Anti-Jewish Violence in Summer 1941 in Eastern Galicia and Beyond

88 ALrrRoDAL linewitha broaderplandevisedby radicalmembersof the OUNin Galiof the Germaninvasion.The OUNleadersin Borivtsi cia in anticipation this planin the villageby recruitingsomethirtylocalmen, implemented mostlyOUNmembers,to quicklyroundup the Jewsand carryout the many Thelingeringsenseof injusticeandremorseexpressed massacre. suggeststhat mostofthe villagers decadeslaterin the 2001interviews were likelynot in favorof the killingsand not involvedin perpetrating them,thoughtheymayhavefelta collectiveshameaboutappropriating lootedpropertyand standingby as their Jewishneighborswere murderedby a groupof localyoungmen. fitthepatterns regarding eventsin thisonesmallvillage Thefindings accountsfor westscholarsin evidence-based identifiedby authoritative Thesescholarscontinueto contend,however, ernUkrainemorebroadly. of the with an opposingschoolof thoughtand policythat is Örotective OUN'Sreputation,that minimizesthe OUN'Sinvolvementin wartime crimes,that dismissesall evidencefromSovietsourcesas tainted,and The crimescommittedare memoryunreliable. witnesses' that considers or loothernon-Ukrainians, Germans, to Romanians, insteadattributed as such.66 notto OUNmembers calhooligans, it... it,or haunting Andsodoesthepastshapethefuture,illuminating

66 John-PaulHimkadiscussesthe viewsof proponentsof this schoolof thought,such as the memoiristYevhen Nakonechnyand the historianVolodymyrViatrovych,in "The Receotionof the Holocaustin PostcommunistUkraine."See: Himka, John-Pauland Joanna Beata Michlic (2013). Binging the Datu Past to Light. The Reception of the Holocaustin PostcommunistEurcpe.LincolniLondon,pp. 635-640.

KrriStruve

in: Simon Geissbühler (Hg.): Romania and the Holocaust. Events - Contexts - Aftermath, Stuttgart 2016, S. 89-113

Anti-Jewish Violencein the Summer of 1941in EasternGaliciaand Beyond l)trringthe first days and weeks after the German attack on the Soviet t,nion on June 22, 194'l, the Jews in the newly occupiedterritorieswere III by a wave ofviolence originatingfrom differentgroupsof perpetrators. ril)ecifically, it includedearlyon massexecutionsby unitsof the German tx)lice,primarilythe Einsatzgruppenof the SecurityPolice,and by other rrrritsof lhe German oolice and armed forces.A second main source of vrolence againstJewswere anti-Sovietinsurgents and non-Jewishcivilr.rnsin lhoseborderlandareasbetweenthe Balticandthe BlackSeathat lrirdbeen only recentlyannexedby the Soviet Union,that is, in Septemlxrr 1939and in June '1940,basedon the agreementsof the MolotovllibbentropPactofAugust23, 1939. This contributionsummarizesthe main results of a larger study on ,r)li-Jewishviolenceduringthe first weeks afler the Germanattack in the rrrostly UkrainianregionofeasternGalicia.lThe focusis on the character .r)d contexlof the violencefrom the side of the local populationand their rnleractionwith German activities.After outliningthe events in eastern (;irlicia,the contributioncomparesthis region with others in that strip of trlrritorybetweenthe Baltic Sea and the Black Sea that had been ruled I'y the Sovietsduringthe previoustwelve to twenty-onemonths. Thereby,the chapter addressesa problemthat receivedconsideral,lo attenlionin researchand in the oublicin the wake of Jan Tomasz ( ;ross'bookon the pogrom in the town of Jedwabnein northeaslernPor.lr)don July 10, 1941.2In contrastto the mostlyPolishregions,the fact

EasternGalicia is dofined here as the southeasternregionsof the Polish state that had belongedto the AustrianCrown Landof Galiciauntil 1918and that becamea part of the Soviet Union after September'1939.Struve,Kai (2015).DeutscheHenachaft, ukainischer Nationalismus, antijiidische Gewalt. Det Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine. Berlin. Gross, Jan T. (2001). Ne,ghbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princ,.to .

89

90 KAI STRUVE that pogroms had taken place in other parts of the westernSoviet borderlandshad alreadybeen knownsincethe beginningof the war and Especially, this was true for was subsequently debatedcontroversially. the Ukrainiancase. pertainednot only to the In the Ukrainiancase,the controversies pogroms, participation and its reasons,but numberand scale of local NationOrganization of Ukrainian mostlyto the roleof StepanBandera's ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, OUN-B).Whileits leadalists(Orhanizatsiia withthem,deniedtheir ing postwaractivistsand historians, sympathizing involvementand responsibility,3 othersascribedto them an important was fueledby the fact that the SovietUnionhad role.aThe conlroversy campaignagainslthe Ukrainiannationengagedin a fiercepropaganda Thiswas of westernUkrainein 19214. alistssincethe Sovietreoccupation pov(Ukrains'ka part Army the war the Ukrainian Insurgenl a of against stans'kaarmiia,UPA)that had beenfoundedby the OUN-Bat the end of 1942.The propaganda campaignalsocontinuedafterUPASfinaldefeat at the beginningof the 1950s.The maingoal of this campaignwas withthe Geras fascislcollaborators to presentthe Ukrainiannationalists mansand as theirhenchmen.5 However, Sovietwritingstendedto ignore againstJews, prethe crimescommittedby the Ukrainiannationalists of executioners sentingthe Ukrainiansinsteadas German-sponsored the Ukrainianpopulation.6 in western Fromthe pointof viewof largesegmentsofthe population was immensely Ukraineand amongUkrainianexiles,Sovietpropaganda coverfor lhe brutal cynicalnot only becauseit providedthe ideological againstSovietrulebutalsobecause suppression of Ukrainianresistance part it was of the denialof Sovietcrimescommiltedin the days after the Most prominently:Stets'ko,laroslav(1967).30 cheNnia 1941. Proholoshenniavid' novlenniaderzhavnostyUkrainy.fotonlo, p. 239f.; for a more recent examplefrom hisforiographysee: V'iatrovych,Volodymyr(2006).Slav/ennlaOUN do ievreiv.Fotmuvanniapozßsil na tlikalasttofy.L'viv,p. 59f. RelationsDuringth€ See, for example:Friedman,Philip(1958/59).Ukrainian-Jewish Nazi Occupalion,Journalof Jewish SocialScience12:259-294, herc pp.274-276. Weiner,Amir (2001). Making Senseof Wa. The Second World Wat and the Fate ol the Bolshevik Revo/ulion- Princeton, pp. 165-169; Rossolinski-Liebe,Grzegorz (2014).Stepan Bandeß. The Life and Afterlifeof a UkrainianNationarst Fascism, Genocide,and Cuft,Sluttgad,pp. 362-383. Rudnytskii(19541.Pod chuzhinizna' See as a blatantexample:Beliaev,V. and l\,'1. merami. Moscow,pp. 54-68.

ANTI-JEWrSH VToLENCE rNTHESUMMER oF 1941 91 ".rrranattackon the SovietUnion.Whenthe Sovietsstartedto retreat, 'r,',ymurderedinmatesof prisonswho had been arrested political for ,.,r:;ons. Thesemurderswerecommitted on an especiallylargescalein ,r|r;lernUkraine,apparentlybecausethe Germanadvancehere was .r,,werthanin otherpartsof the front.In easternGalicia,between7,500 rrrrl10,000orisoninmaleswerekilled.T Whilein the Ukrainiancase,primarily, the questionof the roleof the ,llN-Bandils collaboration wilhtheGermanswerecontroversial, forthe .r',1one and a halfdecades,the discussion on the pogromsof the sum'rrrr of 1941has beenenormously influenced by Jan Gross'studyon the 1,.(lwabne case.On the one hand,Gross'smallbook and the ensuing i,,l)iltehaveproducedimportantnewinsighls,especially with respectto .r rlifferentiated evaluationof relationsbetweenJews and non-Jewsin rr,,!periodof the Sovietoccupationand the increasein anti-Semitism. , )n the other hand, it also seemsto havereinforcedsome misleading .r.'r;umptions aboutthe characterof anti-Jewish violencein lhe summer ,l 1941bothin Polishand otherterritories. Gross'studyemphasizesan ,rrr.rge of the pogromsas a largelyspontaneous, murderous,and mas'.rvooutbreakof anti-Semitic hatredwhere,as he summarizedin his de., riptionof the evenlsin Jedwabne, "halfofthepopulation [...] murdered tllo otherhalf,"referringto the fact that aboutone half of Jedwabne's ,rrlrrbitants were Chrlstianand the otherhalf Jewish.sThe criticalpoint r',,reis lhat such a generalization in fact distractsfrom attemptsto look

