CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW

Tian Shan Policy Center

CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW

Volume 2

Issue 2 1

June 2016

CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW

EDITOR Nicholas J. Mazik

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Franco Galdini, Steven C. Kassel, Daniele Rumolo

CONTRIBUTORS Paul Christian Sander, Philipp Lottholz, Chiara Pierobon, Sandro Knezović and Antonela Franković, Lucio Valerio Sarandrea

MISSION The Central Asia Policy Review is an English-language on-line publication of the Tian Shan Policy Center of the American University of Central Asia dedicated to promoting dialogue and raising awareness on relevant issues in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia on human rights, good governance, sustainable development, migration and social protection. Contributions to the Central Asia Policy Review are encouraged from local, regional and international experts, professors, students, as well as alumni of the American University of Central Asia and other Universities of or with a focus on Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. Representatives of local institutions, civil society organisations, regional and international organisations are also encouraged to contribute. The Central Asia Policy Review aims at addressing issues of public interest with the aim of furthering support for the democratic development of Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring countries, as well as for enhanced compliance with human rights obligations and principles in an inclusive manner.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Contributors shall submit articles to the following email address: [email protected]. An article’s ideal length will be between 1,000 and 2,500 words, including a 100 word abstract. The articles should include a brief introduction to the subject at hand, an analytical section, and policy recommendations to foster dialogue and discussion. The Editor and the Editorial Committee reserve the right to decide whether to publish or edit the article in accordance with the internal publication guidelines of the Tian Shan Policy Center. By submitting the article, the author agrees to its publication and to relinquish his/her copyrights to the Tian Shan Policy Center. Unless otherwise stated in written form by the Editorial Committee, no honorarium will be paid for the contributions.

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CONTENT OF THE ISSUE Page #4 Foreign policy, reforms, and inclusive participation in public life By the Editorial Committee Page #5 Beyond Geopolitics: Foreign Policy and Regime Strategy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 1991 - 2012 By Paul Christian Sander Page #11 The European Union and the empowerment of Civil Society in Kazakhstan: an evaluation of the EIDHR and NSA/LA By Chiara Pierobon Page #16 Comparative analysis of implementation of security reform in Kyrgyzstan and Croatia By Sandro Knezović and Antonella Franković Page #21 Police reform in Kyrgyzstan: Introducing community security mechanisms to deliver fundamental change? By Philipp Lottholtz Page #28 Glocalizing the Rule of law and Developing a Kyrgyzstan-based Index By Lucio Valerio Sarandrea

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FOREIGN POLICY, REFORMS, AND INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE By The Editorial Committee

Dear Readers, Thank you to all of you who have made the Central Asia Policy Review a success. Contributing to, reading, discussing, criticizing and building the publication are all equally important parts. Without any one element, the goal of the CAPR could not be achieved. The objective of CAPR is to provide a platform for students, experts, researchers, PhD candidates, activists, and writers with an interest in human rights, governance, and the environment in Central Asia to promote discussions and dialogue in an inclusive manner. The free discussion on numerous topics found in these pages is intended to educate, provoke and confound. As always, the individual authors and the editorial committee of the CAPR welcome your comments, questions and criticisms. The last few years have seen admissions into the Eurasian Economic Union, the expansion of NGO operations and constitutional changes all over Central Asia, to name but a few milestone events. This is a very interesting time to be studying the region. The CAPR is delighted to bring together some of the brightest minds on the continent and some of the most talented experts in the covered fields to provide our readers with research and analysis that makes a difference. In this issue, published in the summer of 2016, Paul Christian Sander continues his comprehensive examination of political influences in Central Asia by discussing the post-Soviet power structures in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Next, Chiara Pierobon dissects the successes and challenges of EU investments in Kazakh civil society projects. Sandro Knezović and Antonela Franković team up to provide guidance on Kyrgyz security sector reform, based upon the recent Croatian experience. Philipp Lottholz moves that historical discussion on security sector reform into 2016 with an indepth analysis of contemporary police reform efforts in Kyrgyzstan. Lastly, Lucio Valerio Sarandrea then provides a fresh and upbeat view on successful rule of law implementation strategies. We invite you to submit your articles for Volume 2, Issue 3, of the Central Asia Policy Review by August 31, 2016. Our appreciation for your efforts and insights has never been greater, and we look forward to more learning and collaborating in the next issue. The Editorial Committee remains available for further discussions and clarifications at the email address [email protected] or at the new campus of the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek (office 235).

 

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BEYOND GEOPOLITICS: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIME STRATEGY IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN 1991-2011 By Paul Christian Sander Within the geopolitical setting of Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the regional giants vie for ascendancy. They dispose of a lot more power than their neighbors Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, as each of them has a population and gross national product exceeding those of the three smaller states combined. In both states, strong presidents are the primary director of foreign policy, whose common objectives initially have been the consolidation of power and the defense of their country’s sovereignty, thus creating the necessary basis for their pursuit of greater regional ambitions. But despite the fact that these two regional powers have shared some very similar foreign policy goals, their international postures and foreign policy identities have shaped up quite differently since the early 1990s.

past, accommodate the identities of majority and minority ethnic groups, and rationalize the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Beyond that, such ideology had to reflect upon the country’s posture within the new international order. Following this assumption, the present paper shall demonstrate how leaders in both states subordinate foreign policy to the overriding goal of maintaining power. The nature of their country’s relationship with foreign countries serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the ideologies they promoted, and their dominant positions within the state. In order to account for the different, and at times opposing, international postures adopted by the two countries since the mid-1990s, we need to look beyond geopolitics and to the domestic and ideational realms of foreign policy.

This is to a large degree due to the two states’ very different internal threat perceptions based on the different geopolitical implications the post-Soviet international order implied for each of them, and the material distribution of power within their immediate neighborhood. However, as the present paper will argue, this rather simplistic structuralist perspective on foreign policy neglects an important dimension of national interest formation. Definitions of national interest are shaped not only by power and structure, but also by identity, norms, and other social and cultural variables.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: The Dialectics of Foreign Policy and Regime Security in Central Asia’s Heartland Kazakhstan In 1991, it was hard to imagine that the newly independent Kazakhstan would so rapidly establish itself as a significant actor in international affairs. In the wake of independence, the landlocked country had virtually no direct links with the world beyond the Soviet frontier. The basic physical infrastructure for such contacts had to be set in place at the same time that the new state was developing the human resources to conduct foreign relations. But Kazakhstan made rapid progress in both areas and by the mid-1990s, had established reciprocal trade and diplomatic ties with over one hundred foreign countries. It has also been engaged in a bewildering range of partnerships, initiatives and projects around the world. The engagement in a wide range of international organizations,

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had inherited statehood as a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse in late 1991, and their political leaders quickly realized that they had to develop a national ideology that would s o l i d i f y p e o p l e ’s r e c o g n i t i o n o f independent post-Soviet statehood and their own leadership. Such an ideology had to make sense of the complex Soviet 5

reaching from regional integration projects, to U.S. dominated institutions of the Bretton Woods system, U.N. agencies and the Organization for the Islamic Conference, gave Kazakhstan international standing.

visit to Kazakhstan led to the signing of energy deals worth 30 billion USD, including China National Petroleum Corporation’s acquisition of an 8.3 per cent stake in Kashagan, the largest oilfield in the world outside the Middle East. In 2014, China’s trade with the region reached 50 billion USD, a figure that exceeded that of Russia for the first time. Yet, as the author suggested in the previous issue, the value of Chinese investment for the diversification of the economy is subject to dispute among the Kazakh elites. Skeptics suggest China restricts the Central Asian economies to the role of producers and exporters of primary resources.

