Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities

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PhD, Senior Lecturer, University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences.
PhD, Professor, University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences.
Gérard François Dumont and Pierre Verluise, Géopolitique de l'Europe, (Paris, Armand Collin, 2009), 116.
The fail of European Defence Community ratifiyng process, in 1954 (Federica Bindi, European Union foreign policy: a historical overview," in The foreign policy of the European Union, ed Federica Bindi (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 14; Charles de Gaulle veto against the accession of United Kingdom, in 1963 and 1967, in order to maintain France influence and agricultural market position inside Community, to increase its external power and to maintain its equidistance between USA and USSR; (David Ramiro Troitiño, "De Gaulle and the European Communities," in Proceedings of the Institute for European Studies. Talinn University of Technology, no. 4 (December 2008): 145-7, http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Troitino.pdf); Margaret Thatcher fight to reduce UK contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy, at the expense of other, and especially of France (David Ramiro Troitiño, "Margaret Thatcher and the EU," in European Union: Current Political and Economical Issues. Proceedings of the Institute for European Studies. Talinn University of Technology, no. 6 (2009): 127-130); the surprising Denmark negative popular vote in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, because of teh fear for a supranational industrial-relations system (Carsten Strøby Jensen, Jørgen Steen Madsen and Jesper Due, "Towards a European IR System? The Implications of the Maastricht Treaty for Danish Industrial Relations," conference presented at Third Biennial Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Washington DC (May 27-29, 1999), Published, University of Copenhagen, Department of Cultural Sociology FAOS, Industrial Relations Research Group (April 1993), http://aei.pitt.edu/7149/1/002384_1.PDF). It is possible to add also the cases of negative Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice, in 2001; the French and Netherlands no to European Constitution in 2005; The Irish no to Lisbon Treaty; the Czech and Polish tergiversation of ratiofication of Lisbon Treaty. Dumont and Verluise, 103.
Michel Foucher, Is the European Union viable with 27 members and more? From market to geopolitical community," in Politique étrangère, Special issue (2008): 79.
Howewer, even Robert Schuman considered that united Europe had not to limit only to free societies, but it had to extent to East, to the people who were longtime waiting for the recognition and the moral support of the Western Europe: "Nous considérons comme partie intégrante de l'Europe vivante tous ceux qui ont le désir de nous rejoindre dans une communauté reconstituée. […] Chaque pas que nous faisons dans ce sens constituera pour eux une chance nouvelle. Ils auront besoin de nous dans l'immense tâche de réadaptation qu'ils auront à accomplir. […] Ainsi s'édifiera une Europe nouvelle, prospère et indépendante. Notre devoir est d'être prêts." (Robert Shuman, Pour l'Europe, Nagel, Paris, 1963, apud. Dumont and Verluise, 80)
The question is about viability of "the core concepts of the European integration". Nadja Aleksandrova-Arbatova, "Western Balkans: Yet Another Intersection of Global Politics," in Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen. 01 (2012): 16.
European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Enlarging the European Union. Achievements and Challenges. Report of Wim Kok to the European Commission," (26 March 2003), 73, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/communication_strategy/report_kok_en.pdf.
Ludger Kühnhardt, "The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the European Integration," in Panorama. Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs. "20 Years after the Fall of Berlin Wall" vol. 1 (2009): 47. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_18025-1522-2-30.pdf?091130144448
Foucher, 79. Nevertheless, the weak international capacity of EU existed too when European community had few members. It is right, at the moment the Community had not so important common mechanisms in the field of common foreign policy, although the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) already started. So, EEC confronted some internal and external tensions (in EEC-USA relations) in the '70-'80 because of different approaches of the conflicts from Middle East or in its relations with USSR. Bindi, 21-22.
As regarding EU itself, the numer of member states, beside some economical data and some external missions like these from Afghanistan, East Timor or Congo, are the marks of its quality of global player". European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World," Brussels (12 December 2003): 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
Simon Duke, "Pax or Pox Europeana after the Lisbon Treaty," in The International Spectator, vol. 46, no. 1 (March 2011): 85.
EU distinguishes between challenges that are facing the global actors (globalisation, both in its positive and negative aspects, conflicts, poverty ans social insecurity, competition for natural ressources, energy dependence), and threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime), that are different and more dynamic than the threats of the Cold War. European Security Strategy...," 1-5.
European University Institute, 6.
Realised by authors of this paper by using the following sources: European University Institute, 10-14, 17; Biščević, 8-11.
However, regarding these problems it is not possible to assert that they could not reappear, but EU's permanent attention and monitoring of this kind of issues diminishes the risk of escaladation of conflicts.
Although it was a very important objective, EU considered that enlargement have not to happen with any price: "It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe" ( European Security Strategy...," 9). In 2010, although the economic crisis was not outdated, EU considered its "further enlargement" to Croatia, Western Balkans countries and Turkey as a "political priority", and this despite of some "key challenges" as "improving legal standards, public administration, freedom of expression and conditions for socially excluded groups". "EU Enlargement - state of play," http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/091110_en.htm
European University Institute, 3.
European University Institute, 4-5, 9-15, 71-72.
European University Institute, 54-55.
Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 16.
Claudio M. Radaelli, "Europeanisation: Solution or problem?," in European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 8, no. 16 (2004): 3, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm
Report Kok underline the importance of relations between "interest" and "identity" in decisional EU process. European University Institute, 67.
An approach that is guiding our discussion from the quantitative approach of M. Foucher to a qualitative one, concerning the position of member states face to EU institutions.
It seems that the process of Europeanisation have to be assessed not only for the new members, but likewise for the old. The anti-EU attitudes of UK as the recrudescences of nationalism in Western Europe could be considered as possible evidences of the irreversibility of European unification process. Considering the Eastern unconformities and sometimes reject of conditionality, these are rather the sign of political imaturity, a source of discontinuities for the integration process, it is obvious, although not always taken very seriously. Alexandrova-Arbatova is more critical when she asserts that EU tests out a systemic crisis, materialised in the failure to integrate the Muslims in Germany, France and UK, the continuous gap between European institutions and citizens, the new North-South split, and the increasing waves of nationalism, xenophobia and populism that seems to be not connected to enlargement than in the terms of the internal difficulties of EU to manage a new "territorial expansion". Alexandrova-Arbatova, 16.
Opposite attitude of UK is already famous. Although European Economic Community suported UK in its foreign affairs (in the civil war in Rhodesia, in Falkland conflict), UK refused to accept a common sanction in South Africa in the events from 1985. Bindi, 20.
Gergana Noutcheva, European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Balkan Accession. Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance, (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 38.
The term of interest is present too in the Treaty of Lisbon, where it is comming with the term of EU values".
José Manuelo Barroso, "Political Guidelines for the Next Commission," 41, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/press_20090903_en.pdf
European Commission, "State of the Union. Address by José Manuel Barroso to the European Parliament," (12 September 2012): 6, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm
After the Second World War.
