Al-Qaeda - A global Insurgency

Author: Catalin Rolea

Al-Qaeda - a ‘global insurgency’ Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, a wide literature dedicated to understanding the nature of the attack’s perpetrators has emerged. Although al-Qaeda has received numerous significant blows, ranging from its structural decimation in Afghanistan by US forces to several losses of its key leaders, its ability to survive, regenerate, and even expand transnationally has questioned its conventional label as a terrorist organisation. This paper will demonstrate that due to the intricacies it exhibits, al-Qaeda can be best understood as a global insurgency. It will be shown that in one sense al-Qaeda is a transnational insurgent organization in itself but at the same time that it is also representative of a wider global insurgency. The analysis will consist of three main parts. The first part will propose an analytical framework and will differentiate al-Qaeda from a terrorist organization. Drawing on the proposed framework, the second part will analyse al-Qaeda’s societal roots, paving the way for the third part, which will demonstrate its global scope. Terrorists or insurgents? The framework used in analysing al Qaeda, drawn from Wieviorka’s research 1, encompasses three essential elements: social movements, insurgents and terrorists. The process of becoming a terrorist involves going through three phases, gradually evolving from a peaceful militant of a social movement, to a violent insurgent and eventually to a complete misfit. The ‘insurgent phase’ represents the middle, and the most intricate stage as it represents the harmonious blend of the other phases’ features: a rational political aim, and violence as a means of obtaining it. As described by Kilcullen, insurgents’ goals are overthrowing and recasting an existing ‘status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism’. 2 Terrorism, described as tactical violence often used indiscriminately with the specific purpose of instilling fear as a means of coercion is often deployed by insurgent groups when pursuing their goals.3 However, due to their continuous pursuit of rational political goals, the deployment of such tactical violence is not sufficient in labelling such armed groups as terrorists. Terrorists groups start as insurgents but become deluded in their pursuit of their goals and eventually become complete misfits: their views become unrepresentative and they are feared both by the governments they oppose and by the

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Wieviorka, M. (2004) The making of terrorism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press p.25 Kilcullen, D.J. (2005) ‘Countering global insurgency’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28/4, p. 604 Ibid, p. 604

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Author: Catalin Rolea very public they claim to support. As Wieviorka explains, terrorists are estranged from both the social movement they started from and from the societies they oppose. This phase in which a militant becomes a terrorist, and loses its rational political goal represents what Wieviorka calls the ‘anti-social’ phase.4 What is intricate about insurgencies is that while they exhibit the violent nature of terrorists, they also retain the rationality and some means deployed by the peaceful social militants. As it will be demonstrated below, al-Qaeda fits perfectly in the ‘insurgent’ phase. Although it does rely on violent tactics, it still retains the rational political goal of its societal roots, evidenced by the legitimacy it managed to acquire and sustain through its blend of insurgent tactics. While it was convenient for the U.S to call al Qaeda a terrorist organization in order to delegitimize it publicly and amass support against it, this label not only ignores its broader complexity as an insurgency but it is also contradicted by the state’s very response to the 9/11 provocation. As Mumford points out, terrorist organizations surely do not issue declarations of war nor do they carry out attacks which equate to acts of war.5 America’s immediate response of declaring war against al Qaeda instead of pursuing them as criminals proves there is a lot more that has to be understood behind the terrorist tactics deployed. Legitimacy First of all, al Qaeda’s most important feature is legitimacy. Without it, it would not be able to have operated and survive for this long. On one hand, America’s very acts of accepting the war declaration gave it a sense of legitimacy but on the other hand its striking popular support sustained and fed it along the years. Al-Qaeda managed to gain the ultimate insurgent prize of legitimacy by manipulating common grievances amongst the Muslim population and disseminating its agenda through its efficient organisational structure. A multitude of dynamics throughout the Muslim world including corrupt and oppressive governments, gender inequality, a youth bulge, dependency on oil, high rates of unemployment or poor employment and a sense of being victimized by the West led to the emergence of fertile zones of deep political grievance and unrest, where al Qaeda could easily tap into.6 Just like insurgencies, al Qaeda drew its membership and supporters from socio-economic deprived regions and its leaders from radicalized elites.

