El califato de Daesh: ejemplo de la dinámica circular del yihad

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DIRECTORIO Profesor David Noel Ramírez Padilla Rector del Tecnológico de Monterrey Lic. Héctor Núñez de Cáceres Rector de la Zona Occidente Ing. Salvador Coutiño Audiffred Director General del Campus Querétaro Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud Director de Profesional y Graduados en Administración y Ciencias Sociales

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Mtra. Luisa Argelia Carrera Chávez Directora del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y Formación Humanística Mtro. Kacper Przyborowski Director de la Licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales

COMITÉ DE ARBITRAJE DE ESTE NÚMERO Dra. Avital Bloch Universidad de Colima Dr. Joel Angel Bravo Anduaga Tecnológico de Monterrey Dr. Luis Enrique Escobedo D’Angés Tecnológico de Monterrey

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TERRORISM AND THE PERMANENT WAR: OWNERSHIP, AMERICAN PARTICIPATION, AND FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION Por Kyle Brady

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TREINTA AÑOS DE DEPORTACIÓN: CRÓNICA DE UN VIAJE SIN RETORNO Por Susana Panisello Sabaté

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UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014 Por Sarjo Kumar Rath

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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A GENERAL DISCUSSION Por Laini Soszynski

EQUIPO EDITORIAL Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud Dirección Mtro. José Manuel Velázquez Hurtado Itzel Yllescas Balderas Edición

EDICIÓN Alicia Hernández, Maribel García Tirado, Rodrigo Pesce Asistentes de Edición

Dra. Marisol Reyes Soto University of Queens, Ireland Dr. Tamir Bar-On Tecnológico de Monterrey

Retos internacionales es una publicación arbitrada.

EL CALIFATO DE DAESH: EJEMPLO DE LA DINÁMICA CIRCULAR DEL YIHAD Por Francesco Saverio P. Angiò

Retos Internacionales, ISSN: 2007-8390. Año 6, No. 12. Publicación semestral editada por el Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Campus Querétaro, a través de la División de Administración y Ciencias Sociales, bajo la dirección del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y Humanidades, domicilio Av. Eugenio Garza Sada No. 2501, Col. Tecnológico, C.P. 64849, Monterrey, N.L. Editor responsable: Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud. Datos de contacto: [email protected], teléfono y fax: 52 (442) 238 32 34. El presente ejemplar se terminó de imprimir en noviembre de 2015. Tiraje de 300 ejemplares. El editor no necesariamente comparte el contenido de los artículos y sus fotografías, ya que son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores. Se prohíbe la reproducción total o parcial del contenido, fotografías, ilustraciones, colorimetría y textos publicados en este número sin la previa autorización que por escrito emita el editor.

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En las últimas décadas la palabra terrorismo se ha convertido en una constante de la opinión pública. Desde los atentados terroristas ocurridos el 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Estados Unidos, académicos e instituciones se han dado a la tarea de investigar las raíces, motivaciones, definiciones y propagación del terrorismo como una herramienta de presión, intimidación o sometimiento para lograr determinados fines políticos. En diferentes regiones del mundo se han suscitado ataques cuya principal consecuencia ha sido el establecimiento de un estado de alarma a nivel global. Periódicos, noticieros, blogs y redes sociales han centrado su atención en los detalles de estos eventos, exponiendo ante la sociedad lo que el terrorismo implica. La simple definición va mutando según el contexto histórico. El “terrorismo” actualmente incrustado en el imaginario colectivo contemporáneo ya no corresponde al término de la Revolución Francesa, ahora es un fenómeno subjetivo, un tanto vago y difícil de acotar. Esto porque presenta muchas caras y variaciones que demuestran la amplitud del tema y las posibilidades que brinda para ser explorado. Hoy se habla de los secuestros de Boko Haram en África y las ejecuciones perpetradas por ISIS y se ha visto a la comunidad internacional adquirir mayor conciencia sobre las implicaciones de este fenómeno. Asimismo, algo que se está desarrollado paralelamente a la difusión masiva es el interés de la academia por investigar a fondo manifestaciones particulares de los sistemas de terror. Dentro de estas demostraciones se puede considerar al terrorismo de Estado y el ciberterrorismo, mencionando casos como el de los estudiantes de Ayotzinapa y los hackeos de la compañía Sony, como ejemplos respectivamente. Entre sus causas, efectos, actores, repercusiones e incluso entre las mismas teorías existentes hay aspectos que invitan a ahondar en su estudio a fin de comprender el terrorismo desde una perspectiva más crítica. En este número de Retos Internacionales, los autores comparten con nosotros su visión sobre organizaciones terroristas, la guerra contra el terrorismo, la creación de armas de destrucción masiva, causas y consecuencias de estos sistemas del terror. Esperamos que esta compilación de textos sobre la concepción del terrorismo como una guerra permanente sirva para una reflexión más profunda y sea un aliciente para continuar la investigación sobre el tema. Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud

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EL CALIFATO DE DAESH: EJEMPLO DE LA DINÁMICA CIRCULAR DEL YIHAD Por Francesco Saverio Angiò Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado y UNED, España

TERRORISMO: LA GUERRA PERMANENTE

Francesco Saverio Angiò. Doctorando en Seguridad Internacional por IUGM/UNED. MBA, ITEAP, España; MSc, Economía-RRII: Geopolítica&Geoeconomía,Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España, 2011/2013; MA, Ciencias Internacionales y Diplomáicas, Universitá di Bologna, Italia, 2006/2009. Investiga sobre las modalidades de gestión del territorio de organizaciones yihadistas en la región MENA y Sahel. Ha publicado en Eurasia - Rivista di Studi Geopolitici; IV Conferenza Nazionale STS Italia “Tecnologie emergenti, Mondi sociali”; Baab Al Shams - Centro de Análisis y Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales en la región MENA. [email protected]

PALABRAS CLAVE Daesh, Al Qaeda, yihadismo, califato, seguridad.

RESUMEN El avance de Daesh y la proclamación de un “estado islámico” crean una fuerte inestabilidad en Oriente Próximo y afectan los intereses de Occidente. En consecuencia, adquiere relevancia investigar el planteamiento estratégico y los dictámenes del Islam reinterpretados desde una visión salafista yihadista que están a la base de su actuación. Es preciso entender tanto el fortalecimiento de la organización como la reacción que provoca a nivel sistémico la creación del califato, para llegar a una comprensión profunda de las dinámicas de gestación de su éxito. Sólo así se podrán poner en marcha políticas de amplio respiro y a largo plazo, que aborden las causas primarias del fenómeno yihadista e impidan su repetición. ABSTRACT The success of Daesh and the proclamation of an “Islamic state” generate instability in the Middle East and affect the interests of Western countries. Therefore, it is vital to investigate the strategic approach as well as the dictates of Islam as reinterpreted from a jihadist Salafist point of view, which are the basis of Daesh’s actions. Researching both the strengthening of the organization and the reaction that the creation of the caliphate causes globally, is necessary, in order to deeply understand its successful dynamics of gestation. Such an approach would allow to implement comprehensive longterm policies to address the very causes of the jihadist phenomenon and prevent its recurrence.

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INTRODUCCIÓN En 2014, los herederos de la insurgencia antiestadounidense iraquí, enquistada en el conflicto civil sirio, han pretendido restructurar el “califato” medieval en el corazón del mundo árabe-musulmán, en la región histórica de Mesopotamia Superior, entre Siria e Iraq. Ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fīl-‘Irāq wash-Shām, o Daesh (traducido como EIIL/EIIS, Estado Islámico de Iraq y Siria/Levante), la organización que ha protagonizado este avance geopolítico y geoestratégico, autodenominándose “Estado islámico”, se enmarca en la tradición del salafismo yihadista que tenía en Al Qaeda (AQ) su principal promotor. Sin embargo, Daesh ha ido más allá de la práctica qaediana, llegando a ocupar un territorio con una exitosa campaña militar y a proclamar la creación de un estado islámico, que, teóricamente, es el objetivo último de toda formación yihadista.

1. El Qutbismo a la base del terrorismo qaediano

El yihadismo de marca qaedista de los años 90-2000 ha sido caracterizado por un apego incondicional a las tres principales aportaciones teóricas a la doctrina salafista del egipcio Sayyid Qutb, que en sus escritos denunciaba todas las sociedades musulmanas como infieles a los mandamientos del Corán y, por lo tanto, hundidas en la ignorancia sobre la verdadera voluntad de Dios. En consecuencia, asumía particular importancia la estructuración de una vanguardia que usara la guerra para que toda la humanidad conociera la verdadera fe (el Islam) y preparara la creación de un Estado islámico (basado en la sharía) (Avilés, 2009). Para lograr los principales objetivos qutbistas, Al Qaeda pretendía derrotar los gobiernos apóstatas (murtaddun) y crear esa vanguardia que preparara la llegada de una sociedad respetuosa de la tradición islámica. Para ello, había que 1) desafiar Occidente y obligarlo a intervenir en el corazón del mundo árabe-musulmán (la antigua Mesopotamia, el Golfo, la Península Arábiga…) para acabar con la amenaza de atentados y ataques a sus intereses. Eso provocaría 2) que las masas se revelaran contra sus gobiernos y sus poderosos aliados foráneos, que, ante la imposibilidad de sostener los costes sociales y económicos de un largo conflicto, 3) abandonarían el terreno, levantando el último impedimento a 4) la creación del Estado islámico. En la actualidad, Daesh parece haber substituido, por lo menos a nivel propagandístico, el liderazgo de Al Qaeda del movimiento salafista yihadista global, pues gracias a los éxitos de su campaña militar y la súbita proclamación del califato ha cosechado más influencia, lo que se ha traducido en una mayor captación de aspirantes afiliados, que garantiza un mayor flujo de voluntarios y diversificación de fuentes de las financiación.

2. Las diferencias doctrinales con Al Qaeda

Con la reivindicación de haber estructurado el estado islámico por excelencia, el califato, el grupo pretende anular toda clase de división territorial en el mundo islámico,

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y mantener bajo una única autoridad unos 1,5 mil millones de musulmanes. Daesh comparte las bases doctrinales de Al Qaeda, de hecho la formación yihadista es un producto de la insurgencia iraquí afiliada a Al Qaeda durante la ocupación anglo-estadounidense. (Negri, 2014, 40, 44; Samaan, 2015, 2) Pero ha sido la primera organización salafista yihadista a superar la narrativa y el liderazgo qaedista y poner en marcha un nuevo modelo de yihad, que establece que la lucha contra los apóstatas e infieles y la construcción de un estado islámico son objetivos a corto plazo. En eso se ha visto respaldado por una súbita expansión territorial. (Declich, 2014, 51-52). Daesh tiene una estrategia de potencia que supera en ambición la del qaedismo, en la que, quizás por realismo, la idea de la entidad estatal islámica no era bien estructurada, ya que parecía una utopía poder reconstruir un califato universal que eliminara las barreras entre musulmanes. La organización de Bin Laden tenía un diseño político para perseguir con tácticas terroristas, junto con el objetivo final de asustar Occidente y obligarle a abandonar las tierras sagradas y sus aliados árabes-musulmanes. El restablecimiento del califato era, teóricamente, un objetivo final a muy largo plazo. Sin embargo, paradójicamente, Daesh parece caracterizarse por un pragmatismo –en lo referente al aprovechamiento geopolítico del territorio y en la puesta en marcha de tácticas militares tradicionales– que le faltaba a Al Qaeda, más ocupada en planificar espectaculares atentados terroristas que obligaran las potencias occidentales a abandonar sus aliados apóstatas (murtaddun) y corruptos y desencadenaran violencias y rebeliones regionales, que destruyeran las distancias para construir un continuum espacial islámico. AQ nunca reclamó el control de un territorio y hasta 2014 inclusive se limitó a reivindicar la creación de “un” estado islámico (como pueden ser las Repúblicas islámicas representadas, por ejemplo, por Mauritania, Irán, Paquistán), o la construcción de un emirato (en Afganistán), entidades que se sitúan en un nivel anterior –y representan un objetivo más realista– que la restructuración del califato medieval global, “el” estado islámico por antonomasia. (Samaan, 2015, 3)

3. Daesh toma el relevo del yihadismo global 3.1. Los pasos hacia el éxito Daesh se encuentra en las que podrían llamar como la tercera y cuarta fase de la planificación estratégica qaediana: habiéndose retirado las tropas extranjeras y aprovechando la debilidad de los gobiernos considerados apóstatas, la insurgencia yihadista se ha reorganizado y ha dado los últimos pasos necesarios a la creación del estado islámico.

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3.2. El apoyo local Los grupos presentes sobre el terreno en Iraq, que mantenían su porción de poder e influencia sobre la población local –gracias a cierta cercanía doctrinal-ideológica, uso de la violencia (atentados) y tráficos ilícitos con finalidad de financiación del terrorismo (secuestros, extorsiones, contrabando)– se han reactivado de forma prepotente, aprovechando las fault-lines étnicas, tribales, políticas y doctrinales. Tanto en Iraq como en Siria, la comunidad suní se ha visto excluida del reparto del poder y de los beneficios económicos del estado multiconfesional y multiétnico: en Damasco gobierna la dinastía al-Asad, alauíes que representan una minoría del chiismo, secta del islam a la que pertenecía también el ex presidente iraquí al-Maliki. Al mismo tiempo, en ambos países, la comunidad curda es cada vez más autónoma y poderosa. Los suníes, percibiéndose como marginados, han apoyado o, de todas formas, no han dificultado el surgimiento de Daesh y la puesta en marcha de su campaña bélica “tradicional”, que ha sido exitosa también gracias a la presencia de milicias bien equipadas y adiestradas, formadas tanto por veteranos expertos en el manejo de las armas, ex militares de Hussein, como por jóvenes “nativos digitales”, que utilizan las nuevas tecnologías para llevar a cabo acciones de ciberguerra y gestionar eficazmente la poderosa propaganda de Daesh. La proclamación ha sido sucesiva a un avance sobre el terreno que ha sorprendido por su eficacia y su rápidez. La insurgencia yihadista se ha organizado en columnas que llegaron a controlar rutas, ciudades, recursos, sin encontrar mucha resistencia y arrasando en la primera fase de la ocupación del territorio, debido al efecto sorpresa y a la escasa preparación de las tropas regulares. (Echeverría, 2014, 5 y 6) 3.3. La proclamación Después del éxito de la fase inicial de la campaña bélica, Daesh ha conseguido gestionar el territorio como una entidad casi-estatal, llegando a: • Substituir los gobernantes legítimamente elegidos. • Permear la sociedad con una interpretación estricta de la religión islámica, con aplicación práctica sobre el derecho. • Monopolizar recursos estratégicos nacionales y su intercambio, como los hidrocarburos, y adueñarse de otras fuentes de financiación estableciendo incluso un sistema de tasación/extorsión). • “Limpiar” étnicamente las áreas ocupadas con la persecución de minorías étnicas y confesionales, llevando, así, a la práctica una visión doctrinalmente totalitaria de la sociedad. La proclamación del Estado islámico en su forma tradicionalmente más pura y fiel a la historia, el Califato, teóricamente pone fin a la tercera fase de la estrategia yihadista

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global y daría por concluido el proceso. Quedaría pendiente la expansión de la verdadera fe por el mundo a través de la guerra y la sumisión de otras comunidades no islámicas (dhimmi). 3.4. Los juramentos o baya: el califato se expande Las prácticas más violentas de Daesh, que han hecho que se concrete la percepción de la actualidad del peligro para el escenario de seguridad, van desde la política de fomento de actos violentos de clara matriz terrorista en los territorios ocupados, hasta las intimidaciones a quienes apoyan a los gobiernos legítimos, pasando por la fuerte propaganda cultural del yihad global contra los infieles y la difusión de enseñanzas radicales. Además, en varios países árabes-musulmanes (Libia, Argelia, Túnez, Líbano, Nigeria, etc.), hay varias agrupaciones, recién surgidas o ya activas en sus territorios, que, siguiendo el modelo de afiliación qaedista, están jurando su lealtad al Califato. En realidad Daesh no actúa como matriz, como hizo Al Qaeda en su momento. Mucho grupos autóctonos demostraban su valentía y su compromiso con el yihad global, de ahí pedían o esperaban poder franquiciarse con Al Qaeda, llegando a ser sus filiales locales, hasta cambiaban su nombre para aumentar el grado de identificación con la organización líder en la estrategia del yihad global. 3.5. Las wilayaat Con Daesh pasa algo parecido, aunque los grupos no cambian su denominación: es el califato que empieza a considerar como provincias (wilayaat) los territorios que supuestamente controlan las agrupaciones que proclaman baya. El 14 de septiembre de 2014, una facción de Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (AQMI), liderada por Abdelmalek Gouri y, a partir de diciembre, por Abu Abdallah al-Asimi, se autodenominó Jund al Khilafah (Los soldados del Califa), juró lealtad al califato y estableció la primera cabeza de puente de la entidad/organización mesopotámica en África. En octubre surgió en Derna, Libia, el Consejo de la Juventud Islámica, activo con atentados y secuestros, y juró su lealtad al califato. En noviembre de 2014, el califato aceptó también la afiliación de Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Los Partisanos de Jerusalén), activo en el Sinaí egipcio, de los talibanes de Pakistán en septiembre, y en marzo de 2015 el de Boko Haram, que ya había proclamado la creación del califato islámico en la ciudad de Gwoza, en el Estado federado de Borno en el Noreste de Nigeria, en marzo de 2014 (seguramente con un afán menos universal de Daesh, pues según el derecho islámico su territorio correspondería más bien a un emirato). (Samaan, 2015, 4). La teórica subdivisión territorial en provincias es parte del diseño geopolítico de Daesh de restablecer la plena extensión geográfica del califato. Según el mapa que circula desde 2014 en la red, con los límites del califato y sus subdivisiones en provincias, Daesh quiere que el califato ejerza autoridad sobre un territorio, que coincide con

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la máxima expansión histórica del estado islámico abasida1. Pero no acepta que haya reivindicaciones territoriales por parte de entidades externas al califato sobre territorios pertenecientes a él, porque serían divisiones artificiales que separan los musulmanes entre sí, creaciones del hombre, cuya obra es contraria a la voluntad de Dios, porque pretende establecer una autoridad (la ley, la soberanía…) superior a la suya2 (Nielsen, 2015). Con respecto a la terminología, las “afiliaciones” a Daesh o a la entidad califal reciben la denominación de wilayaat, nombre histórico de las provincias en el califato medieval. Así que han ido surgiendo la Wilayat Barqa (Cirenáica), Sinai (Egipto), alJazair (Argelia), al-Haramayn (Arabia Saudí), al-Yemen (Yemen), Khorasan (Pakistán) (Samaan, 2015, 5 y 8). Sin embargo, no a todos los grupos que juran lealtad se les reconoce como administradores de una wilayat. (Milton y Ubaydi, 2015) En realidad, Daesh prescindiría de las afiliaciones, pues el califato es por antonomasia la autoridad superior a la que todos los musulmanes tienen que someterse, así que la adquisición o aceptación de territorios lejanos vinculados a la actividad de grupos yihadistas locales sería puramente formal. Con todo, las proclamaciones, afiliaciones y nuevas denominaciones cumplen con una función de propaganda, al fomentar la identificación con la entidad mesopotámica y fortalecer cierto espíritu “corporativo”. Además, no parece ser imprescindible para las agrupaciones que juran lealtad al califa al-Bagdadi demonstrar el real control de un área o espacio de acción, controlado o arrebatado a un gobierno central contra el que luchan. El juramento de lealtad o las declaraciones de apoyo han sido suficientes para que se les asignara el estatus de provincia a los territorios de pertenencia o sobre los que avanzan alguna reivindicación acerca de su naturaleza islámica. 3.6. El factor propaganda Respetando el derecho islámico, los grupos interesados simplemente juran lealtad al califa y, entonces, al califato, para cumplir sus órdenes y sumarse a su plan, es decir, seguir en el yihad y contribuir a estabilizar su autoridad, por voluntad de Dios. Lo que puede llevar a pensar que, desde un punto de vista “administrativo”, lo que reamente pretenden estos grupos autóctonos no es la identificación con Daesh, sino estructurar exclaves del califato, es decir, entidades estatales intermedias, como emiratos, esperando a que, algún día, esos territorios separados diseminados por la geografía árabe-musulmán se puedan unir entre ellos y con el corazón mesopotámico.

