Democracy, Justice, and Political Legitimacy
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Democracy, Justice, and Political Legitimacy Brandon Gobourne 12/17/2014
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There has been much discussion linking United States foreign policy and colonialism of other nations. It has been a common theme, and is usually the case, that the United States enters these nations to implement a democratic society. In Latham’s book, The Right Kind of Revolution, he analyzes the criticism that modernization theory has faced. Latham suggests that liberalism and neoliberalism, as ideologies supporting modernization, cannot be achieved pragmatically and face heavy criticisms of imperialism and global domination. In Latham’s claim, modernization theory has collapsed due to its impracticality.1 My critique of modernization theory is from an ideological and theoretical position. Because modernization theory tends to imply the development of democracy in foreign nations, I will analyze the sociological characteristics of democratic societies. The data which I will use as the basis of my argument are from Seymour M. Lipset’s influential work “Some Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”. Lipset suggests that the individual or group belief in the legitimacy and effectiveness of the political system directly affect the stability of a democratic society.2 Lipset defines legitimacy as the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.3 Individuals or groups who believe the political system is illegitimate or
Latham, Michael E. The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011. 158. 1
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 86. 2
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ineffective weaken the stability of a democratic society.4 Lipset offers two types reasons for loss of legitimacy. The first emerges while moving from aristocratic monarchies to democratic republics. By this, Lipset is referring to the loss of patriotism and nationalism due to the transition of government systems. The second emerges with how societies handle new groups integration into the political process.5 Lipset does not offer an account of how societies should handle group’s integration into the political process; however, he does claim that “citizenship” and “political equality” issues are one of the three major issues of Western states. The purpose of this paper is to examine the justness of institutions to highlight how political legitimacy functions in the justness of a democratic society. We must not forget, political legitimacy is a belief; a belief based on the perceived appropriateness of a political system. For example, suppose A believes that political system, P, is best for society, however, A lives in a society that practices race‐based slavery. It is widely considered that race‐based slavery is immoral, however, the immorality of the institutions which construct the belief does not hinder the fact that A believes in P. Therefore, the focus of my thinking is not to prescribe beliefs as just or unjust, as it is not relevant to my argument.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 87. 3
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 88. 4
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 88. 5
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Since it is thought that political legitimacy is what keeps democratic society stable, it is important to examine the institutions that produce the beliefs of political legitimacy and how political legitimacy functions in democratic society. It is important to note that I will understand a democratic society as Rawls does, as a fair system of cooperation between citizens who are regarded as free and equal.6 The basic structure for society is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation and the way they assign basic rights and duties to regulate the division of advantages that arise from social cooperation over time.7 A well‐ordered basic structure refers to political and social justice in terms of justice as fairness.8 Therefore, an unjust basic structure may lead to unregulated division of advantages within society. I’ll use a hypothetical situation to fully articulate the claim I wish to make. Suppose there is a democratic society where if one is convicted of a felony drug offense, one loses their right to vote. It is known that most felony drug offenses are likely to happen in concentrated areas of poverty and low‐levels of education. Neighborhoods where racial minorities tend to live have a higher chance of exposure to illegal drugs, provide a poor quality of education, and offer few good employment options. Conversely, middle‐class neighborhoods offer a high Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 5. 6
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 10. 7
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 8. 8
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quality of education and better employment opportunities than neighborhoods where racial minorities tend to live. The government does not distribute enough resources to neighborhoods to create equal educational and employment opportunities where racial minorities live. As a result there is a higher incarceration rate for racial minorities and a large portion of racial minorities are not allowed to vote. However, there is public belief in conception of justice in this democratic society, and therefore, it is commonly felt that one must be held accountable for their own decisions and hereby accept the penalty of violating the law. In virtue of this widespread belief in a conception of justice of the democratic society, there is a high sense of political legitimacy for the majority of citizens within this society. I do not wish to evaluate the justness of the belief. I use this example to highlight a scenario where there is widespread belief in the legitimacy of a democratic society, yet the institutions of this society are unjust. In this democratic society there is high economic development and high political legitimacy amongst the majority of citizens, however, the democratic society contains, what Rawls would characterize as, unjust basic structure.9 A well‐ordered basic structure, which regulates advantages over time due to social cooperation, would provide fair equal opportunity to education to those who are disadvantaged by their social status. In the scenario that I’ve provided, belief in the public conception of justice is more likely to politically alienate groups of citizens in virtue of their social status. This scenario fits into what Rawls suggest as one way a