Kentrotis considers that opposition to the political integration of EU is developed both by the structures of Westphalian nation-states, which permanently find a new national dream" to follow, and by their citizens, who are poorly familiarised with the European affairs. Kyriakos D. Kentrotis, "The European Union and the Balkans: between symbiosis and integration?," in Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3 (2010): 65.
EU failed to integrate by political points of view when it contained few member states, consequently we had to expect to more difficulties when the number of members increased. This doesn't mean, in any case, the new member states are the only guilty for these difficulties of political integration.
Probably it is the time to rise some questions: UK' Euro-skepticism is an answer to the enlargement challenges and new priorities or only of the economic crisis? How the former euro-enthusiastichal states arrived to a Euro-skeptical attitude or even to put into question the future participation into tgeh European project? How exactly the states floated from "compliance patterns" to dispute the legitimacy of EU requirements? Are these the proof of the so debated "artificial" character of European unity? European unity represented a solution for difficult periods of European states, but when stability was accomplished the European "system" became suddenly too restrictive and "transformative power" and legitimacy of European community useless and denied? Could be all these considered as priorities of enlargement? Needs Eu more coercition powers in this so sensitive crisis period? Any of this question was not rised in order to offer immediately the answer, but only to underline the unquantifiable character of some challenges that Eu confronts in this period.
A relevant example could be that following some critics of one of the representatives of UK, when President Barroso said: "… I really believe that some difficulties that were expressed here or there - some of you said today "Yes but". Please, among pro-Europeans, don't say the "but", say just "yes". You don't say to your loved one's, your wife or your girlfriend, your husband or your boyfriend, you don't say "I love you but". You say "I love you, I support you" and we need your support to make Europe stronger. […] Some people say Europe does not deliver. Let's put it frankly – is this Europe that does not deliver, or some governments that do not deliver? This is the real question in terms of the European Union." José Manuel Durão Barroso, "Closing speech following the State of the Union debate," European Parliament, Strasbourg, (28 September 2011): 2-3, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-612_en.htm. Some authors considers the euroscepticism (accused by Barroso by above words) "a deadly virus for the EU". Michel Nazet, Olivier Favry, and Roger Favry, Europe et Russi, un passe pour quel futur?, (Paris: Ellipses, 2011), 164.
Foucher, 81. This could be considered a matter of Europe borders, but that is not easy to untangle, and Foucher is completely aware on this when he quote V. Havel words: "The day that we agree peacefully where the European Union ends and the Russian Federation begins, half of the tension between the two will disappear". Vaclav Have, "Il est nécessaire de poser des questions dérangeantes à Monsieur Poutine [interview with M. Plichta and J. Rupnik]," in Le Monde (February 24, 2005): 3, apud. Foucher, 82.
The EU' documents too state on the American support . European Security Strategy...," 1.
European Security Strategy...," 9. We could add another approach, that of the transformative" role of EU. Hence, Wim Kok considers that Encouraging peace, stability, democracy and prosperity throughout Europe by integrating states and peoples is teh EU's rasion d'être". European University Institute, 19.
Dumont and Verluise, 68-70.
Considered "a human invention", having political reasons, i.e. to be possible to consider Moscow as a European city. Dumont and Verluise, 76.
Aleksandrova-Arbatova considers that, despite AKP (Justice and Development Party) very Islamic agenda, "to lose Turkey would be a geopolitical failure for the modern world". Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 16.
For a complete list, see "Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings," http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#europe
Dumont and Verluise, 71-72.
Tom Casier, The European Neighborhood Policy: Assessing the EU's Policy Toward the Region," in Federica Bindi (ed.), The foreign policy of the European Union, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010): 99-100.
Foucher, 86. We have to remember that the actual system of international relations lost some "classic" characteristics too, and new approaches are necessary in order to answer to the actual international crisis. We consider that is important to consider that EU's main objective is not to become a "classic actor", "an old-type actor" of geopolitics, but to answer with new instruments and approaches to the new regional and international challenges and threats. EU itself considers that any actual international threat "tackled by purely military means", but by a sum of approaches (intelligence, police, military, economic intrsuments). European Security Strategy...," 7. The same idea was advanced by President Barroso in 2012: Europe needs a new direction. And, that direction can not be based on old ideas. Europe needs a new thinking." European Commission, 2012, 5.
"Declaration on European Identity," Copenhagen (14 December 1973), http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf
Francesca Longo, "Justice and Home Affairs as a New Tool of European Foreign Policy," in Federica Bindi (ed.), The foreign policy of the European Union, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 73.
We didn't established to discuss here about the concepts of civilian power", soft power" or hard power", largely discussed in the last years by pros and cons researchers or by different specialists. However, we consider that is a matter of choice for EU to prefer to not assess its foreign missions by the numer of shoots, launched bombs or other like these, although starting with 2003 EU developed external important civilian and military missions in different states splited from the former Yugoslavia, from Africa, Middle East or Asia. On these missions, see Stephan Keukeleire, "European Security and Defence Policy: from Taboo to Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?," in Federica Bindi (ed.), The foreign policy of the European Union, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 58-60sql. Ussualy, when efficiency of EU missions is invoked, all became complicate to be explained and demonstrated. We add that all is difficult to demonstrate for a short term, because the main difference between "classic geopolitic" and EU approaches of foreign policy differ in terms of time, not in terms of efficiency. The effects of classic geopolitic actions are very visible in short term, but time demonstrated that in time these effets could dissapear. EU tries to substitute the "classic geopolitic" with "the convergence of interest" starting from common norms (Longo, 73-74) both of the member states and of the third parties.
See particularly the articles 3, 5, 12-13, 17 and parts A and B. The areas of interest for EU were considered Central and Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of independent states, Balkans, Mediterranean (especially Maghreb), and the Middle East. "Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or goup of countries," http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_4_zirveler_1985_sonrasi/1992_6_lizbon_zirvesi_baskanlik_sonuc_bildirgesi_ekler_en.pdf. Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, this area is considered as the possible key of relations between EU and Russia. Nazet, Favry, and Favry, 242-243.
Bindi, 28-29.
Keukeleire, 57.
The borders of "the area of influence of the EU", could be not only the physical borders of ENP states, but either the states, either some parts of these states or even some institutions of these states.
Dumont and Verluise, 197.
"In a world of global threats, global markets, and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on a effective multilateral system" ( European Security Strategy...," 10), that in EU perspective means an efficient international community under the UNO umbrella, that has "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". European Security Strategy...," 9.
European Security Strategy...," 10, 13-14.
As regarding EU' uniqueness at international level, Tom Casier considers it as being conferred especially by two factors: the balance between its intended and unintended impact, and "the nature of the relation between intended and unintended impact". Casier, 103.
Keukeleire, 68.
