Environmental Ethics

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Environmental Ethics CHAPTER · MARCH 2015 DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199363445-0025

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Environmental Ethics Michael Paul Nelson, Leslie A. Ryan LAST MODIFIED: 10 MARCH 2015 DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199363445-0025

Introduction Environmental ethics focuses on questions concerning how we ought to inhabit the world; what constitutes a good life or a good society; and who, where, or what merits moral standing. The field emerged most significantly in the 1960s from an increasing awareness of the global environmental condition, although its multiple roots stretch back through the conservation legacy of Roosevelt and Leopold, the transcendentalism of Thoreau and Muir, a growing wilderness movement, insights from the ecological sciences and their precursors, and 19th-century Arcadian sentiments. The field of environmental ethics emerged as a reaction to the perception of growing environmental crises, such as the transformation of Australian forests into pine plantations, rivers afire in the industrialized regions of the United States, the pressure of population growth on natural resources, and the preservation of wild lands. In the United States these concerns led to legislative action such as the Wilderness Act (1964) and the formulation of several key pieces of legislation reflecting concern for environmental health and well-being, such as the Clean Water Act (1972) the Endangered Species Act (1973), and the establishment of both Earth Day and the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970. These events and others have most frequently been read through the lens of Western philosophy, with Aristotle, Hume, Spinoza, and others serving as theoretical guides, and Western science functioning as both source of and solution to environmental problems. Contributions from non-Western cultures illuminate other forms of relating to the land, based on very different metaphysical understandings. There is often a fine line, for example, between the animate and inanimate, or communal and individual—a line of moral considerability found in other cultures that some Western philosophers seek to blur. Rather than establishing separate categories for nonWestern environmental ethics, or those offered by feminists, we have focused on the arguments and investigations within the field. Through creating constellations of individuals with similar concerns, we have created a taxonomy of discourse on selected topics. This article opens with general overviews of environmental ethics in single-author monographs and edited anthologies. Foundational texts from

philosophy, science, and the humanities provide an interdisciplinary context for the concepts explored in sections on the human place in nature, moral consideration, putting environmental ethics into practice, and issues of and for the future.

General Overviews These monographs provide general introductions to the field of environmental ethics. They represent varying motivations underlying the call to environmental ethics, and each overview has a particular and unique perspective. Callicott has arguably introduced more non-Western thought and experiences into environmental ethics than any other philosopher. In Callicott 1994, precepts and ethical guides from indigenous and contemporary Asia, South America, Africa, and the Americas are compiled into a valuable cross-cultural introduction to environmental ethics. Des Jardins 2013 compellingly uses early-21st-century environmental issues such as climate change, conservation, and sustainability to introduce significant ethical theories and terms, and asks critical questions to be considered by the reader. Jamieson 2008 joins urgent environmental concerns and ethics with clear discussions of, for instance, why it matters to think about morality, and explains how it is that our wellbeing is tied to that of nature. Curry 2011 provides a thorough overview of basic ethical approaches, such as deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics, although the author’s focus throughout the book is on ecocentrism. Curry introduces nested scales of environmental ethics, from anthropocentric shallow or light green, to biocentric medium green, to core of ecocentric deep or dark green ecological ethics. Brennan and Lo 2008 covers the history of environmental ethics; grounds early21st-century trends in ecofeminism, new animism, and social justice in traditional and contemporary ethical theories; and concludes with a litany of urgent environmental issues and the need to understand their origins. Nash 1989 provides a history of environmental philosophy, with a particular focus on the rights of nature to exist undisturbed.

Brennan, Andrew, and Yeuk-Sze Lo. 2008. Environmental ethics. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. A well-organized, web-based introduction to environmental ethics. Sociopolitical topics and approaches, including feminism, social ecology, and social justice, are foregrounded. The entry is regularly updated, and an extensive bibliography is included.

Callicott, J. Baird. 1994. Earth’s insights: A multicultural survey of ecological ethics from the Mediterranean basin to the Australian outback. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

Callicott introduces an array of non-Western traditions that expand environmental ethics and ground the field in indigenous, religious, and spiritual practices. The focus is on correct relationships with the natural world. This is a useful overview of cross-cultural references.

Curry, Patrick. 2011. Ecological ethics: An introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Curry presents a clear, comprehensive survey of environmental ethics. He passionately argues for an ecological ethics that puts nature at the center of moral consideration. The book includes an easy-tonavigate index, notes, and bibliography.

DesJardins, Joseph R. 2013. Environmental ethics: An introduction to environmental philosophy. 5th ed. Boston: Wadsworth. This book is organized by environmental topics to encourage critical thinking about complex issues and the role of environmental ethics in addressing them. Large trends in environmental ethics are presented from both theoretical and practical perspectives. There is a helpful glossary, and discussion questions at the end of each section.

Jamieson, Dale. 2008. Ethics and the environment: An introduction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. Jamieson provides theoretical grounding for considering the environment as a sphere of ethical problems, with notable chapters on human relationships with animals and intergenerational justice issues. Cross-references, an extensive index, and bibliography make the book easy to navigate. Clear writing and vivid examples. Good introductory textbook for undergraduate and graduate levels.

Nash, Roderick Frazier. 1989. The rights of nature: A history of environmental ethics. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. Nash places environmental ethics within a larger context of rights. He locates the beginning of this largely Western ideological revolution of rights with the Magna Carta, extending through freedom and abolition movements, rights to vote, Civil Rights, and ultimately rights of nature to be left undisturbed.

Journals The leading journal in the field is Environmental Ethics, edited by Eugene Hargrove since its inception

in 1979. Issues of Environmental Ethics are frequently devoted to particular topics, such as environmental ethics and philosophy in South America and Africa, or climate change. Supplements in Spanish are made available for some issues. Environmental Values regularly publishes special issues on topics as diverse as artificial life and environmental aesthetics. Ethics and the Environment focuses on a more applied ethics, and has published special issues on ecofeminism and on climate change. Environmental Philosophy also includes papers on applied ethics, although it and Inquiry may be more accessible to readers with knowledge of philosophical theories. Inquiry hosts regular “roundtables” on subjects such as human and animal agency, metaphysics, and the nature of belief. The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics is unique in its inclusion of scientific papers. The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy broadly interprets environmental ethics, and includes stories and poetry as a means of approaching ecosophy, or the wisdom of the earth. All journals listed are peer reviewed.

Environmental Ethics. 1979–. The first journal to focus on environmental ethics, and still the leading source in the field. Abstracts and table of contents are open access, with full articles available through subscription. Published quarterly in online and print formats.

Environmental Philosophy. 2004–. A professional philosophy journal that features a broad range of topics of interest to environmental ethics and philosophy. Established in 2004; published biannually. Available in online and print formats.

Environmental Values. 1992–. Substantial breadth, including contributions from biophysical and social sciences, environmental design research, and philosophy. All abstracts and some papers are openly available online, and full articles are available through subscription. Print and online formats published four to six times a year.

Ethics and the Environment. 1996–. An interdisciplinary and international journal that focuses on environmental issues in theory and practice such as climate change, ecological economics, and environmental justice. Published semiannually in print and online formats.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 1958–. Founded by Deep Ecologist Arne Naess in 1958. Content focus is on philosophy, although papers on environmental ethics are regularly accepted for publication. Many issues are organized by coherent themes. Published six times a year, in online and print formats.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 1988–. Publishes both scientific and philosophical papers on moral and ethical issues related to agricultural land use, production, and consumption; wild and domesticated species; biotechnology; food justice; and food safety. Published six times a year, available in print and online formats.

Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy. 1983–. Journal content reflects the ecosophy first promoted by Deep Ecologists. Sections include scholarly papers; articles; narratives; book reviews; and submissions of art, poetry, and creative writing. All papers are open access. Online only; published one to two times a year.

Anthologies The first anthologies in the field began to appear in the mid-to-late 1970s. Numerous anthologies and textbooks are now available, a sampling of which is suggested here. Pojman and Pojman 2012; Light and Rolston 2003; and Gruen, et al. 2012 present broad overviews of the field, with essays that historically contextualize environmental ethics and also explore contemporary issues in the field. Pojman and Pojman 2012 stands out for its inclusion of entries from women and non-Western philosophical traditions. Schmidtz and Willott 2011 provides very helpful introductions to each topic, and Keller 2010 includes essays by prominent philosophers on the importance of studying environmental ethics, a unique addition to the typical anthology. Zimmerman, et al. 2004 and Clowney and Mosto 2009 focus on contemporary environmental issues in ethics, and are particularly appropriate for professional audiences.

Clowney, David, and Patricia Mosto, eds. 2009. Earthcare: An anthology in environmental ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. This book contains fifteen chapters on both general topics, such as valuing nature, and topics more specific and relevant to early-21st-century issues, such as waste, land degradation, and biodiversity. The book is designed for undergraduate courses.

Gruen, Lori, Dale Jamieson, and Christopher Schlottmann, eds. 2012. Reflecting on nature: Readings in environmental ethics and philosophy. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. A broad selection of readings, with sections on the moral status of animals, food, biodiversity, and aesthetics, as well as a primarily historical overview of how we see nature.

Keller, David, ed. 2010. Environmental ethics: The big questions. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Keller presents an interdisciplinary introduction to environmental ethics using contemporary and classic references from social sciences, history, business, and literature to contextualize the field. The book includes short essays by twenty leading philosophers on why it is important to study environmental ethics. It is particularly appropriate for introductory undergraduate courses.

Light, Andrew, and Holmes Rolston III, eds. 2003. Environmental ethics: An anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell. This anthology focuses mainly on Western sources, and includes chapters on moral considerability, intrinsic value, monism and pluralism, alternative environmental ethics, sustaining and restoring nature, and environmental values, all conveniently grouped as discussions among philosophers on each topic.

Pojman, Paul, and Louis P. Pojman, eds. 2012. Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and applications. 6th ed. Boston: Wadsworth. Pojman and Pojman present a broad and comprehensive overview of environmental ethics with more than seventy essays and excerpts covering subjects from animal rights to population and food ethics. Includes many classic and contemporary essays, including many entries from female and nonWestern philosophers.

Schmidtz, David, and Elizabeth Willott, eds. 2011. Environmental ethics: What really matters, what really works. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. The editors, a philosopher and a biologist, present over sixty articles covering a wide range of environmental ethics topics. Sections are prefaced by short, thought-provoking discussions, and followed by helpful study questions. The introduction includes a helpful overview of environmental ethics terminology. An excellent introductory book for undergraduate classes.

Zimmerman, Michael E., J. Baird Callicott, John Clark, Karen J. Warren, and Irene J. Klaver, eds. 2004. Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology. 4th ed. Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. In a broad array of primarily contemporary essays, each editor, as a specialist in a certain field, introduces a separate section on a topic of great interest to environmental philosophy: environmental ethics, ecofeminism and social justice, environmental continental philosophy, and political ecology.