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Wieviorka, op.cit p.25 Mumford, A. (2011), ‘Al-Qaeda and Networked International Insurgency’ in Hehir, A., Kurht N., Mumford, A. (ed.), International Law, Security and Ethics: Policy Challenges in the Post-9/11 World, London: Routledge p.33 6 Kilcullen, D. (2009) The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one, Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 15 5

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Author: Catalin Rolea Both Zawahiri and bin Laden came from wealthy families and were properly educated but each held radical views (Islamist and Wahhabist). Together, they put up a well-established and cohesive hierarchical organisation, with bin Laden as the commander and Ayman al Zawahiri as his deputy and operational commander. The organization encompasses four committees: a military committee, a political and theological committee, a media committee and a finance committee, each part with its own formal structure, set of objectives and authorities. A formal relationship structure also runs from the core al Qaeda group to its regional affiliates.7 Just as insurgencies were recognized by the ones whose grievances they addressed so is al Qaeda. Although Islamic law differs from region to region, there is a wide agreement that a fatwa and a jihad can only be declared by a leader holding both religious and political authority. Bin Laden was often referred to as a Sheikh or Emir (prince or commander) of the Islamic front, thus claiming, to an extent, a certain authority over a broad united jihadi force.8 The combination of Islamic orthodoxy and socio-economic unrest gave bin Laden a change to claim both religious and political legitimacy: invoking the cause of Islam in implementing the sharia law on Islamic governing. As it was mentioned earlier, in contrast to terrorist groupings, insurgent groups follow a rational political goal. Al Qaeda’s political agenda and motives have been clearly defined in fatwas and declarations issued both before and after 9/11. In his 1996 issued fatwa, bin Laden basically invokes clauses of the Jus ad bellum: due to the suffering of the Islamic people at the hands of the ‘Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators’ the last resort is a global jihad.9 Nevertheless this jihad is not only directed at the West, but also against the apostate Islamic regimes, which have morally departed from the ways of Islam. As such the primary task becomes driving out the American forces out of the Middle East which would in turn facilitate the overthrow of the apostate regimes and ultimately lead to the formation of an Islamic caliphate. Only then would this Islamic caliphate act as a launching pad that would eventually challenge the global status quo by diminishing Western position in favour of the Islamic one. Al-Qaeda thus confronts two enemies: the near enemy, the apostate Muslim regimes which need to be set straight, and the far enemy, the West, which needs to be firstly expelled in order to facilitate defeating the near enemy, and then, once the caliphate comes to fruition, it is to be 7

Zimmerman, K. (2013) ‘The al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy’, retrieved from http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman-al-qaeda-network-new-framework-defining-enemyseptember-10-2013, p.8 date accessed 10/11/2013 8 Kilcullen (2005), op.cit p. 598 9 Heritage (2013) ‘Al-Qaeda: Declarations and acts of war’, retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-detention/al-qaeda-declarations, date accessed: 30/11/2013 p.1

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Author: Catalin Rolea challenged. Although the proposed idea in itself, the possibility of such a caliphate to emerge and then also act as a cohesive unit against the West is highly unrealistic, the amount of support it receives indicates that it should not be neglected. Unconventional warfare Insurgent struggles begin at all times from a weaker position, from all angles ranging from popular support, financial means, and military strength. A focus on a superior political will combined with innovative unconventional warfare is the only way success can be achieved. As bin Laden stated in his fatwa, due to America’s prowess, a ‘suitable means of fighting must be adopted.’10 Al Qaeda’s subsequent strategy and tactics deployed perfectly resemble the basic proceedings of any insurgency. Throughout history, insurgent groups are well known for having committed provocative events to draw attention and make their opponents overreact and engage in actions that would utterly alienate the population.11 As Mumford argues, insurgents differ through their tactical targeting of specific political or symbolical landmarks, such as embassies as opposed to civilians.12 Whereas terrorist’s grievances are not seen as legitimate by neither part (government or civilian) insurgent politico-military violence are on many occasions supported by societal minorities they represent. As long as the political act transcends the ‘personal statement’ it will be directed at a wider constituency. These also include terrorist acts, which becomes symbolic, as their goal is conveying a powerful political message and the very drama they cause is aimed at inspiring a great collective recognition. As such, any insurgent can be a terrorist through the tactic it deploys but not any terrorist can be an insurgent. Among the different nature and scale of the violence used the most important is, as Mumford underlines, the purpose of the actions.13 In these respects, the 9/11 attacks were not simple deluded terrorist acts but rather symbolical targeting. By striking at the U.S’s symbols of economic (World Trade Centre) and military (the Pentagon), al-Qaeda aimed to demonstrate the power of a superior political will in front of a greater force. The attacks aimed to inspire the radical ‘Islamist’ cause it represented and instil an uprising of the ‘ummah’ (the Muslim population). While the ‘ummah’ did not rise as al-Qaeda envisioned it would, subsequent military actions, such as the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq played well in its hands. Through the invasion of both countries, which in turn resulted in multiple protracted ethnic and sectarian conflicts, Al Qaeda managed to easily portray the 10