Casier considers the ENP as being a new "specific form of regional foreign policy", that tryes to administrate (by "creating stability and avoiding new dividing lines", and by "offering rewards", i.e. by conditionality) an inherent double "unintended impact": that of EU on its neighbours, and that of the neighbours on UE. Casier, 100. However, Casier recognises that, in lack of a future possible integration, ENP can not ensure the guaranty of a permanent obedience to EU normativity, particularly because of the lack of resolute conditionality "at political macro level" (i.e. something similar to Copenhagen criteria for candidate countries). Casier, 106-107sql. In his turn, Wim Kok considered that these only "assisted" countries, if they are aspiring to accede EU, they will be not so content with their statute and they will be "less willing to solve the problems that transcend national frontiers in Europe, or to share responsibility for shaping Europe's role in the world". It is for this that Wim Kok suggested to EU that relations with new neighbours represent a very important challenge no matter how far it will extend. However, Wim Kok considers that although EU expand bring to concerned states more stability and prosperity, the process of enlargement have to stop at some point, in the favour of a "broader neighbourhood policy". European University Institute, 17, 64.
The years '90 represented for EU the period of maximal expectations and confidence from the part of Balkan states citizens (and for the citizens of all former communist states generally). Europe was perceived as a panacea, especially for the economic problems, where people and political leaders considered that Europe has the moral duty to help the Eastern societies. When political issues and military conflicts appeared and Europe failed to find the best solution for them, or when some states accessed and the European rules imposed in front of the nationals, sometimes wrong applied, the confidence of these communities in EU decreased. Probably EU lost its "ability to inspire security and prosperity in its citizens" (Kentrotis, 62, 64), but the so noble idea of united Europe would determinate at least the political leaders to contribute to recovering of the confidence in EU, now, when united Europe need the confidence of its leaders and citizens. The solution for a better presence of EU is "to recover, to come out of the crisis stronger and to reinstate the prestige of the European model" (Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 19), but with a view of this purpose EU as materialisation of idea of united Europe had to receive a large popular and official support. If the European help was "moral" when the collapsed societies received it, may be is "moral" to give back this help by a more preoccupation for the future of EU, by accepting that national interest concerns first of all the EU general and especially political development.
That is the beneficiary states of Neighbourhood Policy, on the one hand, and on the other hand the Balkans, some regions from Africa, Middle East, or Latin America. See also Foucher, 89-90.
European Commission, 2012, 14.
Kentrotis, 59-60.
European University Institute, 65.
Except Turkey, that is ranked by UNO in Western Asia, the other candidate states are considered to be part or Eastern Europe.
Hido Biščević, "EU Enlargement versus Old Geopolitics: the Western Balkans at the Crossroads," in Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, 01 (2012): 8.
Almost all former accessions to EU, whatever would be the period, represented a challenge for communitarian structures. So, UK' accession represented a geopolitical challenge because of the very deep relations with USA and with the former colonies, the both situated so far from the European geographical limits. In its turn, Greece accession had a triple dimension (political, because of the military dictatorship; geographical, giving to the expansion to Meridional Europe; symbolic, giving to the old Greek civilisation that represents one of the sides of European identity). From ther part, Spain and Portugal accession had too a very important political challenge (imposing the democratic values in two former dictatorships), but a geopolitical (increasing preoccupation of EEC for Latin America – Rio Group; Treaty of Asunción, Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, political dialogue with Andean Community) and economic one too; Austria and Finland represented, in their turn, the first step of EU toward the border with the former members of Warsaw Agreement. (Dumont and Verluise, 85-6; Bindi, 23) Accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal were all the three difficult because of economic problems, but Greece raised almost immediately supplementary issues when the socialist Andreas Papandreou asked for and received more benefits (Integrated Mediterranean Program) from the part of Community, and this with the cost of delaying the accession of Spain and Portugal. (Bindi, 23) In the same time, these enlargements came with some internal reforms or new policies of EU: Spain and Portugal accession held with necessity to achieve the internal market policy, with environment, social cohesion, research, technologies and social affairs policies, with EPC reform and, finally, with EPC institutionalisation (adoption of London Report, 1981; Stuttgard Declaration, 1983; Altiero Spinelli' Treaty on the European Union, 1984; Single European Act, 1986; Maastricht Treaty and Lisbon Report, 1992), while Sweden, Finland and Austria accession was followed by the launch of single currency. European University Institute, 22; Bindi, 24, 27. In the end, the 2004 enlargement is considered as a quantitative and geographical major leap". Dumont and Verluise, 86.
Biščević, 8.
Realised by authors of this paper by using the following sources: Biščević, 8-11; Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 16-17.
As for example, Aleksandrova-Arbatova considers that Russia, although it has any strategy for Western Balkans, it could increase its ethno-religious and political influence in the region by economic cooperation and finnancial aid (and the same situation for China, although only at commercial level). In the same time Turkey, by its strategy of "neo-Ottomanism", is considered the main competitor of EU in the region. Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 17-18.
Biščević, 9-10.
Biščević, 7, 10. However, Slovenia accessed EU in 2004 and developed the Presidency of the European Community in first half of 2008, but it is difficult to measure the influence on the integration ambitions of the other West Balkans states.
Aleksandrova-Arbatova, 19.
Bindi, 27-29.
Largelly explained by Nicola Verola, "The New EU Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon," in Federica Bindi (ed.), The foreign policy of the European Union, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
Tratatul de la Lisabona de modificare a Tratatului privind Uniunea Europeană și a Tratatului de instituire a Comunităţii Europene, semnat la Lisabona, 13 decembrie 2007," Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene. Ediţia în limba română, C306, Anul 50 (17 decembrie 2007).
Kentrotis, 61.
Kentrotis, 61.
European Security Strategy...," 12-13. In its 2008 (overly general and positive) report on the European Security Strategy, EU considers that efficiency and registered enough progress necessary to be continued. Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World," Brussels, S407/208, (11 December 2008): 9-12, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf
Barroso, "Political Guidelines for the Next Commission," (2009), passim.
José Manuel Durão Barroso, "European renewal – State of the Union Address 2011," SPEECH/11/607. European Parliament, Strasbourg, (28 September 2011): 5, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/speech_original.pdf
European Commission, 2012, 5.
José Manuel Durão Barroso, "Intermediary and Closing Remarks by President Barrsos following the State of Union 2012 Address," Plenary Session of the European Parliament / Strasbourg, (12 September 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-600_en.htm
European Commission, 2012, 14-16.
European Commission, 2012, 17-18.
"At the start of a new millennium, Europe is faced with major challenges, most of them resulting mainly from the globalisation process. The issues at stake cover a wide range of policy domains, the main ones being economic competitiveness and regeneration, social cohesion, demographic change, environmental sustainability, cultural development and democratic renewal." Eurocities. "Cities cooperating beyond their boundaries: evidence through experience in European cities." In EUROCITIES Working Group Metropolitan Areas, 2011, 7, http://www.eurometrex.org/Docs/METRO-D/Eurocities-Background-paper.pdf
Dumont and Verluise, 129, 208-209, 223, 233.
"EU is perceived throughout the world as an advanced laboratory of regional integration." Foucher, 86.
It is an approach possible to include in the so much debated issue of enlargement vs deepening process. For the internal challenges, we can add the issue of corruption, especially in the new member states, and th eproble of ressources, that should be considered both an external and an internal one.
Nazet, Favry, and Favry, 163-164.
Dumont and Verluise, 97-99, 127-128.
Dumont and Verluise, 108-109.
Dumont and Verluise, 109-110.
Dumont and Verluise, 112-113; "Countries and regions. MERCOSUR," http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/mercosur/; "Countries and regions. Association of South East Asian Nations," http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/asean/; "EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)," http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_cooperation/index_en.htm
The case of Greece and that of accession of Croatia and of some of the Western Balkan states are realy poignant.
Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities

