus conceived of the soul as being composed of fiery and round atoms, because, on his view, what is spherical can be moved best and easiest of all forms (which follows from the fact that two balls can only touch at a single point). This way, Democritus accounts for the soul’s special power of motion. On this condition, however, the possibility of rest is clearly problematic. For Aristotle natural beings are not only characterized in virtue of their internal principle of motion but the very same principle is also responsible for rest. Yet how can a thing that is in motion on account of its own nature and thus is continuously moved, be at the same time the cause of rest? To this question Democritus cannot offer a satisfactory solution for Aristotle which is why Aristotle assumes that the soul does not move in virtue of its physical condition. In addition, it is obvious that at least human souls are moved by intent and reason. To contend therefore that the motion of the soul is merely based on natural properties of atoms contradicts evident phenomena. After his discussion of Democritus Aristotle turns to Plato, but in particular Plato’s position of the Timaeus. We will see that Aristotle understands Plato at many places literally. First a striking similarity to Democritus consists in the fact that Plato appears to believe that the soul moves the body by moving itself. Plato however differs from Democritus, according to Aristotle’s reading, in holding that the soul is moved by reason (this is why Plato unlike Democritus agrees with the phenomena in this respect). Because the elements that make up the soul, for Plato, are arranged according to harmonious numerical proportions (that is to say according to reason) “so that it [the soul; A. H.] might have an innate perception of harmony” (An. 406b29-30). The result is a special motion of the soul, namely circular motion. This movement is special because it is a heavenly motion that otherwise cannot be found among earthly (sublunary) things. The sublunary (that is those things under the moon) moves straight, whereas those thing above the moon (that is the superlunary) has an eternal motion
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that is circular motion. Given that there is a circular motion in the soul, it could be an indication that the soul is close to the Divine and thus above natural bodies. Aristotle first criticizes the alleged composition and remarks that the soul cannot be a magnitude, which is extended by nature. This is because the soul is considered to be of the same kind as “what is sometimes called reason” (An. 407a4-5) or Nous (νοῦς).5 But reason is one in a strict sense and continuous, and this equally applies to its specific activity that is thinking. Moreover the latter is taken to be identical with its product that is thought. Aristotle will later return to the claim that the activity becomes identical with its objects and discuss it in more detail. In his critique of Plato it is especially relevant to notice that thinking becomes identical with its objects of thought in such a way as numbers may coincide with each other and not as extended magnitudes do. Suppose Nous would be an extended magnitude, how can it think something? As an extended magnitude it had to touch his objects in a physical way. This were possible, however, either on account of one of its parts or only in one point. But if it thinks something merely through contact with a point then either with just one point, or infinitely many points. Given this happens through one single point, it would be unnecessary to assume any further points. Therefore being extended would contribute nothing to thought. But what would follow if it thinks not only through one point, but several parts or even all? Provided thinking happened through several parts (that is it were divided into different magnitudes), one would cognize in accordance with the number of parts: If one had many parts one would cognize the same again and again or even infinitely often. However, this is contrary to the phenomena, as Aristotle notes; for it is clearly possible to entirely cognize something (An 407a15). Despite these difficulties, even the underlying assumptions are problematic: Neither can a composition of parts think nor does this happen through touch (at least not literally). If 5
I will keep Nous in the following because to translate as thinking or reason can misleading
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the parts of the soul were essential for thinking, nothing could be thought without parts. Thus simple thoughts were impossible. But if there were no simple thoughts there would not be any composite thoughts either, according to Aristotle; for compositions are based on simple parts. However, if Nous were undivided and cognize through touch, the difficulty arises that what is undivided (that is a point) cannot touch what is divided. We shall later see that for Aristotle Nous, too, is undivided, however, he gives up (bodily!) contact as a condition of thinking. From this it becomes clear that Aristotle understands Plato literally on this matter. This way, Plato’s position is approximated to Democritus atomism. That Plato actually thought of a physical circle and had not merely an (ideal) definition of the circle in mind, is justified by Aristotle with respect to motion: Because for Aristotle only physical bodies can be spatially moved. Thus Plato’s circles must be physical. But why should one assume that the circle is moved for Plato? At this point Aristotle draws an inference from the