Authoritarianism, Energy and Ideas in Central Asia: From Politics and Pipelines to Foreign Policy

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Authoritarianism, Energy and Ideas in Central Asia: From Politics and Pipelines to Foreign Policy CHAPTER · JANUARY 2015

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7 Authoritarianism, Energy and Ideas in Central Asia: From Politics and Pipelines to Foreign Policy Wayne McLean The largely authoritarian Central Asian area has been remarkably politically stable. This is despite its overwhelming dependence on resource income, not to mention the fact that there are extensive great power interests in the region. This chapter explores why this is the case. Here, one common argument is that an inside–outside dynamic has been produced within Central Asian states. In this context, norm cascades reinforce authoritarian politics, with embedded identities shaped by powerful pre-existing socio-historical forces in each particular society. However, I argue that the reverse is the case: in fact, it is regional power structures that have provided incentives for the emergence of stable Central Asian authoritarianism. This is partly because foreign policy decisiveness has enabled elites – and therefore states – to better manage the intense material pressures they have been subjected to. More broadly I argue that a neoclassical realist reading of the domestic–structural nexus is the most useful way of understanding these dynamics, and how they contribute to Central Asian stability. Crucially, it reveals how multi-vector foreign policies combine with resource incomes, which in turn complement domestic ideas about security. There are numerous reasons why the relative stability in Central Asia seems paradoxical, despite constant predictions of deeper turmoil sweeping across this part of the post-Soviet space (see Brzezinski, 1997; Judge, 2009; Shustov, 2011). All the Central Asian states have diffuse ethnic groupings, most have severe democratic deficits, and most are rentier economies. This suggests that the states of the region have managed to balance a diverse set of challenges. Yet this stability comes at considerable domestic cost. Central Asia is arguably the most repressive political region in the world, with all five states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan1 – having variations of façade democracies. Only Kyrgyzstan has made progress in this respect, delivering Central Asia’s first peaceful transition of power in 2010. To explain Central Asian stability, I proceed as follows. First I examine how current theoretical approaches have been applied to the region, and identify the crucial links between elites and resources that are downplayed by some of the most recent scholarship on the topic. Second, I show that a neoclassical realist framework encompasses a wider range of variables, including foreign policy and material pressures, and thus acknowledges the important structural role played by authoritarianism. According to this view, modest

social and economic gains for

the population are mixed with security-laden narratives, and given credibility via resource 242

income. In exchange, elites can take permissive structural action to create foreign policies designed to maximize security. This results in a regional phenomenon whereby states emulate a new authoritarian model, creating a mutually reinforcing relationship between material pressures, incentives and ideas. In the third, and main, analytical part of the chapter, I demonstrate that this perspective is broadly congruent across Central Asia, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which is the most open (but also a highly unstable) state in the region.

The Paradox of Central Asian stability: authoritarianism and resource curses One prominent way to understand the link between authoritarian regimes, their foreign policies and resources is via what Richard Auty terms the ‘resource curse’. In short, good access to substantial resources in politically unsophisticated territories creates so-called ‘rentier’ states, for which a significant amount of income is derived from energy exports, and this concentrates power within a small elite clique (Gray, 2011). Resources are the key systemic variable, and this impacts on the domestic environment by creating an ‘incumbency advantage, undermin[ing] democratic governance and socio-political stability’ (Wantchekon, 2002, pp. 55–77). Michael Ross (2004, pp. 337– 356) also suggests that ‘there is some evidence that oil dependence (and possibly mineral dependence) is more strongly associated with separatist conflicts than other types of conflicts’. A similar view can be found in the work of Indra De Soysa (2000), who argues that rapacity drives civil conflict and that a ‘”honey pot” effect itself is influential in causing armed violence’. Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl and Yahia Said (2007) also follow this line of reasoning, claiming that there is a strong link between oil and war, and highlighting greed as a central determinant of civil conflicts. They argue that rentier states flow through four political stages: state building, stabilization, predation and state failure. However, the empirical record shows these perspectives to be flawed. Using the criteria of Kaldor et al. (2007) Central Asian cases should be reaching the ‘predatory’ state, and civil conflict should be increasingly emerging around identity politics based on ethnic, religious and tribal issues. Furthermore, according to this view, non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, should be seeking a greater role in the spoils of resources. The predatory stage is one ‘where violence and repression become more important tools than patronage’ and where ‘the name of the political game is rent seeking without limits: that is, seeking to capture petrodollars as quickly as possible, regardless of the legality of the methods used’. This means in turn that ‘regimes abandon any long-term developmental pretensions and simply try to hang on as long as possible while enriching themselves’.