Cristina-Maria DOGOT, Ioan HORGA


Abstract: The dynamic character of the European construction process determined numerous situations that could be considered as enough strained in order to ask for new approaches from the part of communitarian decision-makers and of the member states too. The enlargement of the European Communities / European Union is one of the sources of communitarian dynamic character and represented an almost permanent process, although it was never related to a precise schedule. Initially given to the Cold War, and later both to internal problems of EU and to some external difficult realities, enlargement of the European Communities/Union raised every time new priorities both for communitarian general body and for the members states. The both parties had all the time to find the more appropriate solutions to all the new burdens generated by enlargement, solutions materialised in new approaches of different situations, new politics, new strategies, and/or new attitudes towards each other.

Key words: geopolitical priorities, enlargement challenges, global actorness, enlargement' politics


Introduction
The establishment and the permanent vertical development and continuous (but not really following a fixed program) enlargement of the European body represented, it is easy to assert this now, a permanent cause of changes and challenges both from political and economical and from territorial and geopolitical perspectives. Even from its beginning, the single market implied to put into continuity the territories" of the member states, a new and very innovative practice if we consider the two recently ended wars (the second one being one of the most negative experience for Europe and its citizens) and the failed attempt to unite Europe in 1948. Starting with establishment of European Coal and Steel Community, in 1950, each new established institution as every new attribution of any of these institutions, each new common policy (indifferently if considering the spatial planning, that concerns the European internal" territories, or focused on the other internal issues – common defence, common policy, agriculture, different free movements, etc. – or on the foreign activities of the Union), and almost each new enlargement before or after 1989 was either the starting point for a new approach or phase of the process of European construction, either the core of debates concerning the significance and the new roles of the member states, either the basis of some different intensity crisis. Both for the internal and external aspects of integration the member states and communitarian bodies negotiated their new ranks and roles and the result of these negotiations was, usually, either a stimulus for the next European policy, either the cause of a stagnation phase. In the same manner, the process of enlargement of the European Communities/European Union always put into question the relationships of Community with its new members states and with the new third parties (the new neighbours), a situation that requested new politics or even strategies concerning them. Hence, in 2008, following the last wave of enlargement, concerning Romania and Bulgaria, Michel Foucher put into question the political sustainability of the European Union with 27 member states and connects this viability to the necessity of the reform of the European project. Some years before, Wim Kok considered enlargement as offering "the need and the occasion to upgrade the EU system of governance". It is obvious that is difficult to reform a system only in five years, but the always discussion about reform without reform to take place, this didn't offer an optimistic perspective on EU development. And the failure to adopt the EU Constitution in 2005, and difficulties to adopt the Lisbon Treaty after, these are the mainly proofs of a certain incoherence in EU integration process. How EU tried and tries again to reform itself in time of or following to the process of enlargement it is possible to be disclosed by revealing the new challenges and intrinsically the new priorities that EU confronts due to the enlargement process and monitoring the answers that EU offers in order to change its capabilities and to regulate the internal changes both of the new member states and of the new neighbours.
The fall of the Berlin wall is considered to be the biggest challenge to Europe since the fall of Hitler's Third Reich in the same city on May 8, 1945", especially in terms of the new role that the unified state was to play both in the process of European integration and in the international relations system. The German reunification seemed to be not so important from a geopolitical perspective, and the answer is relatively easy to done: on the one hand, EU had not yet the necessary instruments for an active participation in the regional and international events, and, on the other hand, the end of the Cold War seemed to have stabilized the system of international relations, the type of the future international crises can not yet be intuited. However, German reunification and as a result the inherent osmotic enlargement represented only the beginning of a more long and large extension process, embracing all the Central and Eastern European states, excepting Moldova and Ukraine. This enlargement process was not only a geographical one, but it will be the basis of some readjustments of EU's approaches both of its extension and integration processes by adopting the Copenhaga criteria and respectively the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.


Enlargement and some challenges regarding the global actorness capacity of EU
As stated before, Michel Foucher considered, in terms of quantity, i.e. of the number of member states, although we consider only partially he is right, that EU is not a major political actor, due to the lack of unity among the views and actions… of its Member States". More applied in its approach but more critical too is Simon Duke, who considers EU as a "hydra-headed" and "increasingly irrelevant" organisation and explains some of EU faillures by the perspective of the fatalistic interpenetration of the so complex EU decisional system and the personality of the top representatives and decision-makers. Foucher' assertion could be sufficient to agree about the most important challenge and priority of EU: to became one of the key political leaders acting at the international level, despite its internal demanding work to continuously integrate the new (and often the old) members. Although to be more active at international level is considered one of the most important tasks of EU, due not only to enlargement, but to its early commitments too, it is not the only one of its priorities. It is completely acceptable that, in order to become a major political actor", UE had to enlarge, had to expand its territorial capacities beside of enhancement of its institutions and of its peacekeeping forces. In 2003, one year before the most important enlargement of EU, Kok Report considered that 2004 enlargement could be the gold moment for EU in order "to be an actor in world affairs".

Table 1. Advantages of Eastern countries EU integration
Advantages for Eastern countries
Advantages for EU
Geopolitical/political advantages
-continuation of the process of democratisation;
-more regional stability;
-modernisation of political and administrative systems, giving to the necessity to respect the criteria of Copenhagen;
-the bigger size of Union could act as a factor of influence at international level, and in terms of authority;
Security advantages
-enforcement of laws, in the process of adoption of acquis communautaire;
-easy control of international traffic in drugs and humans;
-consolidation of democratic regimes;
-increasing the regional stability;
-removing of the problems of the borders and minorities;
-enhancing the transnational democracy;
-improvement of border protection systems and the control of immigration;
mmmm
-increasing security by the Neighbourhood Policies;
mmmm
-ameliorating the environment policies and quality;
mmmm
-increasing protection for the food standards;
mmmm
Economic advantages
-access to the single market;
-wider market
-wider market;
-deeper internal and external competition;
-abolition of the frontiers for goods;
-access to workforce;
-liberalisation of services, capital, and labour
-higher demand of goods, so economic growth and gains for EU;
-more investments, more technology transfer;
-achieve the reform of economic and social policies;
-EU financial asssistance;
-bigger size will enhance EU international role at economic level and in economic supranational organisations;
-a stable economic framework;