analogy between the activity of the mind and the one of a circle: “for the motion of reason is reasoning while that of a circle is revolving.” (An 407a20-21.) Whether Aristotle is correct with his interpretation of Plato’s position can be set aside. At least one must notice that the parallels that Aristotle sees between Plato and Democritus are based on this consideration. Against the background that the revolving of a circle is an eternal motion the question arises as to what exactly reason always thinks. Plato cannot have practical objects in mind because they are as such limited. The practical thought is directed towards certain external ends which is why it cannot be eternal. But even speculative, theoretical thought is complete and not infinite. Aristotle points out that speculative thought terminates in evidence and definitions, both have a beginning and an end. Even if one assumes that speculative thought had no end and went on infinitely, it would not follow that it necessarily returns to its starting point, such as the revolving of a circle starts anew again and again. Then reason equally would have to think the same endlessly, an assumption which again contradicts the
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phenomena; for “reasoning is more like resting or dwelling upon something than like moving” (An. 407a32-33). Furthermore, such eternal reasoning would not make very happy, as Aristotle notes. Because unlike motions that contribute to perfection, this type of motion would not be satisfied with pleasure because the goal is not realized and thus the activity not completed (completion, however, is a necessary precondition for pleasure). It would be equally troublesome for reason, as Aristotle surprisingly mentions at this point, to be mixed with the body, and in particular in a way that makes it impossible to separate reason from it. This information also comes somehow unexpected at this point because, in the first chapter, Aristotle appears to have embraced the view that reasoning depends on perception, and hence cannot take place without bodily involvement. However, one must bear in mind that Aristotle at the beginning only outlined the problems. His actual treatment of the activity of thinking and therefore the decision on the possible separability of the parts of the soul is still pending. After a short detour to the heavenly circular motion Aristotle draws attention to a serious omission: Hardly anyone of those who have dealt with the soul so far sufficiently engaged with the body (the only exception is Plato, see Tim 44d ff, 70a ff. and Phdr. 246c), although all appear to assume a relationship between soul and body; for the soul supposedly has an impact on the body. However, not any soul can be in any possible body. Rather, each body has its special form (and thus soul) that only it can possibly adopt. Therefore, an inquiry of the soul must not leave out the body, but rather (in analogy to natural science) has to take into account the next matter of its object. How exactly this is to be understood will later be demonstrated by Aristotle.
2.4 Soul and harmony (407b27-408a30) Next Aristotle addresses in detail the opinion according to which the soul is a type of harmony or attunement. That is to say that the soul is a bodily composition of contrary
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elements. This position was initially introduced (Phdn. 85e-86e) and finally refuted (Phdn. 92a-95a) by Plato in the Phedo. Aristotle takes it to be significant enough to give its discussion relatively large space.6 The basic idea is that harmony (or attunement) is a physical “blending and a compounding of opposites” (407b30-31). The appeal of this idea is obvious: On the one hand, a dualism of soul and body is avoided, and, on the other, it does not fall prey to physical reductionism. We will see that Aristotle again finds important links with his own conception. With respect to the previous examination, Aristotle first recalls that the soul is generally considered to be responsible for motion. However, it is unclear how a harmony can actually move something. Thus, assuming that the soul is merely a bodily attunement contradicts the phenomena in certain respect since it is generally admitted that the soul is the source of bodily activities in some way. Instead, one ought to speak in terms of harmony with respect to particular conditions of the body: Aristotle here points to health and other physical benefits or even virtue. The problems this conception faces become particularly evident “if someone tried to ascribe the affections and actions of the soul to some sort of attunement“ (An. 408a3-5). For what kind of composition shall perception or reason be? Then Aristotle distinguishes two apparently distinct variants of this view. We do not know who held these views and the differences appear to us at least at first sight to be merely marginal. However, Aristotle considers them to be important enough to address each separately: According to the first position harmony were to be understood in the sense of a composite magnitude. This means that one has to deal with individually identifiable quantities which are joined together by harmony in a particular way. That is to say that harmony would be the fixed result of the composition. According to the second view, harmony would be a proportion, whereby emphasis is put now on the ratio of the parts. Thus, harmony is the very same ratio which refers to the 6
Very likely did Aristotle deal with this position in his now lost dialogue Eudemos.