For a discussionof numbers,see: Struve20'15,pp.214-216. Otherauthorsmention highernumbers.For example:Oleh Romanivand InnaFedushchakestimatelhe numl)er of murderedprison inmates in WesternUkraineat about 22,000, among them 17,000in eastern Galicia. Romaniv,Oleh and Inna Fedushchak(2002). ZakhidItoukraihs'kattahediia1941.L'viv,p.63. KtzysztofPopiriskimontions20,000-24,000 rnurderedinmatesfor easternPoland,amonglhem 14,000-'18,000 for easlernGalicia. KrzysztofPopiiski (1997).EwakuacjawiQzieÄkresowychw czerwcü194'1r. na podstawiedokumentacji"Memodalu"i ArchiwumWschodniego,in: Zbrod,icza ewakuacja wiQziehi aresztöw NKWD na Kresach Wschodnich ll Rzeczypospolitej w czewcuhpcu 1941,oku. Watsaw, pp.71-77. See also: Musial,Bogdan(2001)-"Konteftevoh ionäre Elemene sind zu eßchießen." Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Kieges im Sommer 1941.Benin, pp.98_142. (;ross2001.o. 7.

92 KAI STRUVE were and whattheirpolitfor answersaboutwho the actualperpetrators ical and organizationalbackgroundwas.eAttempts to exterminatethe whole Jewishpopulationin largertowns such as Jedwabnewere rare exceptionsamong the large number of localitieswhere acts of violence as was the casealsoin Jedwabne, againslJewstookplace.Furthermore, closer examinationclearly shows that the actual perpetratorswere a smaller,organizedgroupwhoseactionsare not adequatelydescribedas outbreakof deadlyviolence,as will be discussed a Iargelyspontaneous in furtherdetailbelow. In the following part of the conlribution,I outline the results of the violencein easternGaliciabeforecomparingthem studyof anti-Jewish with otherregions.

Plans and expectationsbefore June 22,'194'l Concerningthe questionof whetherthe Germanshad made prepara{ionsto instigatepogromsalone or jointlywith lhe help of Ukrainianor other nationalistgroups,a centraldocumentis the often-citedcable that (Reich Main ReinhardHeydrich,head of the Relchsslcherheifshaupfamt SecurityOffice),sent to the commandersof the Ernsatzgruppenon June 29, 1941.Here,Heydrichorderedhis policeforcesto secretlysupport "self-cleansing and anti-Jewishcircles"in activitiesof anti-Communist the newlyoccupiedterritoriesand to instigalelocal pogroms.He referred to a meeting with officersfrom lhe Emsatzgruppenon June 17, 1941, ln fact lhere are more wherehe had alreadygivensimilarinstructions.lo documentsto provethat lhere were widespreadexpectationson the German slde that violentreckoningswith "Jews and Communists"in the newlyoccupiedterritorieswould take placeafter thg Sovietarmedforces had left.Thiswas seenas a good and healthyphenomenonthat should l be supported.l See for an early, partly similaf critiqueof Gross approach and conclusions:Stola, Dariusz(2003).Jedwabne.Revisitingthe Evidonceand the Natureof the Crime,Holocaustand GenocideStudies17t 139-152. '10 The cable is publishedin: Klein,Poter(ed.)(1997).Die Einsatzgruppenin der besetzten Sowjetunion1941/42.Die Tätigkeits-und Lagebeichte des ChefsderSicheheilspolizeiund des SD. Berlin,p. 319. Pläne und Propagandamaßnah1 l Kangeris,Karlis (2004).Die nationalsozialistischen men im GeneralbezirkLettland1941 1942,in Gaunt,Davidelal.leds.). Collaborction

ANTI-JEWrSH VIoLENCE rNTHESUMMER oF 1941 93 Butthereare no furtherdocumentsthatindicateany kindof concrete or preplanningin cooperationwith Ukrainianor other local , r,,t)aralion ' ,rr;csApparently, Heydrichsentthe cablebecausehe (andmostlikely rl ,o HeinrichHimmler)believedthat, so far, the Elnsafzgruppenhad put ', ,,)littleeffortinto instigatingpogroms.Heydrichmay have had in view ,',lrecially EinsatzgruppeB, while the activities of EinsatzgruppeAin , rthuania couldhaveprovidedinputfo, his instructions on how his police ',,rr;es should proceed. 12 Until the date of Heydrich's cable, t t)satzgruppeC, which had been active in the Ukrainianterritoriesin ,',r;ternGaliciaandVolhynia,hadnot had manyopportunities to instigate 1, rrlromsbecauseof the slowadvanceof Germantroopshereduringthe days of the invasion.However,this would also indicatethat there "r.,1 t,,r(lnot beenany thoroughplanningand preparation exceptfor a discus.r,rrrat the meetingon June 17, 1941. Heresupportfor violentreckonings ,r,rsonly one among many subjectsthat were discussedregardingthe l'.t)loyment and tasksof the Einsatzgruppen.l3 Anotherargumentagainstthe existenceof the joint planningand ,,r )re concreteand detailedpreparationof pogromsagainstJews con.l'.lsin the factthatthe instigalion of pogromswas an aim of the German i,'lrce forces.Deep mutualdistrustexistedbetweenthem and Stepan It.!ndera'sOUN.The OUN had cooperatedwith the Germanssinceits in 1929 with an interruplionbetweenthe end of '1933and "ündation l'r.17-38(theperiodof German-Polish rapprochement) in the sameway , . rlspredecessor, the Ukrains'kaviiskovaorhanizatsiia (UVO)(Ukrainrr MilitaryOrganization) had duringthe 1920s.However,in this period, r,, OUN alreadyhadthe supportof the Germanmilitaryintelligence, the

,rxl Reslslance During the Holocaust. Belatus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Betn., '169;Quinkert,Eabette(2009).Propaganda und Tenot in Weißl)t) 161-186, here p. rßsland 1941-1944. Die deutsche "geistige"Kriegführung gegen die Zivilbevölkerung rttd Parlisanen.Paderborn,pp. 56f. llossino,AlexanderB. (2003).Polish"Neighbours"and GermanInvaders:AntiJewish Vrolencein the BialystokDistrictduringlhe OpeningWeeks of OperationBarbarossa, /'.)/rr16:431-451,herep.443. ( )r lhe meetingof June 17, 1941tWildt,l\richael12002).Generationdes Unbedingten. I )as Führungskotpsdes Relchssicherheitshautplamtes. Hamburg,p. 557f.;OgorrecK, ll.rlf ('1996).Dle Ehsatzgruppenund die "Genesisdet Endlösung".Berlin,p. 58f.

94 KAI STRUVE Aöulehr,while the Germanpoliticalpolice,the Gesfapo,and the AußenpolitischesAmt (Foreign PoliticalOffice) of Hitler's NSDAP,headed by Alfred Rosenberg,preferredcooperationwith other Ukrainiangroups.la The distrustwas only aggravaledby lhe split in the OUN in 1940 when Bandera'sfollowersseparatedfrom the organization'sleadership underAndriiMel'nyk.Finally,the conflictswithinthe OUN resultedin an interruplionin cooperationwith Bandera'sorganizationby the Ablvehr in November 1940. However, lhe Abwehr resumed cooperation in the of the attackon the Soviet springof 1941inlhe conlextofthe preparation Union.The reasonfor thiswas thatwiththe split,the Mel'nykleadership in the German-occupied had lostthe supportof mostof the organization part of Polandas well as contactwith the undergroundorganization in the Soviet-occupiedterritoriesof eastern Galicia and Volhynia.As a result of the split,practicallyonly the Bandera-OuNwas able to provide the GermanAbryehrwithintelligencefrom the Soviet territoryand, probably even more importantly,to preparean insurgencyin the Sovietterritories of western Ukraine that were to start with the German attack on Banderaand his followersseemedto the SovietUnion.15 Furthermore, with the German SecurityPolice becauso have avoidedcloser contacts thei knew the hostileattitudeof the SecurityPolicetowardthem and probablyfearedthat it couldpreventthemfrom implementing theirplans to builda Ukrainianstate. In conlrast, Andrii Mel'nyk's OUN not only cooperated with lhe Abwehr bul lhere also seems to have existed some form of cooperation After June betweenMel'nyk'sOUN and the GermanSecurityPolice.16 22, 1941, peoplelinkedto the Mel'nykfactioncouldbe foundas translators or in other capacitiesboth within EinsatzgruppeC and in the socalledEinsatzkommandoLembergthat was s6nt from tne Generalgouvernementlo easternGalicia to establishstructuresof the German SeApparently, not onlythe banderMsikepldistancebut also curityPolice.17 '14 For the ea ier cooperation,see the comprehensivestudy by Golczewski,Frank 12010\.Deutscheund Ukrainer1914 1939.Paderborn. '15 On the Ukrainianundergroundin the Sovietterritoryand the OUN-B'spreparationol an uprising,see: Patryliak,lvan K. (2004). Viis'kovadiial'nist'OUN(B)u 1940-1942 rckakh. Kiev. 1 6 On the preparationsfor the war by both factions of the OUN, see: Struve 2015, oo.172-209. 1 7 lbid., p. 227f., p. 299.

