Exemplar Causality

EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2008. Exemplar causality or exemplary causality1 is utilized in participation metaphysics (together with efficient causality) in the explanation of the causal structure of the fourth way (quarta via) a posteriori demonstration of the existence of God departing from pure transcendental perfections. Exemplar causality is also used in the treatment of the Divine Ideas in natural theology. The exemplary or exemplar cause (causa exemplaris) is the form or idea of something to be made. It is, says St. Thomas, “that to the likeness of which a thing is said to be made,”2 and is defined in the De Veritate as “a form in imitation of which something comes to be according to the intention of an agent which determines an end for itself.”3 Now, the form of anything can be understood in a threefold way: “In the first place, the form of a thing is that from which a thing is formed, as the formation of an effect proceeds from the form of the agent. Secondly, the form of a thing is that in accordance with which the thing is formed, as the soul is the form of man. In the third place, the form of a thing is that for which (in imitation of which) something is formed, and this is the exemplary form to the likeness of which a thing is made. In this meaning the word ‘idea’ is generally used, so that the ‘idea’ is the same as the form which a thing imitates.”4 The definition of the exemplar cause also contains “from the intention of the agent” for “a thing can imitate a form in two ways. The first way is from the intention, as when a painter paints a picture to imitate the one whose portrait is painted. Sometimes, however, the imitation of which I have spoken happens by accident, without intent on the part of the agent, and merely by chance. Thus it often happens that a painter depicts the likeness of someone without intending it…Hence, since the exemplary form or the ‘idea’ is that by which a thing is formed, it is necessary that the thing imitate the exemplary form or ‘idea’ intentionally and not by accident.”5 The last part of the definition of exemplar causality mentions an “agent that determines its end for itself.” “For a thing acts toward an end in two ways. In the first, the agent determines the end for itself, as happens in all agents that act intellectually. Sometimes, however, the end of the agent is determined by another, the principal agent; for example, this is the case in the flight 1 Studies on exemplar causality: A. M. VESPIGNANI, Dell’esemplarismo divino. Saggio teoretico secondo i principi scientifici dell’Aquinate, Parma, 1887 ; M.-C. PERRET, La Notion d’Exemplarité, “Revue Thomiste,” 41 (New Series 19) (1936) ; D. L. GREENSTOCK, Exemplar Causality and the Supernatural Order, “The Thomist,” 16 (1953), pp. 1-31 ; G. GIRARDI, Metafisica della causa esemplare in san Tommaso d’Aquino, SEI, Turin, 1954 ; C. J. CHERESO, Exemplarism, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5, McGraw Hill Co., New York, 1967 ; T. KONDOLEON, Exemplar Causality in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 1967 ; J. L. FARTHING, The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas, “The Thomist,” 49 (1985), pp. 183-222 ; V. BOLAND, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1996 ; G. T. DOOLAN, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2008. 2 In V Metaphys., lect. 2, no. 764. 3 De Veritate, q. 3, a. 1. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

