España y el proceso de la CSCE: la Conferencia de Helsinki (1969-1975)

España y el proceso de la CSCE (1969-1975)

Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo

ABSTRACT The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the “Conference of Helsinki”, was the largest international and multilateral gathering held on European soil since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It took place in the framework of the détente in the Cold War and it was considered by Nora Sainz Gsell as a “unique phenomenon in the field of diplomacy and international relations”1. After nearly four years of meetings, which took place between Helsinki and Geneva and where thirty-five European countries, United States and Canada participated, the final agreement received the name of “Helsinki Final Act”. Spain was also present at this important meeting, as almost all European States. The object of study of this doctoral thesis is to explain, to study and to analyze deeply the role that Spain played in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the most highlighted international and multilateral process of the decade of the 1970s. This is a subject not enough studied by the historiography, although it is one of the most important episodes of the Cold War and culmination of thaw between blocs. Only brief studios –with autobiographies and firsthand testimonies by diplomats present in this “great European Round Table”-, collections of official documents and brief allusions in historiographical and general works have briefly dealt the Spain’s participation in the Conference of Helsinki2. However, there is not a case study which has thoroughly analyzed this issue from a historiographical point of view. 1

SAINZ GSELL, Nora: La Confèrencia sobre la Seguretat i la Cooperació a Europa: de procés a institució paneuropea, Barcelona, Centre UNESCO de Catalunya-Centre d’Estudis sobre la Pau i el Desarmament (UAB), 1993, page 7. 2 Directly linked with our research and in order of appearance, we would emphasise: RUPÉREZ, Javier: Europa entre el miedo y la esperanza, Madrid, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976; ARMERO, José Mario: La política exterior de Franco, Barcelona, Planeta, 1978, page 210; La Conferencia sobre la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa, Madrid, Oficina de Información Diplomática-Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1978; FUENTES, Jorge: La línea de la distensión, Madrid, Imprenta M. Huertas, 1980; Libro blanco del gobierno español: Informe sobre el cumplimiento por parte de de España del acta final firmada en Helsinki el 1º de Agosto de 1975 en la Conferencia sobre la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa, Madrid, Gobierno de España, 1980; PEREIRA, Juan Carlos: Introducción al estudio de la política exterior de España (siglos XIX y XX), Madrid, Akal, 1983, page 195; LÓPEZ RODÓ, Laureano: Testimonio de una política de Estado, Barcelona, Planeta, 1987, pages 152-162; FUENTES, Jorge: El círculo de Helsinki, Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1989; LÓPEZ RODÓ, Laureano: Memorias. El principio del fin, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés-Cambio 16, 1992, pages 404-414; CALDUCH, Rafael: “La política exterior española durante el franquismo”, en CALDUCH CERVERA, Rafael (coord.): La Política Exterior Española en el Siglo XX, Madrid, Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, 1994, page 142; VEIGA, Francisco, UCELAY DA CAL, Enric and DUARTE, Ángel: La paz simulada. Una historia de la Guerra Fría, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1997, pages 410-411; PORTERO, Florentino and PARDO, Rosa: “España en