Ibid, p. 1 Kilcullen(2009) , op.cit p. 25 12 Mumford, op.cit p.31 13 Ibid, p.32 11

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Author: Catalin Rolea Americans as the common enemy, and many locals usually fought as what Kilcullen labels ‘accidental guerrilla fighters’: locals who did not side with al-Qaeda in the conflict but who only took part due to their misconception of who and why the Americans were actually fighting.14 The deliberate targeted bombing of one of the holiest Shia shrines, the Askaritya in Iraq, ordered by al-Zarqawi demonstrates best a rationale behind the terrorist tactical use.15 The bombing was designed to further fuel and entice the conflict between the Shia and Sunni communities in order to gain political control on one side, and ‘scare’ the Americans out of the conflict on the other. As the Taliban pointed out on numerous occasions, time is of essence in ensuring increasing legitimacy for its own cause while degrading its opponent’s. 16 As such, protraction becomes a key tool for enhancing its authority and weakening the establishment’s strategic position. While insurgents cannot match the strength of the opponents, a war of attrition is in their best interest. Thus, avoiding losses and most importantly eroding the other part’s political will, along with its public support becomes the main strategy. Anytime an insurgent group might feel overwhelmed, it can simply lay low and re-emerge after a period of regrouping. Al Qaeda has done so on numerous times, most relevant being bin Laden’s escape from Afghanistan and after a period of laying low, re-emerging in Pakistan with new operations from 2003 onwards. 17 Psychological warfare becomes a key insurgent strategy and propaganda becomes the main tactic for winning the hearts and minds of the people. As both active and passive support is highly essential for any insurgency, al Qaeda has dedicated its media committee to disseminating information around the globe via internet and doctrinal publications. Al Qaeda issues the fortnightly Sawt al Jihad newsletter and also al-Khansa, a women’s magazine.18 Video-material of martyrdoms and executions of infidels are spread throughout theatres in a ‘call to arms’ to mobilize ‘jihadi armies’. ’Russian Hell’ is a notorious example, depicting the mujahedeen’s ambushes conducted on Russian forces in Chechnya and is widely available on-line with subtitles in several other languages.19 While some material glorifies the jihad conducted against the infidels, some justify it through the display of pictures depicting the oppressions of Muslims. The best example would be the dissemination of the Abu Ghraib pictures across the Muslim world in order to stir resentment among the ‘ummah’ and justify why the jihad has been waged in the first place. Just as traditional insurgent groups distributed pamphlets and manuals, so 14

Kilcullen(2009), op.cit p.32 Riedel, B. (2007) ‘Al Qaeda strikes back’ , Foreign Affairs, p. 35 16 Johnson, T.H, Chris, M. (2008) ‘Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan’, Orbis, 51(1) p.77 17 Kilcullen (2009), op.cit p.32 18 Kilcullen (2005), op.cit p.601 19 Ibid, op.cit p.602 15

