Even Deeper into \'Bullshit\'

Even Deeper into ‘Bullshit’ Nader N. Chokr

************************** "One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the situation for granted. ... In consequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or what functions it serves. And we lack a conscientiously developed appreciation of what it means to us...Even the most basic and preliminary questions about bullshit remain...not only unanswered, but unasked... In other words, we have no theory" (Frankfurt, 2005).

[I]. The Age of Bullshit—Contemporary Philosophers on ‘Bullshit’ Believe it or not, “bullshit” has recently become a serious object of concern and discussion among ordinary people, professionals of different stripes, and even among philosophers. Harry Frankfurt’s short essay (1986, 1988, 2005),1 is a pioneering discussion of this widespread but largely unexamined phenomenon of our times. It is however far from being unobjectionable and fully satisfactory as G. A. Cohen’s follow-up critical paper (2002) has shown at least in part. Both have certainly contributed to this renewed attention and interest. It is worth noting in this regard the recent Open Court 2collection of essays, Bullshit and Philosophy (Hardcastle & Reisch, 2006).3 1

In my discussion, I will refer essentially to the 2005 version of Frankfurt’s analysis, On Bullshit unless otherwise indicated. I will also refer to G.A. Cohen’s paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (after which I take the title of my essay) and Frankfurt’s “Reply to Cohen” --both printed in Buss & Overton (2002). 2

Known for its effort at producing and publishing materials aiming to “popularize” philosophy and make it accessible to non-philosophers (Popular Culture and Philosophy Series). While we may readily understand how science can be popularized, and how this can be done effectively without irreparable loss of cognitive meaning and content, it may be questionable whether philosophy can similarly be popularized, and more importantly, whether it should be popularized –assuming that it is done in the right way, in a way that makes it always already relevant to the concerns of human beings in their diverse and multiple pursuits and interests, not the least of which being how to live a human life, worthy of living –and not bullshit one’s way through life. 3

It is arguably the same phenomenon that Max Black investigates in The Prevalence of Humbug (1983). Synonyms for “bullshit” besides “humbug” include the following: “bullcrap,” “baloney,”“horseshit,” “hogwash,” “balderdash,” “claptrap,” hokum,” “drivel,” “buncombe,” “quackery,” “hooey,” “poppycock,” “hot air,” and “imposture” to mention only a few. Black defines “humbug” as “deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes” (Frankfurt 2005: 6). Like Black, Frankfurt believes that bullshit involves ‘a deliberate misrepresentation’ or ‘imposture,’ as we shall see below. Like lying, bullshitting involves someone trying to deceive another. But, as will be made clearer by the foregoing discussion, there are important differences between them: bullshitting someone, while

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And yet, in one sense, one could say that bullshit has always been philosophy’s nemesis –in one form or another, under other names, as that which is irrational, nonsense, meaningless, unclear, incomprehensible, unsubstantiated/ unsubstantiable, untrue, neither true nor false, outright false, untenable, or as too speculative, metaphysical, far-fetched, unrealistic, or merely as practically irrelevant to human life. The history of Western philosophy can even be characterized as the history of what different philosophers over the ages have regarded as philosophy’s other, i.e., as bullshit (albeit under different names). Even though the label of “bullshit” is more readily and commonly applied to what others say or do, rather than to one’s utterances, statements or actions (Black, 1983), it goes without saying, as Frankfurt recognizes at the outset, that we have each contributed our share of bullshit at some point or another. Everyone agrees that there is so much bullshit today that one may be tempted to call our age, “The Age of Bullshit” in contradistinction with other Ages, say, the “Age of Reason,” or the “Age of the Enlightenment,” “the Romantic Age,” “the Age of Discovery,” or “the Space Age,” etc. It is fair to say no areas or spheres of activity at any level of our personal, professional or collective life escapes its encroachment --from advertising, marketing, public relations, politics, print and electronic mass media, mass or popular culture, journalism, religion and televangelism, corporate and business world, sports, to academia, including of course, philosophy, to mention only a few of them. It is therefore quite aptly put, when Frankfurt writes that bullshit constitutes “one of the most salient features of our culture.” Given the dangers and threats that its pervasiveness poses to the social fabric, the body politic and even to culture and civilization itself,4 it must be regarded as a form of “pollution,” and therefore requiring like the other environmental problems we face today political vigilance and mobilization. The reason why I included philosophy in the list above is because, despite claims to the contrary, philosophers cannot claim to have a natural immunity to bullshit (dishing it out, consuming it, or even being victimized by it). Given their avowed ideals of clarity in thought and expression, rationality in reasoning and argument, objectivity in inquiry, and truthseeking goals as well as their training in a broad range of analytical techniques, methods and methodologies, which, presumably, are part of the ever-expanding “philosophical toolbox,” deceiving them, does not involve an outright lie. But where does the difference between the two lie? Which is worse or better? On what basis can we answer such a question? Suppose we can distinguish between two sets of issues about which someone may mislead another person: (1) one’s own feelings or attitudes, or what is the case in the world and (2) one’s own feelings and attitudes. Black would argue that the primary purpose in “humbug” is not to deceive the listener about what is the case in the world, but to deceive that listener about some matter regarding oneself or one’s own qualities. As we shall see, Frankfurt ‘s main effort is directed at capturing the particular kind of dishonesty involved in bullshit, how it differs from lying, and in so doing, distinguishes his account from Black’s treatment of the subject. 4

This obviously sounds like a strong claim, one that is based on a rather big assumption. I hope however it will become clearer why it is made by the end of this discussion.

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one may be tempted to believe without qualification that philosophers are more apt than other people to acquire and build an immunity to bullshit --given that they don’t have a naturally built-in such immunity (or do they?). But even such a belief is questionable from a radical point of view, in that the ideals of clarity, rationality and truth, or rather the conflicting construals and conceptions thereof, can themselves be viewed as fodder for the most elaborate forms of ‘bullshit’ produced by philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, and perpetrated on the rest of humankind under dubious pretences. Who among us has not had to deal in their own way with the rather widespread view or belief among ordinary people that philosophers are, despite claims to the contrary, merely “professional bullshitters,” who can pile it higher and in a more sophisticated manner than most lay-bullshitters by virtue of their aptitudes with a bag full of tools, techniques and methods reserved to the initiated, and their esoteric and jargon-prone language, which make it even harder to decipher what it’s all about, if anything at all, or what its intended ultimate goal or purpose is. In this regard, I must mention my (almost) crippling fear at the outset of writing this essay: how can I write a piece on bullshit which does not itself turn out to be (at least for some) a piece of bullshit? If this were the ever-present question on the front screen of a philosopher’s mind each time he or she sets out to produce something, perhaps it might function a bit like the “Shavian probe” discussed by Max Black (in the form of questions put forth by Bernard Shaw: “do you really believe that?” Or more generally, “do you really mean that?”), and may thereby strengthen our alertness to creeping bullshit and bullshitting, or perhaps dissuade us from engaging in it casually or leisurely, or unconsciously. I imagine one could easily sustain a distinction between “professional” (or “expert”) and “common” (or lay-person) bullshitting. The former is often exhibited most acutely by marketing and advertising executives, PR agents, politicians, and philosophers (I would add) with years of on-the-job training and experience, and in some cases, backed up with ad hoc theoretical and advanced background knowledge. The latter is exhibited by almost everyone whether it is in the context of a family squabble, an interpersonal exchange, a discussion between friends or colleagues, during a job interview, or a commercial transaction, etc. Admittedly, some are more creative and better are it than others, and may therefore qualify as “bullshit artists” as Frankfurt points out. But even as such, they don’t quite yet measure up to the “professional bullshitters” --at least on the present construal of the distinction I am provisionally inclined to draw (see Bernal, 2006). It will be objected however that the widespread common view or belief about philosophy and philosophers as depicted earlier is arguably extreme, unfair, and trades in an over-simplistic generalization, which betrays a serious lack of understanding and appreciation of what good philosophers do and are supposed to do. In this regard, some may even draw out the distinction between the kind of philosophy done by “Analytic 3