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 52. 9
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society may be unjust; when the institutions have caused the prevailing ideal of justice to diverge from the professed ideal of justice.10 On this view, the professed conception of justice deviates from publicly recognized standards of justice.11 First, I will articulate Lipset’s argument of two basic characteristics of democratic societies: economic development and political legitimacy. Next, I will suggest that we ought to frame political legitimacy as an ideology. Then, I will offer a model of a society that has high political legitimacy yet enacts laws that alienate a group on the basis of social status. Finally, I will use Rawls’s first account of injustice to suggest that political legitimacy based on unjust institutions can serve to alienate members of society, which thereby constitutes an unjust democratic society. Justice as fairness has been criticized as being too egalitarian, however I do not intend on developing an ideal egalitarian society, as Rawls calls democratic perfection.12 My aim is to shine light on the theoretical issues modernization theory faces. Any institution – social, political, and economic – that inhibits an individual or group from participating in the political process is unfair, and is therefore unjust.13 According to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the social arrangement we participate in should be
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 309. 10
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 130. 11
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 16. 12
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 5. 13
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organized to give each of us a fair chance to flourish. Fair chance means ensuring that no citizen’s life prospects are diminished because the social scheme disadvantages him or her in ways that cannot be justified on impartial grounds.14 In order for there to be a just democratic society, there must be just and fair institutions in place which give a fair opportunity for an individual or group to participate in the political process. Economic Development and Political Legitimacy Modernization theory tends to give insights on how democratic societies come about. This is not the intention of Lipset’s paper. In “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” Lipset attempts to highlight social characteristics that stable democratic societies tend to have. By using these characteristics Lipset is able to group nations by “more democratic” and “less democratic”.15 It is important to understand what Lipset means when he uses the term “democracy” or “democratic society”. Lipset suggests that a democracy is a political system which allows for the changing of government officials and serves as a social mechanism for societal decision‐making based on majority public electing of political officials.16 There are three conditions that are implied within this definition of democracy: first, there are a set of beliefs which legitimize the Shelby, Tommie. "Justice, Deviance, And The Dark Ghetto." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2007, 126‐60. Accessed December 18, 2014. 130. 14
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 74. 15
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 71. 16
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political system and the political institutions; second, there are a set of leaders in the political office; and third, there is a set of political leaders who are not elected who serve as opposition to the incumbent officials.17 In virtue of Lipset’s first condition of democracy it is implied that he would agree that political legitimacy is a belief. The first social characteristic Lipset suggests is a requisite for democracy is economic development.18 There are four indicators of economic development: industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education.19 Since the focus of my argument is political legitimacy, I will not elaborate on the topic of economic development too much. Generally speaking, Lipset determines sociological indicators of economic development as industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education. For industrialization, Lipset measured the percentage of males working in agriculture.20 Urbanization was measured by the percentage of populations of 20,000 and over, the percentage of populations of 100,000 and over, and the percentage of populations living in standard metropolitan areas.21 Factors for measuring wealth included measuring per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle, number of persons per physician, and the Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 71. 17
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 75. 18
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 75. 19
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 78. 20
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 78. 21
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number of per radio, telephone, and newspapers per thousand persons.22 Education, Lipset suggests, is the strongest indicator of democracy.23 The higher a nation’s education level, the more likely the nation is to believe in democratic values and practices.24 The education of a population was calculated by measuring literacy and educational enrollment in primary, post‐ primary, and higher education.25 When nations score high rates in industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, they tend to carry on the political correlate of democracy.26 Political legitimacy is what stabilizes a democratic society.27 By “stabilizes”, Lipset means that which undermines social or political revolution or upheaval of the current political system. Political legitimacy is broken down into two categories: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness is defined as the actual performance of a political system which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 75. 22
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 79. 23
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 79. 24
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 79. 25
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 80. 26
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 86. 27