Reference Works The foundational texts presented here outline the agenda for environmental ethics. The origins of the field are multidisciplinary, with strong voices from the sciences and other fields from within the humanities emerging along with those from philosophy. Many believe that environmental issues can only be addressed through the joining of the various descriptive sciences as the disciplines that help us understand “what” the world is, and ethics as the prescriptive pursuit of what we “ought” to do. Others have considered the other areas in the humanities and the creative arts as a way to help us make sense of, internalize, and express this relationship between “is” and “ought.” Foundational Texts from Philosophy An early question in environmental ethics was whether our environmental problems and the shifting perceptions of our relationship to nature required a fundamentally new field of philosophical inquiry, or whether it was possible to simply extend traditional Western views of ethics and metaphysics to address concerns about our human interactions with the natural world and to include those outside the human realm within our ethical discourse. Early environmental philosophers such as Richard Routley and Holmes Rolston ask this question directly (see Routley 1973 and Rolston 1975), and find traditional Western ethics inadequate to the task of addressing the environment and nonhuman species. Traditional ethics, they suggest, are innately anthropocentric. These are ethical views that do not respond to what science was revealing about sentience and ecological integration, and generally ignore discussions of our relationship with the natural world, except perhaps to say that only humans have moral standing and that human well-being is in some ways dependent on a smooth functioning nature. These philosophers conclude that a new environmental ethic is required. The Naess 1972, Routley 1973, and Rolston 1975 papers have been widely anthologized, and as an ensemble, lay out initial concerns with environmental degradation, the value of wilderness, and emotional alienation from nature. Naess was a Norwegian philosopher and wilderness-loving mountain climber who brought gestalt psychology and philosophy together in what became known as “Deep Ecology.”

Rolston is an American philosopher, son and grandson of Protestant ministers, who developed a coherent environmental ethic that valued all of creation. R. Routley (later Sylvan) was an Australian philosopher with a penchant for environmental activism, as evident in his early work with his wife, fellow philosopher Val Routley (later Plumwood) that reacted to unsustainable forestry practices in Australia. Stone 2010 investigated legal routes for determining the potential standing of nonhuman entities. This view has been expanded since its original 1972 publication to include climate, oceans, agriculture, sustainable development, and a suggestion for a Future Generations Guardian who can act to ensure the continued well-being of the earth and its citizens. Blackstone 1974 organized the first known conference on environmental ethics, held at the University of Georgia in 1971; philosophers, lawyers, and scientists shared insights on relations between ecological science and ethics. Cobb 1995, influenced by White 1967 critiquing the anthropocentrism of Christianity (cited under Foundational Texts from the Humanities), argued for the relevance of new ecological understanding to religion.

Blackstone, William, ed. 1974. Philosophy and environmental crisis. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference in Philosophy held at the University of Georgia, 18–20 February 1971. Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press. Proceedings from a 1971 conference of philosophers, ecologists, and scholars, organized to develop what Blackstone called an “ecological attitude” connecting ecological sciences to ethical considerations and values found in the natural world. The book introduced issues of obligations to future generations, population growth, and the role of technology in society.

Cobb, John B., Jr. 1995. Is it too late? A theology of ecology. Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics. Cobb suggests that sustaining the common good of humans and countering the destructive relationship we have with nature are essential for living well on earth. He links social justice and environmental concerns, and is concerned that unlimited growth places the natural world at risk. First published in 1972.

Naess, Arne. 1972. The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary. Inquiry 16:95–100. Presents seven principles of what was later called “biospherical egalitarianism”: all is connected, everything has a right to flourish, life requires diversity, diversity must emerge from freedom, our perspectives must include social and environmental concerns, ecosystems are unities of

interdependent parts, it is necessary to engage everyday places we inhabit.

Rolston, Holmes, III. 1975. Is there an ecological ethic? Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 18:93–109. Rolston asks how ecological science and ethics interact, and how an ethic with principles formed by and with ecology, rather than an incidental ethic merely about ecology, develops. Ecology reveals previously unseen beauty of the world, suggesting that the “ought” of ethics emerges simultaneously with the “is” of science.

Routley, Richard. 1973. Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? Paper presented at the International Congress of Philosophy in Varna, Bulgaria, 17–22 September 1973. In Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 1. 205–210. Varna, Bulgaria: Sofia. Routley critiques anthropocentrism as a form of human chauvinism, emerging from Western traditional ethics that grant moral standing only to humans. His classic “last man” argument demonstrates the moral impoverishment in considering the natural world and nonhuman species only as resources to be used as humans see fit.

Stone, Christopher F. 2010. Should trees have standing? And other essays on law, morality, and environment. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Stone demonstrates progress in expanding legal standing to marginalized humans, and presents an argument for the legal standing of trees and other nonhuman entities in their own right, not as a result of utilitarian value. Broadly influential; used in Supreme Court decision making, and published as a book in 1974.

Foundational Texts from Science This group of canonical references presents an array of scientific concerns regarding ethics and the environment. In Leopold 1987, the presumption that nature could, and should, be controlled is challenged. From the perspective of Leopold’s Land Ethic, command and control approaches to managing nature follow 16th-century scientist Francis Bacon’s charge to make nature a “slave” who is bound to serve humans, a belief with its roots in interpretations of positivist science and a technologycentered society that externalized costs to the environment. This concern was echoed in Carson 2002 with the warning raised by the author concerning the indiscriminate use of pesticides and the

threats they pose to all life; Carson’s writing is arguably the primary impetus in the 1972 banning of DDT in the United States. Human population growth continues to be linked to many environmental problems, and is the focus of several early environmental treatises, most notably Ehrlich 1968; Hardin 1968; and Meadows, et al. 1972. Hardin’s tragedy of the commons remains an important concept for understanding the impacts of human development on the environment. The emergence and evolution of the science of ecology has profoundly influenced environmental ethics. Environmental philosophers look to ecology as an analog offering a different portrayal of the world, one that declares relationships are primary units of investigation. Shepard and McKinley 1969 is a valuable anthology of early writings on ecology and ethical issues. Darwin 2004 proposed the theory of natural selection, a formative reference point for scientists such as Leopold, Carson, Ehrlich, Hardin, and Meadows, and greatly influential in the development of ecology.

Carson, Rachel. 2002. Silent spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. A 1962 moral call to arms by a marine biologist and naturalist on the dangers of the indiscriminate use of agricultural chemicals, effects on human health and flourishing, and serious threats to conserving biodiversity in the natural world. Often considered the catalyst for the environmental movement in the United States.

Darwin, Charles. 2004. The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. London: Penguin. Darwin suggests that our moral sense originated with a social instinct and a corresponding caring for others in the social group; this in turn led to the development of emotions like empathy, reciprocity, and affection, qualities he saw in nonhuman species as well as humans. First published in 1871.

Ehrlich, Paul. 1968. The population bomb. New York: Ballantine. Very significant book on the expanding global population and the finite capacity of the planet to sustain human civilization. Ehrlich introduced IPAT (impact = population x affluence x technology) as a measure of human impacts on the environment. Anne Ehrlich was later given credit as coauthor.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248. Hardin claims rational human self-interests coupled with a growing population will lead to inevitable conflicts as more people exploit increasingly scarce resources, and that only “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,” or socially determined restraint, can control population and manage resources. Frequently anthologized paper; sometimes used to argue for privatization of resources.

Leopold, Aldo. 1987. A sand county almanac: And sketches here and there. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Leopold expands Darwin’s progressive morality and comes to understand the whole biotic community as the proper scale of moral consideration. He grounds the value of conservation in aesthetics as well as ethics. Includes Leopold’s Land Ethic, arguably the most influential environmental ethic to date. Originally published posthumously in 1949.

Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III. 1972. The limits to growth: A report for the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind. New York: Universe. The authors connect primary environmental problems of overpopulation, associated depletion of resources, and pollution from industrial sources. These problems share a dependency on unfettered economic growth, which authors declare will ultimately lead to collapse. The book has sold more copies than any other environmental book.

Shepard, Paul, and Daniel McKinley. 1969. The subversive science: Essays toward an ecology of man. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Anthology of provocative essays by ecologists, systems theorists, poets, and landscape architects that situate human values and inhabitation of the planet within an ecological framework. One of the first times Leopold’s “The Land Ethic” was anthologized.

Foundational Texts from the Humanities Natural history, European romantic thought, and American transcendentalism are frequently cited influences in environmental ethics. For many, it was White 1967 that catalyzed the field of environmental ethics. Written by a historian of medieval science and published in the prestigious journal Science, this paper challenged the underlying anthropocentric hegemony of religious values and their impact on the environment, calling for a rethinking of our interpretation of the human/nature relationship. The authors in this section are often cited as guides and inspirations in a reevaluation of what the natural world means to humans. White 1977, an 18th-century record of the natural history of an English parish, has influenced many scientists and humanists, including Darwin, Emerson and Thoreau, Wordsworth, and Virginia Wolff. Muir 1997 is an anthology of significant writings on the author’s experiences in the wildlands of the West. Following in the traces left by Muir’s radicalized footsteps, Abbey 1990 is an impassioned and irascible account of the author’s experiences as a

ranger in Utah’s national parks. Abbey’s books, including the later The Monkey Wrench Gang, would become manifestos for radical eco-groups like Earth First! Dillard is also a solitary explorer, although, in Dillard 2007, the explorations are within the domesticated nature of an Appalachian valley, and share much in common with the year at Walden Pond, a few short miles from Boston, that is chronicled in Emerson and Thoreau 1994. Snyder 1974 is a poetic vision for the future of “Turtle Island,” an indigenous name for North America. Snyder had frequently contributed to Brand 1969. The Whole Earth Catalog was emblematic of a cultural paradigm shift of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and significant to early theories of bioregionalism. Brand, a former experimental artist, eventually became a proponent of nuclear power and GMO crops, illustrating a continuing divide between pragmatic visionaries who see a more just and sustainable future in better technologies to benefit humans, and poetic visionaries with the same future goals, but holding that the goals may only be achieved through a change of heart that focuses on our relationships with the natural world.

Abbey, Edward. 1990. Desert solitaire: A season in the wilderness. New York: Touchstone. Elegy for wild places that are becoming increasingly commercialized through what Abbey called “Industrial Tourism.” His powerful vision has inspired many to find a feeling of belonging in wild places and to work to preserve them. Originally published in 1968.

Brand, Stewart, ed. 1969. Whole earth catalog: Access to tools. Menlo Park, CA: Portola Institute. Brand first published the Catalog in 1968 as a reference book of ideas and tools for radical, countercultural, and innovative do-it-yourself living.

