Amnesia and competency to stand trial: A review of legal and clinical issues

Amnesia and Competency to Stand Trial: A Review of Legal and Clinical Issues1

Ronald Roesch, Ph.D. Stephen L. Golding, Ph.D.

Recent case law is discussed regarding the role of amnesia in determining competency to stand trial. Clinical issues are examinedfor a range of amnestic conditions on a spectrum of organic andfunctional disorders. Clinical methods are explored for establishing the extent of amnesia and its relevance to competency. The relevance of amnesia in determinationsof a defendant’s ability to stand trial is a complex issue on both legal and clinical grounds. Amnesia is difficult to assess and even when it is considered genuine, a court may rule that it does not necessarily affect a defendant’s competency to stand trial. In this article, legal and clinical issues relevant to the assessment of amnesia in incompetency evaluations will be reviewed. Competency to stand trial2 is a legal principle designed to ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Although the state laws vary (Favole, 1983), the statutes essentially following the standard established in Dusky v. United Stares (1960): 1. This article was prepared while the first author was a visiting professor at Arizona State University,

under a Leave Fellowship provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 2. The term competency to stand trial is perhaps not an accurate one, because criminal competency refers to ability to proceed at various levels of the criminal procedures, including arraignment. plea bargaining, and other legal proceedings in addition to an actual trial (trials are an infrequent event in criminal case dispositions; most cases are decided through plea bargaining arrangements). Competency can even refer to competency to be executed (see Wainright v. Ford, 1984). Our use of the term is intended to cover all aspects of criminal competency.

Ronald Roesch, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology and Director of Clinical Training at Simon Fraser University and Stephen L. Golding, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology and Director of Clinical Training at the University of Utah. Please address correspondence and requestsfor reprinrs zo Dr. Roesch, Simon Fraser Universiry,Department of Psychology, Bltrnaby. B . C . , Canada. VSAIS6. BehavioralSciences & r h e h w , Vol. 4, No. I: 87-97 (1986) CCC 0735-3936/86/01OO87- 11$04.00 0 1986 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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It is not enough for the districtjudge to find that “the defendant is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of events,” but that with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him (p. 402).

From a clinical perspective, the state statutes provide little direction to evalua t o r ~and , ~ there is considerable variation in all parameters of the actual evaluation. The courts have typically called upon mental health professionals to assess competency and provide a report to the court. While the court is not bound by the conclusions or recommendations of evaluators (typically local mental health professionals), in practice there is little disagreement (Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber, 1984; North Dakota v. Heger, 1982; Steadman, 1979; Williams & Miller, 1981). Thus, how clinicians define competency is of central concern. The legal definition, as exemplified by Dusky, is not explicit. As we have pointed out elsewhere (Roesch & Golding, in press) the measurement of “sufficient present ability” or “a rational as well as factual understanding” is not a straightforward matter. The lack of an agreed upon basis for a finding of incompetency has led some evaluators to incorrectly equate the presence of psychosis with incompetency (Cooke, 1969; McGarry, 1965; Roesch & Golding, 1980) and has led to other concerns about the validity of decisions about competency (Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber, 1984). Concerns about the definition and assessment of competency are perhaps most apparent when clinicians or the courts must consider the effect that amnesia has on a defendant’s ability to proceed. After examining the Dusky criteria, a clinician might well conclude that a defendant with genuine amnesia would be incompetent. Consider the following example. A suspect in a homicide suffers a head injury sustained in an automobile accident during a police chase. The suspect is charged with homicide and, after a period of hospitalization for medical treatment, is referred for an evaluation of competency. The examining clinicians agree that the defendant has genuine amnesia for the period of several hours before the accident. The alleged homicide occurred during this period; consequently, the defendant has no recollection of events during the time the alleged crime was committed. Does this defendant meet the Dusky criteria for a determination of incompetency? We will provide an answer to this question by reviewing legal cases addressing this issue.

LEGAL ISSUES An early and important case addressing the relevance of amnesia to competency was Wilson v. United States (1968). The defendant Wilson had permanent retrograde amnesia and appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals on the 3. One exception to this is the state of Florida, where specific criteria are listed (see Winick & DeMeo, 1980).