philosophers” and that done by so-called “Continental philosophers” in order to sustain an “us” vs. “them” posture which has infected contemporary philosophy for the past halfcentury or more. Apart from the fact that such a posture may not be desirable nor helpful, the critical assessment of these two conflicting and competing traditions has lead many to conclude that their proponents have in fact been the worst enemies of philosophy itself in that they have each in their own way undermined its viability, relevance and usefulness --to such an extent that a louder and louder chorus now hails the demise or death of philosophy. As for those holding back, and seeking to articulate a reconstructed and transformed philosophy (over and beyond the Analytical-Continental Divide), in the form of a postAnalytical and post- or meta-Continental philosophy, the question still pending is about its presumed nature, role and place, and its distinctive approach, if any, in the Age of Bullshit (see Chokr, 2007; 2008ab; 2009). The study of ‘bullshit’ is unquestionably afflicted by a complexity and fuzziness typical of an ordinary language term, and characteristic of an open-ended, cluster or familyresemblance concept (see Chokr, 1991 for a treatment of such concepts). (1) As Frankfurt points out, “*a+ny suggestion about what conditions are logically necessary and sufficient for the constitution of bullshit is bound to be somewhat arbitrary.” For one thing, the term is often used “loosely, as a generic term of abuse, with no very specific literal meaning” --to describe or characterize, one might add, a broad range and varieties of statements, speechacts, speeches, texts, actions, behaviors and practices. (2) “For another, the phenomenon is itself so vast and amorphous that no crisp and perspicuous analysis of its concept can avoid being procrustean.” (3) “Nonetheless, Frankfurt goes on to say in order to justify his endeavor, it should be possible to say something helpful, even though it is not likely to be decisive. Even the most basic and preliminary questions about bullshit remain, after all, not only unanswered but unasked.” One of the questions that one must immediately confront, as Cohen quite rightly argues is whether given (1) and (2), Frankfurt can justifiably get on with his effort which issue ultimately into a characterization of the “essence” of bullshit. Isn’t it the ‘essence’ of bullshit, of the kind that philosophers are particularly so good at, to claim (3) that “it should be possible to say something helpful, even though it is unlikely to be decisive” and then reach out boldly beyond such a modest and undisputable claim to “characterizing the ‘essence’ of bullshit”? It is as if Frankfurt assumes that we all have some “specific, literal meaning” of “bullshit” implicitly in mind, and that by bringing it out, he will somehow thereby command our consensual agreement. But isn’t this a rather tall order? –given the varieties (in kinds and degrees) of bullshit and conflicting conceptions thereof that we must contend with (see Chokr, 2007; see also Maes & Schaubroeck, 2006).

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Another question that we must address at this early stage of the inquiry has to do with the most promising or fruitful approach to take vis-à-vis this complex, “vast and amorphous phenomenon”? Should we take “a common-sense approach” (Preti, 2006: 19-32) or what we might call “an intuitionist, pragmatic, experiential approach” (de Waal, 2006: 99-114; see also Reisch, 2006: 33-48) which is in effect based on the following common place operational credo: I cannot give you a definition of “bullshit” in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but somehow “I know it if I experience it (see, hear, or read it)”? Interestingly, a similar credo was once adopted with regards to “pornography.” But as in this case, someone’s “pornography” is someone else’s “eroticism.” Similarly, someone’s bullshit is someone else’s truth or pearl of wisdom. How do we then stem the tide of such a creeping and paralyzing relativism? By appealing to what most people in a given society and at a given point in time converge or diverge on? We know that this does not resolve the problem, but merely pushes the relativism one notch up the ladder –from an individual subjective apprehension to that of a group, collectivity, or even a society.5 Should we take “a purely conceptual, linguistic, analytical approach,” and seek to answer the question of “what it is” by engaging to the extent possible in the clarification of the ordinary language use(s) of such a term? --even if we cannot and should not hope to come up with a clear-cut definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but at best a characterization of one or the other kind of conditions (see Aberdein, 2006: 151-170). Admittedly, this would still count as a form of clarification, and one that is desirable. But would it be sufficient given what is at stake? Should we for this purpose focus primarily on the distinguishing feature(s) of the bullshitter’s state of mind, as opposed to, say, the liar, or the humbugger? (Frankfurt). Or should we perhaps more aptly focus on the bullshit produced, i.e., the product, regardless of where, how and by whom it is produced, and most specifically, regardless of whether the bullshitter’s state of mind can be clearly distinguished from that of a liar, a humbugger, or even a truthful and sincere person? (Cohen). Should we combine both of the approaches above and take an inductive approach and examine in turn a number of different examples of ‘bullshit’ and instances of “bullshitting’ so as to arrive at a rough characterization of what all these cases have in common both in terms of the production (activity or process) and the product, and thereby provide a defeasible core-cluster of features for the term (as a verb and as a noun)–even if we can only do so provisionally? (Black, 1983). Should we seek to develop a taxonomy and classification of the different types or kinds, and aspects of bullshit (Maes & Schaubroeck, 2006: 171-182)? Or should we seek to

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I will have more to say on the problem of relativism on the last pages of this essay. See also the more extensive critical treatment provided in Chokr (2007, 2008).

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put in evidence the unity of bullshit despite all appearances to the contrary (Hardcastle, 2006: 137-150), and concern ourselves just with bullshit (Fuller, 2006: 241-258)? Alternatively, should we take a socio-cultural-political and historical approach seeking to examine most particularly the contexts in which bullshit is produced and seek to ascertain not only “when it is produced,” but by whom it is produced, and also for what purposes and to what ends, to do what to whom. This would require that we pay more attention to the diverse and multifarious uses to which it is put, and in the end, to taking proper measure of its impact on consumers or victims (individually or collectively), as well as on the social, cultural and political fabric at large. I am inclined to argue that an archaeologicalgenealogical approach (a la Foucault) might even be more helpful in enabling us not only to better understand its emergence and descent, perpetuation, reproduction and pervasiveness in the nexus of what is at stake in all of the socio-political and cultural struggles of our times, but also possibly find the kind of critical tools that would enable us to cope, resist, and fight against its ever-growing encroachment in all areas of everyday, academic, and professional life. One of the related questions that such an approach would enable us to address is whether some (social, cultural, political) contexts are more conducive to the production and reproduction of ‘bullshit’ than others, and possibly come up with some more or less compelling considerations or hypotheses about the factors and ‘causes’ that distinguish some contexts from others in this regard. Thus, to paraphrase Cohen in an extended unpublished version of his paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002), we may perhaps be able to answer the question he raises, namely, “Why One Kind of (Academic-Philosophical) Bullshit Flourishes in France?” more so than in other countries. Or alternatively, we may be able to develop more perspicuous analyses in an effort to answer the question “Why is Bullshit so Pervasive in American Politics these days?” –or, for that matter, “Why is Bullshit so Pervasive in British, French, German, Middle Eastern or Chinese Politics, to mention only a few representative examples? (See for example Brandenburg, 2006; Evans, 2006: 185-202; Neumann, 2006: 203-214). One might also inquire into the question of whether some ‘cultures’6 are more conducive or prone, or more tolerant of bullshit than others. Naturally, the answers to these different kinds of questions will, as one might expect, yield different answers in different cases. But there may well be a degree of overlap, which is bound to be enlightening. Finally, another question has to do with whether we can reasonably envision a world without bullshit –not just one in which its incidence and prevalence has been drastically reduced, but where it has been eliminated or better yet, eradicated. Should we assume as if 6

The term “cultures” can here be taken in both a narrow sense (as when we talk about the culture of a neighbourhood, a corporation, or an association) or in a broader, anthropological sense (as when we talk of French or Chinese culture).