Dillard, Annie. 2007. Pilgrim at Tinker Creek. New York: Harper Perennial. A walking meditation on seeing the “dizzying” details of a not-so-wild Blue Ridge Mountains valley. Through keen observational skills that an ecologist would envy, and the brilliant insight of a poet, Dillard explores the intersections between inner and outer worlds. Long-standing classic; awarded the 1975 Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, and Henry David Thoreau. 1994. Nature walking. Edited by John Elder. Boston: Beacon. Elder brings together Emerson’s essays on Nature, first published in 1836, and Thoreau’s 1862 meditation and manifesto on Walking. Thoreau’s thoughts on simplicity, enlightenment, and hope

found in uncultivated places were greatly influenced by Emerson’s earlier writings.

Muir, John. 1997. John Muir: Nature writings. New York: Library of America. Compilation of Muir’s major writings beginning in the 1870s: The Story of My Boyhood and Youth, My First Summer in the Sierra, The Mountains of California, and other essays. Muir’s preservation ethic has influenced wilderness advocates and environmentalists for over a century.

Snyder, Gary. 1974. Turtle Island. New York: New Directions. Pulitzer Prize–winning poet Snyder writes about how we ought to live in the world: speaking and working for nature, taking responsibility for the places we inhabit, and managing the land for ten thousand years out. Brings non-Western experiences and reinterpretations of intellectual history to thinking about the natural world.

White, Lynn, Jr. 1967. The historical roots of our ecological crisis. Science 155:1203–1207. This highly influential and controversial essay located sources of environmental ills in anthropocentric Judeo-Christian traditions. White stated that our values, beliefs, and attitudes toward nature must change before we can adequately address contemporary environmental crises. He suggests St. Francis as a model for a practice of a virtue-based environmental ethic.

White, Gilbert. 1977. The natural history of Selborne. New York: Penguin. An 18th-century parish priest in a small English village, White’s observations of the local landscape have become a classic in natural history studies and have been cited as a foundation to contemporary ecology. First published in 1788.

Moral Consideration Who or what qualifies for moral consideration or direct moral standing, and what does that consideration entail? How are we, as moral agents, obliged to act toward or with other humans, all other living beings, and ecological systems, or to the world as a whole? The answers to these questions reveal much about how we see our responsibilities to nonhuman others, both individual and collective, and to the well-being of future generations. A primary conceptual differentiation in environmental ethics is whether humans are at the center of a circle of moral consideration or not,

and who or what is allowed in the circle with us. Much argument in environmental ethics concerns how far the circle may be extended. Anthropocentrists draw the line for direct moral standing at all, but only, humans. Zoocentrists allow for the inclusion of various nonhuman animals, but argue over the foundation for that inclusion, with some suggesting it is the ability to experience pleasure and pain that nets animals moral standing, others that it is the fact that they are experiencing subjects-of-a-life. Biocentrists enlarge the circle to all individual living beings—plants and animals—and out of necessity, they begin to plot ways to sort out the inevitable competing moral claims made by the nowcrowded moral community. Ecocentrists expand the circle to include ecological collectives (i.e., species, populations, biotic communities, etc.), often focusing on the metaphysical inseparability of an organism from its associated species and from the land that supports it. Though we are often unaware of it, assumptions about the moral standing of the human and nonhuman world underpin much of public decision making, from various environmental policies to management directions. Anthropocentrism Environmental ethics is, in many ways, an argument about the place of humans in nature. When Lynn White Jr. introduced the term “anthropocentric” in 1967, and linked it to a belief that humans had a right or even a mandate to dominate the earth, he established a fundamental argument in environmental ethics. Can humans be at the center of moral consideration and still act ethically with regard to the rest of the world? John Passmore is a leading proponent for precisely this position (see Passmore 1974), responding positively that Western philosophy and ethics has the theoretical grounding necessary to act ethically toward the natural world; we do not need another kind of ethics or a “new” ethic, we simply need to be consistent with the application of those ethical systems we already embrace. A strict view of anthropocentrism, such as that presented in Baxter 1974, is that only humans count and that the rest of the world is here only for our use and benefit. While animals or places may be valued or admired, and an animal’s pain or pleasure may affect us and therefore be objectionable, only humans possess intrinsic value. Other beings have instrumental value to us; only considerations for human welfare and human rights determine the moral worth of the natural world. Varieties of anthropocentrism have been proposed: Norton 1991 and Hargrove 1989 propose “weak anthropocentrism” that acknowledges the beauty and integrity of nature, a view that Hargrove further extends to allow for both intrinsic and instrumental value, while other suggestions are “narrow anthropocentrism” and “prudential anthropocentrism” that favor a view of nature as services provided for human use. Sagoff 2008 is concerned with an anthropocentric focus on ecosystem services, and its potential to discount other values of nature. Shrader-Frechette 1991 proposes an ethic between anthropocentrism and biocentrism that gives human rights priority over the welfare of the environment.

Baxter, William F. 1974. People or penguins: The case for optimal pollution. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Baxter posits that nonhuman entities are valuable solely for their instrumental value to humans, and harm done to nonhuman species or systems is an ethical issue only as it impacts human well-being. He claims that people will preserve the natural world when it benefits them. People first, penguins last.

Hargrove, Eugene. 1989. Foundations of environmental ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Hargrove proposes “weak anthropocentric intrinsic value” to describe human encounters with nature as a primary source of environmental values. Nature has value as humans experience it, and alienation from nature is a source of environmental issues. He presents a broad, insightful, and comprehensive overview of the field, as of 1989.

Norton, Bryan G. 1991. Toward unity among environmentalists. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Norton suggests that a full accounting of human values will reveal no real, pragmatic difference between bio- or ecocentric declarations that the natural world is intrinsically valuable, and anthropocentric actions done for the good of present or future human populations, still present adequate constraints on human behavior.

Passmore, John. 1974. Man’s responsibility for nature: Ecological problems and Western traditions. New York: Charles Scribner’s. Passmore declares humans have responsibility to care for the natural world, but that existing philosophical traditions are adequate to address contemporary ecological issues. We can reject Western thought that treats nature as a machine to be used, without rejecting a history that also includes humans as stewards of the earth.

Sagoff, Mark. 2008. The economy of the earth: Philosophy, law, and the environment. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Sagoff declares while we manage nature for human benefit, our individual and social well-being rests on more than an economic valuation of goods that tends to externalize ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual values of the natural world. Argues it is possible to maintain economic value without losing the

“sacredness of nature.”

Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S. 1991. Environmental ethics. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood. While acknowledging the presence of values in the natural world, Shrader-Frechette supports human rights and welfare over that of the environment, a position she views as between anthropocentrism and zoocentrism. Her view seems to change slightly in later writings.

Zoocentrism Zoocentrism is an ethic that centers on animal welfare and rights, and ascribes direct moral standing to certain nonhuman animals either because they are sentient (i.e., capable of feeling pleasure or pain) or because they are experiencing subjects-of-a-life and therefore can be said to possess rights. Peter Singer and Tom Regan are the most recognized proponents of zoocentrism (see Singer 2009 and Regan 2004). As a direct implication of their philosophical and rational arguments, both demand profound changes in how we consider and treat animals. They differ significantly, however, on why animals matter. From Singer’s utilitarian perspective, sentient beings are morally considerable; therefore, to cause or allow unnecessary suffering is morally wrong. From Regan’s rights-based view, the moral wrong is not grounded in sentience itself, but emerges from a more fundamentally erroneous expectation that animals are a resource for our use. Regan emphasizes the inherent value of all animals, while Singer is more concerned with the relationship between sentience and interests, as without the ability to suffer, no interests of the individual may be inferred. Feinberg 1974 grounds moral rights in interests, concluding that sentient animals possess interests and therefore may also hold rights. Bekoff and Pierce 2009 explores the presence of moral intelligence in animals, and rejects human exceptionalism. Written in the late 19th century, Salt 1980 follows the historical expansion of rights and moral obligations to examine our relationships with animals, a position later taken up in Singer 2009 and Midgley 1983. Zoocentrism raises other questions about food ethics, indigenous traditions, and potential differing values of wildlife and domesticated animals. Leopold and Shepard (see Leopold 1987 and Shepard and McKinley 1969, both cited under Foundational Texts from Science) are advocates of hunting, an activity supported by other environmental philosophers such as Plumwood (see Plumwood 2000, cited under Universal Consideration) who include indigenous cultural practices of hunting within an ethical practice. Regan, and Singer to a lesser extent, are adamantly opposed to killing animals or making them suffer for sport, research, or food, a stance shared by ecofeminists such as Carol Adams who proposes veganism as a solution (see Adams 2010). Callicott 1980 provides an important counterpoint to zoocentric animal liberation ethics through emphasizing the good of the community as the measure of health and well-being. Hewing to Leopold’s Land Ethic, Callicott maintains that preserving the good of the whole may well require that

individuals be killed or removed from the land. Callicott was harshly critiqued by Regan and others who labeled such a valuing of biotic wholes as an “environmental fascism,” a charge that has proven persistent.

Adams, Carol J. 2010. The sexual politics of meat: A feminist-vegetarian critical theory. New York: Continuum. Adams links oppression of women with oppression and exploitation of animals, and, noting that equality must be practiced and theory must be engaged, proposes a universal veganism.

Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce. 2009. Wild justice: The moral lives of animals. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Bekoff, a cognitive ethologist, and Pierce, a philosopher, ask if animals have a sense of moral intelligence. Defining morality as species-specific behavior of individuals within social groups, they present numerous accounts of animals acting empathetically, cooperatively, and fairly, challenging traditional views of humans as sole possessors of moral intelligence.

Callicott, J. Baird. 1980. Animal liberation: A triangular affair. Environmental Ethics 2:311–338. Finds zoocentric, animal liberation ethics wanting, as arbitrary rationales are used to determine moral consideration, which is in turn accorded only to individuals. Proposes that a valid environmental ethic must account for all: animals, plants, rivers, mountains—in short, the whole of the biotic community found in Leopold’s Land Ethic.

Feinberg, Joel. 1974. The rights of animals and unborn generations. In Philosophy and environmental crisis. Edited by William T. Blackstone, 43–68. Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press. Feinberg’s 1971 essay on moral rights and interests made a substantial contribution to the first conference on environmental ethics, and remains widely referenced. He bases rights on the capacity to be harmed or benefited, and so acknowledges rights of sentient beings, but not species or beings without cognitive capacity.

Midgley, Mary. 1983. Animals and why they matter. Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press. Midgley examines what shapes human obligations to animals might take, and reevaluates barriers

have been constructed between animals with humans. Accepting domesticated animals as partners, she offers the concept of a “mixed community” of close and caring relationships between humans and nonhuman species.

