Berkeley\'s Critique on Philosophical Materialism

Joseph Omoregbe. Metaphysics without tears. Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd. 1996 p.83.
Jim I. Unah (Dr.). Metaphysics. Nigeria: University of Lagos Press 2010 p.48.
The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth, Winkler P. USA: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.166.
Ibid. p.176-7
Ibid. p.177
Ibid. p.178
George Berkeley, On the Principles of Human Knowledge; in R.T. De George (ed) Classical and Contemporary Metaphysics, p.47.
Ibid. p.47
Ibid. p.48
Kenneth P. Winkler p.186
* Solipsism from Latin solus, meaning "alone", and ipse, meaning "self" is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind.
William F. Lawhead. The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical introduction to philosophy. Publisher: Eva Howard. 2002. p.307
Kenneth p.187
Voyage p.308
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the development of metaphysics from the ancient to the modern period, the question still remains "what is reality?" which has both epistemic and ontological implications. This is why we can regard it as "a puzzle without clue". Its epistemic side draws us to the quest of knowledge while its ontological nature, however, lies in the fact that it presupposes knowledge about, not just beings, but "being qua being". Overtime this question has assumed different forms. Here in the modern era, it was the question of the ultimate ontological category. What is this Ontological Category? "Mind", "Matter" or both?
"Matter" and "Mind" are, in this context, used in connection with the material (physical) and the immaterial (spiritual) realms of reality respectively. While Descartes settles for "matter" and "mind"; Locke settles for "matter" (materialism). These two philosophers' position gives rise to both epistemological and theological skepticism. This, however, is where Berkeley condemns their positions predicating on his popular epistemic cum existential aphorism: esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). And also exonerates metaphysics from the shackle of materialists.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF MATERIALISM
Materialism which is a direct opposite of idealism is a metaphysical position in the system of philosophy which upholds the primacy of matter over spirit or ideas in its view of reality i.e. any doctrine that tends to reduce all reality to matter. Matter, the materialist contend, is the fundamental stuff, the primary raw-material of the world. Ideas they argue, are immaterial and so could not be the elementary stuff of the universe. Some materialist maintained that mind is the second order of reality. Others say it is the by-product of matter.
THE CARTESIAN-LOCKEAN ANTECEDENT
Descartes is considered the father of the modern mind-body problem. He maintained that the essence of the physical is extension in space. Minds, he said are unexpected substances and thus are distinct from any physical substances. The essence of a mental substance is to think. This twofold view is called Cartesian dualism. He maintained that the mind and body are ontological categories.
Locke then came forward to settle for 'matter' as the ontological category in his theory of materialism. Stating that the real things are only things we can see and touch. A very extreme empiristic position that caused both epistemological and theological skepticism.
Berkeley's philosophical aim for arguing against this position was to intractably refute the two kinds of skepticism as stated above. Epistemological skepticism, which states that we cannot know the true nature of things because certain perceptual relativities and psychological contingencies oblige us to distinguish appearance and reality in such a way that the knowledge of the latter is at least problematic or at worst impossible. The other is Theological skepticism, which Berkeley calls "atheism" which in his view, not only the denial of the existence of a deity out rightly, but also deism, for which the universe subsists without a deity's continual creative activity. And he flexibly give a more profound understanding of obscurity cursed by Descartes unresolved mind-body distinction and Locke's materialism.
IDEAS, PERCEPTION, AND MIND
A key concept in the foregoing is that of ideas. Berkeley uses "ideas" to mean 'any immediate object of sense or understanding', but as already noted, he is careful to distinguish this from what he described as 'such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind', which he later calls notions. The distinction is as follows. Ideas are always sensory; either in the content of sense awareness or memory and imagination. Notions on the other hand are concepts of spirit- of self, mind, and God – and have a more complex origin. As regards self-knowledge, notion originate in immediate intuition; as regards other minds, in interpretation; and as regards God, in "reflection and reasoning"
Berkeley gives the name perception to any way of having ideas and notions before the mind, in sensing, conceiving, imaging, remembering, reasoning and the rest. It is accordingly a generic term, and it is not restricted to sensory perception alone. "Perceiving involves a causal relation: Minds perceive ideas either by causing them (when finite mind imagine or dream) or by causally affected by them (when finite minds receive ideas from God).
It also follows that although everything that exists is mind-dependent, it is not dependent on particular or finite minds, but has an objective source and structure, namely, the eternal, ubiquitous and law-like perceiving of an infinite mind. This is the sense in which Berkeley is a realist: the world exists independently of the thought and experience of finite minds.