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grounds that his amnesia deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The Wilson court held that if a defendant has amnesia, the trial judge must make a prediction, prior to any legal proceedings, of the defendant’s ability to participate. Further, if the case proceeds, the trial judge must also determine at the conclusion of the proceedings and prior to sentencing whether the amnesia had an effect on the proceedings. If it did, the trial judge could find that the conviction should not stand and the case would have to be retried. In the retrial, the government must be able to overcome the unfairness; if not, the indictment would be dismissed. The Wilson court suggested six factors which should be considered by the trial judge: (1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to consult with and assist his lawyer. (2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to testify in his own behalf. (3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant’samnesia; such evidence would include evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi. (4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction. The strength of the prosecution’s case. Most important here will be whether the Government’s case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he would have been able to do so. (6) Any other factors and circumstances that would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial (Wilson v. United States, 1968, pp. 463464). The application of these criteria would lead to several conclusions. A defendant who is not able to testify on his or her own behalf (i.e., provide an alibi) may not be competent. However, this could be mitigated by a strong case by the prosecution, particularly if an alibi can be ruled out. The Wilsondecision is consistent with other cases, explicitly ruling that amnesia by itself is not enough for a finding of incompetency. The Wilson court urged that decisions should be made on a case by case basis, applying the six criteria noted above to determine, in a functional manner, whether a defendant had been or would be deprived of a fair trial. A number of courts have supported the Wilson approach (which is consistent with our own approach to the functional assessment of mental disabilities as they relate to competency), but many have made narrower interpretations of the Dusky criteria, while others (primarily mental health professionals) have supported the notion that amnesia per se should bar trial. In his dissent in Wilson, Judge Fahy suggested the absolute bar to trial approach, arguing that since the defendant could not remember anything about the robbery itself or the period surrounding it, a trial would be unfair since it would “try him for something about which he is mentally absent altogether” (p. 466). Citing Hansford v . United States (1966), which held that memory and intellectual ability are crucial to the defense and must not be impaired by mental VOL. 4, NO.1 1986

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disorder, Judge Fahy suggested that amnesia should be considered a mental disorder rendering the defendant unable to furnish his attorney with all relevant facts and information. The dissenting opinion of Judge Fahy is likely representative of the views of many others. Halpern (1975), for example, suggests that the way amnesia is viewed by the courts “reveals the utter absurdity of the law with respect to the competency issue” (p. 54). However, most judicial views of amnesia did not support this position. A representative case is Regina vs. Padola (1959) which held that loss of memory in an otherwise sane individual would never render a defendant unfit to stand trial. Acordingly, amnesia is relevant only when the amnesia is part of an otherwise recognizable mental disorder which affects a defendant’s ability to be tried fairly. Most courts have opted for a narrower view of amnesia and have not followed the stringent criteria and case by case analysis established in Wilson (but see, Delaware v. Lynn, 1985; U.S. v. SuLLivan, 1969 and U S . v. Swanson, 1978 for decisions where case by case analyses are supported). In Montana v. Austed (1983) the Supreme Court of Montana upheld a homicide conviction of a defendant with amnesia (suffered in an accident similar to the example used earlier in this article). The defendant cited Wilson in support of his argument that his amnesia affected his trial. The Austed court observed that many federal courts have not adopted the Wilson standard, relying instead on the less stringent standards established in Dusky. The court held that the defendant was, despite the amnesia, capable of understanding facts and the nature of the charges and could make rational and informed decisions. The distinction between the Dusky and Wilson criteria is perhaps best stated in United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson (1972) in which the court stated: The cases which have decided that amnesia per se does not establish lack of competence for trial have proceeded on two distinct theories. One is that while amnesia may be relevant as a symptom evidencing a present infirmity in the defendant’s reasoning capacity, if the defendant has the present ability to understand the proceedings against him, to communicate with his lawyer and generally to conduct his defense in a rational manner, memory . . . is irrelevant to the issues of competency . . . the second line of cases proceeds on the theory that lack of memory is relevant to the question of whether the defendant can meaningfully consult with his lawyer and that, while a showing of amnesia is not enough, a conviction of an amnesiac cannot stand unless it appears that he was not substantially prejudiced by his impairment. . . I consider the first approach to be the sounder one. (p. 1071).

