FWO Research Proposal (2014) Emancipation or Exclusion? Secularism as a Critical Practice

Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

Ph.D. fellowship

Date of the application Scientific field FWO Expert Panel Motivation of panel choice

Humanities Theology, Philosophy, Science of Religion (Cult4) The project falls within the research area of political and social philosophy. GENERAL

Title of your research proposal Emancicpation or Exclusion? Secularism as a Critical English title Practice Dutch title Emancipatie of uitsluiting? Secularisme als een kritische praktijk Summary in layman's terms As the presence of Islamic immigrants within Europe has intensified, religious critique, as a discursive practice deployed within a secular framework, takes on an increasingly antagonistic stance towards Islam. Secular critiques of religion frame the issues at stake in terms of shifting boundaries between secular emancipation and orthodox religious values. However, this antagonistic religious critique produces an increasing cultural hegemony which excludes religious actors, especially Muslims, from public discourse. This research project is concerned with the exclusionary practices stemming from a secular framework; however, it does not wish to evaluate this exclusion from an external normative viewpoint, but rather from the paradoxical effect that exclusionary critical practices produce with regard to secularism’s guiding aim of emancipation. More specifically, I will analyse the complexity of contemporary varieties of secularism and the discursive practices that they use to criticise religion. This firstly allows for a critical analysis of the way secular discourse presents itself as antagonistic vis-à-vis religion, and constructs antithetical religious and non-religious identities. Secondly, this allows me to reflect upon the conditions necessary for secularism to foster its emancipatory aim, by functioning as a tool for social critique, available for non-religious and religious actors, aiming to prevent obstacles to human flourishing.

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Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

PROJECT OUTLINE State of the Art Several studies within the social sciences show that, as the demographic presence of Islamic immigrants within Europe has intensified, not only in states with an established church but also in secular states, the mere presence of Muslims is framed as posing an existential threat to the dominant culture (Alexander 2013, Croucher 2013). This indicates that religious critique (or critique of religion), a public discursive practice deployed within a secular framework, takes on an antagonistic stance towards this particular religious affiliation. Secular contributors to the discussion tend to frame the issues at stake in terms of shifting boundaries between secular emancipatory values and more orthodox religious ones, claiming that religious critique stems from the Enlightenment, which is aimed at emancipating citizens from unquestioned religious authority (Israel 2011). However, secularism seems to produce a paradoxical effect with regard to its emancipatory aim when deploying antagonistic religious critique, which produces an increasing cultural hegemony that excludes religious actors from public discourses (Valenta 2012). This tension needs to be further examined so as to explore the possibility of rethinking secularism, in order to reconcile religious critique with secularism’s emancipatory aim. 1. Within the field of political and social philosophy, literature shows a widespread concern with the exclusionary effects of secularism (Bader 2007, Cavanaugh 2009, Døving 2010, Jansen 2011, Norton 2011). In response, Jurgen Habermas (2008) has given way to a ‘post-secular’ appreciation of the persistence and positive role of religion in public discourse, to argue that religious and secular mentalities must be open to complementary learning processes, if we are to balance shared citizenships (2008). Although Habermas deals with real concerns, a global shift from one condition (secular) to another (post-secular) runs the risk of missing the complexity of secularism (Warner et al 2013). For a start, secularism can have a wide range of meanings depending on the institutional context. Genealogical studies show that secularism in the initial sense of laicité, somehow tortuously translated as ‘religious neutrality’, guaranteed religious freedom for every individual (Ferrara 2009). Subsequently, secularism’s religious neutrality has not only been translated as a neat separation of the state and church, but also has been allowed to demand marginalisation of religion to a privatised sphere and to expect a decline of religious beliefs and practices from modernised societies (Casanova 2006). Thus, Habermas’ concept of post-secularism clarifies the problematic functioning of secularism. It does not, however take into account the different varieties of secularism. If we consider the varieties of secularism already at work, then we can question the idea that secularism is essentially antagonistic towards religion. 2. An influential contribution towards this end has been made by Taylor (2007; 2011). By exposing how secularism’s historical development is intimately tied to a relation with European Christianity, he rejects the view that secularism needs to be purified from the presence of religious practices, in order to make liberal societies more rational, democratic, and truly secular. With Maclure, Taylor (2011) provides the notion of open secularism to guarantee a fair accommodation of religious claims; -5-

Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

which challenges the prevailing understanding of secularism’s principle of state neutrality, as assertively preventing religious claims from legitimate access to the public sphere. However, scholars like Taylor, who seek to utilise secularism to foster inclusion and promote inter-religious dialogues, should not remain blind to the wide range of disciplinary practices (both political as well as ethical) by which secularism determines to regulate religious life, as shown by Mahmood (2010), Asad (2003) and Butler (2009). Their deconstructions expose secularism’s power to produce blatantly unsavoury critical results in the form of stereotyping, prejudice, and exclusion. However, they do not evaluate these effects against secularism’s emancipatory aim. 3. Critical Social Theory, embodied in the work of, notably, Geuss, Honneth and Cooke, does provide a comprehensive understanding of emancipatory goals: critical practices foster emancipation insofar as they reveal false consciousness, which eradicates obstacles to human flourishing. Regarding human flourishing, these authors take an anti-authoritarian stance which does not rely on a notion of the absolute good. Instead, power structures within the secular framework that present such obstacles need to be deconstructed, allowing us to address the contradictions between what secularism stands for and what is being done in actual terms. Thus, through this method of immanent critique, critical theory offers a promising means of questioning secularism’s engagement with religion.

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Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

Objectives Religious critique has been criticised for its exclusionary effects for religious persons, especially those of non-European backgrounds (Taylor 2007, Habermas 2008, Asad et al. 2009). What has remained relatively out of focus, however, is how the secular framework, which legitimises itself through its commitment to emancipation, is related to the framing of religious actors, particularly Muslims, who tend to become the objects of social and cultural exclusion and discrimination (Bunzl 2007) and, subsequently, how these exclusionary practices need to be evaluated from the perspective of secularism’s emancipatory aim. The project’s first aim is therefore to theorise the tension within the functioning of secularism as a critical practice that on the one hand claims to be an emancipatory ideal often by tracing itself to modernisation (Israel 2011, Cliteur 2010, Weinrich 2011), and on the other hand holds an antagonistic stance towards religion, which excludes and marginalises religious actors. The project’s second aim is to normatively challenge secularism’s critique on religion through examining the tension that these frames produce with regard to secularism’s commitment to emancipation. The first research question is: In what way do religious critique and secularism’s claim to emancipation relate to each other? The second question is: under which condition can a reconceptualisation of secularism serve as a critical tool, both in a cultural and legal sense, without giving in to the paradox of religious critique and exclusion? I will start with conducting a critical examination, in line with Frankfurther Schule, of the effects of religious critique with regard to secularism’s claim to emancipation. As power constitutes subjectivity (Haslanger 2012, Brown 2006), the exclusion of religious agents, especially Muslims, by depicting them as non-self-reflective or unreasonable agents, denies an equitable participation of these agents within democratic discourse, and as such seems to pose obstacles to the emancipation of excluded agents. Thus, this critical investigation allows for a deconstruction of power structures within the secular framework and provides an immanent critique. By doing this I intend to alter the contemporary conception of secularism, aiming to recover its functioning in line with its emancipatory ideal. Such a reconceptualisation requires an assessment of the legitimacy of secularism assuming a place of privilege of nonreligious affiliations in public discourse, based on its claim to neutrality.

Methodology In order to guarantee the feasibility of this project, I will demarcate my research both in terms of methodology and research scope. I will develop my research along two main axes. Firstly, my research will examine secularism’s critical engagement with religion, especially Islam, in order to assess the effects of religious critique on secularism’s claim to emancipation. After valuating this critical engagement of secularism against its own emancipatory aim, the second line of my research project will develop a normative account of secularism that fosters emancipatory ideals, by exploring the possibilities for secularism to provide social critique. -7-

Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

Phase I: Critical examination of secular criticism Starting from the assumption that meaning derives from a social practice, and is constituted by the use of specific words and concepts, rather than by what these words or concepts refer to (Bernstein 2010), concepts such as ‘secularism’, ‘religion’, ‘Islam’, ‘Enlightenment’ etc. need to be rigorously contextualised. Therefore, I will start by systematically examining the available literature (Anidjar 2008, Toscano 2010, Morey & Yaqin 2011) so as to deconstruct how the secular tradition of religious critique is related to modern concepts of religion, and Islam in particular. This genealogy of secularism’s critical engagement with religion has a critical focus, as it examines whether secularist deployment of religious critique, as a modern, Enlightenment tradition, positions itself as antagonistic towards religion in general, and Islam in particular, and as such construct religious and non-religious identities, which produce exclusionary effects. The tension in the functioning of secularism as a critical practice, due to the paradoxical effects of religious critique in view of secularism’s claim to emancipation, needs to be further examined. This inquiry will draw on the distinction between criticism and critique. Following Butler (2009), I start from the assumption that criticism is an analytical tool that takes an object at face value, whereas critique is concerned with identifying the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects appear. Butler’s distinction is in line with, notably Williams and Adorno, who state that critique does not depend on a variety of pre-conceived understandings (e.g. assuming a secular understanding as the precondition of critique’s “Western” operation), but interrogate the taken-for-granted categorical schemes through which phenomena appear (Butler 2009). Applying this distinction to secularism, secular criticism takes religion, religious practices and religious subjectivity as the object of its critical engagement, whereas critique investigates the conditions under which religious and non-religious identities are constructed. Both of these features of critical practice are motivated by the emancipatory aim of human flourishing. However, secular criticism (referred to as religious critique or critique of religion) reveals how secularism can take on a problematic and exclusionary character, which runs counter to the goals of emancipation, insofar as it takes on an antagonistic stance when it critically objectifies religious practices. Critique, on the other hand, has a broader emancipatory aim insofar as it helps us recognise how dominant ideologies construct social reality by providing particular sets of values, beliefs, explanations and justifications. In order to conduct a critical examination of religious criticism, I will investigate the taken-for-granted conditions within a secular framework under which objects appear, by following Geuss’ (1981) influential analysis of ideologies as power configurations that distort our consciousness. Geuss’ analysis of power structures provides a methodological framework by means of which secularism can be understood as a strategy, operating as a public discursive practice through language as well as through social habits and cultural forms, and to bring under review the effects of this discursive practice with regard to the framing and exclusion of religious actors. Phase II: Secularism as a recovered critical tool -8-

Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

In order for secularism to be used as a critical instrument to foster emancipatory ideals, it needs to be withdrawn from its current function within a specific power structure that excludes religious actors, especially Muslims. Instead, for secularism to provide social critique it needs to reveal the (distorted) conditions under which objects appear as they pose obstacles for human flourishing. However, in order to deploy secularism as a critical instrument providing social critique which serves the emancipatory aim, this part of the project needs to deal with two concerns. First, I will carry out an analysis of the normative ground provided by the concept of human flourishing for the emancipatory ideal of critical theory. Human flourishing is a contested term within critical theory, and should not rely on a metaphysical notion of the good, as this understanding presents an authoritarian danger to actors who are in need of being emancipated (Cooke 2006). Instead, I will take as a point of departure the anti-authoritarian approaches of, notably, Celikates, Cooke, and Nielsen, who do not depart from an object that transcends the particular interpretations of the good that (idealised) human subjects have access to, but rather stress the crucial importance for (actual) human subjects to have access to the possibilities for self-reflection. The commitment to a non-authoritarian understanding of human flourishing requires a practice of social critique that does not lead to the exclusion of the agents who are in need of being emancipated. Social critique is a delicate practice that runs the risk of producing the methodological problem of asymmetry (Celikates 2006, Nielsen 1993). Ricoeur (1991) has phrased it from the vantage point of the critic as: “[I] deology is the thought of my adversary, the thought of the other. He does not know it, but I do.” As my research is explicitly concerned with challenging the effects of exclusion within contemporary secular critical practice, it cannot be assumed that agents, either religious or non-religious, deluded by ideology and false beliefs, are fundamentally incapable of reflecting upon their ideas; as this would exclude them from the possibility of emancipating themselves. The project's commitment to the problem of the exclusionary effects of secular critical engagement does not allow this exploration of the inherent problem of critique to take place on an exclusively abstract level, as the research project finally hopes to present an analysis of secularism as a critical tool that can be utilised for social critique. What is needed then, in the final analysis, is an appeal to a reframed secularism, so that no agent or group representing a particular affiliation, religious or non-religious, can own "secularism". Instead, like all other concepts informing policy, it should belong to all as a tool available for furthering discourse towards democratic ends.

Work plan: work packages and timetable Describe the different work packages (WP) the proposed research work will be divided in. Indicate for each WP the time that it is expected to take. You might use a table or another type of scheme to clarify the work plan.