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it goes without saying that such a world would be desirable, even if unattainable? Perhaps not. Eradicating bullshit could well be tantamount to destroying society altogether. It is indeed possible to take --as Mears (2002) 7 does, I believe-- a less extreme, prejudicial or negative stance, and view instead the ubiquity of bullshitting as “an essentially social phenomenon” that is not only “worthy of investigation” but also capable of “informing and being informed by social theory.” In his study, Mears shows how bullshitting performs various useful functions in diverse contexts, e.g., in the socialization of children, in explorations of our sense of “self,” in the passing of time (small talk, chit-chat, joking, roleplaying, or being funny), in the resolution of personal or interpersonal strains, in impression management, in our efforts to gain social, political or economic leverage, or to define and create “reality.” One may alternatively take bullshit the way the French moralists in the 17th century thought of ‘hypocrisy’ –as a necessary lubricant of social relations, which in some sense contributes to making life in society possible or bearable. This approach notwithstanding, I don’t believe that one can make a straight-faced argument for the positive and beneficial effects of the exponential proliferation and ubiquity of bullshit (in its various forms) other than by taking a self-defeating and untenable position. The epidemiological terminology used above is meant to convey the real dangers and threats that bullshit poses --in a way akin to an infectious pandemic disease—to our well-being and welfare, to the social fabric and the body politic, and some would even say, to civilization itself.8 Since the scenario of eradication does not seem to be a realistic one (or perhaps even a desirable one), the only option we have left is to keep it in check somehow, below a certain threshold of tolerance to be decided upon. But then the question is how do we go about achieving this desirable goal of “bullshit detecting, busting, and reduction”? How do we strengthen and shore up our ‘bullshit detectors’ so as to ensure or boost our “bullshit-immunity”? Most specifically, what role can and should philosophy play in this regard? How should philosophy be reconceived, reconstructed and transformed so as to make it most suited for, and relevant in the Age of Bullshit (see Chokr 2007; 2008; 2009)? In this essay, I critically examine the contributions of Harry Frankfurt [II] and G. A. Cohen [III], and take a proper measure of their relative merits and weaknesses ([IV] and [V]). I close my analysis by attempting to go further and even deeper into bullshit –research, detection and busting [VI].

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In this regard, Mears seems to be in disagreement with Frankfurt’s characterization –which he views as unclear, limited and inadequate because it fails to appreciate the social functions of bullshit. 8

In another context, I have entertained the somewhat speculative hypotheses, according to which there may be a significant (causal) connection or mutually reinforcing relationship between (1) radical cultural relativism and bullshit (Chokr, 2007, 2008), as well as between (2) the rising tide of mediocrity-(mediocracy)-bullshit and a new form of ‘fascism’ which should be obviously a cause for concern (Chokr, 2009).

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[II]. Frankfurt: On Bullshit Bullshit as ‘Deliberate Misrepresentation’ or ‘Imposture’ vs. Lying What does “bullshit” mean? What is “bullshit”? What does it involve? If bullshit involves arguably ‘a deliberate misrepresentation’ or ‘imposture,’ and if, like lying, bullshitting involves someone trying to deceive another, are there not important differences between them. Clearly, bullshitting someone, while deceiving them, does not involve an outright lie. But where does the difference between the two reside? Which is worse or better? On what basis can we answer such a question? Suppose we can distinguish between two sets of issues about which someone may mislead another person: (1) his own feelings or attitudes, or what is the case in the world and (2) his own feelings and attitudes. One could argue (as Black had done, I believe) that the primary purpose of “bullshit” is not to deceive the listener about what is the case in the world, but to deceive that listener about some matter regarding oneself or one’s own qualities. Or one could attempt to capture the particular kind of dishonesty involved in bullshit, how it differs from lying, and in so doing, put forward a somewhat different treatment of the subject. This is precisely what Frankfurt undertakes in his analysis. He certainly holds that the bullshitter misrepresents himself in the way described above. However, (unlike Black in this regard) he does not think that it is helpful to say that bullshit is ‘short of lying’ or like a lie, but not quite. One can fairly presume that, in his view, any use of language shares some features with lying --i.e., if we take the latter in a very broad sense, by virtue of being a use of language. In other words, any assertion we make is like a lie, and yet it is somehow different. To say merely that bullshit is like a lie does not seem to go, or take us very far in describing and characterizing what bullshit is in a distinctive way. Bullshit can often just involve deficient, shoddy, or careless communication –even or especially when it is couched in pompous and pretentious language. It may thus be due to a lack of preparedness coupled with a misplaced confidence in delivery that one’s deficiency and limitation will go unnoticed. In such cases, the content of what is said recedes in importance as long as the communication appears or sounds right, or is having the desired effect. But, as Frankfurt points out quite perspicuously: bullshit can also be very carefully crafted, and not just merely the effect of careless talk. The areas of advertising/ marketing, public relations, and politics, among many others, provide us with numerous examples of such undertakings on a daily basis. Great care is taken and sophistication is displayed in efforts to mislead others by members of these professions about their own feelings or attitudes, without quite lying (see Brandenburg, 2006 for an illuminating discussion of political communication). It might even be fair to say that the hallmark of smooth-talking and effective bullshit is careful thought and preparation. People who are capable of fooling others in this way without their noticing or caring are called “bullshit artists.” Frankfurt seem to think that there is some sort of tension between the idea that bullshit is often due to deficient, careless or shoddy communication and the idea that it can also be prepared and crafted very carefully and purposefully (2005: 22). He argues, though, that that there is 8

always something sub-standard even to such carefully crafted bullshit, because even the bullshit artist is trying to ‘get away with something’ or is ‘selling the listener short’ in some respects. The bullshit may be careful about how he portrays himself and his message, but he is not careful about the truth of what s/he says or claims. Bullshit, Truth, and Meaning It is fair to say that Frankfurt’s concern with truth constitutes the main thrust of his argument. By seeking to distinguish bullshit from lying, he aims to make us better understand what goes on when someone lies, and more importantly, by saying what a good use of language is not, it may even help to clarify what it is to speak or use language at all. In this sense, his analysis could well be viewed as making, among other things, a contribution to the philosophy of language –not to mention the philosophy of mind. In discussing bullshit and lying, Frankfurt seems to be relying on an insight captured most strikingly by Davidson (1984) in his theory of ‘radical interpretation.’ According to some philosophers of language, such an insight gives us a very compelling reason for why one’s theory of meaning should be ‘truth-conditional.’ Let me explain briefly why. One could reasonably argue that, at the most basic level, the purpose of language use, of the activity of speaking, is one of sharing truths. People speak in order to provide each other with handy and useful information about where to find what they need or want and avoid what they fear. This was the case when our basic concerns, in our earlier and most primitive incarnation, were food, water, shelter, and security from potential predators or enemies. It is still the case today when we speak about engineering, computer science, or economics; we are still communicating information that is of interest to other people, although we are admittedly communicating information of a different type, one that is not dealing with direct or basic needs, but with more indirect and sophisticated, second-order or third-order needs.9 Whatever the case may be, in order to be an efficient participant in the linguistic community to which we belong, one must speak the truth when speaking to each other. If one says something false for whatever reason, one is passing on potentially damaging information. Needless to say, we all say things that are false sometimes, but for the most part this is just due to honest mistakes. Most people do not try (at least most of the time) to say what is false. Everyone lies at some point or other. Whether it be a ‘while lie’ or a ‘bare-faced lie’ does not matter. Human beings disapprove of lying –not just for moral reasons, but arguably for semantic reasons as well. If everyone lied all the time, there would be nothing like a communication of handy and useful truths to others; in fact, there would be no speech and no language at all. If everyone lied all the time, language use would be pointless, speaking to each other would have no point, but most importantly, words could have no meanings at all if they were not used to communicate truth in the first instance. To cut short a longer line of reasoning, the point here is that language use (‘speaking’) is for describing situations in the 9

In this context, one may quite rightly wonder what kind of information we communicating when speaking about philosophy, or when engaging in speculative, metaphysical flights.