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Y admite alguna forma de soberanía más allá de sus fronteras sólo por razones religiosas: el hecho de que el califato medieval no haya ensanchado más sus límites es porque, probablemente, esa era la voluntad de Allah.

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Esa postura deja claro que Daesh se enmarca en la tradición de la interpretación salafista yihadista del derecho islámico acerca de la soberanía, teorizada por Qutb en 1964, según el que el mundo estaba hundido en la ignorancia por haber intentado substituir la autoridad de Allah en la tierra con la soberanía y la autoridad de los hombres sobre otros hombre (Avilés, 2009).

La realidad es que la aceptación de la lealtad por parte del califa es un reconocimiento ambicionado, pues estos grupos necesitan utilizarla a nivel propagandístico. El califato islámico proclamado les ayuda a justificar sus acciones enmarcadas en el yihadismo global, útiles para mantener el control sobre el territorio y seguir aprovechando los tráficos ilícitos como fuentes de financiación. El éxito del califato proporciona la justificación moral por excelencia de cara tanto a las comunidades que habitan los santuarios yihadistas como a los muyahidines y aspirantes milicianos: el yihad funciona, ya que el objetivo último –reunir toda la Umma musulmana bajo una autoridad superior califal– ha sido cumplido, entonces hay que seguir luchando para aportar el granito de arena. (Wagemakers, 2015)

4. La dinámica circular del yihadismo

4.1. La reacción internacional Sin embargo, la fuerte desestabilización geopolítica en el área mesopotámica –tal como fue la en el Norte de Malí, con la ocupación del territorio más grande jamás controlado por islamistas radicales en 2012/2013– y la amenaza a la seguridad de los países de la región y a importantes áreas de producción de hidrocarburos, ha obligado una coalición, extremadamente heterogénea por composición e intereses perseguidos, a intervenir militarmente. Aunque de escasa contundencia durante los primeros meses, la contraofensiva parece surtir unos efectos que se traducen en la gradual pérdida de terreno por parte de Daesh. 4.2. El bucle yihadista Existe el riesgo que la desactivación de la amenaza de Daesh, sin su total aniquilación, lleve a una dinámica circular en la que: 1) La organización yihadista retrocede, tanto a nivel táctico como a nivel estratégico/doctrinal, a una fase anterior del yihad global, debido a una contundente respuesta militar. 2) Sucesivamente, al desaparecer la amenaza en su fase más aguda, se levantaría la presión sobre lo actores yihadistas por una mejorada percepción del entorno de seguridad. 3) Esto dejaría a los actores radicales la posibilidad de fortalecerse y aprovechar las fracturas presentes en la sociedad para reconstruir un espacio de cooptación moral e influencia económica y reactivar la escalation bélica de atentados/insurgencia/guerrilla. 4) Al final, volveríar a dar el paso hacia la construcción del Estado islámico. 5) La proclamación provocaría una reacción en su contra. Gracias al mantenimiento de este estado de guerra indefinido los grupos yihadistas mantendrían sus cuotas de poder político y económico en los distintos entornos geopolíticos donde actúan. El bombardeo propagandístico, entonces, sería constante, así como constante sería el flujo tanto de recursos humanos como

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REFERENCIAS económicos, por la necesidad de seguir luchando para alcanzar el objetivo final de la doctrina qutbista.

CONCLUSIÓN Es innegable que la amenaza a la seguridad internacional debida a la aparición de Daesh no hace más que mantener alto el nivel de alerta en el llamado Occidente y sensibilizar sus sociedades hacia la necesidad de intervenir y mantener una presión constante para derrotar los yihadistas en sus territorios de origen sin que puedan estabilizarse y dar el salto a la orilla norte del Mediterráneo o al otro lado del Atlántico. Por otro lado, la constante implicación occidental y la perpetración de una dinámica circular como la descrita permitirían a las agrupaciones yihadistas con veleidades totalitarias mantener un estado de confrontación permanente, ya que sería virtualmente imposible alcanzar el objetivo de creación del Estado islámico. De cara a la seguridad en territorio europeo, es preciso mencionar el desafío representado tanto por la actividad de reclutadores que organizan las rutas para voluntarios que desean sumarse al yihad medio-oriental, como por los atentados perpetrados por terroristas locales auto-radicalizados, que afirman actuar en nombre y por cuenta del Califa pese a no mantener ninguna conexión con la estructura de Daesh.

Avilés, J. (2009). De la yihad clásica al terrorismo yihadí. Revista de Historia Militar. No. Extraordinario 1. 199-223 Caracciolo, L. et al. (2014, 9 de septiembre). Limes. Le maschere del califfo. Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso: Roma Declich, L. (2014, 9 de septiembre). Dove sventola la bandiera nera. Limes. Le maschere del califfo. Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso: Roma Echeverría, C. (2014, 3 de diciembre). El Estado Islámico (EI) como grupo terrorista yihadista salafista y otros grupos armados violentos actuando en Irak hoy. Colección: grupos extremistas. Documento de investigación 06/2014. IEEE: Madrid. Milton, D., Ubaydi, M. (2015, 19 de marzo). Pledging Bay`a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State? CTC Sentinel. Recuperado de https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/pledging-baya-a-benefit-or-burdento-the-islamic-state Negri, A. (2014, 9 de septiembre). Lo Stato islamico visto da vicino. Limes. Le maschere del califfo. Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso: Roma Nielsen, R. (2015, 6 de febrero). Does the Islamic State believe in sovereignty? The Washington Post. Recuperado de http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/06/does-theislamic-state-believe-in-sovereignty/ Samaan, J. (2015, 14 de abril). An End-of-Time Utopia: Understanding the Narrative of the Islamic State”, en NDC Research Report. NATO Defense College Research Division. Recuperado de http://www. ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=796. Wagemakers, J. (2015, 27 de enero). Jihadi-Salafi views of the Islamic State. The Washington Post. Recuperado de http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/27/jihadisalafi-views-of-the-islamic-state/

De hecho, la entidad yihadista no tiene ningún poder de control sobre las decisiones autónomas de “activarse” y actuar de los llamados self-starter (que actúan en los países occidentales o en los países árabes-musulmanes considerados apóstatas), aunque éstos se inspiren a sus dictámenes de practicar el yihad estén donde estén, siendo Iraq o Siria sólo uno de los muchos frentes de la guerra santa global. A parte de la intervención militar en apoyo a aquellos países cuyos territorios han sido canibalizados por el “califato”, y en paralelo a las operaciones judiciales para desactivar la amenaza yihadista bajo la forma de atentados, es necesario fomentar una visión global sobre el terrorismo y poner en marcha aquellas políticas que acaben con las causas más profundas del fenómeno yihadista: la marginación política, económica y social de parte de la población, sobre todo los jóvenes, y la falta de inclusión en un proyecto nacional compartido por las distintas almas que componen los estados tribales, multiétnicos y multiconfesionales de Oriente Medio y Norte de África, por parte de gobiernos que a menudo actúan a lo largo de líneas divisorias étnicas o confesionales y responden más a los intereses de una comunidad que a los de todo el conjunto de la población bajo su autoridad.

16

17

TERRORISM AND THE PERMANENT WAR: OWNERSHIP, AMERICAN PARTICIPATION, AND FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION

Despite its recent resurgence in international cultural memory, terrorism is not a new phenomenon: the nearly fourteen years since the attacks of September 11, 2001 on domestic, civilian American targets constitute only the most recent chapter of a history that spans centuries, if not millennia. If the definition of terrorism is expanded to include both its tactical predecessor —guerilla warfare— and its strategic predecessor —asymmetrical warfare— then terrorism, indeed, has quite the storied history. Perhaps more importantly, it is an ever-evolving tactic used in an array of contexts, which now appears to quixotically include traditional forms of warfare. Consequently, the United States —as the most heavily-invested party to counter-/anti-terror efforts— must decide how to successfully address the issue, as it becomes increasingly clear that terrorism cannot be forced to simply disappear. The question facing the United States, then, is one of ownership, participation, and future courses of action.

Kyle Brady Pennsylvania State University Kyle Brady is a graduate student in Pennsylvania State University’s Homeland Security program, where his primary interests are terrorism, law enforcement, and placing American homeland security needs within a broader, international context. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. As a proponent of open academic publishing, all of Kyle’s work can be found online at http://pennstate.academia.edu/KyleBrady and he can be reached by email at [email protected].

KEYWORDS Terrorism, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, war, national security, homeland security, foreign policy, MENA, regional empowerment

18

Terrorism: Definitions

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the current locus of both terrorism’s motivations and actions, has a complicated past, but its modern form may be explained as a partial outgrowth of the constant turmoil in the region, rather than as having an inherent and detracting theological component.1 As such, the form of terrorism currently invading the region should be defined as a worldview perpetuating a circumscribed set of actions: a version of asymmetric warfare that perceives the differences in power, force projection, and overall capability as so great that extraordinary means are required to act as a force multiplier. In a conflict defined where an overwhelmingly strong enemy presents an existential threat to a much smaller, less capable force, any rational effort would seek to better confront the enemy, since the alternative is existential failure. Anything that weakens the enemy and lessens the chance of destruction is, therefore, not only necessary but required (Butko, 2006). This perspective is supported by the weight of MENA’s history upon the present, since modern terrorism has evolved alongside the region, itself.

ABSTRACT Despite its recent resurgence in international cultural memory, terrorism is not a new phenomenon: the nearly fourteen years since the attacks of September 11, 2001 on domestic, civilian American targets constitute only the most recent chapter of a history that spans centuries, if not millennia. If the definition of terrorism is expanded to include both its tactical predecessor —guerilla warfare— and its strategic predecessor —asymmetrical warfare— then terrorism, indeed, has quite the storied history. Perhaps more importantly, it is an ever-evolving tactic used in an array of contexts, which now appears to quixotically include traditional forms of warfare. Consequently, the United States — as the most heavily-invested party to counter-/antiterror efforts — must decide how to successfully address the issue, as it becomes increasingly clear that terrorism cannot be forced to simply disappear. The question facing the United States, then, is one of ownership, participation, and future courses of action.

In this way, terrorism-as-asymmetrical-warfare is a rational attempt at strategic warfare —temporarily disregarding the tactics used and targets chosen— when framed within an existential perspective. This existential component need not be real, only perceived by the weaker actor, and this is where the predominant variant of modern terrorism — ardent proponents of differing versions of fundamental Islam employing the strategy of terrorism, occasionally in conflict with each other— becomes complicated by another order of magnitude: it may be considered a rational act by an irrational actor. The fear of an existential attack on Islam, in one form or another, is undeniably an irrational fear and acting upon it is, too, irrational; however, if the irrational fear is believed, then the rational conclusion has been reached to fully and completely defend against it.2

1

See previous work: “History Over Religion: Misperceptions of Primary Influence in the Middle East and North Africa” (2014).

2

The concept of irrational rationality, along with some competing and preceding arguments, can be explored through Nalbandov (2013). 19

Terrorism —a strategy designed to incite literal terror in its target audiences, far beyond those it directly affects— need not necessarily be brash, cruel, or inhumane. Terror is not a difficult emotion to cultivate in a chosen enemy. Nevertheless, modern terrorism ensures terror is achieved by carrying out acts often unthinkable or unjustifiable in any rational sense, including the intentional targeting of civilians/non-combatants and children. While the use of a force multiplier against a perceived existential attack may be framed as a rational act with an irrational actor’s worldview, the patterns of attack modernity has come to associate with terrorism are, in no way, rational. As such, it seems clear that irrational behaviors stemming from an irrational actor’s subjectively rational strategy are difficult, if not impossible, to stop: such beliefs preclude any opportunity to dissuade, persuade, or entice the actor to hold an entirely opposing worldview. When fundamentalist beliefs and existential fears merge, particularly in the form of non-state actors, traditional strategies of diplomacy will inevitably fail, as they have. Other, deeper steps must be taken.

Terrorism: Ownership

One of the most pressing questions —having defined terrorism in a modern, nontheological context— is that of ownership: who is responsible for the development and perpetuation of terrorism? Then arises the natural follow-up question: who is responsible for its cessation, if not termination? Defining the owners of the problem, and its subsets, begin to point to a solution. As previously noted, modern terrorism can be found, concretely and ideologically, largely in the Middle East and North Africa, even if its proclaimed enemies —namely, those in the West and those perceived as its supporters— are further afield. The problem of terrorism is, therefore, divided between its overwhelming geographical presence in MENA and its declared enemies in the West. Further complicating the divide is the reality that a far greater number acts of terror occur within MENA than in any Western state,3 often killing fellow members of nation, ethnicity, ideology, or theology. Since the roots of modern Islamic terrorism extend far beyond the irrational fears it ascribes to the ills of the West —both alleged and otherwise— it is clear that the West cannot bear full ownership of terrorism. However, simply because the overwhelming majority of terror actors are either birthed or found within MENA does not mean the region bears full ownership of terrorism, either. The historical forces and actors largely responsible for the present state of affairs in MENA similarly do not have full ownership of terrorism. Rather than viewing modern terrorism as the responsibility of a single party, or even a few parties, all must take partial ownership: each must own its stake in the modern terrorist paradigm, even if their position is based upon irrationality or untruths. As such, each actor must undertake courses of action to rectify whatever ills they now

3 20

Using comparisons of regional datasets from the Global Terrorism Database.

own, perceived or otherwise. Within this context, American participation —along with that of other actors— in the modern terror environment may be considered.

Terrorism: American Participation

Fundamentally, if the United States is not wholly responsible for the issue of modern terrorism, then America cannot be expected to be the de facto actor in attempting to find a resolution. In fact, the role of the United States in MENA, as regards terrorism, must be substantially decreased, while that of the region’s states is inevitably increased.4 Although the United States, and the West more generally, appear to be the primary targets of modern terrorism’s ire, the physical location of most such terror actors is within MENA, where they find safe haven5 for growth, in all aspects. This must be addressed, as it is a foundational element of concern. First, and foremost, the United States must develop itself as a supporting actor in the direct combat of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa. Doing so, and openly discussing such a strategy, will force the region’s states to act upon their own partial ownership of modern terrorism. The United States may provide funding, intelligence, training, or limited air support, but ground troops and direct combat should not be part of this strategy. As a result, the region’s states will turn ownership into responsibility and the exercise of power, with the knowledge that the United States supports such activities, and take direct courses of military action to degrade safe havens and destabilize pre-existing terror gains.6 It will take many years, but the region’s powers are more than capable of successfully undertaking such an effort on their own behalf. Second, the United States must acknowledge that its involvement —past and present— in MENA affairs has had an exacerbating effect on modern terrorism. Speeches and the spread of pro-Islam/anti-terrorism propaganda (Winseck, 2008) are simply not enough. The support of unpopular or autocratic regimes7 in the region for overtly political or economic gain has done substantial damage to the image and reputation of the United States (Lyons, 2007). Such support must end, publicly, which inevitably includes the untoward or unseemly activities of private American enterprises in the region that are often assumed, incorrectly, to be government-sanctioned.

4

See previous work: “Solving the West’s Middle Eastern Dilemma: Regional State Empowerment” (2015).

5

The safe haven for terror actors in MENA is not necessarily intentional and this is not intended to be implied as such. Rather, terror safe havens can arise as the result of a variety of other characteristics, such as a state’s failed status, its inability to fully govern/maintain sovereignty, its inadequate military or political power, its inadequate funding, the attitudes and beliefs of a subset of a state’s population, etc. Very rarely could terrorism be said to receive intentional safe haven in any state.

6

This has only just begun to occur, at the time of authoring, through the region’s efforts against the Islamic State/ISIS/ISIL. (Stavridis, 2015).

7 8

Note that “unpopular or autocratic” is not synonymous with “undemocratic.” Besides the overtly, sometimes disingenuous, Christian nature of modern American politics, the United States has historically been, and should remain, atheological. 21

Third, the United States must stop taking positions on Islam. Generally speaking,8 no positions are taken on any other religions of the world, either in support of or against, and Islam should be no exception. Other than to observe that modern terrorism employs a fundamentalist, discredited, and extremely unpopular interpretation of Islam, discussion of religion should be avoided. So, too, should the United States cease asking or expecting non-fundamentalist Muslims to disavow fundamentalist activities. This was not previously requested of Irish Catholics, for example, during the years of battle over religion and state on that North Atlantic island; Islam should be treated no differently. Fourth, the United States must actively require —through legislation, if necessary— companies owned or operated within its borders to stop permitting the use of its resources to spread terrorist propaganda. This would include the compulsory cooperation of media and social media companies, as well as web-/cloud-hosting providers. If MENA’s governments are expected to disallow physical safe havens for terror actors, then digital ones —even in a culture of free speech9— must be barred, as well. Fifth, the United States must continue to bring to bear its considerable resources and influence in coordinating an erstwhile embargo against terror actors. As non-state actors, this is clearly a very different effort than embargoing a state, but once the resources, allies, communication networks, purchasing venues and vendors, or sources of income of terror actors are identified, the United States must build a strong and effective coalition in opposition. Any and all methods that may be used to specifically starve such organizations of money, resources, and power must be employed, so long as they do not place inordinate burdens upon uninvolved citizens or states. Sixth, by asking MENA’s regional governments and powers to exercise greater authority within their own domain, the United States must similarly cede control over many aspects of the region’s developments. Although Western governments will forever have the right to intervene in cases of truly global security concerns —such as with the development and use of nuclear weapons— it is the responsibility of these many governments to, in fact, govern themselves and their affairs as sovereign states. The United States can no longer attempt to influence the courses of political and social history in the Middle East and North Africa, beyond simple support or suggestion. The region must determine how to stabilize itself and the United States must accept that this will not be a quick or simple process, as well as that it may not necessarily produce a wholly desired outcome. However, given that modern terrorism benefits no state or region, stabilization can be expected to include successful counter-/anti-terrorism efforts.

22

8

Besides the overtly, sometimes disingenuous, Christian nature of modern American politics, the United States has historically been, and should remain, atheological.

9

The so-called harm principle of free speech should be sufficient justification to censor terror actors from spreading their message through American networks: the existence of terror-sourced/-related videos, messages, posts, blogs, message boards, etc. stands in active opposition to the wellbeing and welfare of the United States and its people.

Seventh, and similarly, the United States can no longer provide selective military, political, and economic aid to certain MENA states. In recognizing the increased responsibilities of these states and reconstituting their sovereignty, American assistance cannot be used to develop apparent favorites. This applies, even, to long-favored states such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt: by providing substantial amounts of aid, the United States is perpetuating the image of these states as both dependents and Western. There is no logic to helping a few states prepare for war against the others, while simultaneously posturing for a more collectivist and peaceful approach to the region. By proceeding along these seven principles of American participation in the permanent war against modern terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, the United States can substantially begin to lessen the actual domestic threat that it is so desperately attempting to mitigate.10

Terrorism: Future Courses of Action

While undertaking actions designed to prevent the further spread of modern terrorism, the United States and the West, generally, must also begin to look to the future and how to prevent it from, once more, regaining such inordinate power. Having acknowledged the foundational element of terrorism to be the perception of an existential conflict with an insurmountably disparate division of power —not any particular set of ideological or theological views— the central goal in avoiding future growth of terrorism is to, simply, avoid creating this perception. This is, of course, more difficult than it may, at first, appear to be. Similar to the so-called harm principle of free speech,11 American foreign policy must, itself, develop a harm principle: the United States has the freedom to behave in accordance with its wishes and needs, so long as it does not unduly and negatively affect other states and their people.12 By avoiding the subjugation and degradation of other peoples, directly or indirectly, the United States can begin to safely operate in a constructive fashion that does not breed resentment. The American people are not alone in their wish to be respected by other states and other peoples —it is a universal desire.

10

See previous works: “Better Integrating American Intelligence Agencies and Products: Revising a Recurring Solution for a Recurring Problem” (2015), “Secure Management of American Borders in the Modern Era: New Roles for Federal Agencies” (2015), and “The Role of Federal Law Enforcement in Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security” (2015).

11 12

See footnote 8. With obvious exceptions for humanitarian interventions, demonstrably just warfare, etc.