ANTr-JEwrsH VToLENCE rNTHESUMMER oF 1941 95 'r,,.SecurityPolicepreferredthe more docileMel'nykfollowersto the : .rxlerivtsi. The Security Police mistrustedthe banderivtsibecause of 't,,.rractivist.defiantattitude. lhe resultwas thatthe Germanpoliceforcesthathadbeenassigned 'li'. laskof instigating pogromscooperated witha Ukrainianorganization 'r,.rthad lost nearlyall connections to the Ukrainianunderground in the '.,,vietareasand, thus, priorto the Germanattackon June22, 1941, *,ruld not have been able to preparepogroms.On the otherhand,the ,lririnianorganization that had strongunderground forcesin the Soviet :.'rlltorycooperatedwith the Abwehr and lhe Germanarmy that had 'tlr(Jftasksand priorities than preparingacts of anti-Jewish violence.

lhe perception of Jews rs supporters and beneficiariesof Soviet rule , r,'wever,both lhe Germansand the Ukrainiannationalists sharedthe , ','w thatthe Jewswerethe mainsupportersand beneficiaries of Soviet ,1,, bothgenerallyand especially in the periodof 1939-41in the newly r, lrriredSovietterritories. The perception of Jewsas the "biological sub.t.[]ce"of Sovietrule,as Klaus-Michael Mallmannhas argued,formed 'I ,. rationalefor the mass executionsof Jews by the Germanpolice ' 'r,r:sduringthe weeksafterJune22, 1941.18While,duringthe war with r',,l.rndin September1939,the main enemyhad been the Poles,with 'r',..Jews groupofthe population, beingseenratheras an undesirable in 'f.r',newwar they appearedas a core groupof the Sovietenemy.In anll irrr letterlo lhe E nsatzgruppenon July 1, Heydrichexplicitlywrote: "lt . ,,lrviouslhal the cleansingactivitieshaveto extendfirst of all to Bol.rr"viksand Jews."leWhile mostof the Bolsheviksfled beforethe Ger.rrrsarrived,mostof the Jews stayed.By the end of July,the German , ' rr:cunitstargetedJewishmales,primarilyfrom lhe intelligentsia, be,,r,o they were seen as especiallypro-Sovietand as a securityrisk. r,,.irttemplto annihilatethe wholeJewishpopulationbeganonly later.

f,1,rllmann, (2000).Die Türöffnerder "Endlösung"Zur Genesisdes GeKlaus-l,4ichael ,l,),,ids,in Paul,Gerhardand Klaus-MichaelMallmann(eds.).Drb Gestapoim Zweiten Wt:llkrieg."Heimatftonl"und besetztesEuropa.Darmstadt,pp. 437-463, here p. 443f. r\ ,)in'1997.D. 320f.

96 KArSTRUVE The perception ofJewsas supporters andbeneficiaries ofSovietrule had also spreadwidelyamongthe non-Jewishpopulationin the territories occupiedby the SovietUnionin September1939and June 1940,e The radicalUkrainiannationalists sharedit, too. In May and June 1941 the leadershipof the Bandera-OuNwrote down extensiveinstructiong for the beginningof the German-Soviet war.They describedthe organi. zation'smainaim as the installation of localadministrations and militias in localitieswherethe Soviettroopswereaboutto leaveas soonas pos. sibleand preferablybeforethe Germantroopsarrived.This wouldpro. vide the basisfor Ukrainianstate-building and demonslrateto the Gsrmans the strengthof the Ukrainians'will and abilityto establishsucha state.Despiterepeatedefforts,the OUN-Bwas unableto receiveany clearassurances from the Germanside that a Ukrainianstatewouldbe foundedas a resullof the war againstthe SovietUnion. One of the tasksthatStepanBandera'sOUN assignedto its combat groupsand localmilitiaswasto cleansetheterritoryof "hostileelements," that is, remnantsnot only of Soviettroopsand NKVD officialsbut also moregenerallyof supportersof Sovielrule.21 A numberof documentsshowthatwithinthe OUN-8,primarily, Jews wereseenin thisrole.Butalsowithresoectlo the foundationof a UKrarn. ian nation-slate, Jewswereconsideredto be an undesirable group.The headof the OUN-B'sstructuresin the Sovietterritories,lvan Klymiv,interpretedtheselasks in an especiallyradicalway in two leafletsthat hs had writtenalreadybeforethe beginningof the Germanattackand that werewidelydistributed in weslernUkrainein July 1941. One of the leafletsexhortedits readers:"People!Know!Moscow,Poland,the Hungari-

See on the imageof Jews as pro-Sovietin WesternUkrainetMick, Christoph(2007) "Onlythe Jewsdo notwaver... Lviv underSovietOccupation, in Barkan,Elazaretal (eds.). Shared History-Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941.Leipzig,pp.245-262. The questioniI such a perceptionwas based on real attiludesamong Jews or on older prejudiceshas been especialiyintenselydis. cussedfor the Poljshcase, see on that debalet Struve,Kai (2008).ceschichte und Gedächlnis.Polen LrndJuden unter sowietischerHerrschaft'1939 1941. Jahrbuch OeSStmon-UuDnow-lnsrlüls /: 495-lr.JU 21 Veselova,O. et al. (eds.)(2006).OUNv 1941rotsi\pat11).Kiev,pp.58 176,horo p. 93i see also: Carynnyk,[iarco (2011). Foes of Our Rebirth:UkrainianNationatisr Discussionsabout Jews, 1929-1947, NationalitiesPapers 39, pp.315-352, herrl o.329f.

ANTI-JEWISH VToLENCE INTHE SUMMERoF 7941

97

' . lhe Jews lzhydoya]-these are your enemies.Destroythem." In ad' ',,'n KlymivintroducedMilitaryRevolutionary Tribunalswiththe power ,rpplythe death penaltyand to ascribe"collectiveresponsibility" to ',,rrrlrcsand nationsfor all offencesagainstthe Ukrainianarmy and ' rt: r/

I hisdescribesthe frameworkof ordersand instructions thatthe local ', I rcgionalcommandersofthe OUN-Binsurgencyreceived.Theiraim ,r.r'.lo builda Ukrainianstate-which the Germanstriedto orevent

(:ontexts of anti-Jewish violence in eastern Galicia .\ , l()seanalysisof acts of anti-Jewishviolencein about 30 citiesand .,,r.rlltownsas wellas a numberof villagesin easternGaliciaduringJuly ' '.1I with lhe participation or at the instigationof localpeopleenables ' ', (tistinction to be madebetweenthreemaincontextsofthe violence.23 I lro retrievalof murdered prison inmates , ,r numberof localitiesacts of violenceagainstJewstook placein the , ,rrlr:xt of the retrievalof the corpsesof prisoninmateswho the Soviets , .',i killedbeforetheirretreat.The bestknowncase hereare the events llrc westernUkrainiancapitalUviv on July 'l , 1941.24 ln L'viv,as in .,,vr)ralothercilieswheremurderedDrisoninmaleswerefound.the Ger,,Ir militaryaulhoriliesorderedthe Ukrainianmilitiato bringJewsto the , r',ons as workersfor the retrievalof the corosesin orderlo allowrela.,.r,to identifyand to bury them. lt was part of the usualprocedureof 'r,,.(iermanarmyto use primarilyJewsas forcedlaborersfor all kindsof n ,rkaflerGermanlroopshad occupieda certainlocality.Ukrainianmili.r',ostablished themselvesbasedon ihe underoround structuresoflhe r(raievyi provid Ukrainskykh natsionalistiv na MUZ (lralirni ukrainski zemli), (lkrains'ke narode!",in Dziuban,Orest (ed.) (2001). Uka-tns'kederzhavotvorcnnia. Akt 30 cheNnia 1941.Zbinyk dokunentiv i matedaliv.Kiev. pp. 12G-129;Nachal'nyi Lornlandant]Ukr[ainskoi] nats[ionalnoi]revoliuciinoiarmii, leitenantLiegenda,"HroIradiane Ukrains'ko-r derzhavy!",in: ibid.,pp. 129-131;see also Carynnyk201'1, | 332. I he followingsectionis a summaryof a micro-analysis of anti-Jewishviolenceofwhich llrcdetailscan be foundin: Struve2015,pp. 216 667. liee on L'vivalso:Himka,John-Paul(2011).The LvivPogromof '1941: The Germans, llkrainian Nationalists,and the Carnival Ctowd, Canadian SlavonicPaperc/Revue ' ,)nadiennedes slavistes53:209-243.