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Spain was not an exception. Probably because of the proximity in time of this process, most of the bibliographical sources on the CSCE were not historiographical, with the exception of some specific mentions of authors specialized in the Cold War. Basically, political scientists, lawyers and diplomats -especially those present in its various meetings- have been those who have occupied most of the specialized literature the Helsinki process. The new challenges of the surrogate organization -Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE-, the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the need to look back to understand it background and, especially, the opening of the archives, have enabled a major revival of scholarly literature on the forum born in the capital of Finland for the last ten years. Then, we can find a broader historiographical knowledge on the CSCE in other countries such as the AngloSaxon world, Italy, France and especially Germany and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In these latter, Helsinki exerted a decisive influence into their historical development and where this subject is in ongoing debate and historiographical review3. Then, several factors are taken into consideration for the present dissertation. First of all, the situation of the Spanish home and foreign policy of the Franco dictatorship, busca de una aceptación sin restricciones y un papel más activo en el sistema internacional (1957-1975)”, in CARR, Raymond (dir.): Historia de España Ramón Menéndez Pidal. La época de Franco (19391975), Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1996, vol. 41, issue 1, pages 246-249; AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, Nuño: “El largo camino de la Paz. Reflexiones sobre la Conferencia de Helsinki a los 25 años”, Cuenta y Razón del Pensamiento Actual, vol. 112, 1999, pages 27-36; PARDO, Rosa: “La etapa Castiella y el final del Régimen, 1957-1975”, en TUSELL, Javier, AVILÉS, Juan and PARDO, Rosa (eds.): La política exterior española en el siglo XX, Madrid, UNED-Biblioteca Nueva, 2000, pages 366-367; TUSELL, Javier y GARCÍA QUEIPO DE LLANO, Genoveva: Tiempo de incertidumbre. Carlos Arias Navarro, entre el franquismo y la Transición (1973-1976), Barcelona, Crítica, 2001, page 187; MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA, Ricardo M. and PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, Guillermo A.: “Bajo la influencia de Mercurio: España y la Europa del Este en los últimos años del franquismo”, Historia del Presente, vol. 6, 2005, pages 43-59; GIL PECHARROMÁN, Julio: La política exterior del franquismo. Entre Hendaya y El Aaiún, Barcelona, Flor del Viento, 2008, pages 376-379; HUGUET, Montserrat: “La política exterior del franquismo (19391975)”, en PEREIRA, Juan Carlos (coord.): La política exterior de España. De 1800 hasta hoy, Barcelona, Ariel, 2010 (2nd edition), pages 654-656; NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa and RODRIGO LUELMO, Francisco José: “Las relaciones de España con los organismos regionales europeos en perspectiva comparada: Comunidad Europea y CSCE”, Circunstancia. Revista de ciencias sociales del Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset, vol. 24, 2011 (digital edition). 3 Among the latest historiographical essays on the CSCE, we should highlight, in order of appearance: WENGER, Andreas, MASTNY, Vojtech and NUENLIST, Christian (eds.): Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki process revisited, 1965-75, New York, Routedlege, 2008; BANGE, Oliver and NIEDHART, Gottfried (eds.): Helsinki 1975 and the transformation of Europe, New York-Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2008; ROMANO, Angela: From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West shaped the Helsinki CSCE, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009; SNYDER, Sarah B.: Human Rights activism and the end of the Cold War. A transnational history of the Helsinki Network, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011; BADALASSI, Nicolas: Adieu Yalta? La France, la détente et les origines de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe, 1965-1975, PhD thesis supervised by Frédéric BOZO, Université de Panthéon Sorbonne-Paris I, 2011 ; BILANDZIC, Vladimir, DAHLMANN, Dittmar y KOSANOVIC, Milan (eds.): From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente, Göttingen, V&R Unipress-Bonn University Press, 2012.

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which began to agonize at the end of the 1960s and was barely invited to participate in international forums. It has also been done to ponder the fact that Spain was invited to one of the most important multilateral process in the Cold War, the main forum for East-West which specifically addressed issues concerning the European continent, to become a player in equal conditions in a meeting that Jorge Fuentes calls “one of the major diplomatic achievements of the twentieth century, contributing decisively to bury the Cold War, knocking down blocs and facilitating European re-unification”4. It is also assessed under what conditions Spain went to Helsinki and why it was invited; what principles defended the Spanish delegation at different phases of the Conference; what proposals it submitted, and if they affected the national interest or they went further thinking in the general interest of the European continent and which of them prospered; if Spain practiced a “policy of aisles” or was left out of the most critical meetings; in which “lobby group” Spain was inserted or moved easily. It is also taken into account the role did by the highest Spanish State institutions, if the diplomats acted autonomously or received direct orders from the Palacio de Santa Cruz. And all that without forgetting four final elements: the international context, foreign relations maintained by the Franco’s regime with the communist bloc -main promoter of the Helsinki process- in the previous year, and the performance by Spanish representatives in a forum initially conceived to be between blocks but which ended up resulting in greater difficulty at becoming a diplomatic meeting between thirty-five participating States. On the other hand, the time frame for this doctoral thesis is placed between 1969 and 1975. The year 1969 marked a turning point in the evolution of the domestic and foreign policies of the Franco regime. Secondly, the Warsaw Pact countries formally invited all European States to participate in a Conference on European Security through the Budapest Appeal in March of 1969. This one was a document that the satellite nations of the USSR sent to the Government of Spain through a note verbale from the Hungarian Embassy in Paris to the Spanish legation in the French capital. Meanwhile, there were two key events in 1975. The first one, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on the 1st of August 1975 by the Heads of State and Government of the countries participating in the CSCE. The second one, the death of the Spanish dictator, General Fran4