This multi-vector foreign policy was due t o K a z a k h s t a n ’s s t r o n g e c o n o m i c dependence on resource exports. As a matter of national survival, Kazakhstan had to diversify diplomatic relations, to develop alternative trade routes and to gain access to new foreign markets. Three bilateral key relationships lie at the heart of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy: with the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. By maintaining a friendly but firm and evenhanded stance towards these great powers, Kazakhstan has been able to maximize investment flows, while at the same time ensuring that potential predatory advances from any one of them will be blocked by the others. This in turn safeguards Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, as well as its political and economic independence.

Similar balancing acts could have been observed also by the way Kazakhstan built its security alliances. During the color revolutions of the early 2000s, U.S. – Uzbekistani relations began to deteriorate. In 2005, several hundred people fell victim to bloody clashes between protestors and security forces in Andijan province. When facing demands for international investigation into the events, Karimov evicted U.S. troops from a military base at Karshi-Khanabad. Since then, Kazakhstan has taken Uzbekistan's place as the favored security partner in Central Asia for both Russia and the United States.

The U.S. oil company Chevron became the first major investor in Kazakhstan in 1993 with the establishment of the Tengiz Chevroil joint venture. In 2008, in order to encourage closer ties with Europe, as well as to prepare the ground for its chairmanship of the OSCE(2010), Kazakhstan inaugurated a special state program entitled “Path to Europe.” This aimed to promote co-operation in such spheres as technology transfer, transport, trade and economic development. Meanwhile, the European Union has become Kazakhstan's primary trade partner, with almost 40% share in its total external trade.

By 1995, Kazakhstan had joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, which in 2006 was upgraded by the adoption of an Individual Partnership Action Plan. Despite these ties, Kazakhstan refused to participate in NATO exercises in Georgia in May 2009, a move that was widely interpreted as a show of solidarity with Russia and an implicit criticism of the Western stance in the 2008 RussoGeorgian conflict. Overall, the structural bonds with Russia have represented an obstacle to a pure multi-vector foreign policy. These bonds are defined by Kazakhstan’s heavy reliance on Russia as s e c u r i t y p r o v i d e r, t h e g r a d u a l l y transforming legacy of the centralized

Significant Chinese investment in the Kazakhstani energy sector began in 1997 and increased steadily with the construction of new oil and gas pipelines. In September 2013, President Xi Jinping’s 6

Soviet command economy, and, above all, the large Russian minority concentrated in Kazakhstan’s northern provinces.

for example, reserving key posts and business loans for ethnic Kazakhs. By contrast, he has relied more on foreign policy initiatives to legitimize himself among the ethnic Russian population, in particular through the Eurasian Union. But integration has proven useful to assuage fears of both groups: while Russians view integration as a way of securing their identity vis-à-vis ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kazakhs view integration as a way of anchoring Kazakhstani sovereignty vis-àvis China.

Under these circumstances, Kazakhstan’s security cooperation with China has also been rather limited. In the early 1990s, joint efforts to enhance security along the Sino-Kazakh border were dictated by necessity. Later, the multi-lateral framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) introduced cooperative mechanisms for former Soviet states to learn about the Chinese neighbor, and to establish a collective discourse on the common threats they face. Despite unanimous agreements on a joint struggle against the “three evils” (san gushili) of fundamentalism, extremism and secessionism, the member countries have limited their commitment to formal expressions of partnership and the exchange of equipment. Bi- and multilateral mechanisms that enable collective, or at least concerted action, are yet to be developed.

In the early 1990s,President Nazarbaev contended that “the country’s ethnic composition … is too motley … for us to depend on relations with only one partner,” and as a consequence coined the notion of Kazakhstan as the “Eurasian bridge”. He thereby simultaneously stressed the Kazakhs’ Turkic roots—“our forefathers, as part of the single family of Turkic peoples” and the “blood ties” with Russia. The narrative of the Eurasian bridge remained a fundamental element throughout the 1990s, and maintained its centrality in the rhetoric of the post-9/11 years, when it came to underpin Kazakhstan’s “civilizational” discourse. By the turn of the millennium, this discourse increasingly presented Nazarbaev as the sole force driving foreign policy-making. He was portrayed as the architect in chief of the Eurasian bridge, who led both the formulation and the operationalization of Kazakhstan’s external policies. The subjugation of foreign policy rhetoric to the logic of authoritarian propaganda led to the gradual personalization of the propagandistic constructs on Kazakhstan’s external policies.

In Central Asia, Sally Cummings argues, the incorporation of foreign policy-making within regime-building – which this paper understands as “the ensemble of concerted efforts aimed to increase the population’s compliance with the leaderships’ authoritarian outlooks,”- has become “common practice”. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy behavior therefore also needs to be considered as part of the leadership’s strategy to legitimize and maintain its power. There are two reasons why in Kazakhstan foreign policy has been key to regime legitimacy: Kazakhstan was the only Soviet republic to have given birth to a nation whose titular ethnic group was in a minority in 1991, and the incumbent regime forecloses any possibility of multiple interests gaining multiple expression, such as through proportional representation, political parties or an effective parliament. Instead, Nazarbaev relies on informal mechanisms to gain domestic legitimacy among the ethnic Kazakh population, by,

Uzbekistan Uzbekistan is by far the most populous state in Central Asia. It alone shares borders with all Central Asian countries and has significant diasporas in each of them. Unlike Kazakhstan, which is an ethnically divided state, Uzbekistan has a relatively homogenous population. In the wake of independence, the Uzbek 7

economy was more diversified than the economies of the other four Central Asian states. It included agriculture, light industry, heavy industry and important branches in primary commodities. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s economy was insulated from much of the economic decline that affected other former Soviet states due to its labor-intensive economy based on agriculture and mineral extraction. Rapid growth in 1992–1995 in oil and gas production allowed Uzbekistan to halt oil imports and increase gas exports. Additionally, Uzbekistan shifted some of its crop acreage from cotton to grains to boost food self-sufficiency.

competing concern was the Uzbek leadership’s perception of Uzbekistan as a regional power and the commensurate regional ambitions that came into conflict with Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia by the late 1990s. Tashkent’s pursuit of its twin objectives appeared to be a difficult “juggling act.” Practically, the second objective was often overshadowed by the “perceived urgency of the Islamist threat.” Uzbek policymakers found themselves, against their better judgment, approaching Moscow for assistance in dealing with this threat in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Despite Uzbek leaders’ awareness that Russia would exaggerate the threat from Afghanistan in an attempt to draw Central Asian states into Russia-driven integration, it was blatantly clear to them that they could not afford a clear break with Moscow.

Although Uzbekistan might lack the energy wealth of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, it has the region’s largest and best-trained armed forces, welldeveloped industries, and an extensive network of research institutes and higher educational establishments. Not surprisingly, most initiatives for Central Asian integration have come from the Uzbekistani leadership. In Tashkent, the historical experience as the core of both tsarist and Soviet policy in Central Asia had nurtured a sense of rightful influence over its neighbors. Such initiatives, however, and the sheer weight of political and social culture, as well as the country’s size, have engendered frequent references to “Uzbek chauvinism” from its smaller neighbors.