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world, and if one ignores how the world is when using language or speaking, what one produces is not language, but nonsense or noise. In his analysis, Frankfurt seems to be relying on such an insight. Thus, he contends that without the activity of speaking the truth, there could be no lying at all. His reasoning seems to be as follows: the successful liar is someone who knows that others will take him to be speaking the truth, and who therefore derives benefit from the fact that what he says is false; he could not derive such a benefit if people did not have the expectation that what he says is true. But perhaps the best reason for holding lying to depend on speaking the truth is arguably the conceptual one mentioned earlier, namely, that no one could tell a lie if there were no established and well-entrenched practices of communicating information about how the world is to each other in the first place. Lying is just asserting something as true that one knows to be false. To be in the position to do this there has to be, first, a practice between people of asserting and interpreting sentences as true –at least for the most part. Lying depends, in other words, on speaking the truth in the same way. Lying consists in transacting in fake truth. To state more clearly the difference between bullshit and lying, as Frankfurt sees it, we might then say the following. In the case of lying, the liar is engaged in the practice of telling the truth just as the speaker who is speaking the truth is. The liar transmits to his interlocutor a piece of information that is of interest, portrayed or presented as true. The information that the liar transmits is of course false (or believed to be). Yet, it pretends to be true, or to be straightforwardly or verifiably true or false. Besides, in saying what he says the liar is somehow guided by the truth. He could not tell a lie if he did not have definite views or opinions about what is true or false, and consciously avoided telling the truth. In other words, a liar cares about what is true and is guided in what he says by what is true in as much as he avoids saying what is true (2005: 56-61). In the case of bullshitting, we might say, the situation is somewhat different. The bullshitter does not make a straightforward communication of something that he believes to be false. In reality, the bullshitter does not seem to care much about what he actually says. His aim is not to lead the consumer of bullshit or his interlocutor into believing something that is not true. Instead, his aim is to confuse the consumer or interlocutor into believing that he is communicating something at all, when in fact he is doing nothing of the sort. To put the contrast more succinctly, the bullshitter fakes (taking part in) the transmission of information, whereas the liar (wrongly) informs his interlocutor. In other words, the liar contributes paradoxically to the cooperative effort that is communication between people, but what he contributes is something bad. In contrast, the bullshitter pretends to contribute, but contributes nothing at all. The difference between the two: whereas the liar diminishes the stock of truth that his interlocutor may hold, the bullshitter pretends to share something with the interlocutor, but shares nothing at all. Frankfurt’s contribution seems to be focused on the relationship between bullshitting and truth-talking. In his view, the bullshitter not only portrays himself as believing or feeling 10

what he does not (‘deliberate misrepresentation’ or ‘imposture’), but, in speaking, he also shows a disregard for what is true. For Frankfurt, this makes the bullshitter “a greater enemy of the truth than the liar” (2005: 61). One may naturally object to the idea articulated earlier, namely, that the bullshitter’s aim is not to lead the consumer or interlocutor into believing something that is not true. One may hold, as Cohen does (2002: 327-8), that bullshit is often designed to lead to a misapprehension on the part of the consumer or interlocutor. This is arguably true in politics, public relations, as well as in advertising or marketing, where bullshit is presumably used for precisely this purpose, to mislead people into believing something that is not (necessarily) true, e.g., that a particular ideology or political program is compassionate when in fact it is not, or that a particular product or service is better than those provided by competitors, when in fact they all equally defective. In response, one could reply however that one need not miss the precise point of the distinction Frankfurt wishes to make –even if, admittedly, lying may also be a form of bullshitting. Politicians and advertisers do of course lie to achieve their respective purposes. But the point is that, insofar as they are merely bullshitting, there is no specific thing that they want to mislead the consumers, or more generally the people, about. What bullshitters in politics and advertizing want is not for the public to believe something specific, but rather that they believe whatever will make them buy the politician’s packaging or the company’s goods or services. One consequence of Frankfurt’s view is that bullshit need not actually be false. It is not the truth or falsity of a statement, or even its meaninglessness, that makes it bullshit. It is that it is uttered without regard or concern for what is true. According to Frankfurt, it is possible to make a true statement without concern for the truth and still utter bullshit. We may here think of the student bullshitting his way into an essay that is due, and yet still write (accidentally) something that is true. In reality, ordinary people are tempted to think of bullshit as something murkier and more multi-faceted than Frankfurt’s account suggests. Sometimes, bullshitters (like liars) are guided by the truth, but only after a fashion. Viz. government officials attempting to justify their course of actions or failed policies (in times of peace or war) and who, for this purpose, want to appear be ‘speaking the truth,’ though often euphemistically (Brandenburg, 2006); despite (the appearance or even actuality of) speaking the truth, what they say is still bullshit. Much of the bullshit produced by political or advertising campaigns could just as well be treated as a type of lying. Furthermore, there are forms of bullshit produced by people who would not recognize themselves as indifferent to the truth. “An honest person might read some bullshit that a Frankfurt-bullshitter wrote, believe it to be the truth, and affirm it…When that honest person utters bullshit, she is not showing a disregard for the truth. So it is neither necessary nor sufficient for every kind of bullshit that it be produced by one who is informed by indifference to the truth, or indeed, by any other distinctive intentional state” (Cohen, 2002: 331-2). This suggests that Frankfurt’s account may be confronted with a serious problem.

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[III]. Cohen: Deeper into Bullshit Bullshitters vs. Bullshit — or Producers vs. Product It is this kind of problem which, I believe, leads Cohen to go “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002), and to draw a distinction between (1) the intention of the producer of bullshit (that is bullshitting someone) and (2) the product that the bullshitter produces (the bullshit that he utters). For Frankfurt, as we have seen, bullshit is produced when one has a bullshitting intention; the essence of bullshit is the intention to bullshit someone that somehow lies behind it. Cohen, in contrast, holds that not all bullshit is bullshit, because it was produced with a bullshitting intention; some of it is bullshit simply by virtue of features of the statement or utterance itself, independently of the speaker’s intention (2002: 324). For example, what makes the ‘justifications’ offered by government officials ‘bullshit’ is not their intention in saying them, it is simply the terms themselves, the euphemisms and phrases they use in subverted ways, that are bullshit. Similarly, what make much of ‘business-speak’ bullshit is the phraseology and verbiage itself. Cohen is particularly concerned with a particular kind of bullshit –the kind that pervades some quarters of academia. As an example, he mentions scantily the writings of some Althusserian Marxists in France, but he holds in fact the view that much of French Philosophy quite generally is full of bullshit (2002: 322; 333).10 He describes a situation that academics of various stripes and philosophers, in particular, are familiar with. Reading pages and pages of impenetrable prose and jargon-filled text by some writer known for the complexity of his work, one sometimes gives up, brow-beaten into thinking that, as one cannot understand the presumably ‘deep and subtle points’ the author is striving to make, s/he must be more sophisticated than one has assumed and perhaps even smarter than oneself. Cohen believes that such work is often bullshit, rather than being profound or too deep to understand. If one makes the effort to plow through, dig deeper, and persevere in our interpretative effort, past the mystifying jargon and distracting stylistic flourishes, to figure out what essentially is being said or stated, if anything at all, one finds that the text either makes no real sense, states something more obvious than it pretends or is willing to admit,11 or is simply flagrantly absurd and nonsensical. In Cohen’s view, the account offered by Frankfurt does not work well with this kind of bullshit for essentially two reasons. First, honest people often repeat on trust what other 10

In a private communication, during which Cohen sent me an addendum (or part II) to his paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002) dealing more extensively with the social, cultural, institutional, political and philosophical reasons why there is so much (much more than in other European countries) bullshit in Contemporary French Theory or Philosophy. He did not intend to publish it (as is, in any case) because of what he thought could be interpreted as a harsh and over-reaching criticism, bound to rekindle the flames between the so-called two main camps in contemporary philosophy, the Analytic vs. the Continental, or to put it differently, between the clear, precise and rigorous vs. the fuzzy, vague, and mystifying approach to philosophy. 11

This, of course, does not discount the sobering view, according to which the main task of philosophy is ‘to make the obvious even more obvious than it appears” –as long as such a task is assumed honestly and sincerely.