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armed forces.28 Legitimacy is defined as the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.29 For arguments sake, it is necessary to highlight the relationship between the notions of effectiveness and legitimacy with a conception of justice. A conception of justice is a set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and determining what may be considered the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.30 If political effectiveness is the ability of a political system to perform the basic functions of government, and the basic functions of government are grounded by principles of justice, than political effectiveness implies a publicly recognized political conception of justice. Likewise, if political legitimacy is the belief that existing political institutions are most proper for society, and political institutions are grounded by principles of justice, then political legitimacy implies a public recognized political conception of justice. Therefore, when the majority of a nation has high belief in political effectiveness and political legitimacy, it can be assumed that the majority of the nation shares a belief in a political conception of justice. Since the purpose of this paper is to highlight how political legitimacy functions in the justness of a democratic society, it is necessary introduce a theory of ideology. As stated Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 87. 28
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 1959, 87. 29
Remember for Rawls democratic society is a fair system of cooperation amongst citizens who view themselves as free and equal. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 5 30
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previously, political legitimacy is a widespread set of beliefs regarding the appropriateness of a political system. There are two types of uses of the term ideology, nonevaluative and evaluative.31 A nonevaluative usage of the term ideology serves as an explanatory and descriptive account of a set of beliefs.32 An evaluative usage of the term ideology subjects an ideology to negative criticism in an attempt to find grounds to reject it.33 As noted earlier, I do not wish to prescribe a belief as being just or unjust. I am only interested in the implications of interpreting political legitimacy as an ideology. For the remainder of this paper I will characterize political legitimacy as an ideology in the nonevaluative sense. Political Legitimacy as an Ideology Let’s refer back to the scenario that I mentioned earlier. There is a democratic society that has a high belief in political legitimacy. In this society there are strict drug enforcement laws where, if convicted, one may lose their right to vote. It is known that citizens who are convicted in violating these laws tend to be poorly educated and come from areas with high concentrated poverty. Lower‐class neighborhoods tend to be in areas that have a high exposure to illegal drugs, have failing public schools, and have poor job opportunities. Conversely, there are middle‐class neighborhoods that have medial exposure to illegal drugs, fairly successful public schools, and tend to have good job opportunities. Citizens who live in these lower‐class
31
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 156.
32
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 156.
33
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 157.
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neighborhoods are more likely to be convicted of drug crimes than people who live in middle‐ class neighborhoods. The conviction rate of citizens in lower‐class neighborhoods has been high for a long period of time; however, the government has not allocated enough resources to positively change or influence the socioeconomic conditions of lower‐class neighborhoods. There is a high belief in political legitimacy, or belief in the public conception of justice, therefore, there is public belief in conception of justice in this democratic society. It is commonly felt that one must be held accountable for their decisions and hereby accept the penalty of violating the law. Before discussing the function of political legitimacy in this scenario, I will first make a remark on basic structure. Rawls suggests that democratic society is a fair system of cooperation amongst citizens who view each other as free and equal.34 Even in a society with free trade and fair agreements, one must consider the social conditions that are the background to these agreements. As a result of social cooperation, economic status inherited by birth strongly determines the life trajectory of the citizen; creating social disadvantages of fair equal opportunity for those who are not born with prominent economic status. A just basic structure abides by two principles of fairness to regulate any unfair disadvantages for those who are least‐off in society.
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 5. 34
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The public conception of justice, in the scenario postulated above, endorses a political system that is more likely to eliminate the political participation of a group. However, the enacted law is more likely to convict groups on the basis of social status; a socioeconomic status that is acquired at birth and will likely stay with the subject until the end of the subject’s life. In this political system, there exists an enacted law that directly affects citizens’ life‐ prospects based on social status. If social status influences the life trajectory of a citizen, then Rawls first principle of justice (basic equal liberties) has been violated, deeming this law unjust.35 This law is deemed unjust in virtue of unjust institutions. We must not forget that the public conception of justice is quite different than the concept of justice. A conception of justice may be a publicly accepted principle(s) of justice.36 There may be different conceptions of justice that still abide by the objective concept of justice; an example being that there cannot be a form of justice that assigns basic rights and duties on the basis of natural endowment.37 I make this distinction between the concept of justice and a conception of justice to enforce my claim that political legitimacy, as viewed as a conception of justice, is a widespread set of beliefs. Most consider an ideology to be a set of beliefs.38 A
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 42. 35
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 4. 36
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 5. 37
38
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 157.