FUENTES, Jorge: “Una OSCE para el siglo XXI”, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, 123 (October 2005). Available in: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/ elcano_es/zonas_es/europa/ari+123-2005

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cisco Franco, whose last months at the helm of the country were agonized not only for him but also for home politics and foreign relations of Spain. The different phases of the Conference of Helsinki took place between these two dates. The structure of this dissertation is organized in six chapters. In the first one, we analyze the precedents of the CSCE in the framework of the Cold War and, especially, in the years of the détente. In particular, the attempts and formal requests to convene the Conference on Security done by the Warsaw Pact through Bucharest (1966) and Budapest Statements (1969), as well as the “diplomacy of communiqués” between East and West, are studied. The second chapter is focused on the principal actor in this thesis, the Spanish State, studying deeply how its previous way to the Conference of Helsinki was developed. We also show how senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by the own Minister Gregorio López-Bravo, put into practice an intense bilateral agenda to stand up for convening the future Conference of Security -explaining the Spanish points of view on it- and to defend unquestioningly that questions concerning the security in the Mediterranean region should be present in that important meeting. From there, the thesis follows a thread that mixes a chronological and thematic line, based on the different phases of the meeting. Thus, the third chapter evaluates the development of the Previous Consultations of Helsinki, with special emphasis on the role played by Spain. It is paid attention to the “diplomatic masterstroke” that the Spanish delegation played on the issue of Gibraltar on direct orders by the Minister LópezBravo: Madrid wanted to clarify that its respect for the European status quo did not mean the recognition to the British colony, causing an intense controversy in Consultations. This multilateral preliminary meeting also delimited the other topics that marked the performance of Spain in the CSCE: tourism, migration and, above all, Mediterranean. The fourth chapter focuses on the first phase of the CSCE, which also took place in the capital of Finland and whose main object was to ratify the Final Recommendations, text emerged from the Consultations and which marked the issues and procedural lines to deal in the Conference. In this chapter the role played by the then new Foreign Minister, Laureano López Rodó, who headed the Spanish delegation, is explored. The longest chapter of this essay is the fifth one, centered on studying the multilateral negotiations of the second phase of the CSCE, which took place in the Swiss city of Geneva and concluded in the Helsinki Final Act after two years of talks. All the negotiations are not explained in detail, given its complexity from a methodological point of view: many 4

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España y el proceso de la CSCE (1969-1975)

discussions were carried out “word by word”. That is why the negotiations are placed in its context, it is dealt the role played by Spain played in them, and the final agreement reached in all Committees -or “baskets”- and Subcommittees that formed the Conference. Finally, the sixth chapter is based on the official journey of Carlos Arias Navarro, last Spanish Prime Minister during the Franco’s dictatorship, to the third stage of the Conference of Helsinki, which took place between the 30th of July and the 1st of August 1975. The ratification of the text negotiated and approved in Geneva by the Heads of State and Government of participant countries was the main mission of this phase. It is also discussed the political and legal framework of the Helsinki Final Act and its longterm consequences. Needless to say, Carlos Arias Navarro was not only in the capital of Finland in the summer of 1975 to sign the Helsinki Final Act, despite this fact had already a great historical transcendence by itself: he became the first Prime Minister of Spain in addressing a speech at a high international summit since 1939 and was also in Helsinki because of reasons of the foreign policy -given the serious challenges it had to face- and, above all, issues of domestic nature; in fact, he wanted to receive international support to his limited openness reforms, under the “spirit of the 12th of February”, to be against the claims of the most reactionary sectors of the Franco’s regime. Adopting a theoretical and methodological framework was essential for the correct development of this doctoral thesis. After ruling out the Transnational History as a valid approach for this research because their main protagonists are non-State actors5, the research carried out to analyze the participation of Spain in the Conference of Helsinki is placed in two historiographical trends: the History of the Present and the History of International Relations. The History of the Present is a term coming from the French term Histoire du Temps présent. It is suited to this research because most of the authors agree in placing its beginning after the end of World War II, as well as in Spain is set in