23

Although the days of colonization and empire are long since over, the United States must also be careful not to overexert its influence or power, even in what may be earnest attempts at assistance. Without careful thought and exploration prior to action, foreign policy actions may have a dual nature, as they solve the problems of the present while creating more difficult problems for the future.13 This is not a new principle, but it is an important one often ignored. The United States must also continue to take actions, and make plans for further action, to create greater independence in a variety of fields, such as energy and certain forms of manufacturing. By doing so —as already noted by the Executive Branch14 and the Departments of Defense15 and Homeland Security16 — there will be less of an impulse for self-serving actions abroad that secure required resources or partnerships. Without an existential interest in oil, the West may have, arguably, never become so involved in MENA (Bahgat, 2014). Finally, the United States must be careful not to project (Baum, 2004) its culture of political and social demonization outward: although the present domestic sociopolitical environment regularly seethes with hostility and demonization, the American public largely seems to understand and accept this as part of the process (Niose, 2015). However, creating enemies as projections of the Other or Other-ness, for the sake of domestic politics or other lesser purposes, produces no coherent good. Except in the few historical cases where such a distinction was justified,17 the foreign policy of the United States, and all related aspects of American governance, must beware overgeneralizing a group or culture.

CONCLUSION By developing a non-theological definition of modern terrorism and exploring the issue of its ownership, concrete steps can be outlined and executed to pursue the mitigation, cessation, and, ultimately, prevention of terrorism. Terrorism has evolved, over the past few decades, into a state of permanent war between state and non-state actors, but this need not continue. If the United States effectively coordinates and participates with the governments of the Middle East and North Africa —where terrorism is presently

24

13

American involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war stands as evidence of the possible unintended consequences of American involvement, as the well-documented history has a direct line to the events of September 11, 2001 and the evolution of modern terrorism.

14 15 16 17

In the 2015 National Security Strategy. In Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy. In The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Russia are the only truly justifiable examples, in modern history, of the Western use of the Other as a means to develop sociopolitical unity.

centered, expanding in both power and claimed territory— the permanent war may, in the coming years, become far less so. Having the benefit of history to better explain the development of terror actors’ motivations, worldviews, and desires, the future may not be so bleak.

REFERENCES Bahgat, G. (2014). The shale gas and oil “revolution”: Strategic implications for United States policy in the Middle East. The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 39(2), 219. Baum, M. A. (2004). Going private: Public opinion, presidential rhetoric, and the domestic politics of audience costs in U.S. foreign policy crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(5), 603-631. doi:10.1177/0022002704267764 Brady, K. (2014). History Over Religion: Misperceptions of Primary Influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/4957734/History_Over_Religion_ Misperceptions_of_Primary_Influence_in_the_Middle_East_and_North_Africa – –. (2015). Better Integrating American Intelligence Agencies and Products: Revising a Recurring Solution for a Recurring Problem. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/10792298/Better_ Integrating_American_Intelligence_Agencies_and_Products_Revising_a_Recurring_Solution_ for_a_Recurring_Problem – –. (2015). Secure Management of American Borders in the Modern Era: New Roles for Federal Agencies. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/11928471/Secure_Management_of_American_ Borders_in_the_Modern_Era_New_Roles_for_Federal_Agencies – –. (2015). Solving the West’s Middle Eastern Dilemma: Regional State Empowerment. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/11746095/Solving_the_Wests_Middle_Eastern_Dilemma_Regional_ State_Empowerment – –. (2015). The Role of Federal Law Enforcement in Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/11554707/The_Role_of_Federal_Law_Enforcement_ in_Preventing_Terrorism_and_Enhancing_Security Butko, T. (2006). Terrorism redefined. Peace Review, 18(1), 145-151. doi:10.1080/10402650500510933 Byman, D. (2005). Passive sponsors of terrorism. Survival, 47(4), 117-144. doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 Global Terrorism Database. (2014). Region: (Middle East & North Africa). Retrieved 15 April 2015, from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?region=10 – –. (2014). Region: (North America). Retrieved 15 April 2015, from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ Results.aspx?region=1 – –. (2014). Region: (Western Europe). Retrieved 15 April 2015, from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ Results.aspx?region=8 Lyons, G. M. (2007). Rethinking american foreign policy: Toward realistic multilateralism. American Foreign Policy Interests, 29(1), 73-86. doi:10.1080/10803920601188193 Nalbandov, R. (2013). Irrational rationality of terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security, 6(4), 92-102. doi:http:// dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.5 Niose, D. (2015). Is American Patriotism Getting Out of Hand?. Psychology Today. Retrieved from https:// www.psychologytoday.com/blog/our-humanity-naturally/201503/is-american-patriotism-gettingout-hand The Office of the President of the United States. (2015). National Security Strategy. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_ strategy.pdf The U.S. Department of Defense. (2011). Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/ Reports/20110614_Operational_Energy_Strategy.pdf The U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2014). The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014qhsr-final-508.pdf Stavridis, J. (2015). The Arab NATO. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/ the-arab-nato-saudi-arabia-iraq-yemen-iran/ Winseck, D. (2008). Information operations ‘blowback’: Communication, propaganda and surveillance in the global war on terrorism. International Communication Gazette, 70(6), 419-441. doi:10.1177/1748048508096141 25

TREINTA AÑOS DE DEPORTACIÓN: CRÓNICA DE UN VIAJE SIN RETORNO. Susana Panisello Sabaté Universitat Pompeu Fabra, España Susana Panisello Sabaté es licenciada en Humanidades en la especialidad de Historia del Arte por la Universidad Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona en el año 2004. En septiembre de 2011 se doctoró en Historia con la calificación de Cum Laude en la misma universidad con la tesis: Los deportados de ETA: los olvidados del conflicto (1984-1998). Sus principales líneas de investigación son la historia del terrorismo, en especial de la banda armada ETA y, también, temas de contraterrorismo

KEYWORDS ETA, Deportation, Refugees, Expulsion, Terrorism.

ABSTRACT On January 10, 2014 they were fulfilled thirty years of the detention that the French police, by order of his Government in complicity with the Spanish, effected to a fortnight of Basque refugees. Six of them were sent to Guadalupe’s exterior French department for days later to be deported to Panama. It was the beginning of the new modality chosen by the Spanish and French authorities to attack ETA: the deportation to third countries.

INTRODUCCIÓN1 Desde que la Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) anunció el cese definitivo de su actividad armada el 20 de octubre de 2011, muchas han sido las especulaciones sobre su posible final. Ante todos estos rumores sobre el fin de la organización, el colectivo de exiliados políticos vascos dio a conocer el pasado junio de 2013 a su grupo de interlocución. La finalidad de dicho grupo sería tratar con el Gobierno sobre todo lo concerniente al colectivo—por ejemplo si se iniciara un proceso de disolución de ETA, cómo se solucionaría la vuelta de los exiliados y deportados. Entre los interlocutores de este grupo se encontraban Tomás Linaza, Txutxo Abrisketa o Alfonso Etxegarai. Tres nombres irrelevantes para la mayoría pero clave en el artículo que presentamos, ya que ellos forman parte del grupo de deportados que es objeto de nuestro estudio. Sabemos que debido a la tregua permanente iniciada en 2011, el tema de ETA ha quedado relegado a un segundo o tercer plano. De hecho, en la última encuesta del

1 26

Este trabajo forma parte de la tesis doctoral defendida por la autora, Susana Panisello, en septiembre de 2011 y cuyo título es: Los deportados de ETA: los olvidados del conflicto (1984-1998).

CIS de diciembre de 20132, el terrorismo y ETA sólo le preocupaban a un 0.2% de los encuestados. A pesar de ello, una tregua no significa que se haya zanjado el tema porque quedan muchos puntos por resolver para asegurar que se ha llegado al final de la organización. Es por esta razón que el presente artículo pretende dar a conocer la existencia de uno de los colectivos vinculados a ETA que surgió en los ochenta y del que todavía no se ha conseguido resolver su situación. Estamos hablando de los deportados de ETA. Debemos apuntar que es el colectivo menos conocido por la sociedad y que por esta razón y, aprovechando que se cumplen treinta años de las primeras deportaciones, es necesario presentar cómo surgió y por qué. Además, se ha hablado mucho del final de ETA y de cómo se resolverá la situación de los presos si se quiere acabar con ella, pero, como acabamos de evidenciar, existen otros grupos que también reclaman el esclarecimiento de su futuro. Para eso, también es necesario que ahondemos en su historia. Por lo tanto, nuestro artículo tiene también como objetivo relatar cómo se llegó a configurar un grupo de deportados de ETA en terceros países y cuál es su situación actualmente. Ya que creemos que para poner punto y final a la historia de ETA debemos conocer todos aquellos frentes que deben ser cerrados.

¿Cómo se llegó a la deportación?

Deportación es una palabra de sobra conocida en la historia de Euskadi. De hecho, podemos remontarnos a 1794, año en que el gobierno francés deportó al pueblo de Sara y a los de su alrededor al departamento francés de Landas—se les apartó 80 km de la frontera con España. Este castigo fue el resultado de la relación cordial que los habitantes de dicha región tenían con las gentes de Navarra y Guipúzcoa, una fraternidad que buscaba que los vasco franceses decidieran no luchar en la Guerra de la Convención (1793-1795) que enfrentó a franceses con españoles en territorio vasco, aragonés y catalán. Durante este suceso fueron deportadas 4000 personas el 3 de marzo de 1794 y, cuando el decreto del 30 de septiembre del mismo año puso fin a la deportación, 1600 de éstas ya habían muerto. El resto, al llegar a sus hogares, se encontraron con que les habían confiscado sus bienes y estaban arruinados3. Casi cien años después, en 1875, como consecuencia de la segunda guerra carlista, el tema de la deportación volvió a afectar a Euskadi. En ese año se produjeron un total de 4451 deportaciones de vascos y navarros hacia las islas Canarias y también hacia Cuba (Extramiana, 1980, p. 342). La pena que se aplicaba a los carlistas detenidos

2

Véase la encuesta del CIS de diciembre de 2013 en: http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2014/01/08/4db01d9dade70023d90267c0260b6b7c.pdf [Consulta de 18 de septiembre de 2014].

3

Para un relato detallado ver Goyhenetxe, E. (1985). Historia de Iparralde. Txertoa: San Sebastián. pp. 84-85. 27

era la pena de muerte. No obstante, los que se entregaban a las autoridades salvaban su vida a cambio de ser condenados a la deportación. Respecto a los ciudadanos vascos, algunos de los que huían del régimen franquista cruzando la frontera hacia Francia, eran encerrados en el Campo de Gurs, creado, por su proximidad a la frontera, para albergar a los exiliados provenientes del País Vasco4. Así, el 10 de mayo de 1939, había en él un total de 6555 prisioneros de origen vasco. Además del repaso de la historia de la deportación de ciudadanos vascos, debemos añadir que la deportación más prolongada fue la que se llevó a cabo en los años setenta a regiones francesas alejadas del departamento de los Altos Pirineos. Esto porque hasta el día de hoy, la situación no se ha resuelto de manera clara y de aquí han surgido algunos miembros de la ETA. Así, en el año 1983, el gobierno español y el francés llegaron a un acuerdo mediante el cual los miembros de ETA que fueran detenidos en Francia serían deportados a terceros países que aceptaran tenerlos como huéspedes. Pero si ETA se fundó en el año 1959, ¿cómo es posible que no se llegara a un acuerdo antiterrorista concreto con Francia hasta 1983? La razón es que para llegar a estos acuerdos primero se tuvieron que desbloquear las relaciones con Francia que eran nulas desde la dictadura franquista. Es de sobra conocida la persecución que el caudillo Francisco Franco ejerció contra el pueblo vasco, su cultura y su lengua. Esta privación de las libertades provocaba que la gente se reuniera para combatir las opresiones. En este ambiente surgió en el curso académico 1951-52 en Bilbao el grupo EKIN, en el que sus miembros compartían su insatisfacción con el tono burgués que había tomado el Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Pasados cuatro años, empezaron a aproximarse al PNV y esto provocó una división en el grupo. Los escindidos crearon una nueva organización a la que bautizaron con el nombre de Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) y “a finales de 1959, ésta envía una carta al lehendakari Agirre comunicándole su existencia” (Casanova, 2007, p. 27)5. A partir de este momento, ETA actuó efusivamente contra el franquismo. En 1962 decidió usar las armas y en 1968 se produjo la primera víctima, el guardia civil José Pardines. No obstante, esta muerte no fue premeditada, fue fruto de una refriega con la policía. El primer asesinato que tuvo preparación previa fue el del jefe de la Brigada Social, Melitón Manzanas, conocido por sus brutales interrogatorios. Este hecho provocó una dura represión por parte del régimen y tuvo como consecuencia la caída

28

4

Respecto a este tema véase el trabajo de Chueca, J. (2007). Gurs. El campo vasco. Txalaparta: Tafalla.

5

Para más información sobre este periodo también ver Segura, A. (2009). Euskadi. Crònica d’una desesperança. L’Avenç: Barcelona. pp. 14 y siguientes.

de los dirigentes de ETA. Los detenidos fueron juzgados en el conocido Proceso de Burgos, donde se dictaron seis condenas a muerte. Este juicio sumarísimo fue la primera proyección internacional de la organización vasca, ya que en varios países se manifestaron en contra de las penas de muerte, hasta el escritor Jean-Paul Sartre afirmó que: “Este proceso ha perturbado las conciencias en España y fuera de España porque ha revelado a los ignorantes la existencia del hecho nacional vasco” (Cassan, 1998, p.154). El Proceso de Burgos dio a conocer a ETA al mundo, mas no fue el único. El 20 de diciembre de 1973, asesinaban al presidente del gobierno español, el almirante Luis Carrero Blanco. Este hecho le dio una profunda estocada al régimen de Franco porque Carrero estaba destinado a suceder al Caudillo. Además fue un acontecimiento que se vio en el exterior como un atentado contra el fascismo. De hecho, el ministro del Interior francés en los años ochenta, Pierre Joxe, reconocía haberlo celebrado: “cuando ETA hizo volar por los aires a Carrero Blanco, en Francia una gran cantidad de gente, y no sólo de izquierdas, muchos demócratas, convirtieron a los etarras en héroes” (Morán, 1997, p.80). La respuesta del gobierno español fue una represión feroz en el País Vasco, del que huyeron muchos ciudadanos que se refugiaron en Francia. Algo que también hicieron los artífices del atentado. A partir de este momento, las autoridades españolas empezaron a calificar al sur de Francia (conocida en Euskadi como Iparralde) como el “santuario etarra”. De este modo es como empezó el vínculo de ETA con el país vecino. La profesora Sagrario Morán (1997) explicaba que: ETA se benefició, además, de la tradición del país galo como tierra de asilo. En la época franquista, París aplicó fielmente su legislación sobre asilo y protegió a personas y grupos perseguidos por naciones que no respetaban las libertades fundamentales. Para el vecino del Norte, la España franquista no las respetaba. A esto se unía que para el Gobierno francés, ETA era un asunto interno español (p.91). Además de la tradición francesa, también hubo un nuevo hecho que aumentó las simpatías por la organización vasca, los fusilamientos de dos miembros de ETA y tres del FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota) el 27 de septiembre de 1975, después de que personas de muchos países salieran a la calle para pedir clemencia. Dos meses después de los fusilamientos moría Franco y con él su dictadura. Empezaba una nueva época para España y ésta, lo primero que tenía como objetivo, era abrirse al mundo y poder colaborar con Francia. España estaba ansiosa por limar asperezas con el país vecino así que se realizó una reunión entre el Ministro de Gobernación del momento, Manuel Fraga, y su homólogo francés, Michel Poniatowski. Para demostrar que creían en los avances de España, el gobierno francés impuso la deportación a la isla de Yeu de algunos de los refugiados,

29

alegando que se habían saltado las normas de no poner en riesgo la seguridad del país que los acogía. Si bien es cierto que las medidas de control en Yeu eran bastante laxas, fue el primer ensayo de deportación de miembros de ETA que se perfeccionó en los años ochenta. Ésta fue la primera disposición aplicada por Francia, la siguiente fue la retirada del estatuto de refugiado a todos los vascos a quienes se les había concedido. El gobierno francés alegó en un comunicado que las circunstancias por las que se concedía el estatuto habían desaparecido. Y junto a esta decisión se produjeron dieciocho nuevos confinamientos, esta vez en la localidad de Valensole. En 1981 los socialistas franceses ganaron las elecciones y François Mitterrand fue proclamado Presidente de la República. Según los periodistas Antoni Batista y Josep Playà: “su llegada al poder supuso un respiro para los refugiados vascos. Los nuevos mandatarios socialistas anunciaron que no accederían a las peticiones de extradición que empezaba a formular el gobierno español y volvieron a conceder algún estatuto de refugiado” (Batista, 1988, p. 125). En mayo de 1982, después de una redada contra miembros de ETApm (político-militar), los dirigentes españoles volvieron a insistir en que estas personas deberían ser extraditadas hacia España para poder ser juzgadas. A lo que el ministro francés Gaston Defferre contestó de forma contundente: “He dicho, desde mi llegada al ministerio del Interior, que no procederíamos a extradiciones, mientras precisamos que todo vasco que cometiera un delito sería detenido. Lo que hacemos y continuaremos haciendo” (Cassan, 1998, p. 170). Con esta declaración de intenciones, los españoles no sabían qué hacer para convencer a sus homólogos franceses de que ETA era considerada por ellos como una banda terrorista que se refugiaba en suelo francés y que, por lo tanto, era necesaria su ayuda para combatirla. Conseguir este objetivo era uno de los puntos de la campaña de los socialistas españoles. Éstos ganaron las elecciones a la presidencia del gobierno español en octubre de 1982 con Felipe González al frente. Por lo tanto, a partir de este momento España y Francia estaban lideradas por el mismo partido. Un hecho que disparó la imaginación de los dirigentes españoles, que creían que esto les haría aproximar posturas con Francia, sobretodo, en materia antiterrorista. Nada más lejos de la realidad. Francia seguía firme en sus ideas respecto a ETA pero también el gobierno de González, que tenía claro que sólo podía contener a la organización armada con la ayuda francesa y para conseguirla desencadenó una ofensiva diplomática. Ésta empezó a principios de 1983 con los llamados Seminarios Interministeriales que eran encuentros entre los diferentes ministros franceses y españoles, exceptuando a los de Interior. De estas reuniones los ministros españoles volvieron cabizbajos debido a que no consiguieron hacer cambiar de idea a Francia respecto a ETA. La gota que colmó el vaso de la paciencia española fue el secuestro del capitán de farmacia, Alberto Martín Barrios, acaecido el 6 de octubre de 1983. Para su liberación,

30

ETA exigía que se leyera un comunicado suyo en Televisión Española, a lo que el gobierno español se negó. Trece días después del secuestro, Martín Barrios apareció muerto6. La decisión final de ETA fue tomada, aparte de por no haber conseguido que TVE emitiera sus comunicados, por la situación de amenaza constante que vivían sus miembros en esa época. Primero fue el secuestro de José María Larretxea Goñi y, segundo, durante el cautiverio de Martín Barrios, el día 15, la desaparición de José Ignacio Zabala y José Antonio Lasa7. Ambas acciones fueron perpetradas por un nuevo grupo que se empezaba a forjar entonces desde los cuerpos y fuerzas de seguridad del Estado y el Ministerio del Interior español y que es conocido por todos por su acrónimo: los GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación). Por lo tanto, después del secuestro y asesinato de Martín Barrios, la opción radical que adoptó el gobierno español para conseguir que Francia se implicara en la lucha contra ETA era el uso de la guerra sucia y, además, que ésta se trasladada al país vecino. Algo que quedaba claro en el acta fundacional del grupo: Manifestamos nuestra intención de atacar los intereses franceses en Europa, ya que su Gobierno es responsable de acoger y permitir actuar a los terroristas en su territorio impunemente. Ninguna personalidad y ningún objetivo de la economía francesa van a estar seguros en adelante (Woodsworth, 2002, p. 71). Los GAL actuaban contra refugiados vascos que vivían en Iparralde. Una presión que inquietó al gobierno francés, tanto que lo llevó a establecer contactos con el ejecutivo español. La primera visita que recibió Mitterrand fue la del rey Juan Carlos, el 4 de noviembre de 1983, quien insistió en la insuficiente colaboración francesa contra ETA. La ofensiva continuó y, días después del rey Juan Carlos, quien viajaba a París con el mismo fin era el secretario general de la presidencia, Julio Feo. Éste se reunió con Michel Delebarre, jefe del gabinete de Pierre Mauroy (primer ministro de Mitterrand entre 1981 y 1984). De esta reunión salió la idea de las deportaciones de miembros de ETA a terceros países; así lo relataba Julio Feo en sus memorias: Se trataba de convencer a los franceses de que tenían que detener a toda la dirección de ETA. Idealmente, que los extraditaran; si no que los metieran en la cárcel en Francia; como tercera alternativa, que los expulsaran a terceros países o, por último, que los confinaran en regiones francesas muy alejadas de la frontera española. […] Delebarre planteó la posibilidad de que les facilitáramos terceros países que aceptaran a los etarras. Le respondí que no

6

La explicación detallada del secuestro de Martín Barrios se puede leer en Giacopuzzi, G. (1997). ETApm. El otro camino. Txalaparta: Tafalla, pp. 258 y siguientes y también en Barrionuevo, J. (1997). 2001 días en Interior. Ediciones B: Barcelona, p. 87.