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blending of the elements. The apparent difference is that according to the first view a concrete number results from the blended elements, whereas the second form cannot be reduced to a simple number but ought to be understood as a proportion. Aristotle then argues against both views with related arguments. The first view is supposed to be easily refuted: “For there are many different compoundings of parts […].“ (An. 408a11-12) Here Aristotle briefly points to what has been carried out elsewhere (Part. an. 646a12-24, 647a1-3); for the animate body, whose compounding is relevant here, contains not only different types of elements (earth, air, water, fire), but there are also uniform parts like bones or blood and distinct parts made up of uniform parts such as the fingers of a hand. Consequently, with respect to the uniform parts, the ratio in each part must be the same as in the whole, whereas this is not true for disparate parts (see the fingers of a hand). Given however that the soul is a concrete composition, all compositions would have different souls. Every bodily composition thus entails a unique soul. But it appears to make no sense to assume that the bones of the hand are one soul, whereas the hand and its fingers are another. In addition, these distinct blendings, corresponding to unique souls, do not agree with distinct faculties of the soul that we above identified as potential objects of separable parts of the soul: “Of what part, then, should one suppose that its compounding is reason? Or the perceptual faculty? Or the appetitive faculty?” (An. 408a12-13) Aristotle argues similarly against the second position. So it equally applies that one can find distinct proportions even among uniform blendings. Blood, for example, has a different mixing ratio compared to bones. On the assumption that the soul is identical with the proportion, there ought to be as many souls as proportions. Here too a major problem would be that actual bodily blendings do not agree with the assumed faculties of the soul. It is against this background that Aristotle addresses Empedocles (as an alleged proponent of this position) and asks whether the soul is the blending itself or something else aside from this blending. Empedocles took friendship to be a cause for the blending of parts.
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Aristotle wonders whether “Love is the cause of any chance mixture or of the mixtures which are proportional“, and whether it “is the proportion or something more, beyond the proportion” (An. 408a21-23). Notice that Aristotle concludes his discussion of the soul-as-harmony-conception by highlighting its advantages. He underlines that any other conception of the soul ought to meet these requirements. For first it is true that the soul passes away with the dissolving of the body. There is thus a close phenomenal relationship between body and soul. With respect to this relationship a strict dualism does hardly agree with the phenomena. Second, it remains open what the body actually loses by the departure of the soul if it were not a certain proportion. Thus both problems are answered by the harmony theory. This is why at least with respect to these issues it does very well agree with the phenomena, even though it appears to fail in other respects as Aristotle apparently demonstrated. We will later see if and how Aristotle incorporated these considerations into his own conception of the soul.
2.5 Motion and self-motion (408a29-b31) With a summary of the preceding discussion (“Consequently, that the soul can be neither an attunement nor borne in a circle is clear from what has been said.” An. 408a29-30) Aristotle again draws attention to the question concerning the exact type of motion of the soul. It was shown above that even though the soul is not moved per se it cannot be excluded that it is moved in an accidental way. So understood it could also move itself, namely such that “which it is in is moved, or when this is moved by the soul” (An. 408a32), that simply means that it is moved in the present body, comparable to the sailor who is moved while resting on a ship. But now a problem arises: “We say that the soul is pained and pleased, is confident and afraid, and further that it is angry and also that it perceives and thinks. But all of these seem to be motion.” (An. 408b1-4) So Looking at the specific activities of the soul, and given these are understood in terms of motion, the soul is moved in a certain sense. In his reply,
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Aristotle takes up different aspects and at least in part considers them only briefly. First it ought to be true that even if being angry and fearing fall under some form of motion, one must still determine the exact form that applies. Aristotle here identifies two relevant forms: locomotion and alteration (ἀλλοίωσις, An. 408b11). The exact application of the various types of motion or their accurate determination plays a special role in the treatment of the single faculties of the soul, but particularly in the case of perception. Therefore, Aristotle takes up this point later again. But if one speaks about the activities of the soul in an undifferentiated way, that is as “saying that the soul weaves or builds” (An. 408b12-13). The soul is thus only moved in so far as the whole human (that is the composite of body and soul) is moved. Instead of ascribing these activities to the soul alone it would thus be better to say that “the human being does this with the soul“ (An. 408b14-15). But it does not necessarily follow, as Aristotle again emphasizes in what immediately follows, that the motion occurs in the soul itself. Even in this case, the soul can certainly be moved accidentally and not in itself, namely insofar as it is in a body: Because once the physical motion goes towards it, such as in perception (Aristotle explains this assumption in the subsequent discussion of perception), in other cases, the motion proceeds from it. Aristotle illustrates this by the example of memory that extends from the soul to the sense organs (we will return later to the important contribution of memory, for example, to accidental perception). Then Aristotle transfers this idea to Nous since Nous clearly deserves a special consideration. However, this raises special issues Aristotle mentions only very briefly here. But already the indication that Nous is comparable to substance, which as such is imperishable and gets into humans from outside, is highly problematic in respect of other characterizations of Nous. 7 Even the subsequent comparison with the sense organs is
7
According to An. 413b24-25 Nous is apparently a faculty or capacity (δύναµις).