-increasing rate of growth;

-the improvement of the economic and social model
starting from experiences of old and new member states

Hence, enlargement could be considered a core geopolitical priority of EU, necessary to achieve in order to answer to a major external challenge after the collapse of USSR: the need of democratic and reliable international actors. However, triumphing in this objective implies to answer to many other priorities that result from the process of enlargement, especially if enlargement held in a period when EU confronts major challenges at three levels: in "its economic performance, its internal cohesion, and its external role". If we think to the Kok's approach regarding the moment of enlargement, when Europe confronted the above-mentioned three major challenges, from this perspective EU appeared rather self-sacrified in the process of enlargement: it choose to enlarge despite of all challenges with confronted, just because it was very important for the candidate states to not wait so many, to not lose their patience, to not accumulate frustrations, and to not provide amunition to the Eurosceptics. However, Kok considered (in 2003!) enlargement the most successful act of foreign policy that the EU has ever made", and any delay could be reckoned then as a major political failure". The problem again, was, in Kok's very visionary approach, the management of enlargement and the lack of necessary reforms. Hence, Kok indicated five directions for these reforms: i./ reform of decisional institutions (in many terms: of number of votes, members and seats; of efficiency of decisional process, possible to obtain if EU adopts its Constitution; of a better implementation of EU policies), in order to ensure a better common action for the common European interest ; ii./ boosting economy by giving priority to economic growth and convergence, to innovation and reform, to improvement of economic and social model; iii./ ensuring EU citizens security, by more efficient laws against international crime, better control of immigration, by enhancing the standards of nuclear safety and those concerning the quality of environment and foods; by improving the EU decision-making system, closer cooperation of the member states, and more effective monitoring and implementation of EU rules in all the member states; iv./ partnerships with neighbours, whatever they are candidate countries or not; v./ creating a real common foreign policy actor and a unique external voice, in order to become one of the most important international actors. It is very easy in this moment to think that all solutions were known even at the beginning of enlargement process. Member states can not say that they don't knew how many difficult will be the enlargement process. Kok Report pointed up even the difficulties to appear in decisional process giving to the greater diversity of extended Europe, the problems concerning internal justice and the European judicial cooperation from the new member states, giving to their recent history legacies, and the problems that could appear regarding the minorities. The only unexpected event, was, in 2003, the following economic crisis, that troubled in a consistent manner both the interdependently processes of integration and enlargement. First of all, the member states forgot to act commonly for the common European interest, and sometime national approaches of some aspects related to the effects of economic crisis revealed new waves of nationalism, xenophobia and populism. If we remember that removing these attitudes was one of the objectives of ones of the more active early promoters of idea of united Europe, it seems that the most important priority of enlargement is to maintain the member states broadminded, opened to each other, to counteract the politicianism and its petty electoral goals, and to boost the interest for the European unity goal. In a certain way the present priority of EU seems to be the renascence of the European unity goal among the member states, some old and some new. The process of Europeanisation, used actually especially to explain the progress of the new member states in different areas, have to be adopted, probably, by all member states, in its sense of orientation of domestic politics and politicians to the EU common goals, so in the sense of "political integration and political unification" and in that of the "European identity". In this moment seems that Europeanisation, this long-term and concerning many different fields process seems to be not an irreversible one, especially at political level. It is enough that the economic level confronts difficulties and political level become ready to revive former enemies or to invent some new ones. Hence, an important challenge of EU is to maintain on the national agendas the goal of deeper integration, considering that ones of new and old members seem to want more and more decisional independence inside of EU. This is not a new approach of the member states, the everlasting examples of de Gaulle and Thatcher being representative for this rebellious" attitude inside of EU. The question is of what happened that former enthusiastic states became sceptical towards European unity project or even take into account to abandon it, like is the case of UK in actual David Cameron' administration. How exactly and especially why some member states arrive to deny the EU requests legitimacy?
G. Noutcheva considers this in terms of the realist theory of the interest of the member states: "Domestic understanding of the sources of legitimacy of the EU policies will affect whether or not local political leaders are responsive to EU incentives and receptive to persuasion by EU interlocutors. If domestic actors see EU actions as not reflecting their own interest or not responding to notion of appropriateness based on EU norms of universal values, they will openly question the legitimacy of EU policies and will tend to assert both their rational motives and distinctive identities in defiance of the EU more vigorously." This approach of the member states is completely comprehensible, but it opens almost two other questions. First of all, when the particular states considered their accession to EU in their interest and they asked for their accession to European Union, they could to understand that this accession means to assume a superior interest, which of the group that wants to establish a most persuasive, authoritative and powerful body than the individual power of each of its members. A proper example is that of how Switzerland established, at its beginnings, when all members accepted the general rules of confederation as being superior to their individual interest and acting in their own interest. It is right, the actual Switzerland is the result of almost eight centuries of tensions and compromises, but we consider that is not the case for European Union to wait so long time to reach the same results like Swiss confederation. On the other hand, we consider that in the case of the so-called rejection of legitimacy of EU demands is working particularly the unrespect of the principle of subsidiarity, the core principle of functioning of EU, a principle that all members states agreed as working in their common interest. However, assuming this principle means not to put into discussion nor the legitimacy of EU' requests, nor these of the member states, but on the contrary, it respect the both and considers the two levels as having the same legitimacy to put into discussion their requests. President Barroso emphasized in a very synthetic way the role of subsidiarity: "We must kill off the idea that the Member States and the EU level are rivals. [it is] the translation of a democratic principle, part of a very practical doctrine, aimed at making public policy work to best effect in a Union built on solidarity, and at the most appropriate level." Two years after President Barroso retake the idea of adoption, by the member states, of the principle of commonality of the European states, of the interdependence of their destinies, of the common responsibility and solidarity.
Experience shows us that EU is, usually, the actor that submit to debate its decisions, but are the member states the actors that prefer to elude debates and to act preponderantly at individual level. This manner to act shows that we discuss again by two different actors, EU and the members states, that EU is again accepted only as the source of some benefits and not of more conditionality. Hence, it is not only the individual interest to be invoked when states put into debate their place and attributions inside the Union, but in the same extent they have to consider how properly they could accomplish some of their attributions in a more independent position inside of the Union. And, it is enough obvious that, in time of some particular situations like that of actual so complex crisis, only some states (which are not dominated by rigid administrative structures, which are less corrupted and where the paternalist behaviour is weak developed) succeed to achieve individually their own interests.
More specifically speaking, the superior desiderata of the Union to become a global major actor cannot be achieved at individual level than, eventually, by some of the member states and not in all events and regions of the actual system of international relations. Consequently, taking into consideration the different actual capacities of the member states to act in the international relations system, invoking the national interest as regarding the foreign and security policy of the Union is not a sustainable approach. No one of the EU' member states, almost whatever would be its security capacities, could not become a major global actor outside of EU. Therefore, the dishonest "superior" character of the "national interest" by comparison with "EU interest" is noticeable in this case. Evoking the national interest in a some state of affairs only attest the incapacity of the states to assume as theirs own the superior interest of the European unity (which means intrinsically the existence of EU) to establish a powerful global entity, but an entity of which powerness is not based on the aggressive use of the force (as for the most powerful global state-actors), but on the "aggressiveness" of negotiation process, on the force of conciliation between the subjects of the tensioned international situations.
In fact, member states has a dual attitude in their approach of Union issues: when EU decisions are considering as not hitting the "national interests", they are really followed and applied, on the contrary the respective decisions are explained to the national citizens as "imposed by EU", although inside EU the member states are part in community decisional structures. When member states are not directly interested in an issue concerning the common security, they act as following the common interest of EU, on the opposite they invoke the national interest and act separately. This means the presence of two levels of action in the field of CFSP, and is difficult to assert that this situation means the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. Coming back to M. Foucher assertions, we consider that the biggest problem of a global influencing EU is not really the number of the new member states, but that of how the old and the new member states report to the "common interest" of their unity, materialised in the existence of EU (an entity that is possible to transform continuously in a more efficient one). And the "opposite attitude" (or the lack of political will) to the achievement of integration, especially to the political integration, belong not only to new member states (prosecuted rather of passivity, lack of vision concerning the future of EU and submissiveness to EU or some powerful member states), but to ones important founder members of the Union, considered able to act as the catalysts of the deeper political integration.