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RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas (ed.): Bringing transnational relations back in: non-State actors, domestic structures and international institutions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; BUDDE, Gunilla, CONRAD, Sebastian and JANZ, Oliver (eds.): Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, Göttingen 2006; FARALDO, José María: “Más allá de las relaciones internacionales. Nuevas tendencias centroeuropeas en historia transnacional y comparativismo”, in NICOLÁS, Encarna y GONZÁLEZ, Carmen (eds.): Mundos de ayer, Murcia, EDITUM-Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia, 2009 (digital edition); SAUNIER, Pierre-Yves: “Transnational”, en IRIYE, Akira y SAUNIER, PierreYves (eds.): The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History. From the mid-19th century to the present day, Basingstoke (UK), Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pages 1047–1055. Also: PATEL, Kiran Klaus: “Transnational history”, European History Online, 2003; available in: http://www.iegego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history [accessed 7 September 2014].

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1939 with the end of the Civil War6. François Bédarida, one of the greatest drivers of the History of the Present, gives a graphic conceptualization of what this stream represents: “where past, present and future coincide”7, and in which the historian was able to do a critical analysis of the historical facts, not depending on the so-called historical distance to doubt about our scientific independence8. In addition, Julio Aróstegui calls it “living history” and considers its birth arose from the necessity to respond to the methodological challenges posed by the historiographical analysis subsequent to the Second World War9. In the case of the Conference of Helsinki, we have a very close and contemporary history, which took place thirty-five years ago. In the History of the Present10 many of witnesses are still alive, like in this case, some of the protagonists of the Spanish performance in Helsinki. This is linked with the “memory”: the principal actors have developed their memory, their “own history”, with their subjective inputs, as it is shown in the works published by them. That is why the work of the historian must be different from that one written by the protagonist, because we have a methodological background and we use the review perspective with the aim of “historicizing” expressed by memory11. The other current in which methodologically our dissertation is placed is the History of International Relations, fully consolidated in the Spanish historiography12. Juan

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TUSELL, Javier: “La historiografía francesa del siglo XX y la española”, in RÉMOND, René, TUSELL, Javier, PELLISTRANDI, Benoît and SUEIRO SEOANE, Susana: Hacer la Historia del siglo XX, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva-UNED-Casa de Velázquez, 2004, page 27. 7 BÉDARIDA, François: “France”, in SELDON, Anthony (ed.): Contemporary History: Practice and Method, Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1988, page 131. Cit. by NAVAJAS ZUBELDIA, Carlos: “Presentación”, in NAVAJAS ZUBELDIA, Carlos (ed.): Actas del IV Simposio de Historia Actual. Logroño, Logroño, Gobierno de la Rioja-Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2004, vol. 1, page 13. 8 BÉDARIDA, François: “Definición, método y práctica de la Historia del Tiempo Presente”, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 20, 1998, pages 19-27. 9 ARÓSTEGUI, Julio: La Historia vivida. Sobre la Historia del Presente, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2004, pages 21; ARÓSTEGUI, Julio: “La Historia del Presente. ¿Una cuestión de método?”, en NAVAJAS ZUBELDIA, Carlos (ed.): Op. cit., pages 41-75. 10 We can also quote other works such as: CUESTA, Josefina: Historia del presente, Madrid, Eudema, 1993; HERNÁNDEZ SANDOICA, Elena: Tendencias historiográficas actuales. Escribir historia hoy, Madrid, Akal, 2004, pages 518-555. 11 ARÓSTEGUI, Julio: La Historia vivida, op. cit., pages 162-193. 12 To know the starting point and the evolution of the Spanish historiography of international relations: PEREIRA, Juan Carlos: “De la historia diplomática a la historia de las relaciones internacionales: algo más que el cambio de un término”, Historia Contemporánea, vol. 7, 1992, pages 166-180; QUINTANA NAVARRO, Francisco: “La Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales en España: apuntes para un balance historiográfico”, in: La Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales: una visión desde España, Madrid, CEHRI-Universidad Complutense de Madrid-Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores-Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1996, pages. 9-65; more recently, MORENO JUSTE, Antonio: “La Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales y de la política exterior española”, Ayer, vol. 42, 2001, pages 71-96; and PEREIRA, Juan Carlos: “Los Estudios Internacionales en España: la política exterior. Un estado de la cuestión” in PE-