Far from a long-term strategic alignment, security ties with Russia were hence regarded as a stop-gap measure. Soon, Tashkent oriented its foreign policy towards the United States and made initial overtures to join the NATO block in 1994. The U.S. shared Uzbekistan’s assessment of the dangers of Islamic extremism, and could help Tashkent pursue its dual agenda of fighting Islamism and expanding its regional reach. Yet this partnership remained elusive, the major impediment to close bilateral relations being the US perception of Uzbekistan as a country of little geostrategic significance ruled by an authoritarian regime. At the same time, the Uzbek leadership increasingly perceived U.S. engagement within the region as threat to its internal order, which in 2005 resulted in a major reorientation of Uzbekistan’s relations back to Russia.

From the outset, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy was slow to take shape and adopt a clear direction. Two key factors seemed to drive that policy, sometimes in opposite directions. First, the Uzbek leadership was deeply concerned with d e v e l o p m e n t s i n Ta j i k i s t a n a n d Afghanistan, and their implications for the spread of Islamic insurgency throughout the region, especially to Uzbekistan. Therefore, erecting diplomatic as well as military barriers against political Islam became a keystone of Tashkent’s foreign policy. The second

This in turn supports the view that any examination of Uzbek foreign policy cannot extend far without considering the domestic considerations that propel the leadership’s decision-making processes. Domestic factors, external political and 8

economic requirements, environmental, geopolitical and security concerns have all had an impact on the nature and direction of Uzbekistan’s external ties at different times. The impact of structural factors have especially been limited by the peculiar nature of the Uzbek foreign policy discourse, in which the preservation of internal authoritarian stability and the political survival of the regime represented the main concerns for decision makers. The following statement made by Uzbek president Islam Karimov exemplifies how external threats have been exploited to address and curtail perceived threats to domestic stability:

promoted the symbols of a Muslim and Turkic identity. Its lack of a common border with Russia or China and its ethnic homogeneity allowed for a more assertive identity policy than in Kazakhstan. Domestic pressures have encouraged Uzbekistan to seek links to Islamic states and Turkey. On the other hand, the landlocked country had to follow the imperative of promoting economic development and securing trade routes, which resulted in Uzbekistan attempting to build good links with the West and Asia. For this reason, Uzbekistan has never hesitated to present simultaneously different faces to different audiences: To the East its Asian or Islamic side, at the same time as promoting to the West an image of the Uzbekistani state as secular, modernizing and, above all, stable.

“While war is in progress there [Afghanistan], while the most dangerous fanatics and bandits are concentrating there, how can we seriously engage in matters of renovation and democratic transformation and how can we calmly create a market economy and integrate into the world economy?”

Conclusion Systemic and domestic variables impacted – with different intensity at different junctures – on the foreign policy-making processes in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The analysis presented here suggested that, in the highly authoritarian political setting of Uzbekistan, foreign policy developed largely as a function of the country’s domestic environment. The impact of systemic factors on its foreign policymaking process has been limited by the peculiar nature of the external policies pursued by the state, in which the preservation of internal authoritarian stability and the political survival of the regime represented the main concerns for decision makers. Therefore, significant domestic developments - including the Andijan riots of May 2005 – have had a major impact on Uzbekistan’s external policies. Domestic factors accounted for both long-term continuity (consistency with the logic of regime maintenance and regime survival) and change (fluctuating foreign policy and frequent international realignment).

Regime security and the consolidation of national independence appear to be the main goal of Uzbek external policy, rather than the promotion of ideologies such as Islam, communism or pan-Turkism. In Uzbekistan, post-Soviet leaders assigned foreign policy a temporal dimension, in which the state’s external outlook acted as the link between the past and the present to glorify the regime and hence consolidate their future power. At the same time, foreign policy acquired a peculiar spatial dimension, namely that in which discourses of danger based on the juxtaposition of the external with the internal supported the Uzbekistani leadership in their drive to increase domestic legitimacy. The official rhetoric spinning around Uzbek national interests and identity, however, has been far from clear or consistent. On one hand, the drive to free the new state from its colonial past and Russian influence has meant that the Uzbekistani leadership has often

Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy indicates the weakness rather than the 9

intensity of nationalism or a strong sense of national identity, and has played a role in shaping the country’s behavior, properties and, indeed, existence. While Uzbekistan’s ideology is intended to “‘reflect’ or ‘express’ the interests, nature, character, desires, policy preferences and culture of the organic nation rather than be instrumental in forming or transforming them, “Kazakhstan’s state concepts have been more about creating something from above and communicating it below. The construct of the “Eurasian bridge” has allowed for flexible pursuit of both a multi-vector foreign policy and special r e l a t i o n s w i t h Ru s s i a . Pe r i o d i c readjustments in the focus of foreign policy rhetoric led the Kazakhstani regime to reshape the identity of the population, in order to promote forms of selfperception almost exclusively associable with the leadership that has ruled the country in the post-Soviet era. Identitymaking in this context also became a crucial link in (and a key driver for) the progressive subjugation of foreign policy rhetoric to the logic of regime-building in Kazakhstan.

Paul Christian Sander holds a BA in Slavonic Studies and Political Science from the University of Bamberg, Germany, and an MPhil in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, UK. His research interests include the international politics of security, conflict and peace, as well as Eurasian politics, nationalism and identity studies.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN KAZAKHSTAN: AN EVALUATION OF THE EIDHR AND NSA/LA By Chiara Pierobon Between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, Central Asian countries received EU development assistance through the Te c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program and its Institution Building and Partnership Program (IBPP). At that time, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia was very limited as is evident from the modest budget available for the region between 1995 and 2002, the average annual per capita support was about € 4. In 2007, the TACIS program was replaced by the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which assigned to the region a budget of € 314 million for the period 2007-2010.

exclusively addresses civil society actors and the implementation of human rights– related projects, the NSA/LA focuses on fostering local participation in the development process and is also open to local authorities. This article offers a micro-level empirically-grounded analysis of the main outcomes of the EU’s grants looking at the ways in which they promoted the empowerment of civil society in Kazakhstan. It should be noticed that the European Commission defines an “empowered civil society” as one able to articulate citizens’ concerns in the public arena, to represent and foster pluralism and democratic participation, and to contribute policies that are more effective, equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth. Therefore, in the analysis particular attention is devoted to a) the interests and rights that were addressed and promoted through the EU-funded initiatives; b) the extent to which the EUsupported projects stimulated the involvement of civil society in the policymaking process; and c) the contribution of the EU-funded organizations to sustainable development and inclusive growth.

In the same year, the EU introduced the Strategy of a New Partnership with Central Asia (SNPCA), which was emblematic of its new interest in the region. Indeed, the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European Neighborhood Policy, and the Black Sea Synergy initiative have brought Europe and Central Asia closer together g e o g r a p h i c a l l y, p o l i t i c a l l y, a n d economically. Owing to its geographical position, and particularly its proximity to hot spots such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, security concerns apply in Central Asia that also affect Europe.

The EIDHR

Therefore, new forms of cooperation were envisaged in the fields of conflict r e s o l u t i o n a n d s e c u r i t y, b o r d e r management, migration and the combat against international terrorism through the involvement of civil society. Through the SNPCA, new platforms were established for discussion and enhanced cooperation in the field of civil society such as the annual Civil Society Seminars. Moreover, since 2007, the EU has directly supported CSOs in Kazakhstan through two cooperation initiatives: the EIDHR and the NSA/LA. Whereas the EIDHR

The aim of the EIDHR, which has its foundations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is to increase respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to promote and consolidate democracy and democratic reforms in developing countries. This effort also involves the support and strengthening of international and regional frameworks and mechanisms concerned with the protection, promotion, and monitoring of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 11

The EIDHR allows forms of assistance regardless of the consent of governments of developing countries and other public authorities. In an effort to build and maintain a culture of human rights and to make democracy work, a pivotal role is given to “the people of the country” through a partnership with civil society, defined as “all types of social action by individuals or groups that are independent from the state.”