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Hence while this may describe a number of resource-rich states in Africa, South America and the Middle East, it does a poor job in describing Central Asia. If anything, resources in Central Asia seem to have contributed to stability and consolidated patronage systems when compared to other regions. And if we can temporarily ignore human rights abuses, standards of living have been increasing – albeit slowly – in the region. This contrasts with the sharp declines that corresponded with the ‘robber’ capitalism of the early and mid-1990s, where, for instance, Tajikistan’s economy contracted by 29% in the year between 1991 and 1992 (World Bank, 2014) In addition to empirical problems, constructivist scholarship like this is also methodologically awkward. It relies on particularistic ethnographic analyses of the myriad groups straddling the region. For example, Ronald Suny (1999) describes Uzbekistan as creating an ‘inclusive identity in an authoritarian state’, with the goal of fending off the challenge of supranational Islam. In his analysis, a number of post-Soviet states have ‘selectively revived or reconstituted identities’ and these compete with more recent ideational constructions. For Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, he places this phenomenon squarely at the foot of the leaders who see stability in ‘policies of inclusion and tolerance’. In contrast, ‘traditional’ realist scholarship is also problematic. It arguably succeeds in capturing the broader dynamics at play, but suffers from a lack of subtlety or predictive utility. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard (1997) made broad claims that culture and nationalism would combine with geographic determinism in Central Asia to create an ‘ethnic cauldron’ (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 125–135), but these predictions, so far, have not come to pass. Other approaches, including the securitization discourse (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1997) have more success in capturing regional dynamics, but still overplay the role of domestic forces guiding international level behaviour. Roy Allison (2008, pp. 185–202) has used a securitization framework to argue for the existence of virtual ‘macroregional structures’, with authoritarianism persisting thanks to ‘political bonds with likeminded leaders’ (Allison, 2008, p. 189). And yet the Central Asian states have become increasingly bold in their engagement with all three great powers possessing interests in the region, including the US. To address this, the account I present uses a neoclassical realist position that attempts to bridge both the constructivist and conventional realist scholarship. This follows the core assumption that material power trumps identities (Rose, 1998, p. 146; Christensen, 1996; Schweller, 2004), but at the same time, neoclassical realism still sees a place for normative forces as ‘second tier’ variables. Indeed neoclassical realism views norms and ideas as products of power (see Wohlforth, 1994). Understanding how and why norms become instrumentalized through the manipulation of identity, rhetoric and other devices, also leads to much more interesting research questions than simply assuming all ideas are in contestation. Finally, it permits the identification of a hierarchy of variables that might be expected to produce one or more certain types of behaviour.

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Neoclassical realism highlights the problem of scope when undertaking strictly comparative or ideational approaches in the assessment of foreign policy choices. Steven Lobell, Norman Ripsman and Jeffery Taliaferro (2009) note that ‘only a few qualitative studies have attempted to disaggregate democracies and examine how the different institutional arrangements of different democratic states … might constrain foreign policy choice’. Indeed, elsewhere Taliaferro (2006, p. 467) states that a ‘lack of nationalist sentiment or an anti-statist ideology, … can limit the state’s ability to emulate or innovate’. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (1997) similarly views value in tracing causal variables at the domestic level and linking their formation to external material forces. In effect, Sterling-Folker is arguing for the analysis of two important themes that are linked to both power and ideas. First, it is necessary to understand incentive structures for elites. Without this, it is illogical to suggest that actors will behave in a way contrary to their interests. Second, it is important to examine the constraints upon, or (especially in the case of resources) the enablers of, policy. An approach like this gives neoclassical realism both breadth (in an explanatory sense) and depth (in an analytical sense). In the analysis of Central Asia that follows below, I employ a framework to evaluate how external environments impact upon the domestic scene; plot the responses of elites; show how foreign policy is sold to two types of audiences (international and domestic); and explain why states routinely act in a way that is inconsistent with their notional ‘identities’ or unifying ideas. In doing so, I assess how the key themes of incentives and resource enablers interact to inform policy practice: in other words, how foreign policy comes about from both politics and pipelines in Central Asia. I find that a state model has emerged in the region that revolves around an entrenched elite dynamic where incentive structures for elites are heavily weighted in favour of illiberal rule. The state model succeeds partly because the incentive structures for the population are kept in line with regime maintenance, courtesy of resource revenues. It also succeeds at the regional level because it marginalizes domestic audiences and keeps them from interfering in multi-vector foreign policies that keep competing great powers’ interests at bay.

Incentive structures At the domestic level, authoritarianism in Central Asian states persists because it incentivizes the continuity of the entrenched behaviour of both elites and the general population. Internally, the Central Asian states practice neopatrimonialism based around a strong authoritarian centre (Laruelle, 2012). Indeed, during the Soviet era, Moscow was hesitant to interfere in these political systems given their inherent stability, which in turn allowed reliable and consistent access to resources (McGlinchey, 2008, p. 2). These structures persist, but are now informed by a new set of incentives, driven by the new international environment.

