Divide and Conquer.

Divide and Conquer RO B E R T K UPIE C K I The annexation of Crimea and the direct participation of the Russian army in the war in eastern Ukraine have become a tool for Moscow to attempt to keep Kyiv (with the use of force) within its sphere of influence and to impede the process of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union and NATO. In addition, the Russian authorities strive to secure public support based on a widespread sense of insecurity, powered by state-controlled political propaganda. In effect, the Kremlin is attempting to find a way to rule indefinitely without the risk of a social revolt or the pressure of modernisation. Most importantly, however, Russia wants to maintain a level of instability in Ukraine with its “burning” borders, explosive amount of social dissatisfaction and the risk of the implosion of the political system. From such a perspective, Moscow could also promote itself as a stabilising factor and a desired partner for the West, already fatigued by the lengthy crisis. Russia could present itself as a fireman putting out a fire that it in fact had caused. The Kremlin’s broader goal is the consolidation of the territory of the former Soviet Union based on its own political and economic vision and its exclusion

from European integration processes. This implies an extension of the conflict and the tools that are being used to exhaust the West, to show to it the growing cost of its involvement in the East as well as undermine its integrity. In other words, Moscow is seeking to “play the game” according to its own rules. Therefore the current conflict in eastern Ukraine is also Russia’s conflict with the West. It is a conflict with western values, institutions and democratic aspirations. Clearly, the goal of today’s Russia is no longer to be an equal partner for the West, but rather an alternative model for the others. This also applies to its global competition in Asia, the Middle East and Africa; however in those cases, Russian ambitions collide with the plans of China and Iran. The truth is that Russian leaders care little about partnership and co-operation with the West. As a result of the weakness of its political and economic system, Russia is not able to build co-operation based on the principle of sharing benefits and responsibilities. There is no doubt that Russia knows that the West has a lot to offer when it comes to financial instruments or modern technology. Yet, using

How Global is the Ukrainian Conflict?, Robert Kupiecki  this potential (without changing Russia’s own policy) would require a disruption in NATO’s and the EU’s solidarity, dividing their members and making a selective choice of partners that would have to accept proposed forms of cooperation. The global implications of the conflict in eastern Ukraine include the not

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as yet fully known consequences of Russia’s violation of international law, the militarisation of the dialogue between superpowers, the disintegration of the requirements of the treaty for the conventional disarmament in Europe and the limitations to Russia’s co-operation with the West, with all its negative impact on global security issues.

Dr. hab. Robert Kupiecki is a career diplomat (until 2012 ambassador of Poland in Washington DC), a historian and political scientist. He is currently the deputy minister of national defence.

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