98 KAI STRUVE

OUN-Bin all theselocalitiesand nearlyeverywhere elsein easternG& liciacloselybeforeor afterthe arrivalof Germantroopsin linewiih tha plansfor state-building OUN-B'S as fromMay1941. ThefactthatJewswereforcedto retrievethe corpsesof the prison populationthe already inmatesconfirmedin the eyesof the non-Jewish perception widespread of Jewsas supporters andbeneftciaries of Soviel ruleand that they also boreresponsibility for the Sovietmassmurd€t Theworkwiththedecomposing bodiesitselfwasalreadya formof pun. ishment. Mocking andbeatings whiletheyworkedaddedto theirhumillation.In otherinstances theywerearrestedon the streetsorforcedfrom theiraoartments to do thatwork.Sometimes thisescalatedto murder.In joined Uvivandin otherlocalitiesresidents the militiain bringingJewsto the prisons.The violencewas mostintensearoundthe prisonswhera manypeopleseekingrelativesor friendswho had beenarrestedby thc Sovietshadgathered. As manyscenesfromthe L'vivpogromshow,thc violencetherewasalsooartof-and thisis alsotruefor otherlocalitiesthe reversalof the previoussocialorthe publicdisplaysthatcelebrated theJewsfortheirallegedearlierlransgression!. derby publiclypunishing In nearlyall localitiesGermanforceswerepresentat theprisonsand controlled the entrances. Theysupervised the retrievalof the bodiesand usuallyaftersomehoursalsostoppedthe violence.In manyinstances, membersof the Germanpoliceor armedforcesparticipated in the violence.Duringthe pogromin L'viv,the largestsinglemurdercaseconsisted of the executionof about a hundredJews by membersof Einsatzgruppe C in the yardof the Brygidkiprison.Thereare strongindications, thoughno clearproof,thalthe E nsatzgruppe alsocontributod to the factthat manymoreJewswerebroughtto the prisonsthancould workthere.ln at leasttwo of the threeprisons,they seemto haveencouragedlocalciviliansto commitacts of violence.In the caseof Boryslav,thereis moreclearevidencethata unitof the Germanpoliceunderthe command of the HigherSS andpoliceleaderFriedrich Jeckeln encouraged violence.ln thiscity,a fiercepogromwithmanyactsof murder developedon July3 and 4. Alsoherea numberof the victimswere shotby the Germanpoliceunitin the yardof the localprisonbuilding.In Drohobych, a bloodypogromunfoldedimmediately afterGermantroops occupiedthe city and corpsesof murderedinmateswere found. In Zolochivandin Ternopil', the retrievalof murderedprisoninmateswasa

ANTI-JEWrSH VToLENCE rNTHESUMMER oF 1941 99 rr rrrreof anti-Jewishviolence.The events here, however,were primarily l$rt of anothercontext,that is, of a series of violentexcessescommitted try grartsof the "Viking"division of the l4/affen-Ssas will be discussed llowever, Soviet massacresof prison inmates did not always prorlrr;odeadlyanti-Jewishviolence.Apparently,the attitudeand the procertrro of the local German military or police authoritieshad an influence l|'ro. For example, in Stanislaviv (today lvano-Frankivs'k),Stryi, and rflrovkva,the Sovietsalso killedprisoninmates.In Stanislaviv,Jews had r, rotrievethe dead,but this did not becomea publicritualof humiliation .n(l punishmentof the Jews. lt seems that only enough workers were Irought to the prisonwho could actuallywork there. Stanislavivwas ocr.rrlried by Hungariantroops.In thoselocalitieswhere Hungariantroops rrrre present,they usuallypreventedthe murderof Jews, though not all .(.tsof violence.Stryiand Zhovkvawere occupiedby Germantroopsand lrrre too the retrievalof the corpseswas not accompaniedby violence. lr lhe case of Stryi,the sourcesdo not allow conclusionslo be drawn as r' r,vhohad to retrievethe corpsesof the murderedprisoninmates.Jews hrxl to preparea mass grave for them and were threatenedand beaten rhrringthat work.Therewere also some mockingand physicalattackson JIws by Ukrainianyouths in the streetsof the city, but no one seems to trrrvebeen killed.In Zhovkva,SovietPOWShad to take out lhe murdered nrnates from the NKVD building.Shortlyafter the occupationof the city, (;orman troops burned down the synagozgue,and, for several hours, gmups of Ukrainian youths attacked Jews and smashed windows in rtr{retsinhabitedby Jews. But here as well no Jews were killed.25 Punishmentsand executions by OUN-Binsurgents A5describedabove,the instructionsofthe OUN-Bforthe initialphaseof o,r,German-Sovietwar allowedfor "cleansingthe territoryof hostileelerrrlnts"and describedJews in a very generalway as supportersof Soviet

Ihe retrievalof corpsesin Zhovkvathat has not been heated more extensiv€lyin my l)ook is shown in a short sequ€nceof a film mad€ by an officerin the staff of Army Oorps lV, for information on the film: www.filmarchives-online.eu/viewDetailForm?FilmworklD=dsg811dd19f2c01abba0a6174eegb8be (acc€ssed on May 2, 2016). On attacks on Jews, see: GerszonTaffet, ArchiwumZydowskiegoInsMutu rlistorycznego(AzlH) 302]141, p, 9t,; JbzefHochner,ibid.,30l/1892.

100 KAl STRUVE rule.lvan Klymiv'sleafletshad radicalized theseinstructions evenmore, Tribunalsand especiallyhis order to introduceMilitaryRevolutionary their powerto imposecollectivepunishmentson familiesand national groups.That seemsto have been the centralcontextof deadly violence in smalltownsand manyvillagesoverwhlchthe Germanand Hungarian troops did not have full control during the first days and weeks of their occupation. Usually,the violencetookplacewithoutthe knowledgeofthe Germanor Hungarianmilitaryauthorities.Such punishmentcouldtake very differentforms and often affectednot only Jews but also Ukrainians of Ukrainianswas usuallymilder and Poles.However,the "punishment" and less deadly,and concernedspecificindividualswho had servedin the Sovietvillageadministration,supportedthe foundationof kolkhozes, or had allegedly informedon others. In the case of Jews, often whole familieswere killed,and the murderof Jews seemsto have been much morewidespread lhan amongothernationalities. lt can be assumedthat this was the result of the stereotypicalperceptionof Jews as supporters of Sovietrule.Poleswerealsosometimeskilledfor allegedlyhavingsupportedSovietrule,informedon Ukrainians, or becausethey were seen of lhe Ukrainian state. as enemies ln this context,the violencecould take on very differentforms, however. For example,in the villageof Dychkiv,near Ternopil',local OUN activistsarrestednineto twelveJewishmales,ledthemout ofthe village, and executed them there on July 6, that is, about three days after th6 Red Army had retreatedfrom this area.26ln the village of Perevoloka, near Buchach,localOUN-Bactivistsarrestedat leastten men already beforeGermantroopshad arrived,amongthem eight Ukrainiansand two Jews,and executedlhem. In addition,they killedone Jewishfamily. The morningafterthe killings,lhey declaredduringa publicmeetingthat an independentUkrainianstate had been founded, apparentlyreferring to the declarationof the foundationof a Ukrainianstate by Bandera's deputylaroslavStets'koon the eveningof June 30, 1941,in fviv that had also beenannouncedvia the Lviv radiostation.2T ln other localities,for examplethe small towns of Ulashkivtsiand Otyniia,severaldozen Jews were killedout of a Jewish populationof severalhundredor about one thousand.In the memoirsof survivinq 26 Struve2015, p. 534f. 21 l b i d .p, p . 5 1 5 - 5 1 8 .

