Int law and Nigeria-Cameroun conflict.docx

Saint Monica University
Department of Public Policy
Course: INTERNATIONAL LAW
Name: Odibei John N.
Matric No: SBPP16IR041
"Choose two conflicts in the world, past and/or present, and explain what part international law played in resolving or not resolving the conflicts."

Nigeria vs Cameroun: Bakassi Peninsula
Introduction to the conflict
Relations between Nigeria and Cameroon have was strained for years due to disagreements over their common border- the 2,300km land boundary extending from Lake Chad to the Bakassi peninsula and the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea. The sources of disagreement were: rights over the oil-rich land Bakassi peninsula, the rich aquatic resources, sea reserves and the fate of local population in Bakassi. Up north, the drying up of Lake Chad due to desertification in northern Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, had led local populations that rely on the lake for their livelihoods to resettle on disputed territories. The conflict over the peninsula could be traced decades back; from the colonial to the pronouncement of General Murtala Questioning the borders inherited from World War I-era treaties. His government claimed the Bakassi peninsula by declaring illegal the agreement signed on June 1, 1975, by his predecessor, President Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria) and President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon. The conflict escalated with a series of moves by the Nigerian military. They took over villages in the Lake Chad region and advanced towards the mouth of the River Akwayafé in 1993. On the maritime front there were disagreements on the ownership of Bakassi peninsula . Cameroon's attempt to place police and administrators on the peninsula met with harsh retaliation as the Nigerian military moved into the peninsula in 1994. There were incidents of military confrontation between armed personnel of both sides on the island. Several attempts to resolve the issue through bi-lateral talks failed. The government of Cameroun filed a petition with the ICJ for a determination of the sovereignty of the entire boundary.
The ruling of ICJ and Green Tree agreement

Court ruling: Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)
The Court determines the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea. It requests each Party to withdraw all administration and military or police forces present on territories falling under the sovereignty of the other Party.

THE HAGUE, 10 October 2002. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has today given Judgment in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening).

In its Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding for the Parties, the Court determines as follows the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria:

In the Lake Chad area, the Court decides that the boundary is delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and France); it finds that the boundary starts in the lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint (whose co-ordinates it defines) and follows a straight line to the mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose co-ordinates it also defines) and thence runs in a straight line to the point where the river today divides into two branches.

Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirms that the boundary is delimited by the following instruments:

i) from the point where the River Ebeji bifurcates, as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931;

ii) from Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo-German Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946;

iii) from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913. The Court examines point by point 17 sectors of the land boundary and specifies for each one how the abovementioned instruments are to be interpreted (paras. 91, 96, 102, 114, 119, 124, 129, 134, 139, 146, 152, 155, 160, 168, 179, 184 and 189 of the Judgment).

In Bakassi, the Court decides that the boundary is delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 (Arts. XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lies with Cameroon. It decides that in this area the boundary follows the thalweg of the River Akpakorum (Akwayafe), dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang in the way shown on map TSGS 2240, as far as a straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point.

As regards the maritime boundary, the Court, having established that it has jurisdiction to address this aspect of the case -- which Nigeria had disputed -- , fixes the course of the boundary between the two States' maritime areas. In its Judgment the Court requests Nigeria expeditiously and without condition to withdraw its administration and military or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula. It also requests Cameroon expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any administration or military or police forces which may be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which pursuant to the Judgment fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The latter has the same obligation in regard to territories in that area which fall within the sovereignty of Cameroon.

The Court takes note of Cameroon's undertaking, given at the hearings, to "continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the [Bakassi] peninsula and in the Lake Chad area".

