CON COM Digest

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISION CASES LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G. R. NO. L-69137) FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s title. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.

MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills, respondents. ALEX DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation. miso On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract; (b) bad faith falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to disqualify

MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to Cocochem.[1] On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices. spped On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction.[2] On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied. The Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding that the present controversy involved breach of contract as he also took into account the circumstance that petitioner had already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila-Br. 15, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days from notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998.[3] miso Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in dismissing his complaint. He submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG[4] and Republic v. Sandiganbayan[5] have declared that the coconut levy funds are public funds then, conformably with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,[6] corporations formed and organized from those funds or whose controlling stocks are from those funds should be regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary,[7] it follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Sdaadsc Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his complaint refers to a breach of contract is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible amounting to a total disregard of its main point, i. e., whether private respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when they entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly disadvantageous to the government in general and to the CIIF in particular. Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its rules in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a matter of days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed the complaint. Rtcspped Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that they are not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel. They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he

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had similarly filed a case for collection of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.

as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fiftyone (51) percent of its capital stock. Sclaw

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal indictment of private respondents. spped

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.[15] Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction. Sclex

We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. COCOFED v. PCGG referred to in Republic v. Sandiganbayan reviewed the history of the coconut levy funds. I These funds actually have four (4) general classes: (a) the Coconut Investment Fund created under R. A. No. 6260;[8] (b) the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276;[9] (c) the Coconut Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No. 582;[10] and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 1841.[11] The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21 October of that year, P. D. No. 961[12] was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P. D. No. 1468[13] by inserting a new provision authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment and operation of industries x x x commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to coconut and other palm oil indust(ries)."[14] From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased. miso We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the Government. These funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply. Korte But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable

With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner. A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive Secretary v. Gordon[16] is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages. miso WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

FRANCISCA S. BALUYOT, petitioner, vs. PAUL E. HOLGANZA and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) represented by its Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ARTURO C. MOJICA, Director VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, and Graft Investigation Officer I ANNA MARIE P. MILITANTE, respondents. DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Orders dated August 21, 1998 and October 28, 1998 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively.1âwphi1.nêt The facts are: During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Francisca S. Baluyot, was held accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, on January 8, 1998, private respondent Paul E. Holganza, in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit-complaint1 before the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was docketed as OMB-VISCRIM-98-0022. However, upon recommendation by respondent Anna Marie P. Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened against petitioner; hence, OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0063.2

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On February 6, 1998, public respondent issued an Order3 requiring petitioner to file her counter-affidavit to the charges of malversation and dishonesty within ten days from notice, with a warning that her failure to comply would be construed as a waiver on her part to refute the charges, and that the case would be resolved based on the evidence on record. On March 14, 1998, petitioner filed her counter-affidavit,4 raising principally the defense that public respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued that the Ombudsman had authority only over government-owned or controlled corporations, which the PNRC was not, or so she claimed. On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first assailed Order5 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It further scheduled a clarificatory hearing on the criminal aspect of the complaint and a preliminary conference on its administrative aspect on September 2, 1998. Petitioner received the order on August 26, 1998 and she filed a motion for reconsideration6 the next day. On October 28, 1998, public respondent issued the second assailed Order7 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse. We dismiss the petition. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the private character of the organization: (1) the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the government, and that all money given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization; (2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its properties; and (3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based organization, and that the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General by virtue of Section "G", Article IX of its by-laws.8 She threatens that "to classify the PNRC as a government-owned or controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose its neutrality, independence and impartiality . . . .9 Practically the same issue was addressed in Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.,10 where an almost identical set of facts obtained. Petitioner therein was the administrator of the Surigao del Norte chapter of the PNRC. An audit conducted by a field auditor revealed a shortage in the chapter funds in the sum of P109,000.00. When required to restitute the amount of P135,927.78, petitioner therein instead applied for early retirement, which was denied by the Secretary General of the PNRC. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against PNRC before the National Labor Relations Commission. In turn, PNRC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, averring that PNRC was a government corporation whose employees are embraced by civil service regulation. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint, and the Commission sustained his order. The petitioner assailed the dismissal of his complaint via a petition for certiorari, contending that the PNRC is a private organization and not a governmentowned or controlled corporation. In dismissing the petition, we ruled thus: Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its

employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its existing lottery draws for blood program. Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit: Sec. 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.11 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, G. R. NO. 95445, AUGUST 6, 1991 FACTS: The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands. No response was made by the respondent Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on September, 17,1990. September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the right to strike. 2. Whether or not the Court should take cognizance of the case. RULING: 1. No, the petitioners don’t have the right to strike. this court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. The court also found out that it was prima facie lawful and within his statutory authority for the respondent Secretary of Education to

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take the actions complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work order, prefer administrative charges against, and place under preventive suspension, those who failed to comply with said order, and dismiss from the service those who failed to answer or controvert the charges. 2. No, This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court, especially when numerous parties desperately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief. WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of. The motions to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement as to costs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM VS THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 85279, JULY 28, 1989 FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. HELD:

No, the court resided on the intent on the framers of the constitution that “When we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union”. Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to SelfOrganization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

BITONIO, JR. VS COA, G.R. NO. 147392, MARCH 12, 2004 FACTS: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. He was designated by Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his designation, he receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. On July 31, 1998, COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment due to the principle established in Civil Liberties case stating that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefore is unconstitutional. On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to the COA on the following grounds: 1. The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for clarification filed by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition; 2. Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to receive per diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final. In expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case. The motion was denied by COA, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

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RULING: YES. The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better right than his principal. The contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since such law was amended by RA 8748 where provisions in conflict with the law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.