Legitimacy of enlargement
M. Foucher' approach on enlargement could direct our research on the matter of the legitimacy of EU enlargement to the Eastern Europe. First of all author considers that EU territorial expansion […] corresponds to a purely geostrategic design as conceived by successive American administrations", that suggested to include all the member states of the Council of Europe, except Russia, within the Euro-Atlantic structures". It is not a classified that different American administrations supported financially (the well-known Marshall Plan could be an example) and military (would be possible the European unity outside of OTAN protection?) the idea of European unity, but this truism doesn't diminish the legitimacy nor of the existence of EU, neither of its decisions and acts. More that, after the bi-polar era, we consider that American support for a deeper European integration doesn't illegitimate the Eastern enlargement of EU, despite of all the difficulties that EU confronts now because of the weak membership capacities of some of new member states. Finally, taking into account the American fears concerning the continuous improvement of EU military capacities and of their use in the detriment of NATO, EU enlargement could not be an American objective without to accept a larger European influence to East.
The legitimacy of EU enlargement is considered both from the perspective of the new member states to integrate and from geographical and geopolitical perspectives. One of the main questions concerning the accession of new members is: are the new potential members European states from a geographic point of view? And this was or is again the case of Romania, Moldova, Ukraine or Turkey. The discussions on the geographical limits of the European continent date from always, and we consider not necessary to go into details of a so old debate. However, from an actual geographical point of view, European limits are easy to be established, and not only in the Mediterranean, western and northern sides of the continent, where the littorals play their specific role of natural borders. For the Eastern part it is considered as the limit of geographical Europe the region where it is disappearing its multi-peninsular character", that is between the bay of Chesskaia (at the east of the island of Kanin) and the lac of Van (in Armenia), from where it is changing its orientation to south-east, to the bay of Alexandretta", that means that Turkey is an European country. Hence, the Ural are considered as part of Asia and not the limit of Europe.
As a support of them assertions concerning the geographical limits of European continent, Dumont and Verluise consider its insular and peninsular character, both in the South and in the North as in its Western side. It is important to highlight that the two authors insist that they refer to the "physical" and not to the conventional geography", the last considered as questionable" because its view on the limits of Europe changed in different times, giving especially to political reasons. For example, during the Cold War period the conventional Europe stopped at the Eastern or North-Eastern Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian borders", whilst after the disintegration of Soviet Union United Nations established a quadruple Europe: Northern (Baltic states, Scandinavian states, Britannic island states and Iceland), Western (France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Netherland, Luxembourg), Eastern (Russia included) and Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy). The four sous-regions were unequal as surface and so less representative for some of included states, which historically and culturally (or even politically) assumed another regional identity (ex. of Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia or Croatia, which consider themselves as part of Central Europe).

Tabel 2: Subcontinents' areas of conventional Europe

Continent-subcontinent
Area
mil. Km2
% of world surface
% of Europe surface
% of Europe surface without Russia
The largest country (mil. Km2)
The largest country (mil. Km2)
% of population at subcontinent level
N. Europe
1,807
1.3%
7.8%
30.3%
Sweden
450
25%
W. Europe
1,110
0.8%
4.8%
18.6%
Fr
552
50%
E. Europe
18,827
14.01%
81.6%
-
RU
17,098
91%
S. Europe
1,317
1,0%
5,7%
22,1%
Spain
506
38%
Europe
23,061
17.2%
100.0%
-
Ru
17,098
74%
E. Europe (without Russia)
1,729
1.3%
-
29.0%
UA
604
35%
Europe (without Russia)
5,963
4.5%
4.5%
100.0%
UA
604
10%
World
133,963
100.0%
-
-
Russie
17,098
-
Source: Dumont and Verluise, 72.