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Carlos Pereira defines it as the “scientific and comprehensive study of the historical relationships that have been developed between people, States and supranational authorities within international society”13. It has two main differences from the traditional “diplomatic history”: the State is no longer the only actor of its analysis and its methodology is more and more interdisciplinary. Finally, the History of International Relations has a greater contact with other social sciences, without ignoring what two major drivers of the French historiography of international relations such as Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle called “deep forces” in order to analyze the presence of other determinants on the international scene14. While the CSCE process contains many other actors and it reflects the paradigmatic plurality that may raise an investigation related to this question, this dissertation has the States as its main actor and, in particular, the representatives of Spain’s delegation. Needless to say, without neglecting the importance of the historical context and the role of individuals in bureaucratic structures, the foreign policy is also the result of the subjective choice of a number of people -usually the diplomats- representing a State and national interests, given that they are skilled professionals running the foreign policy theoretically conceived by politicians15, putting and to stories “without human face” which were traditional in the old diplomatic history16. Then, we should outline the interdisciplinary character of this research, thanks to the wide diversity of topics and approaches addressed by the Spanish delegates in the CSCE, such as the military aspects, borders, tourism, migration, the economy, environment, trade relations, etc. Thus, this thesis also draws on literature produced by international law, political science, economics or sociology. Because we do not focus, as positivist history would do, only to describe purely bilateral or multilateral problems but also its diverse and pluralistic approaches, from the geographical problems of territorial conflicts in Europe -Gibraltar, REIRA, Juan Carlos (coord.): La política exterior de España. De 1800 hasta hoy, Barcelona, Ariel, 2010, pages 61-91. 13 PEREIRA, Juan Carlos: “Introducción. La historia de las relaciones internacionales en España. Respuestas, propuestas y conclusiones”, in La Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales: una visión desde España, op. cit., page 5. 14 RENOUVIN, Pierre: “Las fuerzas profundas”, in RENOUVIN, Pierre y DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Introducción a la política internacional, Madrid, Rialp, 1968, pages 9-320. 15 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: “El hombre de Estado”, en RENOUVIN, Pierre y DUROSELLE, JeanBaptiste: Op. cit., pp. 323-502; MERLE, Marcel: Sociología de las relaciones internacionales, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1997, pages 358-359. 16 SUEIRO SEOANE, Susana: “La historia de las relaciones internacionales en España. Un balance. Tendencias actuales y perspectivas de futuro”, in RÉMOND, René, TUSELL, Javier, PELLISTRANDI, Benoît y SUEIRO SEOANE, Susana: Op. cit., page 98.

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Ulster, Eastern Europe, risk of national unity’s breakdown in several States, migrations, “national minorities”, etc. Finally, we cannot ignore the growing “cultural turn” in History of International Relations; in fact, this thesis shows the central importance given by Spain in the CSCE to aspects such as the exchanges on culture and information and the promotion of tourism not only in economic but also human, educational and cultural dimensions17. Before presenting our final results, we must clarify what kind of methodology has been followed in the present work. The compatibility and close relationship between History and Present History of International Relations18 has led us to use the framework of both disciplines. First of all, we have worked specialized secondary sources on the Cold War, the domestic and foreign policy in Spain during the last Francoism and the CSCE, taking into account, as noted above, that the historical studies on the latter have begun to emerge with strength in recent years. Then, sources consulted in the former Archives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been essential for the process of decision making, the position of Spain to the other matters raised in the Conference of Helsinki and the view of diplomats representing that country in this multilateral forum of this caliber. Also, the Archivo General de la Administración, placed in Alcalá de Henares, Madrid- and the Castiella Fund -which is in the Royal Academy of Historyhave been used to try to know the initial reaction by the Spanish Government to the invitation extended by the Warsaw Pact in 1969. Besides, the Archive of the Ministry of Presidency only contained some letters addressed to Prime Minister Arias Navarro by Baltic and Eastern dissidents before his official journey to Helsinki. Meanwhile, the multilateral approach of the CSCE has led to us to consult the funds of the Conference, which were in the Office of the OSCE Secretariat in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic. It has also been attempted to compare the Spanish perspective with two key State actors of the Spain’s foreign policy: France and the United Kingdom. In particular, we worked at the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques -placed in La Courneuve, at the north of Paris-, whose funds were essential to understand aspects that were not clarified 17