CAYETANO VS. MONSOD, 201 SCRA 210 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several

followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

CANISOCA VS. COMELEC, DEC. 5, 1997 FACTS: RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes[1] Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually received; (d) control data of the election returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.

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Indeed, the grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration of failure of election. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, reads: Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those enumerated. ISSUES: Whether or not the petition should be heard first by a division of COMELEC, and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution. RULING: No, the petition can be heard by the COMELEC en banc invoking Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc: Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. - (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying or election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed x x x x (h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

We have already disposed of this issue in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections [11] thus should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.

ARUELO, JR. VS. CA, 227 SCRA 311 Facts: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer. Issue: whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the fiveday period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure Held: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less votes than he actually received. But he did not raise any objection before the Municipal Board of Canvassers; instead, he went directly to the COMELEC. He now claims, after the COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition, that it was error on the part of COMELEC to rule on his petition while sitting en banc.

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NPC VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 3 consolidated petitions, with the common question: the constitutionality of §11(b), of RA6646 Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. (I will refer to these folks as Petitoners (P)) Facts: Petitioners’ argument: • That §11(b), of RA6646 invades and violated the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression; • That the prohibition imposed by §11(b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election pd. of 1992; • That the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues; • That §11(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and tv broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of info concerning candidates and issues in the election, thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to info and opinion. Issue: WON §11(b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond the permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech & freedom of the press SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Ratio: The assailed statute • The statutory text the P want to strike down as unconstitutional is §11(b) of RA 6646, aka the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 Section 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda-in addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful; (b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or personality who is candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. • §11(b) of RA 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 & 92 of BP 881 aka Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. (for the full text, see p. 7) §90 refers to the “Comelec space”- space in the newspaper to be allocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of coverage, free of charge §92 refers to the “Comelec time” air time in radio and tv to be allocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of coverage, free of charge. Objective of the statute • Objective of §11(b)-to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the rich from enjoying undue advantage offered by huge campaign “war chests.”

• It prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time “for campaign or other political purposes” except to Comelec. • §90&92 of the OEC on the other hand, require the Comelec to procure Comelec space and Comelec time to be allocated to all candidates for free. • No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by §11(b) of RA 6646 in relation to §90&92 of the OEC. • The objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of the society. • It is important to note, that the objective, is not only a legitimate one, it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Art. IX(C)(4) of the 1987 Consti.

Art. IX-C, Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, and equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Flores vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484 Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679? Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive

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appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional. GARCES VS. CA 259 SCRA 99 FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant. Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy. Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled. Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy. The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.” In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” *Petition denied PHIL. AIRLINES VS. COA, 245 SCRA 39 Facts: PAL is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, principally engaged in the air transport business, both domestic and international. At the time of the filing of the petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of stock was owned by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government corporation. To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a system of bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL awarded to the lowest bidder sixty percent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the second lowest bidder the remaining forty percent(40%), provided it matched the price of the lowest bidder. Petron, Caltex, Shell were usual bidders COA told PAL to stop the bidding and only get from Petron Based on DO 19 requiring GOCC to only get from Petron PAL sought reconsideration, saying DO 19 should not include PAL because: Bidding ensured the best fuel price Petron alone might not be sufficient for PAL’s fuel needs COA denied. Told PAL to just negotiate with Petron. Hence, petitioner.

CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court? HELD: No. The case is cognizable in the RTC. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides: “Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

Issue: Whether or not DO 19 should cover PAL Decision: SC ruled that: DO 19 really included PAL (GSIS owns stocks) HOWEVER, COA committed GADALEJ in not exempting PAL The reasons that PAL gave were really persuasive. They had more weight than the policy enunciated in DO 19. It was COA’s duty to exempt PAL because not exempting PAL would lead to unnecessary spending – the very evil sought to be prevented by the creation of COA Department Order 19 required all GOCCs to get their fuel from Petron. In the case of PAL v. COA, COA ordered PAL to follow DO 19 The very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA the irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures of the government. Thus, it has the power and the duty to exempt certain

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branches from any regulation if, obedience to it would lead to those kinds of excessive expenditures. Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's shares of stock were bidded out early this year, resulting in the acquisition by PR Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% PAL's outstanding stocks. PAL having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA.. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become moot and academic. Had it not been for this supervening event, PAL would have obtained the relief sought in the instant petition. For although COA was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom. The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The authority granted under this constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. NATIONAL HOUSING CORP. VS. COA, 226 SCRA 55 Facts: The Philippine Government forged an agreement on financial cooperation with the Republic of Germany. The agreement involved the Republic of the Philippines as “Borrower” and the National Housing Authority (NHA) as “Project Sponsor”, and the Kreditanstalt Fur Weidaraufbau (KWF) as the lender, for the Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II. However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled. Thus an extension of the contract was made since the NHA did not appear to have much choice. Several extensions were made which triggered the difficulties experienced by NHA. Issue: WON the COA has authority to disallow a duly entered contract and substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of the management or governing body of government entities

LUEGO VS. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment. Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Decision: The COA has been enshrined by the government with powers to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." It has been recognized in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. COA, that COA has authority to disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures. The nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-Dagatan project does not require the expertise of a foreign consultant and that the finishing stage merely requires simple advisory services that can be undertaken by NHA or DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. Our Constitution prohibits unnecessary expenses of public funds. The postulates of our Constitution are not mere platitudes, which we should honor only in rhetorics but not in reality. The power to contract a foreign loan does not carry with it the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.

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