The Thematic Program NSA/LA Another instrument of cooperation with civil society is the thematic program NSA/ LA introduced by the EU in 2006, which replaced earlier programs for NGO cofinancing and decentralized cooperation. The NSA/LA seeks to promote and facilitate the dialogue between state and non-state actors on development priorities and to strengthen the participation of civil society in the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of development strategies. In addition, the program is “actor-oriented” in that it recognizes CSOs as central players in the policy-making process and confers on them the “right of initiative” by providing financial resources for their “own initiatives.”

Between 2007 and 2010, two calls for proposals were issued within the framework of the EIDHR Country-based Support Scheme in Kazakhstan. The first call, published in 2008, focused on “strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests, and in consolidating political participation and representation.”

The program has identified two main sectors of engagement for non-state actors. First, non-state actors are regarded as providers of developmentrelated services in sensitive areas that address the basic needs of vulnerable groups in socially or geographically isolated areas of partner countries. Second, non-state actors are considered central agents in the field of advocacy, the defense of interests, and the promotion of human and civil rights by being included in the consultation process at the local and national levels.

More specifically, the call was directed at activities that would promote media d e v e l o p m e n t a n d c i v i l s o c i e t y ’s contribution to media policy management, the establishment of innovative mechanisms of consultation that would increase the accountability of government authorities to citizens, and education in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Altogether, eight organizations were awarded EU financial support in the framework of this call.

Between 2007 and 2010, only one call for proposals was issued in the framework of the NSA/LA – In Country Actions in Kazakhstan. Launched in 2008, the call focused on strengthening the capacity of CSOs and local authorities and on facilitating their participation in defining and implementing measures to reduce poverty and strategies for sustainable development. Another aim of the call was to strengthen the interaction between state and non-state actors and to support an increased role for local authorities in decentralization processes. Particular attention was given to cross-cutting issues such as the promotion of gender equality,

The second call, published in 2010, focused on increasing the awareness of the National Human Rights Action Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the period 2009–2012 and on promoting its implementation at the local level. Organizations involved in the protection of human rights within the judicial system – such as the right to a fair trial and to freedom from torture and other forms of degrading treatments – were invited to submit their project proposals. Altogether, two organizations were awarded EU financial support in the framework of this call. 12

human rights, and democracy; the protection of children's rights and the environment; the fight against HIV/AIDS; and projects designed to benefit populations that are not within the reach of mainstream services and resources.

areas of the country. Within this framework, the project conducted a monitoring exercise to analyze the existing social services for this target group and formulated a new inventory of conditions and common standards to which this group should be entitled.

Evaluating EU’s support to civil society organizations in Kazakhstan

An additional grant focused on improving the legal and institutional framework of the labor market, with an emphasis on the rights of pensioners. Opinion polls and interviews with ordinary citizens were conducted, and meetings with stakeholder groups were carried out in order to identify and discuss gaps and deficiencies in the sector. In addition, strategy sessions involving government and local authorities were organized during which the needs of pensioners were articulated and recommendations for pension reform were issued.

The first wave of grants awarded in the country covered a wide spectrum of initiatives promoting the rights and socioeconomic development of the most vulnerable groups of the population through the involvement of Kazakh CSOs in consultation mechanisms with the government at the local and national level. In the next paragraphs, concrete examples of the contribution of the EU grants to the empowerment of Kazakh civil society are provided followed by some general conclusions on the achievements and limitations of these projects.

Promotion of Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Another EU-funded project provided capacity-building activities aimed at strengthening the leadership and managerial skills of 14 organizations of women with disabilities in southern, western, and northeastern Kazakhstan. Conducted in association with the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the project led to the establishment of a new mechanism of consultation between CSOs and the government on issues related to disability and gender diversity in the c o u n t r y. A s m e n t i o n e d b y t h e implementing organization, the project contributed to affirming the value of gender equality and disseminating a new model concerning the role of women in politics and their integration into society and the labor market.

Promotion of Social and Economic Rights Through activities focused on analyzing the system of social services in Kazakhstan, the projects implemented under the EIDHR and NSA/LA were focused on promoting and defending social and economic rights of underprivileged groups. For instance, one EU-funded project sought to improve the provision of social services in the Pavlodar and East Kazakhstan regions by developing a methodological tool to monitor and evaluate the existing system. As reported by the organization itself, the project also asserted the right to equal access to information and social services on behalf of marginalized beneficiaries, such as people with disabilities, PLHIV, orphans, and patients in medical institutions. Similarly, a second project was meant to affirm the social and economic rights of people with disabilities who lived in small towns and remote

Promotion of the Rights of People Living with HIV (PLHIV) The projects funded under the EIDHR and NSA/LA also comprised activities focused on ameliorating the situation for PLHIV in 13

Kazakhstan by improving the provision and coordination of the healthcare system and health consulting services. Capacitybuilding activities were offered to medical staff, NGOs, social bureaus, and social workers in the field of HIV/AIDS to provide them with information about current national legislation and the rights to which PLHIV are entitled.

sector, and government to discuss specific issues, such as the improvement of the service delivery system and the socioecological situation in mono-towns. About 2,000 recommendations concerning the budget process were presented to the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning. Recommendations were issued for the Kazakhstan National Action Plan relating to the signing and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and new mechanisms for interaction between NSA and LA for advocacy activities concerning the rights of people with disabilities were established. Strategy papers on how to improve the pension system in Kazakhstan were developed as well, which were delivered to policymakers and other stakeholders.

Awareness-raising events were organized in various cities across Kazakhstan, including Almaty, Karaganda, Shymkent, and Temirtau, that focused on reducing prejudice and negative attitudes to this group. During the events, volunteers were engaged in educational activities with participants and passers-by who were informed about the problem of HIV/AIDS, were sensitized to HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination, and were involved in an exchange about how to improve the life of PLHIV in Kazakhstan.

Conclusion As emerged from the brief analysis presented, the EU-funded initiatives conducted by CSOs in Kazakhstan between 2007 and 2013 contributed in promoting social, economic, civil and political rights of marginalized groups as well as cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and environmental protection. Through the implementation of the projects, the EU-funded organizations were included in consultation mechanisms and bodies at the local and national level through which they were involved in the formulation of policy recommendations concerning the budget process as well as standards of living in the country.

Promotion of a Participatory Political Culture The EU-funded projects contributed to the diffusion of a participatory political culture by promoting the involvement of citizens and, particularly, of CSOs in formulating legislation concerning the rights of underprivileged groups. This involvement took various forms, including membership in councils and boards such as the Advisory Board of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Kazakhstan, the Coalition for the Protection of Children in Kazakhstan, the Monitoring Board of Police of the Department of International Affairs, the National Disability Council, the National Commission for Women, Family and Demographic Policy and others.

At the same time, the EU-funded actions included measures aimed at fostering sustainable development in mono-towns and at facilitating poverty reduction through, for instance, the amelioration of the system of service provision for disable people, PLHIV and marginalized groups living in remote areas of the country. Nonetheless, when talking about the impact of the EU grants, the interviewed organizations expressed some concerns about their ability to promote civil

Cooperation with the local and national administration was guided by a memorandum of understanding that established ad hoc working groups, strategic sessions, and special councils. These meetings brought together representatives from NGOs, the private 14

society empowerment beyond the completion of the projects and limitations in their outcomes were evident at three different levels.