Regan, Tom. 2004. The case for animal rights. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Manifesto declaring the fundamental issue is rights and justice for animals, not merely an implication of their ability to suffer. Animals are more than resources for our use; they are intrinsically valuable, experiencing subjects-of-a-life. Calls for abolition of all animal agriculture, medical testing using animals, and hunting or trapping of animals.

Salt, Henry Stephens. 1980. Animals’ rights: Considered in relation to social progress. Clark’s Summit, PA: International Society for Animal Rights. Salt looks historically at social changes that removed past justifications for human-human inequities, and applies similar reasoning of declarations of rights, sympathy and kinship, to human-animal relationships. An early proclamation against vivisection, killing animals for food or fur, and keeping pets as playthings. First published in 1892.

Singer, Peter. 2009. Animal liberation: The definitive classic of the animal movement. New York: Harper Perennial. This book inspired animal ethics through applying utilitarianism to argue for equal consideration of human and animal suffering and against “speciesism” that unjustly advantages humans. Singer develops the standard of sentience as the basis for moral consideration. First published in 1975.

Biocentrism Biocentrists draw a line between the animate or biotic individual and the inanimate or abiotic to determine direct moral standing. Biological organisms that we typically consider individual living things possessing a good of their own fall within the moral community—while rocks, species, and ecosystems do not. Biocentrism originates in a deep critique of anthropocentrism and its perceived inability to help us comprehend how we ought to interact with and value what is not human. Biocentrism, as a kind of nonanthropocentrism, holds that anthropocentrism, such as that espoused by Passmore or Norton (see Passmore 1974 and Norton 1991, both cited under Anthropocentrism), is inadequate for the preservation and protection of nonhuman living things. Albert Schweitzer is considered by many to be the founding ancestor of biocentrism (see Schweitzer 1936), and inspired

others, such as Rachel Carson who dedicated Silent Spring (Carson 2002, cited under Foundational Texts from Science) to him. Paul Taylor expanded Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” (see Taylor 2011), and has been the standard bearer of biocentrism since the publication of his book, Respect for Nature. He rejects any hierarchal distinctions among living beings, declaring that all should be accorded unconditional respect. Goodpaster 1978 presents a challenge to Taylor’s nonhierarchal stance, stating that it is impossible to live if all living beings are equal in moral significance. This problem of ethical overload prompted others to offer solutions to a crowded moral universe. Sterba 1998 generally supports Taylor’s theory, and further considers the problem of practical application of biocentric ethics through suggesting principles of self-preservation and the fulfillment of basic needs. VanDeVeer 1979 posits that considering the two factors of an entity’s psychological complexity and the level of interest at stake will allow us to justly weigh and adjudicate competing moral claims. Attfield 2003, like VanDeVeer, uses psychological complexity to determine correct action in cases of conflict. Some believe that biocentrists are still susceptible to the charge of speciesism, or the prioritizing of the human species over others for no good reason. Taylor and Sterba directly address this challenge and argue for a species-impartial biocentrism.

Attfield, Robin. 2003. Environmental ethics: An overview for the twenty-first century. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Attfield presents an argument for biocentric consequentialism that projects potential outcomes of actions impacting ethical norms. He supports intrinsic value of living beings that is based on the capacity for living beings to thrive, independent of any anthropocentric instrumental value. There are brief summaries in each chapter, and a useful glossary.

Goodpaster, Kenneth E. 1978. On being morally considerable. Journal of Philosophy 75:308– 325. Beginning with sentience as a characteristic of life itself, rather than grounds for moral consideration, Goodpaster argues that it is arbitrary to exclude any living being/organism; we have obligations and responsibilities to all living beings. In later work, Goodpaster considers the biosphere to be an organism deserving of moral status.

Johnson, Lawrence E. 1992. Toward the moral considerability of species and ecosystems. Environmental Ethics 14:145–157. The essay is a summary of Johnson’s 1991 book, A Morally Deep World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press). Johnson uses intrinsic value, systems theory, and an extended biocentrism to develop

an environmental ethic that looks at ecological collectives (species, populations, biotic communities) as living beings with moral standing.

Schweitzer, Albert. 1936. The ethics of reverence for life. Christendom 1:225–239. Schweitzer’s model of an ethic demonstrating a “reverence for life” has been frequently cited in biocentric ethics. He believed that we are called to live with compassion, gratitude, and respect for all of nature. Schweitzer received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1952 for his humanitarian work.

Sterba, James P. 1998. A biocentrist strikes back. Environmental Ethics 20:361–376. Sterba argues that moral behavior does not require relinquishing access to one’s own basic needs or life for the benefit of another, but does require restraint and “reciprocal altruism.” He establishes a “species-neutral” biocentrism, although he accepts it is possible for a species to ethically maintain preference for its own members.

Taylor, Paul W. 2011. Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. Taylor’s notion of respect for nature has established the basis for most biocentric arguments. He believes it is important to see the natural world as intrinsically valuable, not as a repository of resources that are valuable only as they are instrumentally valuable for human use and consumption. First published in 1986.

VanDeVeer, Donald. 1979. Interspecific justice. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22:55–79. Proposes three types of interests for sorting competing claims to moral consideration: those basic to minimal support of life, “serious” interests without which survival becomes difficult, and peripheral interests that affect flourishing. In cases of conflict, accords priority to those with “more complex psychological capacities” for living a satisfying life.

Varner, Gary E. 1998. In nature’s interests? Interests, animal rights, and environmental ethics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Varner proposes “biocentric individualism” and “axiological anthropocentrism” as midpoints in ethics: individual beings are morally relevant, while the system overall is not. In axiological anthropocentrism,

living creatures that are capable of reasoning and learning possess direct moral standing, although he suggests human interests may override the interests of nonhumans.

Ecocentrism and Deep Ecology Ecocentrism is often said to be grounded in Leopold’s Land Ethic, which further extends moral consideration to include “soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” p. 239 (see Leopold 1987, cited under Foundational Texts from Science). The inclusion of biotic communities most profoundly distinguishes ecocentrism from biocentrism, as species, populations, and ecosystems become morally relevant and part of the moral community. Callicott is the leading Leopold scholar within environmental ethics. In Beyond the Land Ethic (see Callicott 1999), he examines a range of issues from environmental activism to ecological metaphysics in agriculture through the lens of ecocentrism. Rolston 2012 explores what the author calls the “environmental turn” in philosophy, and charts a path for ecological citizenship. Hunt 1980 critiques arguments in Goodpaster 1978 (cited under Biocentrism) and Feinberg 1974 (cited under Zoocentrism) that “mere things” must be excluded from moral consideration because they lack interests. The Gaia hypothesis, proposed in Lovelock 2000, may be seen as an extension of ecocentrism, in which a systems theory understanding of self-organization and self-regulation is applied to the earth as a whole. Ecocentric ideas about the intrinsic value of ecological collectives find their way into practice in many ways, perhaps most notably through policy such as the US Endangered Species Act (1973), which protects rare or threatened species and their habitats. Deep Ecology refers to a specific line of ecocentric inquiry first articulated by Naess (see Naess 1972, cited under Foundational Texts from Philosophy), and later expanded in Devall and Sessions 2001 and Fox 1995. Naess saw technological or most policy solutions as “shallow” and incapable of addressing the larger question of how to encourage change on a fundamental level, change that Naess believed must be based on Self-Realization, or the understanding that humans are deeply embedded within, and inseparable from, the world. The Deep Ecology movement is careful to provide a solid lineage that begins in Leopold and Carson, and references Aristotle and Spinoza to explain the significance of self-realization. Some ecofeminists have been critical of Deep Ecology, declaring the focus on an individual self to be anthropocentric, if not egocentric, and ultimately detrimental to seeing our deep, emotional connections with the natural world. Kheel 2007 critiques the ecocentrists for taking an ethical stance that, the author believes, devalues individuals in favor of the abstraction of wholes.

Callicott, J. Baird. 1999. Beyond the land ethic: More essays in environmental philosophy. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. In this series of essays, Callicott, a leading figure in environmental ethics, contextualizes practical and

theoretical concerns ranging from holistic environmental ethics, intrinsic value, conservation, agriculture, and sustainability. This is the second book of a series of collected essays on Leopold’s Land Ethic.

Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. 2001. Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered. Layton, UT: Gibbs Smith. A compilation of insights and sources exploring the origins and intentions of Deep Ecology. They assert there is no sustained boundary between the self and the environment; if we harm nature, we are also harming ourselves. Includes appendices with writings from philosophers and poets on issues pertinent to Deep Ecology.

Fox, Warwick. 1995. Towards transpersonal ecology: Developing new foundations for environmentalists. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Comprehensive overview of Deep Ecology and how the connection between ecology and spiritual awareness can establish an ecophilosophy informed by insights provided by psychology. Fox finds traditional value theories inadequate for describing the dynamics of human-nature relationships. In a transpersonal ecology, nature is an extension of one’s self.

Hunt, W. Murray. 1980. Are mere things morally considerable? Environmental Ethics 2:59–65. Hunt suggests that “being in existence” is a more inclusive and ethically sound principle on which to base moral relevance than the biocentric principle of “being alive” and possessing interests.

Kheel, Marti. 2007. Nature ethics: An ecofeminist perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kheel proposes a holistic ecofeminist ethic that values empathy, inclusivity, and caring for “other-thanhuman” individuals and the particularities of place—elements that she and other ecofeminists find lacking in the abstractions of some other ecocentric ethics.

Lovelock, James. 2000. Gaia: A new look at life on earth. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis further extends the ecocentrist inclusion of species, collectives, and systems within the circle of moral consideration through proposing a reconceptualization of the Earth itself as a living organism, and so deserving of moral standing. First published in 1979.

Rolston, Holmes, III. 2012. A new environmental ethics: The next millennium for life on earth. New York: Routledge. Rolston exhorts the reader to find value in nature. Using case studies to map environmental ethics issues, such as climate change and sustainability, Rolston encourages us to become “ecological citizens” who are respectful and caring toward the natural world. Worthwhile beyond its intended purpose as an undergraduate textbook.