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considered to be awkward since antiquity.8 Given that the decline in thinking is comparable to the deterioration of vision, because in both cases only the organ gets weaker due to its age, so that through a replacement of the old eye vision too would be renewed, it appears thus to follow, first, that thinking like perception depends on an organ (what Aristotle explicitly rejects later: An. 429a26-7) and secondly, that the perceiving soul is as imperishable as the thinking. If one reads these remarks, however, merely with respect to the immediately preceding discussion it appears that even here Aristotle wants to say only that just like in perception the mind is not moved. He would thus simply focus on the aspect that motions do not affect the soul and its faculties as such, but only the body. That means that the soul itself is not affected, which is why its unique abilities remain unaffected by the body too (αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν An. 408b25). Again, affected or moved were the human only as a compound of soul and body (An. 408b28-29: κοινόν) that is as someone who has these faculties. At the same time Aristotle makes clear that in the case of the death all those faculty are destroyed, which depend on the body. This explains why the soul after the death of the body (that is after the dissolving of the composition of body and soul) were in principle unable to recall everything that essentially rely on the composition. Aristotle however admits the possibility (δὲ...ἴσως An. 408b29) that reason is more divine9 than the other faculties, possibly even immortal. Notice however that the whole passage ought to be read with care, since Aristotle has not fully developed his own theory at this point, but rather argues solely on the basis of his predecessors. Therefore one can understand the view that Nous is an immortal substance as an adaption of another position against which he argues here. Complete clarity cannot be expected at this point.
8
See, e.g., Themistios, De an. par. 29.35-30.24.
9
See Plato, Tim. 51e.
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2.6 Self-moving unities (408b32-409b18) In what follows Aristotle considers a position that appears particularly absurd from his perspective, namely the view that soul ought to be regarded as a self-moving number. According to the ancient commentator Themistios (De an. par. 31.1), Aristotle first thinks of Xenocrates (the successor to Speusippos as head of the Platonic Academy), latter he extends his discussion to Democritus, who, for Aristotle, shares significant similarities with the former, because the moving atoms claimed by Democritus resemble moving numbers in some way. The assumption of the soul as a moving number, on the one hand, faces problems arising from the relationship between soul and motion. On the other, it is unclear how a number as a unity can be moved at all. “For how is one to reason of a unit as something being moved? And by what? How indeed, when it is something without parts and undifferentiated? (An. 409a1-3) The ability of being moved and to actively move something else, is incompatible with those properties Aristotle associates with numbers.10 Accordingly, numbers must be understood as units that are identical with themselves and without parts (An. 409a23), which is why they are simple. Again, this is a feature shared with Democritus’ atoms (An. 409a10-20) that resemble points due to their simplicity. Based on his characterization of number Aristotle levels a couple of arguments against the theory of the soul as a moving number. First, he emphasizes, that what moves itself and others must have parts (“it must be differentiated” An. 409a3). But this contradicts the essence of number which ought to be a compound of simple units. Thus, motion is incompatible with its nature.11 Second, a moving number would become a line and this again a plane. For the soul as a unit would be in a specific position which is why it is comparable to a point that, 10
See Met. 1039a12-14; 1053a30, 1057a3-5 for number as a union of unities; as a measure of plurality; and Met. 1088a5; Ph. 207b6-10, for number as a measure of plurality, and Met. 1001a26-27; 1085b22-24 for number as a multitude of the indivisible.
11
What is simple can as such not be moved, but only accidentally. See Ph. 240b8-15, 241a6-10.