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of an arrow…and in like manner, the operation of nature, which is toward some determined end, presupposes an intellect that decided on the end of nature…If, then, a thing is made in imitation of another by an agent which does not determine its own end, the form imitated will not have the formality of an exemplar or an ‘idea’ in this case…but we only use this term when an agent, in acting toward some end, determines the end for itself, whether the form be in the agent or extrinsic to it. We say that the form of the art in the artist is the exemplar of the work of art. Likewise, the same holds true when the form in imitation of which the artist makes anything is extrinsic to the artist.”6 To sum up the explanation of the definition of the exemplary cause, when we say “a form in imitation of which” we indicate the idea which serves as a model, for the idea is the same as the form which a thing imitates. When we say “according to the intention of an agent” there is excluded the possibility that the likeness come about by accident. And the part of the definition, “which determines an end for itself,” indicates that there can be a question of exemplary causality only if the agent determines the end for itself and not if the end is determined by another, this meaning of course that exemplary causality is involved only in the case of rational agents who are directed in their action by their ideas. The causa exemplaris is truly a cause for it exercises a positive influence upon the being of the effect inasmuch as it influences the rational agent to act in a definite manner. Thus, the causa exemplaris has an influence over the being of the effect, not immediately, but through the agent. The causa exemplaris is different from the efficient cause, not reducible to it, for of itself it is not the first principle of movement in the order of execution, but rather is the form in imitation of which something comes to be. The causa exemplaris, therefore, belongs in the order of intention rather than to the order of execution. Renard explains that “the exemplar belongs to the genus of formal causality; that it is an extrinsic formal cause; that it does not, like an efficient cause, produce an effect by the exercise of action, but communicates its perfection through the action of the efficient cause. It specifies. As an application of this fundamental doctrine, it was explained in the philosophy of man7 that the intellect cannot move the will in the order of exercise, that is, as an efficient cause, but that it does move the will in the order of specification, that is, in the order of formal and final causality, the order of the object and of the end. The term of the act of understanding is knowledge; this term is in the agent. In its highest aspect, this act consists in the contemplation of truth which is in the intellect. Evidently, such an operation can never terminate outside the intellect; and, consequently, by an act of knowledge, the intellect can never move another in the order of exercise. In other words, the intellect as such cannot be an efficient cause.”8 Materially speaking, the causa exemplaris and the final cause are the same for we are dealing with the specific form which, insofar as apprehended as a good, moves the agent as the final cause, and insofar as it specifies the action of an agent, directs the agent as its exemplary cause. Formally speaking, however, the causa exemplaris is different from the final cause for the 6

Ibid. H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, p. 185. 8 H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1951, p. 126. 7

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latter moves the agent to act insofar as it is a purpose to be reached, while the former specifies the effect to be produced, since it is the form to be imitated in the effect. The causa exemplaris determines the species of the effect, it being the specific form of the effect to be imitated and participated, while the final cause moves the agent to action and determines it to this particular action. Kreyche explains that “from the standpoint of the end itself there is no real difference between the exemplar and the final cause. However, from the point of view of the agent (which is the mediating factor with respect to both types of causality) there is this important difference: When we speak of the end as a final cause we are considering it under that formality by which it is ‘attractive’ to the agent; it is the end as sought after or desired, or the end considered as a good. By contrast, when we speak of the end as exemplar we mean the end precisely as known. “The mode of causality in either case is an ‘intentional’ mode of causality, but ‘intentional’ from two different points of view, first, from the standpoint of knowledge, and, second, from the standpoint of appetite, or will. To know the end (through an exemplar) is not the same as to desire it – that is, in the manner of a good – even though the end, considered in itself, be the same. However, it is worth noting here that no intelligent agent desires an end except insofar as it is known (Nil volitum quin praecognitum).9”10 Properly speaking the exemplary cause is reducible to the formal cause, not intrinsic, but extrinsic (it is described as an extrinsic formal cause11) and may in a certain sense be called the “quiddity of the thing that is to be done.”12 “The idea of a work,” writes the Angelic Doctor, “is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image (species) whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter.”13 The type of causality of an exemplar is like that of form in that it specifies the effect, but instead of being the form of the effect directly and of itself, it is the form of the rational or intellectual efficient cause. This is why we describe the causa exemplaris as an extrinsic formal cause. The causa exemplaris is properly reduced to the genus of formal cause (it is classifed, as was already mentioned, as an extrinsic formal cause) for it is this cause which is 9

This means that knowledge of the end is a prerequisite condition for desiring the end. However, the knowledge of the end as knowledge is not the reason for desiring it. The end is desired because it is a good, and it is in this respect that the end functions as a final cause. 10 R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1959, p. 262. 11 “‘Formal cause outside the thing’ (causam formalem extra rem) is contrasted with intrinsic formal cause by St. Thomas (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m). The thing’s form, when existing outside the thing itself, can have two functions: ‘But the form of a thing existing apart from it can have two purposes; either that it be the exemplar of the thing of which it is called the form, or that it be the source of its being known, insofar as the forms of the knowable things are said to be in the knower’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 15, a. 1, c.). In causing formally the specification of the cognitive potency, ‘the object…has in a way the aspect of form, insofar as it specifies’(Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2m). As a type of formal causality, exemplar causality is contrasted with inherent formal causality (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 2, c.). The other type of extrinsic formal causality, the above texts imply, would be the causality exercised by the object as object. Hence there is a Scholastic division of extrinsic formal causality into exemplar and objective. Suarez (Disp. Metaph., XII, 3, 17; ed. Vivès, XXV, 393b) would reject the tenet that the specifying object is a formal extrinsic cause, on the ground that it does not specifiy by any real influx, but only by the relation of the faculty to it. He restricts the causality of the object to the efficient causality by which it imprints its species. Suarez’ view makes it difficult or perhaps impossible to show that the external thing’s content can undergo no change in being known”(J. OWENS, op. cit., pp. 228-229). 12 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, V, 2, 8. 13 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 15, a. 2.