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people seemingly trustworthy people say; if these people talk bullshit, this is liable to be repeated. But, on Frankfurt’s view, according to which bullshit requires dishonesty, as soon as the honest person repeats it, the utterance will stop being bullshit. Second, it is possible that an honest person may simply have a bullshit idea and voice it; especially if this is repeated by others, this person may even be encouraged to spout more similar bullshit and others may begin to produce such similarly packaged bullshit of their own under the spell of the original.12 Because of this possible disconnect between the shittiness of what is said and the utterer’s state of mind, Cohen thinks, as I pointed out earlier, that dishonesty is neither sufficient nor necessary for bullshit (2002: 331-2). Bullshit as Produced ‘Unclarifiable Nonsense’ Cohen’s approach consists in an effort to explain the features that an utterance or a statement must, as it were, ‘have in itself ’if it is count as bullshit. Given Cohen’s interest, bullshit is seen as ‘a species of nonsense.’ More specifically, he defines ‘bullshit’ as that which is “unclarifiably unclear” or as “unclarifiable nonsense” (2002: 332-3). He does however leave open the possibility that there can be even more sorts of bullshit, such as ‘rubbish’ (arguments grossly deficient in logic or in sensitivity to empirical evidence) or ‘irretrievably speculative comment.’ Bullshit and/in Contemporary French Theory or Philosophy This may the right place to discuss some of the examples drawn from works by contemporary French philosophers among others, which have proved to be so much fodder for Sokal & Bricmont’s indictment of their bullshitting esp., when they write about the (natural or mathematical) sciences [in Intellectual Impostures (1998: 137-8ff)].13 Thus to say, as Baudrillard does, “…that the space of the event has become a hyperspace with multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become definitively non-Euclidian” is so obscure that it does not really say anything. Similarly, it is hard to know what to make of passages like the following: In the Euclidian space of history, the shortest path between two points is the straight line, the line of Progress and Democracy. But this is only true of the linear space of the Enlightenment. In our nonEuclidian fin de siècle space, a baleful curvature unfailingly deflects all trajectories. This is doubtless linked to the sphericity of time (visible on the horizon of the end of the century, just as the earth’s sphericity is visible on the horizon at the end of the day) or the subtle distortion of the gravitational field. 12

Some may say that this is what happened among so-called ‘Lacanians’ and followers of Lacan or among ‘deconstructionists’ and followers of Derrida, both being viewed in some quarters as “master-bullshitters” (rather than “master-thinkers”). 13

Is ‘’imposture” or “nonsense” the most apt term for characterizing the bullshitting of a number of contemporary French philosophers when discussing or writing about science? Therein lies, it seems, the cleavage between the English edition (Intellectual Impostures) and the American edition (Fashionable Nonsense) of Sokal & Bricmont’s book (1998) –which has caused such a uproar in France where it was first published. In other words, which account better describe the kind of bullshit produced in some academic quarters, Frankfurt’s or Cohen’s? This is not, it seems, only a matter of editorial licence, but a deeper philosophical problem.

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Perhaps history itself has to be regarded as a chaotic formation, in which acceleration puts an end to linearity and the turbulence created by acceleration deflects history definitively from its end, just as such turbulence distances effects from their causes.

What should we make of the following statement by Luce Irigaray? 2

Is E= mc a sexed question? Perhaps it is. Let us make the hypothesis that it is insofar as it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us. What seems to me to indicate the possibly sexed nature of the equation is not directly its uses by nuclear weapons, rather it is having privileged what goes the fastest…

Similarly, we must ask what is intended by Felix Guattari or by Deleuze when they write respectively as follows: We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying links or archwriting, depending on the author, and this multi-referential, multi-dimensional, machinic analysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism we criticized previously. In the first place, singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, but rather ‘metastable’, endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed…In the second place, singularities possess a process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series and makes them resonate, enveloping the corresponding singular points in a single aleatory point and all the emissions, all the dice throws, in a single cast.

Finally, what should we make, if anything, other than say that it is pure gibberish, when the revered Lacan writes? Thus, by calculating that signification according to the algebraic method used here, namely: S (signifier) ___ --------------- = s (the statement), with S = (-1), produces [s = V-1] s (signified) ___ Or when Lacan goes on to conclude that the erectile organ ”...is equivalent to the V-1 of the signification produced above, of the jouissance that it restores by the coefficient of its statement to the function of lack of signifier (-1). “

If this is the kind of stuff they write when they write about the natural and mathematical sciences, should we not also be concerned about what they write in general about any other subject –whether it be in the social or human sciences or in the humanities at large? Should we not be concerned about the industrial output that followers of these so-called “master-thinkers” (or should I say, “master-bullshitters”) have produced under the banner of French Theory, Cultural Studies, or Postmodernist Philosophy more generally?

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Bullshit and the Problem of Reflexivity Cohen’s disagreement with Frankfurt revolves around the following: whether bullshit should be characterized firstly in terms of the dishonest intent behind someone saying something, or in terms of some features of an utterance or statement independent of the intent with which it is uttered. Naturally, bullshit can also be characterized in both these terms. And Cohen considers in all fairness this possibility. But doesn’t this take away much of the precision that Frankfurt sought to bring in with his attempted ‘definition’? So perhaps, we should confront the question head-on, what is bullshit really? Is it someone deceiving another, or is it merely nonsense? To see if we can resolve the dispute, let’s consider the kind of bullshit that Cohen is clearly worried about. Let’s consider for example what is called ‘postmodernism’ in the humanities. Even though the movement (if there was ever one) is probably on the way down, many philosophers have expressed concern about the fact that much bullshit masquerades as serious academic thought in postmodernism. What seems to puzzle and perhaps disturb Cohen (as well as other like-minded philosophers) about this movement is the absolute earnestness and preachy disposition with which its proponents attempt to convince scientists and analytic philosophers that the pursuit of truth in the whole of science is misguided, or worse yet, politically repressive. Frankfurt also seems to be concerned by the same trends, although he does not mention ‘postmodernism’ by name. Instead, he talks of “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are” (2005: 64). In order to avoid tarring unfairly all postmodernists with the same broad brush, let’s then follow Frankfurt’s lead and focus on the sorts of bullshit that worry Cohen. These include, the relativism about truth, according to which no one person may claim to have found the truth, because ‘nothing is ever really true or false anyway’. What is puzzling lies in the fact that many people seem to believe that there is no truth, and in exactly these terms. They repeat quite often enough that truth, and science, quite generally, is bunk. If what they say is indeed bullshit, as Cohen suspects, the problem is that the seriousness and honesty with which it is said, precludes it from being called bullshit on Frankfurt’s analysis. Furthermore, and quite apart from Cohen’s point, we often say of some people that they believe their own bullshit. What we mean is that they have become so caught up by the grand but empty things that they say and peddle to anyone willing to lend a gullible ear, and even attempt to act in ways bearing out this belief. Another problem for Frankfurt’s account then, is that, if bullshit involves one person attempting to deceive another, it seems difficult to explain how someone may come believe his/her own bullshit, as we so often say they do. Which account works best for this sort of bullshit? Cohen’s contribution brings up an aspect of the phenomenon that constitutes a serious challenge for Frankfurt’s account. Upon closer scrutiny however, his account in turn quickly shows its own difficulties and limitations. In the end, they both provide complementary insights into the phenomenon of bullshit, but, for reasons which shall be made clearer below, their respective account is 15

limited and partial, and therefore in need of further development and additional considerations –as I will show in the forthcoming sections of this essay.