Finally, the Court rejects Cameroon's submissions regarding the State responsibility of Nigeria. It likewise rejects Nigeria's counter-claims.1




Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula (Green Tree Agreement)
The Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter referred to as "Cameroon") and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as "Nigeria"), Reaffirming their willingness to peacefully implement the judgment of the International Court of Justice, Commending the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his efforts made in this respect in organizing the tripartite summits and establishing the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Considering that the question of the withdrawal from and transfer of authority over the Bakassi Peninsula should be treated in a forward-looking spirit of goodwill in order to open new prospects for cooperation between their two countries for the well-being of their peoples and for stability in the subregion, Have decided to conclude the present Agreement.
Article 1
Nigeria recognizes the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon and Nigeria recognize the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the Court and commit themselves to continuing the process of implementation already begun.
Article 2
Nigeria agrees to withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula within sixty days of the date of the signing of this Agreement. If exceptional circumstances so require, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may extend the period, as necessary, for a further period not exceeding a total of thirty days. This withdrawal shall be conducted in accordance with the modalities envisaged in Annex I to this Agreement.
Article 3
1. Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law and in other relevant provisions of international law.

2. In particular, Cameroon shall:
(a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the Zone or to change their nationality.
(b) respect their culture, language and beliefs;
(c) respect their right to continue their agricultural and fishing activities;
(d) protect their property and their customary land rights;
(e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes and other dues on Nigerian nationals living in the Zone; and
(f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the Zone from any harassment or harm.
Article 4
Annex I and the map contained in Annex II to this Agreement shall constitute an integral part thereof. No part of this Agreement shall be interpreted as a renunciation by Cameroon of its sovereignty over any part of its territory.
Article 5
This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith by the Parties, with the good offices of the Secretary- General of the United Nations, if necessary, and shall be witnessed by the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
Article 6
1. A Follow-up Committee to monitor the implementation of this Agreement is hereby established. It shall be composed of representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United Nations and the witness States. The Committee shall monitor the implementation of the Agreement by the Parties with the assistance of the United Nations observers of the Mixed Commission.

2. The Follow-up Committee shall settle any dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement.

3. The activities of the Follow-up Committee shall cease at the end of the period of the special transitional regime provided for in paragraph 4 of Annex I to this Agreement.
Article 7
This Agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or modification of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002, for which the Agreement only sets out the modalities of the implementation.2
International Law and Bakassi Conflict; resolution and impact
In other to ensure a quick and successful implementation of ICJ's ruling, the Cameroun-Nigeria mixed commission was formed. This Mixed Commission drew up a detailed working program comprising a timetable, with the following points:
1. The withdrawal from and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area;
2. The withdrawal from and transfer of authority on the land border;
3. The withdrawal from and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula;
4. The demarcation of the land border;
5. The delineation of the maritime border;
6. The resolution of the issue of the nationality of the populations concerned;
7. The deployment and activities of the observatory staff.
8. The demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries;
9. The withdrawal of civil administration, and military and police forces, and the transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary;
10. The eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi Peninsula
11. The protection of rights of the affected populations in both countries;
12. The development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation; and
13. The reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
The Mixed Commission successfully achieved the following:
- properly ensured the withdrawal of Nigerian armed forces from the Cameroonian territory in the Lake Chad area and by carrying out the transfer of authority in the portions of territory retrieved from either country along the land border;

- solved to the satisfaction of both parties the issue of the populations concerned who may choose to remain in the territory retrieved from either country by keeping their nationality or by applying for naturalization in the host country;

- carried out the demarcation process up to the complete planting of pillars; and

- held discussions aimed at finalizing the maritime border.3

On 14 August 2006, the Nigerian troops, in a solemn ceremony, peacefully withdrew from the Bakassi Peninsula, marking the end of an occupation that spanned a period of 12 years.