Interestingly, this same court hinted that had the facts been different, it might have been persuaded to use the Wilson approach. Parson’s confession was not introduced by the prosecution, nor was there any eyewitness testimony introduced for which Parson’s amnesia would disadvantagehim in terms of crossexamination. In addition, Parson did not claim insanity which, the court observed, would have BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW

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made his amnesia more relevant because amnesia may make it difficult to employ an insanity defense. The Montana Supreme Court appears to be followingthe perspective inMorrow v. Maryland (1982). In this case, the court expressly decided not to follow Wilson’s case by case approach, arguing that “everyone is amnesiac to some degree, as the passage of time erodes memory” (p. 112). Other courts have made similar rulings. In Missouri v. Davis (1983) the Missouri Supreme court held that even though the defendant’s amnesia affected his recall of the alleged murder and events surrounding the crime, it did not bar prosecution (see also Rector v. Arkamas, 1982; Ritchie v. Indiana, 1984). Nevertheless, the Wilson decision has had some effect on views of amnesia. In Parson v . Delaware (1 97 1 ) the court concluded that the amnesia did not affect the trial, under Wilson guidelines, because the defendant: Could consult with and assist his lawyer to the limitation imposed by his claimed amnesia. Furthermore, the prosecution’s case against Parson consisted almost entirely of circumstantialevidence which left no reasonable hypothesis but guilt when considered in its entirety. Moreover, Parson, by the circumstantial evidence, was so tightly tied to the actual commission of the crime that any prospect of the defense of alibi is nonexistent (p. 787).

The decision in Montana v. Austed (1983) also reflects this approach to assessing the strength of the prosecution’s case: “the bulk of the evidence was physical evidence, not eyewitness testimony or defendant’s statements” (p. 1373). Similarly, in US.v. Borum (1972), the strength of the prosecution’s case based upon strong circumstantial evidence and a claim of hysterical amnesia, which did not appear credible, were the deciding factors. It is important to note, however, that the Borum court commented that if the evidence had been weak, it would have been more persuaded and would have attempted to ascertain whether the amnesia resulted in an unfair trial. This approach has been described by us elsewhere (Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber, 1984; Roesch & Golding, 1980) as a functional approach which we believe should be applied to all aspects of competency determinationsand not simply limited to amnesia. In a functional approach to the assessment of competency, the determination of a defendant’s mental status is important, but not sufficient by itself as a means of assessing competency. Rather, the conclusions about mental status must be related to the specific demands of the legal case. In the same manner suggested by the Wilson decision, we have called upon evaluators to make clear how an observed symptom, such as a hallucination or delusion, would impair a defendant’sability to consult with his or her attorney or otherwise impair the ability to proceed. Further, we have suggested that since some cases are more complex than others it is necessary to understand the legal demands of a case in order to ascertain the potential effects of observed symptoms. The competency issue will be different for a defendant expected to testify, provide an alibi, or be able to challenge witnesses, compared with a defendant whose attorney intends to recVOL. 4, NO. 1 1986

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ommend plea bargaining. We are in agreement, then, with the case by case approach suggested in Wilson, and would argue that the logic should be extended to other aspects of competency determinations. The reluctance of the courts to accept amnesia as a basis for a finding of incompetency is no doubt in part due to the consequences of finding such a defendant incompetent. If the amnesia is permanent, a finding of incompetency would be tantamount to a dismissal of charges. This is because a leading case regarding the disposition of incompetent defendants, Jackson v. Indiana (1972) holds that an incompetent defendant “cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the forseeable future” (p. 738). Obviously, a defendant with permanent amnesia would not be expected to respond to treatment. Thus, there would be no possibility of regaining competency and, under most state laws, the charges against such a defendant would have to be dismissed. In fact, the court in MasSachusetrs v. Lombardi (1979) held that a finding of permanent amnesia, in which a defendant was unable to recall circumstances surrounding the alleged offence, may prevent a fair trial. Rather than finding the defendant incompetent, however, the court concluded that circumstances may merit the dismissal of charges. In conclusion, the leading legal cases suggest that amnesia by itself is not a sufficient basis for a finding of incompetency. Most courts have used a strict interpretation of Dusky. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are sometimes circumstances, especially if the prosecution’s case is weak and an alibi is possible, or the defendant’s mental state is in serious question, that amnesia may lead to a finding of incompetency. As the court in Morrow v. Maryland (1982) held, “only when a defendant’s loss of memory obscures the search for truth should an accused be deemed incompetent to stand trial” (p. 112). In the remainder of this article, we will review clinical issues in the assessment of amnesia.