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As in the past, a key incentive for elites to maintain stability is access to wealth. For instance, in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s family clan has assets worth approximately US$7 billion (Swami, 2010). Furthermore, the concentrated patronage system, combined with increasing energy revenues now means the fifty wealthiest Kazaks have a combined income of US$24 billion (Lillis, 2012). Elsewhere, in Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov’s family, and most notably his daughter Gulnara, presides over business interests worth over US$2 billion (Malashenko, 2014, p. 5). This translates to political power. Karimov has ruled since 1991, winning his latest sevenyear term in 2007 with 90.77% of the vote, ahead of Asliddin Rustamov, who only obtained 3.25% (Election Guide, 2007). Likewise, the Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, has filtered profits from state enterprises to family members in London, while also receiving lavish gifts from external investors, such as a US$75 million yacht from Russian resource company Itera (Harding, 2010b). Further east in Tajikistan, a leaked US diplomatic cable revealed that President Emomalii Rahmon has substantial personal funds as a result of diverting revenue from stateowned businesses, which ‘end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by the president’ (Harding, 2010a). Central political rule persists in part due to ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Gill, 2012, p. 453). A typical election tactic in these systems is to use only approved ‘pseudo-opposition’ candidates as challengers, and insist on a high threshold to register as presidential candidates, usually in the form of a large number of signatures. Similarly common is the phenomenon where one individual is permitted to vote on behalf of their entire family (Musayev, 2009). Another device used on ballots is to have voters black out their least favoured candidates on the ballot paper, whereas a vote for the incumbent can simply be inserted into the ballot box without alteration. Overall, this creates phony, ‘façade’, or what Ilkhamov terms ‘controllable’ democracies (2002). This had led to continual criticism from Western observers. For example, in the 2011 Kazak election, the OECD reported ‘numerous instances of seemingly identical signatures on voter lists, cases of ballot box stuffing, and proxy, multiple and family voting’ (OSCE, 2011). An interesting question here is why Central Asian and other post-communist states even bother pandering to democratic norms given the totality of their leadership. According to Graeme Gill (2012 p. 467) it enables leaders to ‘tap into the international norms of democracy’. In the Central Asian environment, similar themes are visible. All the Central Asia regimes have questionable human rights records: an issue that allows for Western political observers to enforce pressure on the state to reform. This is a cornerstone of US engagement in the area, where it consistently links aid and military assistance to promises of liberalization. What the façade of democracy does then, is deflect criticism at a relatively low cost. This mitigates the impact of Western interference, particularly from the US and Europe, where Central Asia states have been instructed by the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq. Façade democracies also make conditions for Western investors into the region more palatable when operating in a transnational environment. All in all, this combination of processes, however cynical, contributes to a general political stability.

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Of course, other such systems have collapsed in the post-1991 environment. The occupation of Iraq revealed complex clan systems, amplifying post-Baathist bloodshed and instability. Libya, an oil-rich state, suffered a similar fate. The point of differentiation in Central Asia though, is that stronger incentives exist across the elites, the broader domestic populations and the international actors, to maintain the status quo. For instance, as Sarah Kendzior (2013) notes, audiences in Central Asia possess a ‘strong aversion to the political sphere’. Here, democratic processes and their autocratic anti-theses are played off against each other in a way often misunderstood when viewed through a Western political lens. Participation by members of the general population in the political process is seen as being an ‘affront to peace’ and therefore stability. But as Daniel Kimage (2005) argues, domestic populations are fed the view that a ‘Western focus on democratization and human rights is at best an intrusion, and at worst an outright menace’. Elites leverage this narrative within the (limited) electoral processes. For example, Uzbek President Islam Karimov has routinely claimed that Western actors have a ‘goal ... to create controlled destabilization [and] to impose a system of behaviour from without’ (Kimage, 2005). This has the result of incentivizing stability over transition and political liberalization. Hence, in Kazakhstan, Edward Schatz and Elena Maltseva (2012, pp. 45–65) maintain that President Nursultan Nazarbayev represents a form of social contract where ‘most Kazakhstanis overlook myriad instances of human rights abuses as tolerable “costs” of economic success’. And while the uprisings in Mangystau, Kazakhstan during 2011 led to confident predictions of a post-Soviet styled ‘Arab Spring’ (Levine, 2011), this did not eventuate, and the rule of Nazarbayev largely remains uncontested. This strongly suggests that there is not a legitimization crisis in these states. As Joshua Foust (2011) points out, Western analyses of the Mangystau uprisings were hyperbolic. Instead, within the general population, the largest protests have revolved around housing issues and Chinese ownership rather than a desire to restructure the eliteentrenched political system. The longer-term political trends in Kazakhstan support this. President Nazarbayev has been President for 25 years, but even Western-run opinion polls conclude that he is genuinely popular. According to one of them, published in 2010, some 89% were satisfied with Nazarbayev (Lillis, 2010). It notes that Kazakhs see ‘the assurance of this calm in the institution of the presidency [and that] President Nazarbayev is [perceived as] a guarantee of that stability’. The tactic of presenting external political systems as threats is successful in maintaining support for the administrations elsewhere in the region too. Thus, in Uzbekistan, Morgan Liu (1997) found ‘strong support for the [Karimov regime’s] ideas, his course of leadership, and the government system’. More recently, Karimov has turned to fear of Islamic radicalism to support his case for strong central rule. The Andijan massacre was the most prominent example, where protests around poor payments were reinterpreted to the domestic audience as Islamic radicalism and