DELGADO GÓMEZ-ESCALONILLA, Lorenzo: “El factor cultural en las relaciones internacionales: una aproximación a su análisis histórico”, Hispania, vol. 54, issue 186, 1994, pages 257-278; NIÑO, Antonio: “Relaciones y transferencias culturales internacionales”, in PELLISTRANDI, Benoît and SIRINELLI, Jean-François (eds.): L’histoire culturelle en France et en Espagne, Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2008, pages 179-205; NIÑO, Antonio: “Uso y abuso de las relaciones culturales en la política internacional”, Ayer, vol. 75, 2009, pages 25-61. 18 HUGUET, Montserrat: “Historia del Tiempo Presente e Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales”, Ayer, vol. 42, 2001, pages 43-69.

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in the Spanish sources; we also looked up Presidents Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing collections, placed in the Archives Nationales. Moreover, the specific dossiers on the participation of Spain in the CSCE which were in The United Kingdom National Archives have also been worked. Finally, problems happened with the declaration of “secret” in 2010 for most of Spanish diplomatic documentation subsequent 1968 and the closing of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 have prevented this thesis to study deeply of the participation of this country in the follow-up meetings of the CSCE19. However, the History of the Present has allowed to us to use -with their usual methodological precautions- additional newspaper and oral sources20, interviewing some of the Spanish diplomats who participated in the Helsinki process. Our standpoint and the sources employed to work on this doctoral thesis have enabled to confirm or to put into their context some of our initial hypothesis, as well as to reach at the following conclusions: 1. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in different stages in Helsinki and Geneva, was the most important multilateral diplomatic event of the 1970s. It supposed a major turning point not only in the era of detente between blocs, but also in the History of Europe. The final agreement of the Conference, which was named “Helsinki Final Act”, was not an international treaty but a text containing a series of political commitments that Heads of State and Government signatories agreed to respect. It was the result of a multidimen19

NIÑO, Antonio and SANZ DÍAZ, Carlos: “Los archivos, la intimidad de las personas y los secretos de Estado”, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, 2012, pages 309-342. To understand the dispute around funds coming from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Exteriores blinda todos sus documentos”, El País, 3rd June 2012. Available in: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/06/03/actualidad/1338750887_077908.html [accessed 7 September 2014]. “Exteriores revisará el acuerdo que declara secretos todos sus documentos”, El País, 5th June 2012. Available in: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/06/05/actualidad/1338903319_488877.html [accessed 7 September 2014]. Similarly, many historians have denounced repeatedly this unusual situation, as evidenced the manifesto launched by the network H-Spain: http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=HSpain&month=1306&week=a&msg=/KcikoRWJ7xz2UOMS4BHaA [accessed 7 September 2014]. 20 GARCÍA-NIETO, Mª. Carmen, VÁZQUEZ DE PARGA, Margarita and VILANOVA, Mercedes: Historia, fuente y archivo oral. Actas del Seminario “Diseño de proyectos de Historia Oral”, Madrid, 29 y 30 de abril de 1988, Madrid, Ministerio de Cultura, 1990; FOLGUERA, Pilar: Cómo se hace historia oral, Madrid, Eudema, 1994; VILANOVA, Mercedes: “Rememoración y fuentes orales”, in NAVAJAS ZUBELDIA, Carlos (ed.): Op. cit., pp. 19-40; FERRANDO PUIG, Emili: Fuentes orales e investigación histórica. Orientaciones metodológicas para crear fuentes orales de calidad en el contexto de un proyecto de investigación histórica, Barcelona, Ediciones del Serbal, 2006; LEONÉ, Santiago and MENDIOLA, Fernando (coords.): Voces e imágenes en la historia. Fuentes Orales y Visuales: investigación histórica y renovación pedagógica, Pamplona, Universidad Pública de Navarra, 2007.