7

Sobre la rocambolesca historia de la aparición de los cuerpos de Lasa y Zabala, ver Woodsworth, P. (2002). Guerra sucia, manos limpias. Crítica: Barcelona, pp. 270 y siguientes. 31

creía que eso fuera problema y que se lo transmitiría al presidente del Gobierno español (Feo, 1993, p. 324).

De entrada, me llevaron a Hendaya, donde me encerraron en la PAF (Policía de Fronteras). Entonces vi a muchos otros. [...] Luego nos llevaron a Angelu, lo que nos tranquilizó un poco: no parecía que fueran a entregarnos... Al final quedamos seis: Peio Zharra, Karlos Ibarguren, Joxe Miguel Arrugaeta, Joxe María Larretxea, José Antonio Mugika Arregi y yo.

Las dos visitas allanaron el camino de la que realizó Felipe González a François Mitterrand el 20 de diciembre y en la que se dio el visto bueno a las deportaciones de refugiados vascos. Un hecho que quedaba recogido en el Verbatim (diario autorizado que recogía las actividades del presidente francés): “Dîner avec Felipe González: un accord est trouvé sur l’expulsion des Basques” (Attali, 1993, p. 556). Y sabemos que dichas expulsiones tuvieron lugar tan sólo veinte días después.

Después nos dirigimos hacia Pau, donde nos metieron en una especie de aeropuerto militar. [...] Finalmente nos llevaron a París, donde hicieron que descendiéramos y estuvimos rodeados de un montón de Policía Especial de Presidencia que le llaman, todos de paisano, que finalmente nos conducirían a las escalerillas de un avión de pasajeros.

¿Cómo empezó la deportación a terceros países?

El 10 de enero de 1984, antes del amanecer, la Police de l’Aire et des Frontières (PAF) y las Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) habían montado un dispositivo de seguridad en el País Vasco francés cerrando la frontera con España. El propósito era hacer detenciones entre los refugiados vascos. A las seis de la mañana se empezó con los registros. Al final se detuvieron a diecisiete personas entre las cuales no había ninguno de los principales objetivos, es decir, los jefes de ETA. La razón era que debido a la escalada de violencia de los GAL contra los vascos, muchos de los refugiados, entre ellos los máximos responsables de ETA, habían abandonado sus hogares habituales para buscar refugio en sitios más seguros. Era evidente que el gobierno francés no actuaba solo, lo hacía con la complicidad del español. De hecho, Felipe González fue informado de toda la operación el día 9 de enero8. Ante la novedad de la medida, es necesario citar la experiencia de uno de los afectados por las primeras deportaciones. Txutxo Abrisketa relataba cómo fue su periplo ese 10 de enero de 1984: En Iparralde, obtuve el permiso de trabajo y todos los documentos necesarios para llevar una vida legal, aunque también seguía ayudando al movimiento. Vivía en Urruña, con mi mujer y mis hijos. Una noche, rodearon la casa. Pensé que eran los GAL. [...] Esa madrugada me levanté a las seis para ir a trabajar. Estaba esperando a un compañero para ir juntos al trabajo. En una de éstas, sentí al perro ladrar y vi linternas encendidas por los alrededores de la casa. Cogí la escopeta y me puse en el pasillo, gritándoles a ver qué querían. «Es la policía francesa», me dijeron en español. Yo pensé que eran españoles intentando hablar en francés, pero resultó ser un policía francés que chapurreaba el español. No les creí y me eché al suelo con la escopeta. En ese momento sonó el teléfono: era otro compañero refugiado que vivía en Askain y me advertía que eran gendarmes; habían ido a su casa a buscarme y luego se dirigieron a mi domicilio. Como era una gran redada, fueron a muchas casas. Al saber que quien estaba allí era la Policía francesa, abrí la puerta. Nos dijeron que era una medida de protección para con nosotros, por lo de los GAL.

8 32

Las azafatas alucinaron cuando les pregunté a dónde iba el avión. [...] Pero llegamos a Guadalupe y lo primero que hicieron fue conducirnos a un cuartel de las CRS para encerrarnos en un cuarto con seis tumbonas. [...] A las 24 horas nos metieron en un camión para conducirnos a otro aeropuerto militar. Al final llegamos. En la escalerilla del avión había un negro enorme, que lo primero que hizo fue pedir que nos quitaran las esposas. A continuación, nos fue dando a todos la mano a la par que decía: «Sean ustedes bienvenidos a Panamá» (Iparraguirre, 1998, pp. 39 y sig.). Como bien explica Abrisketa, de los diecisiete detenidos en la redada del día 10 de enero, al final, once fueron asignados a residencia9. Los otros seis eran: Josu Abrisketa Korta, José María Larretxea Goñi, José Miguel Arrugaeta San Emeterio, José Antonio Mugika Arregi (miembros de ETApm), Karlos Ibarguren Agirre, Nervios y José Luis Ansola Larrañaga, Peio el Viejo (miembros de ETAm). Estos inauguraron la nueva modalidad de medida contra ETA ideada por los Gobiernos de Madrid y París: las deportaciones a terceros países. En este caso, los seis expulsados de Francia fueron destinados a Panamá. El porqué de este destino era debido a la reunión que días antes había mantenido su presidente, Ricardo de la Espriella, con el secretario general del presidente González, Julio Feo, que había viajado a Panamá para conseguir un acuerdo al que es evidente que llegaron. Las deportaciones fueron concretadas en la cena del 20 de diciembre entre Mitterrand y González; no obstante, una vez efectuadas se debía dar una explicación coherente a la ciudadanía. Con este fin, el gobierno francés emitió un comunicado que decía: Dado el clima de violencia e inseguridad progresiva en el departamento de los Pirineos Atlánticos, los servicios de policía han procedido hoy a la interpelación

9 Francia: Palo a ETA. (16 de enero 1984). Cambio16, nº 633.

La asignación a residencia se produce cuando se impone al asignado la obligación de residir en un sitio determinado, con imposibilidad de salir de éste y prohibición de permanecer en determinados departamentos. Se puede producir por asignación judicial o por asignación administrativa. 33

de un cierto número de ciudadanos españoles que han sido objeto de medidas, ya sea de expulsión hacia un país tercero, ya sea de confinamiento en otro departamento10 (Ministerio francés del Interior, 1984). Desde España también se justificó la medida, y aunque nadie se lo creyera, se alegaba que todo el mérito y la responsabilidad eran franceses. Así lo declaraba el portavoz del Gobierno, Eduardo Sotillos: “Ha sido una decisión completamente autónoma del Gobierno francés. El ejecutivo galo ha querido poner orden en su territorio para asegurar la normalidad”11 (Sotillos, 1984). De hecho, para poder ejecutar las expulsiones que garantizaran la normalidad, el ejecutivo francés recurrió al artículo 26 de la Ordonnance n°45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers en France. Una referencia que aparecía en todas las órdenes de expulsión que se entregaron a los deportados vascos. El catedrático de Derecho constitucional, Diego López Garrido, explicaba en qué consistía esta ordenanza: Las disposiciones del artículo 26 de la ordenanza de 2 de noviembre de 1945, enmendadas por la Ley de 2 de octubre de 1981, permiten a la administración utilizar un procedimiento de urgencia de expulsión, cuando así lo exija «una necesidad imperiosa para la seguridad del Estado» o cuando lo justifique «la seguridad pública» (López Garrido, 1991, p.116). Por lo tanto, después de la cena con González, el ejecutivo de Mitterrand pasó de conceder el estatuto de refugiado a los vascos, que recordemos que su antecesor (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) había suspendido, a expulsarles porque eran un peligro para la seguridad del Estado. Ésta era la justificación legal de las expulsiones, a pesar de eso, los mandatarios franceses escogieron esta opción porque debían demostrar que ayudarían a España contra ETA y, de este modo, también conseguirían que los GAL dejaran de actuar en su territorio. Lo que no se explica es que las deportaciones fueran la medida alternativa a las extradiciones, ya que desde hacía años éstas eran imploradas desde el ejecutivo español. Se supone que si los refugiados vascos ponían en peligro la seguridad del Estado o la seguridad pública, sería lógico que desde Francia se aceptaran las peticiones de extradición que España había cursado contra dichas personas, ya que tenían causas pendientes en este país y, así, se las condenaría y encarcelaría. Pero el gobierno francés no estaba seguro de que España pudiera garantizar los derechos humanos de los refugiados vascos si los extraditaban. Sabemos que tenían reticencias con el sistema español que, aunque era una democracia, acababa de salir

10 11 34

Texto del comunicado del Ministerio francés del Interior. (11de enero 1984). Egin, p.3.

de una dictadura. Además, en 1981, había sufrido un intento de golpe de Estado, lo que ahondaba la desconfianza francesa. Con esta cobertura legal, empezaron las deportaciones de presuntos miembros de ETA (debemos apuntar que España los reclamaba por tener causas abiertas pero no habían sido juzgados ni condenados) a terceros países. El primer lugar que aceptó recibir a las seis personas que inauguraron la medida fue, como hemos visto en la explicación de Txutxo Abrisketa, Panamá.

Crónica de las deportaciones

Panamá sólo fue el primero de los países que acordaron con España la acogida y confinamiento de personas pertenecientes a ETA. Los envíos a terceros países fueron continuos entre 1984 y 1990. Pasado este año el gobierno español suspendió las concesiones que intercambiaba con los países (por ejemplo, el pago del mantenimiento de los deportados o aprobaciones pecuniarias en forma de créditos al desarrollo) y, por lo tanto, las deportaciones dejaron de sucederse. Durante este tiempo, el total de terceros países que participaron en las deportaciones fueron diez, cinco de suramericanos: Panamá, Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba y República Dominicana; y cinco de africanos: Argelia, Cabo Verde, São Tomé, Gabón y Togo. El 10 de enero llegaron los primeros deportados a Panamá y en el mes de marzo recibieron a un nuevo compañero, José Ángel Urtiaga. A pesar de esto, Panamá les había dejado claro a las autoridades españolas que este destino sólo debía ser momentáneo, que se ocuparían de los deportados sólo hasta que se encontrara un nuevo país donde enviarlos. De modo que se encontró a un nuevo país, Venezuela. Este nuevo lugar no era para que llegaran los deportados de Panamá, sino para recibir a Venancio Sebastián Horcajo y a José Antonio Gastón. Así Venezuela se convertía en país de deportación en abril de 1984. Esta acción causó el descontento panameño ya que dicho país estaba en pleno proceso de campaña electoral y las figuras de los deportados no daban muy buena imagen a la candidatura del presidente De la Espriella. Al final, tanta era la insistencia panameña que se decidió que los refugiados vascos viajaran a Cuba en el mes de mayo. En este mismo mes se produjeron nuevas expulsiones, un total de seis, que tuvieron como destino Venezuela. Algo sorprendente tuvo lugar en el mes de junio, una vez pasaron las elecciones panameñas, este país volvió a aceptar confinar miembros de ETA en su territorio. Fueron un total de siete personas. Mientras, en el mes de julio, en Francia, Mitterrand renovaba su ejecutivo y sustituía al primer ministro, Pierre Mauroy, por Laurent Fabius. Además, Gaston Defferre, ministro del Interior, era reemplazado por Pierre Joxe y Roland Dumas, ministro de Exteriores,

Eduardo Sotillos considera que se está ante el principio del fin del terrorismo de ETA. (12 de enero 1984). El País. 35

por Claude Cheysson. Este cambio supondría más asedio a las actividades de ETA, porque: “A diferencia de Defferre, que había sido un resistente en la guerra, el nuevo ministro (Joxe) no tenía ninguna imagen romántica de ETA y para él lo más importante era restablecer el orden en Francia” (Morán, 1997, p. 199). De hecho, Joxe se puso al día rápidamente y el 6 de agosto viajó a Madrid, donde prometió mayor colaboración en la lucha contra ETA. La primera muestra de su compromiso tuvo lugar sólo dos días después, cuando el gobierno francés deportó a República Dominicana al que consideraban el número dos de la organización vasca, Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon. Además, esta expulsión tenía de relevante que Antxon era la persona de más rango dentro de ETA de las que Francia había expulsado hasta el momento. En septiembre el acoso al grupo armado fue aún mayor debido a que Francia decidió conceder las primeras extradiciones de miembros de ETA a España. Este hecho también estuvo relacionado con las deportaciones a causa de que se concedieron tres extradiciones de un total de siete peticiones. Las cuatro personas que no fueron extraditadas fueron enviadas a Togo y confinadas en este país. Además, podemos pensar que con las primeras extradiciones las expulsiones a terceros países se suspenderían, pero no fue así. La razón fue que a los franceses no les gustó nada cómo transcurrió el proceso judicial de las personas extraditadas ya que después del juicio sólo una de ellas fue condenada, las otras dos fueron absueltas por falta de pruebas. Para los franceses, después de las insistencias constantes desde España, lo que menos esperaban era que las extradiciones se resolvieran de este modo. Suponían que las primeras extradiciones los dejarían en buen lugar porque extraditaban a terroristas. En cambio, dichas personas fueron absueltas, lo que volvía a generar polémica entre la ciudadanía francesa que pensaba que a la democracia española le faltaban muchos puntos por pulir y que su país debía continuar mostrando su espíritu de tierra de asilo. Ante el aspecto que habían tomado las primeras extradiciones de integrantes de ETA, Francia decidió que la mejor opción era volver a las deportaciones. El problema era encontrar países de acogida. Así, en 1985, España involucró a Cabo Verde y a Ecuador. Respecto a 1986, lo más significativo fue que el gobierno del Elíseo cambió de manos. Los comicios celebrados en el mes de marzo proclamaron ganadora a la coalición de centro-derecha, con Jacques Chirac de primer ministro y François Mitterrand (socialista) de presidente de la República. La cohabitación no significó una modificación en los planes franceses de lucha contra ETA, todo lo contrario, aumentaron, porque decidieron deportar al número uno, Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, Txomin. La deportación de Txomin fue una decepción para el gobierno español, pero se justificaba porque al poseer el estatuto de refugiado no podía ser extraditado. Igualmente, su envío inauguró a Gabón como tercer país. Un sitio que pasó por la deportación de forma fugaz ya que solamente alojó a Iturbe y durante poco tiempo, dos meses, hasta que éste fue enviado a Argelia en perspectiva de ejercer de

36

interlocutor de ETA en un posible contacto con el Gobierno español. Con la aceptación de mantener a Txomin en su territorio, Argelia también se comprometió a recibir a otras personas expulsadas por Francia y, sobretodo, a ejercer de país anfitrión en las conversaciones de paz que los dirigentes españoles iniciarían con ETA. A pesar de la buena voluntad con la que comenzaron, se produjo un hecho que estuvo a punto de suspenderlo todo: la muerte de Domingo Abasolo. Esto significaba que ETA se quedaba sin número uno y sin interlocutor para seguir los contactos de acercamiento con el Gobierno español. Finalmente, se optó por trasladar a Argelia a Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon, que estaba deportado en Ecuador (lo habían trasladado anteriormente a este país desde República Dominicana) y que había sido reclamado por Iturbe desde que se inició el proceso de diálogo. Mientras tenían lugar las conversaciones, un golpe de suerte llevó a la policía a detener al jefe de la organización, Santiago Arrozpide Sarasola, Santi Potros. Fue una operación de grandes dimensiones (500 agentes registraron más de 100 domicilios) en la que se detuvieron a más de sesenta personas. De éstas, doce fueron deportadas a Argelia y otras tres a Venezuela. Fue un operativo que llenó Argelia de miembros de ETA, tanto por los deportados como por algunos que se habían refugiado allí. Pese a los intentos por llegar a un acuerdo, ETA no estaba conforme con los avances y envió a primeros de abril un documento al Gobierno donde borró la palabra “negociación”. Y seguidamente, el día 4 de este mismo mes, declaraba abiertos todos los frentes: “La obstinada actitud del gobierno español de incumplir los compromisos acordados en la Mesa de Conversaciones políticas de Argel y su reiterada negativa a reconsiderar su postura han supuesto la ruptura definitiva de los acuerdos de Argel por parte del Gobierno del Estado” (Egaña, 1992, pp. 209-210.). Y para evidenciar que rompían los acuerdos de paz, pasados tres días del aviso, hicieron explotar un paquete bomba que causó heridas graves a un vecino de Irún. A partir de entonces, el gobierno español anunció públicamente que las conversaciones con ETA se habían acabado y no habían dado ningún fruto. Con este resultado, Felipe González exigió a Argelia que deportara a todos los refugiados vascos que vivían en su territorio. En el mes de abril se realizó el primer envío, con destino República Dominicana. Los elegidos eran los miembros con más peso dentro del organigrama del grupo: Eugenio Etxebeste, Ignacio Arakama Mendía, Belén González Peñalva, Juan Manuel Soares Gamboa, Ángel Iturbe Abasolo y José María Gantxegi. En el mes de mayo se hicieron dos remesas más. La primera el día 9 hacia Cabo Verde y que constaba de: Ramón Bidaburu Otadui, Javier Beloqui Cortajena, José Echeverría Ayeste, José Antonio Olaizola Atxucarro, José Miguel Bustinzar Yurrebaso, Ramón Sagarzazu Olazagirre, Emilio Martínez de Marigorta, José María Pagoaga Gallastegi, José Miguel López, Félix Manzanos, Yolanda Berruete, María Rosa Alkorta. La segunda, el día 28, hacia Venezuela con: Enrique Pagoaga Gallastegi, Gabriel

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Segura Burgos, Koldo Zuloaga Balzisketa, José Luis Zubimendi Oribe, Arturo Cubillas Fontán, Iñaki Ayerbe Múgica, Juan Miguel Barbesi Torres, Begoña Trasviñas Izagirre, Kepa Viles Escobar, Josetxo Portu Espina, Asun Arana Altuna. Escribir el nombre de todos los deportados sirve para demostrar que la deportación que realizó Argelia en 1989 fue la más numerosa de todas. Un total de 27 personas fueron expulsadas de Argel para ser confinadas en otros países. También sirve para ilustrar que los mandatarios argelinos cumplieron a rajatabla las órdenes de Felipe González. Después de un convulso 1989, el año siguiente tampoco fue fácil para los deportados, en concreto, para los que vivían en Panamá. Y es que en el mes de diciembre de 1989 este país fue invadido por tropas norteamericanas que buscaban al general Manuel Noriega, gobernante de facto de Panamá, por tráfico de drogas. Lo que sucedió fue que dio la casualidad de que Noriega estaba escondido en el mismo sitio donde habían buscado ayuda los refugiados vascos, la residencia del nuncio del país, el también vasco José Sebastián Laboa. Al final los EUA detuvieron a Noriega y establecieron un gobierno títere que rápidamente gestionó la salida de los deportados vascos del país rumbo a Venezuela. Y con este hecho insólito se cerró el capítulo de envíos de refugiados vascos a terceros países. Ahora, aunque no se produjeran expulsiones, lo que existirían serían unas setenta personas confinadas en países que no eran el suyo y que desconocían cuando cambiaría su situación.

Conclusión: ¿Soluciones para los deportados?