According to the organizations interviewed, the EU grants were too limited in their range to reverse this tendency and to stimulate new patterns of cooperation and trustworthiness among the target organizations.

At the individual level, although the awareness-raising activities reached and engaged thousands of ordinary citizens, they tended to be too short-lived and limited in scope and were therefore not suitable for creating a sense of commitment among the participants. At the same time, according to the interviewees, the seminars offered to social workers and human rights defenders failed to promote true identification with the rights and new standards presented. Rather, these seminars were characterized by the instrumental involvement of participants who saw them as a way to make contact with the “generous” international donor community and thus improve their job prospects.

At the governmental level, despite the establishment of several consultation mechanisms and the inclusion in councils and boards, some mistrust in the nature and effectiveness of this partnership between civil society and government was expressed by the interviewees, who still prefer to rely on informal networks and personal contacts to advocate for their causes.

At civil society level, the organizations that were awarded funding from the EU succeeded in creating sustainable relationships with other NGOs that were involved in the projects as partners or targets of capacity-building activities, so that most of the time the cooperation continued even after the grant had expired. However, the dependence of these NGOs on funding from international donors and the prevalence of a commercially oriented mentality and competitive atmosphere had a negative effect on the quality of this relationship, particularly on the trust that the organizations have in one another.

Chiara Pierobon is a Research Associate and Post-doctoral Researcher in the Center for German and European Studies at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.

15

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN KYRGYZSTAN AND CROATIA By Sandro Knezović and Antonela Franković Security sector reform (SSR) can be defined as a process whose purpose is not only to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the state security sector, but also to introduce civilian oversight, democratic control and good governance. Implementation of these reforms improves the protection of human rights, strengthens state responsibility and increases control over the actors and functionality of the security sector, which would otherwise have a destabilizing effect. All of these reforms are significant to achieve a greater degree of transparency that leads to greater trust by citizens in the security structures.

politicians and ex-communists were united by the same idea of an independent Croatia, but their different political backgrounds meant that the HDZ resembled more a movement than it did a party. Following the formation of a new political system, was broke out in the early 1990s. The Croatian National Guard (Zbor Narodne Garde) – the new state’s first formal military organization – was created in April 1990. Jurisdiction over it was shared between the Ministry of Interior for political and legal reasons, and the Ministry of Defense, which had the right to command forces during the war. Despite the fact that the system of command was in a great measure underdeveloped, this duality made the situation even more complicated.

Considering the history of Central Asia, and especially its Soviet heritage, all the listed SSR parameters have not been implemented in the region. Incomplete implementation of SSR in Kyrgyzstan has an effect on its security in the regional context, but also on the security of vulnerable minorities in the country. Obviously, in order to protect democratic values and a democratic system as such, it is necessary to subordinate the state security sector to these rules.

The Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska) was formed in September 1991, together with the chain of command based on the existing Defense Law. The army included mostly civilians with no prior military experience and former Yugoslav Army (JNA) military personnel. Given the raging war in the region, all talk about democracy and civilian control over the security sector was put on hold.

Croatia experienced the transition from a semi-authoritarian to a parliamentary system in recent history. Parallel to that process, it reformed the state security sector accordingly. Therefore, Croatia could serve as a good example of slow but steady democratic transition that resulted in the country’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

During the period from 1995 to 2000, the nature of Croatia's governance – which was based on a semi-presidential political system with a strong role for the president – influenced the electoral system, security sector and a number of other mechanisms whose purpose was to preserve the power of the governing HDZ political party. SSR was based exclusively on the need to reduce costs due to the country’s poor economic situation.

The First Years of the New State With the disintegration of Yugoslavia* and the first elections held in 1990, Croatia was established as an independent state, under the stewardship of President Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (or HDZ) party. Under the HDZ umbrella, modernizers, right wing

Civilian oversight did not exist in any sense, nor did the desire to create any framework that would be the basis for SSR implementation. Parliamentary o v e r s i g h t o f t h e s e c u r i t y s e c t o r, 16

particularly over the secret services, was completely ineffective, while all elements of the national security structures were under HDZ supervision. At that time, Croatia did not take part in any accession negotiations with the EuroAtlantic alliances, and had no incentive to push for reforms.

to the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security. In that way, while democratic control was retained, civilian oversight was lost. In order to start negotiations with the EU and NATO, Croatia agreed to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), while setting the return of refugees displaced by the war and regional cooperation as its primary targets. In 2000, Croatia became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) – a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual EuroAtlantic partner countries and NATO – which boosted SSR implementation, and culminated in the country’s joining NATO in 2009.

Democratic Transition A turning point for Croatia''s democratic transition came with the elections in 2000, when the HDZ governing party lost both parliamentary and presidential elections. The death of former President Tudjman – a symbol of independent Croatia – and the consequent end of his undemocratic rule, along with the fact that there were no more direct threats to the security of the country combined to prompt change.

PfP provided expertise as well as financial and logistical assistance during the different phases of SSR implementation, helping Croatia to speed up its reforms process and NATO accession. In parallel to this, negotiations with the EU and the ensuing reforms related to the political criteria of EU accession contributed to a better democratic context for SSR implementation.

The new government introduced constitutional changes that reduced presidential powers, depoliticized state institutions and enhanced parliamentary oversight of the entire security sector. In order to prevent misuse of the army in favour of political power, authority over the security sector was distributed between the president and the government. The president has final authority over the armed forces during war time, while the government retains control over the rest of the security sector. Decisions to be implemented are to be signed by both sides. Croatian intelligence agencies are also accountable to both the president and the government. Guidance falls under the responsibility of the National Defense and Security Council, in which the president, prime minister and other defense and security officials are all members.

Soviet Heritage Kyrgyzstan and Croatia share similar historical features that had an impact on SSR implementation. First of all, Kyrgyzstan was part of the Soviet Union for several decades, where the military sector had significant influence on the economic and political sectors. Although K y r g y z s t a n ’s g o v e r n m e n t a f t e r independence was somewhat more democratic than during the Soviet era, the period following Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s ascent to power in 2005 reminds the authors of the situation in Croatia in the 1990s.

An independent civilian body, the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies, was established in 2002 to oversee the intelligence sector. The resignation of its chairman, however, encouraged its disbanding, and the obligation of supervision was transferred

The rapid decline of Bakiyev's popularity led to his misuse of military structures to prop up his regime. These actions brought great disruptions to the implementation of democratic governance principles, 17

transparent supervision over the security structure and the protection of human and minority rights. The year 2010 witnessed parliamentary elections whose outcome was uncertain, as well as riots in the south which turned the attention of the international community to Kyrgyzstan. Since those trying events, however, Kyrgyzstan has slowly become more open to foreign assistance in the implementation of SSR.

and Kazakhstan, and the importance of domestic issues related to ethnic minorities.

U n d e r i n t e r i m Pr e s i d e n t Ro z a Otunbayeva, the Drugs Control Agency that had been abolished by Bakiyev was reestablished. Instead, the state security service whose mission was to protect top state officials, but also to spy on opposition politicians and activists, was disbanded. The army went through a great deal of reforms. Special forces for presidential protection, anti-terrorism and the prevention of drug trafficking were established, with training assistance from Russia, Turkey and the United States.