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as a potential precursor to the experience of Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya via the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir. More generally internal authoritarianism is sold to domestic audiences as a requirement of a ‘gradualist’ economic policy and politicians will often point to the virtues of the Chinese system. In the most problematic areas, political elites use specific strategies to avoid unrest, such as the provision of targeted social welfare benefits to vulnerable, but prominent, groups (Urinboyev, 2013, pp. 26–27). These deceptive messages are easily distributed given the controlled media environment. For instance, Uzbekistan’s media is heavily censored, with the National Security Service actively involved in the management of idealistic narratives (Freedom House, 2012). Kazakhstan’s media is similarly controlled. The state-owned news agency, Khabar, was run by Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga (Franke, Gawrich & Alakbarov, 2009), while his grandson, Nurali Aliyev ran the Shahar media group (Lillis, 2006). These complement widespread censorship with the government regularly issuing court orders to close down papers deemed as ‘extreme’. In the end, this concentrated press control underpins the solidarity of elite messages and, as a result, Kazakhstan is ranked 161st of 180 in the 2014 Reporters without Borders ‘Press Freedom Index’.

Resource enablers The political incentives for the varied actors in the region are heavily underwritten by resources. Domestically, income from resources and exports helps maintain internal political structures. Internationally, prudent management of resources creates strategic and economic value. Economically, this means that Central Asia has become one of the fastest growing economic regions in the world, with an average of 8% growth over the past 14 years (IMF, 2013). This feeds domestic economic successes. For example, Kazakhstan repaid IMF debts seven years early and has experienced strong economic growth since 2000 (Partlett, 2008). Indeed, the region has enjoyed robust growth driven by resources extraction and remittances from Russia and China. Economic growth in the region for 2013 was 5.8% as opposed to 1.5% for Russia and 2.1% across the CIS states as a whole (IMF, 2013). A number of recent discoveries, combined with improving extraction technologies, have accelerated these gains. Turkmenistan now has 600 billion barrels of oil and 265 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (EIA, 2014) helping to expand the economy by 11.1% in 2012 and 10.2% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014a). Similarly, Kazakhstan’s 13 billion barrels of crude oil reserves is partly the result of the discovery of the Kashagan field in 2000. This has attracted Beijing’s attention and in 2013 China acquired an 8.4% stake of the field costing US$5 billion (India Times, 2013). This complements the 2,798 kilometre-long China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, completed in 2005 and primed to carry oil across to China’s Xinjiang region. Kazakhstan, with US support, has also proposed the Trans-Caspian Transport System, pushing oil via Azerbaijan and into Europe, bypassing Russian and Iranian routes in the process, placing Kazakhstan at the centre of a new resources competition between great powers. These factors in Kazakhstan