INTHESUMMER oF 1941 101 ANTI-JEWISH VIoLENCE r,,ws,theseactsof violenceappearas a pogromin lhe senseof a spon'.rrrr rous,wild outbreakof excessiveviolence.In fact,closerexamination 'Lources and the context of events in other localitiessuggestthat the .'' Iri of murderwere targetedkillingsof a numberof Jewishfamiliesby , ' .rl insurgentgroupsof the OUN-8.28 In the smalltown of Kosiv,near lrortkiv,and the villageof Nezvys'ko,near Obertyn,the punishmentof ,r,',Jewsbecamean attemptto exterminate the wholeJewishpopulation, ,vthB0 to 1'15victimsin Kosivand about60 in Nezvys'ko.2s vlolent excesses by units of the Waffen-SS I ',r ls of the "Viking"Ur'affen-Ssdivisionwere responsiblefor the bloodi,'.,tpogromsin easternGalicia.This unit of the l4y'affen-Ss was part of 'lr'rcombattroopssubordinated to the Germanarmedforcesand had no lasks.The divisionhad been newlydeployedbeforethe German 1",lrce .rtl,rckon the SovietUnion.Mostof the soldiersof thisideologically highly military formation the naunit, which saw itself as an elite of "rolivated ,r,'rralsocialiststate, had had no battleexperiencewhen they moved 'r,rougheasternGalicia.They were part of a secondline of troopslhat ,,,t(jnot,or onlyto a smalldegree,takenpartin the intensefightingin the t , )rder area.Therewere someskirmishes with Soviettroopsalsoeastof r vrv,bul in majorcombatactivitythe "Viking"divisionbecameinvolved rrlyin the northeaslof Ternopil'and at the formerPolish-Soviet border theystartedtheirwar againstthe SovietUnion ",,rrrHusialyn.Apparently, I v shootingJewswhomthey met on theirway to the frontline. Parts of the divisionhad a central role in the violent excessescom',rrllcdin Zolochiv,Zboriv,Ozerna,Hrymailiv, Skalat,and most of all in t,,rrropil'. In all these localities,local Ukrainianmilitiasand inhabitants rl ,o oarticiDated in the violence.But mostof the victims-between8 and ttr percentof the Jewish populationof these citiesand towns-were ,rrrrlythe result of the involvementof the Lyaffen-Sstroops. They ,,rrrbedthese localitiesfor Jewishmen and shot them "as if it was a i,rrrlingexpedition,"as one Jewishwitnessdescribedwhat he saw in l'.rropil'.30 Or they assembledJews at certainplaces-for instancein '.,[rchiv at lhe NKVD orison.wherethe Jews also had to retrievethe lbid.,pp. 551-554,pp. 638-643. , llJrd., pp. 545-548,pp.654-662. otto Schorman;The BrownTerror,A2lH 302/295,p. 7.

102 KAr STRUVE

thelarg. bodiesof murderedinmates-andshotthemthere.In Ternopil', pogrom place, probably by thisunittook between2,300 estcitywherea and 4,000Jewswerekilled.Thiswas violenceon a muchlargerscala andwitha verydifferentcharacterthantheviolencein otherlocalities.3l withhighnumbersof deaths,the sourcesgiva Fornearlyall localities differentor onlyveryroughnumbers.In somecasesit is possibleto di!. in the literatureaa countsomenumbersin lhe sourcesor assumptions unlikely,basedon descriptions of theviolenceor on dataaboutthe Je!vish inhabitants. Nevertheless, everyestimateof thetotalnumberof Jeura of localinhabitants for tha killedin actsof violencewiththe participation The sourcesa|l wholeof easternGaliciacontainsa high uncertainty. oftenvague,and theremay havebeenactsof violencein villagesthal in anysources.However, myestimateofthe numbol arenotdocumented of Jewishvictimsin localitiesfor whichwe havedocumentsis betweon Thesenumbersdo not includemassexecutions by 2,300and 11,300. Germanpoliceforces,of whichthe largestin easternGaliciatookplaca in thoselocalitiga in fviv on July5, buttheydo includethe massacres "Viking" divisionwasinvolved.However,about60 wherethe Waffen-Ss percentof the victimswere killedin pogromsin whichthe Waffen-SS "Viking"divisionplayeda centralrole.32 Nevertheless, in termsof localperpetrators, at the coreof all casel were clearlyor verylikely of deadlyviolencethat I couldexaminethere insurgents of the OUN-Bor localmilitiasfoundedby them.Thiswastha casein thoselocalitieswhereJewswere broughtto the prisonsto rotrievemurderedinmates.The roleof the OUN-Bgroupsis evenclearet in thoselocalities wheretheviolenceconsistedmostlyoftargetedkillingl of certainindividuals or families. In summary, it canbe statedthattherewasno uniform"pogromsce. violenceconsistedof differentsegmenb nario"but that the anti-Jewish Theywereinterconnected by the perthat,however,oftenoverlapped. of Sovietrule.The receptionof Jewsas supporters and beneficiaries violencealsoshowthat undersultsof the closeanalysisof anti-Jewish hatredlr standingil as a massive,spontaneous outbreakof anti-Semitic Therecan be no doubtthat anti-Jewish to a certaindegreemisleading. attitudesstronglyincreasedduringthe periodof Sovietrule and that 3 1 On the massacresof yyaffer-Ssdivision"Viking":Struve20'15,pp. 561 530. ofthe numb€rof victims,see:ibid.,pp.668-671. 32 Fora moredetaileddiscussion

ANTI-JEWISHVIoLENCE IN THE SUMMERoF 1941

.I 03

üx,rowas a generalatmosphereof hostilityloward Jews in the summer ',1 l{)41. However,these anti-Jewishaftitudesalone only rarely seem to h.rvoresultedin deadly violence.There were two other preconditionsfor ,ln,r(llyviolence on a larger scale perpetratedby the local population. 'rrr(Jracts of violence took place where they were encouragedby the ( Lr nan authoritiesor where acts of murder were perpetratedby local 'rnllias or combat groups. In both cases, from the local side, nationalist rrrrrrgentsplayed a central role. For them the acts of violencewere part ,|l thechangeof ruleand of state-building.

teyond easternGalicia (,{rnlparisonof eastern Galicia with other regions of the western Soviet |rrderland confirmsthe findingthat deadlyviolenceagainstJews perpeI'lrlod by the local populationemanated mostly from insurgentgroups *lx) aimed at the removaland the punishmentof alleged supportersof li,viet rule and at establishingtheir own nation-states.Among these reg()r)s,lhe situationin Volhyniawas very similarto that in easternGalicia lxrr;ausein Volhyniatoo a strong OUN-B undergroundexistedthat acted o,.r:ordingto the same instructionsas the undergroundin eastern GaliExcept for Volhynia,the events in eastern Galicia resemble most rtronglythose in the Balticcountries,primarilyin Lithuania.After the SovrrtUnionhad occupiedLithuania,Latvia,and Estoniain the summerof l'140,in all threecountriesan anti-Soviet, nationalist underground devel,4rod that had connectionswith exiled groups in Germany.As in the tthrainian case,duringthe firstmonthsof '1941,the GermanAbwehrest,rhlished,with the help of the exiled organizations,connectionsto the ,rr(jergroundthat served to obtain intelligencefrom Soviet territoryand n, riupport the preparation of uprisingsfor the initialphaseofthe German',,rvietwar.s

On anti-Jewishviolence in Volhynia in the summer of'1941, see: Spector,Shmuel \1990). The Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews 1941-1944. Jerusalem, pp. 6,+-79; lvan Kachanovs'kyi(2014).OUN(b)ta natsysts'kimasovivbystvavlitku 1941 roku na istorychniiVofyni, Ukraihamodema20: 215-244. Kangeris,Karlis(1994).Kollaborationvor der Kollaboration?Die baltischenEmigranlon und ihre "Befreiungskomitees" in Deutschland194011941,in Röhr, Werner (ed.).