Los años 90, en cuanto a las deportaciones se refiere, no fueron ni la mitad de agitados que los 80. Además, podemos afirmar que esta década fue la del olvido de los deportados por parte de aquellas personas que tanto se habían esforzado por expulsarlos de Francia hacia allende los mares. No obstante, en 1995, un deportado ocupaba las portadas de los periódicos. Se trataba de Juan Manuel Soares Gamboa. Éste decidió poner punto final a su confinamiento en República Dominicana acogiéndose a las medidas de reinserción que ofrecía el gobierno español. La petición la cursó a través de una carta al consejero del Interior vasco, Juan María Atutxa, escrito que decía: Necesito que me ayude a hacer mi transición particular de militante de ETA a ciudadano normal de la sociedad a la que pertenezco. La idea de normalizar mi vida ha ido tomando cuerpo en mi mente. Mi decisión es clara. Los argumentos por los que antes luchaba no existen, se desvanecieron. Ya nuestra particular forma de entender la liberación nacional no tiene sentido, y menos matando. Perdimos el rumbo hace tiempo (Barbería, 1995). La petición de reinserción desde España fue vista como un triunfo. Era factible que algunos deportados se estuvieran cansando de llevar más de diez años confinados

38

en terceros países y que se acogieran a las medidas de reinserción, pero después de Soares Gamboa no hubo ningún otro caso. Era una vía que los deportados descartaban ya que la mayoría de ellos apostaban por una solución para la totalidad del colectivo y no para personas concretas. En 1996, después de catorce años de gobierno socialista, las elecciones daban ganador al Partido Popular (PP) con José María Aznar como líder. Si las elecciones fueron en el mes de mayo, sólo un mes después, varios miembros de ETA deportados mostraban su situación públicamente y también la presentaban al nuevo ejecutivo. Se celebraba en Bruselas la marcha Freedom for the Basque Country, un acto de exaltación de la patria vasca. Para sorpresa de los presentes, concluido el acto, subieron al escenario Rosa Alkorta y Patxi Hernández y se presentaron como deportados en Cabo Verde y Argelia, respectivamente. Su propósito era denunciar la situación de los deportados y anunciar la intención de éstos de terminar con ella y volver a Euskadi. Las palabras concretas fueron: “El Colectivo de Deportados Políticos vascos quiere transmitir a la comunidad internacional, así como a la sociedad vasca, la decisión adoptada de poner fin de una vez por todas a una situación injusta e ilegal” (Segovia,121996). Pocos días después de la intervención en Bélgica, al retorno clandestino de Patxi Hernández y Rosa Alkorta se sumaron otros ocho deportados. Se trataba de Gabriel Segura, Iñaki Arruti, Koldo Saralegi y Josetxu Portu Espina, que estaban en Venezuela; José María Pagoaga Gallastegi, Yolanda Berruete, Mikel López, José Luis Beotegi y María Rosa Alkorta, que estaban en Cabo Verde. Todos ellos participaron en una rueda de prensa celebrada en Donibane Lohizune (San Juan de Luz), en la que deajaron clara su postura de querer quedarse en Francia y desear que no los expulsaran hacia España. Su esperanza enseguida fue hecha trizas ya que las autoridades francesas informaron que al tratarse de una entrada irregular en territorio francés y de la rotura de una orden de expulsión, todos eren susceptibles de ser extraditados. Como protesta todo el grupo se encerró en la catedral de Bayona. Mientras, la policía investigaba si tenían causas pendientes con la justicia española para poder detenerles. Al terminar el sondeo, la policía irrumpió en el templo y los detuvo, si bien María Rosa Alkorta y José Luis Beotegi consiguieron huir. De los ocho que quedaban, seis fueron extraditados a España, eran: José María Pagoaga Gallastegi, Iñaki Arruti Agirre, Patxi Hernández Llamosas, Josetxu Portu Espina, Gabriel Segura Burgos y José Miguel López Galarza. Este acto favoreció que el PP se interesara por la posición en la que se encontraban todos los deportados y se propusiera que éstos regresaran a España. Aunque, si tenían causas pendientes con la justicia, deberían saldarlas. Si no lo hacían, como habían comprobado con sus compañeros en Bayona, se pediría su extradición. De momento, esta idea se quedó en una advertencia. Las noticias sobre los deportados se sucedían y en el mes de mayo de 1997 fue arrestado Karlos Ibarguren, Nervios, que había dejado Cuba y había vuelto con motivo

12

Segovia, C. (2 de junio de 1996). Los deportados de ETA desafían a España y Francia. El Mundo, e Iparragirre, P. (1998): op.cit, p. 212. 39

del Errefuxiatuen Eguna (Día del Refugiado) del mes de noviembre. Aquel día, junto al también deportado, Ramón Sagarzazu, hicieron público que habían decidido romper la deportación. Éste último se refugió en Ámsterdam y al ser descubierto las autoridades del país lo devolvieron a Venezuela, de donde venía. En 1997 el tema de las solicitudes de extradición de los deportados volvió a estar en la cabeza del Gobierno español. Sobre todo, después del secuestro y asesinato a contrarreloj (cuatro días después) del joven edil del PP, Miguel Ángel Blanco. Durante la cuenta atrás, se suplicó a Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon, que se suponía que era el interlocutor de la organización, que intercediera por la vida del concejal. Pero se negó y ante este hecho el Partido Popular decidió ser duro y pedir a la República Dominicana la extradición de todos los miembros de ETA que estaban confinados en el país. En el mes de septiembre, Aznar se puso en contacto con los dominicanos e inició los trámites de las solicitudes de extradición. Casi un año después se recogían los frutos y el Gobierno dominicano, finalmente, el 10 de agosto expulsaba a Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon; Ignacio Arakama, Makario y José María Gantxegi, Peio; por consiguiente, se quedaban en América, Belén González y Ángel Iturbe. Éstos, al contemplar lo que había pasado con sus compañeros se fugaron del país al poco tiempo. El gobierno español se propuso terminar de forma legal y colectiva con las deportaciones porque, según la opinión del Ministro del Interior del momento, Jaime Mayor Oreja, así “se termina una situación anómala y excepcional desde el punto de vista jurídico y del derecho internacional, que además era completamente inútil y estéril”13. A pesar de la intención de resolver un tema que llevaba casi quince años abierto, éstas fueron las únicas peticiones de extradición ejercidas a los terceros países que se cursaron y que se admitieron a trámite. Por lo tanto, el gobierno del Partido Popular sólo hizo un intento por acabar con las deportaciones, pero no fue más allá y, podemos asegurar, que hoy en día, todavía siguen viviendo en los países a donde fueron deportados, al menos una quincena de vascos. Viendo que los diferentes gobiernos españoles de la época democrática no han sabido cómo resolver el tema de las deportaciones de miembros de ETA de forma legal y colectiva, algunos de los deportados decidieron poner cartas en el asunto y solucionarlo ellos mismos. Como hemos señalado, la forma más recurrente era fugarse del país de confinamiento. Sin embargo, también hubo algunos que decidieron quedarse en el lugar donde fueron expulsados y regular su situación adquiriendo la nacionalidad del país e iniciando una vida allí. Dentro de estas soluciones arbitrarias, no podemos olvidar el regreso a España a causa de la extradición o también, gracias a la reinserción. Y dentro de estos finales, debemos añadir la cara más triste de las deportaciones a terceros países ya que mientras la medida ha estado vigente, ocho de las personas que

13 40

Expulsados de Santo Domingo. (10 de agosto 1997). Egin, p.13.

habían sido expulsadas de Francia en los ochenta, fallecieron. Los nombres de ellas son: José María Larretxea Goñi; Francisco Alberdi Beristain; Ángel Lete Etxaniz, Patas; Juan Ramón Aranburu Garmendia; Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, Txomin; Koldo Zuloaga Balzisketa; Juan Miguel Bardesi Torres y Endika Iztueta Barandika. Para acabar, como hemos indicado al principio, en el año 2014 se cumplieron treinta años de las primeras deportaciones a terceros países. Actualmente, el tema respecto a ETA está en pausa, porque hay una declaración de cese de actividades por parte de la organización, y esto provoca que se especule sobre cuándo será el final definitivo. Ante tantas elucubraciones, hay quienes se están preparando para un posible futuro y, entre éstos, se encuentran los deportados que aún quedan viviendo allí donde fueron enviados en los años ochenta. Ellos forman parte del colectivo de exiliados políticos vascos. Este grupo decidió escoger unas cuantas personas como interlocutores para que, en caso de que se diera un final de ETA, el gobierno español hablara con ellos sobre sus situaciones concretas y les diera soluciones para poder regresar a vivir legalmente al País Vasco. En definitiva, a principios de los ochenta se empezaron las deportaciones de miembros de ETA a terceros países como alternativa a las extradiciones y, con la idea de que era una medida de menor calado. Al final ha resultado ser todo lo contrario. Seguramente si las personas que fueron deportadas hubieran sido extraditadas habrían cumplido una condena y, hoy en día, después de treinta años tendrían gran parte de ésta resuelta. En cambio, las deportaciones han durado treinta años y todavía tienen una duración incierta.

REFERENCIAS Attali, J. (1993). Verbatim. Tome 1. Chronique des années 1981-1986. Fayard: París. Barbería, J.L. (15 de julio de 1995). El etarra Soares Gamboa renuncia a la lucha armada y pide la reinserción. El País. Barrionuevo, J. (1997). 2001 días en Interior. Ediciones B: Barcelona. Batista, A. y Playà, J. (1988) Artapalo. ETA després de Txomin. Pòrtic: Barcelona. Casanova, I. (2007). ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia. Txalaparta: Tafalla. Cassan, P. (1998). Francia y la cuestión vasca. Txalaparta: Tafalla. Chueca, J. (2007). Gurs. El campo vasco. Txalaparta: Tafalla. Egaña, I. y Giacopuzzi, G. (1992). Los días de Argel. Crónica de las conversaciones entre ETA y el Gobierno español. Txalaparta: Tafalla. Extramiana, J. (1980). Historia de las guerras carlistas. Volumen II. Haranburu: San Sebastián. Feo, J. (1993). Aquellos años. Ediciones B: Barcelona. Giacopuzzi, G. (1997). ETApm. El otro camino. Txalaparta: Tafalla. Goyhenetxe, E. (1985). Historia de Iparralde. Txertoa: San Sebastián. Iparragirre, P. (1998). Deportación. El mal menor. Txalaparta: Tafalla. López Garrido, D. (1991). El derecho de asilo. Trotta: Madrid. Morán, S. (1997). ETA entre España y Francia. Editorial Complutense: Madrid. Segovia, C. (2 de junio de 1996). Los deportados de ETA desafían a España y Francia. El Mundo. Segura, A. (2009). Euskadi. Crònica d’una desesperança. L’Avenç: Barcelona. Woodsworth, P. (2002). Guerra sucia, manos limpias. Crítica: Barcelona. Eduardo Sotillos considera que se está ante el principio del fin del terrorismo de ETA. (12 de enero 1984). El País. Expulsados de Santo Domingo (10 de agosto 1997). Egin. Francia: Palo a ETA. (16 de enero 1984). Cambio16, nº 633. Texto del comunicado del Ministerio francés del Interior. (11 de enero 1984). Egin. 41

UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014

no plan, strategy, vision or interest for a post-Taliban Afghanistan (Rumsfeld, 2001). Twelve troubled years has passed since America achieved a quick military victory in the trenches of Afghanistan but the lack of a vision or Marshal Plan gave way to incessant conflicts, absence of governance and chaos. Afghanistan is at war since 34 years and the question is will the country see a minimal kind of peace when NATO forces end their operation in 2014.

Saroj Kumar Rath University of Delhi, India Saroj Kumar Rath is assistant professor at the University of Delhi and author of ‘Fragile Frontiers: The Secret History of Mumbai Terror Attacks’ (Routledge, 2014), email: saroj1saroj@ gmail.com

KEYWORDS Taliban, Haqqani Network, Afghanistan, Northern Alliance, al Qaeda, and Terrorism.

Was the War against terror in Afghanistan avoidable? Could the war against terror in Afghanistan be avoided? The answer is ‘yes’. Another important question is whether the ‘anti-terror war was the best choice to be taken’. Containment policy, commando raid like Abbotabad to kill or capture al Qaeda big figures, stringent anti-militant policy not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, and diplomatic solution could be the candidates as US policy after 9/11. However, all those choices but the last one are difficult to simulate their progress and outcome. Additionally, if diplomatic solution was available, that would have been the best policy. There were several occasions in the past to have bin Laden extradited from the Taliban but US missed those opportunities. Taliban rule started in Southern Afghanistan in Kandahar in November 1994 and in Kabul in September 1996. Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif fell to the Taliban subsequently. Taliban rule continue until October 2001. President Bill Clinton allowed Taliban presence in the US soil from 1994 until August 1997, when State Department ordered closure of the Afghan Embassy in Washington. The UN permitted Taliban’s New York office to be functional until February 10, 2001. Although neither the US nor the UN recognized the Taliban government, these offices were testimonies of their tolerance towards Taliban.

ABSTRACT The United States started ‘anti-terror campaign’ in Afghanistan in October 2001 with the explicit aims to destroy al Qaeda and take revenge against the 9/11 attacks; to defeat Taliban and establish democracy, and to secure US from future terror attacks. Twelve years later, all these aims are either elusive or defeated. As NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit declared the 2014 troops drawdown deadline irreversible, the return of Taliban seems unavoidable. The present peril in Afghanistan is an outcome of an extended war among the US-led NATO forces, Hamid Karzai-led Afghan government, Taliban including Haqqani Network, Northern Alliance, and petty or powerful warlords. The US policy mistakes and involvement of predatory foreign powers has been stretching the battle beyond limit. Combinedly, all these reasons presents tough challenge for future peace and political settlement. This paper deals with three principal questions, firstly, whether the war against terror in Afghanistan was avoidable. Secondly, what will be the future situation of Afghanistan after 2014; and thirdly, after the war against terror, if the world, especially the US, will become more safe than before.

Contrary to the common belief that the Taliban were the patron, supporter and defender of Osama bin Laden, they had a suffocating embrace with the al Qaeda leader. In Afghanistan, initially bin Laden was under the protection of Younis Khalis of Hizb-i-Islami not of the Taliban. In 1997-98, Department of State engaged Taliban for an oil pipeline project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) (9/11 Commission Report, 2011, pp.111). America wanted Taliban’s favor for UNOCAL against the ArgentineanBritish competitor Bridas in exchange of ‘recognition’ of their rule. But the US scrapped the deal abruptly citing trivial reasons. Had the US managed the deal, its relations with the Taliban would have improved and bin Laden’s al Qaeda would have denied sanctuary in Afghanistan. Instead of recognition, the US sanctioned Afghanistan, which had droved Omar nearer to the wealthy bin Laden. The error in US foreign policy brought the Taliban and bin Laden closer and turned Afghanistan into a sanctuary for international terrorists.

On October 7, 2001, airstrike on Afghanistan heralded US’ response to al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks. Al Qaeda’s attacks has caused 2752 deaths and forced US to take stringent and decisive action against its perpetrators. The US reacted ‘like a wounded bear’ and attacked Afghanistan with the precise goal to ‘eliminate al-Qaida; send a message to the world that terrorists and terrorism will be punished; and start worldwide campaign against terrorism’ (Rumsfeld, 2001). In the ensuing ‘war on terror’ spreading over a decade, 2200 US troops and 1081 coalition soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan. The casualties incurred on the Afghans exceed 20,000.

Such errors were repeated again when in April 1998, President Bill Clinton sent US officials to Kabul to press for the extradition of bin Laden. Surprisingly, Taliban took the demands seriously but cited difficulty in abdicating their Pashtunwali tradition of sheltering a guest1. However, they offered two proposals instead (Milam, 1998). The

Astonishingly, when the US attacked Afghanistan, 95 percent Afghans did not know anything about either September 11 attacks or why their country was under attack. The US targeted Taliban regime with the aim to ‘terminate their rule and their leadership’ and to ‘end the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism’. But appallingly, the US was categorical in ‘not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement’ and it had

1 42

Pashtunwali is the three moral code (Nanawatai, Melmastia and Badal ) i.e. the right of asylum; the grant of hospitality, even to an enemy; and the answer to an insult by an insult. 43

US naively rejected both proposals and Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal’s effort to bring bin Laden back was disturbed by US bombing of Afghanistan on August 20, 1998 (Burke, 2006, pp.186). This was the second chance to arrest bin Laden, which was missed rather cheaply. The third chance was also missed in Islamabad when the US officials could not clinch a deal on the handing over of bin Laden. The Taliban are too religious for negotiation as their pride, custom and faith are paramount to their life. The US assumed that engaging Taliban directly on bin Laden issue was not easy because the Taliban were guided by Sharia and Pashtunwali code. This is where the US made the biggest mistake. They never tried avenues available in Sharia and Pashtunwali Code to deal with the problem. Many grave matters, including the Raymond Davis shooting in Lahore and the killing of 16 civilians near Kandahar by a US soldier, where US interests were at stake, resolved by blood money as per Sharia law2. There were many opportunities to avoid war after September 11 attacks but all those opportunities were stifled by policy blunders. The single most policy blunder was aligning Pakistan in its effort in Afghanistan. From the military point of view, Pakistan’s support is essential for war with landlocked Afghanistan. But to avoid war and to find a durable solution, Pakistan’s participation proved counterproductive. The US erroneously employed Pakistan to strike a deal with the Taliban only to be deceived by the latter (Rashid, 2008, pp.77). Pakistan have a vast militant population and its intelligence agency the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and other state agencies are closely aligned with militant groups. The ISI, which had a history of aligning with the Taliban and al Qaeda, would never cooperated sincerely with the US. ISI trickery in Afghanistan was detected even before the firing of first bullet in Afghanistan. But despite overwhelming evidences, US preferred Bolan and Khyber passes to reach Afghanistan and lost another opportunity to avoid the war. As a final ditch attempt, on October 17, 2001, Taliban offered to handover bin Laden to a third country, if US halted bombings. However, by the time, the die has been cast and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had already taken control of the war, which ceased any civilian negotiation.

44

centred around Herat, Balkh (Mazar-e-Sharif), Kabul, Kandahar and Badakshan (Rashid, 2001). This is true even today (Rumsfeld, 2001). Ahmad Shah was elected as the king in 1747 and brought the present shape of Afghanistan by unifying all the five power centres (Sykes, 1940, pp.353). Afghans are courageous from the very first, and are animated by a love for independence – they are always warlike and energetic, retiring to their mountain fastnesses to escape from tyranny, and leaving them whenever the smallest hope presented itself of seizing lands (Ferrier, 1858, pp.5). The Afghan landscape, 90 percent of which is barren, desolate, mountanous and remote do not provide adequate livelihood for its inhabitants. That is why its people and rulers are at constant war with their neighbours and among themselves for their upkeep. This practice become a tradition and relegated to present generation of Afghans with surprise acuracy. For this reason, US offer of democracy had few takers and rather than supporting the US’ post-war reconstruction programmes, ordinary Afghans reiterated that they do not dislike the warring Taliban3. America lacked understanding and appreciation of Afghan tradition, which made its Afghan involvement worse and future peace distant.

Situation of Afghanistan after 2014

NATO leaders agreed at the Chicago Summit for an ‘irreversible’ plan to end the war by end of 2014. The US is fighting even now against Taliban for two reasons. Firstly, due to the fear that al Qaeda will acquire sanctuary once Taliban returns, and secondly, the anxiety that US will be made responsible for the civil war that will engulf the country immediately after the troops withdrawal. Fighting is another face of the same coin, one face of which is peace negotiation. But the ground reality, as President Obama cleared said, is ‘the danger of Afghanistan sliding into civil war or Taliban control still exists’. The very intervention of the US in Afghanistan was beset with flaw, full of blunderous omissions and adaption of policy mistakes one after another. The intervention was doomed from the outset as ‘the US always lacked the knowledge, power, or legitimacy to fundamentally transform Afghanistan’4. The single most cardinal miss about Afghanistan was failing to realize the fact that ‘Afghanistan has always been a ‘hornets’ nest’ for any foreign army that invaded it’ (Nehru, 2004, pp.378).

Although, it is easier to be wise after an event and avoidance of war was a ‘difficult choice’, especially when the wound and slay inflicted by the terrorists exceeded all calculations, no thought ever spare on this choice as America was swayed by revenge and justice. This policy mistake has a direct bearing on the future course of US action in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was corridor of invaders from the time of Alexander and never united under a central government not even under the royal regimes. Since days immemorial, the country has been divided into four or five power centres mostly

After the fall of Taliban, as the US planners presumed that Afghan people would dispose their pre-historic rulers, rejoice their liberty and never give ground to the dreaded Taliban, proved wrong. The Bonn Conference of 2001 was organized in the backdrop of a resilient but tactfully retired Taliban force. The Taliban had neither accepted defeat nor were invited to the after war conference for ceasefire or demobilization of forces. Hence, from the very outset the defeat of the Taliban in November 2001 was actually the harbinger of the beginning of a long spell of guerrilla war. Five years later, in 2006, UN admitted its mistake but the die has been cast (Rashid, 2008,

2

3

Abdul-Ahad, G.(2009, August 18). Face to face with the Taliban: ‘The people are fed up with the government’. The Guardian.