Arab-Isreali conflict and the question of Palestine
Background to the crisis
Christian, Jewish and Islamic Holy Places in the middle-east had been protected by various laws dating back to the early Ottoman Empire; the communities and Holy Places of Palestine have been under the express protection of international law since the early 19th century. After the collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1918, her territories were partitioned between the British and the French. During British rule in Palestine, it sought to implement a number of programs that favoured oil trade and international politics at the expense of Arab unity. The Zionist movement in Israel saw this as contrary to the San Remo Conference; the Palestinians held little hope of its success. Peter (2001) says that "the British had struggled to reconcile their pledges to the Jews and to the Arabs…but the two were irreconcilable…until the whole responsibility of the mandate was abandoned in 1948"4 The Zionist movement steeped up its activities against the British. They launched a terrorist attack on Tel Aviv in April, 1946. Two months after, the special Jewish units of the Sternn Gang and Irgun Zvai Luemi, bombed part of King David hotel; killing 91 people. The Jews refused the British proposal of a round-table talk; they preferred bi-lateral talk with the British. The First Zionist Congress acknowledged customary diplomatic agreements in the Basle Program. But it reaffirmed that the aim of Zionism was the creation of a state of Israel in Palestine, secured by public law. Arab states did not accept this claim. There was a demand made on the British government to grant 100,000 entry permits to Jewish refugees stranded in Europe; this was refused. There was a deliberate effort not to populate Jews in Palestine beyond 30 percent. Disappointed by the British attitude towards the cause of Israel and her implementation of the White Paper of 1939 limiting Jewish Immigration into Palestine, the Jews turned towards the US for support. The received finance and military assistance from the US President Truman and Roosevelt; also from sympathizers in Europe. In 1947, 4,544 Jewish refugees left aboard 'Exodus 1947' but were refused entry into Palestine. Before the end of the year, 60 or more shiploads of Illegal migrants organized by the Jewish Agency set at different times en route Palestine with varying levels of Success.
After World War II, the British government could no longer protect both the population of in Palestine and their personnel. They decided to abandon their mandate in Palestine and refer it back to the UN. A United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) was assigned to recommend a solution to the conflict to the General Assembly. The recommendation was a tripartite plan for the creation of an Arab and a Jewish state leaving out Jerusalem under UN mandate. A disagreement ensued among Arab countries over an acceptance of the plan. The proposal legally supported the creation of the State of Israel on Arab soil. The Jews were willing to accept the creation of a Jewish state but were uncomfortable with a Palestinian-Arab state. While the confusion intensified, the British announced the surrender of their mandate on May 15, 1948. Fighting intensified and a State of Israel was proclaimed by Ben-Gurion (the Zionist leader and first Isreali Prime Minister) following the departure of the last British officer. Many states beginning with the US granted the State of Israel either 'de facto' or 'de jure' recognition. Israel was accepted as a sovereign member state in the United Nations and established diplomatic relations with many, but not all, sovereign states.
Jewish expansion of territories within disputed lands
Recognizing the controversial nature of sovereignty over Jerusalem, UNSCOP recommended that the city be placed under United Nations administration in the partition plan. This was approved by the General Assembly in November, 1947; accepted by the Jews and rejected by the Arabs. However, the 1948-1949 war resulted in Israeli expansion further west. Israel made Jerusalem its capital in 1950, establishing governmental offices in areas it controlled. Secret communication between Israel and Jordan had ensured that the latter would annex the remainder of West Bank; this occurred in the same year.
After the six-days war in 1967, Israel enforced effective control over parts of Jerusalem captured during the war form Jordan. It extended its municipal borders. On July 30, 1980, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the state of Israel passed a basic law making "Jerusalem, complete and united…the capital of Israel."5 On October 6, 2002, the Palestinian Assembly passed a law making Al Quds the capital of Palestine.
Israel's justification of her action included the following:
There is no basis in international law for denying Israel's establishing its capital in Jerusalem, because there is no binding treaty that makes the city a Corpus seperatum;
the 1980 Basic Law is not a legal innovation and only affirms Israel's long-standing position on Jerusalem;
Israel has the sovereign right to establish its capital at the most meaningful place for its people, and its claim is unique; and
objections to Jerusalem as Israel's capital are political in nature, and not legal.6
Israeli-Palestinian crisis and international law
Due to the complexity of the crisis we would examine its various aspects in bits using International treaties and convention as our measurement.
Jewish annexation and declaration of the State of Israel-
The Geneva Conventions recognize that land:
a) Conquered in the course of a war; and
b) the disposition of which is unresolved through subsequent peace treaties is "occupied" and subject to international laws of war and international humanitarian law which provides for special protection of people living within the territories, limitations on the use of land in those territories, and access by international relief agencies.
In November 1967, UN Security Council resolution 242 clearly emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and a return to the pre-1948 borders in exchange for the recognition of the State of Israel by Egypt. This also meant return of lands captured in 1967 and 1948.
There are two reactions to this resolution:
The Israeli position is that:
The wars in 1956 and 1967 were waged by Israel to ensure the state's survival. As most hostilities were initiated by the Arab side, Israel had to fight and win these wars in order to ensure the state's sovereignty and safety. Territories captured in the course of those wars are therefore legitimately under Israeli administration for both security reasons and to deter hostile states from belligerence.
In the absence of peace treaties between all the parties at war, Israel has under all circumstances the right to maintain control of the captured territories. Their ultimate disposition should be a result of peace treaties, and not a condition for them. Even so, Israel asserts that:
The Suez war was caused by a pattern of Egyptian belligerence against Israel, culminating with the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the blockage of the canal for Israeli traffic in violation of the Convention of Constantinople and other relevant treaties, in their view a clear casus belli (i.e., an act justifying war)
The six-day was similarly caused by the closing of the Straits of Tiran, the rejection of UN Emergency Force in the Sinai desert, and the redeployment of Egyptian forces. Jordan and Syria entered the war in spite of Israeli efforts to keep these frontiers peaceful.
The Yom Kippur war was a surprise attack against Israel by Syria and Egypt.
The Arab position is that:
The 1956 war came after an Israeli attack on the Gaza strip killing 25 Egyptian soldiers, and was a result of a conspiracy between France, the United Kingdom and Israel in violation of Egypt's sovereignty. Egypt claimed several legal justifications for refusing Israel use of the Suez Canal, including the right of self-defence.
The war in 1967 was an unprovoked act of aggression aimed at expanding the boundaries of Israel, and the territories captured during this war are illegally occupied.
As a result, the territories must be ceded in order for peace to be achieved.7
On October 21, 2003, the UN General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution (ES-10/13) stating that the barrier was "in contradiction to international law", and demanded that Israel "stop and reverse" its construction. Israel called the resolution a "farce".
The Israeli illegal construction of security wall on Palestinian territories and Palestinian maltreatment
The world was alarmed when Israel began the construction of a large stretch of security fence within the West Bank, separating Israel proper, Israeli settlements and large parts of the Palestinian territories from Palestinian cities and population centers. The establishment of the state of Israel was done with much bloodshed. Peter (2001) says that "on the eve of the declaration of Independence in May, Israeli forces had contrived at Deir Yasin in the outskirts of Jerusalem, a massacre which set in train an exodus of refugees…one of the sorriest spectacles of the times"8 The Law of Citizenship of 1952 conferred Jewish nationality (not Israeli Nationality) on Jews living in Israel. Arabs in Israel are designated people of Arab nationality, not Israeli citizens. This latter category has limited possibility of acquiring land in the Country. Pre-existing Arabian Land owners suffer undue persecution to force them to leave.
The illegality of the barrier are based on the following arguments:
The International Court of Justice has found the barrier to be illegal.
The selected route of the barrier required the demolition of Palestinian homes and the expulsion of the residents, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides for the protection of refugees and victims of war.
The barrier and Israel's series of checkpoints have made life nearly impossible for residents of the West Bank, constituting collective punishment. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention categorizes collective punishment in occupied territories as a War crime.
The barrier is an attempt to establish de facto borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state, in effect annexing large parts of West Bank and all of East Jerusalem, in violation of numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
The barrier attempts to separate Palestinians from their means of livelihood and from interaction with others and is therefore qualifies as Apartheid. Apartheid is according to the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is considered a crime against humanity.
The barrier is constructed inside of the West Bank, making it completely in violation of international law.
Israel defends the security barrier by arguing that:
The barrier and its route are solely security measures that will have no bearing on future peace negotiations.
The land is not subject to the Geneva Conventions.
The Geneva Conventions explicitly allows structures to be built for purposes of self-defense.
The Israeli Supreme Court is reviewing the route on a continuous basis and has forced it to change.9
On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice gave the following opinion on the issue:
The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law;
Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion;
Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;
All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention;
The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.10
In a reaction to ICJ's opinion, the United Nations General Assembly on July 20, 2004, passed a resolution demanding that Israel obey the ICJ ruling.11 Israel rejected the ICJ ruling stressing that the barrier was for self-defense. It continued the construction of security barriers.