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the measure which gives determination to the intrinsic form which constitutes to thing in its species. Therefore, we cannot affirm, as do Scotus and Suarez, that the causa exemplaris is properly reducible to the genus of efficient cause, since they maintain that it is the idea which completes the power of an intellectual agent, and determines this agent for operation. Hart, on the other hand, holds a “final cause interpretation” of the exemplar cause,14 maintaining that the exemplar cause may properly be reduced to the final cause (although he points out that the exemplar cause is logically distinct from the final cause): “Closely related to final causality is the notion of exemplar cause. St. Thomas defines exemplar cause as ‘a form (idea) imitation of which something comes into being from the intention of the agent that determines its end for itself.’15 (that is, a rational agent). In this same passage, exemplar cause as a form is distinguished from that form from which a thing is made or formed, as the formation of an effect proceeds from the form of an agent (efficient cause). Likewise it is different from the form in accordance with which a thing is formed, as the soul is the form of the body (formal cause). Form as exemplar cause is evidently in the intentional order, an idea which is deliberately used as a pattern to measure the effect to be produced, as distinguished from an accidental imitation which happens to be made, say by an artist as he paints a picture. “Exemplar Cause Reduced to Final Cause. Since it is in the intentional order, the order of ideas, the exemplar cause may properly be reduced to the final cause. However, it is logically distinct from the final cause by which the idea exercises an attractive influence to give the necessary direction or determination of the action of the action of the efficient cause in order that a corresponding determined effect be produced. As an exemplar cause, the idea is thought of in its capacity of a measure for the new form to be educed from the subject matter by the action of the efficient cause. Certainly in this role the idea does not cease to exert its proper final cause influence, which is its primary purpose. Both roles are being performed at once. Each provides a different aspect of the influence of the idea. Considered in this way, final cause and exemplar cause are only logically distinct. “Relation of Exemplar Cause to Formal Cause. Since the idea is a measure of the new form to be produced, the exemplar cause may be related to the formal cause. This latter cause is of course, as we have seen, an intrinsic cause. It contributes itself as a determination of a subject (material cause) to the being of the effect. It constitutes the reality of the effect. It is the idea of this determination actually realized in the subject. In this sense then we can consider the idea (form) before it is realized and when it is exercising its influence to measure the effect. In this state it is evidently outside the effect and therefore a kind of extrinsic formal cause, since it is the form of the thing in the intentional order before it is produced in the real order. In this way the exemplar cause can be thought of as ‘reduced’ to a formal cause. However, its existence in the intentional order as an idea would seem to imply a closer and more proper relation to the final

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William Wallace also holds this position, writing in his The Elements of Philosophy: “Because of the relation to form exemplary causality is alternatively thought of as a type of formal causality. However, since the exemplary cause is extrinsic to the effect and exerts its influence mainly as an idea in the intentional order, it would seem to be more proper to view it as a type of final causality”(W. A. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, New York, 1977, p. 106. 15 De Veritate, q. 3, a. 1.

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cause. That is why we suggested it to be an aspect of the final cause from which it is only logically distinct.”16 Grenier, on the other hand, states that the causa exemplaris “is properly reducible to the genus of formal cause, because it is this cause which is the measure which gives determination to the intrinsic form which constitutes a thing in its species. Therefore, the exemplar cause is classified as an extrinsic formal cause.”17 The causa exemplaris is an extrinsic formal cause, formal because it specifies the effect, extrinsic because it specifies the effect not from within but from without.

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C. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing, Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1959, pp. 321-322. 17 H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 217.

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