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sional cooperation in different baskets or thematic commissions in which their works were distributed. I was based on two fundamental points: the “Helsinki Decalogue”, which provided respecting the European territorial status quo unavoidable claim of the socialist bloc-, amenable only by peaceful means; and compliance for the Human Rights chapter, also developed in the “third basket” on Human Contacts, condition set out by Western countries to participate. It also included cooperation in other fields such as the economy, environment, science, tourism-migration, transports, information, education, culture, etc. from a multidimensional prism. The pessimistic predictions of Western critical sectors against the CSCE process were not accomplished. Just the opposite, various dissident movements sprang shortly after the founding document of the CSCE with great force in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union itself to claim their Governments the observance of the spirit and letter contained in the agreement signed in August 1975. The unstoppable sprang of the opposition groups which emerged after the Act of Helsinki’s signature would play a key role in the collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. 2. There are not empirical evidences showing that Spain was an essential actor in the run-up to Helsinki as the member States of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. However, it was one of the countries which defended most eloquently from the very beginning summoning a Conference on European Security. The Spanish foreign policy under Franco’s dictatorship, in the absence of a strategic planning, had a single view, consisting on a primary goal: the survival of the regime given its testimonial role on the international scene. Thus, the CSCE was conceived at the Palacio de Santa Cruz as the first forum in which Spanish diplomacy would be invited by its own merits since 1939 and where it could play a relatively important role within the “concert of European nations” that, at the same time, could serve: to safeguard its situation -under the belief that it would bring a system of collective security for the continent-; to strengthen its ties with Western nations, not always consolidated; and to normalize relations with Eastern Europe 3. The main principles defended by Spain in the CSCE were: recognition of all the “socio-political realities” existing in Europe and, in particular, the ideological and economic disparities between countries; to refrain from the threat or use of force in all its forms against the territorial integrity or independence of each 10

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State; respect for the sovereignty and independence of all participating States; to ban on direct or indirect interference or coercion in the internal affairs of a country; observance to “own historical and cultural personality” of single States; and to resolve all conflicts between States by such peaceful means as contemplated, being aligned in that sense with the Warsaw Pact. Also, the Conference had to be a truly multilateral forum which would overcome the East-West dimension and that MBFR talks should be developed in the framework of the Conference of Helsinki. Moreover, founding a permanent body with consultative and coordinating functions was convenient to ensure the carrying out of the aforementioned “guiding principles” set out above and the continuity of the process born in Helsinki. Undoubtedly, Madrid believed that with that permanent body its integration into the “European concert”, in a premier pan-European entity, would be ensured, something hitherto closed to the Franco’s dictatorship. 4. Spain wanted to use the CSCE as a means for specific and limited purposes of its foreign policy, such as: the dispute on Gibraltar, the difficult negotiations for the renewal of agreements with the United States and the Concordat with the Holy See, the stagnant talks with the European Economic Community, and the Sahara conflict in the final months of the Franco’s regime. Only Gibraltar could be dealt, when Ambassador Nuño Aguirre de Cárcer, head of the Spanish delegation, cleared up in Helsinki Consultations that respect for inviolability of the boundaries did not mean “in any way” the recognition by Madrid of the status quo of this British colony, whose borders could be changed by peaceful ways. 5. The lack of experience in these kind of meetings and the limited strategic planning of the Spanish foreign policy forced to this country’s delegation to lay emphasis on technical issues such as tourism or emigration, which became the “key ideas” of the Spanish delegation in Helsinki and Geneva talks, not only in the economic field but also in human contacts category. Spain also played an essential role in the military “basket” proposing “other measures of mutual trust between participating States”, which were unanimously backed from the very beginning. In addition, Spanish delegation got the inclusion of the term “regional languages and cultures” as complement to the “national minorities” proposed by Yugoslavia. However, Spain lost the initiative in the second phase of Geneva and its diplomats attempted to replace the lack of thematic initiatives with medi11