Thus, considering UNO ranking, Eastern states belong of the physical Europe, and from this point of view they merited" to accede to EU structures. But this approach is a very minimalist one, the simple geographical position being insufficient to ensure the presence in an organisation or another. However, the EU enlargement considered important the geographical positions not only by the perspective of physical or conventional geography, but from the point of view of geostrategic potential of the regions. If the former communist states would remain outside of EU framework, they would have been easy to fall once again under the Russian influence. In the same time, for 2004 accession, neither EU was able to include all the Eastern former communist states, nor the candidate states was all prepared to access EU. This situation raised to EU two major questions: one concerning its own security after enlargement, because of its new geostrategic position, closer to some insecure areas, and one resided in the new economic and territorial cleavages created by this partial accession. Solution to this geopolitic priority was a more consideration for the perimeter around EU, consideration materialised in the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Classic geopolitics and EU
M. Foucher considered that "EU is not synchronous with classic geopolitics; this is sometimes perceived as a weakness". If we report to classic geopolitics, it is very probably that EU can not be considered as a global influencing actor. Even form its ealy political approaches, European community stated that "European Unification is not directed against anyone, nor is it inspired by a desire for power. On the contrary, the Nine are convinced that their union will benefit the whole international community. . . . The Nine intend to play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute . . . to ensuring that interna- tional relations have [a] more just basis. . . . In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy." Hence, staying confident in its primary objective, to bring peace in Europe and around, EU' actions are not so spectacular as those of classic actors. On the other hand, EU is not a "traditional unitary actor", and the rather humanitarian and peacekeeping actions in the detriment of the offensive ones, made EU almost invisible at international level. On the other hand, there are some conflicts that were never solved by the actors of "classic geopolitics", as for example the Arab/Israeli conflict, assumed as a priority by the European Union by its Security Strategy from 2003, but that irrupt periodically despite of any proposed solution.
In the same time, it is possible to consider that EU acted almost as a classic geopolitical actor when it established its geographical interest zones, in 1992 (by Lisbon Report), when it "persuated" NATO to become a more collaborative partner by participating in UN actions and in Western Europe Union framework when necessary, and this despite NATO and USA suspicions concerning EU possible military concurrence. After Amsterdam, during Bill Clinton administration, USA became more positive and started to sustain the increasing of EU military capabilities in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy, although under three given conditions: no decoupling (of ESDP from NATO); no duplication (of capabilities); and no discrimination (against non-EU NATO members)". Considering the above-mentioned interest zones", the European Neighbourhood Policy could be considered in terms of these interests" of EU. By ENP, the European borders doubled and extended in a classic" manner: EU possess both a hard" frontier, that of its peripheric member states, and a soft" one, composed by the ENP states, which represent the buffer states", the borders of "the area of influence of the EU", the grey zone" of EU. the In the end, although someones will not accept this approach, it is possible to consider the single currency as a representation of a classic geopolitic" act, of the geopolitic power", Euro having an important role in strenghtening and deepening of European integration, in favorising the intercommunity changes... in improving the geopolitical weight of EU".
However, this "classical geopolitics" perspective assessment could be considered as the evidence of some conservatism or nostalgia in the manner to approach the actual system of international relations. EU didn't never intend to become the most powerful or an exclusive global actor in order to convince the advocates of political realism that it is able to play a global role: Strenghtening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectivelly, is a European priority" and the transatlantic (balanced) partnership is considered one of the core elements" and irreplaceable" for the global system, as important as a closer relationship with Russia and the strategic partnerships with China, Japan, India and Canada. Probably it could be considered as a kantian if not a purely utopic perspective, but the different manner to act of the EU could mean originality, innovation, uniqueness, i.e "civilian power". As very properly Keukeleire stats, "civilian crisis management is a fairly new domain of conflict management", fact that could explain the skeptical attitudes toward it. Although the immediate results of the EU type of intervention are not the expected ones (in terms of international authority), it is possible that the new methods and instruments (which are less aggressive) to became more attractive that those of the "classic geopolitics". In the same time, it is possible to interpret in terms of vision and audacity those actions of EU that has as finality its Eastern geopolitical influence (the integration of some Eastern states, the Neighbourhood Policy), and this in the disadvantage of Russia. The same approach it is possible to observe for EU relationships with Mediterranean countries, where EU develops too important partnerships. In this keynote, the existence itself of EU is an important challenge, given to the expectations appeared in some regions of the world and directed to the potential international role of EU. And reality shows us that EU doesn't neglect any part of the world, more less its neighbours, which it try to approach by impartiality and equal consideration.
In conclusion, EU enlargement could not be placed outside of a legitimate process even in geopolitical terms. The most important international actors of the present time are giant states like USA, China, Russia, Brazil, or India. "In today's world, size matters. And values make the difference." Hence, the main challenge should be considered, within or outside any future enlargement, the following: how it is possible that EU became a credible international actor in crisis time?


West Balkans accession to EU
The present candidate states are Croatia, FYROM and Turkey, and as potential candidates to EU membership are recognised Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia. Excepting Kosovo, all the potential candidate states concluded the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with EU between 2006 and 2008. However, EU didn't advance any firm commitment concerning the data of their accession, and Kok Report suggested even in 2003 this "strategy" because of the risk of rekindling the conflict. On the West Balkans it is difficult to affirm that they are not in Europe, especially from the point of view of physical geography. In the same time, it is really very difficult to not accept both that West Balkans countries (already "encircled by the EU and NATO ring") accession to EU is not an important strategic geopolitical goal and priority, despite of "too many undeniable challenges… possibly even strategic barriers" that the region confronts and that EU will confront too both in pre-accession and integration periods.
However, Balkans is the permanent matter for which EU is assessed in its external political and military capabilities. Even at the present time, when EU foreign policy performances are analysed, almost all the time Balkans is considered from the perspective of EU inefficiency in this area during the conflict of '90. This approach could have a double effect on EU: to prove that is able to solve the problems in the region, and to be very careful concerning the evolution of this not only geographical, but important geopolitical area too. However, the both goals could be different to achieve: to solve the problems and to prevent a new conflict, although all the states resulted from the conflict are openly interested in their European integration.

Table 3. State of matters in West Balkans
Country
Local issues
Albania
-???
Bosnia and Herzegovina
-the improbable self-sustainability in case of integration
Croatia
-???
Kosovo
-relationships with Serbia
Macedonia
-the name issue
Montenegro
-???
Serbia
-relationships with Kosovo;
-privileged relations with Russia;




Common issues
-the bad place of the West Balkans amongst the priorities of the international community;
-declining of EU public support for West Balkans accession and rising of Balkans citizens scepticism regarding EU (even in Croatia);
-lack of perspective and coherent vision on the region; short term measures;
-unfinished peace (risk to become again a security problem);
-weak international community pressures on the West Balkans leaders to answer to the necessity of EU-NATO integration process;

At the time, although seems that integration issue is preoccupying both EU and West Balkans states, there are some uncertainties concerning the process of integration. The economic and financial crisis, events from Africa and Middle East that are a source of general insecurity, all these guided the EU attention and energies in different directions. Consequently, the missing of a fixed term for EU integration of West Balkans states could act as a source of instability for the region (beside the severe economic troubles), due to the lack of a fix-term objective to achieve. On the other hand, the weak of EU pressure and presence in region could determine "a prolonged strategic vacuum… which may invite other interests and different power play to fill the gap". For an early stage it would be important "to enhance and consolidate the regional cooperation, as a… tool for the region to accelerate its accession… and to deal with common issues of general modernisation… and to ensure a joint response to the shared problems of evident underdevelopment in priority areas of infrastructure, transportation and energy".
Despite of all the enounced negative aspects and of some "former crisis remnants", the West Balkans communities seem to understand the necessity to live in diversity. The forthcoming accession of Croatia is considered to be an opening for the next accessions, having the role of a model for the other countries of the region, wanting but not yet prepared for accession. More optimistic, Aleksandrova-Arbatova considers that other Balkans states accession is important, but not decisive, a good cooperation between Balkan states and EU being sufficient to achieve the Europeanisation and the harmony of the region.