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have combined to create strong economic growth, averaging 7.8% growth between 2001 and 2013 (World Bank, 2014b) with oil and gas making up 60% of state exports (IMF, 2013). To the north, Uzbekistan has substantial reserves of natural gas, and is the third largest producer of natural gas in Eurasia (EIA, 2014), but lacks a strong infrastructure and has a poor export capability, with domestic customers using 80% of gas production (Natural Gas Europe, 2013). As a result, there has been a decline in hydrocarbon production since 2003 (EIA, 2014), with neighbouring states seen as more reliable providers. Nonetheless, Chinese investment continues thanks to their strategic position, and in 2010 China agreed to import 10 billion cubic metres of gas from the Uzbeks annually (Europetrole, 2010). Finally, Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet Republics, but the recent development of the Sarikamysh gas field has helped grow the economy by 7.4% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014c) and its strategic position above Afghanistan is likely to attract security-driven investment from external powers. This growth has been accompanied by an increasingly strategic role for resources in the changing international systemic environment. Russia has a core incentive to facilitate improved access to Central Asian resources as it increasingly engages Europe via energy security mechanisms. The Ukrainian gas disputes of the mid and late 2000s demonstrated a willingness to use hydrocarbons as a core foreign policy instrument. Here, direct supply issues were complemented by economic coercion linked to strategic outcomes. The South Stream pipeline (see Baran, 2007) was a way to destroy the economic viability of the proposed and competing Nabucco pipe, which would transport resources from the Caspian outside of Russian territory. New Russian decisiveness around energy is also, in part, a response to the addition of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. This overlays EU and – by proxy – US interests directly over the critical Black Sea region. The result has been intensified security pressures, underscored by Russian actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. China, too, has been increasingly focused on energy access as a way to maximize its security. For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in 2013, soon after his promotion to the role of signing trade deals worth over US$30 billion with Kazakhstan (Perlez, 2013) and US$15 billion with Uzbekistan (South China Morning Post, 2013). The security reasoning here is that a diversified pipeline network allows Beijing to hedge against energy dependency on the Western allies and Russia. In this context, Yun Sun (2003) has correctly argued that China is pivoting to Central Asia to avoid containment in the East. This is apparent in the 30-fold increase in West Asian trade over the past decade, which has been driven by resource engagement (Wang, 2012). As a result, pipelines are increasingly a key tool in both delivery and integration in the area. For example, the Turkmenistan–China Pipeline carries natural gas from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang for a distance of 1,800km and now accounts for 50% of China’s natural gas imports. These complement a Turkmenistan oil pipeline

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stretching 2,200km that also terminates in Xinjiang with a capacity of 120,000 barrels a day providing 4% of China’s crude oil imports (Wang, 2012). Resource access has complemented a broader security interest for Beijing in ensuring stability in the region, given that the more rebellious provinces of China are in the Xinjiang region in the far west. Here, a substantial Uyghur population shares the Turkic ethnicity common in the region. Though not a substantial cause for concern yet, Turkic militant groups are involved in separatist activity with the end goal of an independent East Turkistan (see Gladney, 2003). In this context, external actors also seek stability and seek to oversee their interests by promoting said stability. This has the effect of incentivizing pipelines and resources as the key tools of political, economic and security engagement within Central Asia over other forms of coercion. So, for example, Russia is wary of too much Central Asian interference, because instability here has the potential to harm its interests. Any attempts to aggressively pursue their interests in the region risks pushing Central Asian states closer to Washington or Beijing. This combines with fear of political Islam gaining a hold, which might embolden other separatists in the region. The experience (and cost) of the Chechnya conflict is demonstrative here. A further risk for Russia in a destabilized Central Asia is that it may provide space for other emerging regional competitors, such as Iran and Turkey to exert influence, via culture (by Islam and Turkic identity respectively) and pipelines, with both positioning themselves as alternative transit points for Central Asian resources into Europe. China is also unlikely to risk antagonizing Moscow or Washington, with Chinese and Russian strategic objectives in the region sharing common goals. For example, China and Russia have engaged on energy issues, including the construction of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, which opened in 2009 and supplies 15 million tonnes a year to China, with the goal of eventually supplying 50 million tonnes a year. In fact, Russia and China have invested a great deal of political capital in institutional approaches to engaging the region, via organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Common Economic Space and Customs Union, which complement the strategic objectives of collective security organizations, such as the CSTO and SCO (Sussex, 2012). These organizations have evolved as a counter-balance to the perceived influence of the EU and the US, with Russia actively attempting to coerce Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, along with Ukraine and Armenia, to join the economic union in order to fend off US interests. This is part of a wider initiative which, according to Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle, sees Russia in particular, ‘abandoning its previous doctrine of exerting general regional influence in favour of pursuing more focused influence and integration with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan’ (Cooley & Laruelle, 2013). All in all, the institutional initiatives from China and Russia suggest that the Central Asian states are successfully providing incentives – as a result of their resources – to improve their regional bargaining positions.

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Importantly, this contrasts with other comparable areas such as the Middle East and Africa, where resources have frequently driven conflict. But the evidence here suggests that in Central Asia, resources have created less contestation than in the Middle East, in part due to the unified and decisive internal characteristics of the Central Asian regimes, and in part due to the strategic role and value of resources. Together, this has the effect of making great powers approach the region in a passive consultative manner, rather than a contested one, in order to protect their own security interests.