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“belief” is considered a mental representation that expresses knowledge about how the world should or ought to be.39 Rawls suggests that a public conception of justice serves to promote civic friendship and a shared pursuit of justice as an end.40 Citizens are to comply with just laws that are enacted under a just constitution.41 Rawls offers two accounts of injustice. The first is when the social arrangements differ from the just basic structure of society. Shelby clarifies this statement as when a society fails to live up to its professed ideals, however the professed ideals are worthy of public recognition.42 The second is when the social arrangements conform to the public conception of justice; however, the public conception of justice is deeply flawed or clearly unjust.43 The scenario that I’ve given above is accounted for in Rawls’s first account of injustice. The public conception of justice in a democratic society that enacts laws which are more likely to convict citizens based on social status is certainly questionable, but due to the problems of critiquing ideology, the public conception of justice in my argument will remain value‐neutral. The subject of my criticism is solely focused on the justness of institutions and how political legitimacy functions in
39
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 157.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 5. 40
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 308. 41
Shelby, Tommie. "Justice, Deviance, And The Dark Ghetto." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2007, 157. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 309. 42 43
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democratic society. How is it that the public conception of justice can diverge from its professed ideals? Institutions and Legitimacy Rawls offers an idea on reasonable pluralism which gives insight on answering these difficult questions. Reasonable pluralism acknowledges that fact that citizens in a democratic society do hold different religious and philosophical conceptions of the world.44 The fact of reasonable pluralism makes a unified affirmation of a public conception of justice impossible. An overlapping general consensus of the public conception of justice is reasonably supported across different religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.45 Public justification of the public conception of justice allows a society to cooperate justly and to justify political judgments.46 Assuming that public justification is a requisite to justifying political judgements, we must consider who the society is considering “public”. A public conception of justice that is more likely to politically alienate a group in virtue of their social status cannot be reasonably accepted by the politically alienated group. I mean “politically alienated” to describe the process of being denied political participation. To justify this claim, Rawls offers five kinds of primary goods that are needed by citizens in order to be fully cooperating members of society.47 Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 3. 44
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 32. 45
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 27. 46
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To affirm a conception of justice that alienates the affirmer, in virtue of their social status, violates the social bases of self‐respect. Social bases of self‐respect in this regard is meant as the public recognition that citizens are free and equal persons that have equal basic rights.48 If a citizen views themselves as a free and equal member of a society, then one must reject a public conception of justice that is more likely to alienate them from the political process in virtue of their social status. Affirming this public conception of justice contradicts the social bases of self‐ respect. We now begin to see how a society may begin to diverge from its professed ideals of justice. Politically alienated groups, who regard themselves as free and equal citizens in a society, must reject the public conception of justice as described above. The principles of this rejection are based on the failure of institutions to regulate citizens’ shares of primary goods. This conclusion is not premised on the perceived justness (or unjustness) of the public conception of justice. In a society that abides by principles of fairness as the conception of justice, a just basic structure is meant to be that which regulates the disadvantaged caused by social cooperation. Therefore, a just basic structure obligates institutions to regulate citizens’ shares of primary goods in virtue of the principle of fair equality of opportunity (e.g., education).49 On this perspective, because the institutions of society have failed to regulate the
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 58. 47
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 60. 48
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citizens’ shares of primary goods the public conception of justice begins to diverge from its professed ideals; that being, viewing members of society as free and equal citizens. Another primary good of citizens is the freedom of thought and liberty of conscience.50 Citizens in a fair democratic society have the basic right to hold beliefs. Remember, a “belief” is considered a mental representation that expresses knowledge about how the world should or ought to be.51 This notion is directly compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism and democratic society. Reasonable pluralism is a permanent characteristic of democratic society, therefore to attempt to reject a belief in a democratic society seems to contradict the notion of democracy. Conclusion Political legitimacy and political effectiveness are publicly recognized conceptions of justice. In a democratic society, political legitimacy is argued to be that which stabilizes society. When the institutions of a democratic society are unjust, political legitimacy functions quite differently than previously thought. When the institutions of a democratic society are unjust,
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 59. 49
Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 44., Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 53. 50
51
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 157.
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the public conception of justice, or political legitimacy, legitimates a public standard of justice that diverges from the ideals of the professed conception of justice. The public conception of justice does not fairly hold all members of society as free and equal citizens when the institutions of society are unjust. Another primary good of citizens is the freedom of thought and liberty of conscience.52 Citizens in a fair democratic society have the basic right to hold beliefs. Remember, a “belief” is considered a mental representation that expresses knowledge about how the world should or ought to be.53 This notion is directly compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism and democratic society. Reasonable pluralism is a permanent characteristic of democratic society, therefore to attempt to reject a belief in a democratic society seems to contradict the notion of democracy. It is interesting to investigate how public conceptions of justice are made public. How is it that a conception of justice becomes the dominant ideology of justice? This may offer insight to formation of hegemonic groups and characteristics of oppressive regimes.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 53. 52
53
Shelby, Tommie. "Ideology, Racism, And Critical Social Theory." The Philosophical Forum, 2003: 157.
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