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brought into motion, creates a line. This explains that, according to Aristotle, the motions of the soul (such as fearing or being angry) become lines. Third, one must note that it is possible to take away units from numbers and another number would be the result. However, this does not apply to the soul: Thus, one can see, as Aristotle states, that some animals after being split into parts still continue to exist, from which he infers that they must have the same soul and no other (An. 411b19-21; 413b16-20; Long. 467a18-20; Met. 1040b5ff.; Iuv. 468a25-b1; Respir. 479a3-5; Part. an. 682a5, b27-32; Gen. an. 731a21-23). The same applies to plants (to which Aristotle also attributes a soul as a source of life). If one assumes, however, that numbers as unities have a position (what must be presupposed, as soon as the soul has a certain position within the body), these unities resemble Democritean atoms. For even atoms can only be conceived of as points if one takes away everything from them except quantity. This finally raises an even more serious difficulty for Aristotle which follows from both of his predecessors’ views: For how can the soul be imagined as a series of units or atoms at all? On this assumption, the question arises as to what distinguishes the soul from the rest of the body that is also composed of unities. The distinction cannot be based merely on the location, because two points can equally share the same space „And yet, if there are two units in the same place, what prevents there being an infinite number?” (An. 409a23-24) It would moreover be questionable as to what distinguishes animated bodies from inanimate ones or the possibility of separation of the body from the soul. After Aristotle stated again the differences and similarities between Democritus and Xenocrates in this respect, he stresses that both finally ought to fail in explaining the different activities and functions of the soul. It is however essential to capture these in order to properly define the soul.
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2.7 The soul as a principle of perception (409b19-411a26) This brings us back to the question concerning the definition of the soul. Aristotle calls to mind that three attempts at a definition has been proposed so far: “Some have declared it [the soul] to be what is most productive of motion because it moves itself; others make it the mostgrained or the most incorporeal body of all.” (An. 409b20-21) Finally, regarding the soul’s apparent capacity of perception, it was said that the soul should entail all elements of the perceptible things. This follows from the guiding assumption that only like knows like. But given that the soul can in principle know everything, it must consist of the elements of all things. Consequently, the soul would agree with all knowable things in its material constitution. Against this claim Aristotle objects that there are not only elements, but also those things that emerge from the elements, for example through composition. So what about the knowledge of composite things? A composition however is based on certain rational proportions. But the soul cannot have a share in these rational proportions insofar it merely exists of the same elements. Notice that the elements are indifferent with respect to their possible composition. Thus, one can only know the composite by considering the rational proportions and this means, on the condition that only like knows like, if the same rational proportions can also be found in the soul. One must note, however, that it does not follow from this that the actual results of the composition (the cognized stone or house) are as well found in the soul. This would not only contradict the phenomena but is obviously absurd. Further, even more serious problems arise from this assumption with respect to immaterial things, such as “the good and the not good” (An. 410a12). Because a soul composed of material elements does not share any similarities with these things regarding its elemental composition. However, given that only like knows like, abstract matters remain unknown by the elements, at least insofar as these are material elements.
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Aristotle elaborates this thought in what follows by referring to his categories. Thus, he asks whether the presumed elements of the soul fall under all categories, or only under one. However, he rejects both options as impossible; for first of all there are no elements that would be the same for all categories. Second, on the condition both that the principle according to which only like knows like holds and that the soul were constituted by the elements of substance, it would be impossible for the soul to know the other categories such as quantity or quality. With respect to these difficulties it makes sense for Aristotle to look at the principle itself a little bit more in detail. We see that, on the one hand, it is apparently true that like cannot be affected by like and, on the other hand, in perception, which appears to be a form of affection, like perceives like. Obviously, what is dry does not have an effect on the dry, insofar as both are equally dry. But how can it be said then that like knows like if cognition presupposes a certain affection? (“Yet they maintain that perceiving is a sort of being affected or being moved [...].” An. 410a25-26). We will see later that and how Aristotle solves this puzzle. For what has an effect on something must be like in a sort, but at the same time unlike in a significant sense. Thus the cold has an effect on the warmth insofar as both fall under the same pair of opposites. However, they are actually distinct (cold and warmth represent all possible temperatures resulting from them). Aside from these essential difficulties Aristotle makes some specific observations that are related to Empedocles’ conception. Thus, it appears that earth being present in bones and hair is unable to perceive other earth. Further, it follows from the assumption that only like can perceive or know like that God (who Empedocles identifies with Love) cannot cognize strife since it is entirely dissimilar from his nature. On this condition, however, it would follow that only mortal beings can cognize everything (see § 7.6), because only they consist of everything whereas God only cognizes what is akin to his nature, the rest however not. Aristotle rejects this view as not very plausible.
