Descartes on Intentionality, Conscientia, and Phenomenal Consciousness (Studia philosophica)

Does Descartes accept the phenomenal intentionality thesis as the thesis is presented in Terence Horgan's and John Tienson's 2002 article «Intentionality of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of Intentionality»? Raising this question, the paper intends to shed new light on Descartes's conceptions of intentionality and conscientia. In addition, it attempts to identify the aspects of Descartes's view of the mind that account for what we nowadays call «phenomenal consciousness». It turns out that it is an integral part of Descartes's conception of intentionality that thinking substances are conscious of their thoughts. However, the same is not generally true of the phenomenal character that Cartesian thoughts exhibit. Instead, at least in the case of sensory thoughts, the phenomenal character is determined by inner sensory objects that are " carried " by these thoughts, but that do not contribute to the thoughts' intentionality. The upshot is that Descartes does not accept Horgan's and Tienson's phenomenal intentionality thesis since intentionality is not grounded in phenomenal character.