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Author: Catalin Rolea does al Qaeda distribute training manuals, political brochures and operational lexicon, however to an unprecedented global extent, due to its use of the internet. Through the successful efforts of obtaining legitimacy and its unconventional strategic deployment, al Qaeda has proved to exhibit striking insurgent characteristics. The pursuit of a rational political goal, still supported by a considerable amount of followers proves that it has not departed from its societal roots. Had it simply been a terrorist organization, al Qaeda would have been decimated after US’s intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless the destruction of its structure in Afghanistan, or the killing of its leader, Osama bin Laden along other key operatives did not represent its end. Instead, it franchised across Muslim countries and quickly replaced its losses. Strikingly, it managed to operate transnationally through regional affiliates or associates. As such when the US speaks of the al Qaeda threat it does not only use the term al Qaeda but rather the term AQAM (Al Qaeda and its associated movements). 20 Whereas traditional insurgencies aimed at overthrowing power at local levels, due to the highly interconnected era we live in, al Qaeda seeks a worldwide change. As Mumford points out, due to the globalized world which led to the disappearance of state borders and made instant communication possible, al Qaeda has gained the ability to circulate operations through different theatres with the aim of achieving ‘a shared strategic goal’.21 As such al Qaeda has numerous affiliates (AQAP, AQIM, Al Shabaab, AQI, Jabaat al Nusra etc.) which accept its leadership and align with its ideology.22 Al-Qaeda’s ability to franchise and operate transnationally not only points to its global character but also to the wider movement it appeals to and is representative of. Al Qaeda and the radical Islamist movement As argued in the first part of the essay, all insurgencies start as part of a broader social movement, which escalates from peaceful to violent tactics. While traditionally, social movements occurred locally, at a state level, the social movement al-Qaeda emerged from had a global character. According to Schultz, a social movement can be described as ‘a collective that challenges the dominant institutional order and proposes an alternative arrangement’.23 Social movements can take two different turns, thus resulting in a peaceful (such as a trade union or environmentalist action) or a radical variation. The former includes a limited 20

Zimmerman (2013), op.cit p.1 Mumford, op.cit p.36 22 Zimmerman, op.cit p. 17 23 Shultz, R. H. (2008) ‘Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement’, retrieved from http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA482684, p.5 21

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Author: Catalin Rolea number of changes to the current system and militates using peaceful means while the latter demands a fundamental overthrow of the entire system. This radical variation often resorts to high-risk acts such as armed violence deployed through underground organisations and subsequently evolves into an insurgency. 24 Al Qaeda, along with its affiliates can only be understood through the broader Radical Islamic movement that started to take form and develop since the beginning of the 20 th century. An Islamic social movement had existed ever since the inception of the religion, and gradually turned radical as the social, political and economic conditions worsened across the Islamic theatres. The most recent turn towards radicalization and consequently towards insurgency can be grasped through the shift from an Islamic movement to an Islamist one. According to Bayat, while the former seeks to reconcile governing methods with Islamic moral principles, the latter seeks a fundamental political overturn and it has a dogmatic and ideological character. 25 The transition from the former to the latter can be observed through the escalation from non-violent means to violent ones, gradually turning peaceful militants into violent insurgents. The emergence of Islamism represented the radical variation of the Islamic social movement and gradually amplified, like a snowball along the years, peaking with the emergence of alQaeda. Islamism emerged as a response to the vacuum left by the failures of neo-colonialism and social revolutions promised during the Cold War, and displayed striking insurgent features. The pioneers of the movement, Hasan al Banna the founder of the Palestinian Brotherhood and Mawlana Mawdudi, founder of the Jeremiah-i-Islam in Pakistan saw Islamism as the only alternative to Marxism or Capitalism. For Mawdudi, Islamism represented a ‘revolutionary concept and ideology which sought to change and revolutionise the world social order and reshape it according to its own concept and ideals’.26 Hasan-al Banna, on the other hand, was a strong militant and outspoken against the West neo-colonialism calling for the lesser jihad (violence) against the Western forces which would preclude ‘the final Islamization’.27 The movement’s insurgent character can thus be clearly seen through its violent political character. In many respects Islamism can be seen as similar to Marxism through its belief in an inevitable rise of the ‘ummah’, which will establish an Islamist monopoly.28 Just like Marx, Al Banna and Mawdudi did not expect an immediate radical change. Rather, they 24

Ibid. p 6 as paraphrased in Haines, C. (2011) ‘Islam and Islamism in the Arab Spring’, retrieved from http://csrc.asu.edu/news/islam-and-islamism-arab-spring, date accessed: 30/11/2013 26 Esposito, J. L. (2002) Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 51 27 Ibid p.52 28 Haqqani, H. (2013) ‘Islamists and democracy: cautions from Pakistan’, Journal of Democracy, 24/2, p. 9 25