Universal Consideration The basic metaphors of centrism and extensionism place someone, often a human someone, at the center. There is, however, another way to start the conversation: begin with the assumption that all things count, and that no clean lines can be drawn between humans and the rest of the world. Birch 1993 declares that simply because ethics is concerned with determining who or what is morally relevant, the burden of proof is always upon those we wish to include. Perhaps the burden of proof should be reversed and we should begin with the assumption that all entities and conditions in the world have the potential to be morally considerable. Cheney 1998 agrees, and finding alliance in indigenous and ecofeminist ethics, uses a specific example of the moral relevance of rocks to explore what universal consideration might look like. Plumwood 2000 and Kohák 1992 suggest that all beings in the world must be seen as possessing intrinsic value, as demonstrated through having a life to cherish, along with instrumental value, as each being feeds or shelters other beings (see Adams 2010, cited under Zoocentrism, for a dissenting view). In this case, intrinsic value obliges those who would take from or otherwise impact a bearer of intrinsic value—to eat it, to construct a road across its territory, to pollute it—to practice restraint and eat or take only what can be renewed, to build bridges across barriers, and to not overburden with pollutants. Robin Kimmerer, along with Kohák, believes the world is a community of “persons,” not all of whom are human, but all of whom deserve respect (see Kimmerer 2013). They both ask how we might speak of and to the natural world in ways that will lead to sustainable dwelling and how to encourage respect and reciprocity in our interactions. In other writings, Plumwood has suggested a “polycentrism” that in effect removes the image of the center, a tactic that Weston 2009 explores through a proposal for multicentrism that opens space for multiple and overlapping perspectives.

Birch, Thomas H. 1993. Moral considerability and universal consideration. Environmental Ethics 15:313–332. Birch argues that it is wrong to think that humans are masters, holding the keys to the kingdom of moral consideration. He proposes universal consideration, the idea that we should begin with the

assumption that everything merits consideration for direct moral standing.

Cheney, Jim. 1998. Universal consideration: An epistemological map of the terrain. Environmental Ethics 20:265–277. Cheney makes an ecofeminist critique to explore unacknowledged problems rising from ethical dangers integral to scientific methods that seek to know and control nature. He references indigenous thought in order to expand on Birch’s universal consideration by considering rocks as entities that may belong in a moral domain.

Kimmerer, Robin Wall. 2013. Braiding sweetgrass: Indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge, and the teaching of plants. Minneapolis: Milkweed. Integrated collection of essays by a Potawatomi elder, award-winning writer, and distinguished professor of botany. Chapters on the indigenous concept of “The Honorable Harvest” and “Learning the Grammar of Animacy” are particularly useful in the discussion regarding our ethical relations with the natural world as grounded in reciprocity and gratitude.

Kohák, Erazim. 1992. Speaking to trees. Critical Review 6:371–388. Kohák contrasts technological ecology, which does not challenge the dominant socioeconomic paradigm, with a moral or philosophical ecology, which recognizes intrinsic value and expects respectful and considerate interactions with the natural world. Introduces concept of “personhood” as basis for respect.

Plumwood, Val. 2000. Integrating ethical frameworks for animals, humans, and nature: A critical feminist eco-socialist analysis. Ethics & the Environment 5:285–322. Ecofeminist Plumwood investigates ethical relationships between humans and nonhumans, especially when nonhumans are also food. She notes that vegetarians situate living entities, such as plants, outside the realm of moral consideration, furthering the conceptual human-nature separation. She argues for seeing ourselves as part of the food chain, rather than separate.

Weston, Anthony. 2009. The incompleat eco-philosopher: Essays from the edges of environmental ethics. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. A collection of essays by Weston, an environmental pragmatist who rejects the ruling metaphor of an

expanding circle of moral consideration and proposes “multicentrism” with multiple humans and nonhumans bringing individual perspectives and interests into a common moral sphere. Includes chapter on deep space exploration as frontier for environmental ethics.

The Human Place in Nature Many environmental philosophers are concerned with metaphysical issues in environmental ethics, believing that assumptions about the nature of reality underpin our current environmental problems and our proposed environmental ethics. If metaphysics are malleable, and connected to our environmental problems, then metaphysical modifications can result in real-world environmental changes. Mathews 1991 looks for this elemental knowledge of self and world in the entwined and inseparable relationship between an organism and its environment. Cordova 2007 presents an indigenous or ethnometaphysics view that sees the world as nondualistic and polycentered. Merchant 1980 covers early ecofeminist theorization; its author is one of the first to clearly present the association of women with a nature to be dominated. Ecological feminism, through the work of philosophers such as Merchant, Karen Warren, Greta Gaard, and Val Plumwood, has been a transformative addition to environmental ethical theories. Reading environmental ethics through the lens of what Plumwood 1993 calls the “master model” of domination situates Western philosophical foundations in a dualistic conception of human and (or vs.) nature, and within pervasive issues of gender, race, and class oppression that cannot be separated from a similar domination of nature. Throughout such discussions, much hangs on definitions of “nature” and what constitutes “natural.” Social theorists Raymond Williams and C. S. Lewis, among others, have noted the difficulty of the word “nature” and its mutable applications. For McKibben 1989 and Wuerthner, et al. 2014, nature is the totality of the nonhuman world—nature is the wild and untamed, and not the world that is increasingly domesticated and put under human command. In contrast, Cronon 1995 argues that there are problems with assuming that nature exists “elsewhere” and that humans must be excluded from definitions of the natural, a stance echoed by other philosophers who note that we need only to speak of connections with nature when there is no longer a credible relationship between humans and “what is not human,” to use McKibben’s distinction. Birch 1998 is concerned with the project of human domination of the natural world, or what Birch terms the “imperium.” He suggests that all land should be as sacred as we now hold wilderness to be, and that wilderness can be found in cracks in the pavement or the edges of agricultural fields as readily as in distant landscapes.

Birch, Thomas. 1998. The incarceration of wildness: Wilderness areas as prisons. In The great wilderness debate. Edited by J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson, 443–470. Athens, GA:

Univ. of Georgia Press. Birch sees wilderness areas not as freed through preservation, but rather, through the implementation of land management practices and policies, as physically and conceptually confined in humanconstructed prisons. He proposes a reconceptualization of all land as a sacred continuum.

Cordova, Viola F. 2007. How it is: The Native American philosophy of V. F. Cordova. Edited by Kathleen Dean Moore, Kurt Peters, Ted Jojola, and Amber Lacy. Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press. In this posthumously published book, Cordova applies her own experiences as an Apache Hispanic woman, solid scholarship, and a poetic intuition to an elucidation of Native American philosophy of right relationships with the earth, and the role of human beings within the natural world.

Cronon, William. 1995. The trouble with wilderness; or, Getting back to the wrong nature. In Uncommon ground: Rethinking the human place in nature. Edited by William Cronon, 69–90. New York: W. W. Norton. Seminal essay challenging the definition of wilderness as ideal nature, untouched by humans. Cronon posits that there is danger in presuming that wilderness is a destination removed from human inhabitation, and that visions of how to live ethically and sustainably in the world cannot depend on distant pockets of wilderness.

Mathews, Freya. 1991. The ecological self. London: Routledge. Mathews searches for the “metaphysics of interconnectedness” of the ecological self within an ensemble of science (specifically Einstein’s theory of relativity), mythology, and cultural worldviews. The self for Mathews is both autonomous and structurally coupled with its environment, or part of living systems of selves, in other words, ecologies.

McKibben, Bill. 1989. The end of nature. New York: Random House. McKibben declares that respect for nature is dependent on wonder and awe for wildness, and not from places domesticated by humans and technology. Human influence, however, especially through climate change, has extended to every place, creating the “end of nature” as a place of fascination and sanctity.

Merchant, Carolyn. 1980. The death of nature. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Merchant presents an analysis of the intersections among science, history, women’s and environmental movements, culture, and what counts as nature. The ecological revolution she envisions would establish partnerships, rather than oppositions, between and among humans and the natural world.

Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the mastery of nature. New York: Routledge. Plumwood situates environmental issues in the hierarchal opposition of nature and humans that casts nature, and women, as not much more than passive background. She compares the marginalization of nature with that of women, and people who are ethnically, racially, or socially different from those in power.

Wuerthner, George, Eileen Crist, and Tom Butler, eds. 2014. Keeping the wild: Against the domestication of earth. Washington, DC: Island. Essays by philosophers, scientists, and activists who discuss the value of wilderness and naturalness. Many reject the view that wilderness is a social construction or an artifact of a new era of the so-called human-dominated Anthropocene, or destined to be domesticated into a garden on earth.

Religion and Stewardship A significant element of religions worldwide is that of normative standards concerning how humans ought to consider and behave toward the natural world. Explanations about the beginning of the world either directly or indirectly lay down tenets for right behavior and relationships with nature. Different worldviews present differing views of this relationship, whether it is something to be transcended, or something in which humans are deeply embedded. Gottlieb 1996 provides an overview of the ties between religion and nature. The author’s introduction on the role of religion in considering environmental crises is a clear and personal examination of the emotional and spiritual toll exacted by planetary pollution, loss of beauty, and dangers to the health and well-being of all. Sideris 2003 and Grim and Tucker 2014 examine the relationship between ecological science and religion, concluding that it is possible and necessary to find common ground. Grim and Tucker are founders of the interdisciplinary Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale. Deloria 1999 also explores the connections between science and spirituality, and provides an indigenous perspective of the intimacy of humannature relations. Albanese 1991 looks at the role that nature in America had on the development of

American religious beliefs, and later manifestations in New Age thought, while Adler 2006 provides a fascinating view from a social science perspective into the world of paganism in America. Stewardship has contemporary roots in White’s challenge to Judeo-Christian beliefs that, he proposes, have inevitably led to human domination of nature (see White 1967, cited under Foundational Texts from the Humanities). Stewardship attempts to overcome the human-as-master and nature-as-servant relationship through a rereading of Genesis as a call to be stewards of the earth, not plunderers. For some, stewardship is also considered to be anthropocentric, with humans still in a dominant position, still separate from the natural world, and leading to considerations of a nature that cannot be left to manage without us. Palmer 1992 is critical of a green theology that does not examine the underlying assumptions of stewardship or the consequences of casting nature as natural resources to be used, wisely or not, while Welchman 1999 posits that an enlightened anthropocentrism and the cultivation of human virtues encouraging moral decency in our interactions with nature may beneficially foster environmental stewardship.

Adler, Margot. 2006. Drawing down the moon: Witches, druids, goddess-worshippers, and other pagans in America. New York: Penguin. Adler, a National Public Radio correspondent, uses an ethnographic approach to studying contemporary pagan and earth-centered traditions in America, including a survey and participant observation. The result is an objective and sympathetic introduction to the history and practice of a variety of pagan practices. An appendix contains useful definitions.

Albanese, Catherine L. 1991. Nature religion in America: From the Algonkian Indians to the New Age. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In this historical survey of the New Age movement, Albanese pulls together an unlikely ensemble of Native Americans, Christian folk singers, transcendentalists, healers, inventors, and pioneers to explore the thesis that a noninstitutionalized metaphysical, or nature, religion is fundamental to understanding American religious thought.

Deloria, Vine, Jr. 1999. Spirit and reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr., reader. Golden, CO: Fulcrum. A religious current runs through Deloria’s writings, whether the subject is religion, politics, or education. This compilation of his writings directly addresses religion and Native American conceptions of sacred land, the value of myths, and the nondualism of the world.