104 Ket Srnuva The underground seemsto havebeen strongestand most activoIn Lithuania.Becauseof the directborderwith Germany,lhe connection. betweenthe underground and the exiledgroupsin Germanywere alüo the closest.The mostimportantLithuanianorganization in exilewas thr LithuanianActivist Front (LietuvirtAktyvistqFrontas,LAF) that war foundedin November1940in Berlinby representalives of differentpolil. icalgroups.Inthe monthsbeforethe Germanatlackon the SovietUnion. the LAF issuedand distributeda numberof leafletsand instructions to the underground in Lithuaniaon howto preparefor the anti-Soviet uprir, ing and the reestablishment of the Lithuanianstate.Evenmore strongly than in the case of the OUN-B'sinstructions and leaflets,those of tha LAF were characterizedby the identificalionof Jews as supportersand beneflciaries of Sovietrule.Accordingly, Jewsalsoappearedpromineny amongthosewho wereto be calledto accountfor Sovietrule.Similarlo the OUN-B'sinstructions, theytendedto submitJewsto harsherpunish. mentsthan non-Jews.3s In contrastto the Ukrainiancase,documentsol the Lithuaniananti-Sovietresislanceexplicitlystatedthat the expected changeof rule shouldbe used as an opportunitylo driveout as many Jewsas possiblefromLilhuaniaas punishment for theirallegedsupporl of Sovietrule.They assertedthat by spreadingterrorand fear,the Jewr shouldbe madeto escapetogetherwiththe Soviets.36 UnlikewesternUkrainewhere the Germantrooosfaced fiercero. sistanceby strongSovietforcesduringthe first days of the war, in Lithu. aniathe RedArmy quicklyretreatedwithoutmuchfighting.They leftthc Lithuanian capitalalreadyon June23 whileGermantroopsarrivedtnejc only in the late afternoonof June 24. Simultaneously, with the Soviel retreatand beforethe anivalof the Germantroops,underground Lithua. nian insurgentsemergedand eslablisheda Lithuaniangovernmentlsd by the LAF.Alreadyon June23 the Lithuanian insurgents, usuallyknown as "partisans,"had startedwilh arrests of those whom thev considered Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938-1945). Beiträge zu Konzepten und ptaxis dut Kollaborationin det deutschenOkkupationspolltrk. Berlin,pp. 165-190. One leaflet even stated that Lithuanian"traitors"could rehabilitatethemselvesty proofingthat "they had liquidatedone Jew."On the instructaons for the Lithuanianur, dergrcundand on this conkoversiallydiscussedleaflet,seet Dieckmann,Christoph (2011). Deutsche Besatzungspolitikin Litauen 1941 1944 (Bd. 1). cöttingor, oo.246-252. l b i d .o. . 2 5 3 .

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105

' ,, r;upporters state.They of Sovietruleand enemiesof the Lithuanian ,,',', primarilyJews.Also, atlackson Jews look place on the streets, ,,", lr lrad been encouragedby broadcastsfrom the localradiostation 'l lrird beentakenoverby the insurgents.3T Franz Wlrenthe commanderof E nsatzgruppe A, SS-Brigadeführer ,', r t'rr Stahlecker, arrivedin Kaunasin the morningof June 25, he im, |.rtelybeganworkon intensifying violencefromthe local antFJewish t, As required some effort. He talked with he later reported, this had " ' "'.rontleadersof the Lithuanianinsurgenlgroups,but apparentlywas ' r .rbleto convinceone of the leaders,AlgirdasKlimaitis-whomay , ,,' beena memberof the radicalfascist"lronWolf' movemenl-to par,1,, Duringthe rtc in his plansfor extendingthe anti-Jewish violence.3s . ltrtr;of June25-27, Klimaitis'menenteredthe primarilyJewishquarter ' ',/r||jampole and killed,as ChristophDieckmannestimates,between ' r ,rnd 1,000 Jews there.3e However,in his reportfrom October1941, ' rlrlccker menlionsmuchlargernumbers:1,500killedduringthe nights ' trntc,25-26 and2,300moreduringthe followingnightsuntilJune28.40 ', ,.r{}were also otherplacesin the city whereacts of anti-Jewishvio'' ,. or murdertook place.but on a muchsmallerscale.4l Arrestsof allegedSovietsupportersalso continuedduringthese t ' i , About90 percentof lhosewho had beenarrestedby the beginning ' lLrlywereJews,the other10 percent,about360 people,wereLithuarrr., Russians,and Poles.Beginningon June 29, the Jews among ' .o who had been arresledwere broughtto the so-calledFortVll, a ,,'.lcenth-century there. Duringthe folfortification, and incarcerated ,',rrrr; 6, most of them, there. By July days, more Jews were brought , ,rrl5,000men and women,had been killedby membersof the Lithu-

lixi , pp. 313-315;Szarota,Tomasz (2000).U ptogu zaglady.ZaiSciaantyiydowske t)t)grcmyw okupowanejEutopie.watsaw, pp.211-225. i r[ckmann201'1, p. 317f.For Stahlecker's A: Gesamtbereportseer"Einsalzgruppe , ,.lrtbiszum 15. Oktober'1941(Doc. 180-L),"in Tial of the Maior War Ciminals beforc tt|: lnternationalMilitaryTribunal,Nuremberg 14 November1945-1 October 1946. r.rrlremberg 1949 (vol.37),pp. 670-701,herep. 672,p. 642. I rr(ickmann 2011,pp. 319-321. I llrsatzgruppeAr Gesamtbericht...,"in Triat of lhe Major War Ciminals (vol.37), r, (i82. ,'ltrcta2000, pp. 226-264.

106 KAr STRUVE

anian insurgentforces supervisedby the Einsatzgruppe. After plaintsfromthe Wehrmacht aboutthe brutalmurders.the German curityPolicehadthekillingsstopped.InsteadEirsafzkommando3, a ot Einsatzgruppe A that remainedin LithuaniaafterStahlecker and other parts had left for Latvia, organizedihe so-called

underSs-Untersturmfirhrer JoachimHamann,whose members mostlyLiihuaniansrecruitedfrom Klimaitis'men. Duringthe months,thisunitshotseveraltensof thousands of Jewsin Lithuania neighboring regions.a2 The character and extent of anti-Jewishviolence in othet

localitiesin Lithuaniahas not beenresearched very thoroughlyso However,it seems that there too acts of anti-Jewishviolence

primarilyfrominsurgent groupsor newlocaladministrations and thatthey established. Theyanestedor killedthosewhomthey eredto be enemiesof the Lithuanian slateor who hadallegedly ratedwiththeSoviets-intheviewof the Lithuanian insuroents. Jews.a3 A comparisonof the events in Lithuaniawith those in Ukraineshowsthreemaindifferences: a ) In Lithuania, the scaleof murdersof prisoninmatesby the

etswasmuchsmallerthanin westernUkraine.Altogether, 400 inmatesof prisonsand about700othercivilianswere duringtheSovietretreat.ThelargestSovietmassacre took in Pravieniskös, but herethe corpseswerefoundonlvon 28 whenthe largepublicactsof anti-Jewish violencein hadfor the mostpartalreadyfinished.aa b) The commander ol Einsazgruppe A, FranzWalter much more actively instigatedanti-Jewishviolence Einsatzgruppe B andC.Therefore, it seemsto be quitelikely hisactivitiesin Kaunasprovidedinputsto Heydrich's letterof June29. For Heydrich,Stahlecker's activityin

42 On this unit see: Stang, Knut (1996).Kollaborctionund MaEEenmod,Die litauischa Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und Ernordung der litauischen Frankturtam Main. 43 Dieckmann 2011,pp.361-379. 44 lbid..D.301t