Challenge and priority: EU enlargement, EU reform
Almost all the analysis on the process of enlargement happened after the fall of the bipolar era consider that a new enlargement of EU without a profound reform of EU structures and of some of its politics will be not possible.
Before to any post-1989 enlargement, European community considered the new situation and created new instruments able to manage the future extension process. Hence, the criteria of Copenhagen are the best example of EU preoccupation for the fruitful enlargement, the more pragmatic answer to the challenge of the territorial and particularly political expansion. On the other hand, the adoption of Maastricht Treaty was considered the answer to both an internal and an external challenge, giving to the particular interest of European Economic Comunity members and, respectively, to the possible influences on the "transatlantic security relations" from the perspective of the regional and international role of NATO, ONU and WEU. After less regulation of the Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice, the main merit of the Treaty of Lisbon was, beside regulating some institutional changes, that of introducing the EU legal personality, so to create a new international actor, although the global role of EU doesn't succed to change drastically. This legal change pooled EU' external competences, but its foreign policy is staying again largely in the hands of European Council, i.e. of the states and their unanimous vote. Consequently, expressions like "the Europe of Nations continues, of course, to resist", and tailored in different variants, flowed the post-Maastricht studies on European Union suggesting the necessity of political integration. The only problem is the real form of this political integration, but from 1948 (first Hague Congress) until now the specific European "political metastructure" remained an unachieved goal at practical level, despite of all the new treaties dedicated to this prodigious objective. More that, in the context of the actual crisis EU has to fixate its attention especially to the global economic competition and by its internal reform that by enlargement, which is not again considered as a priority for its role as global actor. The actual crisis seems to impede Europe to pursue the objectives concerning the improvement of its foreign policy, i.e. to be more active in following its strategic objective, more capable in realising its potential, more coherent in its foreign and security policy. Starting with 2009 the President of European Commission used to offer an annual speech over the state of the Union, a document that has rather a personal engagement and motivational value than an official one. Amongst the most important ideas emphasised in these communications we noticed the idea of the necessity for a "more political Europe" in order that EU can achieve both its economic and social role and its international objectives; the idea of global leadership by partnership. In the 2009 discourse, President Barroso considers as main challenges for EU some internal aspects, but that are important for the international EU esteem: restarting the economic growth, reinforcing social cohesion, ensuring the Europeans' security, the EU citizenship and participation. Concerning the EU' international role, Barroso considers the EU external relations as a way to accomplish European internal goals. In the same time, EU enlargement, that "is not an infinite process", is perceived as "a huge source of strength for the Union", although it "can only take place when both the EU itself and the candidate country are ready to take on the responsibilities that come with it". The next speech, following the second investiture as President of European Commission, although inspiring, is less general and optimistic: the prolongation of the crisis and its various economic and social effects, the increasing populism, and different vulnerabilities given to both. Solution is considered to boost the political leadership of Europe that is "to make possible all it's necessary "to" live together. In 2012 the President' speech puts the accent on the "crisis of confidence" as a "political crisis", that request a "political solution". This political solution is considered to be the deeper political integration of EU, because the European problems could not be solved with "national solutions". As part of this profounder European political integration President Barroso considers as important some different elements: a more active role of European political parties at European level; concentrate the decisional efforts on the really important problems at EU level; respect of the principle of subsidiarity and of (transnational) democracy' values (freedom, democracy, rule of law and solidarity); a deeper sharing of sovereignties at EU level in order to obtain more sovereignty at international level; the reinforcing of CFSP. The political union would be better to have a federal shape, and President Barroso proposes the moderate way of a federation of nation states as opposite to a "superstate". The way to realise this federation of nation states is to adopt a new treaty, but not before to "identify the policies we need and the instruments to implement them" and only following a large European debate on its stipulations, in order to realise the objective of a more and more democratic, and not technocratic, Europe.


Final remarks
The matter of challenges that EU confronts in our days could be approached from different perspectives, and all of them could be important in a specific considered situation. Depending by challenge, it is possible to establish the different priorities of EU, to offer one solution or other, to redirect the process of European unification to the horisontal level (enlargement) or to the vertical line (deepening integration process). As we portrayed before, European Union is living difficult moments both in terms of its international actorness and in its internal credibility. The territorial, political and cultural diversity make frequently difficult the proper evaluation of EU economic policies coherency. To these general challenges it should be added some particular troubles: demographic matters of enlargement; the more aging Europeans and the natural decrease, the basis both of some problems of human ressources and of generational solidarity; the problem of some minorities that can not transcend their marginal situation (the gipsies) and so the problem of poverty migration. Regions were considered a possible answer both for solving the economic disparities and for the enlargement questions, but the their different statute across the member states made difficult the EU intervention or even generated some vivid situations (the Catalan example).
Considering EU last two enlargements, Nazet and Favry asserted in their turn that EU confronts two types of challenges: internal and external. For the first category they mention the diffuse EU' governance; the demographic challenge and migration, the source of the economic and social challenges, view in terms of social coherence and of economic efficiency. For external challenges are considered the border demarcation (taking into account the "sequels" of Cold War) and deepening the neighborhood relationships.
It is enough easy to observe that EU tried to find solutions for any of these challenges, either internal or external. At internal level EU answered by strengthening its institutions; by migration politicies, materialised in transition periods concerning the open labor market for the new member states; social policies; cohesion policies (ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund); convergence policy, and so on. To the institutional challenges, EU answers refered to a decreasing number of commissioners and of parliamenters, to a better representation of the states in decisional process, to an enhanced collaboration between EU and its citizens.
As regarding the external challenges, EU find different and original approaches to the various new geopolitical areas and priorities. Hence, concerning the Balkans, EU established at the beginning of 2000 the first circle" of priorities and solutions: although recognising the impossibility of immediate EU accession, it decided to offer its financial and monitoring help in order to ensure peace, stability, good neighbourhood, democracy, the respect of human and minorities rights, the return of refugees, and economic prosperity", by the correct application of Stability and Association Agreements the concerned statea increasing their chances to become EU member states. Almost in the same period, was initiated he second circle", that concerned the neighbourhood countries, starting from East and Caucas zone and ending in Mediterranean area. The main objective was the securitization of the EU' peripheric zone, but this new geopolitical approach could easily be understood in terms of a combination between constructivism and realism. The third circle" – started early, by the aggrements of Yaounde (1963), Arusha (1969), Lome (1975, 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1995), and that of Kotonou (2000) – concerned the former French, Italian, Belgian, and Netherland colonies. By these agreements EU helped some low developed zones in economic, human rights, and environment terms. The last agreement, of Kotonou, focused on the political dimension" of the partnership, probably because of the limited effects of these agreements (civil wars didn't ceased and democratisation of political systems known only weak improvements). The fourth circle" concerns the EU relationships with regional associations like Association of South East Asian Nations, MERCOSUR, or Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, and is focused especially on economic cooperation with the respective member coutries. Not in the end we have to consider the EU relationships with NATO and United Nations, although EU is not all the time enough visible in this bilateral relations.
Despite any crisis happened before 2008, EU suceeded to realise a deeper integration of the member states, although the level considered in Schuman hopes concerning the realisation of the federation of Europe" it is not again achieved. Howewer, the economic crisis started in 2008 seems to be the most difficult to sustain, both by the European institutions, that are not enough powerful over the member states, and by some of the member states, that are no enough economically powerful neither to resist by themselves, nor to leave the Union. Consequently, the actual crisis didn't harm only the relationships between the members states or these with the Union, but even represent a challenge both for the future deep integration and enlargement of the Union.


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