Considering Extra-Linguistic Factors in Clear Language

Beyond Words: Considering Extra-linguistic Factors in Clear Language
"The great enemy of clear language is insincerity […] when there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims" (Orwell). These thoughtful words of George Orwell resonate with many even now. Perhaps because they are full of hope, as they paint an ideal picture of man's "good will" purifying and perfecting the flawed bridge connecting man's minds called language. Indeed, as John Goldsmith said, one should believe, to the best of his efforts, in the "good will" of people who express their thoughts (Goldsmith). But is good will enough? Even when a man tries his utmost to speak or write as sincere and clear as possible, it is not certain that his real thoughts and intents would then be communicated fully to his listener. Though language is often considered natural to man, it is also considered naturally imperfect as a vehicle for his thoughts and intents. This long-debated philosophical issue of perfect communication, among various approaches, can be viewed from a linguistic angle. This paper will examine euphemisms, performatives, and literature translations in the extreme cases of cross-cultural comparisons, to show that one reason for this language problem is simply that words alone are not enough. Euphemisms reveal the layers hiding meaning, performatives reveal the foundations establishing meaning, and both phenomena are demonstrated in the fundamentally imprecise process of translating literature.
One reason words are insufficient is that there are societal influences that layer over intended meaning. This is exemplified by a cross-cultural comparison of euphemisms. Euphemisms as a linguistic as well as an extra-linguistic area of research is not a recent development; these expressions are popularly described as "the means by which a disagreeable, offensive or fear-instilling matter is designated with an indirect or softer term […] a speaker constantly resorts to euphemisms in order to disguise an unpleasant truth, veil an offense, or palliate indecency" (Kany). In her 2010 article "Cultural differences in Chinese and English euphemisms", Guo Qi presents a contrastive analysis illustrating societal influences on euphemistic expressions in spite of universal features. She states that there are universal motivations for the use of euphemisms, such as to avoid taboo, to be polite, and to disguise. Besides motivations, there are also shared principles in the formation of euphemisms, and similar classifications of euphemisms. However, her cross-cultural comparison then showed that, despite a universal core, euphemisms are ultimately "a cultural phenomenon" (Guo): Chinese euphemisms for aging contained honorifics and positive connotations, both of which were generally lacking in English euphemisms; euphemisms for death revealed the vast differences in religious ideas and social stratifications, in the contrasting societies of Chinese users and English users. Evidently, "people with different cultural backgrounds would not deal with the same issue in exactly the same way" (Guo). And variations in euphemistic expressions have their roots in extra-linguistic factors such as cultural ideas, religious ideas, and other societal influences on the individuals in the society.
Guo's findings can then be interpreted in the following way. Euphemisms have a universal core, containing similar motivations, criteria, and functions; but such a core is hidden under layers of cultural ideas, religious ideas, and other societal influences that, when there are cultural differences, there appear to be differences in the meaning of euphemistic expressions. A Chinese euphemism for aging and an English euphemism for aging may bloom from the same seed of meaning, motivation, function; but there are such vast differences between the societies of Chinese users and English users that the euphemisms in the two languages consequently appear to have two separate meanings. This key point about euphemism reveals something about language as a whole, too. Why is it that sincere, clear language from a man of good will is not enough? Intended meanings of words may actually be hidden behind layers of societal influences, and in the case of euphemisms the influences are cultural and religious ideas. And when unbeknownst to the listener, the words of the speaker may well be vastly misunderstood, as when a Chinese user tries to understand an English euphemism with no knowledge of the societal influences on the English user. In this way, words alone are not enough. Euphemisms reveal that one criteria of perfect communication is for the listener to have perfect knowledge of the societal influences hiding the intended meanings of the speaker's words.
Performatives, another category of expressions, will be also examined, to show how the meanings of words can be established by social agreements in society. Explicit performative utterances, simply "performatives", are commonly defined as an utterance that is "not 'true or false'" but "is, or is part of, the doing of an action", thus creating enduring effects by being uttered "in the appropriate circumstances" (Austin). Asif Agha examines such circumstances in his 2006 book, Language and Social Relations. To illustrate "the role of culture-internal enregisterment in shaping performative effects" (Agha), he contrasts performatives in English with those in Ilongot:

The table shows how explicit performatives create different social effects in Ilongot compared to in English, despite having similar linguistic structures in both languages. A good example of this is the comparison of directives. Their uses in English are narrow and strict and according to institution-specific status, but in Ilongot they are much more varied and widely seen - Ilongot directives are appropriate even in the everyday family setting. Agha thus observes that "explicit performative utterances cannot be understood by attending only to its locution-internal metapragmatic frame" (Agha), i.e. the structure of the words. He elaborates that this "internal" structure is "neither necessary nor sufficient for construing [performative] effects"; as seen in the English-Ilongot comparison, a certain kind of structure is neither necessary nor sufficient to effectively establish a certain kind of social effect. There are extra-linguistic factors that must be in place, most obviously, "particular institutionalized practices" such as "named institutions" like the Church or Common Law, or the less-recognized conventions "not easily described in decontextualized ways by members of society" (Agha).
Essentially, what is clear is that the very power of performatives comes not from any feature of the words, be it word choice or word structure. It is the social agreements – institutions, socially accepted conventions – that give force to the performatives. Thus, what is meant by "culture-internal enregisterment" is that performatives are only viable within a culture of social agreements, on which the words of the utterances establish their meaning. This key point is simply a small analogy for the workings of language as a whole. Again, why is it that a man trying his best to speak sincere, clear words is not enough? The linguistic meanings of words can be detached from any feature of the words, and fused instead with the institutions and conventions of the society. It is not enough for the speaker to use his words plainly and thoughtfully; just as the structures of the performatives contribute only to a certain extent to its social effect, the structure of the speaker's words is significant only to a certain extent to conveying his full thoughts and ideas. In this way, words alone are not enough. Performatives reveal that another criterion of perfect communication is that the listener must have perfect knowledge of the social agreements establishing the linguistic meanings of the speaker's words.
Thus far, this paper has argued that societal influences do layer over meaning and meaning can be established on social agreements. So to grasp full linguistic meaning intended by the speaker, the listener needs perfect knowledge of the societal influences and social agreements that shape the speaker's words. The two phenomena, and the criteria they consequently reveal, help to understand why communication is fundamentally imperfect and imprecise, as in the process of translating literature. Translation will now be examined to illustrate this interaction.
Translation theories generally describe the process as a continuum; one extreme is "source-oriented copying" i.e. conveying the writer's thoughts in the text as originally as possible, and the other extreme is "target-oriented rhetoric" i.e. making the reader understand the text as best as possible by changing it to suit the reader (Chesterman). Evidently, translation is a "basically imprecise" process of "trial and error" (Eco), as Umberto Eco stated in his 1994 article "A rose by any other name". Eco gives Classical Greek texts as an example of source-oriented translation: "in order to comprehend it at all, the modern reader must understand what the poets of that age were like and how they might express themselves" (Eco). This suggests that source-oriented translation is aimed at texts in which there are clearly societal influences layer over the writer's meaning. Little to no change is necessary ("copying") because the reader of Classical Greek can uncover a large portion of meaning by simply understanding more about the cultural ideas, religious ideas and other societal influences of in the Greek writer's life. Target-oriented translation stands in contrast. Eco describes two instances in which his own works underwent this contrasting type of translation: a change from an allusion to Italian poetry to an allusion to a Keats sonnet, and a deletion of a pun that is only understandable in Italian (Eco). Such notable changes to the text are necessary in some cases, because the linguistic meaning is established on, and thus virtually inseparable, from conventions of society. A target-oriented translation may thus be done when a direct copying of the original text is difficult to understand, even after the reader takes steps to understand the society. Certainly, source and target orientation is not an either-or dilemma but is a continuum. And in the same way, the relationship between meaning and extra-linguistic factors is qualitative, affecting the texts in ways that are not either/or.
This ambiguity is best seen in Eco's example of reading translated Japanese haiku. On the one hand, he wonders skeptically, "What I am really reading, when I look at the translation of a Japanese poem" (Eco). At the same time, he knows, "If I read a haiku after having read some Zen Buddhist koans, I can perhaps understand why the simple mention of the moon high over the lake should give me emotions analogous to and yet different from those that an English romantic poet conveys to me" (Eco). There is this core emotion that he begins to grasp after learning more about Zen Buddhism. The intended meaning of the haiku is somewhat layered over by Japanese religious ideas, and he does uncover some meaning by penetrating through these layers; this meaning seems "analogous" to the emotions he uncovers from English romantic poetry. At the same time, it is "different". Some of the haiku meaning is undeniably established on aspects of Japanese society, and romantic poetry of its respective society; the linguistic meaning is inseparable from the conventions of society. In light of this, one can better understand the impreciseness of translation: it is not always clear whether a source-oriented or a target-oriented approach should be used, since it is not always clear whether a text's meaning is simply layered over by societal influences, or is inseparably established on conventions of society.
Like three mouse holes in a house, euphemisms and performatives and literature translation each reveal how meaning in language is not conveyed by words alone. Words alone are not enough, because there can be societal influences layering over intended meanings, and there can be institutions and conventions on which the linguistic meanings are established. Both of these phenomena are seen in the translation of literature, demonstrating how the phenomena are not separate or exclusive, but can actually occur in tandem. So then, thinking back to Orwell's words, how do we respond to such calls for sincere, clear language? It is important to remember that the responsibility is not simply on the speaker to be sincere and clear. These two phenomena are reminders that it is also important to consider the position of the listener. Does he have knowledge of relevant societal influences? Of relevant social agreements? What would he know, and not know? Clear language, then, is not just sincerity on the speaker's part. It is also considering these questions concerning the listener, these things beyond the words. Clear language is not just the right use of words, because words alone are not enough.


Works Cited
Agha, Asif. Language and Social Relations. No. 24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Austin, John Langshaw. How To Do Things With Words. Vol. 1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Chesterman, Andrew. Memes of Translation: The Spread of Ideas in Translation Theory. Vol. 22. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1997.

Eco, Umberto. "A Rose by any other name." Guardian Weekly 17 (1994).

Goldsmith, John. "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly." Course lecture. University of Chicago. 25 Feb. 2014.

Guo, Qi. "Cultural differences in Chinese and English euphemisms." Cross-Cultural Communication 6.4 (2011): 135-141.

Kany, Charles Emil. American-Spanish Euphemisms. California: University of California Press, 1960.

Orwell, George. Politics and the English language. London: Penguin UK, 2013.

Searle, John R. "Indirect speech acts." Syntax and Semantics 3 (1975): 59-82.

Chiu 1




Language of the indigenous Ilongot people of northern Luzon, Philippines, spoken by about 50,000 people.
This is most obvious when examining implicit performatives, or "indirect speech acts". John Searle gives an example: "X: Let's go to the movies tonight Y: I have to study for an exam" (Searle). Person Y's utterance has the performative effect of refusing X's offer, despite there being no observable structure that identifies the utterance as a performative.