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Applicant: Maria Annemarije Hagen | Application number:

Bibliographical references Anidjar, G. (2008). Semites. Race, Religion, Literature. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Asad, T. (2009). Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism. In: Asad, T., Brown, W., Butler, J. & Mahmood, S. (eds). Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. UC Berkeley: Townsend Centre for the Humanities. Bader, V. (2007) Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Bernstein, R. (2010). The Pragmatic Turn. Cambrigde, UK and Malden, USA: Polity. Braeckman, A. (2009). Habermas and Gauchet on Religion in Postsecular Society. A Critical Assessment. Continental Philosophy Review, 42(3), 279-296. Braeckman, A. (2006). Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theoretical Redescription of the Inclusion/Exclusion Debate. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32(1), 65-88. Brown, W. (ed.) (2006). Feminist Theory and the Frankfurt School. Duke University Press Books. Bunzl, M. (ed.) (2007) . Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe. Butler, J. (2009). The Sensibility of Critique. In: Asad, T., Brown, W., Butler, J. & Mahmood, S. (eds). Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. UC Berkeley: Townsend Centre for the Humanities. Casanova, J. (2006). Secularization Revisited; a Reply to Talal Asad and Talal Asad’s response. Powers of the Secular Modern; Talal Asad and his interlocutors. Cavanaugh, W. T. (2009). The Myth of Religious Violence. Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Celikates, R. (2006). From Critical Social Theory to a Social Theory of Critique: On the Critique of Ideology after the Pragmatic Turn. Constellations; an International Journal for Critical and Democratic Theory, Volume 13, No 1. Cliteur, P. (2010). The Secular Outlook. In Defense of Moral and Political Secularism. London: Wiley and Blackwell. Cooke, M. (2006). Re-Presenting the Good Society. The MIT Press, Cambridge. Døving, C.A. (2010). Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: A Comparison of Imposed Group Identities. Tidsskrift for Islamforskning. Islam og minoriteter (2), pp.52—76. Ferrara, A. (2009). The Separation of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society. Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 35, pp 77-91. Geuss, R. (1981). The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge University Press. Habermas, J. (2008). Notes on Post-Secular Society. New Perspectives Quarterly, vol.25, issue 4, pp.17–29. Haslanger, S. (2012). Resisting Reality. Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford University Press. Honneth, A. (2005). A Social Pathology of Reason: On the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory. The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory, pp.336-360. Israel, J. (2011) Democratic Enlightenment: philosophy, revolution, and human rights. 1750-1790. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jansen, H.Y.M. (2011). Postsecularism, Piety and Fanaticism; Reflections on Saba Mahmood’s and Jürgen Habermas’ Critiques of Secularism. Philosophy and Social - 11 -

Oxford University Press. Honneth, A. (2005). A Social Pathology of Reason: On the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory. The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory, pp.336-360. Israel, J. (2011) Democratic Enlightenment: philosophy, revolution, and human rights. 1750-1790. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jansen, H.Y.M. (2011). Postsecularism, Piety and Fanaticism; Reflections on Saba Annemarije Hagen | Application number: Mahmood’s and Jürgen Habermas’ Applicant: CritiquesMaria of Secularism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (9), pp.977—998. “Modern Individualism and the Ideal of Authenticity: Charles Taylor’s Onto-Historical Approach Reconstructed”, IRO-project (2006-2010) – doctoral researcher: Valentino Lumowa. Mahmood, S. (2010). Can Secularism be Other-Wise? In: Warner, M., Vanantwerpen, J. & Calhoun, C. (eds.), Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. Harvard University Press. Morey, P. & Yaqin, A. (2011). Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and representation after 9/11. Harvard University Press. Nielsen, K. (1993). The confirmation of critical theory: The role of reflectiveness. Human Studies, vol. 16. Norton, A. (2013). On the Muslim Question. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norton, A. (2011). On the Muslim Question. Democracy, Religious Pluralism and the Liberal Dilemma of Accommodation, pp. 65—77. Ricoeur, P. (1991). Science and Ideology. In: From Text to Action. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age. Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. (2011). Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays. Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. & Maclure, J. (2011). Secularism and the Freedom of Conscience. Harvard University Press. Toscano, A. (2010). Fanaticism; on the Uses of an Idea. London and New York: Verso. Valenta, M. (2012) . Pluralist Democracy or Scientistic Monocracy? Debating Ritual Slaughter. Erasmus Law Review 5 (1) 28—41. Warner, M., VanAntwerpen, J. & Calhoun, C. (eds.) (2010). Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. Harvard University Press. Weinrich, M. (2011). Religion und Religionskritik. Ein Arbeitsbuch. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

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