Gottlieb, Roger S., ed. 1996. This sacred earth: Religion, nature, environment. New York:

Routledge. A comprehensive, multicultural survey of religious perspectives on nature. Sections focus on religious ways of seeing nature, traditional worldviews of nature, the roles of ecofeminism and deep ecology in guiding transformation, religious practices, and social justice.

Grim, John, and Mary Evelyn Tucker. 2014. Ecology and religion. Washington, DC: Island. Uses Native American religious thought, Christianity, Confucianism, and Hinduism in a comprehensive exploration of the essentialness of religion if a positive restructuring of human-nature relations and sustainable future are to be possible. Very useful appendices of ethical declarations for the environment, as well as a glossary and discussion questions.

Palmer, Clare. 1992. Stewardship: A case study in environmental ethics. In The earth beneath: A critical guide to green theology. Edited by Ian Ball, Margaret Goodall, Clare Palmer, and John Reader, 67–86. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Palmer is critical of using Christianity to justify stewardship of the earth as a valid environmental ethic. Posits theological, political, and ecological issues in the assumption that the earth can or must be managed by humans without encouraging increased human use of what is easily recast as “natural resources.”

Sideris, Lisa. 2003. Environmental ethics, ecological theology and natural selection. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. A survey of ecological theologians and science is incorporated into the moral guidance provided through religious ethics. Sideris concludes most ecotheologians borrow selectively from science, and that a constructive environmental ethic would be firmly rooted in an understanding of current science, contemporary environmental issues, and respect for natural processes.

Welchman, Jennifer. 1999. The virtues of stewardship. Environmental Ethics 21:411–423. Welchman argues that benevolence and loyalty encourage the cooperative action that will benefit environmental well-being, and that these and other virtues of human flourishing, if coupled with environmental education and experiences that hone greater awareness, can lead to a voluntary acceptance of the role of steward for the natural world.

Conservation and Restoration The more traditional form of anthropocentric, utilitarian-based conservation has morphed into concerns for population viability, ecosystem health, invasive species, and extinction. These concerns, as Vucetich and Nelson 2013 points out, have ethical foundations. Are species and ecosystems morally relevant? How should conflicts between conservation goals and social needs be resolved? What factors should determine population viability or ecosystem health? Similar questions were addressed in the 1920s in Leopold 1979, as the author surveyed degraded land in the American Southwest and concluded that conservation is a moral issue. In response to the provocative essay by Cronon on the meaning of wilderness (see Cronon 1995, cited under Human Place in Nature), Minteer and Manning 2003 attempts to chart the history and future of conservation. Authors in Minteer and Manning’s collection recuperate historical models of conservation ranging from stewardship to communitarian ideals, and extend the conversation on conservation to interdisciplinary, adaptive models that work with cultural and wild environments, are committed to long-term engagement, and have the health and integrity of the land as a guiding objective, a Leopoldian ideal (see Sustainability). There is an extended conversation in environmental ethics concerning restoration of ecological systems. Elliot 1997 and Katz 2012 have prompted a long discussion on the ethics of restoration, arguing the value of a landscape restored by humans is not equal to the value of a nonhuman-designed landscape. Elliot is uneasy with the rationale that restoration could provide for development: if the land could be properly restored, there is little reason to maintain the diversity or functioning of any existing natural system. Katz contends that the primary issue is the role of restoration in justifying human domination over nature, as efforts to preserve natural systems will be greatly undermined if we believe we can meaningfully restore them; it also obscures potential efforts to prevent the degradation that first created the need for restoration. These cautionary views of ecological restoration are countered by philosophers, such as in Light 2000 that argues restorations can foster positive relationships between humans and nature, and in Hettinger 2002 that suggests that environmental ethics cannot ignore the need for a positive view of how humans engage the natural world: If nature is autonomous and better off without humans, then what does environmental ethics offer in guiding right attitudes and behaviors toward the natural world?

Elliot, Robert. 1997. Faking nature: The ethics of environmental restoration. London: Routledge. Elliot examines concepts of ecological restoration, locating the problem of legitimizing the destruction of the environment through promising to recreate it again or elsewhere. Elliot posits that replicas or forgeries are less valuable than originals, in nature as well as in creative works.

Hettinger, Ned. 2002. The problem of finding a positive role for humans in the natural world. Ethics & the Environment 7:109–123. Hettinger proposes the need to differentiate between the absolute autonomy of nature and the freedom of the natural world from human domination and control. He notes that issues of scale are important and overlooked, and suggests a partnership of respect and mutual benefit is possible.

Katz, Eric. 2012. Further adventures in the case against restoration. Environmental Ethics 34:67–97. Katz comprehensively addresses critiques of his argument that there are deep ethical problems embedded in ecological restoration, as the process of restoration ignores human domination of nature, assumes it is possible to control the natural world, and does not foster serious discussion about land uses that first degraded the environment.

Leopold, Aldo. 1979. Some fundamentals of conservation in the Southwest. Environmental Ethics 1:131–141. In this short essay—originally written in 1923, though never published in his lifetime—Leopold discusses conservation from economic and moral perspectives. He uses philosophy, religion, and poetry to propose a view of the earth as a living organism that ought not be destroyed with “moral impunity.”

Light, Andrew. 2000. Ecological restoration and the culture of nature: A pragmatic perspective. In Restoring nature: Perspectives from the social sciences and humanities. Edited by Paul Gobster and Bruce Hull, 49–70. Washington, DC: Island. Light proposes an environmental ethic that appeals to an anthropocentrically inclined public. He argues that ecological restoration also restores positive human relations with nature, and that the connections forged as people work to restore beauty and integrity of a place can result in many advantages over preservation for its own sake.

Minteer, Ben A., and Robert E. Manning, eds. 2003. Reconstructing conservation: Finding common ground. Washington, DC: Island. An interdisciplinary anthology divided into sections on historical considerations of nature and culture; a revisiting of conservation’s roots in community issues, a democratic planning process, and

proposals for new models of conservation. The book concludes with twelve principles of a reconstructed conservation and essays from conservation practitioners.

Vucetich, John, and Michael P. Nelson. 2013. The infirm ethical foundations of conservation. In Ignoring nature no more: The case for compassionate conservation. Edited by Marc Bekoff, 9– 26. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Authors propose that conservation science has a key role in promoting virtue ethics and empathy as a means of comprehending our connections with nonhuman others. Understanding the ethical implications of conservation objectives, such as maintaining ecosystem health, is crucial if conservation science is to be taken seriously and, ultimately, acted upon.

Practicing Environmental Ethics From the beginning, and emerging during a time of environmental crises, environmental ethics has worked to link theory and practice. In addition to theories of normative ethics that construct moral principles guiding our actions, environmental ethics is also an applied ethic that attempts to meaningfully engage specific and real-world situations and problems, from climate change to genetic engineering, to social and environmental justice issues. Environmental virtue ethics moves away from discussions about moral considerability, outcomes of actions or conceptions of rights, and refocuses attention on the role of character in determining ethical action toward the environment. Environmental pragmatism developed first in the 1990s, fueled by a postmodern and pluralist opening up of environmental narratives and the perceived need to find more immediate solutions to urgent issues. Related to this felt need is the rise of environmental activism, a broad term that can encompass ecological literacy, advocacy by scientists, and acts of eco-sabotage in the name of environmental health and well-being. Ecological justice movements have risen simultaneously with pragmatism and activism, and have been strongly affected by social ecology, feminist, and postcolonial thinking. Environmental Virtue Ethics What kind of person would destroy beauty or mindlessly take the life of another? Answering a question like this concerns the norms of character that some suggest should govern our relationships with the natural world. Environmental virtue ethics connects human flourishing to environmental health and well-being, often through the virtues of care, respect, and humility. Routley’s “last man” argument (see Routley 1973, cited under Foundational Texts from Philosophy) is an example of environmental virtue ethics that is frequently invoked: If you are the last human on earth, and soon to

die, what would be morally wrong with destroying the world? Environmental virtue ethics presumes that this is indeed wrong, as it reflects a nonvirtuous character. The kind of people that we are is reflected in our actions with and toward the natural world. The focus on human flourishing introduced in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics is a subject of concern in Sandler 2007 and van Wensveen 1999. Cafaro 2001 and Shaw 1997 evoke Leopold and demonstrate how the cultivation of empathy, justice, humility, integrity, and other signs of a virtuous character may provide the grounding needed to value and preserve what Leopold called the beauty and integrity of the natural world. Hill 2006 suggests that cultivation of virtues such as humility and appreciation can positively impact the environment, and contribute to the resolution of environmental problems. Frasz 1993 expands on Hill’s earlier writing on humility, suggesting that “openness” is a more useful and nondualistic term for a virtue based on being a part of the natural world. Some philosophers engaged with issues of environmental justice, such as Peter Wenz (see Wenz 1988, cited under Ecojustice), caution about the potential of using virtue ethics in ways that puts the moral burden of environmental crises on the backs of disadvantaged individuals and cultures who have few opportunities to interact differently with their environment. Others take issue with the omission of discussion concerning intrinsic value or, as in Rolston 2005, with the human centeredness of virtue ethics and its emphasis on what can be perceived as enlightened self-interest. Many of the individual essays included in this section, as well as excerpts from other books, are also found in Environmental Virtue Ethics by Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), the first anthology in the field.

Cafaro, Philip. 2001. Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an environmental virtue ethics. Environmental Ethics 22:3–15. Through the lives and writings of Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson, Cafaro examines human flourishing emerging from a deep engagement with and respect for wild nature. Core environmental virtues of protection and preservation are connected to core human virtues such as sympathy and justice, health and beauty, quietness, and close watching.

Frasz, Geoffrey B. 1993. Environmental virtue ethics: A new direction for environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics 15:259–274. Frasz presents an analysis of Hill’s virtue of humility as a significant character virtue that leads the way to an environmentally good life. He suggests that “openness” better describes humility as a means of seeing oneself as intricately connected to the natural environment.

Hill, Thomas, Jr. 2006. Finding value in nature. Environmental Values 15:331–341.

Environmental problems may be more effectively approached through discussions of character and attitudes than through analysis of rights, costs and benefits, or metaphysical appeals to intrinsic value. Humility, gratitude, and appreciating what is good in the world are character virtues with significant impact on how we act toward the environment.

Rolston, Holmes, III. 2005. Environmental virtue ethics: Half the truth but dangerous as a whole. In Environmental virtue ethics. Edited by Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro, 61–78. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Rolston finds the emphasis on self-fulfillment of individual virtues to be problematic for an environmental ethic that might foster senses of belonging within the natural world. He distinguishes virtues from nature that emerge from deep, reciprocal engagement, and virtues toward nature that are cultivated with or without experience in nature.