Because of the great overlap in membership between the EU and NATO, European countries often financially participate in both organizations’ initiatives. In general, the level of involvement of European actors in Central Asia is limited and their activity is mainly concerned with supporting the rule of law or civil society. Although the EU does not have any specific strategy towards Central Asian countries, apart from maintaining peace, it does appear to consider SSR as an indirect means to entrench democratic accountability and, therefore, democracy in the region. This is because SSR fosters the overall consolidation of state administrative bodies in the field of security and defense, which overlaps with the political criteria for EU accession.

Despite reforms ushered in under a more democratic system, the army in Kyrgyzstan is still considered to be a highly specialized area where decision making should be left to experts, rather than to parliamentary and public debate. International Initiatives

With the 2010 constitution, parliament gained greater powers, including monitoring authority over the defense sector. The introduction of institutional decentralization, however, slowed the pace of SSR implementation. For example, it took two years to negotiate the reform of the police, while it continued to operate under the old system and with little participation of or protection for minority populations.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had a role in the conflict in 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks as an independent police force in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The activities of the OSCE forces did not take into account the local context and, because of that, their performance came under severe criticism. As Erica Marat explains, “civil society groups criticized the OSCE’s efforts to reform the police force and train them to react peacefully to civilian demonstrations. The local NGO community saw these reforms as potentially dangerous, arguing that the ruling regime would be likely to use a skilled police force for its own purposes.” Although the OSCE in many cases failed in the inclusion of Central Asian leaders in

Since the change of regime, NGOs regained their right to influence the process of adoption of security reforms through the Public Advisory Council (PAC). In 2012, a National Security Concept was adopted after being developed by a broad spectrum of government, military and civilian representatives. This document defined the hard (drug trafficking and terrorism) and soft (poverty and migration) security challenges facing Kyrgyzstan, but also highlighted the country’s economic dependence on Russia 18

the political dialogue, it did contribute to the increased role of civil society, better management of borders, the rule of law and good governance in Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion Not so long ago, Croatia experienced semi-authoritarian rule. With the change of government in 2000, constitutional changes were implemented and the political system became more democratic. New constitutional changes and adjustments to satisfy the terms of EU and NATO membership were a great base for SSR implementation. Despite the relatively small size of its military forces, security reforms made Croatia a reliable NATO member.

Because of its nature, NATO is mainly focused on the improvement of the security sector in accordance with democratic norms, but that focus is more related to ‘hard’ security such as building capacity for interoperability of armed forces and meeting the level of appropriate defense spending, rather than a more holistic approach to it. Given that NATO prioritizes countries applying for membership, or where it performs peacekeeping missions, Central Asia is not among its priority areas. H o w e v e r, N ATO ’s i n v o l v e m e n t i n Afghanistan indirectly affects the region, which primarily involves cooperation through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, of which Kyrgyzstan is a member.

During the war in the 1990s, international peacekeepers were deployed to Croatia. The country was a ‘security consumer,’ while today it is a ‘security provider,’ a fact best indicated by its participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led security mission in the country. The Croatian case could serve as an example of step-by-step democratization and western assistance in it.

There was an initiative for joint military exercises between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and NATO forces with the aim of improving interoperability, but in the early 2000s, NATO replaced such plans with bilateral cooperation. Kyrgyzstan and NATO cooperate on programs of military training and education, with a focus on capacity building of military units which indirectly leads to the gradual modernization and democratization of the defense sector.

Although the West does not show as much interest in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan as it did in Croatia, the development of the current situation in the Middle East could change this very quickly. The fight against ISIL, the war in Syria and the ensuing migration waves towards Europe are the main current challenges. The geopolitical position of Kyrgyzstan could become a serious area of interest, but also an area of conflict between Russia and the West. Russia has a strong interest in having economic and political influence over neighboring countries. Thus, a democratically strong or militarily advanced Kyrgyzstan is not Russia’s primarily goal.

Despite the fact that the West’s main focus is not on Central Asia, peace in the region is valuable for NATO and EU countries. Unpredictability in the region, especially with Russian foreign policy goals, makes it even more important. Because of this situation, we can reasonably foresee an increase of different SSR programs financed by western countries in the region, with the purpose of strengthening democracy and weaning Central Asia off Russia’s influence, even if only partially.

On the other hand, in view of the financial help flowing from the EU and the NATO alliance to the region, it appears that the West is open to cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. This opportunity should not be missed. The main precondition for a successful SSR is a 19

stable democracy and a strong government with civil support, and – in turn – a successful SSR greatly contributes to long-term democratic stability. Regardless of Central Asia’s current geostrategic position and the structural obstacles to SSR, security sector reform should remain an imperative for the period to come for both local and international actors.

Footnote * Tito’s Yugoslavia consisted of

the Social Republic (SR) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR of Croatia, SR of Macedonia, SR of Montenegro, SR of Slovenia, SR of Serbia as well as two Socialist Autonomous Provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Sandro Knezović is a Senior Research Associate at the Department for International Economic and Political Relations of the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb (Croatia). Antonela Franković joined the Department for International Economic and Political Relations of the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb (Croatia) as a Project Associate in 2015. She graduated from the University of Zagreb in 2014 with a master's degree in political science.

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POLICE REFORM IN KYRGYZSTAN:INTRODUCING COMMUNITY SECURITY MECHANISMS TO DELIVER FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE? By Philippe Lottholtz

Past developments and new initiatives

The efforts of civil society actors, especially numerous human rights defending organizations (pravozashitniki), have been diligent in trying to affect more bold steps being taken in the different police reform programs that have been dragging on since 1998. The main desire among both activists and ordinary people is for the police to become more trustworthy in fulfilling its mandate and complying with laws and regulations itself. The everyday experience of Kyrgyz citizens stands in contrast to this ideal picture. Petty corruption in the form of extortion by traffic police, and negligence of duty in failing to record and investigate crimes have for many people become the rule rather than an exception. Harsh criticism of the police, especially in regard to human rights abuses or the disproportionate persecution of ethnic minorities, is generally dismissed by Ministry of Interior Affairs or government officials. In light of such problems, civil society has mostly focused on identifying procedural irregularities and human rights abuses and pushing for their correction through public campaigns or by filing complaints. There is little to suggest that non-state actors have substantively tried to propose concrete institutional changes in order to improve the performance of the Kyrgyz police.

Reforms of the law enforcement and security sector organs generally are seen to be a vital part of democratic transition and a basis for sustainable social development. Given the diverging levels of cooperation with democratization and transition agendas, police reform has become a field in which different Central Asian states have limited the degree or speed of harmonization of national structures with institutional blueprints proposed by international donors and organizations. Kyrgyzstan’s police forces can be seen as a domain in which successive governments have shown limited readiness to cooperate or to follow through on their stated intentions. This fear to touch the police does appear somewhat reasonable in light of the the two revolutions that the country saw in the past decade, as well as the scale of violence during the April 2010 revolution and the violent clashes in the south of the country in June of the same year. There seems to be a fear that a too open discussion of the police policies and structures could be hijacked by domestic or international actors, and thus limit the control of governmental actors and the effective execution of policies. Principles such as a strict hierarchy of command, internal accountability and maintaining confidentiality of internal data and structures have seemed too valuable for Bishkek’s policy makers to just up. The government’s and Ministry of Interior’s (MIA) reform efforts have thus largely been focused on capacity building and modernizing equipment of the police forces. According to several observers, a constructive dialogue and cooperation with the population to sustainably prevent crime and violence had not taken place up to that point, however.