Deportation, transfer of protected persons (Palestinians) and extension of settlement territories and transfer of Jews to these territories.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states in paragraph 1 and 6 that:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.12
The International Committee of the Red Cross commented on article 49, paragraph 6 of the Geneva Conventions. It states that the provisions are "intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories".13 The Committee emphasized the illegality of the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The International Court of Justice, in paragraph 120 of its advisory opinion on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", condemns the activities of Israel to expand its borders through forced settlement expansion and Jewish transfer. It concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law".14 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 446, asserting that "the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity."15
Conclusion
We have considered two different conflicts; the Nigerian-Cameroun conflict which is already concluded and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is inconclusive. In the first conflict, International law was effective in resolving it. When issue became critical, one of the parties took it to the ICJ. Both countries agreed to obey the decision of the court. Once a decision was reached, Nigeria and Cameroun set up a Mixed Commission that would see to the smooth implementation of the court's ruling. While the International Court looked at the matter, there was a stay on activities on both governments in the island. They were supported by other countries in this regard and by the UN. The willingness to 'go all the way' was evident among the leaders of both countries. Despite initial challenges, they bound themselves to the conditions and saw the end of the conflict.
In the case of Israel-Palestinian conflict, from the beginning, the two sides were skeptical about a legal solution to the conflict. They never once agreed to bind themselves strictly on the existing internal legislations that affect the conflict. While legal matters surrounding the conflict were being discussed, each side sought to advance their position on ground. At various occasions, Israel called the bluff of international criticisms, legal and otherwise, against her activities in occupied lands. The international committee of States was political about their support; condemning or supporting when their interests were affected. The conflict became more political than legal. The UN became a 'puppet store' within which political interests were being played; rather than the police implementing ICJ's judgments. As at 2016, the crisis remains unresolved and Israel continues to be defiant of international law and legal opinion over its activities on occupied territories.