CLINICAL ISSUES There is a strong temptation to confuse the issues of fitness and criminal responsibility with respect to amnesia. Compoundingthe problem is the considerable degree of ambiguity that surrounds the definition(s)of amnesia and its assessment. In forensic practice, amnesia, pertaining to either competency to stand trial or criminal responsibility, usually arises as an issue according to one of the following prototypes: I. The defendant’s claim to amnesia involves some form of head injury or trauma that occurred during the alleged criminal act as, for example, when the defendant’s car collides into a tree while attempting escape. 11. The defendant’s claim rests on complete or partial hysterical amnesia arising from psychodynamic mechanisms or repression (because of guilt or the unacceptability of various impulses that were acted upon during the alleged criminal act, e.g., homosexual assault and murder). BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW

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111. The defendant asserts that he or she suffers from a severe personality disorder and/or a premorbid personality type that involves a considerable degree of dissociation, “splitting,” or automatic behavior. While the personality disorder was pre-existing , the events surrounding the alleged crime may have precipitated an exaccerbation of symptomatology. IV. The defendant asserts some form of dissociation, automatism or the like, but claims no pre-existing personality disorder. V. The defendant asserts that some degree of memory loss or dissociative process occurred because of voluntarily ingested alcohol, drugs, or other substances that alter key psychological processes. VI. The defendant claims some form of pre-existing organic condition that may produce periods of amnesia or dissociative process. In some cases, for example, known hypoglycemia, the question of voluntariness arises because the defendant ingested substances that he or she can be presumed to have known would increase the probability of an episode. VII. The defendant asserts some external physical or psychological trauma, beyond his or her control, produced either some degree of memory loss or dissociative process. The judicial view of amnesia is somewhat different in each of the prototypic amnesia situations, and, therefore, the clinical examiner must be aware of certain distinctions and historical themes which come into play when the issue of amnesia is raised. First, the courts and society in general view a defendant’s claim of amnesia with great suspicion. None of the court cases or the scholarly articles discussed in this article have missed the opportunity to observe that (a) “everyone” has amnesia to some degree, (b) most claims of amnesia are based upon the credibility of the defendant who has every reason to be self-serving and to feign amnesia, and (c) lacking a clear organic basis, with proof of memory difficulties prior to the alleged criminal act, no clearly agreed upon basis for determining the validity of a claim to other forms of amnesia exist. Second, most of the cases concerning amnesia have occurred in contexts where either the state’s case against the defendant could be proved by physical or strong circumstantial evidence, or where the defendant’s amnesia was not convincingly relevant to hidher ability to consult with an attorney in relationship to the disputed issues at trial. Third, in most of the cases reported, the defendant’s amnesia claims were either as a result of his or her own actions during the alleged criminal act, the result of self-induced intoxication, or based upon hysterical amnesia or dissociation without a pre-existing personality disorder (Prototypes I, 11, IV, and V). There is some evidence that the incidence of claimed amnesia is higher when the charges are more serious, such as homicide (Bradford & Smith, 1980; Sadoff, 1975). Especially in states which have a death penalty, the motivation to feign amnesia would be considerable. Indeed, Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983), in an article on malingering, suggested that such behavior might be best conceptualized in terms of “coping strategies, good judgment, and survival” (p. 446). Given the potential for deception (Resnick, 1984), it is of obvious importance that an examining clinician be able to distinguish between genuine and feined amnesia. VOL. 4, NO. 1 1986

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Concerns about malingering have led some clinicians to consider amnesia to be genuine only if there is an organic cause. While we acknowledge the difficulties in determining amnesia absent a physical cause, such an approach seems clinically inappropriate. For example, Parwatiker, Holcomb, and Menninger ( 1985) discovered that certain historical information reliably distinguished between confessed murderers and those who were convicted but claimed amnesia. Among the most reliable distinguishing variables were drug and alcohol intoxication and elevations on MMPI scales Hs, Hy, and D (see Rogers, 1984 for a review of studies examining the usefulness of the MMPI in detecting malingering). Such results are consistent with an interpretation that these individuals had a genuine hysterical or dissociatively based amnesia. Lynch and Bradford (1980), using polygraphy, discovered that while 63% of individuals who were diagnosable as antisocial personalities were found deceptive in their claims of amnesia, 50% of those with no major psychiatric illnesses tested as “truthful” in their claims of amnesia. Furthermore, a history of drug/alcohol abuse was associated with “truthful” claims to amnesia. If organicity is a possibility, the evaluation would need to include a complete physical examination, as well as a detailed medical, psychological, and developmental history (Sadoff, 1975). If an organic cause is ruled out, the clinical evaluation would focus on possible psychogenic factors such as repression or denial, or other premorbid personality characteristics associated with hysterical or dissociative processes. While the validity of polygraph or sodium amytal interviews in these evaluations has yet to be established, the authors have found such techniques useful, if for no other reason than that they frequently elicit “fuller” disclosures because the average defendant believes that they will discover deception. Sadoff (1975) proposed a sequential use of lie detector tests and a sodium amytal interview. If the defendant passes the lie detector test, the sodium amytal interview would be held and possibly video taped, to aid in the recall of lost or forgotten material. The contribution of alcohol or drugs would also have to be considered. The present authors have developed a structured interview and rating scale for assessing competency. It is referred to as the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview (IFI) and is comprised of 5 items focusing on legal issues and 11 items that address mental status questions (Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber, 1984). One of the latter items deals with memory and amnesia. Consistent with the functional assessment approach used in the IFI, we discuss rating of this item by assessing its importance to the particular case: Defendants must surely have access to some details of the behavior at the time of the alleged crime, but what is required depends upon the defenses potentially available. The degree and quality of memory necessary thus is contextdependent and cannot be evaluated without expert legal advice and knowledge . . . Under some circumstances, it may be critical that the defendant be able to remember intentions, motives , . . need to know what happened during arrest and arraignment, whether “Miranda” warnings were given, be able to recognize a distortion in the testimony of police officers or other witnesses (Golding & Roesch, 1981, p. 4). BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES &THE LAW