In this context, the work of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (Grazhdanskii Soiuz ‘Za reformy i rezultat’) is unique, as the organization has managed to become actively involved in the discussion, design and implementation of police reform. In fact a network of 28 NGOs with a central office in Bishkek and member organizations spread across the country, the organization was first admitted to consultations with top level policy makers in early 2013. The organization has both 21

lobbied for change on the national level and applied its participatory community security approach in selected localities throughout Kyrgyzstan.

factor for limited engagement with the organization was the generational differences between the two factions. The mostly Soviet-educated and experienced law enforcement experts viewed the ‘young folks’ (molodye rebiata) with interests in security and law enforcement matters as unusual at best, or a reason for suspicion, at worst.

National level advocacy: A change in rhetoric but not in action Influencing national level policy making was initially the main goal and focus of most of the activists of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ and thus was put at the top of the agenda when the network was officially founded in July 2012. After holding over 30 public h e a r i n g s a c r o s s t h e c o u n t r y, a n ‘Alternative conception for the reform of the law enforcement agencies’ was devloped, which was to address the most important omissions and insufficiencies of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) reform approach. The newly established organization managed to collect an impressive 10,950 signatures in support of a petition that officially proposed the ‘Alternative conception’ for consideration by the parliament and the government. Policy makers reacted to this popular support, and a select number of activists consulted with officials including then Prime Minister Satybaldiev, who vowed to take their recommendations into account.

Attempts were made to mitigate this social and ‘mentality’ divide through the inclusion of former law enforcement personnel into the ranks of the Civic Union. These and other measures were not effective, however, in tackling the perceived lack of concrete reform actions that became an issue during the following m o n t h s a n d y e a r s . Tw o m o r e governmental decrees have been passed, which set the normative-legal basis for the ‘complex assessment of the activity of law enforcement organs’ (24 February 2015) and for closer cooperation between law enforcement organs and civil society (30 July 2015). Content-wise, this legislation can be seen as a milestone in the evolution of efforts to foster a positive relationship between the police and the population. The realization of these decrees and their translation into concrete practises, however, proved to be a sluggish undertaking and met with some resistance from people within the public authorities. The ‘Coordination Council’ proved ineffective, as it served mainly as a dialogue platform but did not have any concrete mandate to order implementation measures on the ground. Given the resistance from within the public authorities and the unsatisfactory efforts to implement the reform measures, the Civic Union decided to orient its actions more to the local level. The plan was to, firstly, recruit more active members and build organizational capital, and secondly, to locally test out the participatory community security approaches advocated on the national level.

This incorporation of the Civic Union into the reform process appeared to be a great success. Some of the suggestions of the activists were taken accepted and a governmental decree (No 220, 30 April 2013) ordered the creation of a ‘Coordination Council’ under the government, in which state officials and representatives of civil society and international organizations would assess the progress of the reforms and discuss new measures. Unfortunately, this initial interaction between the activists and governmental officials was not exclusively positive. This is in part due to the acrimonious rhetoric of the Civic Union’s petitions and public statements, which continuously expressed a critical stance vis-à-vis the officials’ failure to substantially reform the police. A further 22

Community security as an expression of institutional change

themselves. Many security problems identified by working groups were strongly linked or in fact more related to economic problems and poverty, as in the case of the widespread livestock theft. In relation to these problems, the security working groups proved a useful platform for discussing the issue and raising awareness with other local actors such as the local council (mestnyi kenesh), administration (Ayil okmotu; meriya) or higher-level bodies such as regional administrations for internal affairs (ROVD).

Having gained experience during the public hearings in 2011, the Civic Union was ready to implement the mechanisms of cooperation between law enforcement organs and the population on their own initiative. The biggest undertaking in this field supported was supported by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). During this cooperation, twelve pilot communities across all seven provinces of Kyrgyzstan formed working groups which regularly analysed the community security situation, prioritized certain areas, and devised community security plans to be implemented by the groups themselves and by community partners. The local security working groups, whose member lists and mandate were certified by the local or city administration, respectively (Ayil okmotu; meria), consisted of local police and representatives from local selfgovernance organizations.

The perhaps most important aspect of the local level cooperation, however, is the signalling effect of the interaction between law enforcement agencies and the population, or local self-governance and civil society acting on behalf of it. This cooperation was a rare, if not unprecedented, occasion in many communities and indicated that law enforcement officers were ready to listen to the population and be accountable towards it. As discussed above, in light of the resistance against (at least some) reform measures on the national level, a fundamental overhaul of the police forces all the way down to the local level is perhaps only possible in the long-term perspective, if at all.

The project was especially successful in communities where the Civic Union already had a support base in the form of NGOs or individual activists. Here, participation levels during the working group meetings were high, and the discussions held were controversial and, crucially, an open and genuine exchange of different opinions that foreshadowed a grounded decision on how to deal with certain issues. A low participation in working group meetings and lack of motivation to execute the different steps of the project was a rare occasion, but could be observed at times.

In the meantime, however, the Civic Union’s community work has helped to implement the measures for a cooperative approach to establishing community security and thus delivered results with an immediate effect. This prioritization of security of communities and their inhabitants –  at least in the 12 pilot communities –  is a reflection of a human security approach prioritizing human needs and everyday life concerns over institutional designs and national security imperatives. Furthermore, many experts interpret the legislative introduction and practical application of community security mechanisms as a sign of fundamental change in the way of thinking on the part of public authorities.

An issue this participatory approach brought with it was the understanding and description of problems or solutions in rather simplistic terms and without consultation of affected groups. Thus, groups would for instance plan different measures to reduce the susceptibility of young people to crime and deviant behaviour, but without inquiring into the demands and ideas that young people had 23

Changing people’s perceptions of the police

Another protagonist in the police reform is the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, whose Criminal Justice programme has a very similar focus to the above organizations, but which also secures the material and capacity-building aspect which is often used by top-level policy makers as excuses for insufficient results of police reform. Thus, in line with training police personnel, assessing community security and devising action plans in conjunction with police and local crime prevention centres, UNODC has also rebuilt local police stations in different localities. Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) works on police reform along similar lines, as it has established a Community Security Initiative with the goal to ‘strengthen the respect for human rights by the police and build relations with local communities’. However, it was also mentioned that this intergovernmental organization and the many former police and security officers in its ranks are generally more focused on technical capacity building and tend to align with the government’s and MIA’s positions in the ‘Coordination Council’ meetings.

One of the most active organizations in the field of police reform in Kyrgyzstan is the UK-based NGO Saferworld, which puts high emphasis on securing government support for their efforts to promote peace and sustainable social development. One of the most crucial actions undertaken is also the least visible one; that is capacity building and enhancement for Kyrgyz NGOs (including the Civic Union) to enable them to participate in national policy debates and influence concrete decisions in Bishkek. This kind support requires continuous communication and provision of advice, which is not always possible to include in project based funding streams and thus even more valuable. One of the more visible projects completed was entitled ‘My police protects me’ (Moia policia menia berezhet). Local activists made a small documentary about the police, organized a photo exhibition and drawing competition on this topic and put up youth-compatible street art depicting police officers in friendly interaction with young people. This idea was further adopted in the promotion of a positive image of the police through billboards put up around the city of Osh showing police officers posing with citizens of different backgrounds and slogans such as ‘When I grow up, I will work as a policeman [chonnoisom miliciada ichteim]’ and ‘Always ready to help [zhardamga daiym daiarbyz]’. Apart from these initiatives that will have an effect on people’s (sub-) conscious way of relating to the police, Saferworld also makes sure not to dispense with rewarding efforts as it hands out diplomas and gratifications to its partners and project participants. These reward and recognition practices and the bonds they create further facilitate the establishment of a network of like-minded people in state institutions and civil society.