Foreign Policy: incentive structures and resources reinforcing multivector practice In addition to incentives and enablers, an analysis of the foreign policy practice of the Central Asian states demonstrates the utility of a neoclassical realist framework, advanced earlier in the chapter. This links the domestic and international levels, but also reveals how the type of political system – authoritarianism – enables prudent decision making in foreign policy, which in turn contributes to regional stability. It draws on the work of scholars such as Schweller (2004), who make the argument that authoritarian political systems allow states to respond to systemic pressures in the most appropriate way. Rather than being an apology for these states abuses, it simply contends that the foreign policy processes in authoritarian states are vastly simplified. Therefore they should respond largely as expected to material pressures, given there are fewer intervening variables. So, while great powers such as Russia, China and the US need to mobilize a number of intersecting interests and actors, including domestic groups, economic interests and military practicalities when reorienting foreign policy, states controlled by a small elite clique can rapidly (or, as Schweller terms it – ‘appropriately’) respond to threats. A good example of this is Uzbekistan, which has adroitly played key powers off against one another. In the aftermath of 9/11, Uzbekistan moved toward the US sphere of influence, driven by a fear of US intrusion, given its proximity to the Afghan conflict and its growing rebel contingent. As a result, Karimov allowed the US to use major airbases in return for major security funding (Tanrisever, 2013, p. 5). That decision served two purposes. Domestically, it strengthened Karimov’s regime, which was facing political unrest linked to Islamist sentiment. It also created a paradox whereby US involvement in Uzbekistan – ostensibly linked to the promoting of democracy – was in fact used as a way for Karimov to reconsolidate authoritarian rule. Internationally, it improved relations with the US, hedging against dependence on Russia or China. The end result was that both the US and Uzbekistan, were guided by material pressures, but backed by narratives that projected the opposite. Karimov’s domestic narrative was that by engaging the US, Uzbekistan was asserting its independence from Russia who had become revisionist under figures such as Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Therefore,

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Karimov, as ‘guardian of the national project’, could easily justify foreign policy double-dealing in terms of national security, which, in turn, resulted in an increase in his internal legitimacy (Akbarzadeh, 2007, p. 109). This same tactic allowed a second reorientation in 2004, as US concerns about human rights intensified. The Andijan massacre provided a catalyst for change and the US was expelled from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base soon after. Differing narratives around Andijan emerged. The US claimed that the trial of the businessmen which sparked the riots was motivated by fears of an internal revolt, while Uzbek elites asserted that the uprising was the work of Islamic radicals (Raman, 2005), therefore justifying the violent crackdown. Russia welcomed the reorientation, and supported Uzbek operations in Andijan, using the notion of ‘non-interference’. Indeed, Chinese and Russian desires to maintain regional stability, while excluding the US, meant both backed an SCO resolution formally recognizing the uprising as a terrorist plot. At a practical level, the terrorist claims may have some merit, with China concerned with the potential for Turkic extremism to penetrate the Xinjiang area. Either way, this allowed Uzbek elites to consolidate narratives around threats, into which both democratization and Islamic revivalism now fitted. Moscow rewarded Tashkent for its pivot in the aftermath of the uprising, and the Uzbeks reinvigorated the Russian economic relationship by allowing Gazprom a number of concessions in November 2005 by signing a cooperation agreement with Russia (Beehner, 2006). But Uzbekistan is not fully inside the Eurasian sphere. In 2012, the Uzbeks seem to have again reoriented, following a high-level trip by Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake. Blake oversaw agreements totalling US$2.8 billion around oil, gas and mining. The deals coincided with the formal withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan which Karimov pushed internally as evidence of Uzbekistan’s ‘importance’ in the new regional order (Markedonov, 2012). More importantly, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO in 2012 in response to the latest wave of Russia revisionism and attempts at regional hegemony. A number of supplementary issues lay behind the CSTO withdrawal, but attempts at Russian regional hegemony threaten Uzbekistan in a number of ways. It threatens Karimov’s ability to play multi-vector games. It threatens his internal rule because it removes his power as a ‘guardian of the state’ who links multi-vectorism to nationalism. And it weakens its position to create competition around its energy resources, therefore weakening its overall security bargaining position. Kazakhstan has also used multi-vector foreign policy to its advantage. This behaviour started soon after independence in 1991 when Astana engaged closely with the US to dismantle its nuclear capability in exchange for financial assistance (Hanks, 2009, p. 257). Decisive foreign policy by Nazarbayev followed, through both political and economic channels. For example, the development of the Tengiz field agreement included three governments and eight oil companies based in a number of states, including the US, the UK and Russia, enmeshing a number of actors in the new Kazakhstan (Ipek, 2007, p. 1184). Nazarbayev also integrated multi-vector rhetoric into new Kazakh