[IV]. How Cohen and Frankfurt Get Hoisted on their Own Petard? The reason why Cohen gets hoisted on his own petard lies essentially with his defining bullshit as (unclarifiable) nonsense. Nonsense, in the philosophical sense, is a sentence that, while it may appear meaningful (because syntactically well-formed), is in fact not. A good example drawn from Chomsky’s work in linguistics is the following: “green ideas sleep furiously.” While this sentence pretends to say something about how the world is, it in fact says nothing –other than evoke ‘poetically’ some unexpected and surprising associations.14 One could even say that it is un-understandable gibberish, or something of which we cannot say what would be the case if it were true. If this is nonsense, the problem for Cohen is that no one can truly believe it. What would it be for green ideas to sleep furiously? Is this the way the world is like? Are ideas green? Do they sleep? Furiously? Now, and in contrast, try believing this instead: “the book I am reading, On Bullshit, is on the table,” or “my dog is called ‘Kat’,” or “the flowers have been placed in a vase.” In order to explain what he seeks to explain, (i.e., essentially honest academics telling us what they say in their works), Cohen has to assume that these people actually do believe what they say [see previous examples drawn from Sokal & Bricmont (1998)], something they cannot do if bullshit is nonsense. To say something honestly, one has to believe what one says, if bullshit is pure nonsense, it cannot be believed, and therefore, also cannot be said honestly. Cohen’s account is confronted with another problem –identified by Frankfurt. Cohen does not define what it is for an utterance or a statement to be unclear; in fact, he refuses to do so. For Frankfurt, this may amount to Cohen “…hoisting his account of bullshit by his own petard….” Not being able to define clarity, Cohen’s own account is unclear, and therefore, bullshit by its own standards” (Frankfurt, 2002: 341-2). Cohen’s concern, however, is serious and definitely not bullshit –this is the sort of bullshit that I also think we should be concerned about. So it is a shortcoming of his theory that it is liable to be lumped in together with bullshit by its own criterion. Cohen’s attempt to define bullshit as that which is “unclarifiably unclear” (or “unclarifiable nonsense”) fails for two reasons: firstly, nonsense is not something that anyone can honestly believe or say, and secondly, nonsense is not something that Cohen has defined in any useful or convincing way, so far. In all fairness, it should be noted that Cohen acknowledges the difficulty of providing a “theory of nonsense’’ for this would presume defining ‘sense’ and ‘clarity,’ which, he admits, cannot be done easily. His recognition may be motivated in part by his recollection of the failure of the verificationist project (Logical Positivism), which, in a sense, also sought to

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I don’t think it is appropriate or tenable to exclude much of poetry as nonsense. Though it may not say, assert, or state something, poetry does suggest, evoke, allude, inspire, edify, and does probably so many other ineffable things that only poets and those with the tight literary or aesthetic sensibility know about.

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define bullshit (‘metaphysics’) as nonsense.15 If we were to ask, for example, how could one defend Hegel and Heidegger –not to mention all the contemporary authors who take after them in some way or another—from the charge that their writings are bullshit –pure and concentrated or diluted and watered-down, whatever the specific case may be? I take it that Cohen would respond as follows: not by showing that they cared about the truth. This would be enough to get them off the hook, so to speak, if they were charged with being bullshitters under Frankfurt’s account. Rather, he would argue, one should try to show that their writings actually made some sense. Failing to have such an option, we might perhaps better be able to do so if we could prove the opposite, namely, that a given statement is hopelessly unclear (unclarifiable), and hence bullshit. Cohen’s proposed test is to add a “not” to the statement and see if this makes any difference to its plausibility. If it does not, then we can conclude that the statement is in fact nonsense or bullshit.16

[V]. How Frankfurt’s Account Can Be Amended and Further Improved? Frankfurt also recognizes also the distinctively academic variety of bullshit as one particular kind in the lush garden,17 but he does not think that it is very dangerous compared with the sort of bullshit he is concerned about. While genuinely meaningless or nonsensical discourse may be infuriating and frustrating, or even constitute some sort of ‘pollution,’ it is unlikely to be taken seriously for very long, Frankfurt believes, even in the academic world. The sort of bullshit that involves indifference to truth and veracity is in contrast far more insidious, in Frankfurt’s view. For, as he points out, “the conduct of civilized life, and the vitality of the institutions that are indispensable to it, depend very fundamentally on respect for the distinction between the true and the false.” How evil is the bullshitter? That depends on the how valuable truthfulness is. When Frankfurt observes that truthfulness is crucial in maintaining the sense of trust on which social cooperation depends, he is appealing to the instrumental value of truth. Whether truth has any value in itself, intrinsically, however, is a separate and far more challenging question –which deserves to be taken up in its own right in another context? (see Williams, 2002, for a compelling discussion in this regard). In the meantime, one might be tempted to conclude that the preceding analysis reinforces Frankfurt’s account as a plausible account of bullshit. I must quickly add however that the phenomenon that Cohen has identified (seemingly honest theorists of all sorts 15

One could as easily also mention Wittgenstein’s attempt in this regard, to define bullshit as “speaking where one should remain silent,” or as idling language,” or Kant’s when warning against “making knowledge claims about those things or phenomena which cannot be the objects of experience, are beyond the concepts and categories of our understanding, and of which we cannot know anything.” 16 Ironically, I was told by a Heideggerian scholar that Heidegger himself seems to have made precisely such a th move. In the 4 edition of his work, “What is Metaphysics?” (1943), he stated “Being can indeed be without th beings.” In the 5 edition (1949), this sentence becomes: “Being never is without beings.” 17

In his reply to Cohen, Frankfurt writes with some humor: ”If I am reluctant to endorse Cohen’s claim that the sort of bullshit on which my attention was focused ‘is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit,’ it is not because I doubt his claim is true, it is only because I cannot help recalling that bullshit is an animal product and not a plant.”

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talking bullshit), not to mention the possibility that someone may come to believe his or her own bullshit, still poses some problems and challenges for Frankfurt’s account. At least two are worth mentioning: (1) how should we explain the fact that people may seem to talk bullshit even when they are entirely honest? (2) How should we explain the often noted fact that some people come “to believe their own bullshit”? Let’s consider what Frankfurt could say regarding the first problem. His answer might be to simply make the case that one cannot straightforwardly and without further qualification identify ‘unclarifiable nonsense’ with bullshit, or hold an entire movement, tradition, or school of academic and philosophical thought to be bullshit. For Cohen, as we have seen earlier, anyone uttering a given unclear (unclarifiably unclear) statement can be said to be talking bullshit. Whereas, on Frankfurt’s account, before this epithet can be warranted one has to make sure that there was dishonesty behind the statement. In short, it is harder to make an accusation of Frankfurt bullshit stick. One could of course argue that this is indeed the right (or desirable) outcome. In other words, this is as it should be. Accusing someone of bullshitting, on Frankfurt’s account, is tantamount to accusing someone of dishonesty, and like all accusations of dishonesty, it is sensible to presume, it should not be made lightly. After all, bullshit is a loaded term and still a profanity for most people.18 Perhaps it is best reserved for cases of provable dishonesty or disregard for the truth. To do so however would be tantamount to saying that Cohen’s identification of much of what passes for French Theory or Philosophy today as bullshit is not grounded or judicious and therefore unwelcome. It is too strong a claim to make and uphold, perhaps even unfair. What would Frankfurt say about the second, and more challenging, problem? Let’s recall that, for Frankfurt, bullshit involves deception. If one were to believe one’s own bullshit, then this would presuppose deceiving oneself. But on the face of it, it is hard to see how this may be possible. Deception requires that the deceived not know that he is being deceived. If deceiver and deceived are one and the same person, then this appears impossible. And yet, common experience and a minimal knowledge of human psychology tell us that people do deceive themselves, more often than they would admit or than one would think.19 Can we then explain ‘coming to believe one’s own bullshit’ in a Frankfurt account as a case of self-deception? Let us consider the case of someone who bullshits people repeatedly and with great success. His bullshitting behavior becomes second nature, more or less automatic: he repeats his own bullshit without giving it another thought. Now, suppose that the memory of the original deception begins to fade in the bullshitter’s mind, and that others encourage him to admire what he himself has said in the past. This person might be said to have become someone who repeats the bullshit of another, and less of an 18

This is the case in the US or in China, for that matter, or anywhere else in between.

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Interestingly, recent research in clinical and cognitive psychology has established that there is a significant correlation between self-deception and mental health. In some respect, they confirm the view according to which realists (those less able to engage or indulge in self-deception) are very likely to be pessimists and depressives, while those who entertain a rosy and optimistic picture and a deluded vision of themselves are likely to ‘healthier’ mentally, and perhaps even more capable of coping with the trials and tribulations of daily living.

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original bullshitter. We would say that he ends up believing his own bullshit, but that what he believes is still bullshit, by virtue of some implicit or background ‘chain of causal reference,’20 due to the fact that, when it was originally said, it was bullshit. We could then say that, on this construal, bullshit is something said (or believed) by someone who does not care about the truth of what he says, and says what he says to impress others or repeats something first said with that intention. In either case, what is actually said may be (trivially) true or simply false, or it may be nonsense. It does not really matter which it is as to whether what is said (and possibly believed) is bullshit. Or does it?