BERKELEY'S CRITIQUE ON PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM
The primary aim of Berkley is to discover a way in which metaphysics can be explained in such a way as to be consistent with the views of a 'plain man'. The main way in which he does this is to deny the idea of 'abstraction', which he feels, is distasteful to the 'plain man'. In doing so, however, Berkeley's immaterialism creates a world that is arguably very different to the ordinary, 'vulgar' views of the 'plain man'. The result of immaterialism is that the idea of 'matter' and the external physical world is denied, and our entire worldly experience exists only within our mind. Also, the most famous result of Berkeley's philosophy is the conclusion that 'to be is to be perceived' (Esse est percipi). The way in which Berkley arrives at this is shown below. Berkeley starts his philosophy with an examination of the senses. He argues that it is unintelligible to say that physical things can exist absolutely, independent of a perceiving mind. He finds such an idea strange. How can things exist outside any perceiving mind? "it is indeed an opinion strangely held and prevailing among men that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding." Berkeley goes on to ask: "For what are the aforementioned objects but the things we perceived by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensation? And is it not plainly repugnant that any of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?" It is sheer abstraction, Berkeley argues, to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them as existing unperceived. One might as well imagine the body without the limbs or imagine the smell of a rose without the rose itself. This is what we to do when we try to imagine physical objects as existing without being perceived. But our power of imagination does not make what we imagine a reality. This is due to the fact that imaginations are only mere abstractions of the mind since it cannot be perceived. Berkeley assures us that sensible objects, precisely as sensible objects, exist only insofar as they are perceived by the mind, and this means that they are nothing other than ideas in the mind perceiving them, since ideas cannot exist anywhere else than in the mind. Thus, matter does not exist in isolation from the mind. Hence, what we call material things are only ideas in the mind of the person perceiving them. There is nothing like material substance. "it is plain", he says, "that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves a contradiction in it"
Following from this, if the 'sensible objects' that we perceive are of the mind, then, we cannot claim that there is an external world. It can be seen that this argument is not a disproof of the external world of matter it simply claims that the hypothesis of a material world is not reasonably grounded on anything knowable. Berkeley, however, does go on to attempt to actually disprove the material world, by investigating the idea of 'matter', and finding that it is not possible for matter, as it is commonly known, to cause sensation. As matter is fixed, passive, and not 'immediately sensible' - it has already been discovered that 'immediately sensible' things are the 'proper objects' of the senses, and only exist in the mind - and it is inconsistent for a fixed, passive unknowable thing to create ideas in the mind, then matter does not exist as we know it. Berkeley would state it in such a way as to define matter as we know it unperceivable, and for matter to exist is not consistent with the existence/perception conclusion mentioned above.
After he concludes that matter does not exist - we exist in a universe of spirit - we are left to investigate the problem of ideas, and their relation to the mind. To begin with, it must be stressed that by the term idea, Berkeley is not referring to an abstract idea, such as a 'form' or 'essence'. This type of idea cannot exist within Berkeley's universe, as it is impossible to form such ideas. For example, an abstract idea or 'form' of the table before me is based upon many different sensory impressions, which are somehow distilled and refined to create a supposedly accurate 'idea' of the true nature of the table. In Berkeley's world, there is no way to distinguish between the different views of the table, in order to decide the true nature of the table; Berkeley claims the true nature of the table is the sense-data which is perceived by the mind. This diverse view of ideas does not overpower his empirical position. Hence, the mind is reality.
Much has been discussed about the relationship between the mind and ideas in Berkeley's philosophy. In his writing, Berkeley states both that the mind and its ideas are distinct, and that the perceiving of an idea is distinct from the idea perceived. Commentators have found that it is possible to find a contradiction in these two statements, as for both to be consistent, it must be agreed that the mind does not perceive ideas. This, however, is absurd, and so it is the other two statements that must somehow be reconciled in order for Berkeley's philosophy to stand. The difficulty in doing this stems from the fact that the perceiving of an idea is an act of the mind and in order for the two statements to be compatible then it must be agreed that an act of the mind is distinct from the mind itself. In order to do this, the 'distinctness' that Berkeley claims is between the mind and its ideas is of the rather weak form, such as a swimmer is 'distinct' from his breaststroke. The first of the two statements above, therefore, must be read in a weaker sense than is immediately obvious.
Another question that is raised by Berkeley's concept of ideas is the question of whether or not it is possible for two people (or minds) to have the same idea. As Berkeley claims that all our ideas are the sensory perceptions, and it is impossible for two people to have the same set of sensory perceptions, then it is equally impossible for two minds to have the same idea. This seems to be difficult, as it seems to imply that two people sitting on opposite side of a room see different chairs, although there is only one chair between them.
Similar to this problem is the question of whether or not a thing still exists when it has stopped being perceived. From the arguments which have been heard so far, the answer would seem to be that since we have no immediate sensory perception of an unperceived object, then there is no reason to suggest that it remains in existence. This is a common criticism of Immaterialism -which it is arguably possible for an unperceived object to exist. Berkeley's reply to this objection starts with the assertion that it is impossible to give any example of an unperceived object, for to do so, one must conceive of it in one's own mind. If it is conceived in one's own mind, then it is the perception of this object which is being conceived, therefore making the unperceived imagined object perceived. In simpler terms, in trying to state an example of an unperceived object, one must imagine oneself perceiving the object in order to comprehend it. Also, the denial of anything abstract promptly disallows any theoretical unperceived object. It is still felt, however, that this is not a very satisfactory answer to the question of existence under Berkeley's Immaterialism.