Sandler, Ronald. 2007. Character and environment: A virtue-oriented approach to environmental ethics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Sandler introduces virtue theory as an alternative to rights-based or utilitarian views of human-nature relationships. He explores the meaning and significance of human flourishing, in particular focusing on the role of environment virtues, such as virtues of respect and stewardship, in the promotion of well-being for both humans and environment.

Shaw, Bill. 1997. A virtue ethics approach to Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. Environmental Ethics 19:53–67. Shaw declares that an ethic is an attitude toward life that, like ecology, is based on relationships. He suggests that there are “land virtues” in Leopold’s writing, such as respect, justice, and prudence that are essential to preserving the integrity of biotic communities (which include humans).

van Wensveen, Louke. 1999. Dirty virtues: The emergence of ecological virtue ethics. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books. Van Wensveen suggests virtue language is embedded in philosophy and nature/ecological writing as it describes revelatory and personal responses to the natural world. She posits an interdependence between cultivation of virtues and environmental sustainability, as human flourishing is only truly possible in an environment that is also flourishing.

Pragmatism and Activism Environmental pragmatism consists of two poles of thinking and action, one based on policy and the democratic process, and the other on civil disobedience. Environmental pragmatist positions such as those found in Light and Katz 1996 and Minteer 2011 look for practical applications of environmental ethics in the resolution of real-world problems. Minteer’s approach focuses on pragmatically engaging political solutions to real problems, and so making environmental ethics more relevant to the conflicts that arise as humans who may well intrinsically value nature also need—or desire—to use nature for human advantage. On the other hand, environmental activists, particularly those influenced by the critique of patriarchal dominance proffered by ecological feminism, tend to believe that actions and attitudes toward nature cannot be separated, and that environmental issues cannot be resolved without addressing the dominant structures supporting a destructive status quo. Both seek change: pragmatists through existing channels, and activists through what List 1993 calls environmental civil disobedience. Shrader-Frechette 1994 declares that environmental crises are too acute for public intellectuals such as scientists and philosophers to be silent or plead neutrality. The author makes the points that it is fallacy to presume that it is possible to be completely objective or value free, and that it is essential for the academy to maintain independent perspectives and the capacity to critique. Ehrlich 2009 concurs that advocacy for the environment is a moral imperative for scientists. Political projects such as the Routleys’ engagement with forest issues in Australia (see Routley and Routley 1974), specifically the transformation of native forests into nonnative pine plantations, and Regan’s militant view of animal rights (see Regan 2004, cited under Zoocentrism) are examples of the philosopher-as-advocate. Nelson—not an environmental pragmatist, but drawn to “doing philosophy that matters” (see Nelson 2008)—suggests that it is necessary for environmental philosophers to engage the ecological sciences, and work collaboratively with others outside the discipline of philosophy if environmental philosophy is to be relevant to contemporary socioecological issues. In an iteration of Routley’s and Rolston’s questions in the early 1970s (see Routley 1973 and Rolston 1975, both cited under Foundational Texts from Philosophy) about the need for a new environmental ethic, List 1993 teases out differences between mainstream expectations that existing anthropocentric values can, and should, be modified to protect the environment, and radical environmentalist belief that new ecocentric values and a new planetary philosophy are needed to deal with environmental crises.

Ehrlich, Paul R. 2009. Ecoethics: Now central to all ethics. Bioethical Inquiry 6:417–436. Ehrlich writes that ecoethics, defined as applied ethics with strong environmental links, connects to all spheres of human activity. He links intergenerational equity for the future with determination of ethically correct behavior in the early 21st century, and stresses the need to build redundancy and resiliency into social and ecological systems.

Light, Andrew, and Eric Katz, eds. 1996. Environmental pragmatism. New York: Routledge. An anthology of diverse essays on pragmatism in environmental philosophy. Light and Katz introduce foundational works in American pragmatist thought; subsequent chapters focus on the practice and applications of environmental pragmatism, and how environmental ethics can be valuable in determinations of water policy, resource management, conflict resolution, and other situations.

List, Peter C., ed. 1993. Radical environmentalism: Philosophy and tactics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Radical environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Earth First! have called vivid attention to inequities and injuries to nature. Through essays by Deep and deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and radical environmentalists, List examines the motivations behind the environmental civil disobedience of those supporting radical tactics on behalf of the earth.

Minteer, Ben. 2011. Refounding environmental ethics: Pragmatism, principle, and practice. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press. Minteer is critical of environmental ethical theories emphasizing intrinsic value and anthropocentric vs. bio- or ecocentric perspectives, declaring that environmental ethics must become more relevant to real-world issues. Presents a pluralist and democratic view incorporating multiple voices and concerns into environmental and conservation policy, decision making, and conflict resolution.

Nelson, Michael P. 2008. On doing helpful philosophy: Commentary on “Redefining ecological ethics and philosophy at Cape Horn.” Science and Engineering Ethics 14:611–614. Nelson proposes examples of how environmental philosophy can be seen as relevant and significant in revealing and working through the ethical issues that are inherent, but more frequently unexamined, in conservation, wildlife ecology, and the ecological sciences.

Routley, Richard, and Vernon Charles Routley. 1974. The fight for the forests: The takeover of Australian forests for pines, wood chips, and intensive forestry. Canberra: Australian National Univ. Demonstrates the activist core of environmental philosophy. Routley and Routley link philosophical argument with knowledge of socioeconomic and ecological systems, and argue against the reductionism of science and management that substitutes the complexity of the forest with the

simplicity of a tree farm. Out of print, but valuable reference.

Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. 1994. An apologia for activism: Global responsibility, ethical advocacy, and environmental problems. In Ethics and environmental policy: Theory meets practice. Edited by Frederick Ferré and Peter Hartel, 587–603. Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press. Shrader-Frechette offers a consequentialist argument in support of environmental advocacy by scientists and public intellectuals: with informed advocacy, less environmental harm is likely to accrue, human and nonhuman welfare is more apt to be protected, public education will be improved, and more reasoned decisions will be made.

Ecojustice Theories of justice inquire into the fair distributions of benefits and risks for humans, and at times, to nonhumans. The 1989 debate between Bookchin and Foreman (see Bookchin and Foreman 1991) highlights the different perspectives of social ecology and deep ecology (see Ecocentrism and Deep Ecology). Bookchin was a pioneer in social ecology, which is premised on the belief that social and economic systems must be revolutionized before true change in the human-nature relationship can occur. Bookchin was critical of radical environmental thought in particular, claiming that it is based on a form of wilderness fundamentalism and on exclusion of social justice issues. Foreman claims that true social and economic justice cannot be obtained without a healthy environmental context. Some postcolonial theorists such as Guha concur with Bookchin (see Guha 1989), critiquing the emphasis on preservation of wild animals and wild lands as a form of heavy-handed imperialism that does not account for social and economic inequities or the local needs of particular people and cultures. The focus on local cultures is connected to bioregionalism, a theory and practice informed by Bookchin’s social ecology and radical environmentalism, as examined by List (see List 1993, cited under Pragmatism and Activism). Social justice is concerned with full participation in society, equity in relationships, and access to educational and economic opportunity. Environmental justice, as examined in Wenz 1988, is concerned with the proximity of and inequalities in exposure to environmental dangers, such as contamination and pollution. Gottlieb and Joshi 2013 discusses food justice and fair access to nutritious, sustainably grown and culturally appropriate food, topics of increasing interest to philosophers and policymakers who are engaged in practical applications of environmental ethics in communities worldwide. Rozzi 2012 adds biocultural ethics as a (re)coupling of biological and cultural diversity that resists homogenization and advantages local and regional forms of knowledge. Shiva is a long-standing advocate for justice movements that support local economies and environmental health, cultural diversity, women’s rights, and long-term sustainability

(see Shiva 2011).

Bookchin, Murray, and Dave Foreman. 1991. Defending the earth: A dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. Edited by Steve Chase. Boston: South End. Bookchin argues that social justice issues are at the core of environmental crises; resolving our current crises will require profound change in our societies and the economies that support them. Foreman counters that only a deep ecological view based on the intrinsic value of nature will provide the change needed.

Gottlieb, Robert, and Anupama Joshi. 2013. Food justice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. An essential guide to food justice issues, although primarily in the West. Covers industrial food production, processing, and distribution, and addresses concerns such as impaired access to nutritious food in food deserts.

Guha, Ramachandra. 1989. Radical American environmentalism and wilderness preservation: A third world critique. Environmental Ethics 11:71–83. Offers critique from the Global South of deep ecology and environmentalists’ focus on wilderness preservation as problematic and inappropriately applied to the non-Western world where the survival of local human populations and cultures is put at risk for the benefit of nonhumans in what he terms an “imperialist project.”

Rozzi, Ricardo. 2012. Biocultural ethics: Recovering the vital links between the inhabitants, their habits, and habitats. Environmental Ethics 34:27–50. Biocultural ethics recouple cultural and biological diversity as well as human habits and habitat, and remove barriers such as physical and conceptual distance from nature that are often shaped through political decisions. Through an inventive investigation into the origins of ethos, Rozzi redefines ethics as dwelling, habit and custom, and natural disposition.

Shiva, Vandana. 2011. Earth democracy: Justice, sustainability, and peace. Cambridge, MA: South End. Shiva outlines a democracy of the earth based on the intrinsic value of humans and nonhuman species and their cultures. Focus is on the recuperation and protection of local economies, resources,

and cultures.

Wenz, Peter S. 1988. Environmental justice. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Examines issues of environmental justice and racism related to the disproportionate number of people of color and the poor who must deal with uneven distribution of environmental burdens, from contaminated land or water to pesticide exposure. Counts biological organisms and ecosystems as morally relevant and subject to considerations of justice.

The Future Our Common Future (1987), also known as the Brundtland Report, established that sustainable development must meet “the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations to meet their own needs.” There are more questions embedded in this statement than clear definitions: How is sustainability measured, and by whom? What are basic needs and what are peripheral? Exactly what do we owe to future generations, and how do we know that we will leave what they need? The long spatial and temporal reach of climate change is further challenging the moral landscape of consideration for the future.

World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our common future. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. First introduction of the term “sustainable development.” The report remains a primary reference in early-21st-century sustainable discourse, although sustainable development also is critiqued as a vague and even oxymoronic term.