4

Stewart, Rory.(2013). Trying to do the Impossible. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April 2013.

Noonan, S.(2011). Afghanistan/Pakistan ISI Chief. Stratfor Strategic Forecasting Inc. Retrieved from http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1664671_re-alpha-insight-afghanistan-pakistan-isi-chief-not-for. html; Waraich, O.(2011, March16). Pakistan: How Sharia Freed American Ray Davis. Time; Nordland, R. (2012, March 14). In Reactions to Two Incidents, a US-Afghan Disconnect. New York Times.

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104). The matter aggravated further, when US sent Taliban members to prisons at Bagram Airfield or Guantánamo Bay. The US had collaborated with Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban, so it felt compelled to install them in government5. In consonant with its ignorance about the ethnic dynamics of the region, the US installed an ethnic Pashtun as head of the state but he was surrounded by non-Pashtuns who have controlled most part of the country. So unwittingly, ‘the West was in fact taking sides in a civil war, a still-unresolved struggle between town and country, modernism and tradition, socialism and capitalism, religion and secularism’6. Resultantly, large section of Pashtuns were left out and resiled, which helped the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005 and 2006. The Afghan problem was beyond the comprehension of the US and it failed to realize that the Taliban, which represent a larger part of the country’s Pashtun could not be indefinitely excluded from the country’s political and economic life. There was no single step solution available to a quarter-century old conflict. The US installed an uprooted leader at Kabul and President Bush claimed the successful initiation of democracy ‘in the five-thousand-year history of Afghanistan’ (Bush, 2005). The US converted Afghanistan into democracy in supersonic speed and that too mainly by military force. This was an enormous error. Sufficient funds to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and economy never arrived, the US refused to deploy troops outside Kabul immediately after the 2001 invasion and rearmed the warlords, brigands, thieves, and the incapable to rule the country instead. Afghans enjoyed reprieve from the Taliban rule but annoyed with the foreign invasion. Even 12 years later the argument ‘Afghanistan has turned over a new leaf and the Afghans wish to take the process of democracy forward’ is bereft of empirical findings. The very basic thought of foreign invasion and the presence of western boot enraged the subliminal passion of Afghans. Most Afghans’ felt disappointed and suspicious about the west. The killings of Westerner by all sections of Afghans, including Afghan army personnel known as ‘Green on Blue’, make reconstruction work risky.

46

responsible and participating in the corruption in grand scale. The US Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reported that US had deployed 260,000 contractors in both the countries and ‘waste and fraud’ had affected $30 billion worth of contracts in the two countries. American inability to reform Afghanistan allowed Taliban to control nearly half of the total 364 districts of the country by the end of 2012 (Rashid, 2012, 81). Abrupt and foreign imposed democracy could not replace the millennia old royal and tribal rule and the new rulers as well as the vast majority of the country’s population ended behaving in the same old way. Afghans never gelled well with democracy and President Karzai’s writ outside Kabul remained questionable. For the future situation analysis, it is essential to identify stakeholders and their role. I have found four or five vital factions, who have a stake in Afghanistan or who are holding key for the future of Afghanistan. Those factions are – the US and NATO members; Afghanistan government and Taliban insurgents; Pakistan and its militant population; and neighboring countries of Afghanistan. All factions have nexus among themselves and each group’s act, good or bad, success or failure, actually influence the trajectory of other group. This situation is like domino effect theory. However, all factions agree on one point – that is peace, even the Taliban want a peaceful solution. But all groups disagree on the modality of peace, which make the conflict murkier and peace elusive.

The foreign imposed democracy had partially benefited city folks, who used to enjoy liberty in the pre-Taliban era. But the lead lost when US offered competitive benefit to brigands and warlords, whom the Taliban had successfully killed or disbanded during their rule, to maintain law and order in the country. Another unwelcomed consequences accompanied the US victory was that the Afghans are surrounded by foreign forces and subjected to regular search and shoot, hunt and humiliation. America was not interested in the amelioration of Afghans and the proclaimed democracy and prosperity were proved hoax. Between 2002 and 2008, the US pledged $10.4 billion for development but delivered only $5 billion, 47 percent of which was paid to American experts, who often were unqualified. Lots of heat generated in international media about the corruption of Afghan government. However, the US and its allies are equally

Since 2001 Afghanistan is in the hands of Americans and despite the so-called democracy it is the US, which calls the shot. Naturally, the US is the biggest player in the Afghan chessboard. The US has tried to introduce democracy, made efforts to rebuild the country and taken steps to augment capacity of Afghan army with an immense cost of $500 billion apart from the cost it expended on its own army7. It has also lost the lives of a couple of thousands US troops during the 12 years period. At a normal site of US intervention, such spectacular scale of involvement would have converted a barren, desolate and even a strife torn province into a prosperous democracy. But not in Afghanistan, where US’ intervention is at the vortex of being dubbed as the single biggest military misadventure unparalleled in human history. After 12 years of war, the best paid and most modern force of the world could not defeat a mere 10,000 to 15,000 Taliban, who do not receive any pay but fight for a cause. War fatigue and stress on the western armies could be ascertained from the fact that only in 2012, more active duty US soldiers committed suicide (349) than died in combat (295)7. The dim progress of reconstruction, bleak prospect of future peace, President Karzai’s inability to revive the economy, US’ diminishing domestic public opinion, the high cost of intervention, stalemate in the war on terror, swelling

5

Musharraf, Pervez.(2013). Marginalizing the Pashtuns. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April 2013.

7

Bumiller, Elisabeth.(2012, December 10). Pentagon Says Afghan Forces Still Need Assistance. New York Times.

6

Saleh, Amrullah.(2013). Believing Pakistan Could Change. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April 2013.

8

Rashid, Ahmed.(2013). Proceeding from The Munich Security Summit. The True Benchmark for Maturity and Stability. Munich: Germany. 47

Taliban capacity, and Pakistan’s intransigence to play with both sides of the war are the reasons, which forced the US to withdraw from Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s killing had provided a complimentary reason for an honorable exit. The withdrawal, which has already started since March 2012, when 33,000-surge forces returned to the US, will be completed before the end of 2014. It is also certain that a small contingent (5,000-25,000) of US boots would remain in Afghanistan even after the withdrawal.

Taliban succeed in South Eastern provinces, it would be difficult for other far flung provinces to defend themselves against a marching Taliban. Military failure lead to political breakdown and the government would crumble once the scaffold is gone. Such a scenario would encourage the Taliban to decimate the last vestiges of US sponsored government at Kabul. Therefore, politically and democratically, Afghanistan will be susceptible after 2014, which would pave way to civil struggle.

While the withdrawal is on its completion, none of the goals is achieved. The US and NATO have been training 200,000 strong Afghan army and 150,000 police force with a $10 billion plus a year cost. After the withdrawal, NATO and other countries have promised, the entire defense cost for the next five years at a cost of $4.1 billion per year. Despite the comparative progress of the Afghan National Security Forces, only one of 23 Afghan army brigades is able to operate without coalition help. Afghan army is still heavily rely on US help for air support, logistics, intelligence, route clearance and other key ‘enablers’. The December 2012 Department of Defense report anticipates that ‘the Afghan army will continue to require assistance beyond December 2014’, which means, even after the US withdrawal the Afghan army cannot stand on its own (Department of Defense, 2012, pp.62). Accustomed with the mode of militia, the Afghan National Army is afflicted with a 95 percent functional illiteracy, 40 percent drug addicts and a 30 percent desertion rate. Therefore, the transition would be more of an exit plan than any real change of guard. Even if the 50 nations involved in the war managed to provide $4.1 billion annual security aid for a peak of 352,000 indigenous Afghan security and police force, who would manage the money and men will haunt Afghanistan. After 2014, militarily, Afghanistan will be remaining highly vulnerable. Civil war after 2014 would testify the hypothesis that external formula and forced fixation would never works in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s sociology remained beyond the grasp of the US and its own people have highlighted this enough. Everywhere, despite the relative property boom and erratic development in cities, Afghanistan is suffering from insecurity, unviable economy, capital flight, poverty and deprivation. The situation is identical as it was in 2001. The US has spent nearly $90 billion over the 12 years only on reconstruction of the country. There are some visible improvements in the infrastructure but much of the money has been wasted in corruption and poorly implemented projects. Despite huge foreign aid, the economy of the country never improved, its sustenance is still foreign dependent and almost all of the country’s youth are still jobless. The precarious economic condition is striking as only seven percent of the population holds a bank account, one-fourth of the country’s capital is fleeing and 97 percent of its gross domestic product is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community presence10. Naturally, Afghanistan could suffer a severe economic depression when foreign troops leave in 2014.

Afghan constitution restricts a president to two terms, therefore, Karzai cannot be a candidate in 2014. Considering his past corruption and future safety, Karzai certainly like to have loyal president even if that means rigging of elections, as he did in 2009. While rigging of 2014 elections by Karzai and his supporters are highly likely, which is even anticipated by the Taliban, the insurgents will never be a mute spectator to such mindless deceit in the name of democracy. Afghans will be the first to suspect the meaning of democracy and because of democratic deceit, their opposition towards the insurgents if not Taliban would be neutralized to a considerable level. The Taliban insurgents who are lurking at the doorstep would never miss the chance to recapture Kabul. Taliban would never find difficulty in capturing the Southern and Eastern part of the country, which are largely populated by Pashtun. The Haqqani Network, not Afghan government, is ruling the southeastern provinces such as Khost, Paktika, Paktia and Ghazni and provinces like Kunar and Nuristan are already with the Taliban and al Qaeda 9. Once the

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Rath, Saroj Kumar.(2011). Haqqani Network and Afghanistan’s Future. Asian Conflict Report. 20(Nov-Dec), pp-4.

The 12 years of reconstruction has done little in producing educated or skilled workforce. The 2012 Pentagon report said that the Afghan government suffers from ‘widespread corruption, limited human capacity, lack of access to rural areas due to a lack of security and an uneven distribution of power among the judicial, legislative and executive branches’(Department of Defense, 2012, pp.8). If their own understanding is as the above, then the question is what the US troops and the reconstruction brigades of the west were doing during the past 12 long years. Such admission of guilt by the US is an unwitting but blatant confession of their gross mismanagement of Afghanistan and terrible underestimation of the local social dynamics. No wonder Afghans consider the US withdrawal a Western excuse to get out, rather than an effort to ensure democracy and peace11. Afghan society has no respect for the US reconstruction and each foreigner is looked with trademark suspicion. Even after the withdrawal Afghan society will remain the same – poverty stricken, belligerent, volatile and unstable. The Americans failed to establish institution, refused help from NATO or the UN on the issue of peace negotiation, and even declined to work with Britain, Norway, Germany and Japan, to reach to a peaceful negotiation solution. Not only this, there is thorough disconnect among the civil and military institutions of the US. Gen. Stanley

10

Committee on Foreign Relations.(2011). Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. Government of USA. Washington DC.

11

Rashid, Ahmed.(2013, March 28). Afghanistan After the War: Is Peace Possible?. The New Republic. 49

McChristall’s ground shaking comments about civilian leadership is a testimony of this disconnect (Hastings, 2012). With every change of top American general in Afghanistan, there is change of US ground policy and there is freequent change of top general with the present top commander Gen. Joseph F. Dunford being 15th such general. Overall, the US is under policy paralysis and trapped in a bad war (Eide, 2012). The inter-departmental infighting has been proved catastrophic for the future peace of Afghanistan12. Sensing the impending dark cloud over Kabul, Northern Alliance leaders have started arming favorable warlords in the Northern parts of the country for their future use and soon after the US departs, there is every possibility that the Afghan National Army and civilian government employees would switch side as they have done after the fall of Najibullah government. The result would be a multidimensional civil war, where neighboring states would again arm and fund their Afghan proxies as they did in the 1990s.

Role of the Neighbors after 2014

Under the looming cloud of a waning and fleeting Western interest, role of neighbors will be vital for the future of Afghanistan. A host of neighbors –partners and predators– surrounds Afghanistan. Militarily, geographically, religiously and ethnically, Pakistan is important. Geographically, culturally and commercially Iran is significant. Strategically, historically and commercially India is vital. Ethnically, commercially and communication wise the Northern neighbors including Russia are crucial. Finally, as a business leader of Asia and a leading investor, China’s role is critical. As the drawdown nearing, the next round of the age-old Great Game battle for influence in Afghanistan has begun. Iran is highly engaged with Afghanistan and its involvement is unavoidable. Since beginning of the Karzai’s government, Iran has been funding aid projects and expanding intelligence networks across Afghanistan. Iranian money invariably flows into the office of Afghan President with the explicit purpose to maintain good relations and to check overwhelming American influence. Although Iran is at loggerhead with the US on nuclear weapons, it participates and endorsed US and Afghanistan sponsored broad guidelines for the future of Afghanistan at the meetings in Istanbul (November 2011) and Bonn (December 2011)13. Iran believes in regional approach rather than an international approach to the problem of Afghanistan. Iran’s Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, unlike the US AID programme, engage directly with the grassroots people and wedge a high degree of influence among the Afghans compare to its American counterpart. Iran shares a common language with half of the Afghans, which act as

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12

Nasr, Vali.(2013). The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/the_inside_story_of_how_ the_white_house_let_diplomacy_fail_in_afghanistan.

13

Laipson, Ellen.(2012). Engaging Iran on Afghanistan. Henry L. Stimson Centre, pp-XI.

an instrument of bonding in between the two country’s populace. More than $100 million a year is spent by Iran for its reconstruction and in the event of Taliban’s return, Iranian government would never be hesitated to channel all these money to its old ally the Northern Alliance. But the contrasting interests of neighboring states in Afghanistan has been a perennial source of trouble for the Afghan government. For example, the US-Afghan long-term strategic agreement is viewed as a threat by Iran and it even threatened Afghanistan with dire consequences, including sending back Iran’s one million Afghan refugees, if the treaty is not abrogated. Afghanistan’s weak position and dependence has been making it too fledgling a country to pursue an independent foreign policy. Iran share a 582-mile border with Afghanistan and half of Afghanistan’s opium, which is 90 percent of world’s production, enters Iran either for consumption or for transit. Afghanistan’s mountainous water has been feeding Iran’s arid east and Iran is hosting an average one million Afghan refugee at any given time. Iran has a great stake in the post-2014 Afghan landscape. Iran wanted that Afghanistan should not slid into civil war and that if it ever descend into civil war, its proxies must dominate the country. Iran view the US presence with suspicion and after withdrawal, it would like to see as minimum US presence as possible. For future commerce, Iran would like to see herself as the transit route to Afghanistan and it also endeavor to avoid the dominance of Sunni extremism in its Eastern neighbor. Similarly, Pakistan is inextricably attached with the affair of Afghanistan and it has unbroken relationship with Taliban and with its other Afghan proxies. Pakistan is the only other country after US, which is applying all its capacity in Afghanistan to produce a pliant government. During the 1980s, Pakistan developed a nebulous Afghan policy where its military strategists argued that Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan would give the country ‘strategic depth’ against its primary enemy India (Bhutto, 2008, pp.194). Since then Pakistan has been persuading a foreign policy that is based on ‘strategic depth’ policy. ‘Strategic depth’ apart, Pakistan seeks a friendly government to get commercial route clearance to Central Asia; to neutralize the Greater Pashtunistan demand; to use Afghan soil to train Islamic militants; and not to get encircled by hostile neighbors. Its ambition to control Afghanistan and its desire to rule Kabul through proxy brought bloodshed, internecine fight and chaos in its own backyard. Belatedly and half-heartedly, it has understood its follies and tried course correction as well. Billed as game changer in Afghanistan, Pakistan military’s surprising shift of attitude in late 2012 has bewildered many. Pakistan has freed Taliban prisoners it has been holding and shown willingness to actively help the process of reconciliation in between the Taliban and Kabul. The change of heart is probably prompted by army’s realization of the fact that violence inside the country is a result of the spillover of Afghan conflict and it is impossible to surgically detach Afghan conflict from the home theatre. Pakistan was a partner when US withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This time as well, when US is about to withdraw, Pakistan is a partner and learning from the past, it has not only started contacting with the Taliban and Haqqani network, but also initiated

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communication with members of the Northern Alliance. This new development send a message that Pakistan is indeed prefers a coalition government in Kabul to Taliban rule after the US withdrawal. The new understanding of Pakistan is based on the presumption that in the event of a civil war or in a fully Taliban controlled Afghanistan, Pakistani militants would get hitherto unknown safe havens in Afghanistan and that must be prevented. But Pakistan’s military is too inconsistent in its policy decision to remain stick to one principle. Despite the realization of the danger of conflict and its spillover into Pakistan, the caprices and duplicity of Pakistan’s military prevailed. Pakistan cannot believe India and the same is true for India against Pakistan. The two regional rivals are at loggerhead in Afghanistan and there is no existing mechanism, which set the two countries in motion in one direction. Their mutual suspicion is so deep that it is preposterous to believe ‘they would not pursue their interest in an individual way’. More damning evidence of Pakistan’s duplicity surfaced on March 28, 2013, when Pakistan ‘demanded Afghanistan to cut all ties to India’14. Pakistan wanted Afghanistan to ink a strategic agreement with it in the same line as the latter has signed with India. But Pakistan’s unpopularity and double game led to the summary rejection of such proposal by President Karzai, who said, if Afghanistan sign an agreement in the line of India, Afghan public would ‘stone us’ to death. While Pakistan is highly unpopular, India is extremely popular in Afghanistan as a BBC journalist reported ‘while you never hear a good word about Pakistan, you rarely hear a bad one about India’15. Pakistan’s commitment to peace in Afghanistan proved highly unreliable as it reneged on its own commitment to release Taliban leaders like Mullah Baradar. In January 2013, at the trilateral summit of UK-Pakistan-Afghanistan in London, Pakistan made a set of demands, which included that Afghan army officers not be trained in India but in Pakistan, and that Afghanistan should reduce its ties with India. Karzai rejected the demand and Pakistan’s support to peace proved illusory. Pakistan feels paranoid about the strategic access India achieved in Afghanistan and it has been adopting bullying tactics to check the progress of its eastern adversary. At the end, Pakistan’s post-2014 Afghan wish list include installation of a pliant government and no change in its militant policy. Following a flawed policy has its own retrograde effect as Pakistan no more hold all cards in deciding the future of Afghanistan. Not only Afghan militants are using Pakistani soil to attacks the coalition troops but the same is true for Pakistani militants who are attacking Pakistani targets from Afghanistan. The ISI has long been giving safe heavens to Afghan militants but now Pakistani militants are getting safe sanctuary in Afghanistan and paying Pakistan with the same coin. Pakistani militants, once protégé

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14

Joshua, Anita.(2013, March 29). Pakistan Denies asking Afghanistan to Snap Ties with India. The Hindu.