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ation efforts between blocs, as well as the signing proposals and initiatives for the provisional registration of agreements. 6. Despite the weak position of this country on the international scene, the Spanish delegation had a leading role in the matters concerning the Mediterranean region, being influenced by the “traditional Arab-Hispanic friendship” promoted by Francoist propaganda and by the fact that that this one was a traditional area of operation of the foreign policy of Spain. The special consideration given by Spain to the Mediterranean area in the Helsinki process was based on a key aspect: the gradual ice-melting produced in Central Europe should not be accompanied by an increase in tension in the Mediterranean area. Then, the security at Mare Nostrum was “inseparable” from the European security, for which Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio López-Bravo proposed to create a “common consciousness” among riparian countries to become later in a “Mediterranean cooperation”. Spain achieved that issues concerning the Mediterranean were included on the Conference’s agenda and had its own chapter in the Helsinki Final Act. Meanwhile, it also got the presence of the Mediterranean South Bank countries, following the interest expressed by Algeria and Tunisia. However, in the second phase of Geneva, Spain followed the initiative taken by France and Italy. Despite their initial shyness, Italian Government presented the “Mediterranean Declaration” project that, broadly speaking, would appear in the same way in the Helsinki Final Act. The moderated role exercised by Italy, France and Spain reinforced by Yugoslav support- leading the “pro Mediterranean lobby”, prevented the radicalism of the Maltese proposals and the crises like the war of Yom Kippur or the Cyprus conflict, from downgrading the discussions on the “Mediterranean question” in the CSCE. 7. The weight of the Spanish intervention in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe mainly fell on diplomats. Moreover, these one had to face a limited reconnaissance at home and an intermittent media attention. However, they did not suffer a permanent or structural “oblivion” or “marginalization”, given that their role depended on who occupied the ministerial office in Palacio de Santa Cruz. In fact, whereas Gregorio López-Bravo paid great attention to process previous to the CSCE and to the Helsinki Consultations, the performance of Laureano López Rodo and especially Pedro Cortina Mauri, was dis12

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creet. That is why the diplomats themselves, acting autonomously, were forced by circumstances to act by themselves more than one occasion in phases like the second one, in Geneva. 8. The influence of the CSCE process in the home and foreign policy of last Francoism was limited. Both diplomats participating in CSCE and high Spanish representatives received, with exceptions, a standardized and standardized treatment. Western leaders had showed their hope towards a possible evolution to democracy in Spain, which looked feasible with the prompt of a physical disappearance of General Franco that seemed to be imminent. Also, the situation in Portugal played in his favor. In fact, the Spanish Prime Minister, instead of meeting the challenges of foreign policy -his knowledge in these matters was scant- tried through his interviews to “whiten” the image of the dictatorship and, above all, to gain enough support from the leaders present at Helsinki for his alleged reforms, in order to strengthen his position against the “bunker” of the regime. However, everything collapsed with the executions of September 1975: Spain became the first signatory country of the Final Act of Helsinki in violating publicly the agreement in the eyes of international public opinion, even before political repression was visible within the Communist bloc. 9. By paradoxes of History, Spain was also the first country, within the process of dismantling its dictatorial regime after Franco’s death, which laid on the principles of political developments in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the founding document of CSCE process. In conclusion, the CSCE was a tool for dialogue hitherto closed to Franco’s Spain, which partially broke the international ostracism suffered by the Francoist dictatorship. Moreover, the Conference of Helsinki supposed a turning point for Spain and the treatment received by its delegation was a global recognition that things would change in this country early. However, the possible metamorphosis was inexistent and imperceptible in the short term. Despite the Spanish delegates did a creditable and remarkable paper in the different phases of Helsinki and Geneva, especially taking into consideration the internal and external problems that surrounded their participation in this panEuropean forum, the facts happened at home in September 1975 and the limited international background became the Conference of Helsinki as the last great lost opportunity

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for the Franco’s regime to change its discontinuous behavior in foreign affairs. The CSCE did very little to resolve the underlying problems of the Spanish foreign policy. However, in the medium term, the seed planted by the Spanish delegation at the CSCE finally paid off. After General Franco’s death and the beginning of Transition, the foreign policy of Spain also changed its course and was adapted to a democratic regime. The Spanish diplomats would play a key mediating role in the follow-up Conferences of Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983), in a context of frenetic change at national and international level. Spain would welcome and would save the born-in-Helsinki process, which had been close to derail. Thus, the results harvested in Helsinki would be visible years later, when Franco had died and Spain had become a democratic country fully integrated into the concert of Western European nations.

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