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Author: Catalin Rolea placed the ‘insurgency seeds’ that would thrive and feed on the economic, social and political grievances across the Islamic theatres. Sayyd Qutb further radicalized the movement by promulgating a Global Jihadist ideology and also adding Takfirist elements to it (the act of differentiating between true and false Muslims).29 His version of Islam thus divided Muslim societies into two irreconcilable camps: the good and the evil, the former representing the true Muslims committed to the word of Allah, and the latter representing both the non-believers but also the apostate regimes. A vanguard comprised of true Muslims was deemed necessary in the corrupt society to take the lead and guide the jihad.30 As Esposito explains this Islamist ideology has been disseminated throughout the world through pamphlets, audiocassettes and Islamic schools and has been behind all major Islamic movements, whether mainstream or extremist, violent or non-violent.31 This first generation of Islamists spawned a gradual steady chain reaction which bound radical elements together and furthered the movement. This Islamist insurgency initially manifested at local levels sometimes erupting regionally (Arab-Israeli war, the siege of the mosque in Saudi Arabia) and peaked with the AfghanSoviet war, which led to the creation of al-Qaeda and what Sageman calls the al-Qaeda social movement.32 The al-Qaeda movement came as a complex combination of Islamism with other radical factors. While Sageman talks about the influence of the Salafist movement, Sir Michael Howard brings attention to the Wahhabi movement. 33 What is interesting is that although both movements are radical and call for a violent jihad, they are actually incompatible as they differ on key issues on the practice of Islam. Nevertheless the climate of the 20th century which combined social, political grievances due to neo-colonial practices, a loss of religious stigma due to Israel’s seizure of holy sites as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, all in turn fuelling deep anti-Western resentment led to the symbiosis of these 3 contradictory Islamic trends into a deadly combination. The new insurgent generation, succeeding the initial three pioneers, merged Abdul Yusuf Azzam’s Salafism , Ayman al Zawahiri’s radical Islamism and Osama bin Laden’s Wahhabism into a lethal Global Jihadi Takfirism.34 The whole embrace of Takfirism , according to Mneimneh, represented ‘the ultimate expression of unrestrained Islamism’, and while it was initially proposed by Qutb it was not until the al-Qaeda movement took form that it peaked.

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Mneimneh, H. (2009) ‘Takfirism’, retrieved from http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/basics/takfirism, date accessed : 30/11/2013 30 Esposito, op.cit p.59 31 Ibid.p.50 32 Sageman, M. (2011) Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press p.30 33 Howard, M. (2006) ‘A long war?’ Survival, 48/4, p. 13 34 Moussalli, A. (2009) ‘Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: who is the enemy?’, retrieved from http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/Wahhabism-Salafism-and-Islamism.pdf, date accessed : 30/11/2013 p.33

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Author: Catalin Rolea As it can be seen, not only does al Qaeda exhibit striking insurgent characteristics through its behaviour but also through its origins. As its origins are fundamentally transnational and appeal to a large community across several Islamic theatres, alQaeda’s scope becomes global in nature. A global insurgency Contrary to common belief, al Qaeda was not bin Laden’s idea but that of Azzam, also entitled the father of ‘Global Jihad’ through his clear militant message: ‘Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues.’35 During the 1980’s Azzam travelled significantly throughout the Middle East, Europe and the United States in an effort to mobilize fighters for the Mujahedeen forces. In the US alone he travelled around fifty states and preached radical jihad to young Muslims urging them not only to help with the efforts in Afghanistan but also wage the fight against the Americans. In the ‘Terrorists among US: Jihad in America’ documentary Azzam is actually caught on tape in Brooklyn preaching that jihad ‘means fighting only, fighting with the sword.’ 36 At this stage the radical ‘snowball’ can be seen to have amplified considerably. For Azzam, Afghanistan represented the beginning of the global insurgency: “ this duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan; jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again : before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad , Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma , Southern Yemen, Tashkent and Andalusia”37 The Afghan-Russian war represented the culmination of Islamism’s transnational character and is best portrayed by Roy: ‘The volunteers in Afghanistan experienced a concrete internationalization based on personal contacts, the brotherhood of comrades in arms, friendships and affinities. They learned to know other people and other languages. In Afghanistan, they found a ‘new community and brotherhood with which to identify.’38

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McGregor, A. (2006) “ ‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone": Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution”, Journal of Conflict Studies, 23/2, p. 4 36 Emerson, S. (2001) ‘Terrorists among US: Jihad in America’, retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UzmCru55Xc, date accessed: 30/11/2013 37 Schultz, op.cit p. 7 38 As quoted in Schultz, op.cit p.68