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107

probablywas an exemplaryprocedurethat otherEinsatzgtuppen hadto follow. ( ) ln contrastto the otherEinsatzgruppel',, alrecruited, Stahlecker the first of the war, local units from among readyduringthe days insurgents thatthencaniedouta largepartofthe actualexecutionsof Jewsandothersduringthe followingmonths. in Latvia.WhenGermantroops }|rl(,cker followeda similarprocedure i ul)iedRigaon July 1, as in Kaunas,they were greetedby Latvlan Red frrOents whohadalsobeeninvolvedin clasheswiththeretreating murdered units. Here, the same day, about hundred corpses of on frrry On July1 andduringthefollowlrurtos of the Rigaprisonwerefound.as (lirys, with lhe Latvianinsurgentforcesarrestedin closecooperation t{ a largenumberof peoplewholhey claimedhadsupJ. I itßatzgruppe lrrkrd Sovietrule.Also, in Riga they seemto havearrestedprimarily b|!t. Therewerealsosomeattackson Jewsin the streetsor in places this rlnro Jewswerebroughtas forcedlaborers.However,apparently ll not havea similardimensionas in a numberof westernUkrainian alrr$or as in Kaunas.a6 hrRigaStahlecker beganio buildhis own localLatvianpoliceforce afterhis arrival.As in LithuaniawithAlgirdasKlimaitis,he t rx)diately ^'rgrick, Andrej and Pet€r Klein (2006). Dte "Endlösung"in Riga: Ausbeutungund v,rnichtung 1941-1944,Darmstadt,p. 72f.;Felder,Bjöm M. (2009).Lettlandim Zweiton Weltkieg. ZwiEchen sowjetischen und deutschen Besatzem 1940_1946. Padetlxrn, p.225. I lro scaleof violonceand the oueslionwho initiatedtho anests is conkoversialin the l,k,rature.AndrejAngrickand Peter Klein(2006,p. 73, pp. 78-84) emphasizelhe Lalvr,rninitiative.For KatrinReicholtthis seemsto be less clear: Reichelt,Katrin(201'.,. I dtland unter deutscher Besatzung 1941-1944. Der leltische Anteil am Holocaust. It'rrlin,pp. 82-84. Andrew Ezergailisdoes not ses indepondentactionsofthe LaMan lorces also for th€ first days after the Soviet retreat, but describes them as having t)('ontotaffyunder German command: Ezergailis,Andrew (1996), The Holocaustin t ,tlvia 1941-1944.The MissingCenter.Riga, pp.21O-221; see also: Ezergailis,An(lrew (2004)."Neighbors"Did Not KillJews!,in Gaunt,Davidet al. (€ds,l,Co aboration ,f,fd Resistarce Duing the Holocaust. Belarus, Estonia, Latuia, Lithuania. gem, pp 187-222, here pp.217-221. On the anests see also: Feldet 2009, pp.225-227. I older's interpretationhere follows Ezergailis',but some of the sourc€sthat he cites ..{'emto supportratherlhe argumentthat in the initialphaseofoccupationthe Latvian tx)liceforcosan€st€dJews to a high degreeon their own initiativebasedon lhe view ,)f Jews as Sovietsupoorters."

108 KArSTRUVE recruitedthemwiththe helpofa personwho seemsto havebeenrarha on the marginsof the Latvianinsurgents,the formerLatvianpoliceotticl ViktorsArä.iswho headed one of the insurgentgroups in the city.Ar||. soon formed a Latvian unit lhat, as Hilfssicherheitspolizei, would canl out togetherwith partsofthe Emsatzgruppemostoflhe mass executiom of Jews duringlhe followingmonthsin Latvia.Duringthe eveningard nightofJuly4, Stahlecker organizedwlththe helpofAräjs'mena pogrom in Riga.Accordingto the reportsof the Einsatzgruppen,400 Jews wora killedandsynagogues wereburneddown.aT Clearly,thiswas nota spon. taneousoutbreakof violence,but a preplannedmassacreby a certalt groupof perpetrators who actedon Stahlecker's inslructions. The large majorityof Latvia'sJews lived in Riga.Therefore,no majd acts of anti-Jewish violenceby Latvianinsurgentsseemedto haveoc, curredin otherlocalities.However,as in otherregions,here as wellIn. surgentswho transformedinto local policeforces or helped to establidl localLatvianadministrations arrestedand sometimesexecutedlndividu, als r,,lhohad supportedSovietrule or whom they consideredto be hailorl Those arresledwere handedover to lhe Germanpoliceforces that exc. cutedthemor had them execuledby theArä.iscommand. Basically, the eventsin Esloniaweresimilarto thosein Lithuaniaand Latvia,but with the differencethat no ma.joracts of anti-Jewishviolenca took place.Clearlythe reasonsfor this were thattherewas only a very smallJewishcommunityin Estoniaandthatafterthe occupationof Latvll. lhe Germanadvancesloweddown and only completedthe occupation of Esloniatowardthe end ofAugust194'1.Thisallowedmostof Estonia,r Jewsto escape.Onlyabout1,000JewsfellunderGermanrule.Howevor. Estonianinsurgentstoo took over localadmjnistralions and formeqpo. lice forceswhen the Red Army relreated,and they also arrestedano ex. ecutedallegedor realsupportersof Sovietrule.as Furthercomparisonwith the Belarusianlerritoriesconfirmsthe sig. nificanceof anti-Sovietinsurgenlsfor the violenceagainstJews.Therc 4 7 Mallmann,Kfaus-l\,4ichael et at. (eds.) (2011).Die 'ErcjgnismeldungenUdSSR_.Do kumentedet Einsatzgruppenin det Sowjetunion(Bd. j). Darmstadt,p. 129. Birn, Ruth Bettina(2006).Dre Sicherheitspotizei in Esttand1941_1944.Ene Stud, über Kollaboßtion.Paderborn,pp. 73-79, pp. 159-121;Weiss-Wendt,Anton (2OO9l MurderwithoulHatred.Estoniansand the Holocaust.Syracuse,pp. 94-1Ot,pp.12.,1 135.

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. , rroBelarusiananti-Soviet insurgency. for thoseregions Accordingly, , t rx;alities of westernBelarusthat were inhabitedmostlyby Belarus,' :rourcesshow only a small numberof acts of violenceagainst . ,.., as it seems,mostlyof a non-deadly The reasonfor this character. . ' . rrol that generalhostilitytoward Jews here was significantly less ' r, n otherregions.LeonidRein has arguedthatthe readinessto take ,'I r) the persecution and murderof Jews,as laterphasesof the Holo' | ,l show,did not differherefrom neighboring regions.4s The decisive ' ", rrnce with resoectto acts of antFJewishviolencein the summerof ' I I was thal no Belarusiananti-Sovietinsurgencywith a programof | .irring powerand removingor punishingSovietsupportersexisted. lhe case thal seems to contradiclthe argumentthat deadiyanti, .,,r,,hviolencecan be ascribedlo a highdegreeto nationalist anti-So,., t rnsurgentsand their attemptat state-building is the Polishone. A , .rrlerable violenceoccurredin numberof acts of deadlyanti-Jewish , .i' territoriesof westernBelarusinhabitedmostlyby Poles.so For the ,.,;.the Germaninvasionwas not accompaniedby the expectation ,r ,I Polishstatewouldbe reestablished. Yetheretoo an active,nation' .l ,nti-Sovietunderground movementexistedamongthe Polishpoprt|rrr Polishinsurgentsalso attackedSoviettroopsin the days after ' recent " 22 and supportedthe Germaninvasion.As an important , ly by MiroslawTryczykclearlyshows,in Jedwabneand othertowns , I vrllagesin the region,the violenceemanatedprimarilyfrom mem-

'FinalSolution in ,i, lr. Leonidi2006).LocalCollaboration in the Executionof the 'Li,,l-OccuDiedBelorussia, Holocaust and Genocide Sfudles 20: 381 409, here I l{19f.See alsol Cholawsky,Shalom ( 1998).The Jews of BielorussiaDuing World iv r //.Amsterdam, p. 271f. ,\ rrxrrethoroughinvestigationinto acts ofanli-Jewishvioloncebeganas a reactionto lri, publicationof Jan Tomasz Gross' book Nelghborson the pogrom in Jedwabne, .'.i IVachcewicz,Paweland Kzysztof Persak(eds.)(2002).WokotJedwabnego,t. 1: 'ttnlia,t. 2: Dokumenty.Warsaw,and here primarilythe articlesby Dmitröw,Edmund \r)2) Qddzialy operacyjneniemieckiejPolicji Bezpieczenstwai Slu2by Bezpiec', lrslwaa poczqtekzagladyzydöw w Lom2yirskiemina Bialostocczyznie latem 1941 ,r.rrin ibid.,pp.273-351;Zbikowski,Andeej (2002).PogromyI mordyludnosci ytl()wskiejw Lom2yÄskiemi na Bialostocczy2nie latem 194'1roku w Swietlerelacii ' ,1.Jych ZydöwIdokumentöw sqdowych.in ibid.,pp. 1b9-271rsee also:Zorkowskr. ,,rrrtrzej(2006). lJ genezy Jedwabnego.zydzi na krcsach pölnocno-wschodnichll tt. t\:zypospolitej,wrzesieh1g3g-lipiec1941.Watsaw, pp.213-231.