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Interviewers are instructed to use caution in rating the memory item. As we point out, “since it is relatively easy for a defendant to feign amnesia or memory loss . . . a claim of amnesia would be tested against either plausible physical or organic causation, or against third party reports from observers prior to the alleged crime” (Golding & Roesch, 1981, p. 20). Taking a defendant’s claim of amnesia seriously, in a skeptical but functional context, is always required in forensic examinations, as the following illustrates. The defendant, charged with sexual assault and murder, had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse, and a verifiable history of dissociative tendencies, schizotypal personality, and suicidality . On initial interview, he claimed “patchy” amnesia and a desire for the state to “get it over with” (i.e., execute him). A clinical decision was made to engage in brief therapy with an aim to deal with his suicidal ideation and to facilitate reconstruction of his memory, prior to an opinion about his amnesia and competency. After three sessions, he revealed that the murder had occurred in a context quite different from that alleged by the prosecution, although certain aspects of his memory remained “patchy”. Nevertheless, it was discovered that the sexual assault had not taken place, but rather the young girl had solicited sex for money, and had then threatened reporting him to the police if he did not pay more. The murderous assault occurred in this context, and the police were able to discover evidence which corroborated his version of the solicitation. He pled to second degree murder, and the sexual assault charge was dropped. Otherwise, it could have been a death penalty case. While the courts have been generally unsympathetic to claims of amnesia involving hysterical or dissociative reactions, we believe that clinicians need to be sensitive to this issue, which occurs frequently in personality-disordered individuals, whether or not they also meet the criterion for antisocial personality or other personality disorders (particularly schizoid, schizotypical, borderline, and dissociative). In many cases, such claims are relevant either to the mens rea element of the crime or to details of the actual crime act (actus reus) and must be thoroughly investigated. While no technique is of sufficient validity, we recommend a complete evaluation, using not only mental status data, but also carefully obtained third party reports, social and developmental histories, neuropsychological examinations, and sodium amytal and polygraphicinterviews(see Resnick, 1984;and Rogers, 1984 for discussions of interview techniques and evaluation procedures).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS The conclusion to be drawn from a review of legal cases which have addressed the relevance of amnesia to a finding of incompetency to stand trial is clear: amnesia by itself is not a sufficient basis for such a finding. Indeed, at least one court has held that amnesia does not even entitle a defendant to an evaluation of competency (Kirby Y. Texas, 1984). The courts have often cited the Dusky criteria rather than the case by case approach advocated in the Wilson decision. The majority of courts seem to be concerned about two consequences of a finding that amnesia is a basis for a finding of incompetency (see, Shepard, 1983 for a disVOL. 4, NO.1 1986

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cussion of these issues in the context of Morrow v. Maryland). One is that defendants may not be eligible for commitment to an institutional facility since amnesia is not a mental illness. Two, some courts have been concerned that, at least in cases of permanent amnesia, a finding of competency would allow a defendant to avoid prosecution. Nevertheless, the Wilson case and a number of the other cases reviewed in this article (e.g., Montana v. Austed, 1983) suggest that amnesia may be a basis for a determination of incompetency if it can be shown that the amnesia has a direct effect on the preparation of a defense. In other words, if it can be shown that a defendant’s right to a fair trial might be hindered (e.g., if an alibi is possible), then amnesia may well be relevant to a finding of incompetency. This is precisely the kind of functional, case by case assessment which we have proposed be used in all determinations of competency (Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber, 1984). It may also be useful to make a distinction between permanent and temporary amnesia (Koson & Robey, 1973). One explanation for the view of most courts regarding amnesia is that such a finding would result in dismissalof charges. However, the courts may agree that a finding of temporary amnesia may justify a finding of incompetency and a limited treatment period.

