Heidegger\'s \"produktive Logik\"

Beginning especially in the 1930s, Heidegger’s ontology famously and frequently used a great deal of obscure technical terminology. His use of this terminology has contributed to confusion in Heidegger scholarship and has been a target for many non-Heideggerian philosophers. In this paper, I have two correlated goals. First, I hope to establish certain elements of a reconceived methodology for interpreting Heidegger, such that a consistent reconstruction of many of his seemingly bizarre concepts becomes possible. Rather than the dominant chronological approach according to which Heidegger’s various renditions of the ontological problematic are understood in relation to their position on the timeline of his career, I argue that these renditions should be arrayed along an axis of ground or what I call a “diagenic axis.” Making good sense of Heidegger’s obscure concepts requires reconstructing them in terms of their position in the methodological evolution of his project along a diagenic axis. Second, I hope to show why on the basis of this methodology a particularly obstinate line of critique of Heidegger goes wrong – the Carnapian critique, which captures the spirit of many who dismiss Heidegger on the basis of his difficult terminology. Accomplishing both of these goals, I argue, is dependent upon clarifying the methodological operation by which Heidegger’s ontology evolves and the role of the concept of ground in this evolution. In his early work, Heidegger provides a way of making sense of this evolution in terms of a “produktive Logik” characterizing his ontology.