End Notes
Retrieved from www.icj-cij.org
Pacific Settlement of Border Disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi Affair and the Greentree Agreement, INTERNATIONAL PEAC E I N ST I T U T E, October 2008.
Maurice Kamto: "Bakassi Affair: Cameroon's Challenge for Peace", International Peace Institute, (2008). Retrieved from www.researchgate.net/publication/236108920
Peter Calcocoressi: World Politics; 1945-2000, Pearson Longman, (2001). p382
Ibid, p410
Falk Richard: "Support for Wall Mocks International Law", Miami Herald, (2004).
Shalim Avi: The Iron Wall, Penguin Books, (2000). pp. 117–119
Peter Calcocoressi: World Politics; 1945-2000, p387
"High Court of Justice rules on security fence around Alfei Menashe". Retrieved from www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/government/law/legal-issues-and-rulings/high-court-rules-on-security-fence. Retrieved 22 April 2016
High Court of Justice rules on security fence around Alfei Menashe". Retrieved from www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/government/law/legal-issues-and-rulings/high-court-rules-on-security-fence. Retrieved 22 April 2016
John Dugard: International Law: A South African Perspective, Kluwer. (2006). p. 477.
"Geneva Convention" Retrieved from www.icrc.org/nhi.nsf
"Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions." Retrieved from www.icrc.org/nhi.nsf/com/380-600056?
"Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ advisory opinion", July 9, 2004, paragraph 163. Retrieved from www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131
UN Security Council Resolution 446, retrieved from www.un.org
Bibliography
Pacific Settlement of Border Disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi Affair and the Greentree Agreement, INTERNATIONAL PEAC E I N ST I T U T E, October 2008.
Maurice Kamto: "Bakassi Affair: Cameroon's Challenge for Peace", International Peace Institute, (2008). Retrieved from www.researchgate.net/publication/236108920
Peter Calcocoressi: World Politics; 1945-2000, Pearson Longman, (2001).