[VI]. Even Deeper into Bullshit –Research, Detection, and Busting Before proceeding further in this last section, it might be useful to take stock of my analysis so far. I have argued essentially that Frankfurt takes an activity-centered approach, concerned with the process of bullshitting, or producing bullshit, and which, for this reason, focuses primarily on the state of mind or intention of the bullshitter, not so much his goal, or his product. To use Cohen’s phrase, the focus, in Frankfurt’s activity-process-intentionbased account, is on the bull rather than the shit. Though his distinction between bullshit and lying is useful in some sense, it remains arguably inadequate, and the examples he interprets for this purpose are problematic and unconvincing. Besides, his characterization of the “essence” of “bullshit” as “indifference to truth or how things truly and really are” is itself bullshit because the latter phenomenon has no essence, to speak of. Nevertheless, it provides us with a clue as to one aspect or manifestation of “bullshit” particularly in the realm of everyday life, his primary locus. I have also shown how Cohen takes in contrast to Frankfurt an output-centered approach, concerned with the product produced, namely, shit, as a result of bullshitting, putting into play certain tactics, with special attention being paid to the goals (standard vs. ultimate) of the bullshitter, but regardless of how we may (or may not) characterize the intentions or state of mind of the bullshitter. The motives for producing bullshit are many and varied. Cohen’s output-product-[goal & tactic]-based account avoids, in my view, the pitfalls and weaknesses of Frankfurt’s, and gives us a treatment in which the focus is one the shit rather than the bull. Unlike Frankfurt, who is primarily focused on bullshit in everyday life, Cohen is particularly interested in the kind of bullshit that he was (almost) victim of in his youth, and about which he has become in his own words “the least tolerant people I know,” namely, the kind that academics and especially some philosophers –particularly though not exclusively French philosophers—are prone to engage in. According to him, the 20

I am here referring to the kind of chain put into play by Kripke in his theory of Naming and Necessity (1980). Admittedly, this line of reasoning may seem to be stretched, and its plausibility questionable. Nevertheless, it could perhaps serve to bolster a Frankfurt‘s account on this score.

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“essence” of bullshit is best characterized as “unclarifiable unclarity or obscurity” --of the kind that cannot even be redeemed in terms of any degree of plausibility by a ‘not’ being inserted or subtracted (if it has one) in a given text or statement. Given the pervasiveness of this kind of bullshit in certain areas of philosophical and semi-philosophical culture, Cohen urges us to conduct a struggle against it. He recognizes that “something important is at stake here, and the character of what is at stake makes the bullshitter/bullshit distinction important,” to boot, there is a lot of work aiming at obscurity and sowing conspicuously a lack of concern with truth in philosophical-bullshit production. He nevertheless recommends that the “proper polemical target” be bullshit and not bullshitters. “These moral faults should not be our primary focus,” he writes, but “we may hope that success in discrediting the product will contribute to extinguishing the process.” In the end, though Cohen admits to the political nature of the struggle against bullshit, he seems to believe that the logical rigor of old-fashioned Analytic philosophy carried out in accord with rational and objective criteria of judgment and evaluation will enable us to stem the rising tide of bullshit and ultimately of bullshitters in academia. However, if Analytic philosophy so conceived has not been able to do so in its heydays, why should we be optimistic that it can do so at this juncture, or in these times of rampant and empty rhetoric? Besides, couldn’t the case be made that Analytic Philosophy also have its own brand of bullshit?21 I am inclined to argue for a third approach, which is not so much concerned with what is bullshit (the process or product), but with when is bullshit (as both process and product), and the context(s) in which it is traded. Admittedly, both Frankfurt and Cohen touch upon this aspect as well, but only in a secondary manner, as an afterthought, as it were. My approach in contrast will not so much be focused on the internal point of view [bullshitter (producer)– bullshit (product)], as it will be on the external point of view, namely, the impact of bullshit (as process and product) on individuals, groups, and communities, and ultimately on culture and society, its normative practices, values and ideals [Bullshitter (Producer) — Bullshit (Product)—Bullshittee(s) (Consumer(s) or Victim(s) in Situated Contexts)]. Such an approach would be properly archaeological-genealogical in character. Apart from to the purely conceptual, linguistic analysis of the concept, it would offer us an apprehension of the social phenomenon that would be useful, I believe, not only for the purpose of academic study but most critically for that of political engagement and struggle. In what direction lies the way forward in terms of bullshit research, detection, and busting –for those seriously interested in the phenomenon, its exponential growth and prevalence? Does it lie in deciding whether bullshit involves, to put it succinctly, a deliberate 21

Admittedly, this remains to be documented and established. It would have to be done more than likely by taking a different tack on bullshit –not so much by looking for ‘unclarifiable nonsense,’ but perhaps by considering how the obsessive concern with ‘rigor, clarity, and precision’ can also be a source of a different kind of bullshit.

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attempt at dishonesty and mis-representation on the bullshitter’s part, or whether it involves instead something that can be bullshit by virtue of some distinctive and autonomous features or characteristics of the utterance or statement? Isn’t such an attempt to ‘define’ bullshit, or to choose between two ‘definitions’ itself an instance of academic bullshit? The argument can certainly be made. One could even argue that what both Frankfurt and Cohen write is itself bullshit (of a different sort), or even a clever parody on Analytic philosophy. This is not to deny however those interested in, and writing on, bullshit may well be serious in their intent. They are undoubtedly interested in explaining why there is so much of it, its ubiquity, and its multiple and varied functions in diverse contexts (Mears, 2002). And in the process, they may be interested in providing those who object to it and who are ‘allergic’ to it some critical tools which could enable them to detect, bust, and immunize themselves against bullshit whenever or wherever they are confronted with it. Thus, we could understandably view the attempt to ‘define’ bullshit as part of the general effort to maintain the conviction that some utterances, statements, forms of exchange, or communications must (not) be disapproved, and to say which ones they are. It would be misguided to say for example that all of postmodernism, all of French Theory or Philosophy (or any other philosophical tradition or movement) is bullshit. Regardless of our philosophical affiliation, we would presumably want to be able to distinguish between (1) honest and truthful expression (2) lying, and (3) talking-writing bullshit, or bullshitting. This in turn presupposes that we uphold a plausible and defensible conception of ‘truth.’ If one were to claim, as some postmodernists have, that there is no truth at all, wouldn’t this effectively undermine the distinction between (1), (2) and (3)? It might be appropriate to recall here one of the major concerns of Frankfurt: why is there so much bullshit in our culture? He recognizes that that there may be many reasons for this unprecedented state of affairs in our history, and it is precisely at this point, I believe, that the relevance and comparative advantage of an archaeological-genealogical approach can perhaps best be seen. Frankfurt explicitly discusses the following two: (1) Bullshit is “unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about” (2005: 63). More and more people (democratic or cosmopolitan citizens) are impelled to speak about things they know very little about, or about which they are to some degree ignorant, and to appear all the while as ‘experts.’ (2) The impact of radical, anti-realism doctrines, postmodern critiques of truth, rationality, and objectivity, --not to mention the fact that ‘sincerity’ has become an alternative ideal to ‘truth’, and thereby making ‘sincerity’ itself bullshit (see Richardson, 2006). The proliferation and exponential growth of bullshit is due to the philosophical zeitgeist promoted by “various forms of scepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are” (2005: 64). 21