110 KAr STRUVE

bersof the Polishunderground who startedto punish"traitors"and tablishnewlocaladministrations and militias.Thesituationherewas peciallytenseowingto numerousarrestsamongmembersof the underground sincethe summerof 1940,whenthe NKVDliquidatod major Polish partisanbase in the region and obtainedlists of the bers of the anti-Sovietresistance.sl

In manylocalitiesof the mostlyPolishregionsof western anti-Jewish violence claimed a veryhighnumberof victims, alsoin parisonwithmostUkrainianand,as it seems,alsoLithuanian Exceptfor the numerousSovietarrests,thereseemto havebeen reasonsfor the scaleof violence.Firstly,radicalanti-Semitism had strongrootsin thisregionevenbefore1939andbecamean integral of the anti-Soviet underground, andsecondly, thereseemsto have moreactiveand longer-lasting encouragement for antFJewish by Germanpoliceunitsthan in otherregions.Mostof the more acts of violencefrom the local side, as in the case ofthe mass murdef J.edwabne,only beganten days after the Germanoccupationor later. The level of anti-Jewishviolencewas also very high in Northern kovina and Bessarabia,which after July 2 were invaded by

troops. According to SimonGeissbühler's estimate, in Northern about4,500Jews were killedhere by mid-July1941,that is, about percentof the 70,000 Jews living in that region. In Bessarabiathe

portionof victimsamongtheJewishpopulation seemsto havebeen higher.s2 The high level of deadly violencewas clearly the result of involvemenlof the Romanianarmed forces and police units. In to the other parts of the Sovietborderlands,the invadersand shared the same nationalidentity and both intendedto avenge tho miliationof summer 1940 when the Romanianstate and its armed policeforces had been forced to leave the region.Already by then,

Jewishpogromsby Romanianarmedforcesor policeunitswith hundredviclims had taken place.53When Romaniantroops crossed 51 Tryczyk,l\riroslaw(20'15).MlasfaSmierci.Sesiedzkie pogromy2ydöw.\Narszawa; the anti-Sovietundergroundalso Strzembosz,Tomasz (2004). Antysowiecka tyzantka i konspimcja nad Biebtzq X 1939-Vl 1941. Warsaw. 52 For a discussionof numbersof viclims,see: Geissbühler,Simon (2013||.Blutigel Rumäniens Venichtungskrieg und der vergessene Massenmotd an den Juden 1911. Paderbom,pp. 114-118. 53 lbid.,pp.44-47.

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1,.(l(,ron July2, theirclearaimwasto cleanseNorthern Bukovina and brsirrabia of its Jewishinhabitants, whomthey considered to be supFxk,rs of Sovietrule and "traitors."The removalof the Jewswas also "nationalliberation."sa -.n as lhe attainment of the Romanians' Afterthe invasion,unitsof the Romanianarmedforcesandthegenand Jews,"which &nrerie beganto cleanselocalitiesof "Communists trfuded the murderof the elderly,women,and children.Theyalso into actsof anti-Jewish violence.However, in a numao(l localinhabitants violencehad begunalreadybeforethe arrivalof Roma1., of localities, rtrn troopsor policeunits.ss Apparently, herealso,this was partof the .tunge of ruleand the assumptionof powerby new groups,basedon structures. ,rlr Sovietunderground In thoseparlsof NorthernBukovinathat were mostlyinhabitedby tlrninians, apparentlythe Ukrainianattemptto take overthe localadtrnslration beforethe Romaniansanivedor couldestablishtheirown lo the factthat acls of violencewithoutthe d.ls institutions contributed Frlicipationof the Romanianmilitaryor policeseemto havebeenmore ü(lospreadthan in Bessarabia.s The OUN also had a strongundergound movementin NorthernBukovina.In contrastto easternGalicia rxl Volhynia, theBukovinian OUNremained loyalto theMel'nyk leader.htt)afterthe splitin the OUNin 1940.Nevertheless, afterJune22,the hkovinianOUNbeganan uprising in a similarwayas the OUN-Bhad rt oirsternGaliciaandVolhynia.lt createdlocaladministrations in a numbr of localitiesto preparefor the buildingof a Ukrainianstate.s7 Here rx,. thisattemptat state-building includedthe anestor killingof alleged

9loanid,Radu(20001.TheHolocaustinRomania.TheDestructionofJewsandGypsies undertheAntonescuRegime,1940-1944.Chicago,p. 90f.; Solonari,Vladimir(2006): ModelProvince".Explainingthe Holocaustof Bessarabiaand BukovinianJewry,NatrcnaliliesPapersU: 471-500, hero pp. 485-487. l;olonari,Vladimir(2007). Pattems of Violonce.The Local Populationand the Mass Murderof Jews in Bessarabiaand NorthernBukovina,July-August 1941,Kritika.Explorationsin Russianand EumsianHistory8:749-787, here pp. 755-766. ll)id.,pp. 767-771:Geissbühler 20'13,pp.61-71. l)uda, Andrii and Volodymyr Staryk (1995). Bukovyns'kyi kudn'. V boiakh za ukrains'kuderzhavnis{ 1918, 1941-1944,Chernivtsi,pp. 55-59; see also; Hausleitlror, N4ariana(2001). Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina. Die Dutchsetzung clesnationlslaatlichen Ansptuchs Großtumäniens 1918-1944. München, pp.38,+-386, nD.41742z

112 KArSTRUVE Soviel supporters,whom the BukovinianUkrainiansalso primarilybo. lievedto be amonglhe Jews.

Gonclusion Overall,a comparisonof lhe findingsfor easternGaliciawith the otht regions cleady shows that the core group of perpetratorswere anti-So viet insurgentswho were aimingat (re)establishing their nation-sraroa, Onlythe Polishcaseis lo a certaindegreean exceptionbecause,for tha Polishinsurgents, the Germanattackdid not createthe expectalion d the renewalof statehood. Nevertheless, the Polishinsurgents alsoexp.. riencedthe Germaninvasionas a liberation fromthe Sovietthreat,whidl pavedthe way for a changeof localadministration. The anti-Jewisn vto. lencehad spontaneous elements,butat the core of the larger-scale acL of deadlyviolencein all placeswereorganizedgroupsof insurgents. Beforethe beginningof the Germanattack,there had been jolnl preparationsof the anti-Sovietinsurgencyby the Abwehr andthe diffef. ent nationalistundergroundorganizations.fhe Abwehr expectedthota groupsto have a certainrole in the establishment of new localaomrn. istrations,but there were no clear agreementsregardingthis issue. Fur. thermore,thereis no indicationthat therewas any agreementon anll. Jewishpogroms.The anti-Jewishviolencefrom the localside resulted mostlyfrom the state-buildingprojectsof the insurgenlgroupsthat wer., however,contraryto the Germanplansand laterin all casesprevenlod by them. For the antFsoviet insurgents,the anti-Jewishviolencewas part ol the punishmentof "traitors"or Soviet supportersthat also affectednon, Jews. But Jews were punishedand killedin much highernumbersand more generallybecauseof the stereotypicalperceptionof Jews as pro. Soviet. Nevertheless,the fact that the long{erm aim of the nationalial insurgentswas to establishan ethnicallypure nation-stateplayeda rola here.At leastin the Lithuanianand Ukrainiancases,the changeof rula appearedas an opportunity to rid lheir countryof unwantedminoritier This was also clearlya centralfactorin the Romanianviolenceagain Jewsin NorthernBukovinaand Bessarabia. Theremay havebeensome connections, in additionto thoseoftha Abwehr, belweenthe German SecurityPolice and undergroundgroupa of a fascistorientationin the Balticcountries,where the undergroundwar

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,,.. rrnifiedthan ln Ukraine.However,at leastthe researchliterature r,.,., tlo indicationthat this may have been significantfor acts of anli'1941. Activeincitement to engageln anti",,,,r',lrviolenceaftet June22, .,,,,r.,h violencefrom the Germanside only startedwith the activitiesof r",'rrxrtGermanpoliceunitsand,in easternGalicia,alsoof the Waffen. . Viking"divisionafterthe Germanattack. I verywherea precondition for deadlyviolenceon a largerscalewas t,, lrvolvementof insurgentsor clearGermanencouragement and in ..riy cases both. Spontaneousattackson Jews that also took place .r,,'iyseemto havebecomedeadlyoutsidethesecontexts.