15

North, Andrew.(2012, June 28). India’s growing stake in Afghanistan. BBC News, accessed on April 5, 2013 at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18622573.

of ISI, have gone astray to threaten the country’s security and writ of the government. Once the US withdraws from Afghanistan and in the event of failure of peace negotiation with the Taliban, Pakistani militants would certainly aid Taliban’s quest for Kabul. With the absence of drones and US air support, Pakistani militants would flock in huge lot to assist the Taliban in the civil war. Even if the US decided to station few thousands troops in Afghanistan after 2014 the Taliban would not take much time to overwhelm the meager US presence. Sooner or later, the Afghan National Army would be forced to switch side. The complex concentration of a wide array of militants in Pakistan; their safe heavens in Kunar, Nuristan and Paktia; the increasing strength of Afghan Taliban; and the intricate but crucial ISI support to Afghan Taliban has been indicating future bloodshed of spectacular scale in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, when India’s contact with Kabul ceased, Pakistani extremists and ISI used Afghanistan as a sanctuary for anti-Indian terrorists. India with all its historical ties has genuine interest in Afghanistan and Afghans considers India as an old and reliable friend. India has invested or pledged $2 billion in Afghanistan during the past 12 years for the purpose of reconstruction. Invariably all factions of Afghanistan, with money or government support, visit India for treatment and safekeeping of their families. Most of the Afghan ministers have their families in India and because of their frequent visit to New Delhi, the city is called as the winter capital of Afghanistan. Since 2007, India has been training Afghan infantry and the size and quality of training increased since the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement on October 4, 2012. Every year over 200 Afghan military officers, 600 infantry and 100 commandos will be trained at various Indian military academies. Apart from cooperating with Kabul, New Delhi has also expedited the $100 million Chabahar port in Southeastern Iran. The project is significant as its commercial rival China has obtained ownership of Gwadar port in Pakistan located 70 km east of Chabahar. The Iranian port’s potential is high because it will allow India a link with Kabul bypassing Pakistan. To stay apace with the changing time, New Delhi has sharply re-oriented its Afghan strategy, reached out to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami party and keeping its door open to the Taliban. The Taliban have also returned the courtesy in kind and called India as a ‘significant country’ in the region. While Afghans liken India’s involvement in the reconstruction of the country, such intimate contacts have sent trembling alarm to Pakistan, which feel encircled by two hostile neighbors. Indian consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat are viewed as outposts to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan16. Pakistan accused India of abetting Baloach rebels and never missed an opportunity to isolate India from the affairs of Afghanistan. Afghanistan wanted to extend the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 2010 to India but Pakistan not only vetoed the decision but also restricted the Afghan transport to Peshawar without allowing it to move to Wagah border. Pakistani proxies invariably attack India’s interests in Afghanistan and the volley

16

AFP.(2010, November 9). India Creating ‘Anti-Pakistan’ Afghanistan: Musharraf. Express Tribune. 53

of fight in between the two traditional rivals was so deep that ‘Kabul is considered as the new Kashmir’. India’s confidence in Afghanistan; its high degree of reconstruction efforts; its contribution in skill development and peace building; and its genuine regional interest in Afghanistan are vastly acknowledged by all except Pakistan. The West, especially the US, understood the value of India in the post-2014 Afghanistan and India is confident of maintaining robust relations with Afghanistan. But India’s link would be disturbed, if civil war descend in the country. Although in the pre-9/11 period, China had reached to the Taliban to promise political recognition in return of the latter’s commitment not to allow anti-Chinese forces to operate in Afghanistan, Beijing’s policy towards Kabul was mostly masterful inactivity. For long China preferred to reach Kabul via Islamabad; never interested in serious engagement with Afghanistan; never recognized India’s role there and hardly interacted with the country’s commerce. But as the drawdown is closing, Beijing heralded a tectonic shift in its Afghan policy17. Chinese interaction with Afghan officials over the years has prompted China to start its own channel of communication with Kabul without relying on Pakistan. It has started investment in Afghanistan in a gigantic way, treating Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia’s commerce, and initiated dialogue with India about the post-2014 Afghanistan. The Chinese government has refused to contribute to a yearly $4.1 billion fund for sustaining the Afghan Army after 2014 but agreed to train Afghan police officers and admitted 15 young Afghan diplomats to the China Foreign Affairs University in May 2012 as part of a joint American-Chinese program. In an effort to maintain its strategic interests, China has signed a host of agreements with Afghanistan in Septem¬ber 2012 to train 300 Afghan police officers, fund and equip the Afghan security forces and invest in mineral sector for several years18. China’s interest in the stability of Afghanistan stems from the fact that once US troops leave, increased instability in Afghanistan will enable Uygur separatists to play a greater destabilizing force in Xinjiang region. China understands the ills of civil war and chaos in Afghanistan, which would escalate proxy battles among Afghanistan’s neighbors and pose security threat to the region. To avoid such a nightmarish future in the region, China has been taking active role in Afghanistan’s stabilization process. Russia, which has a long and devastating association with Afghanistan, is concerned with the US drawdown. The Russian anxiety is based on the assumption that once the NATO troops left Afghanistan, Islamist militants will gather force and infiltrate into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to threaten Russia’s Southern flank. Russia believes that

17 18 54

Small, Andrew.(2012, October 3). China’s Afghan Moment. Foreign Policy Magazine. Shih, Toh Han.(2012, December 5). China Takes a Bold Step in Afghanistan. South China Morning Post.

‘real ability of Afghanistan to defend itself not the artificial timeline of withdrawal’ would result in the stability of the country19. Apart from the infiltration of terrorism, Russia fears heavy drug trafficking once NATO is gone. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan provides military supply routes to Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network through which close to 75 percent of the non-lethal ground sustaining cargo and 40 percent of all cargo travels to Afghanistan. Despite their internal trouble, these two countries have made strides in reaching out to international community while cooperating in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. After withdrawal, security of Central Asian countries and Russia would face new challenges. Real control and power in Afghanistan is exercised by a multitude of local field commanders without any real political affiliation. The Tajik and Uzbek minorities of Afghanistan are apprehensive about the return of Taliban, which means a renewed minority cleansing in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar, learnning from his past experience no more claiming all parts of Afghanistan, but only 75 percent. The US in its laborously slow moving negotiation with the Taliban still to resolve major issues like Taliban’s adherence to Afghan constitution, participation in a coalition government and participation of the Taliban in elections. However, the West’s peace talks have not only recognized the strength of the Taliban but also provided them legitimacy as potential future rulers. The exact position of the Taliban is still a mystery and the Northern Alliance leaders have already expressed their displeasure over the negotiation with the Taliban. Taliban’s return would reunite the disgruntled factions of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras into the erstwhile Northern Alliance and these ethnic blocs will pose a formidable opposition to the ambition of the Taliban20. No matter what the international community do, if the internal dynamic of Afghanistan remain explosive as in the present time, it would be difficult to avoid civil war in the country.

If the world, especially US will be more safe after 2014 than before

As the drawdown from Afghanistan is nearing, the question is, if the world, especially US is safer than before and whether Afghanistan would again become the launching pad of international terror. For the outsiders, especially the westerners, the perception about the Taliban is that they are one of the ‘ardent supporters of terrorism’ (Rashid, 2001; Rashid, 2008; Shahzad, 2011; Gul, 2010; and Burke, 2004). This impression is based on the assertion that Taliban ‘have invited terrorist groups and allowed to operate from Afghanistan’ (Mir, 2010, pp.312). But the truth is something else. The Taliban are illiterate or at best madrassa educated introverts. They formed and run the self centric Taliban movement on puritanical line, where Sharia is paramount. Their interpretation of Sharia is dictated not by Islamic order but by their own parochial

19

Ungar, Amiel.(2012, April 20). Russia’s Lavrov Criticizes NATO for Artificial Withdrawal Timing. Artuz Sheva.

20

Dobbins, J.(2009, November 4). Our Man in Kabul. Foreign Affairs. 55

understanding (Rashid, 2001, 33&107). Their opposition to the US, before 9/11 was because of the presence of US troops in the gulf and because of the imposition of sanction against Afghanistan (Milam, 1998). They never sent terrorists to attack US homeland before and after 9/11 despite the presence of US troops in Afghanistan since 200121. Some fringe Taliban freelancers had gone to attack US. Before Taliban, it was bin Laden and the Jalalabad Shura in collaboration with the ISI, trained Kashmiri militants in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001, 186). Although the Taliban had allowed Afghan soil for militant training, it was mostly due to their weak writ on the country and not because of their direct involvement with such programmes. Sheltering bin Laden by the Taliban was because of three reasons, firstly, the Pashtunwali custom of sheltering a guest; secondly, bin Laden’s impressive role during Afghan war; and thirdly, because of supports from the Islamists of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan (Milam, 1998). The reason of flourishing of militant organizations during Taliban rule was due to the fact that only 75% of Afghanistan was under Taliban control and even in those areas also their writ was not tight. Leading terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami (HuJI), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Haqqani Network were neither formed during Taliban rule nor established their bases in areas controlled by Taliban (Coll, 2004, 89,102; Yousuf and Adkin, 2001, pp.105). All these groups had acquired land, constructed training camps and operated from there during Afghan war. Some of these camps were constructed with US’ tax payers money (Crile, 2007, 473; Coll, 2004; Yousuf & Adkin, 2001). Many of these camps were abandoned after Afghan war but some of them were functional when Taliban came to power in September 1996. The Taliban were not entirely disliked by international community when they came and the US wanted to ‘give the Taliban a chance’ as they were ‘less anti-American than other Afghan groups’ (Weinbaum, 2003, 2). In fact, the Taliban had followed all the right policies like – they brought order to a chaotic region, tighten opium production and promised to expel Kashmir militants (Weinbaum, 2003, 1). Mullah Omar even clarified that Taliban ‘have no intention of exporting jihad’ (Rashid, 2001, 186). These were some of the testimonies of Taliban’s past policies. The US understand well that Taliban does not pose danger to US homeland security. The Taliban per se are not US’ enemy and ‘the US president has never made a single statement asserting that the Taliban threatens US interests’22. Nevertheless, US is fighting Taliban with a huge cost only to secure homeland from any future 9/11. Number of US commanders, who worked in Afghanistan and numerous official reports conceded that America gone to Afghanistan without a vision. Consequentially, America’s policy resulted in a ‘spiralling eruption of war due to directionless entry into

21 22 56

Southern District Court of New York.( 2010). United States of America Vs. Faisal Shahzad. 10 MAG 928, pp-9.

Afghanistan’. This directionless policy has been making US more insecure than what it was before its entry into Afghanistan. In the contemporary scenario, there are four strong groups comprised of Taliban, Haqqani Network, Northern Alliance and the Hamid Karzai-led faction operating in Afghanistan. The strength of Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is disputed. Out of these five factions, Hamid Karzai-led democratic set up is ruling since 2001 and Northern Alliance is either participating or supporting the government. Rest of the three distinct Pashtun groups are leading insurgency in the country. Curiously, none of these three insurgent groups were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the US until September 7, 2012, when only Haqqani Network was elevated into the list. The Obama administration is working to encourage dialogue with insurgent leaders despite the fact that listing of Haqqanis as Foreign Terrorists will deter them from coming to the negotiating table. Washington has a historical policy of denying support to Northern Alliance and except for a brief spell in 2001, their policy largely remains the same (Rumsfeld, 2001). The US has never involved Northern Alliance in the future settlement talk with the Taliban. Karzai government is only counting its days and despite troop surge Taliban had established shadow governments in many provinces of Afghanistan and dispensing official duty on regular basis. With a political settlement nowhere in sight and Pakistani support for armed extremists unabated, Washington’s options for preventing a Taliban takeover have narrowed. The US is not blind to Taliban strength and therefore negotiating with the group, which unwittingly made the prospect of Taliban takeover high. The US’ policy of fight-negotiation-fight with Taliban is puzzling. Because, if it is possible to make sure that Afghanistan could be secured from the danger of terrorist heaven by establishing Taliban regime solidly once more in future, and if it is sufficient to cooperate with Taliban to repel international terrorists when time comes, why not end immediately the war against terror and prepare for an upcoming necessity? Because of US’ anti-terror war, Taliban, Haqqani Network and al Qaeda were, if not united, obliged to fight together against the US. This forced togetherness has made them more acceptable to each other not only for present but also for future, and in case Taliban dominates Afghanistan, al Qaeda will not reject them. The US fears that al Qaeda will again swarm Afghanistan, if Taliban return to power, is one of the reasons why fighting is continue although Taliban itself is no danger to US. The Taliban-al Qaeda expulsion and return is a vicious cycle and if Taliban becomes weaker by US fighting, the danger of sheltering al Qaeda will become bigger. Taliban will shelter al Qaeda because apart from their experience of fighting together for 12 years, al Qaeda’s usefulness cannot be ignored in civil war situation, which mainly will be fought between Taliban-Haqqani-Pak militants-al Qaeda on one side and former Northern Alliance and Afghan National Army forces on the other side. This paper argues that under civil war situation Afghanistan will inevitably become the launching pad of international terror attacks, which would make America more unsecure. If Taliban manage to control Afghanistan, the next concern is whether Afghanistan

Gelb, L.H.(2011). Joe Biden On Iraq, Iran, China and the Taliban. Newsweek. December 19. 57

checkmate US-India bonding23. Pakistan have sacrificed a lot due to trouble in its Western border and never missed the chance to play a significant role in influencing Taliban’s policy24.The Taliban do not have a fixed policy on the issue of supporting or opposing international terrorism. They are guided by the spar of the momement and too religious to stick to one point, which make them vulnerable.

will become the launching pad of international terrorism. This paper asserts that the core of Taliban would not involve them in international terrorism. However, considering their weak writ on most parts of the country, al Qaeda and other militants will nest in Taliban Afghanistan. During the past 12 years, Taliban fighters had harboured great resentment against the US, which is sufficient for al Qaeda to be acquiesced being not leaving from Afghanistan after 2014 to launch international terror attacks using its soil, not necessarily hand in hand with Taliban ideologically. Owing to their common fundamentalist background; prolong togetherness in wilderness and common suffering at the hands of the US, the Taliban will never oppose al Qaeda’s presence forcefully, which will convert Afghanistan into an incubator of international terrorism. The US is in impasse having no deterrent against such eminent danger, which makes it more unsafe than before.

Apart from that, Taliban are erratic and gullible. Their rigid interpretation of Islam could be exploited in future as in the past. The Taliban are not one entity and there are at least 10 Taliban factions operating in Afghanistan. It is not clear even whether Mullah Omar can deliver all of the Taliban that he nominally controls in Southern Afghanistan, because they are often fissured into purely local groups. In Afghanistan, ‘There’s no Ho Chi Minh, there’s no Slobodan Milosevic and there’s no Palestinian Authority’25, which made durable peace difficult and the US less secure.

Many top al Qaeda leaders are killed since 2001, therefore cooperation with Taliban is diminished but never ceased. Haqqani Network is the conduit organization for maintaining link in between Taliban and al Qaeda (Rashid, 2008, 99 & 268). Documents seized from bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound revealed a three-way communications among bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri and Mullah Omar. The new discovery has undermined Taliban’s Afghan nationalist agenda as there is impending fear of Taliban offering safe heaven to al Qaeda and other militants.

CONCLUSION Across the world leaders from great many countries have been talking about the stabilization and future situation of Afghanistan. Despite their best of efforts and despite the application of best minds, the situation in Afghanistan is dicey. The failure of coalition forces in general and US in particular to bring peace and stability is palpable. An ‘occupying’ force ‘largely ignorant of local history, tribal structures, languages, customs, politics, and values’ was destined to be unsuccessful. Their obstinacy in futilely trying to fix the perennial problem has been blurring their vision to see the reality.

Harboring militants in Afghanistan was not the principal policy of Taliban but a byproduct of their rule (Milam, 1998; Burke, 2004, 160 & 168). The Taliban per se are not going to pose any threat to the security of the US, and their militant partners outside Afghanistan are Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their ideological partners are the Deobandi Pakistani madrassas. But, other than their common interpretation of Islam and Pashtun background, Afghan Taliban and TTP differ greatly from each other. TTP claim allegiance with Afghan Taliban but the latter routinely deny connection. This trend is rampant where many self proclaimed Taliban centric militant groups assert their proximity with Afghan Taliban. Therefore, there is high possibility that international terrorists group will nest in Afghanistan against the will, approval and discouragement of the Taliban. Pakistan being the most significant neighbor of landlocked Afghanistan possesses huge influence on the social fabric of Afghanistan and Taliban. Its stake in Afghanistan is high for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Pakistan wants a pliant government in Afghanistan to achieve ‘strategic depth’. Secondly, Pakistan army is not only guided by religiosity but housing a large pool of extremists, who consider protection of Taliban as their Islamic obligation (Jalal, 1999, pp.94; Gannon, 2005, pp.142). Thirdly, Pakistan army, which control the country’s Afghan policy wish to settle score against India through Afghanistan (Bhutto, 1979, pp.195). Finally, Pakistan wants badly the inflow of US money and by prolonging the war; it can not only extract financial benefit but also

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Zaidi, S.A.(2011). Who Benefits from US Aid to Pakistan?. Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook. September 21.

For example, the US do not considers Taliban as their enemy but fighting with them since 12 years. The US is more insecure today than before as even after 12 years of war against terror, the military shudder to vacate the country leaving no troops behind as the fear of terrorist attacks on US mainland is ever high. But stationing of US troops after withdrawal would prove counter-productive as the Taliban already made it clear that they do not want international forces in Afghanistan26. So the US decision would invite more problems and casualties than any good to either side. Likewise, the US is historically not comfortable with the Northern Alliance and always refrained from letting the alliance dominate Afghanistan. However, since 2001, US strategists are working with them and supported their participation in Karzai government. The policy confusion is conspicuous where US do not want the ethnic Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara dominated Northern Alliance to rule Afghanistan but at the same time reluctant to offer chance to Pashtun Taliban. While doing so, the US is not confiding with any of the four major ethnic groups and inviting the ire of all.

24

Khar, H.R.(2011). Address at the UN General Assembly. New York, September 27.

25

Sterling, J.(2010). Richard Holbrooke, Noted Diplomat, is Dead at 69. CNN. Retrieved from http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-11/us/richard.holbrooke.obit_1_richard-c-holbrooke-diplomat-bosnianwar/4?_s=PM:US.

26

Bergen, P.(2011). Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington DC: May 24.

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REFERENCES It is in the interest of the US foreign policy to admit the fact that Taliban are the most powerful group in Afghanistan and despite the dislikeness of the world, they stand against all odds for the past 12 years to press their claim at Kabul. Rather than sticking to the directionless policy and rather than refusing to accept Afghan’s strict religious mode of life, the US should help building Afghanistan by letting the Afghans to do the job. After the successful battle against the Soviet, the US walked out of Afghanistan in 1989. The walk become run subsequently when Afghanistan required assistance the most. Consequentially, the country returned to civil war, which contributed in making Afghanistan as the breeding ground of terrorism. It is in the interest of the US to avoid repetition of its past follies. Past US policy ‘to remain aloof from Afghanistan’ as well as present US policy ‘to occupy the country’ have failed terribly. There is an urgent need to device a third policy. The strength of Northern Alliance is historically limited to the Northern part of Afghanistan while the Pashtuns, which include the Taliban, Haqqani and other warlords, exert their influence in greater portion of Afghanistan. No group is capable of capturing the whole country in a civil war situation. So the various ethnic groups and tribes have to device some power sharing formula to avoid bloodshed and anarchy. Taliban participants at the Paris Conference have already indicated their willingness for ‘an inclusive government’. Since the Taliban is not the enemy of the US, it is better for US and for the world to device a policy where Taliban would be a leading stakeholder in future Afghanistan. The world have to understand the Taliban on certain subjects like interpretation and implementation of their version of Sharia, adherence to Pashtunwali code, and making Afghanistan a pious land. Since the Taliban are very vulnerable to religion, international Islamic terrorists will nest in Afghanistan against their will. That is when the international community led by the US must walk into Afghanistan to help the incumbent ruler to bail the country out from the impending danger. Civil war situation in Afghanistan will convert the country into a perfect stage for international terror attacks. The US must avoid such a disastrous outcome. As the leader of Afghanistan has been demanding money at conference after conference to run the country and to handle their security, merely providing money would never help. An imposed leader would act against the interest of Afghanistan. The US stubbornness to get a loyal Afghan leader would serve the interest of none, as was the case of Karzai. While it is significant to offer financial packages, it is equally significant that leadership must evolve from inside. While ignorance about local culture and tradition is acceptable, forced dilutions of the age-old ethos bring danger and disaster. It is essential for the US to understand the hard reality and take an unpopular decision, where peace and stability must not be the casualties.