While we may readily agree with Frankfurt on the first reason, what should we think of his second reason? Is it the case that scepticism about truth and objectivity can only lead to much bullshit? A straightforward argument can be unpacked to show that here again Frankfurt is right on the mark. If the (philosophical and common) zeitgeist is such that we cannot say what things truly are, or we believe that there is no ‘how things truly are,’ then of course this will lead to the proliferation of bullshit. If there are no facts of the matter as to how anything truly is, then anything goes. There can no better or worse descriptions, no genuine or false assertions, no lying or its opposite at all. Everything we would say in such a world would be bullshit, and at the same time, nothing would be. But if this was the case, then we would have to say that everything is somehow fake. This would not make sense however, unless we also have a notion of what is not fake. In other words, if there is fake speech, it is because we can distinguish it from genuine or real speech. Similarly, there cannot be fake art or fake money unless the real thing exists. Paradoxically, the very existence of bullshit seems to demonstrate that language users are for the most part really concerned with making assertions that purport to be about reality, about how things truly are. So, the view according to which no one can ever say or think something true, or that all thought and speech is simply incoherent and untenable. In the absence of truth, everything is bullshit, and nothing ever is. We have already ventured beyond the bounds of binary logic, and are in flagrant violation of the principle of non-contradiction. Let us consider a slightly different variant of the view that Frankfurt seeks to impugn. Instead of holding that there is no truth at all that can be reflected or not in what we say, one can argue that there is no one truth, but many different truths. Under such a view, we may say that each of us has her own individual truth, or that different cultures have their own truths. This is tantamount obviously to a form of relativism, which is rampant today, and which is often impugned to the legacy of Nietzsche’s perspectivism upon contemporary thought. Though I would be prepared to dispute (in another context) the culpability of Nietzsche in this regard, it is easy enough to show, independently of its possible source, why such a relativism whether in its subjectivist-individualist or cultural form is untenable and even incoherent (see Chokr, 2007; 2008). A straightforward application of Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language -in the Philosophical Investigations (1953) would suffice to undermine the subjectivist or individualist version of the relativism here in question. It simply does not work to say that there are many different truths for different individuals to aim at when they use language to speak or make an assertion. If, as language user, I only aim to believe and say something that is ‘true for me’ but not ‘true for you,’ then no one can ever fail to be correct. The word ‘true’ loses its meaning: there is no point in calling anything ‘true.’ It only makes sense if we assume that the beliefs or assertions to which it is applied could be wrong. But no one can 22

ever be wrong if by ‘true’ we only mean ‘true for me’ and not ‘true for you.’ If the game of believing and saying things is such that each of us can only aim to believe and say what is true for each one of us, who would want to play it? We would be always already winners. In some sense, it is not a real game. Relativism, in its subjectivist or individualist version, is untenable. As for the cultural version of relativism, it can also be disposed of by an application of the argument articulated by Davidson in his well-known paper “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1984) in which he discusses the possibility of people with radically different conceptual schemes. In a nutshell, it comes down to this: it does not make sense to say that each culture has its own culturally specific truth that it aims for. Let us consider the case of two presumably different cultures, American and Chinese. If believing for Americans is a matter of aiming at truth according to American culture and believing for Chinese is aiming at truth for Chinese culture, and these two types of truths are radically different, then it is fair to say that the Americans and Chinese would not both be believing except in their different ways; we might even have to say that they have completely different cognitive attitudes. If we wish to maintain that they both believe, then we would have to accept that they are doing something similar when they believe. It must be something similar enough that we can best make sense of by holding that they are both aiming to represent the same external reality as honestly and accurately as possible. When people from different cultures believe certain things, we would have to hold that they are indeed engaged in the same activity. Otherwise, we would not be able to make sense of people from other cultures as thinking beings at all, if we did not view them as believers or if we could not see them as getting (or failing to get) at the truth, just as we might also take ourselves to be hitting or missing the truth. For the American to make sense of the Chinese as a thinking being, the Chinese needs, when believing, to aim at the same cognitive target as the American, or at least, at a cognitive target that the American can understand, which amounts to saying the same thing, and, of course, vice versa. In sum, Davidson’s point I take it is this: rather than being different, cultures must at least similar enough so that we can call the members of those cultures believers. This requires enough of an overlap between what they all actually believe that we can no longer talk in a meaningful way about ‘truth-for-a- culture.’ Radical cultural relativism is thus untenable. Despite all efforts in recent decades to defend relativism, it cannot provide us with a viable account of truth.22 And as I pointed out earlier, this is precisely what we need if we are going to make a meaningful distinction between (1) honest or truthful expression, (2) lying, and (3) talking–writing bullshit, or bullshitting. Everyone, in academia or outside, 22

Bernard Williams makes a very illuminating effort in that direction with his essay in genealogy, Truth and Truthfulness (2002).

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would want to be able to say of him or herself that he or she is making a statement or assertion truthfully and honestly, when this is indeed the case. And one can only say this if one does believe the statement or assertion to be true, when one says it. The notion of truthfulness or honesty, in academia as well as outside, presupposes that one is aiming at the truth in what one says. If bullshit involves “expressly disparaging truth,” then some versions of postmodernism may be considered to be “bullshit *that has+ risen to consciousness of itself” (Cohen, 2002: 333). Saying that ‘there is no truth’ is not bullshit, however; it is making a false statement, which provides the perfect alibi for much of the bullshit in our times by undermining the very idea that anyone can ever speak truthfully or honestly.

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References Aberdein, Andrew. [2006]. “Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, and the Definition of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 151-170. Bernal, Sara. *2006+. “bullshit and Personality.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 63-82. Black, M. *1983+. “The Prevalence of Humbug.” In The Presence of Humbug and Other Essays. www.ditext.com/black/humbug Brandenburg, Heinz. *2006+. “Short of Lying—The Prevalence of Bullshit in Political Communication.” Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, Reading, April, 4-6, 2006. www.psa.ac.uk/2006/pps/Brandenburg.pdf Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds.). [2002]. Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. (A Festschrift). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chokr, N.N. [1991]. Clusters’ Last Stand: Toward a Theory of the Process of Meaning-Making in Science. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Information Service, pp. 1-437. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/19075 / or http://en.scientificcommons.org/36480998 ________. [2007]. « Qui (n’) a (pas) peur du relativisme (culturel)? » Traces –Revue des Sciences Humaines No.12. Paris: Ecole Normale Supérieure, pp. 25-59. www.traces.revues.org/index188.html ________. [2008] “Who is (Not) Afraid of (Cultural) Relativism?” Traces –Revue des Sciences Humaines No.12. Paris: Ecole Normale Supérieure, pp.1-65. www.traces.revues.org/index401.html ________. *2008+. “’Philosophy –after the End of Philosophy.” XXII World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, Korea, July-August 2008. ________. [2009]. Unlearning, or How Not to Be Governed. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic—Societas: Essays in Political and Cultural Criticism. Cohen, G.A. *2002+. “Deeper into Bullshit.” In Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds.) Contours of Agency. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 321-339. [Reprinted in Hardcastle & Reich, Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, 2006, pp. 117-136]. Davidson, D. *1984+. “Radical Interpretation.” In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation . Oxford: Clarendon Press. ________. *1984+. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Frankfurt. H. *1986+. “On Bullshit.” Raritan 6: 81-100. ________. [1988]. On Bullshit. In The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, pp. 117-133. ________. *2002+. “Reply to G.A. Cohen.” In Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds.) Contours of Agency. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 340-344. ________. [2005]. On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. de Waal, Cornelis. *2006+. “The Importance of Being Earnest: A Pragmatic Approach to Bullshitting.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 99-114.

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Evans, Marc. *2006+. “The Republic of Bullshit –On the Dumbing Up of Democracy.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 185-202. Fuller, Steve. *2006+. “Just Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 241-258. Hardcastle, Gary L. & Reisch, George A. (eds.). [2006]. Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court (Popular Culture and Philosophy Series). Hardcastle, Gary L. *2006+. “The Unity of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 137-150. Kripke, S. [1980]. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Maes, H. & Schaubroeck, K. *2006+. “Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 171-182. Mears, Daniel P. *2002+. “The Ubiquity, Functions, and Contexts of Bullshitting.” Journal of Mundane Behavior 3/2. www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v3n2/mears.htm Neumann, Vanessa. *2006+. “Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of Self.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 203-214. Preti, Consuelo. *2006+. “A Defense of Common Sense.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 19-32. Reisch, George A. *2006+. “The Pragmatics of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 33-48. Richardson, Alan. *2006+. “Performing Bullshit and the Post-Sincere Condition.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 83-98. Sokal, A. & Bricmont, J. [1998]. Intellectual Impostures. London: Profile. [Published in the American edition as Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. NY: Picador, USA]. Williams, Bernard. [2002]. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. NJ: Princeton University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. [1953]. Philosophical Investigations. New York: MacMillan.

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