Conclusion As has been illustrated, police reform in Kyrgyzstan is not proceeding in the previously dominant modus operandi anymore. With the establishment of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ and its proposal of the Alternative Conception for the Police Reform, a major shift has taken place. The government has acknowledged that a more complex and inclusive approach to the reform of the police is necessary. This has so far resulted mostly in a change of rhetoric and the creation of a normative-legal basis urging the MIA and law enforcement agencies to implement complex assessment methods and foster cooperation with civil society, but a substantial implementation of these approaches has not yet ensued. 24

Therefore, the Civic Union has invested time and effort into promoting participatory community security practices on the local level. This has led to the successful creation of an environment where human security is enhanced through the accountability of the police and the cooperative problem solving that is practiced in the local community security working groups.

and the population in preventing crime and violence, is generally seen as a big step towards fundamental change. It remains to be seen, though, if this development will spur further changes in the Kyrgyzstani judicial and law enforcement system, or whether it will make such change avoidable given the improved accountability mechanisms and increased resilience of particular communities.

The perception of the police will likely change over time given the comprehensive efforts of the Civic Union, Saferworld and other actors. It remains to be seen what change in the conduct of the police’s work and its institutional culture will follow this image ‘makeover’. Decisive change will be determined by what role the progressive thinking police officers and MIA officials play within their own institutions and how successfully domestic and international NGOs can extend and use their alliances with these actors. It will be interesting to see if the Kyrgyzstani police will indeed become the transparent and modern body that many want it to become while they invoke Western democratic countries’ police forces as role model. The legislative introduction of community security mechanisms, i.e. of cooperation between police, civil society, local administration

25

Appendix: Visual material showing interactions and campaigns in the police reform Select result tables from the ‘International public safety survey in Kyrgyzstan, Final Report,’ published and coordinated by the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result.’

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Philipp Lottholz is a PhD candidate at the University of Birmingham and a former Visiting Scholar at the Central Asian Studies Institute (CASI), American University of Central Asia (AUCA). He conducted research on state-society relations and post-conflict reconstruction in Kyrgyzstan. His current doctoral research looks into state building processes in Kyrgyzstan under the title “State building in Central Asia: Moving towards a post-liberal model? Inquiring local agency and hybridisation processes in Kyrgyzstan.”

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GLOCALIZING THE RULE OF LAW AND DEVELOPING A KYRGYZSTAN-BASED INDEX By Lucio Valerio Sarandrea

Promoting the rule of law in transitional countries is a challenging but necessary endeavor, in order to achieve a more inclusive, prosperous and ultimately peaceful world.

The McDonald’s Link But how is this connected to McDonald’s? Like tastes in food, laws are cultural products subjected to differences according to setting and customs. As far as laws are concerned, the only limitation is found in the boundaries set by human rights, outside of which any law becomes a means of oppression and an infringement upon the social contract.

An interesting suggestion on how to accomplish this daunting task can come, no less, by looking at the menu of the most famous fast food restaurant on the planet, McDonald’s. The first hurdle to overcome in promoting the rule of law is the translation of the very phrase ‘rule of law,’ as each language translates the expression with significantly different nuances. Several languages, for example, stress the importance of the rule of the right instead of the law, as in the Spanish expression ‘estado de derecho.’ Others omit the importance of the rule to instead concentrate on the law, as is the case in Russian (verxovenstvo zakona, or ‘supremacy of the law’).

In contrast to this, McDonald’s restaurants offer a menu worldwide with a fixed choice of dishes normally based on hamburgers, fries and sodas. In order to expand into new markets, however, the company had to adjust to different tastes over the years. McDonald’s now gives different options to satisfy vegetarians, non-beef eaters in India and also people interested in combining their local dishes with American-flavored cuisine. With this aim in mind, McDonald’s has progressively adjusted their offer based on the concept of glocalization, a word which contains the apparent oxymoron of globalization and localization. In fact, menus worldwide do include the classic features of the fast food products, but at the same time they contain examples of the reinterpreted traditional dishes from various local cultures. Some well-known examples of this glocalization are the shrimp burger in Japan, the tacos in Mexico, the McPita in Arab countries and the McGazpacho in Spain.

Perhaps such difficulty in translating the expression ‘rule of law’ should be seen as an advantage rather than an obstacle, meaning that the rule of law is something we innately know without the need to formalize it through words. Formulations are always complex and often tend to be more divisive than inclusive. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 deliberately omitted any definition of human rights. In a sense, we could argue that the rule of law begins at the imaginary moment when the social contract was created and individuals give up their right to claim possession over everything and anything with no rules in exchange for liberty and peace. Then, the rule of law becomes the means through which the social contract can deliver its goal of peace and stability, in opposition to the pre-contract ‘rule of the fittest’ also known as war.

McLaw I contend that international development agencies who aim to promote the rule of law should use the same glocalizing approach. For over two decades, professors and practitioners have undertaken a critical review of assistance programs with a special emphasis on rule of law projects. In this context, in their 28

Escaping Capability Traps through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation, Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock argue that “many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry - that is, governments and organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like rather than what they actually do.”

With the support of the British Embassy, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is undertaking an in-depth study aimed at better capturing local understandings of the rule of law by Kyrgyz citizens in order to identify the local features that fit in with this global principle. It is a difficult yet necessary exercise to better understand local tastes and adjust assistance policies accordingly in full respect of local ownership principles.

In other words, the authors show that, too often, the rule of law is not really promoted, but rather it is exported to transitional countries without adequate consideration of the local environment, culture and customs. In a sense, it would be like McDonald’s trying to sell hamburgers to a country of vegetarians. Thus, they propose to apply “positive deviance” and adaptations to the prepackaged solutions which have worked in other (non-transitional) contexts. Such an approach would allow the inclusion of innovative and context-specific methodologies similar to the introduction of a shrimp burger in Japan or a McGazpacho in Spain.

The innate concept of the rule of law with the ensuing principle of universalism should not prevent us from modifying previously established formulas, in order to find innovative and unexpected solutions that work better in a given context. Glocalization could provide original insights to outstanding problems and, in the longer term, locally finedtuned tools that can produce concrete and long-lasting results.

This glocalized approach is more sound and sustainable, but requires developing a deep cultural understanding of the local landscape to determine which local practices can be used and transformed into suitable reforms. Long-term studies are often at odds with the necessity of delivering results on a short-term basis in the humanitarian world, which can lead to counterproductive results.

Lucio Valerio Sarandrea is the Chief Technical Adviser on Rule of Law for the United Nations Development Program in Kyrgyzstan. Mr. Sarandrea previously worked as Legal Adviser on Rule of Law for the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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Tian Shan Policy Center

The Tian Shan Policy Center (TSPC) is an innovative nonprofit, public interest organization focused on research, analysis, and implementation of appropriate and effective public policy in the nations and communities of Central Asia. The TSPC specializes in the critical fields of strategic development policy, human rights, and sustainable environment programs, and through its efforts strives to strengthen good governance as the bedrock for efforts to better the lives of the peoples of our emerging countries.

Contact details: Tian Shan Policy Center American University of Central Asia 7/6 Aaly Tokombaeva St. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic Tel: +996 312 915 000 [email protected] www.auca.kg/en/tspc

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