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Author: Catalin Rolea The defeat of the Soviets was in no means an end but the beginning of a new stage of the insurgency. Jihadists were not only armed with the ideological belief against the nonbelievers but also with techniques of fighting greater suppressive powers. Drawing on Qutb’s ideology, Azzam proposed the same idea of a vanguard organisation that would overthrow apostate regimes throughout the Muslim world. Before his assassination in 1989, he proposed that the Jihadists who had helped out in Afghanistan would also utilize their experience in other parts of the Muslim world such as Kashmir, Somalia, Sudan, Balkans Chechnya and Bosnia.39 This phase could be argued to have represented the inception of the al-Qaeda social movement, a variation of the wider, already radical Islamist one. As such, as Sageman explains, while many aligned themselves with the alQaeda social movement, they did not actually take part of the al-Qaeda organization.40 As Mumford argues, ever since its foundation, Al Qaeda has engaged in supporting insurgencies aimed at fostering social and political change through the use of armed force.41 Although not in command, it played a key role in supporting the mujahedeen insurgents’ efforts of driving out the soviet forces out of Afghanistan through guerrilla warfare.42 Al Qaeda was formed during the Afghan war and once its efforts had been successful, jihadists started to adopt a more global perspective in addressing their religious beliefs.43Up until the 1990’s the focus was mostly on the near enemy, on the overthrow of apostate regimes but Azzam’s efforts of globalizing jihadist efforts against the West have been furthered by al Qaeda co-founders, Ayman al Zawahiri and bin Laden. While the focus had been primarily on the near enemy, the apostate regimes, the stationing of the American troops in the holy land was seen as a huge stepping stone in achieving the Caliphate. It was then that Zawahiri and bin Laden decided to continue Azzam’s plans of waging a Jihad against the West. As Mumford argues, that event signified al Qaeda’s transformation, ‘from a defensive reactionary insurgent group to an offensive proactive organisation, formalised with the fatwa declaration in 1996.’

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Between 1996 and 2001, radical jihadists travelled to Afghanistan for training and al Qaeda gained huge support internationally. This period is what Sageman calls its Golden Period.45 US intelligence officials have estimated that in that golden period, an approximate number of 20 000 fighters went through instruction.46 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Schultz, op.cit p. 70 Sageman, op.cit p. 19 Mumford, op.cit p.33 Ibid., p. 33 Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding terror networks, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press p.18 Mumford, op.cit p. 33 Sageman (2011), op.cit p.33 Schultz, op.cit p.75

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Author: Catalin Rolea

It was this period that gave bin Laden and Zawahiri the chance to review al Qaeda’s ideology and globalize it in the current Islamist movement. The fatwa issued in 1996 clearly described the aims of creating a global insurgent organization with affiliates all over the Muslim world in order to repel the infidels and overthrow the apostate regimes. By late 2001 al Qaeda managed to harness enough symbolic, financial and military to bring the insurgency to its next stage. This golden period represented the peak of the insurgent movement, which culminated with the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda was barely a radical strain of the wider Jihadist movement, which in itself has a global insurgent nature. As Kilcullen argues, instead of a commander-in chief, al Qaeda is rather the ‘inciter-inchief’.47 As such it operates through influencing other local insurgencies while working, alongside similar organisations pursuing similar goals. Instead of issuing direct orders for other organizations, al Qaeda is basically engaged in proxy warfare by providing expertise planning, operational tasking and funding. Intelligence data is dispersed by local actors across Islamic theatres. One example would be the failed planned attack on Singapore by JI, AQ affiliate, whose strategically-targeting documents were found in an al Qaeda warehouse in Afghanistan.48 Its regional affiliates such are used to co-opt and assimilate efforts of multiple diverse local actors across over 60 countries. Robb describes al-Qaeda as more of a movement, instigator of change rather than as the primary mechanism for seizing control of a nation state. 49 Botanical phraseology developed by General Rupert Smith depicts al Qaeda as having a rhizomatic nervous system, characterized by connection, heterogeneity and multiplicity. 50 As such, it manages to connect its different hubs by promoting a similar ideology but also multiply by appealing to new recruits and potential affiliates, breaking borders and ignoring traditional centralized structures. Overwhelming evidence show al Qaeda’s transnational capability but there is also overwhelming evidence that al Qaeda is not unique of its type. Rather it has other competitors on the world scale deploying similar tactics and following same ideology principles(Tehrik e-Taliban, IMU, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar al Sharya in Lybia, Haqqani Network, Ansar al din in Mali, Boko Haram , Jamal network etc).51 Such associates do not recognize al Qaeda’s leadership and as Kilcullen points