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Badkhen, A. (2012). Afghanistan by Donkey. New York: Foreign Policy Magazine Publication. Berntsen, G. & Pezzullo, R. (2005). Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda – A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander. New York: Crown, 2005. Bhutto, B. (2008). Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West. London: Simon & Schuster. Bhutto, Z.A. (1979). If I am Assassinated.. New Delhi: Vikas Publication. Blackwill, R.D. (2011). Plan B in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs. 90 (1). Boucher, R. (2001). Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, Press Section, American Embassy, Tel Aviv. February 9. Burke, J. (2006). Al Qaeda. London: Penguin Publication. Bush, G. (2005). President Welcomes Afghan President Karzai to the White House’, Whitehouse, Washington DC, May 2005. Coll, S. (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. London: Penguin Publication. Committee on Foreign Relations. (2011). Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. Government of USA. Washington DC. Crile, G. (2003). Charlie Wilson’s War. New York: Grove Press. Department of Defense. (2012). Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Report to Congress. Government of USA. Department of State. (1994). Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993. Washington DC. – –. (2011). 2010 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan. Washington DC. Retrieved from http://www.state. gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm. Eastham, A. (1998). Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat’, Secret Cable, US Embassy in Islamabad. Washington DC: Department of State, September 13. Eide, K. (2012). Power Struggle Over Afghanistan: An Inside Look at What Went Wrong And What We Can Do to Repair the Damage. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. Ferrier, J. P. (1858). History of the Afghans. translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Captain William Jesse. London: John Murray. Gannon, K. (2005). I is for Infidel. Washington: Public Affairs Publication. Grad, M. (2009). Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader. London: Webster University Press. Gul, I. (2010). The Most Dangerous Place: badkhen’s Lawless Frontier. New York: Viking. Hastings, M. (2012). The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: Plume Book. Jalal, A. (1999). The State of Martial Rule. Lahore: Sang-E-Mil Publication. Jones, S. G. (2011, November 6). Why Haqqani Network is Wrong Target. Foreign Affairs. Katzman, K. (2011). Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. Congressional Research Service. Washington DC: CRS Publication, December 12. – –. (2012). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy. Congressional Research Service. Washington DC: CRS Publication. Khar, H.R. (2011). Address at the UN General Assembly. New York, September 27. Kilner, S. (2009). Pervasive Corruption Undermining Ghazni Province’s Public Administration, Secret Cable, US Embassy in Kabul. Washington DC: Department of State, December 28. Laipson, E. (2012). Engaging Iran on Afghanistan. Henry L. Stimson Centre, pp-XI. Lawrence, B. (2005). Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden. London: Verso. Milam, W.B. (1998). High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances, in October 11 Meeting with Ambassador, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad. Washington DC: Department of State. Mir, A. (2010). Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11 and Beyond. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. Musharraf, P. (2013). Marginalizing the Pashtuns. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April. Nasr, V. (2013). The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy, March-April. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. (2011). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Washington DC: W.W. Norton. Nehru, J.L. (2004). Glimpses of World History. New Delhi: Penguin Publication.

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Obama, B.H. (2009). Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whitehouse, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington DC: December 1. Pigott, P. (2007). Canada in Afghanistan: The War So Far. Toronto: Dundurn Press. Rashid, A. (2001). Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords. London: Pan Macmillan Publication. – –. (2008). Descent into Chaos: How the War Against IslamicExtremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. London: Penguin Publication. – –. (2012). Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. London: Allen Lane. Rath, S.K. (2011). Pakistan’s Double Game: Supporting and Opposing Terrorism. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues. 15(2). – –. (2011). The Haqqani Network and Afghanistan’s Future. Asian Conflict Report. 20, NovemberDecember. Rumsfeld, D. (2001). US Strategy in Afghanistan, Secret Cable, Department of Defence. Washington DC: Department of Defence, October 30. Saleh, A. (2013). Believing Pakistan Could Change. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April. Shahzad, S.S. (2011). Inside the al Qaeda and the Taliban. London: MacMillan Publication. Singh, M. & Karzai, H. (2011). Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi: October 04. Small, A. (2012, October 3). China’s Afghan Moment. Foreign Policy Magazine. Stewart, R. (2013). Trying to do the Impossible. Foreign Policy Magazine. March-April. Sykes, P. (1940). A History of Afghanistan, Vol.I. London: MacMillan and Co. UN. (2001). Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), S/2001/1154, Kabul, December 5. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html. UNAMA. (2011). Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. UN Mission in Kabul. Retrieved from http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/ March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf. Waldman, M. (2010). The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents. Discussion Paper 18, London: London School of Economics Publication. Weinbaum, M. (2003). Interview to the 9/11 Commission on August 12, 2003, Author’s Collection. Wright, L. (2006). The Looming Tower. New York: Vintage Books. Yousuf M. and Adkin M. (2001). Afghanistan The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower. New York: Casemate Publication.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A GENERAL DISCUSSION Laini Soszynski American Military University, USA Laini Soszynski is a Graduate Student from Massachusetts, United States, with American Military University. She is studying the United States’ Intelligence system with an emphasis on Terrorism Studies and a certificate of Middle Eastern Studies. Her areas of interest include jihadist terrorist organizations, weapons of mass destruction, and the psychology of terror groups.

KEYWORDS Taliban, Haqqani Network, Afghanistan, Northern Alliance, al Qaeda, and Terrorism.

ABSTRACT Terrorist’s desire to possess of weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, is no secret to the United States or any other nation monitoring certain groups. The potential of WMD procurement and use is based largely on the capabilities and motivations of individual groups. Specific discussion in this paper related to the overall potential of terrorist usage of WMD, the results of a chemical attack on a target population, how and why to protect against agroterrorism, and a threat analysis of a biological WMD attack on the United States. Key Words: WMD, chemical, biological, terrorism, agroterrorism

Terrorist Potential of Weapons of Mass Destruction Use

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been a target of interest for terrorist organizations for decades. The ultimate power a terrorist group would achieve from demonstrating its WMD capabilities would earn the group the respect, influence, and projection of power needed to continue its campaign while gaining supporters and destroying target populations. Additionally, WMD capabilities of a terrorist organization would deter oppositional forces from attacking the group because of a fear of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) retaliation. The devastation of chemical weapons was originally demonstrated in the trenches of World War I, with the death of thousands of American soldiers due to the enemy usage of these weapons. The overwhelming power of nuclear weapons shook the world after America dropped the two atomic warheads on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945, collectively ending the Second World War. It is not surprising, with such demonstrations, that terrorist organizations are attempting to obtain or cultivate such weapons for personal usage. Terrorist groups are likely to use weapons of mass destruction because of the projection of power that comes with WMD possession, as well as the influence perceived by potential supporters, deterrence of enemy attack,

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and the ability to induce political change while defending religious beliefs. Power projection resulting from WMD use revolves around the psychological disarray, economic devastation, and casualty producing capabilities of such a weapon. Successful employment of a weapon of mass destruction on a target population would likely result in a combination of, or all of these factors. It is important to note that a WMD attack could elicit such an impact even with a relatively small amount of casualties. Psychological impacts are due largely to the fact that primal instinct is fear of contamination or infection from agents that cannot be seen (McComb, 2013). Such agents could be deployed in biological or chemical weapons, infect only a few individuals, and cause mass panic at the prospect of spreading contamination. If the terrorist organization that is deploying such a weapon only intends to cause psychological damage to a population, the weapon needs not be highly sophisticated, but contain dispersal techniques that would infect a target population. A primary example of such WMD usage would be Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin-gas attack in 1995, in which the nerve agent was released in Japanese subways, causing 13 deaths and effecting up to 6,252, successfully obtaining its goal of producing an apocalyptic-like response (Aytac, Kibaroglu, 2009). The group also released thousands of liters of anthrax via aerosol sprays mounted to rooftops in Tokyo. Both attacks resulted in mass panic, psychological damage, and the negative economic impact of decontamination teams, hospitalizations, and stopped transportation. Aum Shinrikyo’s attacks demonstrated to the terrorist community that WMD use did not need to be overwhelmingly casualty producing to make an impact, and in fact only few people needed to be severely impacted to ensure success of an attack in terms of psychological and economic damage. Other groups, such as al Qaeda, intend to use WMD to rally supporters and defend specific religious and political beliefs. Al Qaeda’s motivation for WMD obtainment or procurement is of political retaliation against the West, and the defense of Islam (Stone, 2009). Since 1998, Osama bin Laden, founder of al Qaeda, declared it a religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction, issuing a religious fatwah to the jihadist community in the ensuing years (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought to light the seriousness of the terror group’s assertion of WMD capability. Reviewing the history of the group, it can be noted that al Qaeda had been active in biological and chemical weapon cultivation, recruiting biologists and chemists in an effort to develop anthrax and ricin dispersal devices, as well as planning radiological “dirty bomb” plots against the United States throughout the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). After the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in an attempt to oust the terror group, Osama bin Laden stated to the West that “if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons,” a clear deterrence factor for the group’s protection (Hamid Mir, 2001). It is clear that there has been terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction in the past, and terror groups continue to chase such intentions with the recruitment of specially trained individuals, and attempts to obtain nuclear or radiological material,

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as well as attempts in various biological and chemical agent productions. The motives of individual terror organizations vary, but to each organization, definite and valuable consequences will come of WMD obtainment or use against a target population.

Chemical Weapon Effect on a Target Population

Chemical weapons use originated in World War I when chlorine gas was used by German troops against the United States and its allies in 1915, demonstrating the incapacitating nature of the weapons with the death of over 5,000 troops (Hilmas, 2008). In addition to the incapacitating, casualty producing nature of chemical weapons, there was a significant psychological impact on the troops following the initial dispersal of such weapons. Seeing their comrade fall to the devastating effects of the toxic agent produced fear among the troops that at any moment they, too, could fall to the gas. This caused the defending countries to establish protective measure, such as gasmasks, against the chemical weapons, as well as the production of its own, more volatile and persistent vesicant that could work beyond such protection. After the war ended, the 1925 general agreement of the Geneva Convention was established, in which all countries agreed that chemical weapons were inhumane and should not be used (Hilmas 2008). Regardless of this agreement, there are still organizations and nations that utilize chemical weapons, whether conventional or improvised, to increase the amount of casualties, promote panic, and establish a show of force. By looking at historical uses of chemical weapons, the prospective effects of chemical weapon use on a targeted population can be analyzed and predicted. Noteworthy chemical weapon employment has occurred both in terrorist attacks as well as attacks on civilians as directed by leaders such as the President of Syria, Bashar al Assad, and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Terrorist organizations operate with little or no regard to moral and legal restrictions, allowing unconstrained attacks to be carried out in the name of their religious beliefs or ideological demand (Tucker, 2011). Politically motivated terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo of Japan have utilized relatively simple improvised chemical devices in the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the subway in Tokyo, demonstrating the economic and psychological effect of chemical weapon use. Jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Islamic State), have threatened the West with such attacks. To date, al Qaeda has validated its ability to build improvised chemical weapons with the planned attacks on the New York City subway system in 2002, although it was cancelled by al Zawahiri due to the need to focus on “something better” (Tucker, 2011). In the wake of the Islamic State’s expansion through Syria and Iraq, it has become known that the group has access to chlorine weapons stockpiled in areas that they now occupy. In the event of such an attack on the United States, as the jihadist groups have threatened, it can be expected that mass chaos, casualties, and economic disaster would occur as a result, similar to the reaction of the Japanese following Aum Shinrikyo’s attack (McComb, 2011).

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A chemical attack on the United States would likely occur in an enclosed area, allowing the agent less area to dissipate following its dispersal. Likely targets could be enclosed sports stadiums, subway cars or stations, airports or airplanes, and other frequently populated areas such as concert halls and convention centers. Depending on the size of the device and the amount and type of chemical agent being dispersed, it could be assumed that nearly all people within the immediate area would become symptomatic, with a percentage of them becoming fatally incapacitated. Following the immediate panic, windows and doors will be opened and the chemical would eventually dissipate. In the aftermath of the attack, there would be significant chaos, media coverage, panic, and psychological damage as the extent of what had happened is realized. Emergency responders will be tasked to the scene, and hundreds or thousands would swarm hospitals with symptoms of the agent. Following the attack, the building and immediate area would have to be secured and decontaminated, and depending on the venue that was attacked, additional negative economic impact could occur as businesses shut down while the decontamination is in motion (Pangi, 2002). In comparing the 1995 Japanese sarin gas attacks to a similar attack occurring in New York, the Government Accountability Office estimated approximately $34 billion loss and up to 6,000 fatalities, assuming the gas is dispersed effectively (Enders, Olson, 2010). To ensure the United States population is prepared for a chemical attack, military, law enforcement, hazardous materials teams, first responders, and public health officials are all being trained on the specific actions following a chemical incident. Being able to take previous experiences and apply them to potential targets for terrorism allows the United States the ability to train and prepare, as well as monitor and defend against certain chemical attacks.

Protecting Against Agroterrorism

Agroterrorism is defined as “the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability” (Monke, 2007). The threat of agroterrorism was recently revisited following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and is considered a threat to the national security of the country. Attacks on farmers’ cattle or crop involves the use of biological agents, such as pathogenic viruses or bacteria, to intentionally contaminate the food sources of the animals, or poison the crops to such an extent that they can no longer be harvested for production. Groups like al Qaeda, with goals that include the ultimate disruption of the American economy, could utilize agroterrorism in different areas simultaneously, which would impact the economic balance of the country, as well as the means of livelihood for many, severely. Terrorist organizations could be attracted to agroterrorism because of the economic disaster that would follow the overwhelming destruction of crops and cattle, as well as the relative ease of producing such an attack due to lacking security of farms and the non-transmittable nature of the pathogen used. Protection against such an attack would improve with increased surveillance of farms, strict sanitation measures, and increased education on foreign diseases and

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protective measures. The United States maintains an agricultural sector of farms, fishing and forestry, food and beverage manufacturing, and leather manufacturing, as the third largest of the economy, producing upwards of $780 billion a year (USDA, 2014). Industries that success directly correlates to the success of the agricultural sector include transportation, restaurants and entertainment, grocery stores, and animal grain production, to name a few. The economic impact of agroterrorism- or an accident involving the infection of feed or livestock- can be seen in two incidents that had occurred in the 2000’s. The United Kingdom’s agriculture economy came under attack with a foot-and-mouth epidemic, resulting in $21 billion in losses. Additionally, the Netherlands experienced a bout of contaminated animal feed, generating $1 billion in losses (Gyles, 2010). The cost of the clean-up of such an attack would include hazardous material crews, disposal of infected crop or animals, recall of all meat that had been processed through that farm, and potential personnel seeking medical attention for fear of contracting the disease. Vulnerabilities of farms to an agroterrorism attack revolve around the loosely secured nature in which they operate, and the heavily overpopulated environments that the cattle live in throughout their lives. Farms within the United States contain anywhere from 4,000 to 10,000 animals at a time, making is significantly more difficult to recognize a sick animal that may be transmitting an illness to the other animals at the farm (CIAS, 2014). Farmers’ ability to monitor these animals individually is inhibited by the crowded conditions, implying that by the time a farmer recognized an illness in the herd, the disease had likely spread to other animals in the herd. Today, the cattle raised for slaughter generally contain a high amount of hormones and have decreased immune systems, making them highly susceptible to infection. In the event a farmer does recognize a sick animal, the potential of the disease being foreign to the country is high, considering the prospect of a terrorist causing the infection. Because of this, trained veterinarians lack experience in caring for animals with such diseases, delaying the response to the outbreak and allowing it to spread (Monke, 2007). Protective measures could be taken in better securing the farms within the country. Due to the need for farms to contain large amounts of land, securing the area can be difficult and expensive. A lack of security measures could facilitate terrorist trespassing and infecting the animal or plant population. Additional preparation was considered in the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002. This act outlined specifics of agricultural safety and included protection measures involving the Food and Drug Administration’s authority, the tightened control of biological agents and toxins, the expanse of agricultural security activities and upgrades, and increasing criminal penalties for acts against animal enterprises (P.L. 107-188, 2002). The expanded protective measures revolving around the safety of farming within the United States will make the prospect of an agroterrorism attack less likely; however, the reactiveness of those in immediate care of the animals is the primary method of response and protection.

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Threat Assessment: Biological Weapon of Mass Destruction

Biological weapons have been within the capabilities of Islamic jihadist groups since before the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Groups like al Qaeda have demonstrated not only the capabilities of manufacturing specific biological pathogens such as anthrax and ricin, but also the ability to recruit those with the expertise needed to aid in further developments of such weapons. This threat assessment will be primarily concerned with al Qaeda and its splinter groups, and the potential of a biological weapon of mass destruction attack on the United States. The assessment will evaluate why the group would chose such an agent, the intent of its use, the capabilities to manufacture or obtain such a weapon, and particular targets that the terrorist group may choose based on the estimated successful dispersal of an agent. Al Qaeda, an Islamic jihadist terrorist organization, focuses its efforts around retaliation against the West because of North America and Europe’s occupation in the Middle East. Since its establishment by Osama bin Laden in 1988, al Qaeda has been relatively successful in obtaining and cultivating biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, anthrax letters began circulating throughout the United States, indicating that the terror group had the capability to manufacture the biological agent. The intention of utilizing such an agent was to parallel its attempts of obtaining a nuclear weapon, serving as another means to produce similar mass casualties as its leaders began to accept the difficulties of obtaining nuclear material (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). Because of the demonstration of the weaponized anthrax via the letters sent post-9/11, it can be assumed that al Qaeda understands how to manufacture the pathogen. In addition to this capability, al Qaeda is successful in recruiting biochemists to aid in their production. In 2001, Pakistani humanitarian NGO Unna Tameer e Nau (UTN) offered to construct a biological program for al Qaeda, and furthers this professional capability with the recruitment of Yazid Sufaat, a biochemist, who began instructing at al Qaeda’s training camps on how to develop biological weapons (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). Biological labs are easy to conceal and maintain, as seen by the many labs found in Europe in 2002, furthering their attraction to terrorist cells of al Qaeda. Pathogens not manufactured by the group can also be obtained during natural outbreaks, such as the recent Ebola outbreak in Africa, making it a low-cost, high-efficiency weapon of choice if weaponized correctly. Using pathogens such as Ebola or smallpox would allow for a natural spread of the disease once the initial infection phase has been completed, ensuring a widespread panic and economic impact as people flood hospitals with symptoms- or imagined symptoms- of the disease. This natural spread of the pathogen elicits more attraction for its weaponized use. Based on an assumed intent of the terrorist group, targets of a biological attack would likely be highly populated areas within an enclosed space. Due to the political nature of al Qaeda, government targets could be expected, or conventions, rallies, sports events, schools, or governmental capitals. On the other side of the spectrum, targets could include heavy economic impactors such as airports and other forms

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of transportation. Methods of dispersal would revolve around the type of pathogen utilized and the target population. Aerosol sprayers, glass vials, or other inconspicuous means of dispersal would allow for maximum personnel infected. Choosing agents such as smallpox, which has a two week incubation period, followed by a two-week symptomatic and contagious period, would allow for those infected spreading the disease to a significant amount of people as they go about their daily lives for that two week period (Cary, 2009). Based on the motives of al Qaeda- retaliation against the West, mass casualties, and a significant economic and political impact- it can be expected that a biological weapon attack will be attempted at some point in the future. The group would likely use agents with a high contagion potential, dispersed in an enclosed area of frequent travel or high political profile of its occupants. Because the group has demonstrated its biological capabilities in the past, and it continues its training, recruitment, and purchase of biological materials and manufacturing, the current status of a biological weapons program is likely still active. Defensive means can be taken in reference to detection capabilities, security measures, and proactive reporting of symptomatic citizens.

REFERENCES Cary, Scott. 2009. “The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 2, No. 3. September. Accessed April 18, 2015. Aytac, O., Kibaroglu, M. 2009. “Defence against weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.” Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press. Accessed April 18, 2015. Center for Integrated Agricultural Systems. 2014. “Large-scale pastured poultry farming in the U.S.” January. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.cias.wisc.edu/large-scale-pastured-poultry-farming-in-theus/ Enders, Walter and Eric Olson. 2010. “Measuring the Economic Costs of Terrorism.” Department of Economics Finance and Legal Studies. University of Alabama. Accessed April 15, 2015. Gyles, Carlton. “Agroterrorism.” The Canadian Veterinary Journal 51.4 (2010): 347–348. Print. Accessed April 15, 2015. Hamid Mir, “Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response,” Dawn, November 10, 2001, Shaba’an 23, 1422. Accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.dawn. com/2001/11/10/top1.htm. Hilmas, C., Smart, J., Hill, B. 2008. “History of chemical warfare.” Lenhart, K. Ed. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Borden Institute. Accessed April 16, 2015. McComb, Jonathan M. 2013. “Closing Pandora’s Box: The Threat of Terrorist Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Global Security Studies 4, no. 1: 71-92. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed March 14, 2015). Monke, Jim. 2007. “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” CRS Report for Congress. Resources, Science, and Industry Division. Accessed April 18, 2015. Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Accessed April 19, 2015. Pangi, Robyn. 2002. “Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Accessed April 18, 2015. Stone, John. 2009. “Al Qaeda, Deterrence, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 9: 763-775. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed March 14, 2015). United States Department of Agriculture. 2014. “AG and Food Sectors and the Economy.” November. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statisticscharting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy.aspx 69

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