It is at this point Berkeley introduces his theories of the role of God. He claims that it is evident that ideas do have some form of consistency and continuity, and therefore there must be an eternal, omnipresent being that is all-perceiving. Berkeley uses God to explain many a problem with his philosophy. For an idea-object to exist it must be perceived by God. The only necessary requirement for existence in Berkeley's philosophy seems to be that the object is perceived by God. The role of God is a very important one, and without it, many of his assertions cannot be made. Curious then that he only brushes over attempting to prove the existence of God. Without this proof, all of Berkeley's philosophy takes on a very circular property.
Put simply, the nub of Berkeley's argument for God is that because everything that exists is either mind or ideas, and because finite minds, even in concert, could not perceive all the ideas that constitute the universe, there must be an infinite mind which perceives everything always and thereby keeps it in being.
EVALUATION ON BERKELEY'S IMMATERIALISM
The argument in fact has two stages. The first argues that things are causally dependent on mind for their existence, and therefore, because I cannot think of everything always, there must be mental activity elsewhere carrying out the task. The second stage says that one can infer the character of that mind by inspecting the nature of its ideas: because the universe is so huge, beautiful, and intricate and so on, it must be a "wise, powerful", mind.
The first stage is Solipsism* as Berkeley means to claim that the only reality I can know or even think about consist of those objects I perceive, then reality as I understand is reduced to the subjective contents of my mind. Berkeley, of course, would reject this position by claiming that God also perceives these objects. Thus, there is some objective existence apart from me. This is what pushes him to the unpersuasive second stage of this argument for an infinite mind.
However, a second problem arises. Are my ideas merely copies of God's ideas of an object? Some of Berkley's remarks suggest that our ideas are mere versions of the divine archetypes. In other words, reality for God is not identical with our reality as we know. If this interpretation is correct, then he comes close to lapsing into a version of the representative realism he found so problematic in Locke. In this case, our experience on reality will not be direct and unmediated.
Third, if we seek to avoid the claim that our ideas are not distinct from God's idea, then it would seem our minds overlap or participate in the divine mind. This will be theologically unacceptable by Berkley. Thus, it seems he is caught between solipsism, representative realism or some form of pantheistic overlap between our minds and God's mind.
It can be seen, then that Berkeley's philosophy relies heavily on there being an omnipresent, all-perceiver. If there is not, then it is difficult for him to make the claim for the continued existence of the continued existence of unperceivable objects, or the claim that two people could have the 'same' idea. Indeed and more importantly, without Berkeley's God, there is no reason for the world not to be thrown into chaos, and it is his God which ensures the laws of nature are obeyed. Furthermore, without a solid proof of the existence of God, Berkeley's argument seems circular. God's existence can be seen from the non-chaotic nature of the universe, and the non-chaotic nature of the universe is due to God's existence. This seems to be the underlying flaw in Berkeley's Immaterialism, the inability to properly show either the existence of God, or the non-existence of matter without requiring God's existence. Finally, Berkeley's concept of "notion" as stated earlier above depicts reflection and reason of "a God". Going by the term notion which can be likened to idea; it is obvious to say with great certainty that applying his own theory with this concept clearly shows loops in his argument. For as we know that God is a concept that cannot be perceived as Berkeley disputes the power of imagination with the statement 'our power of imagination does not make what we imagine a reality. This is due to the fact that imaginations are only mere abstractions of the mind since it cannot be perceived.' But for the sake of Berkeley's religion he affirms that there is one who we can reflect and reason out that exist, though we cannot perceive Him. From this, going by the strict sense of this it implies that since I cannot imagine what I cannot perceive, then it follows that the concept God does not exist ipso facto I cannot perceive Him. Even theists have not found Berkeley's system to be helpful in undermining "all the monstrous systems of the atheists."
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Berkeley, in his argument for immaterialism, elevates and heightens the powers and usefulness of the mind above the brain in which Descartes fails to distinguish in his mind-body problem. He exonerates the mind from the reduction of its value as part of the pineal gland to a place of admiration. But this is not without consequences as we have seen above.
Secondly, his uncomfortable conclusions showed where a thoroughgoing, narrow empiricism can lead. As some philosophers conclude that empiricism should be abandoned; others on the side of Berkeley known as phenomenalism hold that all comes from ideas and sense data but the remove Berkeley's metaphysical concepts of self and God.
Finally, Berkeley's approach of philosophical analysis and the issues he dealt with, especially his theory of perception have had a significant influence on the tradition of British empiricism.
CONCLUSION
Having, painstakingly scanned Berkeley' critique of philosophical materialism by introducing the causal effect of his critique, his positions and argument for immaterialism, it is pertinent to conclude that though not exhaustive in itself, the strength and weaknesses of this posit have changed the British empiricist in their methodic approach.
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