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nationalism, with Nazarbayev stating in 2003 that ‘as far as pipelines are concerned, our policy is clear and simple: have as many export routes as possible’ (Hanks, 2009, p. 264). The Kazakh policy of hedging penetrates a number of areas. For instance, it is a charter member of the SCO, but still engages comprehensively with NATO (Hanks, 2009), most notably during the yearly Steppe Eagle exercises. Kazakhstan was also the only Central Asia state to support US operations in Iraq, sending military engineers to clear minefields and from 2009, Kazakhstan allowed the US and NATO to use air and land corridors to access Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attempted to increase military cooperation with Astana by hosting a number of joint military exercises (Wagner and Costa, 2011). The Kazakhs also hedge at the regional economic level, with Nazarbayev agreeing on economic integration with Belarus and Russia while simultaneously negotiating economic integration with Central Asia during the Shymkent summit (Cummings, 2003, p. 152). Indeed, these actions all support a nationalist narrative constructed by Nazarbayev, built on the back of resource enablers. This can be traced back to Kazakh independence, where the state faced initial instability because of a concentration of Russian nationalists within the political elite. The so-called ‘Nazarbayev accord’ addressed this domestic issue (Surucu, 2010, p. 391) and moved actors into a different political sphere – the ‘new sector’ – where they could engage economic interests, but were detached from high politics. In doing so, Nazarbayev removed the potential formation of broad political cleavages around Kazakh and Russian nationalists and the associated risk of political instability. Revenues from energy helped pacify the ‘new sector’ over the subsequent period. This, in turn, allowed Nazarbayev to concentrate on the construction of a new domestic political agenda based on a revival of Kazakh national identity via a reinterpretation of language, history and culture (Isaacs, 2010, p. 440). Importantly, it also infused Nazarbayev himself as part of this new state identity, and in doing so created a dichotomy, where criticizing Nazarbayev and his foreign policy became analogous to criticizing the state and its gains (Isaacs, 2010, p. 440). For its part, Turkmenistan follows a similar pattern, but it is enlightening that it also demonstrates resilience across leadership transition. The use of a multi-vector policy approach is more problematic in Turkmenistan given the amount invested in the narrative of independence, and the state has been defined as possessing ‘permanent’ neutrality. Indeed, the idea of neutrality is such a source of national pride that the UN passed a resolution in support of the concept in 1995. Symbols of neutrality are a cornerstone of identity and are typified by the 75-metre-high rocketshaped ‘Arch of Neutrality’ found in Ashgabat. Nonetheless, the idea of neutrality has provided a useful point of continuity during the transition from Niyazov to Berdymukhamedov. The change in leadership resulted in a slight deviation in foreign policy, away from Niyazov’s close ties to Russia. When Berdymukhamedov assumed power he reoriented foreign policy by directly

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engaging the leaders of China, Iran, Turkey and the EU while also presenting a new military doctrine confirming the ‘non-alignment of our state with any military alliances and blocs, [and] not allowing foreign military bases on its territory’ (turkmenistan.ru, 2009). Despite these narratives, Turkmenistan’s early years were marked by a great deal of loyalty to Russia, only later changing to the pursuit of the ‘Chinese model’ (Kazantsev, 2012). Indeed, China seems to be benefiting most under Berdymukhamedov, demonstrated by the China-Turkmenistan Friendly Cooperation Agreement (Tanchum, 2014) along with Chinese provisions for military aid, low-level security cooperation on transnational crime, and support for the One-China policy (Peyrouse, 2010). One of China’s core interests in Turkmenistan is maintaining stability and security given the poor state of the military. For example, the air force consists of a number of ex-Soviet combat aircraft, but only possesses 10 to 15 pilots capable of flying them (Fitzpatrick, 2010). So, while the neutrality narrative restricts public discussion, a number of secretive and track II engagements occur with the US. For example, Turkmenistan was used as a supply hub for the northern supply network for ‘nonlethal’ supplies to land and air supplies to NATO and the US in Afghanistan (Tynan, 2009). Furthermore, leaked US diplomatic cables presented evidence that the US and Turkmenistan had a number of deals in place including the use of its airspace and use of the majority of its military airfields, including those on the Iranian border (Valvo, 2012). The smallest of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan, also uses the notion of neutrality via their ‘open door’ foreign policy (Nichols, 2013, p. 12). This has revolved around improvements in Chinese and Iranian relations after disputes with Russia that emerged after the jailing of a pilot in 2011 for crossing into Tajik airspace. In response, Moscow applied a number of retaliatory measures including bans on food imports and Tajik trains crossing into Russia. The disproportionate response by Russia may be the result of strengthening bargaining tools as Russian contracts signed in 2004 to maintain a military base are soon to expire. Russian and Uzbek support has been critical to Rahmon, and of the post-Soviet states, Tajikistan initially seemed the most loyal to Russia’s regional goals. Despite this, Tajikistan has engaged the US post-9/11, which supplied over US$1 billion in US aid (Nichols, 2009, p. 17). Additionally, Rahmon also allowed the use of Tajik airspace and airfields by US forces and the coalition. At the same time, Tajikistan has growing relations with Iran and Russia, while China is now its largest foreign investor. Under these circumstances, President Rahmon uses a reinvented Tajik nationalism to rule, references threats from Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, and relies on imagery linked to Hanafi Sunni Islam and Tajik nationalism to maintain power (Nichols, 2009, p. 3). This emphasis on nationalism has meant that Tajikistan can justify a multi-faceted foreign policy without losing credibility internally.