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Kiclullen (2009) op.cit p. 14 Kilcullen (2005) , op.cit, p. 603 49 Robb, J. (2007) Brave new war: The next stage of terrorism and the end of globalization, Wiley: New Jersey p.40 50 Mumford, op.cit p.35 51 Zimmerman op.cit, p. 25 48

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Author: Catalin Rolea out, many (such as Hezbollah) would be ready to take its place in case it was completely destroyed.52 This very fact, in turn has a lot to say about the underlying conditions that have led to the creation of such organizations. As al-Qaeda merely represents a symptom of a wider movement, its eradication would not represent the end of the jihadist insurgents. The wider, Islamist insurgent movement previously analysed encompasses a loose confederation of independent networks and movements that follow similar religious ideas (proposed by the three initial pioneers) but nevertheless lack the character of a single unified organization. Such global actors, as al Qaeda exploit local actors through regional affiliates, rarely interacting with locals themselves, but rather financing them and supporting them through intermediaries.53 For example, the Indonesian version, JI of the Islamist movement, in its ‘General Guide to the struggle of Jema’ah Islamiyah’ suggests similar strategic thinking: creation of a pan-Islamic state in SEA, covering Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines southern Thailand and Singapore. 54 This global jihadi movement was best described by Lybian intelligence officers as ‘a swarm of bees looking for a queen.’55 This swarm of bees extends across six Islamic theatres: the Iberian Peninsula and Maghreb (NW Africa), the Greater Middle East, East Africa, South and central Asia, the Caucasus and Southeast Asia.56 Interestingly, the geographical locations of these ongoing insurgencies correspond to the Islamic historical area of the caliphate. Many of the insurgents are somehow affiliated either through birth, marriage, religious schools or the previous Afghan effort against the Russians. Although several of these insurgencies have a national character, they are united by the wider Islamist movement. Undoubtedly, the Islamic social movement (as opposed to the Islamist one) still exists, with countless peaceful militants across the Islamic theatres. However, in the current unstable context actors such as al Qaeda can easily tap in and turn them from peaceful militants into aggressive insurgents. The disillusionments of the Arab spring, for example has given al-Qaeda a fresh recruitment ground. The sectarian civil conflict in Syria has produced several jihadists from across the Muslim world and also increased the prevalence of Al-Qaeda Iraq led by al-Baghdadi.57

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Kilcullen(2009), op.cit, p. 36 Kilcullen (2005) p.603 54 Kilcullen (2009),op.cit. p.45 55 The Economist (2013) ‘The State of al-Qaeda’ retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586834-adaptable-and-resilient-al-qaeda-and-its-allies-keepbouncing-back-unquenchable-fire , date accessed : 30/11/2013 56 Kilcullen (2009), op.cit p. 36 57 The Economist, op.cit 53

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Author: Catalin Rolea Conclusion Due to the intricacies al Qaeda exhibits, labelling it as a terrorist organization would bear no analytical significance and fail to address its underlying formational process. On the other hand, equally insignificant would be analysing al Qaeda without taking into consideration the wider, global Islamic insurgent movement it represents and draws its very essence from. By using a social framework, this essay has demonstrated that as most insurgencies, al Qaeda emerged as a symptom of wider political grievances. Despite its heavy reliance on terrorist tactics, it also uses a variety of other unconventional warfare methods but also highly relies on propaganda for amassing popular support, just as any insurgency would do. Al Qaeda, since its formation exhibited a global character: it was formed by three different nationals (Palestinian Azzam, Saudi bin Laden and Egyptian Zawahiri) who drew their ideology from a wider Islamist insurgency. Using O Neill’s framework58 the best way to describe it is as a traditionalistreactionary insurgency: an insurgency in which religious groupings (al Qaeda) envisions a fundamental transformation of the society and a return to an envisioned past (the caliphate). Opposing governments are labelled as corrupt, unjust and irremediable and thus the struggle is seen through Manichean wars: a struggle between good (the true Muslims) and evil (the infidels and the apostates). In addition, such insurgencies believe in a supreme power (Allah) and a predetermined victory through the intervention of a deity. As al Qaeda draws its ideology from a wider Islamic transnational movement and appeals to a considerable number of radicals, not only does it prove it has not departed from its societal roots, as terrorist organizations do, and maintained its insurgency status, but also that it is truly global in scope.

58

O'Neill, op.cit p. 25

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