REFERENCES Bradford, J. W., &Smith, S. M. (1979). Amnesiaandhomicide:ThePadolacaseandastudyofthirty cases. The Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 7 , 219-231, Cooke, G. (1969). The court study unit: Patientcharacteristicsand differences between patientsjudged competent and incompetent. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 25, 140-143. Delaware v. Lynn. 490 A. 2d 605 (1985). Dusky v. VnitedStates. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Favole, R. J. (1983). Mental disability in the American criminal process: A four issue survey. In J . Monahan & H. J. Steadman (Eds.), Mentally disordered offenders: Perspectivesfrom law and social science (pp. 247-295). New York Plenum. Golding, S. L.,& Roesch, R. (1981). Interdisciplinary FitnessInterview Training Manual. Available from authors. Golding, S. L., Roesch, R.,& Schreiber, J. (1984). Assessment and conceptualizationof competency to stand trial: Preliminary data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview. Law and Human Behavior, 8.321-334. Halpern, A. L. (1975). Use and misuse of psychiatry in competency examinations of criminal defendants. Psychiatric Annals, 5, 123-150. Hansfod v. United States. 365 F. 2d 920 (1966). Jackson v. Indiana. 406 U.S.715 (1972). Kirby v . Texas. 668 S.W. 2d448 (1984). Koson, D., & Robey, A. (1973). Amnesia and competency to stand trial. American Journal of Psychiatry, 130, 588-592. Lynch, B. E., & Bradford, J. W. (1980). Amnesia: Its detection by psychophysiologicalmeasures. Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 8, 288-297. Massachusetts v. Lombardi. 393 N.E. 2d 346 (1979). McGarry, A. L. (1965). Competency for trial and due process via the state hospital. American Journal of Psychiatry. 122, 623-631. Missouri v . Davis. 653 S.W. 2d. 167 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1983). Montana v. Austed. 641 P.2d. 1373 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1982). Morrow v. Maryland. 443 A.2d. 108 (Md. Ct. App. 1982). North Dakota v . Heger. 326 N. W. 2d. 855 (N.Dak. Sup. Ct. 1982). Parson v. Delaware. 275 A. 2d 717 (Del. Supr. 1971).

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Panvatikar, S. D., Holcomb, W. R., & Menninger, K. A. 11. (1985). The detection of malingered amnesia in accused murderers. Bulletin of the American Academy ofpsychiatry and Law, 13.97110. Rector v. Arkansas. 638 S.W. 2d 672 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1982). Regina v. Padola. 3 W.L.R. 718 (1959). Resnick, P. J . (1984). The detection of malingered mental illness. Behavioral Science and the Law, 2, 21-38. Ritchie v. Indiana. 468 N.E. 2d 1369 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1984). Roesch, R., & Golding, S. L. (1980). Competency to stand trial. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Roesch, R., & Golding, S . L. (in press). Defining and assessing competency to stand trial. In I. B. Weiner & A. A. Hess (Eds.), Handbook offorensicpsychology. New York: Wiley. Rogers, R. (1984). Towards an empirical model of malingering and deception. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 2, 93-1 1 1. Rogers, R., & Cavanaugh, J. L. (1983). “Nothing but the truth” . . . : A reexamination of malingering. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 11,443459. Sadoff, R. L. (1975). Forensic psychiatry: A practical guide for lawyers andpsychiatrists. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas. Shepherd, K. L. (1983). Criminal law: Amnesia as to the events of the crime charged does not by itself justify a finding of incompetence to stand trial. Baltimore Law Review, 12, 351-358. Steadman, H. J. (1979). Beating a rap? Defendanrsfound incompetent to stand trial. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. United States v. United States v. Sullivan. 406 F. 2d 180 (1969). United Stares v. Swanson. 572 F. 2d 523 (1978). Wainwright v. Ford. 35 Crl4071 (1984). Williams, W., & Miller, K. K. (1981). The processing and disposition of incompetent mentally ill offenders. Law and Human Behavior, 5, 245-261. Wilson v. United Stares. 391 F. 2d 460 (1968). Winick, B.,& DeMeo, T. L. (1980). Competence to stand trial in Florida. Universiw of Miami Lnw Review, 3.5, 31-76.

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