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It is instructive to contrast the experience of the four Central Asian states under analysis here with Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek implemented a Western designed parliamentary system that quickly resulted in fragmentation creating the paradox where political liberalization and transition have resulted in instability and predatory great power behaviour. The revolution of 2005 came during a period of foreign policy where Bishkek displayed a preference for Washington over Moscow. The US had an interest in developing democratic practice in the region, but its core security significance came from the strategic location of the air base at Manas that allowed close air support during Operation Enduring Freedom. Indeed, during operations in Afghanistan, support for Bishkek became a liability for the US regionally. The Manas airbase allowed the Kyrgyz’s within the newly-pluralized political environment to play Moscow and Washington off against each other, and in 2009 a promise was made to Moscow to close the US airbase. In exchange, Russia provided a US$2 billion loan and US$150 million in aid (Barry & Schwirtz, 2009). Kyrgyz leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev soon reversed the decision after Washington promised to increase the rent for the airbase threefold to US$60 million per year (Schwirtz & Levy, 2009). Further perks included expansion of the airport, substantial aid for economic development and money to combat drug smugglers, who were becoming increasingly powerful. Interestingly, Kyrgyzstan has the freest media of the Central Asian states according to the Europe and Eurasian Media Sustainability Index (IREX, 2014), in part linked to Washington’s effort to promote democracy and liberalization. But this has had the counter-intuitive effect of allowing Russian media influence to dominate. For example, Russianbacked media interests in the country stirred resentment against the US when a 2006 incident occurred where a Kyrgyz truck driver was killed yet the US soldier responsible was unpunished and free to return home (Harding, 2009). At the 2010 Presidential election, his replacement, Almazbek Atambayev, was elected with 60% of the vote, and has since been a prominent pro-Russian force. One of his first moves was to support Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EurAsEC customs union, although at present this has not been finalized. Thus overall, controlling this domestic rhetoric is more problematic for Bishkek given its lack of external revenues. In contrast with other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan is poor in hydrocarbons and is a net hydrocarbon importer. This means political power is less centralised when compared to elsewhere in the region. This, in turn, creates a porous environment open to great power influence. The key points of differentiation in Kyrgyzstan are, then, a lack of energy resources to back up the regime, and a domestic political system that currently contains few incentives to remain stable. There is also extreme corruption, combined with few social payoffs. This contrasts with the other states of the region which can strongly link their foreign policy goals to single unified narratives and back them with revenues from resources (see Anceschi,

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2010). Indeed, the Kyrgyz’s seem to lack a unified foreign policy agenda, with a number of political groups, including the pro-Western Ata-Zhurt, the Russophile Ar-Namys, and pro-Russian centrist Social Democrats leveraging a number of different narratives for immediate, rather than strategic state gains.

Conclusions This analysis has demonstrated four key points. First, material pressures, resources and ideas have combined to inform relative stability in the Central Asian region despite increasing great power rivalry. Second, one can reveal a hierarchy of variables, where great power pressures create incentives for states to form strong central governments, overseen by decisive leaders and financed by resource revenue. These leaders create narratives that embed themselves as critical to state security. In doing so, they grant themselves permission to undertake multi-vector foreign policies. These are rarely questioned by the strong domestic political structure. Third, elites respond to pressures on the basis of incentives, both at the international level and domestic level, and in doing so explains why states act in a way that is inconsistent with their notional ‘identities’ or unifying ideas. Finally, Central Asia can be differentiated from other conflict-prone areas in terms of its mutually reinforcing model, where material pressures shape ideas that are enabled by resource funds. This means that authoritarianism has become the ‘preferable’ stable model in Central Asia due to this combination of resources, authoritarianism and great power pressures. The final point comes in the form of a disclaimer. This chapter is not meant to be an apology for authoritarian rule. The analysis above simply seeks to explain the processes at play. Unfortunately, this combination of processes also makes democratic reforms unlikely in the near future. Central Asia’s material pressures are likely to intensify in the future as both China and Russia increasingly turn to the region to develop transit routes, with the goal of bypassing resources choke-points within the US sphere of influence. And as the example of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates, attempts by the US to push political reform invites competition that may result in conflict. Thus, given the stability of the current regional structure, and the incentives for great powers to not engage in destabilizing activity, the Central Asian status quo is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.

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A number of differing definitions of ‘Central Asia’ exist. The often encompass Afghanistan, but I have omitted this for both space and epistemological reasons. Afghanistan has not completely ‘played’ out with the recent US withdrawal and it is therefore hard to draw any analytical conclusions at the present time.

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