Sustainability Sustainability is a challenging concept with multiple meanings and applications. Norton 2005 offers a comprehensive view into the vague terrain of sustainability and seeks to develop a common vocabulary that can cross disciplines and integrate diverse perspectives. The author proposes a pluralistic approach to developing sustainable policies that pragmatically works toward consensus. Newton 2003 also aims for consensus; the work, along with Newton and Freyfogle 2005, evokes Leopold as a model for ethical engagement. For Lutz Newton and Freyfogle, the fuzziness of the term hobbles progress in conservation and results in the marginalization of ecological science and land

health in favor of human needs that are deemed more pressing. Scherer 2003 suggests there are multiple views of sustainability depending on whether it is resources; lifestyles; or the renewability, reusability, or substitutability of particular materials and practices that are to be sustained. Unlike Newton 2003, Thompson 2010 is cautious and sometimes critical of the nonneutrality of technology. The agrarian philosophy proposed by the author is based on the habits, virtue, and good character that emerge in community solidarity and a sustainability he defines as “functional integrity.” Vucetich and Nelson 2010 points out that the many philosophical and ethical ambiguities in the notion of sustainability could lead to a radically different world. The authors write, “depending on how critical normative terms such as ‘human needs’ and ‘ecosystem health’ are defined, sustainability could mean anything from ‘exploit as much as desired without infringing on the future ability to exploit as much as desired’ to ‘exploit as little as necessary’” (p. 540) to maintain a meaningful life.

Newton, Lisa H. 2003. Ethics and sustainability: Sustainable development and the moral life. Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Newton uses Leopold’s Land Ethic and the virtue of simplicity to evaluate sustainable development. Her view of an ethical sustainability focuses on new technologies and stewardship, and strives to balance human needs with preservation of nature.

Newton, Juliane Lutz, and Eric Freyfogle. 2005. Sustainability: A dissent. Conservation Biology 19:23–32. Broad definitions of sustainability make it difficult to focus on conservation and the well-being of ecosystems and species; Newton and Freyfogle claim that concerns for the environment itself are muffled by the human centeredness of sustainable development and management of natural resources, and suggest “land health” as a useful counter image.

Norton, Bryan G. 2005. Sustainability: A philosophy of adaptive ecosystem management. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. A lengthy exploration into how we talk about sustainability and adaptive management, and how that conversation both reflects and directs how we conceptualize, and subsequently manage, natural resources. Appendices helpfully explain Norton’s methods.

Scherer, Donald. 2003. The ethics of sustainable resources. In Environmental ethics: An anthology. Edited by Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, 343–358. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Scherer suggests that resources must be reconceptualized as nonanthropocentric, as all life forms use resources, and all of life is a resource. States that sustainable development needs to consider the inherent value of what is taken from the natural world.

Thompson, Paul B. 2010. The agrarian vision: Sustainability and environmental ethics. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky. Collection of Thompson’s essays covering almost three decades. Thompson conceptualizes agrarian culture as a socioecological practice, and argues for the contribution of agrarian ideals to the dialogue on sustainability, a field he suggests is closer to a form of self-sufficiency than it is to outcomes of technological innovation.

Vucetich, John A., and Michael P. Nelson. 2010. Sustainability: Virtuous or vulgar? BioScience 60:539–544. Vucetich and Nelson demonstrate that the vagaries of the meaning of sustainability are fundamentally philosophical or ethical in nature. They show that the variations in how we define the notion of sustainability can lead to radically different worlds.

Climate Change and Intergenerational Futures Climate change, enduring land uses, persistent degradation of the environment, and sustainability are all concerned with relationships of equity between spatially and temporally distant people. Climate change is particularly difficult to parse, as the dispersed causes and effects are unevenly generated and felt, and the sources are thoroughly integrated with contemporary expectations for what constitutes a good life. Gardiner is disturbed by uneven distribution of costs and benefits resulting from climate change, as those with fewer resources are generally asked to bear the biggest burdens (see Gardiner 2013). What he calls the “perfect moral storm” is the outcome of a lack of ethical consideration of the impacts borne by marginalized individuals, cultures, and the environment as a whole. Nanda 2011 helpfully provides international perspectives on the ethical and practical effects of climate change, and insights from environmental philosophers on our moral responsibilities toward distant others. Heyd 2010 focuses on the role of cultural frameworks in determining the range of potential responses to climate change. As “social actors,” the author claims, we have inherent responsibilities to limit the harm caused by climate change. Palmer examines obstacles to accepting that humans are responsible for harm to species due to climate change (see Palmer 2009). She suggests that intentionality and foreseeability may be usefully applied to assessing responsibility and causes of harm to groups and species. As noted in Attfield 1998, the very existence of future

generations depends on the decisions that are made today, underscoring the urgency to define our relationships to distant others. That these decisions must include principles of equity that stretch across great temporal distances complicates odd ensembles of governance structures, cultural frameworks, data storage, and public discourse on moral obligations to unknown people and places. O’Neill 1993 offers an argument that links past, present, and future generations in a single continuum, with knowledge, value, and risk shared across generations, similar to the arguments in Weiss 1992 and Attfield 1998 that society is a partnership between generations. Brown Weiss extends the inherent obligations of this partnership to include the right of future generations to a healthy planet with reasonably intact resources. While Attfield rejects rights as a basis of obligation between present and future, both James Sterba (see Sterba 1981) and Brown Weiss assert that it is possible to attribute rights to future generations.

Attfield, Robin. 1998. Environmental ethics and intergenerational equity. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41:207–222. Attfield, following a metaphysical model of human society as an intergenerational partnership, proposes trusteeship as a credible and morally sound view of responsibility for future generations. He offers a consequentialist argument based on the Precautionary Principle that prudence is required in order to reduce risk for future generations.

Gardiner, Stephen M. 2013. A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Gardiner proposes that issues related to climate change are the result of inappropriate ethical stances that pass the impacts of climate change on to less developed and more vulnerable places on earth, and to future generations. He also cites a general lack of ecoliteracy. Includes an appendix on global population.

Heyd, Thomas. 2010. Climate change, individual responsibilities and cultural frameworks. Human Ecology Review 17:86–95. Heyd examines the role of cultural patterns as a factor that influences the capacity of a society to adapt to climate change or enact any necessary transformation. He concludes that individual efforts may initially appear futile, but may also be effective roads to changing the governing institutions.

Nanda, Ved P., ed. 2011. Climate change and environmental ethics. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Nanda pulls together interdisciplinary and international scholars and activists to present a map of alternative ways to envision and enact our values, and act collaboratively to resolve complex issues. Philosophers, political scientists, environmental scientists, and community leaders contribute a broad array of insights, including from the Global South.

O’Neill, John. 1993. Future generations: Present harms. Philosophy 68:35–51. O’Neill proposes a continuum across and among generations. Considerations of present harm to future generations are legitimate when we examine how the future finds use in or can contribute to current knowledge, and how current social needs are either inhibited or facilitated by actions and decisions made in the past.

Palmer, Clare. 2009. Harm to species—species, ethics, and climate change: The case of the polar bear. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 23:587–603. Explores anthropogenic climate change and its impact on the well-being of polar bears as a moral issue concerning harm done to species. Suggests because it is possible to foresee climate change impacts on species, whether intentional or not, that humans may be morally bound to consider harm caused by climate change.

Sterba, James P. 1981. The welfare rights of distant people and future generations: Moral sideconstraints on social policy. Social Theory and Practice 7:99–119. Sterba presents a fine-grained interpretation of rights that extends rights granted to spatially distant people as a means of outlining moral consideration of temporally distant people. He challenges the assumption that possession of goods today entails no obligation to provide for future generations.

Weiss, Edith Brown. 1992. In fairness to future generations and sustainable development. American University International Law Review 8:19–26. States that as “intertemporal entities” of society, future generations have group or generational rights to receive a planet with a natural resource base that can reasonably fulfill future goals. Achieving this requires long-term scientific research and maintenance of data to provide needed guidelines for future decision making.

The Environmental Humanities

Environmental humanities is an interdisciplinary field that uses multiple avenues to “read” the landscape and investigate our complicated and tangled relationships with the natural world through the language we use to describe it and the values and beliefs embedded in the stories that we tell. Drawing from foundational texts by Thoreau and Muir, and continuing in the vein of Dillard and Snyder (see Foundational Texts from the Humanities), these present an ensemble of reflective and visionary ethical practices.

Berry, Wendell. 2004. That distant land: The collected stories (Port William). Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint. In this collection of stories by poet and farmer Berry, stewardship of a place is a manifestation of personal and communal virtue, and linked to the virtues of friendship, patience, and hard work. Philosopher Freyfogle (see Newton and Freyfogle 2005, cited under Sustainability) uses Berry’s protagonist Mat Feltner to illustrate communitarian ethics.

Callenbach, Ernest. 1990. Ecotopia. New York: Bantam. Callenbach captured the ecological anxiety of the 1970s through a story of a sustainable, utopian society of local food, bicycles, recycling, public transportation, and bioregional politics. It continues to provide a means of seeing that it is possible to change how we live and what we value. First published in 1975.

Coetzee, J. M. 2001. The lives of animals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. First presented as Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Philosophical narrative follows animal rights, and the lives we allow them. Coetzee’s protagonist declares we are surrounded by cruelty and killing that is rarely acknowledged, as animals, who can only respond with silence, are the recipients of suffering.

Kingsolver, Barbara. 2012. Flight behavior: A novel. New York: Harper. The story imagines climate change impact in a rural Tennessee community that improbably becomes a new wintering home for monarch butterflies. Shifts in climate patterns affect more than weather: the love for places, our relationships within the world-at-large, and values guiding how we “ought” to act will all be profoundly challenged.

Le Guin, Ursula. 2004. The wind’s twelve quarters. New York: William Morrow.

Collection of 1960s–1970s science fiction short stories, including “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas (Variations on a Theme by William James)”—a “psychomyth,” according to Le Guin, and inspired by William James’s analysis of morality that James posited is innately possessed and continually negotiated.

McPhee, John. 1980. Encounters with the archdruid. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. McPhee’s nonfiction narrative about prominent environmentalist David Brower poses Brower against three antagonists with very different views of our relationship to the environment: as resources we are obliged to use, as terrain we should change just as nature changes, and as a partnership between humans and nature.

Moore, Kathleen Dean. 2004. The Pine Island paradox: Making connections in a disconnected world. Minneapolis: Milkweed. A book that belongs in the classrooms of many disciplines. Through essays on encounters, engagements, and wild affairs with the natural world, Moore develops an ethics of care that rejects the dualism of human vs. nature or the sacred vs. the mundane and argues for the intrinsic value of nature.

Moore, Kathleen Dean, and Michael P. Nelson. 2010. Moral ground: Ethical action for a planet in peril. San Antonio, TX: Trinity Univ. Press. A collection of powerful short essays from leaders in ethics, business, literature, politics, and activism —all addressing the question, why is it wrong to wreck the world? Introduction clearly lays out the need to combine ethical and ecological thinking. back to top

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