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In the following, Aristotle enumerates further puzzling consequences this assumption together with the claim of the elementary composition of the soul creates. I want to mention only a few of them here: Accordingly, one must consider everything as ensouled, since it is all equally composed of elements. Eventually, one will even believe that “the soul was mixed into the universe” (An. 411a7). Further, material elements cannot form unities due to their nature. Therefore they are in need of a further unifying ground. Moreover, Aristotle draws attention to an essential mistake his predecessors made; for they did not properly differentiate between distinct forms of animals. One reason for this can be seen in the fact that their conception of soul is too narrow. For if one determines the soul only on the grounds of its movability, the definition does not capture all those animals that are unable to change their location. The same applies to perception. Against this background a further problem arises from the distinction between thought and perception. Some have identified perception with thought (Aristotle mentions Democritus in this context). However, this is contradicted by the phenomena: Clearly, not all perceptive creatures are capable of thinking. Finally, the assumption that only like knows like also contradicts the phenomena. So one can observe that many contrary things can be cognized on account of one of the pair of opposites: For instance, the curved is recognized by comparison with the straight. This also makes clear that there is not only no reason to let the soul be constituted of elements, but moreover this assumption creates a number of serious difficulties.
2.8 Unity and division of the soul (411a26-b30) At the end of the chapter, Aristotle returns to another problematic claim which can be found prominently in Plato. Accordingly, he takes the soul to have different parts (Res. 435a-444a; Tim. 69aff.). Aristotle lays his focus at this point primarily on the question as to how these parts are interrelated and thus constitute one soul. Given that the activities of the soul are based on different parts, one could assume either that the parts are actually distinguished or in
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some sense combined with each other. The first assumption would contradict their evident connection. With respect to the latter, one must wonder what the unifying ground could be. That this cannot be the body, however, is clear to Aristotle, since the soul presumably holds together the body and not vice versa. “At any rate, when the soul has departed, the body disintegrates and putrefies.” (An. 411b8-9) The unity of the soul must therefore either be derived from the parts themselves or be grounded on something else. However, the unity cannot be provided from the parts themselves, because with respect to the Platonic Timaeus, a view Aristotle rejected in the first book, is was assumed that they are of a different substance. If their unity is brought about by something else, this other must in turn a soul. Thus, an endless regress would follow, so that in order to avoid the regress, one can immediately accept that the soul itself has this unity. Hence, one should not say that the soul is different in actuality, notably in the sense that it entails different substances, such as Aristotle wants to understand Plato here. Another difficulty arises from this opinion with regard to the individual parts of the soul: “For if the entire soul holds together the whole body, it will also be appropriate for each of its parts to hold together a certain part of the body.” (An. 411b14-15) The problem rises for those who believe that the soul is individuated by virtue of the different parts of the body, in which it is present. Assuming one accepts that the courageous striving is mainly found in the heart, then this part of the soul will be in particular responsible for the unity of the heart. Notice that this view creates a special problem with respect to the Nous. For what physical part does the Nous provide a unity? Aristotle doubts that there is an organ for the Nous at all. Another difficulty is created by the observation that plants and some animals live on after being split into parts.12 For one could infer that these parts have the same soul, even though it were located in different places. That split insects cannot survive in the long run 12
Aristotle discusses this phenomenon at different places (An. 411b19-20; 413b16ff.; Long. 467a18-20; Met. 1040b10ff.; Iuv. 468a25-b1; Respir. 479a3-5; Part. an. 682a5, b27-32; Gen. an. 731a21-23)
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could then be explained through their lack of appropriate organs by which they can could preserve themselves. This in turn suggests that the soul must be uniform and inseparable in a sense: All faculties must therefore be present in an individual. The soul is uniform because it can be split into pieces and still continues to exist with all its parts. This last observation already indicates that plants must also have a soul for Aristotle, namely, inasmuch they perform certain activities, such as feeding and reproduction, which can also be found in animals. In addition, it follows that even though sense perception presupposes vegetative activities (nutrition and reproduction), the latter can occur without perception (as indeed the example of the plant shows). Vegetative activities and senses are thus in a certain sense separable from one another, albeit not locally.
Literature Aristotle, De anima. Translated with an Introduction and commentary by Christopher Shields, Oxford 2016. Aristotle, De anima, ed. with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford 1961. Aristotle, De anima Books II and III (with Passages from Book I), ed. by Hamlyn, D.W., Oxford 1993. Aristotle, On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, with an English translation by W. S. Hett, Cambridge Mass., London 1936. Hahmann, Andree, Aristoteles’ Über die Seele. Ein systematischer Kommentar, Stuttgart 2016. Shields, Christopher, “The Phainomenological Method in Aristotle’s Metaphysics“, in: Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics, ed. E. Feser, Basingstoke 2013, 7-27.
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